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Complaints, Correspondence and Litigation Team

1st Floor, Post Point 1.4


102 Petty France
London
SW1H 9AJ

Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

11 August 2016

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: Failure to reach satisfactory outcome to number of serious issues


I understand my complaint should in the first instance be made to the Court Manager; however,
I have attempted (unsuccessfully) through regular correspondence with the Legal Team
Manager to resolve the concerns I now wish to raise. I consider this avenue now exhausted
having been informed by letter (8 June 2016) that the Manager does not intend to reply further
on the issues, hence escalating my concerns to the Complaints Handling Team.
The complaint surrounds two separate but related matters. The first, a Council Tax liability order
was made against me by District Judge Daniel Curtis at Grimsby Magistrates court, despite
being alerted to the possibility that the Councils Witness Statement intended to deceive the
court. Subsequent to the court hearing, sufficient evidence was obtained to prove beyond all
doubt that North East Lincolnshire Council (the Council) had in fact committed perjury,
therefore the judge was complicit in the Councils fraudulent application for liability order.
The second matter, with more serious consequences, concerns Grimsby Magistrates' Court,
with Humberside Police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) as accomplices misusing the
Criminal Justice system by allowing fabricated evidence to convict me on charges which I am
innocent thereby defrauding me of a sum of 620. The court had no evidence whatsoever with
which to find a guilty verdict and as the burden of proof is beyond all reasonable doubt in
criminal cases Im satisfied that a crime has been committed against me. It is suspected that an
officer serving with Humberside Police incited a witness to commit perjury and there are very
good grounds to suspect that CCTV footage, which would support my innocence, has been
destroyed. The CPS had no evidence with which to justify prosecuting the case and therefore
suspect that the CPS Solicitor was corruptly influenced by Humberside Police/Grimsby
Magistrates' court to proceed with a case which could not under proper scrutiny pass the
evidential stage and have no realistic prospect of a conviction.
The case went ahead in my absence during which I was found guilty. I had not attended court
after learning not long before the hearing that the judge trying the case would be District Judge
Daniel Curtis. It was expressed without reservation by writing to the court a number of days
before the trial that I did not consider the Judge, 'a fit and proper person to hear the case', which
was based on evidence relating to the aforementioned matter. I was not prepared to stand

before the same judge who I'd complained about only weeks before the hearing to the Judicial
Conduct Investigations Office and reported the matter of complaint as a crime to the police.
I was in any event insufficiently informed about the proceedings, for example I was given no
information regarding my rights to legal representation and left to produce my own
representations. The judge in sentencing at a later hearing, which I did attend, was apparently
not briefed as the mitigating evidence documents I had sent to the court had not been
considered in my conviction.

Background fraudulent application and granting of Council Tax liability order


The Council fraudulently obtained a Council Tax liability order by committing perjury (lying in a
witness statement to the court). There was no debt owing, however, the Council criminally
engineered a non-payment scenario. The Police, Local Government Ombudsman and judges
are complicit because all of them have looked the other way when the matter brought to their
attention.
The negligence of the organisations has enabled the Council unhindered to make further
fraudulent demands by appointing bailiffs Rossendales (a firm proved to have committed fraud
'en masse') to enforce the liability order that was obtained by lying to the court about money that
is not owed.
The Councils Revenues & Benefits service had not as you would have expected considered it a
close shave to have avoided being the subject of a criminal investigation, but emboldened it to
take further liberties with the law and seen it as a green light to continue taking steps to recover
the sum. It can only reasonably be assumed that because it was ultimately the judge's
responsibility for granting permission the council would deem it appropriate to exploit that
decision regardless of being aware it was not entitled to the sum being pursued.
With regard to the unwarranted bailiff fees which have been added since, these are of no
financial benefit to the council and it must be considered that Revenues & Benefits officers have
allowed them to be added for nothing more than their own personal gratification.
Meanwhile, the fraudulent charges continue increasing (currently around 540) and the bailiff
firm does not intend to cease enforcement on account of the monies not being owed. It is likely
when the bailiffs have to refer the case back to the Council on being unsuccessful, the Council
will only have available to it under the fraudulently obtained order the option of committal. It is
considered the police are complicit as its failure has enabled the Council to commit crime
against a taxpayer by the fraudulent use of the Magistrates' court and should be held ultimately
responsible for the circumstances which could realistically lead to false imprisonment.

Key points
Refusal to refer matter to police
After being provided concrete evidence that the Council had in fact been dishonest by stating
what was known to be false in its Witness Statement, the court refused when asked to confirm
this to Humberside Police. Grimsby Magistrates court was therefore obstructing justice as the
force had stated it did not investigate allegations of perjury unless a request to do so comes
from the court. The police therefore had not disagreed with the evidence, just simply would not
investigate.
Trivialising the consequences of the crime
In anticipation of having to defend myself in court at a potential committal hearing as a
consequence of the criminally obtained council tax enforcement order, I asked the court to
produce a letter explaining that the reason why Humberside police did not investigate my
allegations was not because there was no realistic prospect of conviction, but because the court
was unwilling to cooperate by requesting the Police investigate. The court replied without any
reference to the fraud I had been a victim of that the matter related simply to an issue of non
payment of council tax and would be given the opportunity to attend court for an inquiry into my
financial circumstances where the court will deal with that issue and that issue alone.

All issues raised generally fobbed off


None of the issues were properly addressed.

Failing to act on accusations of criminal offences


Criminal accusations against various holders of judicial office and generally about the way
Grimsby Magistrates' court criminally operated were fobbed off with a response expressing that
my comments in respect of dedicated and hard working professionals within Her Majestys
Courts Service were outrageous.

Protecting the Justices' Clerk for the Humber and South Yorkshire
It is likely the injustice can be attributed to the judge acting in the interest of the Justices' Clerk
in granting the council a liability order in the circumstances, i.e., knowing that the council were
lying. Had there been a fair hearing and he'd refused to grant the liability order he would have
implicated the Justices Clerk by drawing attention to the gross negligence in her mishandling of
my high court appeal, still being covered up (see complaint dated 25 June 2016 to HMCTS). It
would seem now that Grimsby Magistrates court, by fobbing off my concerns is protecting both
Justices' Clerk Alison Watts and District Judge Daniel Curtis.

Key points victim of criminal justice system


Insufficient information about proceedings
It was assumed the duty solicitor Mr Havery of John Barkers who had been appointed on being
falsely imprisoned in a cell at Humberside police station (27.8.15) was dealing with the matter
though he had not replied after he was written to with an update on the proceedings in advance
of the court appearance.
I discovered only minutes before being called into the courtroom from the usher telling me that I
was not entitled to legal representation (without explanation). Mr Havery was obviously no
longer dealing with the matter but had not replied to my correspondence to say so. The Crown
Prosecution Service's case file was handed to me at this point giving me no opportunity to read
any of it before going into court.
This may have been part of the stitch-up and the Court, Police and/or CPS had instructed John
Barkers not to respond to ensure the best chance of a successful conviction.

Lack of evidence
The burden of proof is beyond all reasonable doubt in criminal cases and because there was no
evidence I am satisfied that a crime has been committed against me. Witness statements
contained lies and it is suspected that the arresting Police officer incited perjury.

Concealment of CCTV footage


There are good grounds to suspect that CCTV footage, which would support my innocence,
was concealed. Details have been obtained of the arrangement Humberside police has for
monitoring the public grounds in front of the Victoria Street station. In respect of the day of the
alleged matter, a total of 7 CCTV cameras covered relevant areas. The camera footage is on a
loop system and kept for 90 days. When asked for, video footage is retained, although
Humberside police have stated that no requests were received on the relevant date, therefore
the video footage has been overwritten.
If there were 7 cameras covering the area, it would be expected that video footage, material in a
criminal case, would be available for proving the innocence of someone convicted of an offence
alleged to have been committed there on that date.
It is recorded in the CPS case file, in reference to the summary of the Defendant interview that
the defendant hopes there is CCTV as this will confirm his account.
It is clear that the evidence (which appears to be none) fell short of the standard which would be
required by the criminal justice system to meet the criteria of a fair trial

Inconsistent witness statements


The statements recorded in the CPS case file identified some glaringly obvious inconsistencies
which supported the fact that both the civilian witnesses had committed perjury.

Refusing to accept reasons for not to attending court


The Legal Team Manager would not acknowledge that my lack of confidence in the judge, and
that I did not considering him 'a fit and proper person to hear the case', was good reason for not
attending the court. He used the fact I had made the conscious choice not to attend court to
refuse reopening the case under s142 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 after I had argued
that it would be in the interests of justice that the case should be heard again by different
justices etc.
Sub-paragraph 1 of s142 of the 1980 Act provides the following:
"A magistrates court may vary or rescind a sentence or other order imposed or made by
it when dealing with an offender if it appears to the court to be in the interests of justice
to do so; and it is hereby declared that this power extends to replacing a sentence or
order which for any reason appears to be invalid by another which the court has power
to impose or make."
Sub-paragraph 2 also has relevance in which the following provides:
"Where a person is convicted by a magistrates court and it subsequently appears to the
court that it would be in the interests of justice that the case should be heard again by
different justices, the court may so direct."
I was asked at the hearing (sentencing) by deputy district judge Andrew Pascoe whether or not I
was guilty of failing to turn up for the trial without good reason. I pleaded not guilty as I
considered I had very good reason for not attending as I had no confidence that I would have
had a fair trial knowing that District Judge Curtis was trying the case. The court was informed in
writing making it categorically clear that I did not consider this judge fit to hear the case.
Sub-section 2A of s11 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980 provides that:
"the court shall not proceed in the absence of the accused if it considers that there is an
acceptable reason for his failure to appear."

Written mitigating evidence not considered


The Legal Team Manager has implied that mitigating evidence documents I had sent to the
court had not been considered in my conviction. Though conceding that the court cannot find a

guilty verdict merely on account of the defendants absence it has in effect done exactly that by
admitting also that the court makes its decision based on the evidence it hears i.e., that which
is given in court in person.
Under the circumstances, a trial on the papers, prescribed by sections 16A to 16D of the
Magistrates Courts Act 1980 would have been the procedure most in the interest of justice to
have taken and is questioned why it was not, given I was disadvantaged by having no legal
representation and completely in the dark as to my rights. Trying the case on the papers would
have been the fairer option as I had submitted various documents of mitigating evidence. This
would have compensated slightly for my ignorance of the court system for which Im certain the
court has exploited to my detriment in open court. Being unable to ignore the submission and
set against the prosecutions lack of evidence and the questionable, inconsistent witness
statements, it is inconceivable that the court could have found a verdict of guilt this way.

Compiled correspondence
The issues relating to both matters of complaint are evident from the correspondence compiled
chronologically appended to this letter. Included is a record of the various procedures
undertaken as a consequence of the injustice, but which have in reality only added to that
already caused.
It will be evident on reading the account that the cause of the gross injustice which has
protracted over a wholly unacceptable period is largely attributed to the unwillingness of the
court to cooperate, choosing instead to take no responsibility for its failings.

Yours sincerely

Page 1 of 2

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Andrew Havery" <adh@jbarkers.co.uk>


<
@btopenworld.com>
01 September 2015 11:59
RE: GRIMSBY POLICE STATION

Dear Mr
I write following on from my recent attendance upon you at Grimsby police station last Thursday evening
following your arrest and detention in respect of an allegation of indecent exposure.
I thank you for your instructions and I was pleased to have been of assistance to you during the period of your
detention and time at the police station. I trust that my presence with you both prior to and during the course of
the police interview was a re-assurance.
The Alleged Offence / Police Disclosure
Upon my attendance at the police station and prior to our private consultation with you, the police officers
conducting the interview with you disclosed the reason for your arrest / detention and I did, of course, relay
that information and those facts to you prior to the formal police interview taking place in order that we could
together decide the best approach to the interview under caution.
As discussed with you in private consultation prior to the interview, the reason for your arrest was that a
complaint had been made by a member of the public that he has seen you appear to urinate against a tree outside
the police station, resulting in police involvement and you arrest on suspicion of indecent exposure.
Your Instructions
Your instructions to us in relation to this matter were that you denied absolutely any wrong doings either
urinating against a tree or indecently exposing your penis.
My Advice to You
Based upon the limited disclosure provided to us by the police prior to your police interview under caution and
also given your instructions to us which amounted to a denial of any wrong-doing, my advice to you was to
indicate a full comment interview so as to formally put on record your own full denial account so as to avoid any
risk of an adverse inference being drawn against you in the event that your case were to proceed to court.
The Interview
I remind you that during the course of the police interview you proceeded to procreative a fully commented
interview, during the course you made it absolutely clear that you denied any wrong doing as alleged or at all.
The Outcome
Having been interviewed, the police now apparently have further investigations and enquiries to undertake
before they are able to determine whether or not any further action is to be taken against you in respect of the
matter[s] for which you were arrested.
In those circumstances, you have been bailed to return to Grimsby Police Station on Friday 4th September 2015
at 5:30PM].
Please note that there is a legal obligation for you to attend at the police station at the stated time and date unless
you hear from the police prior to that time that your bail has been cancelled.
However, in the event that you do hear anything further from the police prior to your bail date either to cancel it,
re-schedule it or to request your further attendance to further interview, no doubt you will contact myself. I will
do likewise.
General
John Barkers Solicitors are a part of the Criminal Defence Service and as such the costs of assisting and

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representing you at the police station are paid from public funds - this covers all the advice we have provided to
date.
Other
Incidentally, are you aware that John Barkers Solicitors have been representing the legal needs of the local
community since 1884? We would like to take the opportunity to remind you of the full range of legal services
offered here at John Barkers Solicitors.
Whether you be moving house, making a will, claiming compensation for an accident, getting divorced/separated
or even in the event that you should have the misfortune to face a criminal [or motoring] allegation, we are proud
to say that since 1884 we have been helping the people of this area with all of their legal needs.
May we also take the opportunity to introduce you to the heads of department here at the Grimsby office:Howard Field
Matrimonial / Child Care
Jonathan Stones
Commercial / Conveyancing
Ian Robinson
Civil disputes / Personal Injury
Malcolm Cooke
Wills and Probate
In the event that there is anything further with which you require advice or assistance at this time, please
contact either Mr Havery or Miss Fisher directly or any of the above in order that we may advise you as
appropriate.
Assuming that you are satisfied with the service which we have provided, we would be grateful if you would
recommend John Barkers Solicitors to any friends or family members whom we could assist with any legal
matter / problem. We would be pleased advise them as appropriate.
Should be requiring of any further advice or information, please feel free to contact me directly either by e-mail
[at : adh@jbarkers.co.uk] or at the office.
Yours sincerely,

John Barkers Solicitors


E mail: Andrew Havery : adh@jbarkers.co.uk
Lauren Fisher : Lauren.Fisher@jbarkers.co.uk

Andrew Havery
Partner : Solicitor
A : 9-11 Bethlehem Street, Grimsby, North East Lincs. DN31 1JN DX: 13501 Grimsby
T :01472 358686 F: 01472 240890
E: adh@jbarkers.co.uk

Louth Office 11 Upgate, Louth, LN11 9ES T: 01507 604773 F : 01507 600040
Mablethorpe Office 27 High Street, Mablethorpe, Lincolnshire, LN12 1AF T: 01507 477 673 F: 01507 478 581
Emergency Numbers Personal Injury / Compensation Claim 07803 184 485 Family / Matrimonial 07860 962 924 Commercial 07810
871 183 Criminal 07710 511 721
VAT number: 127 8519 49.John Barkers Solicitors is a partnership regulated by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority SRA No 46578.
Service is not accepted by fax or email.
The current partners are: J L Needley, H S Field LL.B, A D Havery BA and J C Stones LL.B. For further information see
http://www.jbarkers.co.uk/http://www.jbarkers.co.uk. This e-mail (including any attachments) is intended only for the recipient(s) named
above. It may contain confidential or privileged information and should not be read, copied or otherwise used by any other person. If you
are not a named recipient, please contact the sender and delete the e-mail from your system. You must not copy or disclose the contents
of this e-mail or any attachments to any other person. We may monitor all e-mails sent to or from this or any other office of the firm for
compliance with our internal policies. E-mails can, for example, be intercepted, amended or lost. They are therefore not secure and
cannot be guaranteed error free. E-mails may also contain viruses. These risks are deemed accepted by everyone who communicates
with us by e-mail. All e-mails sent by us to our clients are subject to our terms and conditions of business, which include our charges.

02/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Andrew Havery" <adh@jbarkers.co.uk>
01 September 2015 15:07
Re: GRIMSBY POLICE STATION

Dear Mr Havery
Thank you for contacting me. I wish to confirm in writing that I have received your email having suspected that
the receipt may not have been sent.
The email address I gave you at the police station only works on an incoming basis (or at least appears to).
There was no record of the receipt being sent on my out box.
I will as you request keep you informed if there are any changes to the attendance scheduled at 5:30pm on
2.9.15 at Humberside police station.

Yours sincerely
.

02/07/2016

Page 1 of 3

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Andrew Havery" <adh@jbarkers.co.uk>
21 September 2015 12:29
RE: GRIMSBY POLICE STATION

Dear Mr Havery
Re: Grimsby police station 27 August 2015

I've been on holiday for the last couple of weeks so I don't know whether Humberside police have contacted
you regarding their third charge attempt.
Events so far
The first charge was described as urinating in a public place, which after the arresting officer discovered that it
couldn't have happened, quickly changed to a charge of indecent exposure. Incidentally I will be reporting the
arresting officer on suspicion of inciting the witness to commit perjury as the witness stated falsely (not
suspected) that I had indecently exposed myself, which is perjury because he could not have witnessed what
hadn't happen.
If he had stated it appeared I had indecently exposed myself, that would be a different matter, but it was an
outright lie which appeared to have been incited by the arresting officer.

Attendance Police station 4 September 2015


Whilst attending Humberside police station it was conveyed to me that the CPS had considered that because it
was a first offence that they would not take on the case of prosecuting for indecent exposure. I assume this can
be interpreted to mean either one or a number of the following:
1. CCTV footage had been found that proved I had neither indecently exposed myself nor urinated in a
public place
2. There was no CCTV footage to prove either way
3. The witness (or witnesses) considered the seriousness of perjury and were not prepared to take the
risk of lying while under oath
It is my opinion that police forces are under pressure to pursue cases to hit performance targets which in turn
boosts the CPS's successful prosecution rates (the CPS only likes to take on low failure risk cases). This
together with the newly introduced minimum 150 court fee in criminal cases I suspect gives police officers
a perverse incentive to bring about prosecutions.
I also have concerns that because of an ongoing dispute I have with the force relating to bailiff fraud amounting
to millions of pounds being brushed under the carpet, mishandling complaints against it in regards that failure
and the problems that it may be causing certain persons serving with Humberside police, there may be a
perverse incentive to abuse police powers and have me inconvenienced. This could be behind why the police
officer wrongly arrested me on trumped-up charges which led to false imprisonment for around 8 hours on the
evening of 27.8.15.
The third charge was read out to me (see under heading below) which strikes me as a desperate attempt to
salvage something out of its blunderous attempts to convict me for indecent exposure etc., and as a bonus
enhance performance data and make some money for the government in the way of a fine, costs, victim
surcharge and at least 150 court fees.

Charges as they stand

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Use threatening / abusive words / behaviour or disorderly behaviour likely to cause harassment,
alarm or distress
On 27/08/15 at Grimsby in North East Lincolnshire used threatening or abusive words or behaviour or
disorderly behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or
distress thereby CONTRARY TO SECTION 5(1) AND (6) OF THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1986.
H.O. 125/12 Local None CJS PU86149
I have had a brief look at the relevant Act (Public Order Act 1986) and there are some issues which require
pointing out.
None of the events relating to the charges which stand presently (which are very sketchy) would have occurred
had first the witness and the police employee on duty in the front office, and later the arresting police officer,
not stated falsely (not suspected) that I had committed acts of indecency. The false accusations continued even
after I had made it clear that they were mistaken and couldn't have seen what they had stated to be fact. Any of
the events relating to the present charges therefore were provoked and it considered the 'conduct reasonable,
which is a defence under sub-section (3)(c) of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986.
There is another concern regarding the arrest. Under section 5(4) it provides that
(4) A constable may arrest a person without warrant if
(a) he engages in offensive conduct which a constable warns him to stop, and
(b) he engages in further offensive conduct immediately or shortly after the warning
I have no recollection of the above described circumstances occurring before I was arrested and falsely
imprisoned. It therefore would seem that the charges should be brought against the Humberside police force
rather than myself which would be for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment.

Magistrates Court
I have been granted bail and a date is set for an attendance at the Grimsby Magistrates court on 30 September
2015, at 1:45 pm (court 1) the consequences of which I have been informed if I fail to do so may be a fine,
imprisonment or both.
I have expressed my view to the police that I have no confidence in the Grimsby Magistrates' court (a kangaroo
court) and have been lied to by the Justices Clerk in another matter (High Court appeal) and find it inappropriate
that this court is given the opportunity to hear the case and pass judgment.
In brief
The case (case stated appeal) submitted in November 2012 has remained undetermined. The Justices' Clerk
went as far as producing a draft case stated, only after being coerced by a Judicial Review claim for
mandamus. Since then, communications have been stonewalled by the Justices Clerk for Humber and South
Yorkshire, Alison Watts who has lied about continuing the case to the subsequent stage, i.e., producing the final
case stated.
Whilst the case has been ongoing, another with significant relevance to matters raised in my appeal has been
determined. In R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin) the claimant sought judicial
review of the decision of justices to make an award of costs in favour of the Interested Party, London Borough
of Haringey following the granting of a council tax liability order concerning unpaid council tax.
I believe the costs claimed against the defendant in the case referred to was in the sum of 33,000 and wonder
if the effort put into preventing my case progressing was to prevent a similar outcome. A complaint was
submitted to the Advisory Committee on 2nd September 2014 regarding what I considered to be perverting the
course of justice, but have concerns that my complaint has been deliberately ignored because the Advisory
Committee Secretary (Alison Watts), to whom the complaint is addressed, is also the Justices Clerk in my
case.
A further complaint has been submitted to the Judicial Appointment and Conduct Ombudsman (8.8.15)

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regarding the Advisory Committee Secretary's failure to respond and has similarly elicited no response.
I therefore will be looking at the possibility of bringing charges of misconduct in public office against those
employees of HMCTS who have been involved in the gross negligence. That also goes for Humberside police
with regards to the force failing to take allegations about bailiff fraud seriously and mishandling complaints
against it in regards that failure.

Your sincerely
.

02/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
<hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
30 September 2015 11:40
Defence to public order charge.pdf
Defence statement

Dear Sir/Madam
Will you please acknowledge receipt of this email and ensure the attached is seen by the Legal Advisor and
JPs for a hearing in court 1 on 30 September 2015, at 1:45 pm.
Your sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"HU-Grimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
"
" <
@gmail.com>
30 September 2015 12:12
Re: Defence statement

I acknowledge receipt of defence statement and have placed it on the file

Regards
Mrs H Wright
Admin Officer
Grimsby Magistrates Court
01472 592410

02/07/2016

IN THE GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT

Ref: 16AY/XXXX/YY

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

DEFENDANTS STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION
1.

This is the defendants (my) statement in the matter of charges brought against me for
alleged offences under s5 of the Public Order Act 1986 for which I have no legal
representation. The Duty Solicitor, a partner at John Barkers Solicitors, to whom I will
refer in detail later, was contacted on 21.9.15 about the court case but failed to reply and
therefore the reason I have produced this statement myself. I have no background
whatsoever in proceedings connected with the criminal justice system and must
therefore apologise for the manner in which I have approached the production of this
statement.

BACKGROUND
2.

On the afternoon of 27.8.15 on public grounds in front of Humberside Police station


Victoria Street Grimsby I was looking at one of a number of trees in the vicinity (the
reason for being in close proximity to it). The bark configuration appeared to be that of
either a large-leaved Lime (Tilia platyphyllos) or what might have been a small-leaved
Lime (Tilia cordata). I may of course have been wrong on both counts but is an
academic point as it is unlikely any criminal charges could be brought in respect of a
person innocently observing the features of a tree on land which is not private.

3.

At this time I noticed from a distance which I can only roughly estimate to have been
between 20 and 40 meters, a male who appeared to be pointing me out to the person
who was on duty in the Police Stations front office. I proceeded to walk towards the
office intending to find out what seemed to be concerning them both. On enquiring what
their interest was they both stated that I was urinating against the tree, to which I replied
I was not and they had been mistaken. The person on duty in front office then in a raised

voice insisted he had seen me do so. I then reiterated in a voice equally raised that they
were mistaken and had only made that assumption based upon the close proximity I was
to the tree. They had as they say, put two and two together and got five.
4.

The matter continued being disputed at which time the question arose concerning why if
they were so certain I had been urinating in a public place there was no arrest, in answer
to which the employee on the desk stated that he was not a police officer, despite the
clothing suggesting he was. The point was raised about it being a crime to impersonate a
police officer and that if he had no powers of arrest there was nothing stopping me from
walking away.

5.

Despite not being under any obligation I volunteered to wait for a police officer to arrive
on the scene, knowing that I had done nothing to require the attention of the police and
when the matter had been looked into, it would be obvious.

6.

Shortly after an officer turned up who I believe, though not certain, can be identified as
PC Blake. He ordered me to stay were I was (in or around the front office) while he
walked over to the trees location, accompanied by the male who had initially alerted
the police employee. Both appeared to be examining the tree and immediate area for
signs of evidence to prove that their false allegations were true.

7.

On their return, I fully expected to be informed that they had in fact been mistaken and
an apology offered in the matter for which the police were no longer suspicious.

SUSPICIONS OF INCITEMENT TO COMMIT PERJURY / WRONGFUL ARREST


8.

I suspect that when it became obvious to the officer that I had not been urinating as
falsely accused, it occurred to him that if he changed the accusation from one of
urinating in a public place to indecent exposure there would be a lesser burden of proof
required for a conviction.

9.

The officer after returning from inspecting the area, rather than apologising as I
expected began questioning me and giving out orders. The person who I believe went on
to make a complaint, and who had incidentally said to me he would not do so before
accompanying the officer to the spot where I had been accused of urinating, made a
statement that he had seen me zipping/unzipping my fly. However, I was wearing denim
jeans which had no zip the fly operated with buttons. The reliability of a witness must
be brought into question when the accused actions (stated to have been seen) were an

impossibility. When this was conveyed to the arresting officer he appeared not to
consider it relevant and seemed like he had decided upon bringing a charge for public
indecency regardless of there being no evidence.
10.

I was of the view that as I had committed no offence and was completely innocence I
was under no obligation to respond to the questioning. Within seconds of refusing, the
officer arrested me and I remained handcuffed for approximately half an hour in what
Id describe as a holding room of ridiculously small dimensions accompanied by the
arresting officer.

11.

I happened to notice at the point when I was arrested (which is not an insignificant
matter) that the police employee who had made false accusations about me was smugly
grinning. This can only be put down to having a perverse satisfaction of bringing about
the gross and unwarranted inconvenience which includes the events set out in this
statement.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT
12.

After about 10 minutes stood in the holding room, I requested the handcuffs be
loosened as they were unnecessarily tight and causing pain. After a quick check the
officer responded by stating that there was plenty of room and suggested I try moving
my elbows closer together (my hands were behind my back) in an attempt to lessen the
pressure.

13.

Further questioning took place once entering the main building at which point the
handcuffs were released. I was informed I was entitled to a Duty Solicitor as I had no
access to a solicitor of my own. On asking if the one theyd had in mind was
independent from the police, I took up the offer when they stated they all were
independent.

14.

Over all I was falsely imprisoned for around 8 hours during which time I was allowed
out for short intervals on around three occasions. Once to have finger prints taken etc.
with the threat of being forced if I refused another time to take a call when the
solicitor phoned, and the third time to be interrogated, following a pre-interrogation
discussion with the solicitor.

15.

After a while in the cell I still sensed soreness from the handcuffs and noticed the marks
remained visible, so called for someone to have them photographed. A woman spoke

through the cells spy hole and stated that someone would come and deal with the
matter. However, nobody ever did come and the marks which in fact remained visible
for some days afterwards were never photographed.

ATTENDANCE POLICE STATION 4 SEPTEMBER 2015


16.

I was released on bail at approximately 2am on 28.8.15 on false charges of indecent


exposure. The police bail notice required I surrender to the police station on 4.9.15 at
5:30pm with the threat of arrest if I failed to do so.

17.

Whilst attending Humberside police station it was conveyed to me that the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS) had considered that because it was a first offence that they
would not take on the case of prosecuting for indecent exposure. I suspect that the
reason was not because it was a first offence but for some other reason which would
more likely be either one or a number of the following:

18.

i)

CCTV footage had been found that proved I had neither indecently exposed
myself nor urinated in a public place.

ii)

There was no CCTV footage to prove either way

iii)

The witness (or witnesses) considered the seriousness of perjury and were
not prepared to take the risk of lying while under oath

Though the CPS had apparently decided against prosecuting the false charge of indecent
exposure, that was not the end of the matter. The third charge (an offence under the
Public Order Act 1986), presumably the result of desperation to secure a conviction was
read out to me which appears on the charge sheet as follows.
Use threatening / abusive words / behaviour or disorderly behaviour likely
to cause harassment, alarm or distress
On 27/08/15 at Grimsby in North East Lincolnshire used threatening or abusive
words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby CONTRARY TO
SECTION 5(1) AND (6) OF THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1986.
H.O. 125/12 Local None CJS PU86149

19.

I am not familiar with how criminal offences are dealt with by the police, CPS and
courts. I therefore have no idea whether it is normal practice for the authorities to
consider introducing a new offence which was not the cause for arrest, purely as a

contingency when that arrest was made erroneously. If such an approach is standard
practice then it should be considered an abuse of the criminal justice system. A
defendants (other) actions plainly do not suddenly become a police matter just on
account of the arresting officers blunder in the original charge/arrest.
20.

I do not consider that the court should even consider the charges which are clearly the
result of the criminal justice system being exploited, perhaps to make money from or as
an opportunity to get retribution. I have though, had a brief look at the relevant Act
(Public Order Act 1986) and there are issues which require highlighting.

21.

None of the events relating to the charges which stand presently (which are very
sketchy) would have occurred had first the witness and the police employee on duty
in the front office, and later the arresting police officer, not stated falsely (not suspected)
that I had committed an act of indecency.

22.

The false accusations continued even after I had made it clear that they were mistaken
and couldn't have seen what they had stated to be fact. Any of the events relating to the
present charges therefore were provoked and it considered the 'conduct reasonable,
which is a defence under sub-section (3)(c) of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, as
follows (emphasis added):
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he
(a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly
behaviour, or
(b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is
threatening, abusive or insulting,
within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm
or distress thereby
(2) An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place,
except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used,
or the writing, sign or other visible representation is displayed, by a person
inside a dwelling and the other person is also inside that or another dwelling.
(3) It is a defence for the accused to prove
(a) that he had no reason to believe that there was any person within
hearing or sight who was likely to be caused harassment, alarm or
distress, or

(b) that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the
words or behaviour used, or the writing, sign or other visible
representation displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside
that or any other dwelling, or
(c) that his conduct was reasonable.
(4) A constable may arrest a person without warrant if
(a) he engages in offensive conduct which a constable warns him to stop,
and
(b) he engages in further offensive conduct immediately or shortly after
the warning.
(5) In subsection (4) offensive conduct means conduct the constable reasonably
suspects to constitute an offence under this section, and the conduct
mentioned in paragraph (a) and the further conduct need not be of the same
nature.
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
23.

With regard to the arrest and not withstanding that there were no reasonable grounds
there also appears to have been a procedural error and therefore unlawful under section
5(4). It provides there that a constable may arrest a person without warrant if he engages
in offensive conduct which a constable warns him to stop, and he engages in further
offensive conduct immediately or shortly after the warning. I have no recollection of the
described circumstances occurring before I was arrested and falsely imprisoned. It
therefore would seem that the charges should be brought against Humberside police
force rather than myself for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment.

CONCERNS REGARDING THE MAGISTRATES COURT


24.

I have been granted bail and a date is set for an attendance at the Grimsby Magistrates
court on 30.9.15, at 1:45 pm (court 1) the consequences of which I have been informed
if I fail to do so may be a fine, imprisonment or both.

25.

I have expressed my view to the police that I have no confidence in the Grimsby
Magistrates' court and have been lied to by the Justices Clerk in another matter (High
Court appeal) and find it inappropriate that this court is given the opportunity to hear the
case and pass judgment.

26.

The case (case stated appeal) submitted in November 2012 which has brought the
concerns about the court to my attention has remained undetermined to this day. The
Justices' Clerk went as far as producing a draft case stated, only after being coerced by a
Judicial Review claim for mandamus. Since then, communications have been
stonewalled by the Justices Clerk for Humber and South Yorkshire, who has lied about
continuing the case to the subsequent stage, i.e., producing the final case stated.

27.

Whilst the case has been ongoing, another with significant relevance to matters raised in
my appeal has been determined. In R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015]
EWHC 1252 (Admin) the claimant sought judicial review of the decision of justices to
make an award of costs in favour of the Interested Party, London Borough of Haringey
following the granting of a council tax liability order concerning unpaid council tax.

28.

I believe the costs claimed against the defendant in the case referred to was in the sum
of 33,000 and wonder if the effort put into preventing my case progressing was to
prevent a similar outcome. A complaint was submitted to the Advisory Committee on
2nd September 2014 regarding what I considered to be perverting the course of justice,
but have concerns that my complaint has been deliberately ignored because the
Advisory Committee Secretary, to whom the complaint is addressed, is also the Justices
Clerk in my case.

29.

A further complaint has been submitted to the Judicial Appointment and Conduct
Ombudsman (8.8.15) regarding the Advisory Committee Secretary's failure to respond
and has similarly elicited no response. I therefore will be looking at the possibility of
bringing charges of misconduct in public office against those employees of HMCTS
who have been involved in the gross negligence. That also goes for Humberside police
with regards to the force failing to take allegations about bailiff fraud seriously and
mishandling complaints against it in regards that failure (see below paras 30-37).

BAILIFF FRAUD ABETTED BY NORTH EAST LINCOLNSHIRE COUNCIL


30.

I have for a number of years been engaged in matters relating to fraud committed by
private bailiffs working on behalf of local authorities.

31.

Since around 2009, Humberside police have for an array of reasons refused to
investigate allegations of fraud committed by the aforementioned firms. The force has
made it categorically clear that the evidence I have submitted initially relating to

attempts by Rossendales to defraud myself and subsequently to the matter scaled up


and relating to several bailiff firms, does not warrant police resources being used.
32.

The sums, which are based on a five year period, potentially amount to millions of
pounds throughout the country.

33.

I have submitted complaints in relation to the force turning a blind eye to the serious
matter, i.e., local authorities abetting their bailiff contractors to abuse their powers in
helping themselves to vulnerable taxpayer's money, in response to which the force has
been equally negligent in dealing with. The force demonstrates no signs of
accountability, appearing to conduct itself without any standard or duty to the taxpayer,
or in other words, a law unto itself.

34.

There is a sense that police forces are under pressure not to pursue cases that might
impact on the amount of tax collected by the state and so the fraud associated with
private firms awarded government contracts for this work is brushed under the carpet.
The force's unaccountability is self evident by it failing to take allegations of fraud
seriously and subsequently mishandling complaints against it in regards that failure.

35.

A complaint which has only this month concluded (negatively) and has been ongoing
for approaching two years was initially recorded wrongly as 'Direction & Control' whilst
in fact should have been classified as a 'Conduct Matter'. The significance being that
whilst a 'Conduct Matter' had a right of appeal, in the case of a 'Direction and Control'
complaint there was no right of appeal, and stated as such in the negative outcome to the
complaint.

36.

After taking the time to research the matter and contacting the Independent Police
Complaints Commission (IPCC), the IPCC agreed with my assertions that Humberside
police had wrongly classified the complaint, i.e., to avoid having to deal with an appeal.
It was implied anyway at that time by the department head dealing with the complaint,
who incidentally blatantly lied in the contrived response that an appeal right was
academic because the force would at no point consider the fraud allegations for an
investigation.

37.

My concerns are that because of my ongoing dispute with the force and the problems
that it may be causing certain persons serving with Humberside police, there may be a
perverse incentive to abuse police powers and have me inconvenienced in some way.
This appears may be behind why the police officer wrongly arrested me on the false

charges already set out in these representations. My suspicions are as Ive also set out
that the arresting officer may also have encouraged the witness to make false allegations
to aid a criminal case against me, i.e., incited the witness to commit perjury.

CONCLUSION
38.

The time, effort and waste of resources which have resulted from the events set out in
this statement provide a perfect example of how the respective public bodies undermine
the credibility of the judicial process in a way contrary to the interest of justice. It is
worth noting that the authorities are willing to pull out all the stops to ensure the local
authority endorsed fraud of council taxpayers by their bailiff contractors is not pursued,
but do the opposite and fabricate evidence of non-crimes to oppress ordinary citizens.

39.

The evidence suggests that the criminal justice system is being exploited for at least two
immediately obvious reasons. One, to raise money from fines, costs etc., which is even
more obvious since the newly introduced court fee in criminal cases of between 150
and 1,200. The other, which in my opinion arises from the existence of performance
targets for which police forces are presumably under pressure to meet giving
police officers a perverse incentive to arrest. This abuse of the courts is likely to be
further fuelled by the CPS also having to report increasingly presentable figures for
successful prosecutions.

40.

The arresting officer had no good cause to suspect that the charges originally brought
were warranted and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment was unlawful for which
Humberside Police should be held to account.

41.

