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Relationship between TIEZA and NCFI: PRINCIPLE-AGENT

With TIEZAs intention to preserve Balay Negrense by renovating the existing structure and
maintaining its status as a museum pursuant to the initial contract between TIEZA and
Gaston in relation to the conditions set upon the deed of donation, TIEZA as a principle
party extended intentions to be facilitated by appointing as NCIF as an Agent via a
contract of agreement, to act on behalf of TIEZAs intentions.
Article 1868 of the Civil Code defines the contract of agency as one whereby a person binds himself
to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent
or authority of the latter.
In Orient Air Service & Hotel Representatives v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 645 (1991), the Court held
that the purpose of every contract of agency is the ability, by legal fiction, to extend the
personality of the principal through the facility of the agent; but the same can only be
effected with the consent of the principal.
In Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006), the Court held that It bears stressing that in an
agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the
agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts
which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent
of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any court.[2] (at p. 223)

*** in response to the affirmative defense submitted by NCIF (no.9), regarding the

lack of capability of TIEZA to institute a cause of action: generally an agent


cannot be a subject of a suit, but with the revoked consent of TIEZA, NCFI loses
the standing as agent whilst TIEZA maintains ownership of the property by
virtue of donation, the failure to vacate premises gives rise for the cause of action
for unlawful detainer to be instituted by TIEZA.

Unlawful Detainer
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

A suit against an agent in his personal capacity cannot, without compelling reasons, be
considered a suit against the principal. Philippine National Bank v. Ritratto Groups, Inc.,
362 SCRA 216 (2001).
*** Just in case we are held accountable for the actions of NCIF.

Agency arrangement is not presumed - Although an agency contract is consensual in nature and
generally requires no formality, the Court has stressed that an agency arrangement is never
presumed. Lopez v. Tan Tioco, 8 Phil. 693 (1907). In other words, the declaration of one that he is an
agent of another is never to be accepted at face value, except in those cases where an agency arises
by express provision of law. Compania Maritima v. Limson, 141 SCRA 407 (1986).
***at this point NCIF can no longer put in defense that they are still in the standing of TIEZAs agent
without the consent provided for. The presumption cannot be maintained.

*** In response to the counterclaim submitted by the defense to be compensated for expenses to
restore, maintain and administer the Balay Negrense, we find this without standing. According to
article 1918 of the new civil code:
Art. 1918. The principal is not liable for the expenses incurred by the agent in the following
cases:
XXX
(4) When it was stipulated that the expenses would be borne by the agent, or that
the latter would be allowed only a certain sum. (n)
As stipulated in the memorandum of agreement Article 2, B.3. That the Foundation will
appropriate adequate funds for the continuous operation, administration, and sufficient
maintenance of the project. In this connection, the Foundation shall appoint an
administrator who shall be directly responsible for the project and provide a full
complement of manpower necessary and required thereat

***in response to the affirmative defense submitted by NCIF (no.8), the jurisdictional requirement was
duly satisfied by the service of the letter of final notice of demand to vacate, which was received by an
employee within the premises.
RULE 70 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such
action by the lesser shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon
the person found on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply
therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)

*** in the event that NCIF argues our standing as a party to the case, since we have signed a letter of
revocation.