The final charges brought under the provision of the Public Order Act 1986 had been
provoked by the false accusations which were in any event not considered initially. This
strongly suggests that Humberside police were abusing the criminal justice system and
motivated for reasons already set out, i.e., retribution, financial or in relation to
performance and targets. I therefore recommend that a thorough investigation into the
forces policies and procedures is undertaken. There is no doubt in my mind that the
overall person responsible for this should be answering to charges of misconduct in
public office and/or perverting the course of justice.

42.

There are also key officers within local authorities in place at huge cost to the taxpayer
who should be answerable to the charges previously mentioned for the cover-ups and

negligence detailed briefly in connection with council tax fraud. That also goes for the
various bogus watchdog organisations (IPCC, LGO, ICO etc. etc.) which can only
properly be described as sham organisations which are put in place at the expense of the
taxpayer to fake accountability.
43.

There is also a costs/damages issue (including potential loss of earnings) which if


aggregated over the years for the gross inconvenience of having to deal with the
negligence, maladministration, and criminal actions of the various public bodies briefly
mentioned in this statement would amount to hundreds of thousands of pounds and need
assessing in their own dedicated proceedings.

44.

For the reasons set out above the court is respectfully invited to find the defendant not
guilty of the charges and consider instigating proceedings against the relevant public
bodies for answering to charges of misconduct in public office and/or perverting the
course of justice.

Dated this 30th day of September 2015

Signed:

The Defendant

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
<hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
01 October 2015 22:38
Defendants Grounds of Appeal.pdf; R (on the application of Reverend Nicolson) v Tottenham
Magistrates.doc; Case stated Draft.pdf
Grounds of Appeal - Council Tax Liability Order Hearing

Dear Mrs Wright


Will you please acknowledge receipt of this email and ensure that the three attachments are seen by the
Legal Advisor and JPs for a Council Tax Liability Order hearing on 2 October 2015.
I will be attending to appear before the bench. I request that on the court dismissing the complaint that the
court, under the provision of section 64(1)(b) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, make an order as to
costs as it thinks just and reasonable.

Your sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"HU-Grimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
"
" <
@gmail.com>
02 October 2015 08:48
RE: Grounds of Appeal - Council Tax Liability Order Hearing

I acknowledge receipt of the paperwork have printed it and put on file.

You have sent this email to the Listing secure email address and we do not deal with these types of requests.
Your email has been forward onto the Admin department. In future please send all these types of requests
onto them at HU-Grimsbymcadmin@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk Could you please amend your protocol and inform all
staff regarding this.
Thank you

Regards
Mrs H Wright
Admin Officer
Grimsby Magistrates Court
01472 592410

03/07/2016

IN THE GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT

Ref: 5501

CIVIL JURISDICTION (COUNCIL TAX)


APPLICATION FOR LIABILITY ORDER

BETWEEN:
NORTH EAST LINCOLNSHIRE COUNCIL
Complainant
and

Defendant

DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF APPEAL

INTRODUCTION
1.

The issues in the complaint arise from the provisions of the Council Tax
(Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (the Regulations"). Part V of the
Regulations deals with the billing of persons liable to pay Council Tax; Part VI deals
with the enforcement of their liabilities to billing authorities such as the Complainant
(the Council"). Part V requires where the notice is issued before the beginning of the
relevant year that liability be paid in 10 instalments, in accordance with Regulation 21
and Part I of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.

2.

Under Part VI, Regulation 33, a liability order cannot be applied for unless a reminder
notice under Regulation 23(1) or a final notice, showing the amount for which the
application is to be made, has been served. A final notice need not be served where a
debtor fails to pay any instalments due within seven days of the issue of a reminder
notice.

3.

Once a demand notice, that is, the Council Tax bill, has been issued and one or more of
the statutory scheme instalments have become due and less than the full amount(s) has

been paid, the billing authority must issue a reminder notice to the taxpayer giving
seven days for the outstanding instalment(s) to be paid.
4.

Demand for payment in respect of tax year 2015/16 was such that the first payment was
due 1.4.15 with remaining instalments due on the first of each subsequent month with
the final payment on 1.1.16.

5.

The taxpayer (the Defendant) met the first two instalments (April and May) in
accordance with the demand notice, i.e. 88.91 in respect of the first payment and
91.00 (as were the remaining instalments) for the second. The following instalment due
1.6.15 was paid by the due date but from two different bank accounts. A payment error
resulted in a 1.00 overpayment thus 92.00 was paid in total.

6.

The Defendant received an auto-generated reminder dated 12 June 2015 stating that
there was an overdue amount of 59.00 at the above date. The reminder continued as
follows:
This overdue amount, together with any other instalment that becomes due in the
next 10 days, must be received by the 26th June 2015. If payment is not received
in accordance with this request the instalment facility will be withdrawn and the
total balance of 696.00 will become payable immediately.
The next paragraph warned that:
If payment is not received a summons will be issued without any further notice
being given to you and you will incur 60.00 costs.
It is of central importance, so far as the matters giving rise to this appeal are concerned,
to contrast the above paragraph with the corresponding text as was standard in the notice
before costs were reviewed. The paragraph previously relevant to costs is stated as
follows:
If recovery action is taken there will be costs of 32.00 if a summons is issued,
and further costs of 25.00 if an application is made to the Magistrates Court for a
Liability Order.
The review had the effect of increasing the overall costs by 23% and because both
charges had been consolidated into one, the summons rose by 120% (then 70).
Advantages of front loading all costs to the summons stage, to which will be referred in
detail later, commenced in April 2011 when changes were implemented.

7.

Reminders rely entirely on the Council Tax processing system so there is no possibility
of spotting anomalies before being sent out. Notwithstanding that the Defendants
account was in credit by 1.00 (not overdue by 59.00), the total remaining balance was
636.00 not 696.00 stated on the reminder. The reminder went on to state that if you
have made payment since the date of this letter, please ignore this reminder which the
Defendant did as his account was not only up to date but in fact in credit.

8.

The fourth instalment due 1.7.15 was paid by the due date but a sum of 90.00 instead
of the sum specified on the demand notice (91.00) so that the account was no longer in
credit. The balance was therefore 546.00 and the correct sum outstanding for the
remaining six instalments of 91.00 to pay off the 2015/16 account.

9.

The Defendant received a second auto-generated reminder dated 14 July 2015 stating
that there was an overdue amount of 60.00 at the above date. The reminder continued
as follows:
This overdue amount, together with any other instalment that becomes due in the
next 10 days, must be received by the 28th July 2015. If payment is not received in
accordance with this request or you fall in to arrears again, your instalment facility
will be withdrawn and the total balance of 606.00 will become payable
immediately.
If payment is not received a summons will be issued without any further notice
being given to you and you will incur 60.00 costs

10.

Notwithstanding that the Defendants account was up to date (not overdue by 60.00),
the total remaining balance was 546.00 not 606.00 stated on the reminder. The
reminder went on to state that if you have made payment since the date of this letter,
please ignore this reminder which the Defendant did as his account was up to date.

11.

The fifth instalment due 1.8.15 was paid by the due date but similarly to the third
instalment, paid from two different bank accounts with the same payment error resulting
in a 1.00 overpayment, thus 92.00 was paid in total. The balance was therefore
454.00 (1.00 in credit) which would have been 455.00 but for the overpayment and
the correct sum outstanding for the remaining five instalments of 91.00 to pay off the
2015/16 account.

12.

The Defendant received an auto-generated final notice dated 12 August 2015 which
stated so far as is relevant, as follows:

It appears from our records you have again overlooked payment of your account.
Please arrange for the full remaining balance of 514.00 to be received at the
Council Offices before 26 August 2015 to avoid further recovery action.
If further action is taken there will be costs of 60.00 if a summons is issued.
13.

The unpaid balance becomes payable immediately in accordance with regulation 23(3)
of the Regulations arising from the failure to pay within 14 days from the issue of the
reminder notice. Regulation 23(3) provides as follows:
(3) If, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which a reminder
notice is issued, the liable person fails to pay any instalments which are or will
become due before the expiry of that period, the unpaid balance of the estimated
amount shall become payable by him at the expiry of a further period of 7 days
beginning with the day of the failure.

14.

The Defendants account was in credit by 1.00 and payment had at no stage been
overlooked. Both reminders and the final notice had been sent erroneously by the
Council as the account was either up to date or in credit at all times so the demand for
payment under regulation 23(3) was unlawful. In any event, the total remaining balance
was 454.00 not 514.00 stated on the final notice. The Council also attempted to
exploit the final notice to further its campaign of securing a greater take-up of direct
debit, stating so far as is relevant, as follows:
We may consider re-instating your instalments if you bring your account up to
date immediately, including your next monthly instalment and pay the remaining
balance by Direct Debit....

15.

The final notice went on to state that if you have made the above payment since the
date of this letter, please ignore this reminder which the Defendant did as his account
was again not only up to date but in fact in credit.

16.

The sixth instalment due 1.9.15 was paid by the due date but similarly to the fourth
instalment, the sum of 90.00 paid instead of that specified on the demand notice
(91.00) so that the account was no longer in credit. The balance was therefore 364.00
and the correct sum outstanding for the remaining four instalments of 91.00 to pay off
the 2015/16 account.

17.

Part VI, Regulation 34(1), provides that if an amount has fallen due under 23(3) Part V
of the Regulations and remains unpaid in whole or in part, then the billing authority may

apply to a magistrates court under the provision of regulation 34(2) for a summons to
be issued, requiring the debtor to appear before the court to show why the sum stated
had not been paid.
18.

The Council was not legally entitled to seek a liability order (or add court costs) but did
so by applying to the magistrates court for a summons on 15.9.15 and on 19.9.15, a
summons was served at the address of the Defendant, in so far as relevant, the following
terms:
Complaint has been made before me, the undersigned Clerk to the Justices, by
The Executive Director Resources of North East Lincolnshire Council that you,
being a person duly subject to and liable for Council Tax, have not paid the sum(s)
set out below:
COUNCIL TAX
SUMMONS COSTS
TOTAL AMOUNT PAYABLE

424.00
60.00
484.00

If the total amount outstanding as stated above including summons costs is paid to
North East Lincolnshire Council before the date of the hearing, all further
proceedings will be stopped.

19.

The total amount payable on the summons was 484, an amount 120 in excess of the
Council Tax outstanding. The remaining sum outstanding was at the time of the
summons, 364.00. Half of the sum (60.00) accounted for the unlawfully applied
summons costs, and the remaining sum is with almost all certainty the cause of the
Council Tax processing system misallocating payments to an account from another tax
period, thus increasing the current years liability by an equal amount. The sum (60.00)
relates to 86% of summons costs (70.00) which were disputed as being unreasonable
by the Defendant in an appeal to the High Court by way of a case stated in respect of a
previous tax year (2012/13).

20.

The sum has appeared on the Defendants bill each year since as a separate balance
from the current liability described as a sum subject to court proceedings. It is unlikely
that there will ever be a determination of the costs as the Magistrates court has made
every attempt to prevent the case coming before the High Court. The Council Tax bill
states as follows:

Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings
21.

The Council has taken recovery action on two previous occasions since the 60.00 sum
subject to court proceedings has been incorporated into the Council Tax account. The
Defendant has each time taken the trouble to explain to the Council how, and under
what circumstances, its Council Tax processing system misallocates payments. On this
third occasion, it has occurred to the Defendant that the Council would again unlikely
address the issue and continue allowing the recurring software glitch to trigger
unnecessary recovery action, and took the view that defending the complaint may have
more impact on the Council to resolve its system failures.

22.

The Council had no legal right to serve a summons and demand the outstanding debt,
the Defendant therefore intended to continue paying in accordance with the original
instalment scheme which entailed a further 4 monthly payments of 91.00 commencing
on the 1st of October 2015. The summons costs, which the Council also had no legal
right to apply had been added to the Defendants account, somewhere between 13th and
18th of September 2015. The Defendant has since paid Octobers instalment (the 7th) on
30th September 91.00 thus leaving a balance outstanding of 364.00 and the correct
sum outstanding for the remaining three instalments of 91.00 to pay off the 2015/16
account.

23.

The evidence should be sufficient to satisfy the Magistrates court that the Council had
no legal entitlement to pursue recovery and so dismiss the complaint outright. The
Defendant will be able to provide records of payment as proof if necessary but the
burden of proof lies with the Authority: see Tower Hamlets LBC v Fallows and Fallows
[1990] RA 255.

24.

There is however in these proceedings an opportunity to make representations about the


Councils standard costs in reference to the Regulations, looking at for example, the
level at which theyre set and how they were arrived at, and what costs they represent.

THE LEVEL OF COURT SUMMONS COSTS & THEIR APPLICATION


25.

Regulation 34 provides that if, after the summons has been issued, an amount is paid,
equal to the unpaid balance of the estimated amount and an amount in respect of the

costs incurred by the authority, then the authority must accept the payment and stop the
proceedings. The relevant part being paragraph 5 which follows:
(5) If, after a summons has been issued in accordance with paragraph (2) but
before the application is heard, there is paid or tendered to the authority an amount
equal to the aggregate of
(a) the sum specified in the summons as the sum outstanding or so much of it
as remains outstanding (as the case may be); and
(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority
in connection with the application up to the time of the payment or tender,
the authority shall accept the amount and the application shall not be proceeded
with.
(6)....
26.

The billing authority may not itself add an amount to the outstanding liability in respect
of instituting proceedings, yet it stated that the total amount outstanding for which the
Defendant was liable included summons costs. The complaint at that stage had not been
heard and so adding 60 court costs on or around 15.9.15 to the Defendants account
was pre-empting the bench awarding the amount applied for (see below para 35).

27.

The Defendant had paid in accordance with the Regulations and so the court, if it is to
follow due process, must dismiss the Councils complaint (the court has no discretion in
the matter). That, however, does not render the remaining representations academic as
the 60.00 summons costs have already been unlawfully added and the level, and what
costs they represent etc., involve a matter of general public importance.

28.

The costs incurred by the Council in respect of issuing the summons (60.00) may
lawfully (by virtue of their application on the summons issue) only include the
Councils expenditure up until that point. A costs breakdown produced by the council,
to which will be referred in detail later, proves without any doubt that the majority of
expenditure is not provided for in the Regulations and those regulations do not provide
for the summons costs income to cover the cost of running the service, which is clearly
a mistaken belief that the Council holds.

Case of significant relevance to these proceedings


R (on the application of Reverend Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates
29.

In R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin) (Nicolson v


Tottenham Magistrates) the claimant sought judicial review of the decision of
justices to make an award of costs in favour of the Interested Party, London Borough of
Haringey (LBH) following the granting of a council tax liability order concerning
unpaid council tax. It was adjudged that an order for a council tax summons was
unlawful because the court had insufficient information to determine the reasonableness
of costs claimed, then failed to inquire further into how the sum was calculated (and
elements it comprised of) and because the applicant was denied a fair opportunity to
challenge the lawfulness of the order before it was made.
Councils policy to review court costs and produce annual breakdown

30.

Pressure from various quarters has been the trigger for the Council to keep under review
its level of court costs and to produce a breakdown annually supporting them. The first
published set of accounts appeared on the Councils website, based on activity in
2012/13 informing the standard costs charged during 2013/14.

31.

A Cabinet report dated 17.2.14 reviewing council tax court costs provided the legal
framework supporting the Councils decision to reduce its standard summons costs from
70 to 60 which its subsequent years breakdown (2014/15) reflected.

POINTS OF LAW
32.

The matters central to this challenge arise from the provision of regulation 34 of the
Regulations. The provision enables a billing authority to recover its costs by recharging
an amount reasonably incurred to the defendant in relation to an application to the
Magistrates Court to obtain a Liability Order. Regulation 34 makes provision for
applying costs in three distinct circumstances which are set out in paragraphs (5), (7)
and (8).

33.

Under paragraph 5 of the Regulations (see above para 25), expenditure which the
Council may lawfully claim in respect of instituting the summons is described as costs
reasonably incurred. Therefore the billing authority is under a legal duty, before
levying the sum, to have properly accounted for each element in arriving at the figure

and ensuring that each element it claims is in fact incurred in connection with the issue
of the summons.
34.

Costs described under paragraph (5) are distinct from those under paragraphs (7) and (8)
in that there are no court proceedings (the latter two require the case be brought before
Magistrates). Paragraph (5) provides that if, after a summons has been issued but before
the application is heard, there is paid or tendered to the authority the aggregate of the
sum outstanding, and costs reasonably incurred by the authority in connection with the
application up to the time of the payment or tender, the authority shall accept the
amount and the application shall not be proceeded with.

35.

Consequently, a defendant settling in the circumstances described under paragraph (5)


will not be subject to any costs awarded by the court. This conflicts with the general rule
that costs follow the event and the understanding of the way a party to court
proceedings is normally awarded costs. It is for this, and examining the primary
legislation, that it is viewed that the Regulations, which provide that the parties may
agree costs prior to the case being heard, are ultra vires the enabling Act. The
incompatibility of bringing the argument into one contesting the defendant parties
compliance with the Regulations makes it inappropriate to expand on here; nevertheless,
the rationale for asserting that the Regulations are ultra vires the enabling Act is
provided separately (see Annex A).

36.

Paragraph (7) provides that if after a summons has been issued and the sum has not been
paid, an order shall be made in respect of an amount equal to the aggregate of the sum
payable, and a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the applicant
in obtaining the order. Paragraph (8) provides that the court shall, subject to an
application by the billing authority, grant an order solely in respect of costs, if after the
issue of a summons but before the liability order has been made by the court a debtor
settles only the sum outstanding (see Annex B).

37.

Pursuant to regulation 35, liability orders may be dealt with individually, or, where the
court thinks fit may be dealt with collectively. The impracticality of magistrates hearing
a thousand or so defendants all summonsed to the same court at the time and on the
same day means that debtors are steered away from appearing. It is those defendants not
attending who will generally by default have admitted liability and be the ones whose
cases will be considered appropriate to be aggregated. It does not mean that because the
established practice is to include all cases in a bulk application, the Council has any less

legal duty to properly account for the costs individually where a defendant seeks to
make representations, nor ensuring that costs it claims are properly referable to the
relevant enforcement process in respect of an individual's circumstances.
38.

In the Defendants aforementioned High Court application (see above paras 19-21) the
questions of law on which the opinion of the High Court were sought were presented to
the Magistrates court in the following terms:
The questions focus on two principle points of law with regards regulation 34 of
the Council Tax regulations (SI 1992/613).
Those points being, whether
i)

costs being disputed as unreasonable should have been awarded by


the court without evidence from the council to support them.

ii) costs specifically incurred by the council for obtaining the liability
order should have been charged at the summons issuing stage.
39.

In Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates it was held unlawful for the court to award costs
without having sufficient relevant information from the billing authority to support
them. Consequently the first question of law in the Defendants appeal (which has not,
and unlikely to be determined) appears to be resolved in Nicolson v Tottenham
Magistrates judgment at paragraph 61 which states as follows:
This application for judicial review of the decision taken by the Magistrates must
therefore succeed. I was told that since the hearing the order for costs against the
Claimant has been withdrawn, but that does not render the proceedings academic;
as I have said, it raises issues of wider public importance. Had the order not been
withdrawn, I would have quashed it. Since it has been withdrawn, I will declare
that the order was unlawful, because:
i)

the Magistrates did not have sufficient relevant information before them
to reach a proper judicial determination of whether the costs claimed
represented costs reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining the
liability order;

ii) the Magistrates erred in law by failing to make further inquiries into
how the 125 was computed and what elements it comprised; and
iii) the Claimant was denied a fair opportunity to challenge the lawfulness
of the order before it was made, by reason of the failure to answer his

requests for the provision of information as to how the sum of 125 was
arrived at.
40.

It would be helpful at this point to consider the matter in the context of two Freedom of
Information (FOI) requests submitted to the Council, after which, the opinion of the
Information Commissioner and subsequently the Information Rights Tribunal was
sought on whether on the balance of probabilities a calculation was held by the Council
and whether the Regulations provided a legal obligation to be able to support its costs.

41.

Firstly some conflicting evidence should be highlighted that arises from the Councils
representations which are recorded in the draft statement of the case (the Draft Case)
produced on 22.7.13 in relation to the Defendants High Court appeal, which potentially
brings into question the reliability of the Councils evidence. The Draft Case claimed
(3(d)), as follows (emphasis added):
The level of costs sought had been calculated to reflect both administrative and
legal costs in bringing the proceedings to court, including the court fees.
The above was stated despite the Councils fervent denial of the existence of a
calculation in both FOI requests, the first of which (see below paras 52-53) was
submitted on learning that the Council had increased the summons costs by 120%, but
before the Magistrates court and the Defendants High Court proceedings commenced;
the second submitted subsequent to both. Both the Information Commissioner and
Information Rights Tribunal agreed unanimously with the Council that on the balance of
probabilities such a calculation was not held and with whom it also agreed there was
nothing legally obliging it to support its costs.

42.

The second FOI request focussed solely on the Councils incurred expenditure to issue a
summons (the matter central to the Defendants High Court appeal) which escalated to
an appeal to the First-tier (Information Rights) Tribunal (FtT), 'Gilliatt v Information
Commissioner' (Appeal No: EA/2013/0285). The appeal relied in part on the Council
being legally obliged to demonstrate how it came by the figure in order to persuade the
FtT that it would in fact know this cost and enable its disclosure.

43.

The Response to the FtT appeal (4.2.14) supported the Commissioners findings in the
Decision Notice (the DN) reference FS50505226, which were reiterated to the extent
necessary to respond to the appeal grounds. In the matter of a legal requirement, and

with reference to the Governments good practice guide1, it records in paragraph


27(1) of the Commissioners Response that the documentation is merely guidance and
does not entail a legal obligation to hold the information requested (DN, para. 16). In
the same matter, but with reference to regulation 34(5) of the Regulations, it records in
paragraph 27(2) of the Response, as follows:
The legislative provisions referred to by the Appellant, specifically regulation
34(5) of the [Regulations], provide that public authorities shall not proceed with
summonses for unpaid council tax if there is paid/tendered to the authority both
the outstanding sum and a sum equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the
authority in connection with the application up to the time of the payment or
tender [of the outstanding council tax payment]. However, neither this provision,
nor any other statutory provisions, provides any obligation on local councils to
hold information enabling them to provide a breakdown of those reasonable
costs (DN, paras. 17, 19).
In Judge Farrers Final Decision dated 22.5.14 dismissing the appeal it is evident that
the FtT had been persuaded that a local authority is under no legal obligation to be able
to support the incurred costs it recharges to those debtors against whom complaint is
made. Under heading The Tribunals Decision (paras 7 and 8) it is held, so far as is
relevant, as follows (emphasis added):
7 Regulation 34(5) of the [Regulations] does not oblige a council to hold the
requested information. It reads (5) If, after a summons has been issued in accordance with
paragraph (2) but before the application is heard, there is paid or
tendered to the authority an amount equal to the aggregate of
(a) ......
(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by
the authority in connection with the application up to the time
of the payment or tender,

In June 2013 the Government produced a guide entitled Guidance to local councils on good practice in the
collection of Council Tax arrears." Paragraph 3.4, the document states as follows:
Local Authorities are reminded that they are only permitted to charge reasonable costs for the court summons
and liability order. In the interests of transparency, Local Authorities should be able to provide a breakdown, on
request, showing how these costs are calculated. While it is likely that authorities will have discussed costs with
the Clerk to Justices it should be recognised that the Court may wish to be satisfied that the amount claimed by
way of costs in any individual case is no more than that reasonably incurred by the authority.

the authority shall accept the amount and the application shall not be
proceeded with.
8 The obligations imposed are those set out in the last line, no more. A council
may use a standard estimate of the costs that it reasonably incurs but, as the
Guidance says, a court may question it so keeping the relevant data is good
practice. This basis for rejecting the Councils denial therefore fails. Even had
there been such an obligation, that would not have demonstrated that the
Council must have complied with it.
44.

The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal contending that
the judge was wrong in law to have considered that the Council was under no duty to
hold the requested information by virtue of regulation 34(5) of the Regulations. The
grounds of challenge to the FtT determination in paragraphs 7 and 8 are set out in the
application for permission to appeal (3-5). The appellant attempts to persuade the FtT
(para 5) that the issue involves the interpretation of regulation 34(5) because the judge
held that a legal obligation for a council to show how the sum it claims in costs is
arrived at does not exist explicitly in the statutory language. The Appellants
interpretation is summarised as follows:
After a summons has been issued but before the case is heard, Magistrates have no
jurisdiction over costs until the case is brought before the court where they then
may fall under scrutiny. There is no prescribed amount and the court can not, in a
legal context, agree a standard sum, so is open to the council to accept payment,
mindful that the amount may vary from case to case. Proceedings are not yet
before the court, so if on payment or tender, the authority fails to agree the sum,
then it must, by virtue of regulation 34(5)(b) be obliged to support its claim in
order to justify the sum is no more than costs reasonably incurred. To proceed
once an amount has been paid or tendered would be unlawful, as it clearly states:
the authority shall accept the amount and the application shall not be proceeded
with

45.

Permission to appeal was refused by the FtT in a Decision promulgated on 4.7.14


(DRP). The FtT declined to review the decision because it was not satisfied that any
arguable issue of law arose from its decision to dismiss the appeal, which states at
paragraph 5, so far as is relevant, as follows:
Its response remains the same as in its Decision; Reg. 34(5) does not impose the
asserted duty and, if it did, the Tribunal was entitled to find as a matter of fact that
NELC did not comply with it by holding the requested information.

46.

The FtT was concerned in determining whether on the balance of probabilities the
Council had any demonstrable way of supporting its costs, so the mere existence of a
legal duty would not in itself be evidence. It was nevertheless something that the FtT
had a duty to assess, which in the context of Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates (61)
had done erroneously. Having no way of verifying its costs, the Council is left unable to
provide Magistrates with sufficient relevant information...to reach a proper judicial
determination of whether the costs claimed represented costs reasonably incurred.

47.

Though the matter was FOI and concerned information the Council held rather than
what it should hold, there may be merits in considering the FtTs reasons for declining
to review its decision to better understand how it fits within the context of this challenge
and as a point of comparison in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates. Paragraph 6 of the
DRP states, so far as is relevant, as follows:
As to the supposed duty, it is evidently based on the claim that the duty under
Reg. 34(5) to accept the paid or tendered amount can only be discharged if, in
every case, the taxing authority is able to specify precisely the ...amount equal to
the costs reasonably incurred by the authority in connection with the application
up to the time of the payment or tender, (Reg. 34(5)(b))
There is nothing in that wording to preclude the application of a standard charge,
provided it represents a reasonable estimate of the average cost of the application
at the prescribed time.

48.

Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates agrees (46) in so much as it considers in principle,


provided that due consideration is given to the dangers of artificially inflating costs, it
may be a legitimate approach to provide an average figure which could be levied across
the board in "standard" cases. It does however go further and add that such costs could
be amplified in circumstances where there was justification for incurring additional
legal and/or administrative costs.

49.

This approach would require the average figure being derived from the aggregate
recoverable costs, which (i) excluded any expenditure that was not common to every
application, and (ii) be properly referable to the summons/liability order. That is to say
in broad terms the exclusion of those elements which are referred to later (see below
paras 78-115). It would then be open to the council in cases where it incurred additional
administrative costs (where they were lawful and there was justification to do so) to
amplify the standard costs, but again subject to them always being properly referable to
the enforcement process. There is however another factor arising due to the fact that the

standard summons costs is added to the taxpayers account routinely at the point when
the processing software triggers the summons issue. In doing this the Council has
imposed upon itself a greater restriction in the amount of expenditure it may lawfully
claim than otherwise regulation 34(5) entitles. This could be viewed as a policy which
backfires but for the fact that there has thus far been a free rein given by the
Magistrates court for the Council to set its own costs and apply them in a way without
regard for the Statutory Instrument that governs them.
50.

It is open to those against whom the council proceeds, to challenge the application, and
where representation is made about costs, Magistrates must look at the case on an
individual basis but need not involve the onerous task of calculating the level of costs
incurred in each individual case. In seeking to standardise costs, the very least
requirement would be to have a standard sum for the summons and another for the
liability order; then only where costs are challenged or an amount tendered, as per the
Regulations, would they need individually assessing to ensure that the debtors are
treated lawfully.

51.

The Governments good practice guide states (see above para 43) that the Court may
wish to be satisfied that the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case is no
more than that reasonably incurred by the authority because the Regulations provide
for individual costs. Moreover, the court would not require satisfying on an individual
basis for any arbitrary reason, but because an individual sought to challenge the costs,
which is why regulation 35(1) of the Regulations provides that a single liability order
may deal with one person and one amount. Regulation 35, so far as is relevant, is as
follows:
Liability orders: further provision
35.(1) A single liability order may deal with one person and one such amount
(or aggregate amount) as is mentioned in regulation 34(7) and (8), or, if the court
thinks fit, may deal with more than one person and more than one such amount.

The court was provided no evidence supporting a 120% summons costs rise
52.

A copy of a breakdown was asked for via FOI that was assumed would be supplied by
the Council to the Magistrate's Court in support of a near 120% increase of its standard
council tax summons costs. The Councils 2011/12 budget setting revealed it aimed to

achieve savings by generating 188,000 additional each year in court costs income and
was what brought about the request.
53.

The FtT (in whose hands the matter had been placed) took the decision to strike out the
appeal on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it,
succeeding. Though plainly the attempt to obtain a breakdown via the FtT was
unsuccessful, it has nevertheless provided formal judgment in support of the Magistrates
not having sufficient relevant information before them to reach a proper judicial
determination of whether the costs claimed were reasonably incurred by the Council.
See paragraph 4 of the Appendix to the Order of Judge Taylor dated 27.4.12 striking out
the appeal in case 'Gilliatt v Information Commissioner' (Appeal No: EA/2012/0050):
Following a complaint to the Information Commissioner, a Decision Notice was
issued concluding that the Council had complied with the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 (the Act), and no further information was held. This was because on
the balance of probabilities the Council had provided all of the information it held
that fell within the scope of the information request, and:
a. The Information Commissioner considered the Council had explained
why it did not hold more information falling within the scope of the
request there was no business need for it to hold information in the detail
and context requested.
b. Request A: The Council had explained that it had not supplied the
Magistrates Court with a breakdown of the increased summons costs. It
had explained that it did not hold a breakdown for the calculation of the
70.00 fee, as it was based on comparisons with the fees charged by
neighbouring authorities (including Hull City Council and East Riding of
Yorkshire Council) and then compared against national averages, and as
previously identified checked to ensure that the monies raised from costs
would not be greater than the cost of the service.

Further conflicting evidence Draft Case in Defendants High Court application

54.

Paragraph 3.4 of the Governments good practice guide (see above para 43) is
reproduced in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates (56) where it is affirmed thereafter
that the information was asked for in that case and was not forthcoming. Paragraph 57
which states as follows:
The Claimant asked for that information and it was not forthcoming. The
Magistrates did not have that information before them either. It was not good

enough for them to be told in general terms that the costs had something to do
with administrative time and the number of people who were involved in the
process for making the application. Nor was it good enough for them to be told
that some arrangement or agreement had been reached in 2010 between the
Council and the clerk to the justices about the level of the costs without carrying
out any investigation of what the agreement was and the basis for it. Looking to
see whether the costs were broadly in line with costs being charged by other local
authorities was all well and good, but it was not enough to discharge the courts
obligations.
It was also found unsatisfactory in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates (29) that the
Magistrates accepted LBHs justification that the costs claimed were reasonably
incurred on the basis that they were no more than the standard amount claimed in every
case. Paragraph 29 states so far as is relevant, as follows:
The Magistrates sought to rely on the fact that the 125 claimed was no more
than the standard amount claimed in every case; but the fact that a standard sum is
attributed to costs recoverable in every case where a summons has been issued
was one of the matters that gave rise to the Claimants concerns. That is why the
Claimant was seeking to find out how it was computed and what was the
Councils justification for claiming it across the board. For all he knew, there
might well have been a plausible justification, but in the absence of further
information he was in no position to tell and neither were the Magistrates.
55.

It was also in the Defendants High Court case broadly the same criteria that satisfied
Magistrates that the costs were reasonably incurred. The Councils representations are
recorded in the Draft Case in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 3 which are
summarised as follows:
The costs were the same level as were sought in all similar proceedings arising in
cases on or after 1.4.11 which was a sum previously notified to the Court on
4.3.11. They did not exceed the prescribed amount described in regulation 34(8) of
the Regulations and were within the range sought by other local authorities in
similar proceedings. The level sought had been calculated to reflect both
administrative and legal costs in bringing the proceedings to court, including the
court fees.

56.

The courts findings are recorded in sub-paragraphs (a) to (g) of paragraph 7 of the
Draft Case which are summarised as follows:
We recognise that in all cases where costs are claimed we have discretion whether
to order them and in what sum, so the fact that the Council asked for the normal
amount did not prevent us from reducing the sum or refusing to order any costs.

The Council has taken a broad approach to the question of costs and has sought a
similar amount to all others in the same court list. This is normally appropriate,
though we accept we must look at each case individually, so in principle, the
respondent could have sought a greater amount in an individual case where more
costs were incurred, subject to any limitations set by regulations, had it chosen to
do so.
The amount requested in all cases before us was a sum advised to the court over a
year before these proceedings commenced and the court in the intervening period
has considered it appropriate by making orders in favour of the respondent in that
sum. That fact of course did not prevent us from considering the amount requested
here. A court fee payable in respect of each application as well as other
administrative and legal costs of bringing the proceedings satisfied us that 70 was
an amount reasonably incurred by the respondent in making the application before
the court and obtaining the liability order.
On the basis of the information presented to us by both parties, the contention that
the amount claimed by the Council was in the nature of general revenue raising
did not succeed and we were satisfied that it was instead an amount to cover the
cost of bringing council tax enforcement proceedings to court. This case had no
features to distinguish it significantly from other cases in our list to suggest a
different level of costs. The appellant should pay the full amount of the costs
sought. We could not see that it was just to order the appellant to pay less or we
would have so ordered. We ordered that the costs requested by the respondent
should be paid by the appellant in the proceedings and made a liability order
against him to enable that sum to be recovered.
57.

There is nothing left to question or take apart any further from the accounts. The
Magistrates in the Defendants High Court case clearly sought to rely on the same
criteria that satisfied Magistrates in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates which had in that
case all been considered unsatisfactory. There is however a need to focus on the
declarations which raise issues beyond simply whether or not they were considered
satisfactory.

58.

The court expressed in the Draft Case (7(f)) that the case had no features to distinguish
it significantly from other cases in its list to suggest that a different level of costs should
be considered. It is understood that the data provided on the complaint list relating to
each case simply consists of the defendants personal details, liability period, summons
notice value, costs and the total, therefore unrealistic to expect that this information
would enable the court to go through a judicial exercise of distinguishing different
levels of costs from one case to another.

59.

The Council declared under representations in the Draft Case (3(b)) that the level of
costs sought did not exceed the prescribed amount described in regulation 34(8) of the
Regulations which is an incorrect reference to costs (See Annex B). Regulation 34(8)
describes the expenditure incurred in bringing the case before the court and obtaining
the liability order whilst the costs contended were those of instituting the complaint in
regulation 34(5). This was similarly misconceived by the court as evidenced by the fact
that in its findings in the Draft Case (7(d)) it stated that they considered 70 was an
amount reasonably incurred by the Council in making the application before the court
and obtaining the liability order.

60.

Apart from there being an incorrect reference in the Defendants High Court case, it was
implied that the then 70 costs (the same whether a case proceeds to court or payment
renders a hearing unnecessary) included an element of front loaded expenditure in
applications which were not proceeded with.

61.

The remaining question to be determined in the Defendants High Court case i.e.
whether the costs of obtaining an order which have not been incurred are claimed
lawfully in respect of instituting the complaint has now been established in Nicolson v
Tottenham Magistrates. The judgment focuses on the legislative provisions that sets
apart costs which may be claimed in respect of obtaining the liability order and those
which are limited to a lesser amount (by virtue of payment or tender) under the
provision of regulation 34(5) of the Regulations. It concludes (37-38 & 49-50) that
additional costs in obtaining an order (which have not been incurred) may not be
lawfully claimed in respect of instituting the complaint.
Costs set at same level whether applied at the summons or liability order stage
and/or including costs arising post liability order

62.

A legislative provision for capping costs in Welsh authorities (See Annex B 8-10) is
set out in the Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rating (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations
2011 (the Amendment). The Amendment and particularly its Explanatory
Memorandum suggest that the Regulations were formulated, intending to give a person
issued a summons an incentive to settle liability before the case proceeded to court.
Although there is no provision for each stage to be capped independently, the language
is implicit (Annex B 9) that costs in respect of instituting the complaint, form one
distinct part of an aggregate amount (capped at 70) in respect of the authoritys total
incurred expenditure to obtain a liability order.

63.

LBH made representations in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates defending the setting


of costs at the same figure, regardless of whether payment was made before the case is
heard. The Explanatory Memorandum provided the rationale behind why the councils
approach to applying costs was legitimate, which on the face of it, appeared not in
accordance with the Regulations. The explanation is contained in paragraph 49 of the
judgment which, in so far as relevant, is reproduced below (emphasis added):
.....It explains why the limit was not set at 35 for each of the two stages, on the
basis that during the consultation process "several local authorities pointed out
that the greatest amount of work is incurred before the initial summons is issued
and argued that the charge should be higher at this stage. Ms Henderson said
that this explained why in the case of some local authorities, such as the Council
in the present case, the costs were set at the same figure regardless of whether
payment was made after the summons was issued. The costs of obtaining a
liability order were very small in comparison with the costs incurred in connection
with the issue of the summons.
The explanation was accepted in principle but it expressed that in practical terms the
approach provides no incentive....to pay up after the summons is issued. It concluded
(in that matter) in paragraph 50, so far as relevant, as follows:
.....What matters is that the costs that it does decide to claim are properly
referable to the enforcement process.

64.

Observing legislative restrictions that limit costs to expenditure incurred up to the point
where an amount has been paid or tendered and that some authorities claim an
identical sum in cases that proceed to court then those that make no distinction would
be falling foul of the law if the further cost incurred in obtaining an order were not
borne by the taxpayer. The same would be true if continuing expenditure incurred by the
authority after obtaining the order in respect of securing payment etc. was claimed as
court costs (at either stage). However, in order that the cost of recovery does not fall on
the taxpayer as a whole, many billing authorities express a view that rechargeable costs
in respect of applying for a liability order should extend to cover all expenditure which
is considered attributable to recovery and enforcement (See Annex C).

65.

In this respect there is some assistance to be derived from Chiltern District Councils 16
March 2010 Cabinet report into Court costs (See Annex D), see in particular paragraph
4, where the essential point being made is that, the majority of costs it incurs arise from

the court hearing to obtain the order and the additional work required to secure payment
thereafter. Paragraph 4 of the report is as follows:
The level of costs should be realistic but reflect the fact that we do not believe in
principle that it is fair to pass on the costs of recovery from the few people who
default on payment of Local Taxes to the vast majority who do not. Most of the
costs the Council incurs arise from the application for a liability order at Court and
the additional work required to secure payment once we have the liability order.
66.

Understandably, expenditure varies in proportion to the authoritys size and may be


affected by economies of scale, but that has no bearing on at what stage in the process it
is incurred. It is therefore rational that one authority incurs recovery expenditure in
much the same way as another.

67.

With it established that a billing authoritys priority is to ensure that no cost of recovery
is borne by the taxpayer, the following line of reasoning must lead to the conclusion that
billing authorities in general, account for expenditure in their standard court costs which
falls outside the boundaries defined by law:

68.

a billing authoritys incurred expenditure in securing a liability order makes


up only a small element of its overall cost of recovery due to non and late
payment (Annex C 2-3); however

billing authorities endeavour to ensure that no cost of recovery is borne by the


council tax payer in general; but

the law restricts costs that can be recharged, to an amount incurred in


obtaining a liability order, or limited further to an amount in connection with
instituting the complaint (in the circumstances described under regulation
34(5) of the Regulations).

In context of the Defendants case the Council implies that its priority is to safeguard
the taxpayer from having to bear any element of recovery administration by setting its
standard court costs at a level which includes expenditure that falls outside the
boundaries defined by law (Annex C 4-10). The Councils Cabinet report, Review of
Council Tax court costs, dated 17.2.14 briefly outlines the risks of members opting
either to levy a higher level of court costs than recommended or a lower level. The
relevance in this context, was the risk outlined which was associated with opting for a
lower level than recommended, as follows:

Members may choose to levy a lower level of costs than that recommended,
however, this would mean that additional costs incurred by the Council due to
non-payment are borne by those Council Tax payers who pay on time in
accordance with their instalment plan.
69.

Responses by the Council to FOI requests asking for breakdowns of its costs underpin
this. For example, as a final safeguard in a series of checks to be satisfied its costs are
claimed lawfully, the Council consistently refers to ensuring that the monies raised
from costs do not exceed the cost of the service (see above para 53).

70.

If the law made provision for the cost of the service to be recharged to the taxpayer, it
might be good enough, but that reference has been confirmed to relate to the costs
reasonably incurred for Council Tax collection and recovery. The cost of the service
must include expenditure attributable to the court application but only as an element of
the aggregate amount and so the idea of ensuring income is kept within this budget is
misconceived as a measure of what might be lawful.

71.

The Council implies that because court costs income is within its annual budget (1.1
million) for all activity associated with recovery of Council Tax etc., it considers that its
claim is lawful. The DN (ref: FS50400874) records this in para 6:
...The [Regulations] do not require the Council to justify the amount charged to
each individual, only that the costs have been reasonably incurred by the authority
in connection with the application up to the time of payment or tender. The annual
budget for all activity associated with recovery of Council Tax and Business rates
amounts to approximately 1.1 million.
It is reinforced further at paragraph 15 of the DN that the Council sets it costs, not at a
level to cover the court application, but for recovering Council Tax, ultimately in a bid
to safeguard the taxpayer from having to bear any element of recovery administration:
...The monies raised from costs are not greater than the cost of the service. The
increase in summons costs does not represent income generation but a saving
that can be made in the cost of the delivery of the service, that would otherwise
ultimately be passed on to the Council Tax payers of North East Lincolnshire...
As stated the costs raised from the increased Summons costs are to cover the
cost of recovering Council Tax, and do not represent income generation but a
saving that can be made in the cost of the delivery of the service for the benefit of
all Council Tax payers of North East Lincolnshire

72.

The view held by perhaps all billing authorities that costs claimed in an application for a
liability order should encompass all recovery and enforcement administration, appears
to be endorsed by the Ministry of Justice (the MoJ). In a response to a FOI request on
related matters (FOI-87328) the MoJ stated that the level of costs applied for is
calculated by reference to the actual expenditure incurred in recovering council tax
debts...
Policy to review court costs and produce annual breakdown

73.

The calculation produced by the Council, subsequent to the Defendants High Court
application, attributed the vast majority of expenditure to instituting the complaint (the
summons). Only 5% of what was accounted for as the Gross Recoverable costs was
estimated as being attributed to further work in obtaining a liability order. The
breakdown shows, in apparent compliance with the law, that the estimated 5% was
deducted from the gross figure before dividing that sum by the number of summonses
issued to arrive at the average cost per summons.

74.

In accounting terms therefore, the relatively small cost attributed to additional work in
obtaining a liability order after a summons has been issued is absorbed by the taxpayer.
In this matter it is agreed in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates (50) that In principle
there is no reason why a local authority should not decide to limit the costs it claims to
the costs in connection with issuing the summons.

75.

The breakdown allowed the Council to demonstrate, in theory at least (or to an


acquiescent body willing to endorse the figures), that the requirements of the
Regulations were met. Under proper scrutiny however, validation would require further
proof that the expenditure was reasonably incurred and the gross recoverable costs
were in fact lawfully recoverable. The very minimum that would be expected from the
court to be satisfied of this would be that:
a)

estimated further work attributed to obtaining the liability order was not
determined as negligible, merely to justify charging all costs up front,

b)

average costs do not include subsidy for bad debt arising from waived or
unrecoverable costs,

c)

costs do not include subsidy for administration expenditure arising from


setting up payment plans, dealing with queries etc. (Annex H 9)

d)

costs claimed do not include any element attributable to the expenditure of


enforcing the order after it is obtained

a) Further work to obtain liability order determined as negligible


76.

The calculation would have to be dismissed on the basis that it provides nothing at all
that could satisfy the court that the expenditure attributed to obtaining the liability order
only represented 5% of the gross recoverable costs, based as it appeared to be on an
arbitrary estimate. In any event, the Councils claim to incur the vast majority of
expenditure in respect of instituting the complaint conflicts entirely with Chiltern
District Councils view (see above para 65) as to where most of the costs arise which
would reinforce justification for the court to require evidence.

77.

The probability that the split is random is reinforced further by the fact that the Council
once weighted costs contrary to how they are applied now. In 1998/99 there were no
summons costs applied; only debtors against whom liability orders were obtained had
costs added. From then on the weight shifted until after the April 2011 review, the entire
costs were applied on instituting the complaint (Annex E).
b) Subsidising bad debt arising from waived or unrecoverable costs

78.

The Councils breakdowns are to be dismissed similarly because they have established
that the standard costs included a subsidy for bad debt. It is clear from subsequent
breakdowns relating to 2013/14 (Annex F) and 2014/15 that the standard sum recharged
to customers in respect of summons costs include a significant element of bad debt
brought about by defendants, who for example, may have no means to pay. Those
debtors are then being subsidised by those from whom payment is more easily
recovered. The Councils Cabinet report, Review of Council Tax court costs, dated
17.2.14 confirms this, as follows:
The Council recognises the difficulties some residents have encountered in
paying Council Tax as a result of Welfare Reform changes, and as a result has
been more flexible with instalment arrangements. In cases where residents owe a
modest amount, and have subsequently made an arrangement which clears the
balance within the financial year, costs have not been applied. It is anticipated that
such action will continue into 2014/15.

79.

It is estimated from the Councils breakdown (and number of summonses issued in


2013/14) that at least 42% of taxpayers against whom complaint was made were

summonsed without costs applied2. Put in context, at least 25 was added to the
standard sum for the remaining debtors, which is conservatively estimated because no
element of bad debt has been factored in to account for unrecoverable costs in those
cases where they were applied.
80.

The calculation confirms that the average cost per summons is determined by dividing
its gross recoverable expenditure by an estimated number of summonses requested
where costs are applied. The recorded number of summons issued (17,197) was
significantly higher than the estimated number of summons requested where costs were
applied (10,000) used in the Council's 2013/14 calculation. The relevant part of the
Councils breakdown is presented as follows:

Gross Recoverable costs


Estimated number of summons requested in 2013/14,
where costs applied
Cost per summons

Cost rounded to nearest

81.

597,160

10,000

59.72

60

Clearly if the true number of summons issued (17,197) was substituted for the 10,000
figure above, the cost per summons, based on the Councils method of calculating the
sum (disregarding other questionable expenditure), would return a sum of 34.72.

82.

The disparity between the number of summonses issued and the figure used has almost
certainly arisen from the effects of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (Annex G). However,
even before the Acts introduction in April 2013 (albeit to a lesser degree), the average
cost included expenditure attributable to instituting the complaint, which in a percentage
of cases could not be recovered from the person summonsed. That element of
expenditure was therefore subsidised by those from whom payment was obtained.

The dividing figure used in the Council's 2013/14 calculation was 10,000, but the figure submitted to the
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) relating to the number of summonses issued in
2013/14 was 17,197.

c) Subsidising administration cost for customer contact


83.

The calculation would be impermissible because it includes a disproportionate amount


of staff time attributable to customer contact under the budget category, Council Tax.
This expenditure arises from dealing with queries/calls etc. as a consequence of issuing
summonses. A second category, Debt Recovery, also includes a disproportionate
amount of staff time that accounts for expenditure in negotiating, setting up and
monitoring payment arrangements etc. The vast majority of this expenditure will not
have been incurred by the Council in a proportion of cases, for example where the
application does not proceed (by virtue of payment or tender) or where it does proceed it
does simply without staff contact.

84.

The gross recoverable costs under the Council Tax budget is 191,730. Based on the
Councils computing method, this adds 18 to the cost per summons, though an element
of this would arguably be legitimate only in cases where the debtor had taken up
resources by engaging staff in matters connected with the summons, as this is the basis
upon which the expenditure is justified.

85.

The breakdown explicitly sets out that its recoverable costs (after deducting 50% for
routine billing activity from the Council Tax budget) is in the ratio of calls arising
from summonses to calls arising from reminders that do not result in a summons. The
final recoverable costs for those proceeding to summons is a sum estimated as 50%
(191,730) with the other half attributed to what the Council categorises as those
paying on time.

86.

None of the expenditure could have lawfully been incurred by the Council in respect of
the Defendants summons simply because the assumptions on which the calculation was
based were that each person against whom complaint is made would take up resources
by engaging with staff in one way or another in matters connected with the summons.

87.

Gross recoverable costs under the Debt Recovery budget are 327.480 and add 31 to
the cost per summons. A 3 fixed cost is budgeted for in this category and payable on
making complaint to the justices for each application. This element is therefore justly
claimed in respect of every summons issued, if it was lawful and reasonable to apply,
which in the Defendants case it wasnt and can not have been considered reasonably
incurred by the Council.

88.

Where accounts are settled on receipt of the summons, none of the other expenditure
could have been incurred by the Council in respect of those summonses because there
would be no outstanding liability. No resources would therefore be called upon to
negotiate, re-schedule or monitor any payment plan and the whole element of costs
relevant to the Debt Recovery budget, except 3 court application fee would be
impermissible.

89.

In broader terms, the majority, if not all (see below paras 99-102) of the costs appear
questionable even in those cases where resources are required to re-schedule and set up
payment plans etc.

90.

Additional to the statutory Regulations instalment scheme, regulation 21(5) provides


for an agreement to be made between the billing authority and the liable person either
before or after the annual bill is issued. In such cases, a debtor may, if the agreement is
kept, avoid incurring summons costs. However, this is enabled by, and at the cost of the
Council re-scheduling and monitoring the plan which must exceed any that would have
been incurred from simply allowing the pre-set parameters in its council tax processing
system trigger the appropriate action uninterrupted by recovery staff.

91.

Additional administration costs incurred by the Council due to the interruption of the
automated process cannot lawfully be included in the recoverable costs from which the
average summons is computed because the extra recovery work caused is unrelated to
those cases that result in a summons. Neither can the cost be recovered from customers,
for whom the re-scheduled payments are made3, because the measure is taken to prevent
(or instead of) taking recovery action.

The law cannot have been enacted with the intention of giving billing authorities powers to increase costs in
respect of one debtor from whom collection is easy in order to subsidise another's costs whose payment is more
difficult to obtain. Neither would the same be intended to entirely fund those defendants costs who simply dont
pay them, perhaps because theyre waived for example.
The disparity can be no better illustrated than comparing two account holders, who after being served
summonses, respond differently as follows. One having contacted the billing authority enters into a payment
arrangement and by doing so has his costs waived; the other simply settles his liability, including payment of the
standard costs, in accordance with the demand.
The individual who escapes paying all costs has clearly caused the authority the majority of extra work in respect
of dealing with the enquiry, setting up a payment plan and the ongoing monitoring of that account. On the other
hand, the individual who straightforwardly settles the debt without causing this work is left standing the losses
that arise from staff negotiating favourable terms for the authority that see the defendants costs waived.

92.

This expenditure must therefore be absorbed by the Council in a way consistent with
other administrative functions processing benefit claims for example. The line of
reasoning that follows removes any ambiguity that the Regulations might allow for this
administration cost to be subsidised by those against whom complaint is made to the
Magistrates court:

93.

in order for a billing authority to recharge costs to the debtor, it is required


first to make complaint to the Magistrates court; but

where applications to the court are not made (by virtue of flexible payment
plans being arranged), potential rechargeable administrative costs in those
cases are rendered unrecoverable from those for whom the concessions are
made

expenditure can therefore only be met by inflating the standard sum or


alternatively having the cost borne by the taxpayer; however

where complaint is made, the amount claimed must not exceed what is
reasonably incurred by the authority in an individual case. Clearly no
expenditure attributable to assisting the debtor avoid recovery is incurred by
the Council which is referable to those debtors summonsed because none of
those for whom concessions are made are proceeded against;

to that end, it would have to be treated as an unavoidable cost in


administering council tax as it would be unlawful to have this element of
expenditure subsidised by inflating the standard costs.

Notwithstanding that there is no legislative provision to recover this cost, the sheer size
of the estimated recoverable component, indicates that it must be funding far more
resource intensive functions than merely an automated process, upon which instituting
the summons relies. Engaging with customers for example, would far outweigh the
demand on resources and it likely that even expenditure in respect of work done after
securing the order is included, as almost a third of a million pounds annually is
accounted for.

94.

Even before the Welfare Reform changes the Council has implied through various
documents, reports etc., that its standard costs include subsidy for bad debt and/or for
administration expenditure attributable to assisting the debtor avoid recovery. In a
budget consultation in 2010 (Annex H, particularly 6) the Council stated that the
number of summons issued has reduced over the last 2 financial years due the work that
is being done to make more flexible arrangements with debtors at an early stage.

95.

On 29.11.12, the Grimsby Telegraph published an article informing readers how council
tax arrears are recovered. At the final notice stage it stated the council gives the
opportunity to bring the account up to date and continue with instalments if the
customer agrees to a direct debit

96.

The Council has a Debt Management Strategy which provides more insight into how
the subsidy element of court costs is increased to fund the Councils campaign to secure
a greater take-up of account holders who pay by direct debit. Paragraphs 10.7 & 10.8
state so far as is relevant as follows:
10.7

When recovery action has commenced payment arrangements will only be


entered into when the debt is secured by a liability order or the debtor
agrees to make payment by direct debit......
......................

10.8

97.

In exceptional circumstances special payment arrangements may be made


by authorised staff prior to a liability order being obtained and without the
debtor agreeing to pay by direct debit.

This raises two issues; one that expenditure is incurred by the Council for work
attributed to customer contact in setting up payment arrangements, for example, where
payment is agreed by direct debit, and as a consequence, no order is obtained nor court
costs incurred by the debtor. The other concerns the Councils application for an order
to protect its interest where circumstances are not exceptional, and where no agreement
is made to pay by direct debit (thus costs are incurred by the debtor).

98.

Inflating the standard sum for the purpose of subsidising bad debt has been asserted
already to be unlawful. However, there is also an exploitative element linked to the offer
of having court costs withdrawn as bargaining power to persuade taxpayers to sign up to
the Council's preferred payment method. This goes beyond just subsidising bad debt as
it exploits those against whom costs are applied by inflating summons costs to directly
fund the Councils campaign to secure a greater take-up of direct debit the success of
which depends entirely on the volume of costs that are waived.

99.

Where the Council allows for an arrangement to be entered into, conditioned upon
obtaining a liability order to protect its interests, those debtors are liable for costs so
theoretically that expenditure is recovered from those driving the level of activity. It is
however contested, even under these circumstances, that the law makes no provision for

its recovery. In that case, no cost referable to the Regulations, whether attributable to
bad debt or subsidising arrangements before recovery has begun, will be recoverable.
100. As a simple matter of statutory construction, it is evident that the Regulations do not
condition that a liability order may be applied for where there has been tendered to the
authority the aggregate of the two sums described in parts (a) and (b) of sub-paragraph
34(5), as follows (emphasis added):
(5) If, after a summons has been issued in accordance with paragraph (2) but
before the application is heard, there is paid or tendered to the authority an amount
equal to the aggregate of
(a) the sum specified in the summons as the sum outstanding or so much of it
as remains outstanding (as the case may be); and
(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority
in connection with the application up to the time of the payment or tender,
the authority shall accept the amount and the application shall not be proceeded
with.
101. Considering the relevant provisions of the Regulations in the context of a payment
arrangement being agreed once recovery action had commenced, it is a reasonable
understanding that the re-scheduling is made as a consequence of a formal offer or
proposal. It is also a reasonable understanding of the terminology used in regulation
34(5) that a tender is used in the context of a formal offer, in response to which the
authority must accept and the application not be proceeded with.
102. In that case, it would not simply mean there was no longer a lawful avenue to proceed
further and request a liability order, but also that the cost attributable to the work
involved in making the arrangement could not lawfully be included in the costs claimed.
Expenditure may only be recharged that has been incurred by the authority up to the
time of the tender and clearly resources called upon by engaging staff in the matter
would occur after the payment was tendered.
103. It follows therefore that the associated costs, even in cases were payment plans are rescheduled (pre or post enforcement commencing), can not include any element of
expenditure which is attributable to controlling or monitoring those plans as this activity
must logically follow reschedulement. Gross recoverable costs under the Control &
Monitoring budget are 109,380 and add around 10 to the cost per summons and

would, if referring to rescheduled payment plans (in whole or in part) be unrecoverable


in the appropriate proportion.
104. If the recoverable amount under the Control & Monitoring category budgets for
checking account details before instituting recovery, then that would be wholly
unjustifiable because there are no demonstrable checks. All papers served on the
defendant in connection with the application are generated as a consequence of settings
in the council tax software. Parameters are agreed in advance by the relevant manager
and set in its Council Tax processing system relating to the number of days behind and
the monetary value etc., and summonses issued on this basis.
105. If any doubt arises that the Council does not totally rely on the automated procedure and
there may possibly be staff double checking the bulk court applications, then this can be
disproved beyond all reasonable doubt. It is provable that the Defendant has (on this
occasion, and previously), where all payments have been up to date, been subjected to
recovery by the Council due to a deficiency in its Council Tax processing system which
would have been highlighted if a manual check into payments made on the account had
been carried out prior to instituting the complaint (Annex J).
106. In explaining how the recovery action had wrongly been instituted it is helpful if some
background is provide into the payment system relied upon by the Council to
automatically allocate payments when the council is owed money for past years as well
as the current year.
107. The Councils software has built in allocation rules to ensure, so far as is practical in an
automated system, that the law with respect to specified payments is met. Case law from
1814 (Peters v Anderson (1814) 5 Taunt 596) still relevant, held that "A person who is
indebted to another on two several accounts, may, on paying him money, ascribe it to
which account he pleases...and his election may either be expressed....or may be
inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.
108. In respect of payment allocation for different years accounts, processing systems rely
on transactions matching exactly the instalment amount set for the relevant year in the
softwares parameters. Inevitably payments for various reasons will not always be made
in the exact manner that the system requires to function correctly, so the system can not
be claimed to provide a fail safe solution to ensuring the law is complied with.

109. If a payment is made which doesn't exactly match an instalment amount, where a
taxpayer has more than one account with an outstanding balance, then the system
automatically allocates payment to the oldest debt. If payment was intended for the
current years liability then potentially that account will go unpaid and may lead to
instalment withdrawal, demand for the whole balance immediately and ultimately being
charged court costs.
110. During the period in which the court has unreasonably protracted proceedings in the
Defendants High Court appeal, the Defendants liability has included an additional sum
subject to court proceedings which appears on the bill as a separate balance from the
current liability. Complexities have caused the Councils system to misallocate
payments to the additional sum on three occasions because parameters have triggered
payment to reduce the previous years liability. In respect of the first misallocation,
recovery was halted before a summons was served because the Local Government
Ombudsman intervened. For the subsequent mistakes (including this occasions),
recovery did proceed further and resulted in a summons being served on both occasions.
111. Checks would have verified that payment was made in full and that the balance against
which payment was allocated incorrectly, related to court costs that were in any event
suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. The absence of manual checks is an
obvious concern as is the unreliable way payment allocation relies on exact sums
matching set parameters; however, these are secondary to the matters in the Defendants
present case. It is not the issue that there are no manual checks, rather, there can be no
justifiable expenditure attributable to debt recovery officers monitoring accounts in
respect of checks that are not carried out.
d) Administration cost of enforcing the order after it is obtained
112. The judgment in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates goes a step further than clarifying
the position regarding recharging expenditure for obtaining the liability order in respect
of the costs which are applied in connection with serving the summons (the second
question of law on which opinion was sought in the Defendants High Court appeal).
Paragraph 35 of the judgment states as follows (emphasis added):
It is clear that there must be a sufficient link between the costs in question and
the process of obtaining the liability order. It would obviously be impermissible
(for example) to include in the costs claimed any element referable to the costs of

executing the order after it was obtained, or to the overall administration of


council tax in the area concerned.
113. At around 0.3m, the Debt Recovery budget which adds 31 to each summons has
been shown to be disproportionate for processes that are largely automated. The most
feasible explanation would be that expenditure in respect of work done after securing
the order is included. Administrative work at this stage does not seem to lend itself to
automation and is much more likely to be performed manually considering the type of
activities which are undertaken. This would give credence to Chiltern Councils claim
(see above paragraph 65) that the work to secure payment once having obtained the
liability order is one of the stages from which most costs arise.
114. To put the additional recovery expenditure incurred into context, staff engage in
activities ranging from notifying the debtor of possible further action to applying to the
court for commitment to prison. Information must be obtained about the debtors
circumstances in order to assess whether accounts are more suitable for attachments of
earnings, deduction from benefits or referral to bailiffs. Where those measures fail to
obtain payment then staff might engage in further recovery work, for example applying
to the court for charging orders or instigating bankruptcy. Similarly to pre court action
arrangements, terms of mutually acceptable payment plans might simply be agreed,
albeit still requiring resources to correspond with debtors, re-schedule instalments and
then monitor accounts until settled. For all stages, staff must be available for dealing
with queries whether by telephone or written correspondence.
115. It is therefore believed, that on the balance of probabilities (regardless of the
Regulations not making provision), these costs are recharged to the debtor in a bid to
minimise the financial burden on the taxpayer in general, which would appear to be the
ends for which disregarding the law is justified.
Unreasonable steps taken to enforce costs
116. A three stage test is set out in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates (34) to establish
whether the costs order made by magistrates was lawful. For a proper judicial decision
to be made it is established that the Magistrates must be satisfied: (i) that the local
authority has actually incurred those costs; (ii) that the costs in question were incurred
in obtaining the liability order; and (iii) that it was reasonable for the local authority to
incur them. The judgment considers (51) whether the costs claimed have been

"reasonably" incurred, after it is established to the satisfaction of the court that the costs
were incurred and properly referable to the enforcement process. It offers the below
examples to clarify the kind of challenge that it might be the courts duty to consider
(emphasis added):
.....there may be individual cases in which it would be open to the respondent to
argue that the costs were not reasonably incurred, for example, if it was not
reasonable for the local authority to take steps to enforce payment, or if the costs
which were incurred were excessive e.g. if the local authority sent a QC along to
argue a simple point of law in the Magistrates' Court.
117. In the Defendants case, there is little to convince Magistrates that the Council was
reasonable in its actions, particularly in view of the process relied on to institute the
complaint being entirely automated and the Defendants case required no call on
resources to correspond on matters relating to the alleged debt. It is contended therefore
that the Councils motivation to proceed was punitive and/or to generate additional
revenue. It is well established that costs are not to be awarded as a penalty and should
not exceed the proper costs incurred: see R v Highgate Justices ex parte Petrou [1954] 1
ALL ER 406.
Costs set at levels for improper purposes
118. Evidence has been discovered confirming that the Council has historically manipulated
costs in order to generate income to meet a number of different objectives.
Encouraging behaviour (deterrent / penalty)
119. It is documented in relation to a review of costs in 2001/02 that prompt payment of
Business Rates could be encouraged as well as generating additional income by
charging in those cases (which had before the review been identical) three times the cost
of a Council Tax summons (Annex I 2-4).
120. It is well established that costs should be awarded as compensation, not as punishment.
In R v Highgate Justices ex parte Petrou [1954] 1 ALL ER 406 it was held that costs
should not exceed the proper costs incurred and should not be a penalty. In that case the
Appellant owned premises which were let to another party for use as a club. The other
party was charged with offences relating to the supply of alcohol and the appellant was
joined to show cause why the club should not be struck off the register. The justices
convicted and fined the other party and ordered him to pay 20 guineas of the

prosecution costs of 21 guineas and also ordered the Appellant to pay 100 costs. On a
motion for an order of certiorari it was held that since the other party had already been
ordered to pay all but one guinea of the prosecution costs, the order against the appellant
was a penalty in the guise of costs.
121. It is clear from the Councils 2001/02 review that the decision by authorities to set the
level of costs disproportionately high was made on the basis that the level of costs (the
penalty) might be considered so small in comparison to the amount owed in Business
Rates.
Resolve issues caused by IT system failures
122. A Cabinet report in 2002/03 identified ways of funding additional resources to ensure a
backlog of work that had arisen due to changes in the IT system were addressed (Annex
I 5-8). The summons costs were increased by 50% in order to raise additional revenue
to meet funding to pay for additional staff.
123. In 2013 the High Court ruled against Barnet Borough Council budgeting for a surplus of
income from residential parking schemes to be used to meet other transport expenditure.
In Attfield v the London Borough of Barnet [2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin), it was held
that a local authority must not attempt to raise revenue where there is no clear statutory
power to do so. In the Defendants case, the statutory power expressly limits costs that
may be claimed to the expenditure incurred by the Council in connection with
instituting the complaint.
124. The decision to increase summons costs did not arise because of an increase in the cost
of instituting the complaint, rather for the clear intention of funding additional resources
to overcome the backlog of work that had arisen in the administration of Council Tax,
Business Rates and Housing Benefit due to delays in implementing a new IT system.
The Council had therefore acted for an improper purpose namely to raise revenue as it
clearly intended to use the surplus to defray other administration expenditure and reduce
the need to meet the cost, by for example increasing council tax, using reserves or
cutting down on waste. This purpose was not authorised under the Regulations and
therefore the decision was unlawful.

Budget savings and alternative to charging for non statutory services


125. The Council forecasted that it could raise an additional 0.752 million in costs income
over a four year period by increasing the overall court costs and front loading all the
charge in respect of instituting the complaint (Annex I 9-17). This was proposed as
one of a number of possible ways it could save or increase income to meet its 29.7
million target set out in the Councils 2011/12 draft budget and medium term financial
plan for the period 2011-2015. Increasing summons costs was the preferred measure
in response to public consultation over alternative proposals to introduce a charge for
replacement bins or garden waste collections.
126. Clearly increasing costs in order to plug a gap in its finances had no legal basis, just like
there was no statutory power to set them disproportionately high for the purposes of
offsetting expenditure for waste services. The public were able to influence the level of
court costs, and probably elected the increase to avoid paying additional for services
(Annex H). The Council had acted for an improper purpose by increasing summons
costs on account of the majority of respondents preferring to raise additional money this
way over introducing charges for waste services.
127. It was wrong in law to increase costs based on criteria other than by reference to an
increase in the Councils incurred expenditure. Though indicative of the Council
functioning democratically, the publics preference was not, in the context of the law, a
relevant factor to be considered. The statutory power which provides for reasonably
incurred costs, by definition, renders the determining of them by a democratic process
unlawful.
Set targets for court costs income
128. The Council has a budgeted income stream for court costs which is evident from
published reports showing outturn variances for this income. A report of the Audit
Committee (Final Accounts 2004/05) compares the outturn with the budget to show
major variations. A surplus of 0.125 million to its summons costs income target is
recorded at Appendix 2 of the report of 28.7.05 (page 15) as follows (emphasis added):
Finance Restructure resulted in vacancy savings (597K), additional benefit
subsidy income arising from changes in subsidy rules and grant received on
benefits overpayments (1,004K) Revenues and Benefits also exceeded their
income target in respect of Council Tax and NNDR summons income (125K)
and housing benefit overpayments (116K)

129. The provision of a budgeted income stream has presented a means for the Council to
influence its financial position. That is evident with Revenues & Benefits exceeding its
summons income target, leaving a 125k surplus, for example to off-set overspending in
other areas or transfer to reserves. The system is clearly open to abuse with income
targets unquestionably creating a perverse incentive to summons.
130. Costs were set at a level such that a significant surplus was achievable, which in
2004/05 amounted to 125k. The Council had therefore raised revenue for an improper
purpose, namely to prop up other budgets, and in doing so acted unlawfully (see above
paras 123-124).

CONCLUSION
131. It is contested that enforcement should have never proceeded to the stage where the
Council applied for a liability order as the Defendants account had at no stage fallen in
arrears. There was for that reason no cause for the reminders or the final notice to have
been sent. However, the fact that the Council did proceed does not render these
representations invalid as the Magistrates actions and the Councils approach to
supporting its costs raises matters of general public importance.
Case for impermissible costs
132. It is established that the Council sets its standard costs at a level to ensure that no cost of
recovery is borne by the taxpayer in priority to complying with the Regulations that
restrict the amount that can be recharged in costs to the court application. It is therefore
contended that an element of the standard 60 costs can not be compliant with the
Regulations, based as they are on the premise that any expenditure considered
attributable to recovery and enforcement activity (however tenuously linked) is
recoverable by recharging it to the defendants through costs claimed in an application
for a Liability Order.
133. The breakdown of costs which the Council has undertaken to keep under review
provides evidence that in the circumstances relating to the Defendants case the vast
majority of expenditure it claimed was not incurred for the issue of a summons so is
contended that the claimed costs represent a sum outside that which the law provides.
Moreover it is contended that under any circumstances where the Council makes use of

the court (whether to obtain an order, or merely institute the process) the costs detailed
in its breakdown are not properly referable to regulation 34 of the Regulations.
134. For the reasons set out above the Court is respectfully invited to determine a realistic
level of costs which are compliant with regulation 34(5) of the Regulations either at this
hearing, or at a hearing to be arranged.

Annex A J
Omitted
Request complete paper

Dated this 1st day of October 2015

Signed:

The Defendant

Case No: CO/976/2014


Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 06/05/2015
Before :
MRS JUSTICE ANDREWS DBE
--------------------Between :
R (on the application of THE REVEREND PAUL
NICOLSON)
- and TOTTENHAM MAGISTRATES
THE LONDON BOROUGH OF HARINGEY

Claimant

Defendant
Interested
Party

----------------------------------------Helen Mountfield QC and Eloise Le Santo (instructed by The Bar Pro Bono Unit) for the
Claimant
Josephine Henderson (instructed by Legal Services Department, London Borough of
Haringey) for the Interested Party
The Defendant did not appear and was unrepresented.
Hearing date: 30 April 2015
---------------------

Judgment

Mrs Justice Andrews:


1.

This case raises issues of significant public interest to both council tax payers and
local authorities relating to the costs sought by local authorities with regard to the
enforcement of unpaid council tax.

2.

Regulation 34(7) of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations


1992 (SI 1992 No.613) (the Regulations) provides that when granting a liability
order the court shall make an order reflecting the aggregate of the outstanding council
tax and a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the applicant
in obtaining the order. In England there is no legislative cap on those costs; in Wales
there is a proviso that the costs including those of instituting the application under
paragraph (2), are not to exceed the prescribed amount of 70.

3.

The issue at the heart of this claim is what is required, prior to making an order for the
costs claimed, to satisfy the court that the requirements of the Regulation are met, i.e.
that those costs have been reasonably incurred by the local authority in obtaining the
liability order.

4.

The claim began as a challenge by the Claimant, then acting in person, to the refusal
by Tottenham Magistrates on 20 December 2013 to state a case in respect of an order
for costs in the sum of 125 made against him on 2 August 2013 in favour of the
London Borough of Haringey (the Council) under Regulation 34(7). However, at
the oral hearing of the permission application, in line with the approach suggested by
Simon Brown LJ in Sunworld Ltd v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2000] 1 WLR
2102 (referred to later in this judgment) Green J granted permission to bring judicial
review of the substantive decision by the Magistrates to award the Council costs in
that sum against the Claimant. By that time, the Claimant had secured representation
by leading and junior counsel via the Bar Pro Bono Unit. I am most grateful to Ms
Mountfield QC and Ms Le Santo for the assistance they have provided to the
Claimant and to the Court on this occasion.

5.

As is quite often the case in claims of this nature, the court whose decision is under
challenge has chosen not to make submissions or to instruct counsel to appear at the
hearing. It has been left to the Interested Party, the Council in whose favour the
impugned decision was made, to decide whether or not to defend it. In this case, the
Council instructed Ms Henderson to appear and to resist the application. I am also
grateful to her for the assistance that she has provided. Given the nature of the public
interest in the issues in this case, this Court would be at a severe disadvantage if it did
not have the opportunity to hear (and test) the legal argument opposing the grant of
relief as well as the legal argument supporting it. Indeed, had the Council taken a
different stance it might have been necessary to appoint an amicus curiae.

6.

The challenge to the legality of the order focuses on the absence of information that
the Claimant says was necessary for the Magistrates to address their minds to the
question whether the essential causal connection between the costs claimed and the
obtaining of the order had been established by the Council, allied with the complaint
that the Magistrates appear to have confused the reasonableness of the amount of the
costs with the question whether that sum was reasonably incurred.

7.

In consequence of disclosure ordered by Green J, both the Claimant and this Court are
now far better informed than the Magistrates were on 2 August 2013 as to how it was
that the Council arrived at the figure of 125 and what elements it took into account in
doing so. Two witness statements have been provided by Winifred Grealish, the
Councils Assistant Head of Service for Revenues, Benefits and Customer Services,
together with documents relating to the process through which and the manner in
which the Council calculated the 125, and the political process by which it decided
to seek those costs from defaulting taxpayers. Although the information provided
may have allayed some of the Claimants suspicions, it casts more than a little doubt
on whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the costs as computed, (or
at least certain of the elements that were included in the computation) and the legal
process undertaken by the Council in order to obtain a liability order. The Claimant
has now taken up that particular battle with the Councils auditors.

8.

It is possible that if this information had been made available before this claim for
judicial review was initiated, matters would have taken a different turn. However, it
was not available: indeed, its absence and the failure by the Council to produce it are
at the heart of the Claimants complaint.

9.

In consequence, as Ms Henderson was understandably anxious to remind me, this


claim does not involve consideration of whether the sum of 125 was in fact
reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining the liability order; the scope of my
investigation is confined to examining whether it was lawful for the Magistrates to
conclude that it was, in the circumstances in which they did. I do not need to say
anything more about the evidence as to how the Council reached its figure of 125 in
order to reach a conclusion on that issue.

10.

In determining whether the substantive decision was lawful, I must consider:


i)

whether the Magistrates had any or any sufficient relevant information before
them to reach a proper judicial determination of whether the costs claimed
represented costs reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining the liability
order;

ii)

whether they erred in law by failing to make further inquiries into how the
125 was computed and what elements it comprised; and

iii)

whether the Claimant was denied a fair opportunity to challenge the lawfulness
of the order before it was made, by reason of the failure to answer his requests
for an explanation of how the sum of 125 was arrived at.

Those matters cannot be determined without also considering the proper interpretation
of the relevant provisions of the Regulations, including, but not limited to, Regulation
34(7). Before I do so, I should explain how the claim for judicial review arose.
Background
11.

The Claimant, Reverend Nicolson, is a retired clergyman. He is an active campaigner


on issues affecting the rights of those on low incomes, including the effect upon them
of cuts in council tax benefit and other benefits. Since 2012, when the impact of those
cuts started to be felt, the Claimant became increasingly concerned about the level of

enforcement costs being levied by the Council on people who had fallen behind with
their council tax, which seemed to him to be disproportionate to the likely actual costs
of obtaining liability orders. He suspected that the costs were being used as a form of
penalty or deterrent, or as a means of covering the Councils general administrative
costs of collecting council tax, rather than reflecting any actual or fair appraisal of the
actual costs incurred by them in enforcing the obligation to pay. This concern led the
Claimant to take the decision to refuse to pay his own council tax as a matter of civil
disobedience, so that he could experience the enforcement process for himself and
investigate the procedures used and the basis upon which the costs claimed by the
Council were calculated.
12.

On 10 July 2013, the Council issued an application for a liability order against the
Claimant under Regulation 34 of the Regulations. As a matter of procedure, this is
done by making a complaint to a justice of the peace requesting the issue of a
summons directed to the person against whom the liability order is sought (the
respondent) to appear before the Magistrates Court to show why he has not paid the
sum which is outstanding (Regulation 34(2)).

13.

Before such an application can be issued the local authority must take the preliminary
steps prescribed by Regulation 33, which requires a final notice to be served on the
respondent, stating the amount in respect of which the application is to be made. It
must then wait for seven days beginning with the day on which the final notice was
issued (Regulation 34(1)). It is only if the claimed amount of council tax remains
unpaid in whole or in part on the expiry of that period that the authority may seek the
issue of the summons.

14.

On 2 August 2013 the Claimant appeared at Tottenham Magistrates Court in answer


to the summons. His son went with him to take a note of the hearing. The Claimant
read out a prepared statement expressing his concerns about the impact of benefit caps
and cuts on the health and wellbeing of benefit claimants. He raised no objection to
the making of a liability order, but he did raise queries about the level of costs that
were being claimed by the Council. He challenged the figure of 125 (the figure
claimed by this Council in every case, whether or not the summons results in payment
without the need for a hearing) on the basis that, having regard to the large number of
summonses being determined and the scale of the issue fee (3), this sum appeared to
be far greater than the amount of costs likely to have been reasonably incurred in
obtaining each order.

15.

The Claimant specifically asked both the Magistrates and the representative of the
Council who was present in court seeking this and other liability orders, to explain
how the figure of 125 for costs had been arrived at. He also pointed out that the
figure was different from the amounts charged by other local authorities (giving the
examples of Newark and Truro where the costs recovered are 80 and 100
respectively) and asked for an explanation of these regional differences.

16.

According to the Claimant, whose evidence is unchallenged, the Councils


representative stated that the sum of 125 had been agreed between the Council and
the court by email in March 2010. The Claimant was not shown the email, nor was he
given any breakdown or rationale for the agreed level of costs. Moreover, neither
the Councils representative nor the court provided him with any explanation of how
the figure of 125 represented costs reasonably incurred in obtaining the liability

order. The Magistrates just told him that since he personally had the means to pay the
costs, they would approve the liability order.
17.

The Magistrates proceeded to make the order in the sum claimed against the
Claimant. They then made identical costs orders against a large number of other
people against whom liability orders were made, mostly in their absence.

18.

The primary remedy for correcting an error of law made by a Magistrates Court is an
appeal by way of case stated under Section 111 of the Magistrates Court Act 1980.
This provides that:
Any person who was a party to any proceeding before a magistrates court or is
aggrieved by the conviction, order, determination or other proceeding of the
court may question the proceeding on the ground that it is wrong in law or is in
excess of jurisdiction by applying to the justices composing the court to state a
case for the opinion of the High Court on the question of law or jurisdiction
involved.
The Magistrates are entitled to refuse to state a case if the application is frivolous
(in the sense of raising questions that are futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic),
or inappropriate, or if it raises issues which are irrelevant to the courts decision.

19.

The Claimant was plainly entitled to know how the court was able to satisfy itself that
the 125 costs awarded against him did in fact represent costs reasonably incurred in
obtaining the liability order, in the absence of any information as to how that figure
was computed. Neither the Magistrates nor the Councils representative provided an
answer to his enquiries during the hearing, despite being asked. Therefore the
Claimants only avenue for obtaining an answer to that question, which is a question
of law, was to seek an answer by way of case stated.

20.

On 22 August 2013 the Claimant made an application to state a case under s.111 of
the Magistrates Court Act 1980, asking the Magistrates to justify the basis upon
which the court had satisfied itself that the sum of 125 represented costs reasonably
incurred and submitting that there had been an error of law in this respect. He said
that he was concerned that there was no lawful basis for the sums being awarded in
costs in his and other cases. He needed to know how it was that the Magistrates had
reached the conclusion they did.

21.

After an exchange of correspondence in which further clarification of the Claimants


position was sought by the deputy clerk to the justices, on 4 December 2013 the
Claimant sent a letter which spelled out in no uncertain terms what he was seeking.
The delay was partly due to the (mutual) mistaken belief that the Criminal Procedure
Rules were applicable in this context they are not; the Magistrates were exercising a
civil jurisdiction. In the letter the Claimant expressly asked what factors the
Magistrates took into account in reaching their decision that the costs were
reasonably incurred. He said that he could see no basis upon which they could
lawfully have concluded that the costs incurred by the Council amounted to 125 per
liability order, and pointed out that not only was the issue fee only 3, but the
summonses were sent to respondents by post using computer-generated standard
letters.

22.

If, as the Claimant had discovered by making freedom of information requests in the
intervening period, the number of summonses issued on application by the Council in
2012-2013 was 17,200, that would mean that the costs of obtaining these orders in
bulk batches during that period amounted cumulatively to some 2.5 million. Given
that instinctively that figure seems excessive, he queried how the court could find that
costs of that magnitude had been actually incurred, let alone reasonably incurred by
the Council in obtaining those orders.

23.

The Claimant pointed out the serious consequences that orders of this type can have
on some of the poorest people in society, and the anxiety which the making and
consequences of such orders can cause. He made this observation (with which I
agree):
The making of such an order is not, therefore, a matter of rubber-stamping, but
one in respect of which it is vital that the due process of law is observed.

24.

On 20 December 2013 the Magistrates decided not to state a case and provided a
certificate of refusal with their reasons. The Magistrates said that they were of the
opinion that the application was futile and academic. Their reasoning indicates that
they had either completely missed the point that the Claimant was making, or else
they were trying to justify their decision after the event on the basis of patently
inadequate material.

25.

The Magistrates pointed out, correctly, that once they were satisfied that the costs had
been reasonably incurred, they had no discretion but to award costs in that amount,
and that the ability of a particular respondent to pay those costs was not a relevant
consideration. However, that begged the question as to whether they had lawfully
reached the stage where it was compulsory for them to make the order.

26.

They then went on to explain how they reached the view that the costs were
reasonably incurred and on the basis of what information:
we heard from [the Council] in general terms about the justification for their
claim for costs being based upon their administrative time and number of people
involved in the process for making an application for the Liability [sic] all adding
to the expense. [my emphasis]
we heard representations that the amount was higher than in other Boroughs but
we are of the view that the amount is not so disproportionate as to give rise to a
possibility of our decision being properly considered as wrong in law or being in
excess of jurisdiction
we are entirely satisfied that our decision on quantum was a discretionary one,
based on facts submitted by the [Council] and the amount imposed was no more
than the standard sum claimed in each and every case. [my emphasis]

27.

This suggests that, contrary to the Claimants evidence, the Councils representative
said something at the hearing in addition to mentioning the email agreement in 2010
between the Magistrates Court clerk and the Council. The email exchange was not
produced to the Claimant or to the Magistrates at that time, and would not have added
to their store of knowledge even if it had been, because a schedule of calculations that

was supposed to have been provided to the clerk to the justices at the time has never
been found.
28.

Even if what is stated in the reasons for refusal is correct (though the Council have not
adduced any evidence from the person concerned) the only facts submitted by the
Council that the Magistrates say they relied upon appear to have been general and
vague assertions with no supporting particulars, that the costs were somehow based
upon (i) administrative time (ii) the numbers of people who were somehow involved
in the process for making the application (other than presumably pushing a button on
the computer to generate the standard form letters).

29.

The Magistrates sought to rely on the fact that the 125 claimed was no more than the
standard amount claimed in every case; but the fact that a standard sum is attributed to
costs recoverable in every case where a summons has been issued was one of the
matters that gave rise to the Claimants concerns. That is why the Claimant was
seeking to find out how it was computed and what was the Councils justification for
claiming it across the board. For all he knew, there might well have been a plausible
justification, but in the absence of further information he was in no position to tell
and neither were the Magistrates.

30.

The Magistrates were plainly in error in characterising their decision as


discretionary. They are bound by law only to award costs that satisfy the
requirements of Regulation 34(7). What the requirements are is a matter of law,
whether they are satisfied in a particular case is a matter of fact. Consequently the
question whether the requirements are satisfied is an issue of mixed fact and law, not
a matter of discretion. The Claimant was entitled to ask upon what basis the
Magistrates had reached the conclusion that those requirements were met, and to
challenge the decision as wrong in law if it was based on no information, inadequate
information or irrelevant factors.

31.

Of course, if the information provided to the Magistrates does establish the essential
causal nexus between the costs and the obtaining of a recovery order, the question of
whether those particular costs were reasonably incurred by the local authority in a
particular case will be a matter for the Magistrates to determine, and their decision on
that question would only be subject to challenge on Wednesbury grounds. However
there is nothing in the reasons attached to the certificate of refusal addressing the
causal connection that must be established between the costs claimed and the
obtaining of the liability order. Indeed, as Ms Mountfield submitted, it would appear
from the reasons given that the focus of the Magistrates was upon the wrong question
altogether, namely, whether the amount of the costs claimed was a reasonable
amount, rather than upon whether those costs were reasonably incurred in obtaining
the liability order.

32.

If Magistrates decline to state a case, the proper approach is set out helpfully by
Simon Brown LJ in Sunworld Ltd v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough
Council [2000] 1 WLR 2102 at 2016F-H:
1. Where a court, be it a Magistrates Court or a Crown Court, refuses to state a
case, then the party aggrieved should without delay apply for permission to bring
judicial review, either (a) to mandamus it to state a case and/or (b) to quash the
order sought to be appealed;

2. If the court below has already (a) given a reasoned judgment containing all the
necessary findings of fact and/or (b) explained its refusal to state a case in terms
which clearly raise the true point of law in issue, then the correct course would
be for the single judge, assuming he thinks the point properly arguable, to grant
permission for judicial review which directly challenges the order complained of,
thereby avoiding the need for a case to be stated at all.
Given that this case plainly fell into the latter category, Green J granted permission to
seek judicial review of the legality of the underlying decision. With that by way of
background, I turn to consider the merits of the claim.
The legal obligations of the Magistrates
33.

The proceedings before the Magistrates were civil in nature, but the Civil Procedure
Rules do not apply to them. Thus there is no provision for the assessment of costs, as
there would be in normal civil litigation. By contrast with the Civil Procedure Rules,
there are no provisions in the Regulations requiring the costs to be reasonable or
proportionate, nor is there any requirement that any doubt be resolved in favour of the
paying party. The Magistrates were bound to decide the matter of costs in accordance
with the Regulations.

34.

As a matter of straightforward construction of Regulation 34(7) that means that the


Magistrates must be satisfied:
i)

that the local authority has actually incurred those costs;

ii)

that the costs in question were incurred in obtaining the liability order; and

iii)

that it was reasonable for the local authority to incur them.

35.

It is clear that there must be a sufficient link between the costs in question and the
process of obtaining the liability order. It would obviously be impermissible (for
example) to include in the costs claimed any element referable to the costs of
executing the order after it was obtained, or to the overall administration of council
tax in the area concerned.

36.

Since the question whether the costs claimed in this case were reasonably incurred in
obtaining the liability order is not a matter I have to decide and I have not heard
argument on it, it seems to me that I should be circumspect in any observations that I
make which could have a bearing on that issue should it arise on a future occasion. On
the other hand, there are no authorities that specifically address these Regulations, and
this is an opportunity for the Court to afford some general guidance as to their
interpretation and scope.

37.

I doubt whether any assistance in this regard can be derived from authorities in
relation to the CPR or the pre-CPR costs regimes, as the Regulations do not refer to
costs of the proceedings. There is some limited assistance to be derived from the
Regulations themselves as to what kinds of costs are included. Regulation 34(5) sets
out the circumstances in which the application for a liability order shall not be
proceeded with. The respondent must pay or tender to the local authority any unpaid

council tax plus a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the
authority in connection with the application up to the time of payment or tender.
38.

Ms Henderson submitted, and Ms Mountfield agreed, that if such costs were


recoverable at the stage in between issue of the summons and hearing for the liability
order, they must necessarily be subsumed in the expression costs reasonably
incurred in obtaining the order in Regulation 34(7). Otherwise there would be no
incentive to the respondent to pay the council tax before the hearing. I agree that as a
matter of necessary implication, and for the policy reason referred to by counsel, costs
incurred in obtaining the order must encompass costs incurred in connection with the
application for a summons. Plainly the costs would encompass, but are not confined
to, the fee for issuing the summons: the expression in connection with the
application is wider than the costs of making the application. However, there still
has to be a sufficient link between the incurring of those costs and the application for
a summons.

39.

Ms Henderson submitted that the expression costs is not necessarily confined to


legal costs and that in other contexts it has been held to encompass time spent in
investigations and elements of administrative costs. She referred to R v Tottenham
Justices ex parte Joshi [1982] 1 WLR 631 in which the Divisional Court decided that
the statutory discretion to award costs in criminal proceedings was wide enough to
cover the time of an investigating officer paid out of public funds whose job it was to
investigate alleged offences, and time spent by clerical staff. However, as Ms
Henderson frankly admitted, it is difficult to draw any analogy between council tax
and the scope of costs awarded to prosecuting authorities in criminal cases, because in
the latter scenario there is a discretion to award costs. Moreover, as in cases falling
under the CPR, it is possible to have an assessment of the reasonableness and
proportionality of the costs; and the nature of the criminal investigations is very
different.

40.

Ms Henderson pointed out that before it makes its application, the local authority has
to be satisfied that it is requesting the issue of a summons for the right amount of tax
against the right respondent, and that may take up staff time, which is a cost to it. She
submitted that it was at least arguable that such administrative or investigatory costs
fell within the expression in connection with the making of the application. She also
submitted that the costs of deciding whether or not to exercise the discretion to
enforce could properly be included.

41.

Ms Mountfield accepted that the expression in connection with might extend to


some administrative expenses and overheads provided they were properly referable to
taking enforcement steps against the respondent. She submitted that, for example, it
was arguable that the expression might be interpreted as extending to the
administrative costs and expenses of issuing and serving final notices in those cases in
which the local authority then goes on to seek a summons, because they are a
compulsory step without which the application for a summons against that respondent
cannot be made. On the other hand, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to
establish the necessary connection between the enforcement process and costs
incurred by a local authority in the normal course of events, such as the costs of
sending out reminder notices to taxpayers.

42.

It seems to me that in principle the intention in the Regulations is to enable the local
authority to recover the actual cost to it of utilising the enforcement process under
Regulation 34, which is bound to include some administrative costs, as well as any
legal fees and out of pocket expenses, always subject to the overarching proviso that
the costs in question were reasonably incurred. However, bearing in mind the courts
inability to carry out any independent assessment of the reasonableness of the amount
of those costs, the Regulations should be construed in such a way as to ensure that the
costs recovered are only those which are genuinely attributable to the enforcement
process.

43.

Apart from the costs of the final notice, which can arguably be justified on the
specific basis adverted to by Ms Mountfield, (though only in those cases where a
summons is issued) it seems to me, both as a matter of language and purposive
interpretation, that it would be difficult to justify including any other costs incurred
prior to the decision being taken to enforce (which is a matter of discretion under
Regulation 34(1)). In order for costs to be incurred in connection with the making of
the application, a decision to make such an application must have been taken. It is
only then that the process of enforcement gets underway. Indeed Regulation 34(5),
which includes that phrase, is specifically addressing the scenario where a summons
has been issued, and thus the decision to enforce has been taken.

44.

That does not necessarily mean that the costs have to be incurred on or after the date
on which the summons was issued once the decision to enforce has been taken there
may still need to be checks carried out to ensure that the summons is issued in the
correct amount and against the right person. However, what the court is concerned
with are the costs incurred by the applicant in obtaining the liability order (or in
seeking to obtain one before the respondent capitulates). I note that in Wales the
proviso specifically refers to the cap including the costs of instituting the
application which is consistent with that reading of Regulation 34(5). On the face of
it, therefore, contrary to Ms Hendersons submissions, the costs of taking the decision
to exercise the discretion to enforce would appear to fall on the wrong side of the line.

45.

I bear in mind the practicalities of the enforcement system; time in the Magistrates
court is limited and given the large number of summonses issued, it would not be
practical for the local authority to carry out and provide a detailed calculation of the
actual costs incurred in each and every case (save possibly where the actual costs are
well in excess of the norm, for example if the local authority has to instruct counsel to
turn up and argue specific points of law raised by the taxpayer in defence).

46.

In principle, therefore, provided that the right types of costs and expenses are taken
into account, and provided that due consideration is given to the dangers of doublecounting, or of artificial inflation of costs, it may be a legitimate approach for a local
authority to calculate and aggregate the relevant costs it has incurred in the previous
year, and divide that up by the previous (or anticipated) number of summonses over
twelve months so as to provide an average figure which could be levied across the
board in standard cases, but could be amplified in circumstances where there was
justification for incurring additional legal and/or administrative costs. If that approach
is adopted, however, it is essential that the Magistrates and their clerk are equipped
with sufficient readily available information to enable the Magistrates to check for
themselves without too much difficulty, and relatively swiftly, that a legitimate
approach has been taken, and to furnish a respondent with that information on request.

47.

Ms Henderson helpfully drew my attention to the Explanatory Memorandum to the


Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rating (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2011
which explained how the 70 cap on costs recoverable under s.34(7) came to be
introduced in Wales. Consistently with my interpretation of the Regulation it ties the
costs recoverable to the issue of the summons and the making of the liability order
(rather than costs incurred at any earlier stage, including, I note, the issue of the final
notice). A cap on costs in enforcement (and also costs recoverable in committal
proceedings against those who failed to pay the liability order) was introduced
because the amount that was charged varied considerably between local authorities in
Wales.

48.

The explanation given for introducing the rule that no more than 70 may be charged
to the debtor in total for the issue of a summons and for a liability order was that:
This will allow for some flexibility for local authorities to set charges at the two
stages that are proportionate to the amount of administration required to process
the debt whilst also providing fairness and consistency for individual debtors
across Wales.
In context the reference to processing the debt must mean processing it after the
decision to enforce has been taken.

49.

The memorandum goes on to explain that the 70 would enable the local authorities
to recover the costs of court fees and a reasonable amount for administration costs.
It explains why the limit was not set at 35 for each of the two stages, on the basis
that during the consultation process several local authorities pointed out that the
greatest amount of work is incurred before the initial summons is issued and argued
that the charge should be higher at this stage. Ms Henderson said that this explained
why in the case of some local authorities, such as the Council in the present case, the
costs were set at the same figure regardless of whether payment was made after the
summons was issued. The costs of obtaining a liability order were very small in
comparison with the costs incurred in connection with the issue of the summons.

50.

In principle there is no reason why a local authority should not decide to limit the
costs it claims to the costs in connection with issuing the summons, although in
practical terms that approach provides no incentive to the respondent to pay up after
the summons is issued. What matters is that the costs that it does decide to claim are
properly referable to the enforcement process.

51.

If the necessary causal link is established to the satisfaction of the court then the next
question is whether the costs claimed have been reasonably incurred. It may be that
the method by which the costs are calculated demonstrates this without the need for
further evidence; but there may be individual cases in which it would be open to the
respondent to argue that the costs were not reasonably incurred, for example, if it was
not reasonable for the local authority to take steps to enforce payment, or if the costs
which were incurred were excessive e.g. if the local authority sent a QC along to
argue a simple point of law in the Magistrates Court.

52.

Establishing that the costs were reasonably incurred is not the same thing as
establishing that the costs were reasonable in amount. Of course, the latter may have a
bearing on the former, since if the costs appear to be excessive, or disproportionate,

there may be legitimate grounds for querying whether it was reasonable of the local
authority to incur costs in that amount. However so far as proportionality is
concerned, one has to bear in mind that in the present context where the recoverable
sums are relatively small (though by no means insignificant to many of those who
have to pay them) it is inherently likely that there will be a disparity between those
sums and the costs of recovering them. On the other hand, the practice of processing
applications in bulk could drive the average costs of obtaining liability orders down
rather than up.
53.

Given the absence of any independent assessment, the scope for abuse of the system
is self-evident, and that makes it all the more important that due process is observed.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Magistrates to reach a proper judicial
determination of the amount of costs reasonably incurred by the applicant, in this
case, the Council, in obtaining the liability order. In order to do so they need to have
sufficient information as to how the figure was arrived at, and what costs it
represents; and they need to have enough information on which they can be satisfied
that the costs were incurred in obtaining the order and not, for example, in sending out
council tax bills to all the taxpayers in the Borough.

54.

It is a well-established public law principle that where a public authority has to make
a decision, it must know (or be told) enough to ensure that nothing that it is necessary,
because it is legally relevant, for it to know, is left out of account. That formula was
adopted by Sedley LJ in the context of a ministerial decision in R(National
Association of Health Stores & Another v Department of Health) [2005] EWCA Civ
154 at [62]. It applies with at least as much, if not greater, force in a context such as
the present where the decision is not wholly a matter of discretion.

55.

Ms Mountfield referred me to Browning v Lewes Crown Court [2012] EWHC 1003


(Admin) in which the Divisional Court directed the Crown Court to state a case in
respect of an order for costs made in favour of the prosecuting authority, in that case,
the RSPCA. The basis on which the claim for judicial review succeeded was stated in
paragraph [16] of the judgment of Wyn Williams J: at least arguably, the court
failed to address matters which were highly material to whether or not an order for
costs should be made. That is precisely the complaint made by the Claimant here,
and in my judgment it is well-founded.

56.

In June 2013 the Department for Communities and Local Government issued a
document entitled Guidance to local councils on good practice in the collection of
Council Tax arrears. Under the section entitled Enforcement, in paragraph 3.4, the
Guidance states as follows:
Local Authorities are reminded that they are only permitted to charge reasonable
costs for the court summons and liability order. In the interests of transparency, Local
Authorities should be able to provide a breakdown, on request, showing how these
costs are calculated. While it is likely that authorities will have discussed costs with
the Clerk to Justices it should be recognised that the Court may wish to be satisfied
that the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case is no more than that
reasonably incurred by the authority.

57.

The Claimant asked for that information and it was not forthcoming. The Magistrates
did not have that information before them either. It was not good enough for them to

be told in general terms that the costs had something to do with administrative time
and the number of people who were involved in the process for making the
application. Nor was it good enough for them to be told that some arrangement or
agreement had been reached in 2010 between the Council and the clerk to the justices
about the level of the costs without carrying out any investigation of what the
agreement was and the basis for it. Looking to see whether the costs were broadly in
line with costs being charged by other local authorities was all well and good, but it
was not enough to discharge the courts obligations.
58.

Ms Henderson said that the Claimant did not ask for disclosure of documents, nor did
he seek an adjournment. That is no answer, because whatever the Claimant did or did
not do, the fact remains that the Magistrates did not have any information before them
which would have enabled them to evaluate whether the costs that were being claimed
had been reasonably incurred in obtaining the liability order. In any event, the
evidence demonstrates that the Magistrates and the representative of the Council can
have been under no illusion as to what the Claimant was asking them for.

59.

The Claimant was entitled to have the information he requested in order that he could
form a view as to whether the proposed order was within the powers of the
Magistrates under Regulation 34(7) and make submissions on it. The fact that he did
not ask for an adjournment has no bearing on the lawfulness of the decision made in
the absence of that information. Ms Henderson submitted that the Magistrates had
sufficient material to enable them to make the decision, but in my judgment it is
patent that they did not. In fact, they had no material which would have justified them
in reaching the conclusion that the costs that were claimed were incurred in
connection with the issue of the summons or obtaining the liability order. All they had
was the say-so of a Council representative, who was unable to give any better
explanation when he was challenged than (at most) the vague statements recorded in
the Magistrates reasons for refusal to state a case.

60.

I also consider that the decision was unlawful because the Claimant was not provided,
on request, with the information that would have enabled him to make properly
informed submissions on whether the costs claimed were reasonably incurred in
obtaining the liability order. It is immaterial that he made no request from the Council
for disclosure before the hearing. There was no requirement on him to do so. It was
perfectly proper for the Claimant to expect that the Magistrates would be able to
provide him with information as to what costs were comprised in the 125 and how
that figure was calculated, since they needed to know that information in order to
discharge their legal duties.

Conclusion
61.

This application for judicial review of the decision taken by the Magistrates must
therefore succeed. I was told that since the hearing the order for costs against the
Claimant has been withdrawn, but that does not render the proceedings academic; as I
have said, it raises issues of wider public importance. Had the order not been
withdrawn, I would have quashed it. Since it has been withdrawn, I will declare that
the order was unlawful, because:

62.

i)

the Magistrates did not have sufficient relevant information before them to
reach a proper judicial determination of whether the costs claimed represented
costs reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining the liability order;

ii)

the Magistrates erred in law by failing to make further inquiries into how the
125 was computed and what elements it comprised; and

iii)

the Claimant was denied a fair opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of the
order before it was made, by reason of the failure to answer his requests for the
provision of information as to how the sum of 125 was arrived at.

Ms Henderson submitted that if I were to reach the conclusion that the Magistrates
fell into error, I should not make an order for costs against the Council, which is not a
Defendant but only an Interested Party. It was not the Councils fault that the
Magistrates reached an unlawful decision. Whilst I am very grateful that the Council
chose to instruct Ms Henderson to appear at the hearing, her instructions were to try to
defend the indefensible. It was the Council that benefited from the unlawful decision,
and they were responsible for the failure to adhere to the Guidance, which had been
promulgated before the hearing in the Magistrates Court took place. Their
representative should have been in a position to provide the breakdown of the costs
requested at the hearing. If that information had been forthcoming, then these
proceedings would not have been necessary. In principle, therefore, there is no
injustice in ordering the Council to pay the Claimants pro bono costs, and the fees,
costs and expenses that the Claimant incurred earlier, whilst acting in person. There is
no good reason to depart from the normal rule that the party who unsuccessfully
resists the application should pay the costs of the other party.

In the High Court of Justice


Administrative Court
Between
Xxx Xxxxx

Appellant

and
North East Lincolnshire Council

Respondent

Case Stated by Justices in the County of Lincolnshire, acting in


and for the Local Justice Area of Grimsby and Cleethorpes in
respect of their adjudication as a Magistrates' Court sitting at
Grimsby.

CASE

1. On 10 October 2012 a complaint was laid against the appellant


on behalf of the respondent that for the period 1 April 2012 to 31
March 2013 at Grimsby in the County of Lincolnshire he was a
person who was liable to pay the sum of 437.52, the balance of
council tax he owed arising from his occupation of XX Xxxxxxx
Xxxxxxx, Grimsby, and application was therefore made to the
court for a liability order to secure payment of that sum in
accordance with regulation 34 of the Council Tax (Administration
and Enforcement) Regulations 1992.
2. The court heard the complaint on 2 November 2012. The court
did not hear evidence in the matter as the appellant admitted the
following facts:a) The appellant was liable for the amount of council tax, namely
437.52, claimed against him by the respondent for the period 1
April 2012 to 31 March 2013.
b) The appellant had by the time of the court hearing paid the
sum due to the respondent in respect of the outstanding council
tax that was claimed by the respondent.

c) The appellant was liable to pay an amount in respect of the


costs of the respondent in bringing proceedings before the court
d) The claim for costs in respect of the proceedings made by the
respondent on the face of the summons served upon the appellant
was in the sum of 70.00.
e) The appellant had by the time of the hearing paid 10.00 to the
respondent in respect of the costs.
f) The appellant had not paid the full amount of the costs
requested by the respondent and did not intend so to do so.

3. The following is a short statement of the representations made


to us by the parties:a) The respondent stated that the amount of the claim for costs
was the same as that sought in all similar proceedings
commenced by the respondent, a sum which had previously been
notified to the Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates' Court under
cover of correspondence dated 4 March 2011 for cases arising on
or after 1 April 2011.
b) The level of costs sought by the respondent did not exceed the
prescribed amount described in regulation 34(8) of the Council Tax
(Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992.
c) The level of costs sought by the respondent in the proceedings
was within the range of costs sought by other local authorities in
similar proceedings for unpaid council tax
d) The level of costs sought had been calculated to reflect both
administrative and legal costs in bringing the proceedings to court,
including the court fees.
e) The appellant referred to correspondence he had had with the
respondent in which he asserted that the level of costs claimed by
the council was a means of raising additional revenue from the
respondent.

f) The appellant referred to the respondent's 2011 budget and


financial plan in which a majority was stated to be in favour of

increased charges for summonses rather than charging for other


council services such as replacement bins or garden waste
collections.
4. It was contended by the appellant that:a) The level of costs requested by the respondent in the
proceedings was disproportionate to and not commensurate with
the true cost of bringing the proceedings before the court in that it
was much higher than the actual cost.
b) The reason the respondent sought such a high level of costs in
the proceedings was as a means for the respondent to raise
additional revenue for the respondent.

5. It was contended by the respondent that:a) The level of costs sought in the proceedings was an amount
that had previously been advised by the respondent to the court
that would be sought by the respondent in each case in
proceedings to recover unpaid council tax. This amount had been
claimed in all cases before the court since that notification.
b) The sum requested was not a means to raise additional revenue
for the respondent but a reflection of the broad average costs of
bringing any individual case for unpaid council tax before the court.

6. We were not referred to any case authority.

7. We were of the following opinion:a) We recognise that in all cases where costs are claimed we
always have a discretion as to whether to order them, and if so, in
what sum. Although the appellant admitted the matter of complaint
and costs would therefore normally follow the event, the fact that
the respondent asked for the normal amount of amount of costs in
this case did not prevent us from reducing the amount or refusing
to make an order for costs at all.
3

b) The respondent, as with other council tax billing authorities, has


taken a broad approach to the question of requests for costs and
has sought a similar amount in this case as with all others in the in
the same court list. In normal circumstances this is appropriate,
although we accept we must look at each case individually. This
means that the respondent could in principle have sought a greater
amount of costs in an individual case where more costs were
incurred, subject to any limitations set by regulations, had it
chosen to do so.
c) The amount of costs requested in all cases before us for nonpayment of council tax was a sum advised to the court in writing by
the respondent well over a year before the current proceedings
against the appellant were commenced, and the court in other
such proceedings in the intervening period has considered that
level of costs to be appropriate by making orders in favour of the
respondent in that sum. That fact of course did not prevent us from
considering the level of costs requested in the proceedings against
the appellant.
d) The respondent had to pay a court fee in respect of every
application for a liability order as well as cover the other
administrative and legal costs of bringing the proceedings, and we
therefore considered 70.00 was an amount reasonably incurred
by the respondent in making the application before the court and
obtaining the liability order.
e) On the basis of the information presented to us by both the
appellant and the respondent, the contention that the amount
claimed by the respondent was in the nature of general revenue
raising by the respondent did not succeed and we were satisfied
that it was instead an amount to cover the cost of bringing council
tax enforcement proceedings to court.
f) This case had no features to distinguish it significantly from other
cases in our list to suggest to us that a different level of costs
should be considered in this case.
g) The appellant should pay the full amount of the costs sought.
We could not see that it was just to order the appellant to pay less
or we would have so ordered.

8. We ordered that 60.00 costs requested by the respondent


should be paid by the appellant in the proceedings and made a
liability order against him to enable that sum to be recovered by
the respondent.

QUESTION

9. The question for the opinion of the High Court is:Were we entitled in the circumstances of this case to order
payment of the full amount of the costs requested by the
respondent and make the liability order which followed as a
consequence thereof?

Dated the 22 day of July 2013

Mr J A O'Nions JP
Mr T A Shepherdson JP

Justices' Clerk
for and on behalf of the Justices adjudicating.

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"Bateman, Samantha" <Samantha.Bateman@nelincs.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
16 October 2015 12:35
Alan French - Witness Statement.pdf; NELC1.pdf; NELC2.pdf; NELC3.pdf; NELC4.pdf; NELC5.pdf;
NELC6.pdf;
Grimsby Magistrates Court Case - 30th October 2015 (PART 1)

Good afternoon Mr

,
th

Grimsby Magistrates Court Case - 30 October 2015


th

Please find attached documents the Council are submitting in regards to the above Court Case (30 October
2015)
Kind regards,

Samantha Bateman
Court Enforcement Officer
Resources Directorate
Finance & Assets
Local Taxation & Benefits Shared Service
Municipal Offices
Town Hall Square
Grimsby
DN31 1HU
Tel. 01472 326287 (Ext. 3767)
Fax. 01472 324322

From:
To:
Sent:
Cc:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
16 October 2015 15:43
"Bateman, Samantha" <Samantha.Bateman@nelincs.gov.uk>
NELC Court Bundle

Dear Mr
As you maybe aware we have been attempting to electronically serve the court papers regarding your
case. We have been unsuccessful in this and so have had to use a different form of file transfer.
You will shortly receive an email from NELincs.co.uk. This will inform you that there is a package
waiting for you. This email will also include a link and instructions to download the information.
Should you have any problems obtaining the files please contact Samantha on
Samantha.Bateman@nelincs.gov.uk on Monday
Kind Regards
Alan French
Alan French, Court Enforcement Officer, Local Taxation & Benefits , North East Lincolnshire Council
Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, North East Lincolnshire DN31 1HU
01472 323767 | Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk | www.nelincs.gov.uk

04/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"North East Lincolnshire Council Notification Service" <notifyMoveit@Nelincs.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
16 October 2015 15:45
MoveIT Secure Email New User Account for North East Lincolnshire
Council (Moveit.Nelincs.gov.uk)

Good afternoon Mr

Welcome to North East Lincolnshire Council!


An account has been created for you to access the Council's MoveIT Secure Email System with the username
'
@gmail.com'.
Your new login credentials for MoveIT are:

Username:
@gmail.com
Temporary Password: 6mygn9
You will be required to change your password the next time you sign on.
Please use the following URL to sign on to the system.
( https://Moveit.Nelincs.gov.uk/human.aspx?InstID=7950 )

If you need assistance, please contact the ICT Service Desk on 01472 323999.
Kind regards
ICT Service Desk
North East Lincolnshire Council

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"French, Alan via North East Lincolnshire Council Notification Service"


<notifyMoveit@Nelincs.gov.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
16 October 2015 15:45
New Package Is Waiting

New Package Notification


Welcome to North East Lincolnshire Council! A new package has been posted for you.
Subject: NELC Liability Application
You will be required to supply credentials in order to login and access this package. These credentials will be
provided to you either by the original sender or by another email notification.
Please use the following URL and your username/password to login and view this package. You will also be given
the opportunity to compose a secure reply to this package.
( https://Moveit.Nelincs.gov.uk/human.aspx?OrgID=7950&Arg12=message&Arg06=233555132 )

Regards,
North East Lincolnshire Council Notification Service

04/07/2016

Grimsby Magistrates Court

Claimant

North East Lincolnshire Council

V
Defendant

Mr

Application for Liability Order

1.

North East Lincolnshire Council application for Liability Order:

2.

The person who is liable to pay Council Tax in respect of any chargeable dwelling
and any day, is the person who falls within the first paragraph of subsection (2) below
to apply, talking paragraph (a) of that subsection first, paragraph (b) next, and so on.
(2) A person falls within this subsection in relation to any chargeable dwelling and
any day if, on that day
(a) He is a resident of the dwelling and has a freehold interest in the whole or any part
of it;
(b) He is such a resident and has a leasehold interest in the whole or any part of the
dwelling which is not inferior to another such interest held by another such resident;
(c) He is both such a resident and a statutory [F1, secure or introductory tenant]of the
whole or any part of the dwelling;
(d) He is such a resident and has a contractual licence to occupy the whole or any part
of the dwelling;
(e) He is such a resident; or
(f) He is the owner of the dwelling.
Section 6, Paragraph (1) & (2) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992.

3.

The Secretary of State may make regulations containing such provisions as he sees fit
in relation to the collection and recovery of amounts persons are liable to pay in
respect of Council Tax; Paragraph 1, Schedule 2 to the Local Government Finance
Act 1992.

4.

(1) Regulations under paragraph 1(1) above may provide that


(a) The authority concerned may apply to a magistrates court for an order (a
liability order) against the person by whom the sum is payable;
(b) the magistrates court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has
become payable by the person concerned and has not been paid.
Paragraph (1)a & b Section 6, Schedule 4 to the Local Government Finance Act
1992.

5.

On the 9th March 2015 the Defendant was issued with a Council Tax Bill (NELC1) for
the period 01st April 2015 to the 31st March 2016 for the property known as
.

6.

The amount charged for the period being 907.91

7.

At this juncture it is also important to point out that the defendant had a further
amount of 60.00 outstanding in regards costs relating to a Liability order application
granted on the 2nd November 2012.

8.

2.(1) This paragraph applies where the demand notice is issued on or before 31st
December in the relevant year, but has effect subject to paragraph 3 below.
(2) The aggregate amount is to be payable in monthly instalments.
(3) The number of such instalments
(a)where the notice is issued before the beginning of the relevant year or at any time in
the period beginning on the first day of that year and ending on 31st May of that year,
shall be 10;
(a)where the notice is issued before the beginning of the relevant year or at any time in
the period beginning on the first day of that year and ending on 31st May of that year,
shall be 10;
Paragraph 2, Part 1, Schedule 1 to The Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

9.

The 10 month statutory instalments where set out as so:

10.

First Payment 1st April 2015


9 Payments due thereafter on the first of every month

88.91
91.00

11.

The made payment of 88.91 on the 10th April 2015 and a further payment of 91.00
on the 22nd April 2015. Both payments being for the correct amounts and in adherence
to the first two statutory instalments set out on the Defendants Council Tax Bill.

12.

The Defendants next payment was received on the 29th May 2015 for an amount of
85.00. This amount was not the amount of the statutory instalment on the Council
Tax Bill. Due to this the payment was allocated by North East Lincolnshire Councils
Council Tax database (Northgate) as follows:

13.

60.00 allocated to the 60.00 costs outstanding from the Liability Hearing in
November 2012.

14.

25.00 allocated to the Current years Council Tax Bill for the period 01st April 2015 to
31st March 2016.

15.

As of the 1st June 2015 25.00 had been paid to the 91.00 statutory instalment,
leaving a 66.00 to be paid.

16.

On the 2nd June 2015 a further 7.00 was paid by the defendant, leaving a further
59.00 still to be paid to the statutory instalment for June 2015.

17.

23.(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where


(a) a demand notice has been served by a billing authority on a liable person, .
(b) instalments in respect of the council tax to which the notice relates are payable in
accordance with Part I of Schedule 1 or, as the case may be, a Part II scheme, and .
(c) any such instalment is not paid in accordance with that Schedule or, as the case
may be, the relevant scheme, .
the billing authority shall serve a notice (reminder notice) on the liable person
stating
(i) the instalments required to be paid,
(ii) the effect of paragraph (3) below and .
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 1 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

18.

(3) If, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which a reminder notice
is issued, the liable person fails to pay any instalments which are or will become due
before the expiry of that period, the unpaid balance of the estimated amount shall
become payable by him at the expiry of a further period of 7 days beginning with the
day of the failure.
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 3 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

19.

In accordance with the regulations a reminder notice for 59.00 was sent to the
Defendant on the 12th June 2015. The reminder notice sent to the defendant can be
seen as (NELC2).

20.

No communication was received from the Defendant.

21.

A further payment of 90.00 was paid by the defendant on the 2nd July 2015.

22.

This payment cleared the 59.00 arrears on the Reminder notice and allocated a
further amount of 31.00 to the 1st July 2015 statutory instalment.

23.

The amount left outstanding for the 1st July 2015 statutory instalment was 60.00.

24.

23.(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where


(d) a demand notice has been served by a billing authority on a liable person, .
(e) instalments in respect of the council tax to which the notice relates are payable in
accordance with Part I of Schedule 1 or, as the case may be, a Part II scheme, and .
(f) any such instalment is not paid in accordance with that Schedule or, as the case
may be, the relevant scheme, .
the billing authority shall serve a notice (reminder notice) on the liable person
stating
(i) the instalments required to be paid,
(ii) the effect of paragraph (3) below and .
(iii) where the notice is the second such notice as regards the relevant year, the
effect of paragraph (4) below.
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 1 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

25.

(4) If, after making a payment in accordance with a reminder notice which is the
second such notice as regards the relevant year, the liable person fails to pay any
subsequent instalment as regards that year on or before the day on which it falls due,
the unpaid balance of the estimated amount shall become payable by him on the day
following the day of the failure.
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 3 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

26.

The 2nd Reminder notice in accordance with the regulations was sent to the Defendant
on the 14th July 2015 for the amount of 60.00. The 2nd Reminder sent to the
defendant can be seen as (NELC3)

27.

No Contact was received from the Defendant.

28.

Two separate payments were made by the defendant on the 31st July 2015. The first
payment being for 7.00 and the second for 85.00.

29.

The 7.00 reduced the 60.00 arrears to 53.00.

30.

53.00 of the further 85.00 payment was cleared the outstanding amount of the
arrears.

31.

The 32.00 was then allocated to the 1st August 2015 statutory instalment. Leaving an
overdue amount of 59.00.

32.

No further payment was received in August 2015.

33.

33.(1) Subject to paragraph (3), before a billing authority applies for a liability
order it shall serve on the person against whom the application is to be made a notice
(final notice), which is to be in addition to any notice required to be served under
Part V, and which is to state every amount in respect of which the authority is to make
the application.
(2) A final notice may be served in respect of an amount at any time after it has
become due.
(3) A final notice need not be served on a person who has been served under
regulation 23(1) with a reminder notice in respect of the amount concerned.
Part VI, Regulations 33 to the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement)
Regulations 1992.

34.

A Final Notice was sent to the defendant on 12th August 2015. The Final Notice
sent to the defendant can be seen as (NELC4)

35.

The amount outstanding being 514.00.

36.

As per the statutory Final Notice the Full Amount wholly or partially paid becomes
payable in full.

37.

No Contact was received from the Defendant.

38.

A further payment was paid by the defendant on the 2nd September 2015 for 90.00.

39.

The payment reduced the outstanding amount of 514.00 to 424.00.

40.

34.(1) If an amount which has fallen due under regulation 23(3) or (4) is wholly or
partly unpaid, or (in a case where a final notice is required under regulation 33) the
amount stated in the final notice is wholly or partly unpaid at the expiry of the period
of 7 days beginning with the day on which the notice was issued, the billing authority
may, in accordance with paragraph (2), apply to a magistrates' court for an order
against the person by whom it is payable.
(2) The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace,
and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the
court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.

41.

Complaint was laid before the Clerk to the Justices on the 9th September 2015 and
subsequently Summons were issued. The Summons sent to the defendant can be seen
(NELC5).

42.

The Summons states the amount outstanding of 424.00 and 60.00 Summons Costs,
equalling 484.00. It also made the defendant aware there would be a liability hearing
on the 2nd October 2015 at the Grimsby Magistrates Court.

43.

No Contact was received from the Defendant.

44.

A further payment of 91.00 was paid by the defendant on the 30th September 2015.

45.

Therefore the application for a liability order including costs was for 393.00.

46.

The defendant alleges that the recovery notices and subsequent Final Notice and
Summons have occurred due to misallocation of his payments.

47.

It is North East Lincolnshire Councils contention that there has been no misallocation
of payments in this case.

48.

A person who is indebted to another on two several accounts, may, on paying him
money, ascribe it to which account he pleases.And his election may either be
expressed, Or may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. But if
the payer does not. pay specifically on one account, the receiver may afterwards
appropriate the payment to the discharge of either of the accounts that he pleases.
And if he sue on each account, semble that he thereby declares his election, and the
Defendant cannot, by a subsequent notice of set-off, elect to which account he will
ascribe the payment.
Peters v Anderson 1814, 823 paragraph 1

49.

The defendant makes reference to the above case however it is noted that the
defendants quote from the Peters V Anderson case is paraphrased and does not
include the full description as set out in the original text. Original text of Peters and
Anderson can be seen as (NELC6)

50.

It clearly states that if the payer does not pay specifically The Northgate system is
set up as per the Peters V Anderson case. It asks for a specific payment is made so
that the allocation can be made correctly. If payment is made as per the statutory
instalment due, the payment will allocate to that instalment plan.

51.

This allocation system also helps if there are further debts owing on the account.

52.

If a person was to have a current years bill of 100 per month and arrangement on a
previous years amount for 30 per month then as long as the Debtor makes the correct
payment of the 100.00 and 30.00 the amount will be allocated to the debts which
the Debtor makes his election by the expressed payments made.

53.

The fail-safe of this system is if the payments are not made as per the regulations a
Reminder notice is sent to the payee.

54.

At this point it would be reasonable, as it is the defendants liability, for him to contact
the Council and express his election that the payment be allocated differently.

55.

The defendant made no attempt to make his election after receiving notices in June
July and August and subsequently the Summons and as per Peters V Anderson the
receiver of the payment, North East Lincolnshire Council, appropriated the monies
paid.

56.

Further case law establishes that Northgate allocates unspecified payments correctly.

57.

The case of Peters V Anderson 1814 is one of the earliest cases that deals with the
appropriation of payments, further case laws sets somewhat of a precedent for the
appropriation of payments for creditor and debtors.

58.

The case of Devaynes V Noble 1816 merivale 529 (Claytons Case), it established the
basic rule of 'first-in, first-out'. In further terms payments are presumed to be
appropriated to debts in the order which the debts are incurred. If no election is made
the earliest debts are paid first (NELC7).

59.

It is the first item on the debit side of the account, that is discharged, or reduced, by
the first item on the credit side. Devaynes V Noble 1816 merivale 529 *608

60.

This point is further carried forward in the case of Cory Brothers and Company,
Limited Appellants; V The Owners of the Turkish Steamship "Mecca" Respondents.
The "Mecca" 1897 A.C. 286.(NELC8)

61.

When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor and makes no appropriation to
particular items, the creditor has the right of appropriation and may exercise the right
up to the last moment, by action or otherwise; Cory Brothers and Company, Limited
Appellants; V The Owners of the Turkish Steamship "Mecca" Respondents. The
"Mecca" 1897 A.C. 286

62.

Again it is clear that it is the creditor / payee that should make their election clear at
the point of making payment.

63.

In the case brought before you today the defendant had 3 months to make his election
clear however he did not.

64.

It is also noticeable that on the 16th October 2014 the defendant sent an email to the
Council with regards to expressing his election on a payment made to an earlier Bill
which due to not paying the specific amount was allocated to the earlier amount
outstanding. The email can be seen on as (NELC9).

65.

On that occasion the amount was allocated on the defendants request.

66.

This is also shown by the extract from the 'Bailiff Help' forum, 20th April 2013 to 21st
May 2013,(NELC10) clearly showing an awareness of the need to make an election
of payment .

67.

Further evidenced by 'Legalbeagle' post on 2nd October 2015 (NELC11). This shows
that the defendant is well aware of how the Northgate system works and that he is
aware that he needs to make his election if the payment made is not specifically as set
out in the statutory instalment scheme.

68.

The Council is aware that the defendant has taken matters further with regards to
disputing the 60.00 costs incurred from November 2012.

69.

Correspondence received from the defendant as of 20th November 2013 stated


that he had withdrawn his application for the Judicial review of the costs (NELC12)

70.

Given this the Council no longer held action in attempting to recover the outstanding
amount.

71.

Thus in October 2014 when the defendant made a non-specific payment the amount
was allocated to his costs until the defendant contacted the Council and made his
election clear.

72.

An appropriation of a payment cannot be inferred from an intention in the mind of the


debtor un-communicated to the creditor. It can only be inferred from circumstances
known to both parties. Leeson V Leeson 1936 K.B156 (NELC13).

73.

As of the letter from the Defendant regarding his withdrawal of the Judicial review
North East Lincolnshire Council had no further reason to believe that the costs were
being disputed and the allocation of unspecified amounts was made in accordance
with Peters V Anderson.

74.

It is on these authorities that North East Lincolnshire Council would state that the
monies, have, due to the defendants non-election or expression, been allocated
correctly and that North East Lincolnshire Council, have adhered to the Local
Government Finance Act 1992 and the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992 in issuing recovery notices and applying for a
Liability Order.

75.

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signed:
On Behalf of North East Lincolnshire Council

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>
16 October 2015 16:13
Re: NELC Court Bundle

Dear Mr French
I have received the following files:
Alan French - Witness Statement.pdf
NELC1.pdf
NELC2.pdf
NELC3.pdf
NELC4.pdf
NELC5.pdf
NELC6.pdf
NELC7.pdf
NELC9.pdf
I guess the files that I don't have will be NELC8.pdf and NELC10.pdf
If you email those, or whatever files are missing I will confirm receipt. I'm not willing to create an account to
access the files in the way suggested.
Regards
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
16 October 2015 16:13
Automatic reply: NELC Court Bundle

I am away until 26th October 2015. For urgent enquires please contact Court Enforcement on
323767

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>
19 October 2015 09:03
Fw: NELC Court Bundle

Dear Ms Bateman
I have reassessed the files that I assume I don't have. Those will be NELC8.pdf and NELC10.pdf,
NELC11.pdf, NELC12.pdf and NELC13.pdf
As stated in the email below, I'm not willing to create an account to access the files in the way suggested.
Regards,
.

04/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
19 October 2015 13:19
RE: NELC Court Bundle

Good afternoon Mr ,
Thank you for your email and its content. Due to the difficulties in accessing the electronic file may I
arrange a handover with you, in order for you to have the paper files instead?
If you can let me know your availability at your residential address, I will endeavour to get these files to you.
Kind regards,

Samantha Bateman
Court Enforcement Officer
Resources Directorate
Finance & Assets
Local Taxation & Benefits Shared Service
Municipal Offices
Town Hall Square
Grimsby
DN31 1HU

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>
19 October 2015 14:18
Re: NELC Court Bundle

Dear Ms Bateman
I am satisfied that the files I have already give me sufficient information to locate the material contained in the
files I don't have. It is therefore unnecessary that the case bundle in paper form is delivered.
Regards,
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
19 October 2015 16:21
RE: NELC Court Bundle

Good afternoon Mr ,
Thank you for your reply, I will ensure that your comments are noted.
Kind regards,

Samantha Bateman
Court Enforcement Officer
04/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk> "HUGrimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
29 October 2015 03:16
Defendants (Supplementary) Grounds of Appeal.pdf
Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear all,
Please find attached further representations with regards the council tax liability hearing on 30 October 2015.
Supporting documents will follow separately in two further emails (five files in total).
Can it be confirmed please that the hearing is still scheduled for 10:15am on 30.10.15?

Regards
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk> "HUGrimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
29 October 2015 03:19
Case Stated Consent order draft.pdf
Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Second attachment

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk> "HUGrimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
29 October 2015 03:21
Case Stated Skeleton Argument draft.pdf; Case Stated Chronology draft.pdf; Case Stated
Grounds of appeal draft.pdf
Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Third attachment

04/07/2016

IN THE GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT

Ref: 5501

CIVIL JURISDICTION (COUNCIL TAX)


APPLICATION FOR LIABILITY ORDER

BETWEEN:
NORTH EAST LINCOLNSHIRE COUNCIL
Complainant
and

Defendant

DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENTARY
GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Amendments to Defendants Grounds of Appeal (1st October 2015)


Para 22 of the Defendants Grounds of Appeal (1.10.15) should have stated a sum of 273.00
in respect of the balance outstanding, not 364.00 as stated in the emphasised text.
At Annex A (para 3) of the same representations the reference, (75-82, Annex A), is a
reference to the Defendants Draft Consent Order which will be provided as a supporting
document to this.

1.

It is clear from the preliminary hearing on 2.10.15 that North East Lincolnshire Council
(the Council) does not dispute that the Defendants payments were made in sufficient
amount to meet the legal obligation he was under to pay the sums set out on the demand
notice relating to his 2014/15 Council Tax liability.

2.

It seems that the Councils decision to make complaint to the Magistrates court against
the Defendant was attributable to payments (albeit in sufficient amount) not always
being sums which matched exactly those specified in the demand notice, therefore,
deemed not to have been paid in accordance with the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (the Regulations"). It would therefore be helpful and

expedite proceedings if in readiness for the Councils anticipated representations on


which it is likely to rely, a response is offered here.1
3.

For an informed decision on whether the Council were entitled to make complaint to the
Magistrates court under the circumstances, there are three key areas of consideration
from which the matter is likely to benefit; those are:
i)

Provision under Part I of Schedule 1 of the Regulations (monthly instalments)

ii) The law with respect to specified payments


iii) Payment misallocated to a sum subject to court proceedings from 2012/13
tax year.
4.

The Council states in a letter accompanying the summons served on the Defendant that
we have sent you a Summons because you have not paid your Council Tax in
accordance with your bill. It was implied by the Council at the preliminary hearing on
2.10.15 that the decision to take recovery action was down to the Defendant engineering
a court hearing in the manner which he had made payments.

5.

The Defendant however suspects that the summons is likely to have been issued relying
entirely on parameter settings in the Council Tax processing system2 and so not checked
to ensure there were no anomalies. The amount on the summons described as the
Council Tax owing (424.00) includes the 60.00 sum which is subject to court
proceedings. This does not relate to a previous years unpaid debt as the sum had been
suspended (and still is) pending a High Court decision (see below para 7).

6.

The systems failure to correctly allocate payments is an indication that the Council had
neither awareness of the Defendants intention to attend the court hearing nor of the
circumstances surrounding why the system triggered the summons (the case being just
one of hundreds on the Councils list). It is feasible that only upon learning of the

Representations were served by the Council on 16.10.15, at which point the production of this supplementary
submission was underway though incomplete. The content in paragraphs 7, 68-70 and 73 of the Councils
Witness Statement caused the Defendant to suspect a deliberate intent to deceive the court. This matter will
consequently require additional representations here to essentially contend the Councils statement that it had no
further reason to believe that the costs were being disputed when the claim for Judicial review was withdrawn.

The process is controlled automatically in accordance with parameters set in the Council Tax software package.
The system compiles particulars of all account holders requiring issue of a summons. The complaint list is
generated from the individual entries contained in the database (including the amount outstanding and costs to be
applied for at the hearing) and delivered to the court where reviewed by a legal adviser who issues the
summonses.

Defendants court attendance, did it occur to the Council that the complaint had been
made based on improper evidence. Then, in an effort to save-face, pointed the finger at
the Defendant, asserting he had engineered the hearing to divert attention from the
Councils reliance on IT to institute court proceedings (a major contributor to Council
maladministration).
7.

If ever further evidence was needed to satisfy the court that the Council were at fault, a
letter sent by the Councils Legal Department in connection with a claim for an order of
mandamus3 requiring the justices to state a case for an appeal to the High Court should
be enough. The letter dated 19.7.13 contains, so far as is relevant, the following
(emphasis added):
Yourself v Grimsby Magistrates Court & NELC
I write further to the legal proceedings issued by yourself at Leeds High Court
against Grimsby & Cleethorpes Magistrates Court, naming North East
Lincolnshire Council as an interested party. The papers have been passed to me
upon Mrs Conolly's departure from employment with the Local Authority.
The purpose of my writing to you is to inform you that the 60 court costs, which
you dispute, will be suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. At the
completion of those proceedings, dependent on the Court's decision, the fee will
either be withdrawn from your account or will remain outstanding to the Local
Authority.
A copy of this letter has been sent to the Leeds High Court for their information.
Yours sincerely
for Group Manager Legal & Democratic Services

8.

There has however, despite the elapsed time of approaching three years from when the
proceedings to state a case were instituted, still no decision by the High Court on the
Defendants appeal. The final correspondence from the Justices' Clerk for Humber &

The Justices Clerk conditioned the production of the draft case upon agreeing recognizance set at a level
effectively denying the Defendant access to justice. Six months on from the application being served (subsequent
to pre-action letters), permission was sought to bring judicial review proceedings for a mandatory order requiring
the Justices to state a case, as a consequence of numerous contacts going unanswered that queried the
recognizance and which proposed alternative remedies.
The judicial review claim succeeded in prompting a response where contact with the Magistrates court had
failed and delivery of a draft case was taken eight months after the date that the initial application to state a case
was served. Representations upon the content of the draft case were served in accordance with the relevant court
rules; however, the final case stated was not served in the required time limits (and in fact never served).

South Yorkshire who is dealing with proceedings was on 6.3.14 who stated in an email
to the Defendant that either that day or the following the position regarding the case
(advising on the next steps) would be set out and communicated in writing. The email
contains, so far as is relevant, the following (emphasis added):
I am sorry that I have not been available to speak with you when you have called
my office.
I understand that it is not possible for me to contact you by telephone and that you
would prefer me to contact you by e mail.
I am due to be in meetings all day today but I will have written communication
with you either later today or first thing tomorrow setting out the position with
your case and advising you on next steps.
9.

The Defendant enquired into whether HMCTS had any arrangements in place to restrict
his contact with the court, as a consequence of a further letter being sent requesting the
production of a Certificate of refusal to state a case which was never replied to. At that
stage around twenty months had elapsed since the application and after a couple of
months from then a judicial complaint was submitted to the relevant Advisory
Committee which has not been acknowledged over a period of thirteen months as of
October 2015.4

10.

In May 2015 the Defendant made enquiries to try and establish why he had not even
received acknowledgement regarding the complaint. The Magistrates HR Team was
contacted rather than the Advisory Committee Secretary as it was deemed by the
Defendant that eliciting a response from the later was guaranteed to fail. Unfortunately,
the end result was the same as the HR Team merely forwarded the email to the
Committee Secretary. An email sent in response dated 15.5.15 contained, so far as is
relevant, the following:

It is understood that the Secretary to the Advisory Committee for the Humber to whom the complaint was
addressed, and against whom allegations were made is also the Justices Clerk dealing with the Defendants
High Court case. In view of that, the subsequent attempt to avoid addressing the failure must raise the
seriousness of the matter to one of misconduct in public office.

I am sorry that your complaint has taken long to be replied to.


I have been advised by my Policy manager that your email has been forwarded to
the Justice Clerk & Advisory Committee Sec for Humber & South Yorks, Alison
Watts.
This is all we can do from our office, as the subject matter isn't something for us to
get involved with.
kind regards
Magistrates HR Team
11.

The Advisory Committee Secretary made no contact so the following month the
Defendant emailed the Head of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office. The email
drew attention to the comments made by Mrs Justice Andrews regarding the successful
Tottenham Magistrates case5 which concerned matters not dissimilar to the issues raised
in the Defendants case stated appeal. The Defendant had also understood that 33,000
costs were awarded against Haringey (the interested party) and suggested that the effort
put into preventing his case progressing was to prevent a similar outcome. The
Defendant was sent an email in response dated 29.6.15 which contained, so far as is
relevant, the following:
I have e-mailed Ms Watts today to ask when you might receive a reply, however,
she is away currently away from the office. I hope she will contact you directly. If
however, you remain dissatisfied with the way in which the advisory committee
has handled your complaint, you may complain to the Judicial Appointment and
Conduct Ombudsman; you may do so by e-mailing [email address] further
information about the Ombudsmans remit may be found at: [website address]
I hope this is of assistance to you.
Yours sincerely
Judy Anckorn | Head of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office....

12.

The Advisory Committee Secretary (Justices Clerk in Defendants High Court appeal)
again made no contact so on 8.8.15 the Defendant emailed the Judicial Appointment and
Conduct Ombudsman. A reminder was sent on the 19.8.15 as a consequence of the

Mrs Justice Andrews in the judgment of R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin)
expressed her gratitude to the appellant and Pro Bono legal reps for bringing the case before the court which
raised issues of significant public interest to both council tax payers and local authorities relating to the costs
sought by local authorities with regard to the enforcement of unpaid council tax.

Ombudsman failing to acknowledge the Defendants submission and that was similarly
ignored.
13.

It is without any doubt that the disputed 60.00 court costs from 2012/13 (the cause of
misallocated payments and unlawful recovery action being taken by the Council on
three occasions) have not yet been determined by the High Court, and remain, according
to the Councils directions, suspended (see above para 7). Moreover, the Defendant has
made more than reasonable efforts to ensure that the case advances and can be held in
no way responsible for the failure in the matter. However, one of the questions of law on
which the opinion of the High Court was sought by the Defendant was whether the
costs being disputed as unreasonable should have been awarded by the court without
evidence from the council to support them. There was clearly no supporting evidence
before the magistrates in respect of that liability order hearing, therefore in the context
of Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates it is completely rational that had the Defendants
case been allowed to proceed, the High Court would have made a similar judgment6.

14.

It seems the present case can no longer be viewed simply in terms of the Councils
unlawful recovery but take into account that had due process been followed, the 60.00
costs would never have been incorporated into the Defendants account (suspended or
otherwise) to cause the council tax processing system to appropriate payment wrongly.

15.

The Defendants representations for the intended High Court appeal bundle, which exist
in draft form, are therefore submitted along with these supplementary appeal grounds.
Those papers include a draft Consent Order, Grounds of Appeal, Chronology of events
and Skeleton argument. The Skeleton argument has substantially amended content to
reflect the judgment in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates.

16.

Returning to the Council justifying recovery in the court and its anticipated reliance on
the Regulations providing that payments are to be made as specified in the bill. The
Defendant does not dispute this which is set out in the provision for monthly instalments
under Part I of Schedule 1. Part I of Schedule 1 of the Regulations provide, so far as is
relevant, as follows (emphasis added):

Paragraph 61 in Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates, .... I will declare that the order was unlawful, because: i)
the Magistrates did not have sufficient relevant information before them to reach a proper judicial determination
of whether the costs claimed represented costs reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining the liability
order.

2.(1) This paragraph applies where the demand notice is issued on or before
31st December in the relevant year, but has effect subject to paragraph 3 below.
(2) The aggregate amount is to be payable in monthly instalments.
(3) The number of such instalments
(a) where the notice is issued before the beginning of the relevant year or
at any time in the period beginning on the first day of that year and
ending on 31st May of that year, shall be 10;
(b) ......
(4) The months in which the instalments are payable must be uninterrupted, but
subject to that are to be such months in the relevant year as are specified in the
notice; and the instalments are to be payable on such day in each month as is so
specified.
(5) If the aggregate amount divided by the number of instalments gives an
amount which is a multiple of a pound, the instalments shall be of that amount.
(6) ......
17.

Sub-paragraph (6) goes on to provide a mathematical formula to apply where the


aggregate amount divided by the number of instalments does not give an amount which
is a multiple of a pound. The formula simply determines two different amounts
permitting all but the first instalment to be the same amount, and a multiple of a pound.
The total liability in the Defendants case for 2014/15 was 907.91 therefore specified
on the demand notice were 10 monthly instalments to be paid with the first (88.91) due
on 1.4.15 and the remaining nine (91.00) due on 1.5.15 to 1.1.16.

18.

Regulation 23 of the Regulations sets out the steps to be taken where the taxpayer fails
to make an instalment payment under the schedule. Where an instalment is not paid as
specified and all the instalments have not fallen due, a reminder notice is required to be
served on the taxpayer stating the instalments to be paid. Regulation 23 (as amended by
regulation 3 of SI 1994/505), is as follows:
Failure to pay instalments
23.(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where
(a) a demand notice has been served by a billing authority on a liable
person,

(b) instalments in respect of the council tax to which the notice relates
are payable in accordance with Part I of Schedule 1 or, as the case
may be, a Part II scheme, and
(c) any such instalment is not paid in accordance with that Schedule or,
as the case may be, the relevant scheme,
the billing authority shall serve a notice (reminder notice) on the liable person
stating
(i) the amount which is the aggregate of the instalments which are
due under the demand notice or any subsequent notice given
under paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 and which are unpaid and the
instalments that will become due within the period of seven
days beginning with the day on which the reminder notice is
issued;
(ii) that the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) above is
required to be paid by him within the period mentioned in that
sub-paragraph;
(iii) the effect of paragraph (3) below and the amount that will
become payable by him in the circumstances mentioned in that
paragraph; and
(iv) where the notice is the second such notice as regards the
relevant year, the effect of paragraph (4) below.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall require the service of a reminder notice
(a) where all the instalments have fallen due; or
(b) in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (3) and (4).
(3) If, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which a reminder
notice is issued, the liable person fails to pay any instalments which are or will
become due before the expiry of that period, the unpaid balance of the estimated
amount shall become payable by him at the expiry of a further period of 7 days
beginning with the day of the failure.
(4) If, after making a payment in accordance with a reminder notice which is
the second such notice as regards the relevant year, the liable person fails to pay
any subsequent instalment as regards that year on or before the day on which it
falls due, the unpaid balance of the estimated amount shall become payable by
him on the day following the day of the failure.
19.

Taken literally, it would mean that the Council was under a legal duty to take steps in
recovery in all circumstances where the taxpayer did not pay an instalment in
accordance with that Schedule. For example if a payment was made a day earlier than

the date specified on the bill, such a payment would not have been paid in accordance
with the demand notice, or if a taxpayer paid an advanced instalment because he was out
of the country when the next was due, that similarly would not have complied with the
bill.
20.

It can not of course have been the intention of parliament for a council taxpayer to be in
default in every instance where payments were not made precisely as had been
determined under the Schedule. The intended provision is clarified under regulation 23
(below) where it is set out what must be stated in the reminder notice:
the billing authority shall serve a notice (reminder notice) on the liable person
stating
(i) the amount which is the aggregate of the instalments which are
due under the demand notice.....and which are unpaid and the
instalments that will become due within the period of seven
days beginning with the day on which the reminder notice is
issued;
(ii) that the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) above is
required to be paid by him within the period mentioned in that
sub-paragraph;
(ii) ....

21.

The above is explicit in its references to mean that the reminder functions only to notify
the taxpayer that there is an unpaid sum due, the amount of the unpaid sum and when
that amount is required to be paid by him. The expression paid in accordance with
therefore for the purposes of avoiding a reminder notice must only refer to a
requirement that the payment, or aggregate of payments, is/are made in respect of each
instalment in sufficient amount to at least meet the amount specified on the demand
notice and be paid on or before the specified date.

22.

It does not matter whether the taxpayer chooses to pay an instalment in one or more than
one transaction or if that payment exceeds the amount specified on the demand notice,
so long as the account is up to date at any given time. Moreover, it is typical for billing
authorities to have parameters agreed in advance by their relevant managers and set in
their Council Tax processing systems relating to the number of days behind and the
monetary value etc., and notices issued on this basis. In practice therefore, billing
authorities provide a safety net for payment oversights or to allow for bank transfers to
clear. Ultimately, it would serve no useful purpose for the Council to serve a reminder

notice which notifies a taxpayer to bring his account up to date when there is no liability
outstanding or where the taxpayers account is in credit.

Peters v Anderson (1814) 5 Taunt 596


23.

It was sensed by the Defendant at the preliminary hearing on 2.10.15 (from the
Councils brief representations) that it is likely to rely on case authority in Peters v
Anderson (1814) 5 Taunt 596 (Peters v Anderson) together with the way
instructions are defined in its Council Tax processing system to allocate payments. As
aforementioned, the Council does not seem to dispute the Defendants payments were
made in sufficient amount etc., rather that they were not always in amounts matching
exactly those specified on the demand notice, and therefore, deemed not paid in
accordance with the relevant provision. That provision has already been examined (see
above paras 16-22), but there, the scenario was in relation to a taxpayer making
payments in circumstances where no monies were owing for a previous years liability.

24.

It would be helpful to explain that when the Council is owed money for past years as
well as the current year the account to which its council tax system allocates payment is
entirely reliant upon payments matching exactly the instalment amount. The Councils
software is believed to have built in allocation rules to ensure, so far as is practical in an
automated system, that the law with respect to specified payments is met. The judgment
in Peters v Anderson, held that:
A person who is indebted to another on two several accounts, may, on paying
him money, ascribe it to which account he pleases...and his election may either be
expressed....or may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.

25.

It has already been dealt with at length (see above paras 7-15) that the 60.00 costs for
which the Council already have a liability order to enforce and are attempting to obtain
another to enforce the same sum relate to costs which are subject to court proceedings
and suspended pending the outcome of the case. That sum, by virtue of the case not yet
being determined, can not lawfully be considered a several account to which payment
made (in any manner or sum) by the Defendant may be allocated.

26.

That, however, does not render the following submissions academic as the Council had
erroneously treated the sum as outstanding arrears, and it was allocating payment to that
sum that caused the system to trigger complaint to the Court which no doubt commonly
occurs, so clearly involves a matter of general public importance. The opportunity

therefore presents itself for the Court in context of Peters v Anderson, to also make
judgment, based on the assumption that the suspended costs did relate to a previous
years liability, whether the Council was entitled to allocate payment to that account to
engineer arrears for the current year to enable adding costs for using the court for
complaint.
27.

The opportunity therefore also presents itself for the Court in context of Peters v
Anderson, to adjudge whether the Council would have been entitled to allocate payment
in a way that enabled adding costs for using the court for complaint had the 60.00 sum
related to a previous years liability, and not as it was suspended. Not only that, there is
the question of whether it can be lawful for the Council to apply court costs, which are a
distinct matter, to a taxpayers council tax liability under any circumstances.

28.

The Defendant anticipates that the Council in justifying serving the summons is
likely to claim that on occasion, his payment did not match exactly the sum specified on
the demand notice and therefore unclear as to which account payment was intended. The
Defendant recalls corresponding with the Council on these issues in April 2013 (see
letter identified as [D-3] Annex D). He alerted the Council to the Peters v Anderson case
on which he then relied to persuade the Council to allocate the payment, misallocated to
the disputed costs (putting his account in arrears) to his current years account. It was
also implied in the letter that the Defendant had knowledge of how the Councils
council tax processing system allocated payments in accordance with the instructions
defined by its software supplier.

29.

The Defendant had discovered that the system in all probability allocated payments in
the same way as Milton Keynes (MK) Councils system. He had come by information
regarding the way payments are allocated by MK in an internal audit report which was
produced as a consequence of an investigation into alleged manipulation of in-year
collection figures. The report gives an account of how the council tax system allocates
payments where a taxpayer has arrears from a previous year, in the context of its built in
allocation rules to ensure (supposedly) that the law with respect to specified payments is
met (see Annex A para 4).

30.

In February 2014 the Council was asked for information (see Annex A) to verify how its
system allocated payments against a person's council tax account when more than one
debt is outstanding relating to different year's liability and how it would do so in
compliance with proper accounting protocols. The Council refused to explain how its

system was set to do this on the basis that disclosure of the information, would or would
be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of its software supplier. In a further
exchange the Council claimed it was copyrighted. However, the requester in response
expressed that MK council used the same system (Northgate), and submitted the
relevant account that was contained in the internal audit report to suggest that the cash
allocation rules set by the Councils software supplier were not copyrighted.
31.

Whether the audit reports explanation was in effect the information that was claimed to
be copyrighted, the Council was alerted to, if not already aware, how the same software
supplier set its system for another client using it so that the law with respect to specified
payments was considered to be met. In February 2014, the Council was made aware of
the relevant case law relating to Peters v Anderson to which the Defendant had referred
previously (see above para 28) which held that (emphasis added):
A person who is indebted to another on two several accounts, may, on paying
him money, ascribe it to which account he pleases...and his election may either be
expressed....or may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.

32.

It is the Defendants view that the Council has no feasible grounds to contend that it was
justified in making complaint to the court other than to claim that its Council Tax
processing system had correctly allocated monies to a sum other than the current years
account (in accordance with the legal authority in Peters v Anderson). A possible
rationale would be that the law is complied with on the assumption that the election to
which account monies were allocated, was expressed by the sum not matching exactly
the instalment amount (or not paid in a single transaction). The system would then, in
accordance with the instructions defined by the Councils software supplier, allocate
monies to the oldest debt thus engineering default for the current years account.

33.

Reliance on such settings can not be claimed to provide a fail safe solution in ensuring
the law is complied with. Payments for various reasons will not always be made in the
exact manner that the system requires to function correctly. It would for example be
detrimental for taxpayers who rely on financial help from family or friends to make up
the difference of amounts they are unable to meet in full. This must occur frequently
especially since changes to the benefit system have left claimants, who before the
reforms were exempt from paying council tax, now having to pay up to 30% of their
liability. Incomes for these people will have fallen below levels which the government
once deemed was a minimum amount needed to live on frugally.

34.

Turning again to the legal authority in Peters v Anderson and the provision that a billing
authority is legally obliged to assign payment to the years debt that the person
specifies. The Councils built in allocation rules could at a stretch be considered to be in
accordance with the law, if the relevant provision were only to stipulate that the
persons election must be expressed. That would still require the Council to move
monies manually when requested to the intended account when a taxpayer discovers that
the system had misallocated payment. However, the law provides more importantly that
the election may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction which suggests
a processing system that automatically allocates monies to the oldest debt when unable
to hard" allocate (see Annex A para 4) rather than the current years liability, does not
fulfil that legal duty.

35.

It is only rational that a person indebted on two separate accounts would intend payment
to be made against the current year if failing to would also subject that account to
default. Knowing that a billing authority may then withdraw instalments and demand
the whole balance immediately with further risk of being charged summons costs are
consequences enough to infer that payment was intended for the current years account.

36.

So far as is practical in an automated system, a more serious attempt to ensure that the
law with respect to specified payments is met, would be if the system was set to
automatically allocate payments which did not match specified instalment amounts to
reduce the indebtedness of the current years liability. That appears to be how payments
are allocated in a processing system believed to be the Capita Academy Revenues and
Benefits system used by Hyndburn Borough council (HBC).

37.

A guide to recovery for council tax and Business rates dated November 2013 published
on HBCs website, contains on page 5 under heading Methods of Payment the
following:
When any payment is received by the Council it will, unless otherwise specified
by the Taxpayer, reduce the balance outstanding for the current years outstanding
Council Tax or NNDR. Once payment in full has been made for the current
financial year any payments subsequently received will go towards reducing any
outstanding arrears from previous financial years.
Automating payment this way must result in a better allocation success rate, assuming
you can measure success by the number of payments that match up with accounts to
which the taxpayer intended.

38.

It is reasonable to assert that automating the payment system in a way that ensures the
law in respect to specified payments is complied with can not in any practical sense be
achieved. There must be a common sense approach to implementing a system, which on
failure to allocate monies correctly, affects as few taxpayers as possible. Moreover it
should not be possible in those cases for whom monies are misallocated, that as a
consequence, their current years accounts are put in arrears and incur court costs and
bailiff fees associated with recovery. Therefore, the system most closely fitting those
criteria is the one used by HBC which automatically allocates payments to the current
years outstanding debt, unless otherwise specified by the taxpayer. Finally, most if not
all taxpayers indebted on two separate accounts, would, if not expressing their
preference, intend reducing the balance that would least likely subject them to additional
recovery. It is therefore self-evident that in those cases it is enough to infer from the
circumstances of the transaction that the election would be the current years balance.

39.

It is fair to deduce that a council taxpayer struggling to meet payments and who owes
money from a previous year stands more chance of entering a cycle of being subjected
to recovery action whom can be relied on to provide an additional income stream in
perpetuity. The success of securing that source must significantly be increased by the
council tax software package implemented which would logically be the one that
defaults to allocating payment to the oldest account.

40.

It may be for this reason that the Council claimed that the information regarding how
payments are allocated against a person's council tax account was exempt from
disclosure. MKs audit report reveals that its council tax system (supplied by the same
software developer as the Councils) programs its product so that payment amounts
which are not recognised by the systems set parameters, by default allocates payment to
the oldest account. Paragraph 3.3.2 of the report states as follows:
3.3.2 The council tax system has built in allocation rules to ensure that the law with
respect to specified payments is met. For instance, if a customer has a
payment plan for any year of debt and the payment they make matches the
planned instalment then the money will be allocated to that year (this is
known as hard allocation on the council tax system). If the system is unable
to hard allocate then it will instead soft allocate and the debt will be used
against the oldest debt unless manually adjusted.

41.

It could be that the Councils software supplier did not want the information circulated
because the built in allocation rules are defined to advantage the supplier over
competitors, with a selling point on which to promote its product, being a claim to
optimise court costs income.
ii) The Councils assertion that the Defendant wished to engineer a hearing

42.

The Council stated its opinion at the preliminary hearing on 2.10.15 that the Defendant
had engineered a court hearing. By that it can reasonably be assumed that the Council
suspected that there was some aspect of the law which the Defendant had it in mind to
challenge. If this was in fact the Councils belief it was wholly misconceived as the
Defendant had already attempted to do that in 2012 (see Annex B) in response to the
Council front loading costs imposed to obtain the liability order to the costs applied in
respect of making the complaint (120% increase). There was no serious consideration of
the evidence provided then and a subsequent appeal to the High Court in the matter has
similarly been a complete waste of three years of the Defendants time.

43.

It is for these reasons that the Defendant has made a decision to submit a complaint to
the Local Government Ombudsman (the LGO) about the Council with the
recommendation that the Parliamentary Ombudsman jointly investigates Her Majesty's
Court Service under powers granted by 2007 Regulatory Reform legislation7 for its part
played in the failings. Section 26(4) of the Local Government Act 1974 provides that a
complaint shall not be considered unless it is made within twelve months from the day
the matters alleged in the complaint were known about. The Councils Final Decision
to a formal complaint about which the Defendant wishes to escalate to the LGO was
dated 15.9.14. The completion of the complaint has been delayed because of the time
taken dealing with the Councils recovery action so it is now out of time.

44.

Over 12 months work has been invested to produce the complaint and supporting
documents which is now at risk of being refused by the LGO for consideration. The
Council therefore is completely without grounds to assert that the Defendant would
want to engineer a court hearing given the pressure he was under to complete the work
he had already undertaken.

The Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc. between Ombudsmen) Order 2007, under powers granted by the
Regulatory Reform Act 2001 empowers the Parliamentary Ombudsman and LGO to conduct joint investigations,
thus enabling both organisations to work together collaboratively to address the issues raised by the complainant.

45.

Notwithstanding the Councils untrue statement it is an entirely legitimate approach for


somebody aggrieved by a public bodys unlawful actions to pursue that through a court
of law. The fact that somebody is able to engineer circumstances where a billing
authoritys council tax processing system triggers recovery action for monies which are
not owed is testament to the matter being of general public importance (it is hardly
surprising that the Council claimed that the information regarding how payments are
allocated against a person's council tax account was exempt from disclosure). Moreover,
the Council should not be averse to a member of the public wishing to seek the courts
opinion, when the Council plainly encourages it.8 Considering the Councils corporate
complaints procedure is in reality a charade and you add to this that the watchdog can
be relied on to find a get out clause in 99% of escalated complaints an aggrieved
member of the public has no real alternative.

46.

A customer who is for some reason unable to pay the exact instalment amount in one
transaction, and for example pays the exact instalment amount but from two different
sources is considered not clearly requesting allocation of payments to his current year's
account. If this is the case then the council's reliance on automation amounts to
negligence as the billing authority is legally obliged to assign payment to the years debt
that the person specifies.

There are responses to questions concerning the Councils actions, where the message being conveyed is that it
has no moral duty so will continue unless (or until) a court of law tells them otherwise. For example, contained
in a response from the Council to a Freedom of Information request (FOI) that asked for the expenditure incurred
for issuing summons arriving at 60 for a completely automated process was the following (Ref: 8816_1415):
If you believe there is a point in law on which this can be challenged then there are avenues available for
you to pursue this.
In a reply from the Councils Monitoring Officer (29.6.15) to concerns raised by the Defendant regarding a
public consultation for introducing a charge for garden waste collections which he alleged was unlawful
contained the following:
Should you wish to take formal proceedings to challenge the legality of the public consultation in question
these proceedings should be served on: [Council address]
In another FOI concerning Enforcement fees provided under the provision of the Taking Control of Goods (fees)
Regulations 2014 there was stated the following (Ref: 8931_1415):
Should you consider that North East Lincolnshire Council is not carrying out its duties appropriately then
you are within your right to take appropriate action for which you may wish to seek your own independent
legal advice.
This confidence probably arises from knowing that the technicality of bringing civil proceedings is beyond the
scope of those who are most likely to want to and assessing that the risks (both financially and in time) are such
that the likelihood of a challenge is remote.

47.

It can be in no doubt that the 60.00 sum in respect to outstanding costs relating to the
Liability order application granted on the 2nd November 2012 was not a sum to which
the Council were entitled to allocate any monies and so the laws in relation to the
appropriation of payments are not an issue in this case. The Council had acknowledged
receiving letters, the contents of which left no doubt that the High Court appeal
(disputing those costs) had not been withdrawn and as such those costs were and are
suspended until there is a decision made by the court.

48.

Even if the 60.00 outstanding was a sum to which the Council were entitled to allocate
payment, the representations are not sufficiently persuasive to satisfy an argument that
the payments were allocated in accordance with the relevant laws. The Council seems to
rely principally on the payments made by the Defendant being neither expressed nor
inferred from the circumstances of the transaction to account for its system (Northgate)
allocating monies to the sum outstanding from 2012/13.

49.

The automatic posting then of payment to the oldest debt is defended in the first
instance with what seems to be the argument that because the system is set so it asks for
a specific payment and that payment has not matched the specified sum asked for it has
not, in accordance with Peters v Anderson, been paid specifically on any account.

50.

It is important to note that when making payment online, the taxpayer identifies his
payments (whether relating to the current or a previous years balance) with the same
account number i.e., he can not specify an account. The Northgate system therefore
operates under a scheme whereby it allocates monies according to specified payments,
not as defined in Peters v Anderson, on a specified account. The system does not allow a
debtor to pay specifically on one account when there is more than one outstanding
balance and the transaction is made by online banking.

51.

The Council describes a scenario where a debtors current instalment is 100 a month
but has arrears in respect of a previous year for which an arrangement has been made to
pay instalments of 30 a month concurrently. The Council asserts that the debtors
election is expressed if payments are made by transactions exactly matching the 100.00
and 30.00 amounts. Presumably, where a payment does not match either of the
amounts, then payment is deemed to be neither expressed nor inferred from the
circumstances of the transaction and may be allocated to which ever account the
Council pleases.

52.

This however can be distinguished from the present case. In the example, the amount
relating to a previous year constitutes a payment plan for which an arrangement has
specifically been made to pay instalments in that sum, but in the present case there has
been no such arrangement therefore no matter what amount is paid, the Defendants
election does not come into it. In respect of the Defendants account, the Councils
system has only one defined instalment amount (91.00). Therefore, if not expressed
(which is difficult to see how it could not be) the election must have at least had to have
been inferred from the circumstances of the transaction to be allocated to the one
account for which parameters are specifically set. In any event the 85.00 paid more
closely matched the defined instalment of 91.00 than it did the 60.00 sum to which
payment was misallocated and must therefore be considered an appropriation of a
payment inferred not merely from an intention in the mind of the Defendant, but
communicated to the Council. If that isnt enough, the Defendant made a further
payment in respect of his June 2015 instalment on 1.6.15 in the sum of 7.00, which,
when aggregated with the previous transaction (28.5.15) amounted to 92.00. That sum
matched the defined instalment amount 91.00 plus 1.00, for which the overpayment
was the consequences of an obvious oversight in the favour of the Council.

53.

The Council, in its witness statement (WS) seeks reliance on Leeson v. Leeson (1936)
2 K.B. 156 (Leeson), in so much as an appropriation of a payment cannot be
inferred from an intention in the mind of the debtor un-communicated to the creditor. It
can only be inferred from circumstances known to both parties (see WS para 72).
However, in that case, it is noted that Greene LJ states that the communication may be
expressed or implied, see p 161 of the judgment as follows:
The appropriation by a debtor must take the form of a communication, express or
implied, of his intention to the creditor so that the creditor may know that his right
of appropriation as creditor cannot arise.

54.

Greene LJ elaborates at p162 in the same judgment where he states as follows:


When, however, he does not notify the creditor of his intention, and when the
circumstances are such that the creditor receives the payment merely in
satisfaction of the debts and the payment is not more appropriate to the payment of
the one debt than to that of the other the creditor is entitled to make the
appropriation. When it is said that there need not be an express appropriation of a
payment, but that the appropriation can be inferred, that does not mean that
appropriation of a payment can be inferred from some undisclosed intention in the
mind of the debtor. It is to be inferred from the circumstances of the case as

known to both parties. Any other view might lead to injustice, as the creditors
right to appropriate a payment would be defeated.
55.

Knowing that an appropriation can be inferred from the circumstances of the case as
known to both parties, and the communication may take an implied form, even if not
specifically appropriated at the time of the payments, in the light of the correspondence
between the parties, then the Defendant must be regarded as having appropriated all
payments to his current years liability.

56.

The relevant principles to the law of appropriation (Debtors rights) are set out in Chitty
on Contracts (31st Edition) Volume 1 at Para 21-061. It is noted that the initial content
is effectively that said by Greene LJ (see above para 53):
Debtors right to appropriate. It is essential that an appropriation by the debtor
should take the form of a communication, express or implied, to the creditor of the
debtors intention to appropriate the payment to a specified debt or debts so that
the creditor may know that his rights of appropriation as creditor cannot arise. It is
not essential that the debtor should expressly specify at the time of the payment
which debt or account he intended the payment to be applied to. His intention may
be collected from other circumstances showing that he intended at the time of the
payment to appropriate it to a specific debt or account. Thus, where at the date of
payment some of his debts are statute barred and others are not, it will be inferred
(in the absence of evidence to the contrary) that the debtor appropriated the
payment to the debts that were not so barred.

57.

It could be drawn from this that where the purpose for which a payment is made is
unspecified it must be carried to that account which it is most beneficial to the debtor
to reduce9. Therefore, if as is alleged in the present case, the Defendant paid money
unappropriated, the mere fact that it would be to his detriment if allocated to the earlier
debt was sufficient to infer that the payment was intended to reduce his current years
liability. It therefore suggests that the law, which provides for inferred payments,
protects the debtor from the right of appropriation falling on the creditor when his
election may be to the detriment of the debtor.

58.

The communication clearly does not have to be made at the time when the payment is
made for the appropriation to be inferred, and so the correspondence which arises from
the Defendants dispute with the Council (ongoing since 2.11.12) is categorically known
to both parties. Therefore, this could not fall under a description of an attempt to

Walter Pereira's Laws of Ceylon at page 722

appropriate a payment inferred from the intention in the mind of the Defendant uncommunicated to the Council.
59.

The question of liability for payment has run ever since the liability order was granted in
November 2012 with the costs so far as the Defendant is concerned being disputed. In
addition to correspondence identified as [C-2], [C-4], [C-6], [C-8] and [C-9] in Annex C
there are all the letters contained in Annex D which provide indisputable evidence that
the inferred payment was by no means un-communicated to the Council. In light of the
Defendants unbroken challenge to those costs, it would be unreasonable to construe
that any payment was intended to have been appropriated to that disputed sum. Though
correspondence arising from the Defendants dispute with the Council did no
specifically accompany the payment in question it was sufficient to show that he
intended at the time of the payments to appropriate them all to his current years council
tax liability.

60.

It is a point worthy of mentioning that the public forum, apparently monitored by the
Council, which it references (see WS para 67) is updated by the Defendant with
developments as they arise in respect of his High Court appeal and disputes with the
Council (see Annex B). Clearly the contents, as are set out on that forum, all add to the
information which can be deemed collected from the circumstances to show that the
sum to which the Council allocated payment was disputed and that the High Court
appeal challenging the summons costs had not been withdrawn.

61.

In the Leeson case, Greene LJ draws assistance from authority in the judgment of Lush J
in Parker v Guinness (1910) 27 TLR 129 at 130 to explain how, from circumstances
known to both parties, an appropriation of a payment can be inferred. However, this is
expanded in Caltabiano v Electoral Commission of Qld & Anor [2009] QCA 182 at para
108, as follows:
An undisclosed, subjective intention to appropriate is not itself effective, but in
the absence of any express statement an inference may be drawn from the
circumstances that a debtor appropriates a payment to a particular debt. The
principle was explained by Lush J in [Parker v Guinness (1910) 27 TLR 129 at
130 131]:
It is clear, I think that the debtor need not state in express terms that he
appropriates the payment he makes in any particular way. What is to be
considered is this. Is the true inference to be drawn from all the
circumstances of the case that the debtor paid the moneys generally on

account, leaving the creditor to apply them as he thought fit, or is the true
inference that he paid them on account of special portions of the debt for
the purpose and with a view to wipe these out of the account? His
undisclosed intention so to do would, of course, not benefit him. It is what
he did in fact, and not what he meant to do that is to be regarded. But if the
inference to be drawn from the circumstances is that the payment was in
fact appropriated by the debtor at the time of payment, the fact that he made
no express statement at the time is immaterial. Now an appropriation by the
debtor may be inferred from a variety of circumstances. Each case must, in
my opinion, be considered on its own peculiar facts. The fact that accounts
are rendered by the debtor before payment in a particular manner may be
enough if the payment which is afterwards made is to be regarded as made
in pursuance of the accounts that have been so rendered, and the nature of
the transaction entered into between the creditor and debtor may be such as
to show that the parties must have contemplated that the payments made by
the debtor on account were appropriated in a particular way by the debtor.
(See City Discount Co v McLean, LR 9 CP 692) The conduct of the parties
coupled with the nature of the transaction, may be sufficient to lead to the
inference I have mentioned. (See Newmarch v Clay 14 East, 239).
62.

The Council relies on the case of Devaynes V Noble 1816 merivale 529 (Clayton) to
support its assertion that its Council Tax processing system allocates unspecified
payments correctly (see WS paras 58-59). It argues that payments are presumed to be
appropriated to debts in the order in which the debts are incurred and if no election is
made the earliest debts are paid first, and cites from Clayton: it is the first item on the
debit side of the account, that is discharged, or reduced, by the first item on the credit
side.

63.

The present issues however, can be distinguished from those arising in Clayton as that
concerned the distribution of monies between parties from a running account (bank)
where all the sums paid in formed a single account. In the Defendants case, there are
two distinct accounts in issue; one in respect of his current Council Tax liability and the
other, relating to a previous years account where that liability, is in any event, disputed
and has been since it was incurred in November 2012.

64.

Sir W. Grant Master of the Rolls in his judgment in Clayton (as follows) implied it
would not simply be reinventing existing authority (referring to established cases of the
application of indefinite payments), rather the case was deemed an exception worthy of
determining in its own right.

I should, therefore, feel myself a good deal embarrassed, if the general question,
of the creditor's right to make the application of indefinite payments, were now
necessarily to be determined. But I think the present case is distinguishable from
any of those in which that point has been decided in the creditor's favour. They
were all cases of distinct insulated debts, between which a plain line of separation
could be drawn. But this is the case of a banking account, where all the sums paid
in form one blended fund, the parts of which have no longer any distinct
existence.
65.

It cannot therefore be that the principles of appropriation of payments are overruled by


the Clayton case, and that rule (or presumption) would apply only where payment is
made without appropriation by either party and where the debtor has a running account
with the creditor, such as a bank account. Then only where the accounts are treated as a
single account by all parties would payments be attributed to the earliest items in the
account.

66.

That case is clearly distinguishable from the final case referred to by the Council; Cory
Brothers & Company v Owners of Turkish Steamship Mecca [1897] AC 286 (the
Mecca), however, it is unclear in what way it seeks to rely on the authority. It states
(see WS para 61); when a debtor pays money on account to his creditor and makes no
appropriation to particular items, the creditor has the right of appropriation and may
exercise the right up to the last moment, by action or otherwise. If the Mecca is the
authority on which the Council relies in appropriating, what it considers an un-specified
payment right up to the last moment (by action of a summons), then that appears to have
already been established. Lord McNaughten in the Mecca said:
In 1816, when Clayton's case was decided, there seems to have been authority for
saying that the creditor was bound to make his election at once according to the
rule of the civil law, or at any rate, within a reasonable time, whatever that
expression in such a connection may be taken to mean. But it has long been held,
and is now quite settled, that the creditor has the right of election up to the very
last moment," and he is not bound to declare his election in express terms. He may
declare it by bringing an action, or in any other way that makes his meaning and
intention plain.

67.

But to rely on these principles still presupposes that the Defendant had not inferred
payment from circumstances known to both parties. It is consistent with all cases that it
is the debtors right to appropriate the money as he pleases, failing which the creditor
may do so. This in the Mecca is conveyed by Lord McNaughten as follows:

When a debtor is making a payment to his creditor he may appropriate the money
as he pleases, and the creditor must apply it accordingly. If the debtor does not
make any appropriation at the time when he makes the payment the right of
application devolves on the creditor.
This concurs with the relevant principles to the law of appropriation (Rights to
appropriate payments) set out in Chitty on Contracts (31st Edition) Volume 1 at Para
21-060:
Rights to appropriate payments. Where several separate debts are due from the
debtor to the creditor, the debtor may, when making a payment, appropriate the
money paid to a particular debt or debts, and if the creditor accepts the payment so
appropriated, he must apply it in the manner directed by the debtor; if, however,
the debtor makes no appropriation when making the payment, the creditor may do
so.
68.

Assuming that the Defendant had not specified the sum to which he intended to reduce
indebtedness, the Council had nevertheless appropriated payment at (or near enough)
the time of the transaction on 29.5.15 (see WS para 13) and later communicated this in
written correspondence to the Defendant on 2.6.15 (see WS para 19). Lord Herschell in
the Mecca said this (emphasis added):
It is clear that if the appellants had merely entered in their own books an account
such as was transmitted, it would not have amounted to any appropriation by
them, and they would still have been at liberty to appropriate the payment as they
pleased. It is equally clear, however, that when once they had made an
appropriation and communicated it to their debtors, they would have no right to
appropriate it otherwise. What, then, was the effect of bringing the items of debt
into a single account, and transmitting it to their debtors in the manner they did?

69.

There appears no relevance to the Council seeking reliance on having the right of
appropriation up to the last moment (presumably when summonsing) as the
appropriation had been made and communicated to the Defendant approximately 3
months earlier to that action.

70.

The case had more relevance in determining, in one respect, whether there had been any
appropriation made by the creditor, and if not, whether in the context of Clayton,
payments made without appropriation (by either party) ought to have been attributed to
the earliest items in the account. The contention surrounded a Statement of Account
(SoA) given by the creditor as seen below:

April 7 To draft p. ss. State of Pennsylvania, at Genoa,


267l. 14s. due, and notarial exp. 3l. . . . . .
,, 26 To draft p. ss. State of Nevada, at Alexandria,
176l. 5s. due, and notarial exp. 17s. . . . . .
,, 27 To draft p. ss. State of Nevada, at Port Said,
194l. 8s., and notarial exp. 15s. . . . . . . .
,, 27 To draft p. ss. State of Pennsylvania, at Port Said,
630l., and notarial exp. 15s. . . . . . . . .
Aug. 27 To telegrams to and from Constantinople . . . .
To interest to date at 5 per cent. . . . . . . .

Days

Interest at 5
per cent.

s. d.

s.

137

270

14

118

17

177

117

195

117

10

21

630
7
20
1,301

15
2
6
2

0
5
4
9

17
6

3
4

900

20

401

1,301

401

Aug. 15 By amount received from H. E. Moss & Co. . . .


,, 22 By balance of interest . . . . . . . . . . .

By balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

,, 22 To balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71.

d.

The case surrounds action that was taken against the owners of the steamship Mecca
(formerly called the State of Nevada). The owners of that vessel also owned another
called the Medina (formerly the State of Pennsylvania). Two of the items in the SoA
were of the same date (April 27), and the first in order was in respect of the Mecca.

72.

Payment was made in part (900) for the debts due which left a sum of 401 2s. 9d.
outstanding. When the debtor failed to pay this, action was brought by the creditor to
recover the debt due with respect to Mecca (the 900 part payment had been
appropriated to Medina debts). However, the debtor argued that by appropriation in
accordance with the SoA, Mecca debt had been paid. Mr. Justice Gainsford Bruce, in a
decision of the Court of Appeal, held that the payment was by law appropriated to the
earlier items in the account, and gave judgment for the defendants. However, it was held
in the House of Lords, on appeal of that decision....
....that the delivery of the account did not constitute an appropriation of the sum
received from the third parties to the earliest items in the account, and the
appellants were therefore justified in their arrest of the ship for the balance.
By THE LORD CHANCELLOR.The principle of Clayton's Case cannot apply to two
transactions of the same date.
Decision of the COURT OF APPEAL reversed.

The House of Lords made the following distinction in the context of Clayton with
regards items listed earliest in the account:
The rule in Clayton's Case (1 Mer. 572) that where there is an account current
between parties, and payments are made without appropriation by either debtor
or creditor, such payments are to be attributed to the earliest items in the account,
does not apply to a case in which debts arise from distinct transactions which are
not brought into a common account, and where with respect to the items to which
it is sought to appropriate the payments there has been only a temporary
abandonment of a remedy in rem.
73.

In the present case, it appears that none of the authorities on which the Council seeks to
rely are of any assistance. Notwithstanding the suspended costs from the account to
which monies have been allocated, and that the election would have otherwise been
inferred from circumstances, it is misconceived to assert that its software is correctly set
to appropriate monies to the earliest account when neither party specifies. The rule, in
the Clayton case cannot apply in a system whereby the accounts relate, as they do in
council tax, to distinct insulated debts, between which a plain line of separation could
be drawn (see above para 64).
Councils indecision to enforce the summons Costs

74.

Whilst the appeal to the decision of Magistrates regarding the liability order for
summons costs from 2012 remains undetermined by the High Court, the Council has
stated in a number of communications, with regards the 60.00 outstanding costs, that it
has made no decision on how it would enforce the debt.

75.

The Defendant made the enquiry in an email (6.2.13) see letter identified as [D-1] in
Annex D as follows:
....I have had no contact from your bailiffs Rossendales since the council
threatened in a letter dated 19 December 2012 to instruct them within 14 days. Do
I take it that NELC have not and will not be instructing its bailiff contractor to
enforce the sum of 60 and the council consider the amount no longer owed.
In response the Council [D-2] stated that no decision has been taken at the present time
regarding further action to enforce the debt.

76.

The Council referred again to making no decision to enforce the sum in a response to
the Defendants letter (14.7.14) [D-9] but gave an undertaking [D-10] to give ample
notice of any action it decided on:

With regards to the 60.00 outstanding on your account I can make you aware
that it is for North East Lincolnshire Council to decide on any course of action.
Any action that is taken will of course be relayed to you, giving you ample
notice.
77.

Again the Council [D-12] in its final response to a formal complaint 15.9.14 refers to
the enforcement of the 60.00 outstanding in regards costs relating to a Liability order
application granted on the 2nd November 2012:
Details of final recommendations:
This investigation has found that the Council acted in accordance with the
Regulations and the Guidance at all times.
No justification can be found to remove the 60 court summons costs from Mr
's account and the investigation cannot provide any evidence to support
Mr
's request for compensation for damages.
The recommendation is that North East Lincolnshire Council consider the options
available to them to recover the outstanding 60 and decide on what will be the
appropriate course of action to take. The Council should ensure that Mr
is duly informed of any action that is to be taken.

78.

This time it was specifically recommended that the options available to them to recover
the sum should be considered, despite the Council at no time having notified the
Defendant that the costs were no longer suspended. It did however, reiterate in the
recommendation that the Defendant should be informed of any action that is to be taken.

79.

The Council has never given the Defendant any notification that it had taken a decision
to enforce the sum let alone what steps it would take. A liability order empowers a
billing authority to recover arrears by such methods as Attachment of Earnings/Benefits
or instructing bailiffs to levy distress/control goods. There is nothing likely to be in the
Regulations which allows billing authorities to adopt a system of deception, as appears
to have happened in this case. If there is such a scheme, the Defendant had not been
notified that it was the option considered best for the Council to take. In any event, the
High Court has not yet made a decision and if it had, there is no logical reason why it
would not have found the liability order to enforce the summons costs had been
obtained unlawfully, because like in R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015]
EWHC 1252 (Admin), the court had insufficient information to determine the
reasonableness of costs claimed.

Annex A D

Omitted

Request complete paper

Dated this 29th day of October 2015

Signed:

The Defendant

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"HU-Grimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
"
" <
@gmail.com>
29 October 2015 11:42
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Confirm receipt of papers. This matter is listed at 13:45.

Regards
Mrs H Wright
Admin Officer
Grimsby Magistrates Court
01472 592410

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
29 October 2015 15:51
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Good afternoon Mr ,
Thank you for your email, of which the contents and attachments have been noted, and yes I can confirm
that your Hearing is scheduled for the 30th October 2015, however please note the time was set by the Court
for 14.15pm.
Kind regards,

Samantha Bateman
Court Enforcement Officer
Resources Directorate
Finance & Assets
Local Taxation & Benefits Shared Service

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Bateman, Sam (Gov Connect)" <Sam.Bateman@nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>
02 November 2015 11:44
Re: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear Ms Bateman
Would you please send the files (court exhibits) which NELC claimed it had difficulty serving (identified as
missing in a previous email).
I'm considering reporting a crime committed by NELC of perjury and would therefore like all documents
relevant to the council tax liability hearing on 30 October 2015.
Yours sincerely
.

04/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
02 November 2015 13:11
NELC8.pdf
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear Mr
Please find attached NELC8
Kind Regards
Alan French

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
02 November 2015 13:13
NELC10.pdf
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear Mr
Please find attached NELC10
Kind Regards
Alan French

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
02 November 2015 13:13
NELC11.pdf
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear Mr
Please find attached NELC11
Kind Regards
Alan French

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
02 November 2015 13:14
NELC12.pdf
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear Mr
Please find attached NELC12
Kind Regards
Alan French

04/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
02 November 2015 13:15
NELC13.pdf
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear Mr
Please find attached NELC13
Kind Regards
Alan French

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"French, Alan" <Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
02 November 2015 13:16
RE: Council tax liability hearing - 30th October 2015

Dear Mr
Please confirm receipt of the documents NELC 8 10 11 12 and 13 as requested
Kind Regards
Alan French

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
<inbox@jcio.gsi.gov.uk>
07 November 2015 21:19
7 Nov 2015 - ocj-complaint-0913.pdf
Judicial conduct - ocj-complaint-0913

Dear Sir/Madam
Please find attached completed Judicial Conduct Complaint form (form 09.13).
I do have all the relevant papers on file, so when a reference number is allocated to the complaint I can send
these as attachments.
If you require any further information please don't hesitate to ask.
Yours sincerely
.

04/07/2016

Judicial Conduct
Investigations Office
___________

Complaint form
Thank you for sending us details of your complaint.
Below is a copy of the details you supplied, please keep this form for your records.
When we reply you we will provide you with a unique case reference number. In the meantime, if you
need to contact us, please quote the reference number provided here.
Date form submitted

7 November 2015

Your details
Title

Mr

First name
Last name
Address
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

Postcode

Daytime telephone

None
@gmail.com

Email
Details about your case
Type of judicial
office holder

District Judge (Magistrates Court)

Name of judicial
office holder

Daniel Curtis

Name of the court


or tribunal

Grimsby Magistrates Court

Case number

Not known

Is your case still


ongoing

No

JCIO Complaint form (09.13)

Date of Hearing

30 October 2015

Brief description of your complaint

Category
of complaint

Miscellaneous

Description of your complaint

Background to case
North East Lincs Council (the 'Claimant') erroneously applied for a liability order for non-payment of council tax
due to misallocating monies to a sum that had arisen from a previous years summons costs, which were
disputed and appealed to the High Court. That sum was suspended pending the court's decision; therefore no
payments in respect of the current liability were ever overdue. The case (High Court) is yet to be determined so
the costs still suspended; therefore, under no circumstances was it a sum to which the Claimant could
legitimately allocate payment.
Myself (the "Defendant") submitted extensive evidence to support that i) the appeal (as alleged) had never
been withdrawn and so the suspension of costs from the account never lifted, ii) payments were in any event
inferred by the circumstances to be appropriated to the current liability, iii) it was inconceivable that the
summons costs as applied on making complaint could have been incurred by the claimant, as per the
Claimants breakdown.
The Claimant made a statement (material in the proceedings) which he knew to be false, to the effect that the
appeal challenging the costs had been withdrawn. Indisputable evidence was submitted to support why the
statement was untrue and why the Claimant could not have believed it to have been true. The Defendant's
suspicion that the statement was made with deliberate intent to deceive the court was made clear in those
representations.

Professional Misconduct
The judge was unwilling to listen to, accept or understand any evidence which didn't fit in with the predetermined outcome (to accept the false statement to justify granting the order). It was sensed throughout the
hearing that the judge pretended to be out of his depth as a strategy for denying evidence that might, if
considered, defeat the Claimant's argument and make granting the order more difficult to justify. His ineptitude
was almost certainly put on for show; therefore a description far more accurate would be of 'Professional
Misconduct' than that of incompetence.

Criminal Allegations
The judge was so lacking in objectivity and obviously pro-prosecution that had an unsighted person walked into
the courtroom he would have almost certainly mistaken him as the Claimant's barrister, albeit one grasping at
straws, raising irrelevant matters with the intention of hoodwinking the bench. It can therefore be stated
unreservedly that there had been not even a hint of a fair hearing.
There seems no doubt that the judge had acted with intent to pervert the course of justice as he had before him
indisputable evidence that a false and corrupt statement had been made. Granting an order therefore made
him complicit in the Claimant's criminal actions that sought to exploit a complaint to the court for the purposes
of defrauding the Defendant with an attached claim of costs.

Inappropriate Comments / Discrimination


His manner (the judge) was antagonistic and belittling and although there was no retaliation to speak of, the
provocation was such that a conflict could have easily arisen. It is easily seen how such an approach might be
used to distract attention from the case in order to discredit someone or simply to goad someone who the judge
took a personal dislike to. If such incidents have occurred, which is difficult to see how they could not have,
based upon my experience, I would fully support anyone who has fallen victim who might now, for example be
on a charge for contempt of court, as a consequence of the provocation.
His concluding comments in so far as they can be recalled were that hed listened for half an hour to an
outburst of political diatribe for which only 5 minutes made any sense. This can only be put down to his inability
(or demonstration thereof) to understand the representations which had in any event been submitted as
detailed written evidence. The diatribe referred to can only reasonably be put down to a couple of issues raised.
A reference to the misconduct of the Justices Clerk for the Humber and South Yorkshire which is considered so
serious as to warrant answering charges of misconduct in public office is one. Secondly, a matter which the
Claimant relied on was contended as being misleading evidence (additional to the false statement).
As for the political reference, it was merely pointed out that the issues were of general public importance as
they could detrimentally affect significant numbers and more so since government reforms introduced changes
to council tax benefits. These issues were material to the case and did not exceed a brief mention as the judge
made it plain that they were not matters worthy of consideration, presumably because they were not favourable
to the outcome that had obviously been pre-determined in the interest of the Claimant. Again everything
relevant to these points was set out in the written evidence.
His comments were far from the most tactful thing to say to someone, who whilst over the period of time that
the judge will have received over half a million pounds of taxpayer's money, has had no remuneration
whatsoever for consistently and voluntarily dedicating around 15 hours a day, 7 days a week to matters
concerning the wholesale fraud, which it has become obvious is endorsed by people appointed in a judicial
capacity.
The judge was acting beyond his authority when again in his belittling manner his interrogation turned to an
irrelevant matter concerning the number of payments, in what sum those payments were made and the method
chosen for paying council tax instalments. It irked him, so much so, that he enquired if a bank account was held
and why payments werent made by standing order like everyone else. It wasnt for the court to lay blame
elsewhere for the Claimant exploiting its council tax processing system as a means of defrauding taxpayers.
Unashamed bias was displayed again when the judge referred to previous maladministration, similarly in
respect of misallocated payments, for which 27 days was taken by the Claimant to respond and resolve the
matter, by which time reminders and a summons were wrongly issued. The facts were distorted out of all
recognition and portrayed in the courtroom to be the Defendants fault for the Claimants gross error. The judge
was again noticeably irked to the point that he was motivated to make a spurious statement which was that the
Claimant, as a consequence, had a right to demand subsequent years liability up-front thus removing the
statutory instalment entitlement.
Misuse of Judicial Powers
Not withstanding his reliance on a statement which he knew was false, the judge acted outside his powers by
granting the order. The regulations governing council tax liability do not give the court authority to make an
order when the defendant has proved that there is no outstanding debt. No discretion in such cases is given to
impose a penalty (especially not for ones own perverse gratification) which is what the judge did in this case by
allowing the application and granting costs, based on his own opinion differing from the Defendants about how,
and in what manner bills are paid.

Neither is the court allowed discretion in the amount of costs it orders. The regulations restrict the level so that
no more than the expenditure incurred by the applicant in respect of instituting the complaint is rechargeable to
the defendant. The breakdown contained indisputable evidence that the vast majority of the costs claimed were
not incurred by the Claimant in respect of instituting the complaint in the Defendants case. The judge approved
the level from a brief glance of the breakdown. It was then explained to him that the costs itemised referred
largely to council resources dealing with enquiries, rescheduling and monitoring payment plans etc. and
subsidising bad debt for which none could be attributable to the Defendants summons. A detailed analysis in
this regard had in any event been submitted in the written evidence.
The order was not made because there was a legal obligation, but for what appeared to be the assistance that
imposing a financial penalty might provide in coercing the Defendant into conceding and making payments in
line with the Claimant's preferred method.
There was a substantial amount of evidence before the court. Had due process followed and the
representations considered objectively it is inconceivable that the judge would have determined the case in the
way he did. He seemed to view his role as a disciplinarian rather than someone who was duty bound to deliver
a decision based on the legal arguments that were before him.
It is appreciated that a complaint cannot consider the judge's decision (that is now a police matter), but this is
not a complaint about that, rather it concerns the failure to carry out his duties in an unbiased way and for that
reason unfit to sit on the bench in a court of law and should no longer be allowed to for the sake of future
potential victims of the judicial system.

Annex A to C
The misconduct is of such a serious nature that should the concerns raised be misjudged and no action taken
as a consequence, the justice systems reputation will be seriously at stake. That is why material has been
included in Annex A to C which demonstrates, for want of a better phrase, that it is beyond reasonable doubt,
that the Defendant has been stitched-up by what points to a criminal conspiracy between the Claimant and the
court.

Annex A
Contained here is an exhibit identified as NELC12. In its Witness Statement, the Claimant refers to the letters
in that exhibit to justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were being disputed because the
Defendant had withdrawn his application for the Judicial review of the costs.
It is not only clear from the content of the Defendants letter dated 20 November 2013 that the application to
state a case regarding costs had not been withdrawn (only the claim for a mandatory order), but the letter was
not a copy of the original. It is beyond all reasonable doubt that the Claimant had sourced those letters from a
public forum, the same forum which it had sourced the contents of another of its exhibits (NELC11).

Annex B
The letters contained in Annex A had been redacted and matched the entries that were posted on the public
forum as seen in Annex B. The forum is the only place from which those letters could be sourced in that
redacted form. The characteristics of the letters which the Claimant submitted to the court were identical to the
forum posts.

Clearly the Claimant had not sought the original letters and had presumably for convenience consulted the
public forum on which all letters connected with the matter (albeit redacted) where conveniently in one place. It
is a reasonably assumption that if on this occasion the Claimant consulted the forum to produce its exhibit, it
would have done so subsequently where further updates on that forum continued providing evidence that the
case stated was still very much being pursued. That would only reinforce the established fact and so does not
matter whether the Claimant did or did not continued monitoring the forum, as the crux of the matter is that the
post (Annex A) from which the content was sourced was accompanied with some commentary which reinforced
the matter in itself. Crucially the commentary ended with this sentence: the next move will be to arrange to
appear before the Magistrates' Court to agree terms of a recognizance.

Annex C
The exhibit (NELC1) is the Defendants 2015/16 council tax bill (demand notice) which displays unambiguously
at the bottom of the document that an amount of 60.00 is a sum which is subject to Court Proceedings. The
same has been included on each of the Defendants demand notices ever since the appeal, by way of a case
stated, was instituted.
Allegations of Judicial Misconduct
For the avoidance of doubt, this does not constitute an appeal of the courts decision, it is a complaint made in
accordance with the Judicial Conduct (Judicial and other office holders) Rules 2014 about the judges conduct
on several counts which are set out in detail above and itemised as follows:

i)

Professional Misconduct

ii)

Criminal Allegations

iii)

Inappropriate Comments / Discrimination

iv)

Misuse of Judicial Powers

I confirm that the information I have provided is correct.


Judicial Conduct and Investigations Office, Royal Courts of Justice,
Queens Building, Strand, London WC2A 2LL
Enquiry Line: 020 7073 4719
JCIO Complaint form (09.13)

Fax: 020 7073 4725

Annex A C

Omitted

Request complete paper

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
<ProfessionalStandards@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
08 November 2015 15:13
Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015.pdf
Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015

Dear Sir/Madam
Please find attached completed complaint form in regards my concerns about suspected incitement to commit
perjury.
(Police complaint 8 Nov 2015.pdf)
Please note I have also set out details with regards two false witness statements. I wish to confirm that my
complaint constitutes an allegation of perjury in regards those statements. I trust Humberside police will be
investigation these allegations and would therefore appreciate the force providing me with crime numbers.

Yours sincerely

04/07/2016

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Making a complaint against the


police, a Police and Crime
Commissioner or the Mayors
Office for Policing and Crime
IPCC Office Use Only

Completing the form


Please use BLOCK CAPITALS when completing this form. If you have any difficulties in filling
out this form, and would like to discuss it please call 101. If you would like someone to act on
your behalf (perhaps a friend or relative) please provide their details and your written
permission for them to act on your behalf and submit this with your form.

Your details (complainant)


Title: e.g. Mr, Miss, Mrs, Ms

(Mr)

First name:

Surname:

Date of birth:

. .

Address:
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
Work telephone

N/A

Mobile telephone number:

Postcode:
Home telephone number

N/A

Email:

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

N/A

@gmail.com

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Who are you complaining about?


Please give the details of who you are complaining about for example the police force /
Police and Crime Commissioner or the Mayors Office for Policing and Crime.
Police force
For complaints against the police please give us any details you might have about the
officer(s) you would like to make a complaint against:
Name, rank, ID and any other identifier: Police Constable Thomas Blake 1131
Name, rank, ID and any other identifier:
If you know the police station that the officer/s work from, please give details:
Grimsby police station (Assume)

What is your complaint about?


Please describe the circumstances that have led to your complaint? Include details of:

Who was involved?


What was said and done
Where the incident took place
When the incident took place
If there was any damage or injury
Any other people who witnessed the incident
Details of any witness

At this stage we only require a summary of your complaint, but you may attach additional
information if necessary. Please use the space provided on the last page of this form.

On 27.8.15 (afternoon) on public grounds in front of Humberside Police station Grimsby a


witness (whom I accuse of perjury) mistook my observing a tree in the vicinity, to be that of
taking a piss against its trunk. Shortly after, PC Blake turned up and walked over to the trees
location, accompanied by the witness who had initially sounded the alerted.
Both appeared to be examining the tree and area for signs of evidence to prove that the false
allegations were true. It was obvious to the officer that I had not been urinating as falsely
accused, but used the fact that there was no evidence that I had been urinating to change the
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

accusation from one of urinating in a public place to indecent exposure, presumably because
of the lesser burden of proof required for a conviction.
The witness who went on to make a complaint had said to me he would not be doing so
before accompanying the officer to the spot where I had been accused of urinating. He stated
at the time (when I believe PC Blake was present) that he had seen me zipping/unzipping my
fly. However, I was wearing denim jeans which had no zip the fly operated with buttons,
therefore, if I had been taking a piss or indecently exposing myself, he would not have
witnessed the zipping or unzipping of my fly.
Note: By 1 September 2015 when the second witness produced her statement, the reference
to my fly had been changed from zip to buttons.
When this was highlighted to PC Blake he appeared not to consider it relevant and focussed
on bringing a charge for public indecency regardless of there being no evidence. The sudden
decision change by the witness from stating that a complaint would not be made to actually
pursuing a complaint leads me to suspect that PC Blake had incited him to commit perjury as
he has produced a witness statement which he knows to be false.
Ongoing dispute with Humberside police
I have been embroiled in a dispute that has been ongoing for a number of years with
Humberside police relating to matters for which the force is complicit in substantial fraud (on a
national scale) committed by private bailiffs working on behalf of local authorities which those
councils also endorse. My concerns are that because of my allegations of complicity that the
force may be motivated to fabricate evidence, as has happened in this case, for the purpose
of pay-back.
The arresting officer had no good cause to suspect that the charges brought were warranted
and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment was unlawful for which Humberside Police
should be held accountable.
My complaint specifically relates to
i) Suspicion that PC Blake incited a witness to commit perjury.
ii) Wrongful arrest by PC Blake, leading to false imprisonment.
The key witnesses of whom there are four Im aware of are:
1) Arthur Johnson
2) Tammy Johnson
3) Steven Warriner
4) Thomas Blake
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Im in possession of the papers relating to the prosecution and all of the above have
submitted witness statements. As a consequence I wish to formally report crimes in the
matter of perjury with regards to the witness statements produced by Arthur and Tammy
Johnson as they contain evidence that both witnesses intend to pervert the course of justice
by means of false and corrupt statements. Both state without reservation that they had seen
my willy on the afternoon of 27 August 2015. That, I know to be a fabrication because at no
point in time did any act take place which would have required the exposure of my penis.
With regard to PC Blakes witness statement, it was inaccurate particularly where the text had
been emphasised with capital letters. One such obviously contrivance was evident by the way
he reported something he had alleged Id said:
I asked him what he was doing and he replied I WASNT HAVING A PISS, I WASNT
DOING ANYTHING, I HAVE A KEEN INTEREST and then stopped himself.
Of course, it doesnt take much intelligence to conclude that his creative input to omit what
was actually said, i.e., I have a keen interest in trees was to allow an opening for the police
to imply that the keen interest might be something for which it could secure a trumped-up
charge which became evident in the interrogation conducted at 23:17 on 27 August 2015.

Signature and date


The details of this complaint will be sent to the appropriate authority responsible for
considering your complaint. Please sign and date to confirm the information you have
provided is correct:

Signature

Date 8 November 2015

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Additional notes
Concerns I wish to raise surrounding arrest and imprisonment
After around 10 minutes into being handcuffed I requested they be loosened as they were
unnecessarily tight and causing pain. After a quick check the officer responded by stating that
there was plenty of room and suggested I try moving my elbows closer together (my hands
were behind my back) in an attempt to lessen the pressure.
I was falsely imprisoned for around 8 hours. After a while in the cell I still sensed soreness
from the handcuffs and noticed the marks remained visible, so called for someone to have
them photographed. A woman spoke through the cells spy hole and stated that someone
would come and deal with the matter. However, nobody ever did come and the marks which
in fact remained visible for some days afterwards were never photographed.

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Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
<counciltax@nelincs.gov.uk>
10 November 2015 16:54
Appropriation of Payments

Dear Sir/Madam
Re: Council Tax Account 5501
I have two instalments remaining of 91.00 (182.00 in total) in respect of my 2015/16 council tax liability.
It is noted from viewing NELC's website that my account shows a total sum of 302.00.
120.00 therefore does not relate to my current year's council tax liability. 60.00 of that sum relates to
summons costs from November 2012 which are suspended pending a high court appeal; the remaining
60.00 relates to a sum which NELC obtained in an attached claim of costs in a fraudulent application for
liability order.
I am writing to make it categorically clear that any payment I make on my account (whether that sum matches
an instalment amount) my express election is for that payment to be allocated to the current year's liability.
This applies also to future year's, unless there are express instructions (in writing) to the contrary.
Also for the avoidance of doubt, should NELC decide upon instructing its bailiff contractor to attempt
collecting any of the fraudulently obtained summons costs, NELC does not have my permission to allocate
any element of payment I make on my account in respect of sums accruing in fees and charges.
I require acknowledgement that NELC fully understands these instructions.
Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Fin - CouncilTax" <CouncilTax@nelincs.gov.uk>


"
"<
@gmail.com>
10 November 2015 16:54
Council Tax

Dear Sir/Madam

This is an automated response to confirm we have received the e-mail you have issued to the Council
Tax department.
Work is dealt with in date order and we will aim to respond to your query within 10 working days.
However this may take longer during peak periods.

05/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Morley, Gillian 9614" <Gillian.Morley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


"
"<
@gmail.com>
12 November 2015 00:21
Crime Reporting Submission

Mr
With regards to your report that was submitted to Humberside Police on 08/11/2015 as follows:
North East Lincolnshire Council produced a false witness statement (thereby committing perjury) with
regards a council tax liability hearing at Grimsby Magistrates' Court. The District Judge (Daniel Curtis) was
aware that the evidence surrounded a false and corrupt statement, but nevertheless granted the council a
liability order to enforce a fraudulent sum which presently stands at 120.00. This sum is likely to increase if
the council appoints its criminal firm of bailiffs, Rossendales. My allegations are that the council has
committed perjury with the intent to fraudulently obtain money from me by the use of Grimsby Magistrates
court and that Judge Daniel Curtis has perverted the course of justice by being complicit to that crime.
Please be advised that this is not a Police matter and is civil which I suggest you seek further advice from a
solicitor/legal advisor.
Command Hub
Humberside Police

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
"Morley, Gillian 9614" <Gillian.Morley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
12 November 2015 10:48
Re: Crime Reporting Submission

Dear Ms Morley
I am in disbelief that Humberside police have arrived at the conclusion that fraud is not a police matter. I have
not heard such an absurd statement since the force said the same with regards bailiff firms defrauding council
taxpayers.
Your suggestion that I am put to the expense of enriching the legal profession when I am in any
event contributing to fund the police out of the very tax which the council wishes to defraud from me has some
irony to it.
I am left obviously with no option than to submit a complaint about whoever within the force made this
decision. However, I would much prefer the person against whom I make the complaint to be the Chief
Constable so that any investigation will not be conducted by the force itself in the hope of removing the 'sham'
element which is associated with these matters. Therefore, please escalate this matter for the attention of the
Chief Constable.
Yours sincerely

06/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Smithey, Graeme 1226" <Graeme.Smithey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
19 November 2015 19:04
RECENT CORRESPONDENCE WITH HUMBERSIDE POLICE

,
I write with regard to your recent correspondence with Humberside Police. I have brought the matter to the
attention of our Professional Standards Branch that are based at Priory Road in Hull. Someone will be in
touch in due course.
I would advise that you collate all evidence and intelligence that would support the claims you are making
against the court.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Smithey
Police Sergeant

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"
"<
@gmail.com>
<ProfessionalStandards@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
20 November 2015 08:35
Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015.pdf
Fw: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015

Dear Sir/Madam
Would you please acknowledge receiving this email and attached complaint and provide me with crime
numbers to which these reported offences have been designated in order to be satisfied that they are to be
investigated.
Yours sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"Langworth, Sam" <sam.langworth@jcio.gsi.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
27 November 2015 14:21
.doc
Your complaint to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) - Reference: 22905

Dear Mr
Please see the attached letter from the JCIO.
Yours sincerely,
Mr Langworth
Caseworker
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office | 81 - 82 Queens Building | Royal Courts of Justice | Strand |
London WC2A 2LL | Phone: 020 7073 0301 |
06/07/2016

Judicial Conduct Investigations


Office
81 & 82 Queens Building
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
DX44450 Strand
T 020 7073 0301

Mr
@gmail.com

Our ref: 22905/2015


27 November 2015
Dear Mr
Your complaint about District Judge (DJ) Curtis
I am writing further to your complaint of 07 November 2015, received 09 November
2015, to inform you that the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) is unable to
accept it for consideration. This is because your complaint does not contain an
allegation of misconduct on the part of a judicial office holder. Rule 8 of the Judicial
Conduct (Judicial and other Office Holders) Rules 2014 requires that your complaint
meets this criterion if it is to be considered as valid.
In summary, you complain that DJ Curtis acted outside his powers and perverted the
course of justice by making an order in the claimants favour despite your
indisputable evidence that a false and corrupt statement had been made. You state
that DJ Curtis was unwilling to listen to, accept or understand your evidence and you
sensed he pretended to be out of his depth as a strategy for denying evidence that
might, if considered, defeat the claimants argument. Further, you state that DJ
Curtis was antagonistic and belittling as, in relation to your submissions, he
commented that he had listened for half-an-hour to a political diatribe, only 5 minutes
of which made sense, and he interrogated you about irrelevant matters concerning
council tax instalments.
The concerns put forward in your complaint, and summarised above, do not
constitute a case of personal misconduct on the part of a judicial office holder. Your
complaint relates to judicial decision and judicial case management. The JCIO is
unable to investigate, challenge or question a judges decision or case handling
because these are part of a judges function and not personal conduct. An essential
part of a judges function is weighing up the evidence presented to them and applying
the law accordingly. In order to carry out this aspect of their function, judges have
discretion to determine the evidence they are willing to consider and the matters they
wish to explore in a hearing, irrespective of whether a party considers those matters
irrelevant. Further, although I note you state DJ Curtis was antagonistic and belittling,
judges are entitled to respond to the parties evidence and I confirm that DJ Curtiss
response to your submissions would not be a matter of misconduct because it relates
to his handling of the case in court.

I note you state that your appeal to the High Court is still to be determined. I confirm
that judicial decisions can only be challenged through the appeal process, where one
exists, or by judicial review. The judicial discipline process cannot be used as
alternative method for challenging any aspect of a judicial decision. For example, if a
party were of the opinion that the decision in their case was influenced by bias, the
appropriate course of action would be to appeal. This office is not able to review a
judicial decision to be able to ascertain whether it was correct in law or made as a
result of bias. The only way of determining this is for a case to be appealed and,
therefore, subject to review by a higher court. If, on appeal, a judge was criticised for
their decision because of bias, this could then be subject to consideration by this
office and the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice.
In regard to your court case, you may wish to consider seeking legal advice.
Members of staff at the JCIO are not legally trained. However, you may find it helpful
to seek advice from a solicitor, law centre or the Citizens Advice Bureau
(http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk). The Civil Legal Service (CLS) a Government
organisation might also be able to help. This service helps put people in touch with
sources of legal advice in their area. Further details about the CLS can be found on
their website (https://www.gov.uk/civil-legal-advice). The Bar Pro Bono Unit may also
be of assistance. The Unit receives applications for assistance through advice
agencies and solicitors. The Unit aims to help in cases where the applicant cannot
afford to pay for the assistance sought or obtain public funding, has a meritorious
case, and needs the help a barrister can provide. Further details about the charity
and how to apply can be found on their website: www.barprobono.org.uk.
With further reference to your allegation that DJ Curtis has perverted the course of
justice, the JCIO does not have remit to consider criminal allegations. In the event
that a judicial office holder was to be found guilty of committing a criminal offence,
the matter may be referred to the JCIO for further consideration.
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman
If you are unhappy about my handling of your complaint, you should contact the
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, Sir John Brigstocke KCB. The
Ombudsman can consider complaints about how I have handled your complaint, but
he does not have the power to investigate your original complaint to the JCIO.
The Ombudsman will consider a complaint if you write to him within 28 days of our
decision. After this time, he will consider whether he is able to investigate it. You
can contact the Ombudsman:

in writing at: 9th Floor Tower, 9.53, 102 Petty France, London, SW1H 9AJ;
by e-mail at headofoffice@jaco.gsi.gov.uk ; and
by telephone on 020 3334 2900.

For further information about the Ombudsman see www.judicialombudsman.gov.uk


If you require anything further, please contact me.

Yours sincerely,

Mr Langworth
Caseworker Judicial Conduct Investigations Office

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Langworth, Sam" <sam.langworth@jcio.gsi.gov.uk>
27 November 2015 16:37
Re: Your complaint to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) - Reference: 22905

Dear Mr Langworth
I don't know how District Judge Daniel Curtis normally conducts himself but
I found him to be corrupt beyond belief.
I can't believe that is of no concern to the Judicial Conduct Investigations
Office and wonder whether it too is wholly corrupt.
I would like my comments passing on to the person who heads the JCIO.

Your sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Smithey, Graeme 1226" <Graeme.Smithey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries"
<enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>; <owen.bowcott@guardian.co.uk>; <pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
02 December 2015 15:40
Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Re: RECENT CORRESPONDENCE WITH HUMBERSIDE POLICE

Dear Mr Smithey
I have a letter dated 23 November 2015 from DCI Andy Oliver explaining that the Professional Standards
Branch is in receipt of my complaint.
It strikes my that this matter is now consigned to the complaints process which from my experience will entail
a number of years being fobbed off until it can go no further and will be told to F. off unless I want to try my
luck in the casino justice system and challenge the decision in the High Court.
I have acted on your suggestion by collecting all the evidence etc. and produced a statement. I have
explained in the document (attached) that because of a conflict of interest which exists if Humberside police
were to deal with this matter, it is suggested that another police force does so (see para 68 for details).
There are a significant number of documents accompanying the statement and will withhold those until I'm
informed further about the matter.
Yours sincerely

06/07/2016

Ref: / /

IN THE MATTER OF ALLEGATIONS OF


PERJURY TO COMMIT FRAUD AND
PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE

IN THE GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT


CIVIL JURISDICTION

STATEMENT

Below is the list of supporting documents (SD) which accompany this statement. It is
important that all are to hand, and a copy requested in the case of any missing document. SDs
#1 to #24 relate directly to this matter and those which are relevant but not specifically
referred to are a numbered #25 to #31 in the list and relate to previous concerns raised with
Humberside police on a similar theme.

LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (SD)


No #

DATE

DESCRIPTION

FILE NAME

1 Oct 2015

Defendants representations proof of


payment; summons costs

Defendants Grounds of
Appeal.pdf

6 May 2015

High court Judgment in the matter of an


appeal of Council Tax court summons costs

R (on the application of


Reverend Nicolson) v
Tottenham Magistrates.doc

22 July 2013

Draft case stated for appeal to the high court

Case stated Draft.pdf

16 Oct 2015

NELC (Claimant) - Witness Statement

Alan French - Witness


Statement.pdf

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 1 (Defendants 2015/16


Council Tax bill)

NELC1.pdf

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 2 (Council Tax reminder)

NELC2.pdf

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 3 (Council Tax second


reminder)

NELC3.pdf

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 4 (Council Tax final


notice)

NELC4.pdf

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 5 (Council Tax summons)

NELC5.pdf

10

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 6 (Peters v Anderson case law)

NELC6.pdf

11

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 7 (Devaynes v Noble case law)

NELC7.pdf

12

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 8 (Cory Brothers & Co - NELC8.pdf


case law)

13

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 9 (Defendants email to


Claimant)

NELC9.pdf

14

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 10 (Extract from Bailiff


help forum)

NELC10.pdf

15

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 11 (Extract from Legal


Beagle forum)

NELC11.pdf

16

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 12 (Contents of letters to


and from Admin Court Office at Leeds)

NELC12.pdf

17

16 Oct 2015

Claimants Exhibit 13 (Leeson v Leeson case law)

NELC13.pdf

18

29 Oct 2015

Defendants representations appropriation


of payments; evidence of costs appealed

Defendants (Supplementary)
Grounds of Appeal.pdf

19

Chronology (case bundle draft document high court application)

Case Stated Chronology


draft.pdf

20

Consent order (case bundle draft document high court application)

Case Stated Consent order


draft.pdf

21

Grounds of appeal (case bundle draft


document - high court application)

Case Stated Grounds of


appeal draft.pdf

22

Skeleton Argument (case bundle draft


document - high court application)

Case Stated Skeleton


Argument draft.pdf

23

2 Sept 2014

Complaint to Advisory Committee


(Magistrates / Justices Clerks conduct)

Judicial complaint 2 Sept


2014.pdf

24

7 Nov 2015

Complaint to Judicial Conduct Investigations


Office(Judges conduct)

7 Nov 2015 ocj-complaint0913.pdf

25

2 Aug 2011

Concerns about the automated procedure of


issuing council tax summonses en masse

Fake court Summons 2


August 2011.doc

26

31 Aug 2011

Concerns about the automated procedure of


issuing council tax summonses en masse

Fake court Summons 31


August 2011.doc

27

20 March 2012 Concerns about the automated procedure of


issuing council tax summonses en masse

Fake court Summons 20


March 2012.doc

28

5 Sept 2013

Business Rates (NNDR) summons fraud

Business Rates summons


fraud 05 Sept 2013.pdf

29

25 Oct 2013

Highlighting effects of benefit reforms on cost


income / inappropriately funding council tax
admin

FOI data 25 October


2013.pdf

First document referred to in FOI data 25


October 2013.pdf

Total Cost of CT Admin.pdf

Second document referred to in FOI data 25


October 2013.pdf

FOI costs letters.pdf

30

31

INTRODUCTION
1.

The issues raised here will no doubt be considered by the police to be civil rather than
criminal matters because of the association with the recovery of council tax, for which
the recovery of such debt falls under the Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure of the
Magistrates Courts Act 1980. Perjury however is punishable as an offence whether it
occurs in criminal or civil proceedings and the consequences are in this case that a false
statement was made in order to commit an act of fraud.

2.

The seriousness of the matter is compounded by the obvious knowledge by the judge
that a false and corrupt statement had been made but nevertheless proceeded to find in
the councils favour.

3.

Because of a conflict of interest which exists if Humberside police were to deal with this
matter, it is suggested that another police force does so (see below para 68).

BACKGROUND
4.

North East Lincolnshire council (NELC) essentially instituted court proceedings to


enforce council tax liability even though payments were made in sufficient amount to
meet the legal obligation to pay the sums set out on the demand notice relating to my
2015/16 Council Tax liability. Ironically, at various times the account was in credit due
to over payment, but at all other times the account was up to date.

5.

A billing authority is able to exploit its council tax processing system which allocates
payments to the earliest debt (if one exists) where payments are unspecified.
Note: A specified payment, for the purpose of NELC's processing system, is a payment
that matches exactly the instalment amount or an arranged payment plan.

6.

A billing authority is advantaged by the costs generated for making complaint to the
Magistrates' court for engineering a non-payment scenario, by making a decision not
to re-allocate a payment which a taxpayer obviously intends reducing the indebtedness
of the current year's liability.

7.

NELC exploited its processing system in exactly this way in my case to divert a sum
obviously intended to reduce the indebtedness of the current years liability to a sum
which was outstanding from the 2012/13 tax year and so engineered default. The
criminal implications are clear as in the context of R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2 (the
test of honesty), there is no doubt that even if the council held genuine belief that its
actions were morally justified, it must have realised that ordinary people would consider
them dishonest.
Disputed sum outstanding from previous year

8.

The sum outstanding from 2012/13 related to court costs for a similar matter involving
NELC making complaint for non payment of council tax. That sum was disputed (the
costs) and an application to state a case for an appeal to the High Court was submitted.
That sum was suspended pending the court's decision (yet to be determined) so under no
circumstances was it permissible for NELC to exploit its processing system for
engineering default by allocating payment to that sum. A letter dated 19 July 2013 sent
by NELCs Legal Department in connection with the claim for a mandatory order, to
which will be referred later, contains the following (emphasis added):
Yourself v Grimsby Magistrates Court & NELC
I write further to the legal proceedings issued by yourself at Leeds High Court
against Grimsby & Cleethorpes Magistrates Court, naming North East
Lincolnshire Council as an interested party. The papers have been passed to me
upon Mrs Conolly's departure from employment with the Local Authority.
The purpose of my writing to you is to inform you that the 60 court costs, which
you dispute, will be suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. At the
completion of those proceedings, dependent on the Court's decision, the fee will

either be withdrawn from your account or will remain outstanding to the Local
Authority.
A copy of this letter has been sent to the Leeds High Court for their information.
Yours sincerely
for Group Manager Legal & Democratic Services

9.

Even if the costs were not suspended, the sum (court costs) did not form part of any
year's council tax liability for which its system would have a parameter set to accept
specific payment (paras 4752, SD #18). Moreover, if NELC had lifted the
suspension, it could not simply be recovered by diverting payments made on the current
year's council tax because the sum then would be under enforcement. In those
circumstances, a decision about which one of a range of enforcement measures
empowered by the liability order would have had to be made to enforce the sum and
communicated to me. Despite NELC stating in a number of correspondence that I would
be notified if and when it were to resume enforcement, it never at any point conveyed
this to me (paras 7479, SD #18).

10.

An additional concern is why it is that one of the exhibits NELC1 (copy of my current
council tax bill) itemises the sum as a separate balance from the current liability and
describes it as a sum subject to court proceedings. NELC has at the same time as
claiming to have no reason to believe that the costs were being disputed, submitted an
item of evidence to the court that states that they are. This was additional to being
highlighted in my initial representations (para 20, SD #1) which the judge missed or
ignored. The Council Tax bill states as follows:
Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings

Missing papers
11.

On 16 October 2015, NELC served court papers by electronic transfer on myself and the
Magistrates court in respect of the 30 October 2015 court hearing. Fourteen files made
up the complete set of documents but only 9 of those which included a 'Witness
Statement' (SD #5) and exhibits 'NELC1' to 'NELC7' and 'NELC9' were successfully

transferred. Exhibits 'NELC8' and 'NELC10' to 'NELC13' were not transferred. Shortly
after NELC sent an email explaining it was having difficulty serving the court papers
and provided a link and instructions about how to download the files from an
account which NELC had created on its system which required me to log on with details
it provided after which I needed to change the password to one of my choice in order to
access the information.
12.

I was suspicious about why it was, that only certain files could not be served, and not
happy about entering sensitive information that might get into the wrong hands, it had
after all been able to transfer most of the papers by email attachment. I identified the 5
missing files and asked if those could be emailed but made it clear I was not willing to
create an account to access the files in the way suggested.

13.

On 19 October, NELC replied and explained it was having difficulties accessing the
electronic file and wanted to arrange a visit to my home so the paper files instead could
be handed over.

14.

I was suspicious about why a simple task was causing such difficulties and it crossed
my mind that there might be something NELC wanted to propose (off the record) in
view of the compelling evidence against it, or if not that some other ulterior motive to
make contact. In any event, it was pretty obvious from the context of the 'Witness
Statement' that the missing content could be sourced elsewhere, for example where the
content related to case authority. NELC was therefore informed that it was unnecessary
to deliver the case bundle in paper form.

15.

Exhibit 'NELC12' was identified in paragraph 69 of the Witness Statement to be a letter


on which NELC relied to justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were
being disputed [because I had withdrawn my] application for the Judicial review of the
costs'. As it was indicated to be the letter sent to the Administrative Court Office dated
20th November 2013 my email records verified that NELC had been sent a copy and
acknowledged by way of a 'read receipt' sent 22 November 2013.

16.

I was satisfied that not having exhibit 'NELC12' would cause no disadvantage. The
letter, however (Annex C [C-6], SD #18) does not give any cause to lead NELC to
believe that the High Court appeal (case stated) challenging the summons costs had
been withdrawn. The letter was in response to the Administrative Court's
recommendation (Annex C [C-5], SD #18) to withdraw the judicial review claim as the

process had prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case (SD #3) and deemed there
no longer a need for further action on their part as the process of stating a case was
underway. The judicial review claim, which was a separate matter from the application
to state a case for an appeal challenging the costs, was merely the vehicle used to get the
Magistrates' court to conform. The judicial review claim therefore was for a mandatory
order, not a 'review of the costs' and so the case stated appeal challenging the summons
costs has never been withdrawn.
17.

It is clear from the context of that letter alone that it was only the judicial review claim
for a mandatory order that was withdrawn and that the High Court appeal challenging
the summons costs was still being pursued (draft bundle, SD #19 to #22). It is
inconceivable that the judge would have had difficulty understanding this, therefore the
reason he refused to, reinforces the assertion that he was biased in the favour of NELC.

18.

The bias toward NELC was made plain from the way the judge turned the matter from
being a question of whether the appeal had been withdrawn to whether evidence could
be produced to support the appeal was still live. The appropriation of monies was
supported by NELC on the basis that it believed the appeal had been withdrawn, and on
that basis alone. Upon realising that NELC had made a false and corrupt 'Witness
Statement', the judge offered assistance (as a way of justifying granting a liability order)
by introducing a defence for those actions, on which NELC had not sought to rely,
thereby seeking to pervert the course of justice. The question of whether the case was
live was not a factor in NELC's decision making to engineer court proceedings; the
decision upon which NELC misappropriated payment was based on its false claim that
it believed the appeal was withdrawn.

19.

When asked if I could provide evidence that the appeal was still live (as opposed to not
being withdrawn) the judge prevented me raising the matter that NELC had
acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read receipts' returned on
15 January, 14 February and 23 April 2014 in respect of letters dated 10 January, 13
February and 22 April 2014. Those letters, which were copies of correspondence sent to
the Justices' Clerk contained hard evidence that the high court appeal was still
being pursued, and sent after the judicial review claim for mandatory order was
withdrawn (Annex C [C-8], [C-9] and [C11], SD #18).

20.

Acknowledgement of letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the failure
to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 10 January (Annex C [C-8]):

From: Mike (Gov Connect)


To: xxxx
Sent: 15 January 2014 11:50
Subject: Read: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Your message
To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)
Subject: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Sent: 10 January 2014 15:09:48
was read on 15 January 2014 11:50:32.

21.

Acknowledgement of second letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the
failure to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 13 February (Annex C [C-9]):
From: Mike (Gov Connect)
To: xxxx
Sent: 14 February 2014 11:29 AM
Subject: Read: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Your message
To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)
Subject: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 13 February 2014 16:18:48 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London
was read on 14 February 2014 11:29:00.

22.

Acknowledgement of letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, requesting certificate
stating that the application has been refused sent on 13 February (Annex C [C-11]):
From: Mike (Gov Connect)
To: xxxx
Sent: 23 April 2014 15:44
Subject: Read: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North
East Lincolnshire Council)
Your message
To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)
Subject: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North East
Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 22 April 2014 14:48:32 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London
was read on 23 April 2014 16:44:20.

23.

The judge's argument in favour of NELC was apparently based on the length of time
elapsing since the Justices' Clerk gave an undertaking to set out in writing the position

regarding the appeal and advising on the next steps which were never acted on (Annex
C [C10], SD #18).
24.

The judge ironically exploited the Magistrates Court's failure to comply with the
relevant procedure rules, thus preventing/delaying the case coming before the high
court, in order to justify granting an order for which NELC fraudulently applied. In a
twist of fate, had the appeal proceeded, it is completely rational the high court would
have made similar judgment as in a case raising the same issue (see Nicolson v
Tottenham Magistrates, SD #2) and found the Magistrates Court's granting of the costs
unlawful. Crucially, had the Magistrates' court not sought to pervert the course of justice
in that appeal (SD #23), the disputed costs would never have been incorporated into my
council tax account (suspended or otherwise) to enable NELC to fraudulently allocate
payment to, in order to engineer a further recovery cycle (and costs) for recovering the
sum.

25.

It was conveyed to the judge that the matter in need of addressing surrounded the issues
raised in the argument he had made in support of NELC, which was the misconduct of
the Justices' Clerk that has led to wasting three years of my time. The efforts set out in
the representations (paras 715, SD #18) to ensure that the case advanced leaves no
doubt that the delay or prevention of the appeal coming before the court was in any way
my responsibility.

OBTAINING MISSING PAPERS


26.

The missing court papers were requested again on 2 November 2015 (after the court
hearing). I was considering the options to take the matter further and wanted the files in
preparation for providing as evidence for whichever route was decided upon. NELC was
able to transfer them on this occasion and on viewing them it was obvious (especially
with regard to exhibit NELC12), that contrary to my initial view, I was disadvantaged
by not having all the papers.

27.

Exhibit NELC12, which contained my letter withdrawing the claim for a mandatory
order and another from the Administrative Court acknowledging that instruction,
provided additional evidence that NELC had wilfully made a statement material in the
proceeding, which was known not to be true. The letters were not copies of the original;
it can be confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the contents of that submission were
obtained from the same source that recorded publicly everything relevant to the matter

(Annex B, SD #18). The source was a public help forum dealing with council tax issues,
the same forum which NELC had sourced the contents of another of its exhibits
NELC11.
28.

The letters contained in exhibit NELC12 had been redacted and matched the entries
that were posted on the public forum (Annex B, SD #24). The forum is the only place
from which those letters could be sourced in that redacted form. The characteristics of
the letters which NELC submitted to the court were identical to the forum posts.

29.

Clearly NELC had not sought the original letters and had presumably as a short cut
referred to the website where all correspondence connected with the matter (albeit
redacted) where conveniently in one place. It is likely that if NELC had made use of the
forum to produce its submission, it would have been informed from the regular updates
posted that the case stated appeal was still very much being pursued.

30.

Whether NELC did refer generally to the forum is not the deciding factor that would
determine that it knowingly made a false statement; it would however reinforce the
allegations. The crux of the matter is that the post from which the content was sourced
(NELC12) was accompanied with some commentary (see below) which reinforced the
matter in itself:
Back almost to square one.
Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely
successful in mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the
draft), it would never have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the
terms of a recognizance at the hearing. It took this process to prompt a response
from the Justices at Grimsby Magistrates' Court.
The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates' Court to
agree terms of a recognizance.

31.

Contents of exhibits NELC10 and NELC 11 where also sourced from public forums
but were produced from screen shots and included information such as the date to
indicate when the websites were accessed. The content in exhibit NELC12 was not
obviously produced from screen shots, but although possible it is much more likely that
the text would simply have been copied and pasted, retaining the same formatting.

32.

These exhibits where referred to in paragraphs 66 and 67 of NELCs Witness Statement


to make the point known to the court that I was aware about the need to make an
election of payment and that I had knowledge about how the Northgate system works.

33.

It is with disbelief that NELC could make the assumption that I intended to allocate
monies to the oldest sum (and the judge agree) when it is self evident from those
exhibits that my disputes, past and present, surround my objection to monies being
allocated that way. Clearly NELC has incriminated itself by submitting material which
fully supports it knowingly misallocating monies to a sum against my express wishes.

34.

The remaining missing court papers all provided the case authority on which NELC
sought to rely in its Witness Statement. Though it was anticipated sourcing these cases
would not cause undue difficulty, the complete judgments were not found, only
references in other cases, which though time consuming, provided an outline of the
issues and enough to piece together a response (paras 4873, SD #18).

35.

Exhibit NELC8 which is referred to in paras 60 and 61 of NELCs Witness Statement


relies on the case; Cory Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Turkish Steamship
"Mecca" 1897 AC 286. In para 61 (Witness Statement) the partial sentence on which
NELC sought to rely was this: When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor
and makes no appropriation to particular items, the creditor has the right of
appropriation and may exercise the right up to the last moment, by action or otherwise.

36.

However, on viewing the exhibit after obtaining it post court hearing, there are several
references to the case which it relied on in exhibit NELC7: Devaynes V Noble 1816
merivale 529 (the Clayton case). NELC relied on that case to defend that its Council
Tax processing system allocates payments correctly if no election is made, i.e., the
earliest debts are paid first (paras 58-59, SD #5).

37.

Returning to exhibit NELC8, it is revealed in the paragraph from which NELC quoted
in part, that the rule in Clayton's case does not apply to a case where there is no
account current between the parties:
When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor and makes no appropriation
to particular items, the creditor has the right of appropriation and may exercise the
right up to the last moment, by action or otherwise, the application of the money is
governed, not by any rigid rule of law, but by the intention of the creditor,
expressed implied or presumed. The rule in Clayton's case, (1816) 1 Mer. 585
does not apply to a case where there is no account current between the parties, nor

where from an account rendered or other circumstances, it appears that the creditor
intended, not to make any appropriation, but to reserve the right.
38.

The judgment in exhibit NELC8 further clarifies the kind of account which the rule in
the Clayton case does not apply to in a reference to Sir W. Grant Master of the Rolls
judgment in Clayton where he distinguished one debt and account type from another:
They were all cases of distinct insulated debts, between which a plain line of
separation could be drawn. But this is the case of a banking account, where all the
sums paid in form one blended fund, the parts of which have no longer any
distinct existence.

39.

The case authority, on which NELCs software supplier bases its allocation rules with
regard to allocating unspecified payments to the oldest debt, cannot apply in a system
whereby the accounts relate, as they do in council tax, to distinct insulated debts,
between which a plain line of separation could be drawn.

40.

Exhibit NELC13 which is referred to in para 72 of NELCs Witness Statement relies


on the case; Leeson v. Leeson (1936) 2 K.B. 156. The context of that case is not clear
from what is detailed in its statement which is limited to the following: an
appropriation of a payment cannot be inferred from an intention in the mind of the
debtor un-communicated to the creditor. It can only be inferred from circumstances
known to both parties.

41.

Again, after obtaining the exhibit and viewing the judgment, it is clear that the authority
on which NELC sought to rely should not have been any assistance as it is obvious from
the circumstances, to which sum payment was intended. Despite not having the exhibit
NELC13, some relevant information was sourced (paras 5361, SD #18).

42.

Not withstanding his reliance on a statement which he knew to be false, the judge acted
outside his powers by granting the order. The regulations governing council tax liability
do not give the court authority to make an order when the defendant has proved that
there is no outstanding debt. No discretion in such cases is given to impose a penalty
(especially not for ones own perverse gratification) which is what the judge did in this
case by allowing the application and granting costs, based on his own opinion differing
from mine about how, and in what manner bills are paid.

43.

He made this obvious by raising irrelevant matters which were no ones business but my
own concerning the number of transactions, in what sum those payments were made and

the method used for paying council tax instalments. He implied that using the
enforcement process as punishment was legitimate for not paying the way NELC
preferred by the concern, which drove him to the point of enquiring if I held a bank
account and why payments werent made by standing order like everyone else.
Evidently, it was for my objection to Direct Debit as a means of paying bills that the
judge viewed it warranted for NELC to exploit its dysfunctional council tax processing
system as a means of defrauding me.
44.

The bias could not have been more obvious when the judge referred to previous
maladministration (Annex J, SD #1), similarly in respect of misallocated payments, for
which 27 days was taken by NELC to respond and resolve the matter, by which time
reminders and a summons were wrongly issued. The facts were distorted out of all
recognition and portrayed in the courtroom to be my fault for NELCs gross error. The
judge was again noticeably irked to the point that he was motivated to make a spurious
statement which was that NELC, as a consequence, had a right to remove the statutory
instalment entitlement for subsequent years liability and demand the full sum up front.

45.

The order was not made because there was a legal obligation, but for what appeared to
be the assistance that imposing a financial penalty might provide in coercing me into
conceding and making payments in line with the NELC's preferred method.

TURNING BLIND EYE TO REPRESENTATIONS CONTESTING COSTS


46.

The Magistrates court has no discretion in the amount of costs it orders in respect of a
complaint made to the justices in the matter of council tax liability. The regulations
restrict the level so that no more than the expenditure incurred by the applicant in
respect of instituting the complaint is rechargeable to the defendant. The breakdown
(Annex F, SD #1) contained indisputable evidence that the vast majority of the costs
claimed were not incurred by NELC in respect of instituting the complaint in my case.

47.

It was explained to him (the judge) that the costs itemised referred largely to council
resources dealing with enquiries, rescheduling and monitoring payment plans etc. and
subsidising bad debt for which none could be attributable to the issue of my summons.
A detailed analysis in this regard had in any event been submitted in the written
evidence (paras 67 and 27117, SD #1) to support that the summons costs as applied

on making complaint could not have been incurred by NELC, as set out in its
breakdown (Annex F, SD #1), therefore fraudulent.
48.

The judge approved the level from a brief glance of the breakdown. There was nothing
in that calculation that could remotely satisfy the court that the expenditure attributed to
its standard costs was referable to the court application at the prescribed time, neither in
my individual case nor as an average of those against whom complaint was made.
However, the spreadsheet is indicative of a breakdown of NELCs expenditure for
council tax enforcement and recovery (paras 6772, SD #1) which would incorporate
impermissible costs. The application, for which NELC may claim costs, simply involves
a process to obtain the courts permission to enforce payment and nothing more. There
is no vehicle through which NELC may lawfully recharge expenditure it incurs to the
defendant beyond that process.

49.

The law further restricts costs with the provision for incrementally applying them, first
in a sum for making complaint and the further amount (if required) on making the
application. Singly applying standard costs in respect of making complaint would be
lawful only if the authority were to forfeit the element of expenditure it incurs
subsequently in respect of the court application.

50.

It is noted that the judge allowed NELC to succeed in pulling the wool by convincing
him that the costs had been incurred and therefore permissible but with no justification
that the expenditure was referable to the relevant legislation. It is without doubt that the
ignorance displayed by the judge was a show put on as a means to impress on the court
that the fraudulent claim was legitimate. It is alleged that the charade was to avoid being
the judge responsible for the inevitable uncovering of the massive scale fraud committed
nationally by local authorities and enabled by Her Majestys Court Service.

51.

His acquiescence was expressed first by the way the figures, though irrelevant, appeared
to him to be comprehensively set out. It is obvious however that the elaborate
presentation was for duping anyone having to scrutinise and endorse the figures. NELC
had even prided itself on the accounts having authenticity in regard their lawfulness by
attaching auditor approval when in fact the figures were not subject to audit and
NELCs external audit contractor (KPMG) was not willing to have a reference to
District Audit on the Councils website. However, it is clear that had the figures been
subject to audit (and it is not seen why they are not) the evidence was such that NELC's
claims were not reasonable in the context of the relevant law which governs costs. It

would therefore have been appropriate that KPMG apply to the court for a declaration
that an item of account is contrary to law under section 17(1) of the Audit Commission
Act 1998.
52.

In another demonstration of over willingness to accept the figure, the judge attributed
justifying the costs on the basis of the materially irrelevant fact that the cost per
summons which on the breakdown presented to him had been rounded down from
63.05 to 60.00. He had, it appears, purposely allowed this to divert attention from the
relevant matter which was that the majority of the costs were impermissible under the
regulations. The judge did not, or it appears he did not read or account for the
representations that showed without any doubt that the vast majority of costs were
unlawful (paras 73115, SD #1).
Inflating the standard costs to factor in bad debt element

53.

NELCs breakdown provided the required data to determine the amount of bad debt
arising from waived or unrecoverable costs that was added to the standard sum. At least
42% of taxpayers against whom complaint was made were summonsed without costs
applied which had the effect of inflating the standard summons costs by around 25 for
those who did have them applied (paras 7982, SD #1).

54.

The breakdown also provided information to inform the person scrutinising it that the
gross recoverable costs under the Council Tax budget was attributable to resources
taken up dealing with queries relating to the recovery. The amount was taken (budget
figure around 0.8m) as a ratio of calls arising from summonses to calls arising from
reminders that do not result in a summons. Based on the Councils computing method,
this adds 18 to the cost per summons. None of this was lawfully incurred by NELC in
respect of my summons simply because the calculation was founded on assumptions
that each person against whom complaint was made had taken up resources by engaging
with staff in some way in matters connected with the summons (paras 8386, SD #1).

55.

Similarly the element attributed to the standard sum from the recoverable costs under
the Debt Recovery budget adds a sum (31) which has been determined unlawfully.
Assumptions are made that each person against whom complaint is made gives cause
for recovery staff to carry out their various functions. In my case no resources were
called upon to negotiate or re-schedule any payment plan and the whole element of costs
relevant to the Debt Recovery budget can not be lawfully justified (paras 87102, SD

#1). The same goes for the Control & Monitoring budget which accounts for around
10 of the standard costs. As a consequence of having no re-scheduled payment plan, it
is fraudulent to claim costs for monitoring one (paras 103111, SD #1).
Costs to be no more than that incurred by the authority in any individual case
56.

The amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case must be no more than that
reasonably incurred by the billing authority (para 51, SD #1). Therefore, if NELC
wanted to take advantage of streamlining the administration process by applying a
standard sum in all cases (paras 4751, SD #1), in order for it to be done lawfully, it
would need to forfeit each element of expenditure it incurs that is not common to every
application (the majority of costs which are accounted for in its breakdown).

57.

In other words, a standard sum could not exceed that incurred by the authority in a case
where the least expenditure is attributed, which would in practice relate to a taxpayer
settling his outstanding debt on receipt of a summons without contacting the council on
any issue. Deriving a figure therefore from the Gross Recoverable costs which is split
between an estimated number of summons, can not be lawful; even less so if the number
of summons is reduced to factor in an estimate for those withdrawn, waived and those in
respect of unrecoverable costs. The least cost case is the only basis on which to
determine a standard sum if the aim is to eliminate the administrative burden of
calculating the costs in each case, whilst at the same time complying with the
regulations which require that the costs be no more than that incurred by the authority in
any individual case.
If the Regulations were applied lawfully, the consequences would be that the majority of
Council Tax (191,730), Debt Recovery (327,480) and the Control & Monitoring
costs (109,380) would not be permissible in respect of re-charging expenditure for
instituting the complaint. What is set-out above should have been enough to alert the
judge that NELC's claims were not reasonable in the context of the relevant law and
should therefore have, as legally required, sought to award lower costs accordingly. The
number of taxpayers summonsed in relation to the monthly council tax liability hearing
held on 2 October 2015 totalled 942. If the standard 60 costs were applied in each case
there would have been raised in excess of 56k which would account for approximately
10 times an amount had they been properly referable to the law governing them.

Unquestionable Bias
58.

Representations submitted to the court argued a case in the context of the relevant
enforcement power which was ignored in its entirety by the judge who made his
decision in favour of NELC from briefly viewing a copy of irrelevant accounts relating
to its council tax enforcement and recovery budget.

59.

The ease with which the judge was swayed in favour of NELC was demonstrated with
the statement that implied that the costs must be reasonable from a reference made to
other authorities standard costs, and that the ruling in Nicolson v Tottenham
Magistrates (SD #2) had not determined that the level was unlawful. From that it is
clear that he had not read/understood (or pretended not to have) the judgment provided
as a supporting document, which at paragraph 57 said; looking to see whether the costs
were broadly in line with costs being charged by other local authorities was all well and
good, but it was not enough to discharge the courts obligations (paras 4751, SD #1).
And in the judgment the distinction was clear at para 52 that establishing that the costs
were reasonably incurred is not the same thing as establishing that the costs were
reasonable in amount.

60.

It is obvious from the comment referring to the Nicolson case that the point had been
missed as the issue did not exclusively revolve around the level. What was provided in
that judgment regarding the relevant regulations was some general guidance as to their
interpretation and scope (para 36, SD #2). The degree to which that guidance and
interpretation extended is evident in the judgment from paragraph 33 onwards. There
was nothing in that breakdown which would suggest anything other than that it being an
account of its expenditure incurred in connection with council tax enforcement and
recovery.
Costs set at levels for improper purposes

61.

It was summarised (paras 118130, SD #1) how NELC historically manipulated costs
unlawfully in order to generate income to meet a number of different objectives. The
apparent blind eye the judge turned to this can not give the public confidence in the
justice system. It is one thing having local authorities operating fraudulently but quite
another when the Magistrates court blatantly endorses it.

62.

In 2001/02 court costs had been set with the admitted intention of encouraging prompt
payment (as well as generating additional income) that came with the threat of a more

severe financial penalty. It is well established that costs should be awarded as


compensation, not as punishment. In R v Highgate Justices ex parte Petrou [1954] 1
ALL ER 406 it was held that costs should not exceed the proper costs incurred and
should not be a penalty.
63.

Another summary set out that in 2002/03 summons costs were increased by 50% in
order to raise additional revenue to meet funding to pay for additional staff to ensure a
backlog of work that had arisen due to changes in the IT system were addressed. In
Attfield v the London Borough of Barnet [2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin), it was held that a
local authority must not attempt to raise revenue where there is no clear statutory power
to do so. In the present case, the statutory power expressly limits costs that may be
claimed to the expenditure incurred by the Council in connection with instituting the
complaint. The decision to increase summons costs did not arise because of an increase
in the cost of instituting the complaint, rather for the clear intention of funding
additional resources to overcome the backlog of work that had arisen in the
administration of Council Tax etc., due to delays in implementing a new IT system.

64.

Another summarised how NELC manipulated court costs to provide additional income
as an alternative to charging for non-statutory services. The summons costs were
increased in preference to an alternative proposal of introducing a charge for garden
waste collections. Summons costs were therefore increased disproportionately, with no
statutory power to do so, in order to plug a gap in its finances for the purposes of
offsetting expenditure for waste services.

65.

Finally the existence of a budgeted income stream for court costs was highlighted which
was evident from published reports showing outturn variances for this income. A report
relating to the 2004/05 financial year indicated that the costs were set at a level such that
a significant surplus was achievable, which in that year amounted to 0.125 million. The
Council had therefore raised revenue for an improper purpose, namely to prop up other
budgets. Apart from being fundamentally unlawful, the whole approach suggests that
the system is clearly open to abuse with income targets unquestionably creating a
perverse incentive to summons.

CONCLUSION
66.

What has been allowed to happen, with the court as an accomplice can only be
described as daylight robbery committed with arrogant impunity by NELC. There is no

doubt that the judge had acted with intent to pervert the course of justice as he had
before him indisputable evidence that a false and corrupt statement had been made.
Granting an order therefore made him complicit in NELC's criminal actions that sought
to exploit a complaint to the court for the purposes of defrauding me with an attached
claim of costs.
67.

The criminally obtained court order was not the only issue, as the costs awarded were
fraudulent in amount. The only logical reason for the judge denying existence of the
representations contesting them is because had they been considered, its not seen how
they could have been feasibly challenged. The judges responsibility entailed overseeing
the full transfer of 56,000 from defendants to NELC in respect of that one hearing no
matter how fraudulent the claim. A proper consideration of the evidence therefore
would have made that job impossible and why it was ignored. The crucial role played by
Grimsby Magistrates court in ensuring the income generated for NELC continues at
current levels would explain why in respect of the High Court application appealing
these costs the court has prevented proceedings for three years through means of lies
and deception.

68.

There are a number of correspondence itemised in the list of supporting documents


relating to previous concerns raised with Humberside police on a similar theme which
were never properly investigated then (SD #2531). The same can be said for concerns
relating to bailiff fraud (not included). Humberside polices Economic crime unit has,
over a number of years, concentrated its effort into challenging the evidence gathered to
avoid dealing with the allegations thus protecting the accused and enabling them
without consequence to continue their criminal activity. It would therefore be reasonable
to suspect that Humberside police, along with Grimsby Magistrates court and NELC is
complicit in the fraudulent raising of revenue through unscrupulous means. In light of
that, it would seem a conflict of interest if Humberside police were to deal with these
allegations and so it would seem a reasonable suggestion for another police force to do
so. This is especially the case with it being my intention to pursue action against all
those officers who have been party to the misconduct, cover-ups, negligence and lies
etc. There is in any event, no reason to have confidence that the matter would be
properly dealt with by Humberside polices Economic crime officers as Ive found to
my cost from several years being fobbed off by them.

69.

The allegations which point to a criminal conspiracy between NELC and the court are
summarised below:
NELC for committing;
a. Perjury by making a statement (material in the proceedings) that was
known to be false with the intention misleading the court to justify
misallocating payment to a disputed sum
b. Fraud by engineering default for the current year enabling a further court
application for the purposes of attaching a claim of costs and potential
bailiff charges which have been threatened already in a letter dated 8
November 2015
c. Fraud by claiming a level of costs both in my individual case and in
general which are not provided for under the Council Tax (Administration
and Enforcement) Regulations 1992

District Judge Daniel Curtis for;


a. Perverting the course of justice knowing that before him was evidence
that a false and corrupt statement had been made
b. Complicity in NELCs fraudulent application for liability order by,
i) granting the order knowing that a false statement had been made
ii) ignoring evidence contesting payment allocation laws were breached
ii) ignoring evidence contesting costs (level) breaching the Council Tax
(Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992
70.

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated this 2nd day of December 2015

Signed:

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<ProfessionalStandards@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
02 December 2015 16:24
Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015.pdf
Fw: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015

Dear Sir/Madam
I have a letter dated 1 December 2015 from DCI Scaife (ref: CO 432/15) explaining the position regarding the
complaint made about the conduct of an officer from Humberside police force.
There is no mention however, about the matter concerning the crimes I reported which were that two false
witness statements were made by members of the public.
I trust Humberside police will be investigation these allegations and would therefore appreciate the force
giving me assurance that action is being taken.
Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<headofoffice@jaco.gsi.gov.uk>
02 December 2015 17:56
Conduct Ombudsman jaco 2 Dec 15.pdf
Complaint

Dear Sir/Madam
Please find attached complaint which I wish to escalate from a complaint made to the Judicial Conduct
Investigations Office.
Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Adam (JACO)" <Adam.Jones@jaco.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
03 December 2015 15:40
RE: Complaint

Dear Mr

Thank you for your email and attached completed complaint form.
I will now request your complaint file from the JCIO and you will be written to again when it has been received
and considered.
Yours sincerely,
Adam Jones
JACO

07/07/2016

Conduct Complaint Form


Use this form to particularise the details of your complaint to the Ombudsman about
how the Judicial Complaints Investigations Office (JCIO), a Tribunal President or
Magistrates Advisory Committee handled your complaint. You can complete this
form online or by sending it to us at the address at the end of this form.
Final Checklist
1. Have you complained to the JCIO, a Tribunal President or a Magistrates Advisory
Committee?

Yes

No

Please state the name of the judicial office holder you complained about:
District Judge Daniel Curtis
Please provide the details of the person/office that dealt with your complaint:
Mr Langworth
Yes

2. Is your complaint with one of the above finished?

No
Yes

3. Are you unhappy with how your complaint to one of the above bodies
was handled?

No

(See
page 4)
(See
page 5)

Only if you have answered Yes to all these questions are you ready to complete this form
You should make your complaint within 28 days of receiving the letter from the JCIO, Tribunal President or
Magistrates Advisory Committee, notifying you of their decision about your complaint. The Ombudsman is
not required under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to consider complaints outside this period, and will
only do so in exceptional circumstances. These should be explained in section 4 of this form.
1. Your Details
Mr

Mrs

Miss

Ms

Other (please specify):

Name:
Address:
Postcode: AA00 A00
Email:
If you provide us with an email address we will use it as the main source of contacting you unless you advise us otherwise.

Contact phone number(s):


2. Permission
If the Ombudsman decides that he is able to deal with your complaint, he will need your permission
to contact the JCIO, a Tribunal President or Magistrates Advisory Committee. In most cases it will be
impractical to proceed with an investigation if you withhold permission.
I confirm that I am content for the Judicial Appointments and Conduct
Ombudsmans Office to contact the JCIO, Tribunal President or Magistrates
Advisory Committee about my complaint.

Yes


No

I have read and understood the Conduct Leaflet and understand that the
Ombudsman can only look at the way in which my complaint was handled by the
JCIO, Tribunal President or Magistrates Advisory Committee.


Yes
No

3. Your signature
Signature:

Date: 2 December 2015

4. Your complaint
Your complaint must be set out concisely on this page only. You must give specific details, illustrating
exactly why you believe the JCIO, Tribunal President or Magistrates Advisory Committees handling of
your complaint fell short of the standards you could reasonably expect.
The Ombudsman will investigate the issues that you provide below if he considers your complaint
warrants investigation. He will not be able to deal with your complaint unless you particularise your
concerns on this form. You may provide supporting documents if necessary.
The Judicial Conduct Investigations Office explained that my complaint could not be accepted for
consideration because it did not contain an allegation of misconduct on the part of a judicial office
holder. I disagree completely. It was in anticipation of this view that I deliberately emphasised that my
complaint did not constitute an appeal of the courts decision, but a complaint made in accordance with
the Judicial Conduct (Judicial and other office holders) Rules 2014 about the judges conduct on several
counts which coincided with the misconduct descriptions set out on the complaint application web page.
Those were itemised as follows:
i) Professional Misconduct
ii) Criminal Allegations
iii) Inappropriate Comments / Discrimination
iv) Misuse of Judicial Powers
The Caseworker was of the opinion that my complaint surrounded an appeal I had made to the High
Court which was still to be determined. That was not my complaint. Details were only included as it was
a relevant factor in the matter.
The Caseworker gives an example where he considers a judge's bias is not a conduct matter but
something for which the victim of that bias should be put to the trouble and expense of appealing to a
higher court. There must be some incentive for a judge in the Magistrates' court to conduct himself
properly, like having an effective watchdog, otherwise the only message that is sent out is that the
hierarchical court system exists as an excuse for incompetence in the lower courts as they can claim
fairness of the system with it being open to you to make use of the casino justice system by appealing a
botched decision to a higher court.

5. What are you hoping to achieve from your complaint?


am disgusted with how the justice system operates. There is simply no accountability for judges
making appallingly bad decisions with the emphasis on bias towards the authorities. If what I've seen of
it is typical I hope that my compliant goes some way to reforming the system which is apparently corrupt
to the core. A start would be investigate why the judge in my case granted a liability order knowing that
a false statement had been made by the claimant with the intention to defraud me.

This form can also be found on our website at www.judicialombudsman.gov.uk and can be downloaded and
sent to us by email to headofoffice@jaco.gsi.gov.uk
If you wish to complete this form by hand, please send it to the Judicial Appointments and Conduct
Ombudsman, 9th Floor, The Tower, 102 Petty France, London SW1H 9AJ.
If you have a disability, if English is not your first language, or if you need advice on how to complete this
form please contact us on 020 3334 2900 or email headofoffice@jaco.gsi.gov.uk

Page 1 of 1

From:
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
To:
<
@gmail.com>
Sent:
03 December 2015 15:54
Subject: RE: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR

Mr
With regard to your email below. Your complaint is being dealt with in accordance with the Police Reform
Act. Your complaint is being held sub judice at this time as there are outstanding criminal proceedings. The
correct forum for you to challenge the evidence given by any of the witnesses is through the court. It is not
practice to investigate an allegation such as you have made unless the magistrates or judge makes comment
about the evidence and recommends that the Force investigates the matter unless there are other
aggravating circumstances to make an investigation imperative. In this case you have not provided any
evidence, other than your opinion, which would suggest that it is necessary at this time to carry out an
investigation.
I would re-iterate that if you wish to challenge the evidence the witnesses have provided the correct forum
is the court system. It would be considered as an abuse of the complaints process to investigate the
allegation you have made under the Police complaints process as the situation stands now.
Regards
Tony Walmsley

Tony Walmsley 8637


Caseworker
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police HQ
Priory Road
Hull
HU5 5SF

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>; "Walmsley, Tony 8637"
<Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
03 December 2015 17:21
Re: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Mr Walmsly
Humberside police is the appropriate organisation to report a crime. I have reported a crime and therefore
expect to have proof that the crime has been recorded, irrespective of the Police Reform Act. Whichever way
Humberside police are going to get out of dealing with the matter after that is another issue.
Please provide evidence that the crimes I reported regarding two false witness statements made by members
of the public have been recorded.
Your sincerely

08/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
To:
<
@gmail.com>
Sent:
07 December 2015 12:19
Subject: RE: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR

Mr
The Professional Standards Branch deal with complaints against the Police as opposed to the recording of
alleged crimes.
You consider that certain aspects of your complaint amount to a crime whereby you should receive a crime
number. I have sought advice from the staff who deal with the recording of crime who advise me that an
allegation of perjury is a state based crime and would only be given a crime report number once we were
satisfied that all the requirements to prove the alleged crime are in place. This partly relates to the giving of
evidence at court which clearly has not happened at this time. I refer to my original response in relation to
the fact that the court is the correct place for you to challenge the evidence of the witnesses.
Regards
Tony Walmsley

From:
To:

Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>;
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<owen.bowcott@guardian.co.uk>
07 December 2015 15:49
Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Re: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Mr Walmsley
You have referred to criminal proceedings, sub judice etc. with regards an impending court case.
The circumstance surrounding the matter you're referring to are out of the ordinary because the judge dealing
with the case (District Judge Daniel Curtis) has also been reported by me to the police for perverting the
course of justice in other proceedings.
I have hard evidence that North East Lincolnshire council made a false and corrupt statement, material in the
proceedings, in order to exploit a complaint to the court for the purposes of defrauding me with an attached
claim of costs. The judge had been made aware of this and therefore complicit by granting the order knowing
that a false statement had been made.
Turning to your 3 December 2015 email in which you refer to having "not provided any evidence, other than
[my] opinion". I'm at a loss to know how I'm supposed to respond to that. Other than having a schizophrenic
condition (of which I'm unaware) or my mind was altered to such a degree by some powerful hallucinogenic
(which it was not), there is no question about it, those statements made by the two members of the public,
who I believe are Husband and Wife, contained outright lies.
If Humberside police's focus is so much concentrated on evidence, I seriously suggest that the force come up
with some evidence itself with respect to the matter of which I'm charged.

08/07/2016

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Humberside Police
Professional Standards Branch
Police Headquarters
Priory Road HU5 5SF
Tel No: 01482 578133
Fax No: 01482 305004
Switchboard: 101
This matter is being dealt with by:
Caseworker - Mr T Walmsley
psb@humberside.pnn.police.uk
www.humberside.police.uk

8 December 2015

CO/00461/15/TMW/LAW
Mr
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

Dear Mr
May I refer to the complaint received on 12 November 2015 about the conduct of
an officer(s) from this Force.
This matter has been formally recorded under the Police Reform Act 2002 as
amended by the Police Reform & Social Responsibility Act 2011. I enclose a copy
of the complaint as it has been recorded for your information.
The file has been passed to a caseworker who will do some initial evidence
gathering in relation to your complaint before it is forwarded to an investigating
officer. You will be informed in due course as to who the investigating officer will be.
This process would normally be completed within 28 days however if there is any
further delay you will be updated accordingly.
Should you change your address before the completion of the enquiry, I would ask
you to notify this office at the above address as soon as possible, to enable us to
keep you updated with the progress of the enquiry.

Yours sincerely,

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Professional Standards Branch

Complainant Report
Case Reference

CO/00461/15

Case Recorded

08/12/15

COMPLAINANT
Title
Surname
Forenames

Mr

Address
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

ALLEGATION(S)
No
Recorded
Type
Location
Allegation
Allegation Result

1
08/12/15
Other neglect or failure of duty
The Hub
The complainant alleges that an officer wrongly informed him that a matter
which he wanted to report is a civil matter, when he believes it to be a criminal
matter.

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
11 December 2015 11:41
Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015.pdf; Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Please acknowledge receipt of this email and ensure the attached is seen (and following emails) by the Legal
Advisor and JPs for a hearing in court 2 on 15 September 2015, at 10:00 am.
For the avoidance of doubt I do not consider District Judge Daniels a fit and proper person to hear the
case. Moreover, I consider the court as a whole should be under investigation for crimes of complicity in
defrauding the public along with Humberside police and North East Lincolnshire Council.

08/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
11 December 2015 11:55
Fw: Crime Reporting Submission (Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2))

----- Original Message ----From:


To: Morley, Gillian 9614
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 9:48 AM
Subject: Re: Crime Reporting Submission
Dear Ms Morley
I am in disbelief that Humberside police have arrived at the conclusion that fraud is not a police matter. I have
not heard such an absurd statement since the force said the same with regards bailiff firms defrauding council
taxpayers.
Your suggestion that I am put to the expense of enriching the legal profession when I am in any
event contributing to fund the police out of the very tax which the council wishes to defraud from me has some
irony to it.
I am left obviously with no option than to submit a complaint about whoever within the force made this
decision. However, I would much prefer the person against whom I make the complaint to be the Chief
Constable so that any investigation will not be conducted by the force itself in the hope of removing the 'sham'
element which is associated with these matters. Therefore, please escalate this matter for the attention of the
Chief Constable.
Yours sincerely

----- Original Message ----From: Morley, Gillian 9614


To:
@gmail.com
Sent: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 11:21 PM
Subject: Crime Reporting Submission

Mr
With regards to your report that was submitted to Humberside Police on 08/11/2015 as follows:
North East Lincolnshire Council produced a false witness statement (thereby committing perjury) with
regards a council tax liability hearing at Grimsby Magistrates' Court. The District Judge (Daniel Curtis) was
aware that the evidence surrounded a false and corrupt statement, but nevertheless granted the council
a liability order to enforce a fraudulent sum which presently stands at 120.00. This sum is likely to
increase if the council appoints its criminal firm of bailiffs, Rossendales. My allegations are that the
council has committed perjury with the intent to fraudulently obtain money from me by the use of
Grimsby Magistrates court and that Judge Daniel Curtis has perverted the course of justice by being
complicit to that crime.
Please be advised that this is not a Police matter and is civil which I suggest you seek further advice from
a solicitor/legal advisor.
Command Hub
Humberside Police

08/07/2016

Page 1 of 4

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
11 December 2015 11:58
Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Fw: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]
(Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2))

----- Original Message ----From:


To: Walmsley, Tony 8637 ; pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk ; !enquiries ; owen.bowcott@guardian.co.uk
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2015 2:49 PM
Subject: Re: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]
Mr Walmsley
You have referred to criminal proceedings, sub judice etc. with regards an impending court case.
The circumstance surrounding the matter you're referring to are out of the ordinary because the judge dealing
with the case (District Judge Daniel Curtis) has also been reported by me to the police for perverting the
course of justice in other proceedings.
I have hard evidence that North East Lincolnshire council made a false and corrupt statement, material in the
proceedings, in order to exploit a complaint to the court for the purposes of defrauding me with an attached
claim of costs. The judge had been made aware of this and therefore complicit by granting the order knowing
that a false statement had been made.
Turning to your 3 December 2015 email in which you refer to having "not provided any evidence, other than
[my] opinion". I'm at a loss to know how I'm supposed to respond to that. Other than having a schizophrenic
condition (of which I'm unaware) or my mind was altered to such a degree by some powerful hallucinogenic
(which it was not), there is no question about it, those statements made by the two members of the public,
who I believe are Husband and Wife, contained outright lies.
If Humberside police's focus is so much concentrated on evidence, I seriously suggest that the force come up
with some evidence itself with respect to the matter of which I'm charged.

----- Original Message ----From: Walmsley, Tony 8637


To:

Sent: Monday, December 07, 2015 11:19 AM


Subject: RE: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


Mr
The Professional Standards Branch deal with complaints against the Police as opposed to the recording of
alleged crimes.
You consider that certain aspects of your complaint amount to a crime whereby you should receive a crime
number. I have sought advice from the staff who deal with the recording of crime who advise me that an
allegation of perjury is a state based crime and would only be given a crime report number once we were
satisfied that all the requirements to prove the alleged crime are in place. This partly relates to the giving of
evidence at court which clearly has not happened at this time. I refer to my original response in relation to
the fact that the court is the correct place for you to challenge the evidence of the witnesses.

Regards
Tony Walmsley

Tony Walmsley 8637


Caseworker
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police HQ

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


_____________________________________________________________________________
From: [mailto:@gmail.com]
Sent: 03 December 2015 16:22
To: !enquiries <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>; Walmsley, Tony 8637
<Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
Subject: Re: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]
Mr Walmsly
Humberside police is the appropriate organisation to report a crime. I have reported a crime and therefore
expect to have proof that the crime has been recorded, irrespective of the Police Reform Act. Whichever way
Humberside police are going to get out of dealing with the matter after that is another issue.
Please provide evidence that the crimes I reported regarding two false witness statements made by
members of the public have been recorded.
Your sincerely

----- Original Message ----From: Walmsley, Tony 8637


To: <
@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:54 PM
Subject: RE: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


Mr
With regard to your email below. Your complaint is being dealt with in accordance with the Police
Reform Act. Your complaint is being held sub judice at this time as there are outstanding criminal
proceedings. The correct forum for you to challenge the evidence given by any of the witnesses is
through the court. It is not practice to investigate an allegation such as you have made unless the
magistrates or judge makes comment about the evidence and recommends that the Force investigates
the matter unless there are other aggravating circumstances to make an investigation imperative. In
this case you have not provided any evidence, other than your opinion, which would suggest that it is
necessary at this time to carry out an investigation.
I would re-iterate that if you wish to challenge the evidence the witnesses have provided the correct
forum is the court system. It would be considered as an abuse of the complaints process to investigate
the allegation you have made under the Police complaints process as the situation stands now.
Regards
Tony Walmsley

Tony Walmsley 8637


Caseworker
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police HQ

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


_____________________________________________________________________________
Sent: 02 December 2015 15:25
To: PSB SPOC box <TempProfesionalStandards@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; !enquiries
<enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>; SPOC PCC <PCC@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
Subject: Fw: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015
Dear Sir/Madam
I have a letter dated 1 December 2015 from DCI Scaife (ref: CO 432/15) explaining the position
regarding the complaint made about the conduct of an officer from Humberside police force.
There is no mention however, about the matter concerning the crimes I reported which were that two
false witness statements were made by members of the public.
I trust Humberside police will be investigation these allegations and would therefore appreciate the force
giving me assurance that action is being taken.

Yours sincerely
.

----- Original Message ----From:


To: ProfessionalStandards@humberside.pnn.police.uk
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2015 7:35 AM
Subject: Fw: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015
Dear Sir/Madam
Would you please acknowledge receiving this email and attached complaint and provide me with crime
numbers to which these reported offences have been designated in order to be satisfied that they are to
be investigated.

Yours sincerely

----- Original Message ----From:


To: ProfessionalStandards@humberside.pnn.police.uk
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 2:13 PM
Subject: Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015
Dear Sir/Madam
Please find attached completed complaint form in regards my concerns about suspected incitement to
commit perjury.
(Police complaint 8 Nov 2015.pdf)

Please note I have also set out details with regards two false witness statements. I wish to confirm that
my complaint constitutes an allegation of perjury in regards those statements. I trust Humberside police
will be investigation these allegations and would therefore appreciate the force providing me with crime
numbers.

Yours sincerely

08/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
11 December 2015 16:01
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Good afternoon Mr
I acknowledge receipt of the email.
The District Judge will be trying your case on Tuesday.
A direction was made at the first hearing that you are prohibited from cross-examining the 2 civilian witnesses
in person.
The court has appointed a solicitor to conduct cross-examination on your behalf.
Regards

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>"
"Res - Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>
17 December 2015 20:00
Formal Complaint - 17 December 15.pdf
Formal Complaint

Dear Sir/Madam

Please find attached my formal complaint.

Your sincerely

08/07/2016

North East Lincolnshire Council


Finance Department
Civic Offices Knoll Street
Cleethorpes
North East Lincolnshire
DN35 8LN

XY Xxxxxxx Yyyyy
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
AB12 3XY

17 December 2015
Dear Sir/Madam

Re: Council tax Ref: 550xxxxxxx Formal Complaint

Firstly I wish to bring it to the Councils attention that the time responding to correspondence
regarding my council tax account is unacceptable. I sent an email on 10 November 2015 and over 5
weeks later, the council has still not responded.
I thought a record had been set for the longest response time when on 16 October 2014 I emailed
the same department and had to wait until 12 November to receive a reply. In which time a number
of council tax recovery steps had been taken which would have been obvious were unnecessary had
the council attended to the query sooner and corrected its error.
The second issue I am raising concerns the e-mails content. If you locate the query I sent on
10.11.15 it will be clear I have alleged that the council fraudulently obtained a liability order from
Grimsby Magistrates court by committing perjury, and did so in order to enforce a sum which, if it
had conducted its affairs lawfully, and not the unscrupulous way it has become accustomed, would
not be entitled.
I expect by now the council has had sufficient time to consider its actions and will (notwithstanding
the criminal implications) attend to my account by removing the fraudulent costs and offer an
appropriate sum of compensation. I suggest in the first matter, it do this by applying under the
relevant legislation to have the Magistrates court quash the liability order.
I also expect a response to the email regarding the allocation of monies to the years account which
I specify.

X. Yyyyy

NOT PROTECTIVELY

MARKED

Humberside Police
Professional Standards Branch

Communities,

Police Headquarters
__ Priory Road
Hull, HU5 5SF
Switchboard: 101
Tel: 01482578343
Fax: 01482 305004

Criminais

This matter is being dealt with by:


PC 2389 Caroline Middleton
psb@humberside.pnn.police.uk
www.humberside.police.uk

CO 432/15

17th

December 2015

Dear Mr
With reference to the complaint which you made on 8th November 2015 about the
conduct of an officer from this Force.
I note that the court case has been concluded, which means that your complaint can
now be dealt with. In order to progress your complaint please contact PC 2389
Caroline Middleton on the above telephone number between 8am and 4pm
(weekdays only).
If no reply is received from you within 28 days of the date of this letter, or, having
responded you fail to keep any subsequent appointment that is made, it will be
assumed you do not wish to pursue the matter further and the file will be closed.

Yours sincerely

tfJO"
fb Scaife
Detective Chief Inspector

NOT PROTECTIVELY

MARKED

NOT PROTECTIVELY

MARKED

Humberside Police
Professional Standards Branch
Poiice Headquarters
Priory Road
Hull HU55SF
Te1No:01482
560101
Fax No: 01482 305004
Switchboard: 101

Communities,

Criminals,

Makififl

9 Difference

This matter is being dealt with by:

Inspector 5521 Harvey


Hessle Police Station
psb@humberside.pnn.police.uk
www.humhArsirlA.nolicA.uk

CO 461/15

DearM __

17th

December 2015

With reference to the complaint you made on 12th November 2015.


I write to inform you that your complaint has been formally recorded under the Police
Reform Act 2002 as amended by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act
2011 and in accordance with that legislation I enclose a copy of the record of
complaint for your information.
In accordance with the Acts the complaint is considered suitable for Local Resolution
and the file has been forwarded to Inspector 5521 Harveyat Hessle Police Station to
be dealt with. You will be contacted in due course.
It is important to note that if you fail to cooperate with the Investigating Officer this
may have an adverse effect on the outcome of your complaint.
Should you change your address before the completion of the enquiry, I would ask
you to notify this office at the above address as soon as possible, to enable us to
keep you updated with the progress of the enquiry.
Yours sincerely
",..c

,;~:::--,

lC Scaife
\l

Detective Chief Inspector

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<Alan.Harvey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
20 December 2015 20:18
Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Perjury to commit fraud - CO 461/15

Dear Mr Harvey
I have a letter dated 17 December 2015 regarding case reference CO 461/15 which was recorded 8
December 2015. I'm aware that the issue has been considered suitable for Local Resolution and the file
forwarded to yourself to deal with. The matter concerns a complaint about an officer wrongly informing me that
a crime I have reported is a civil matter.
I have read through the information document "Key facts: local resolution" and strongly believe that this matter
is not suitable to be dealt with by this process.
In the period between making my complaint and it being recorded I have done a significant amount of work
putting together a statement after being advised by Police Sergeant Graeme Smithey in an email 13
November 2015 which contained the following:
"I would advise that you collate all evidence and intelligence that would support the claims you are
making against the court."
For the avoidance of doubt, it might be helpful if I stressed that allegations of perjury were levelled against
North East Lincolnshire Council for presenting a false witness statement, this is additional to the allegations
made about Grimsby Magistrates' Court for perverting the course of justice. As set out in the introduction of
the attached statement, the association with the Civil Jurisdiction.. of the Magistrates Courts Act, does not
make the matter civil. Perjury is punishable as an offence whether it occurs in criminal or civil proceedings and
the consequences are in this case that a false statement was made in order to commit an act of fraud.
The process described in the 'Key facts' document will not get the result I intend to achieve. However, the
attached statement (and supporting documents) provide the evidence required to justify that a full
investigation is carried out in order to satisfy the Crown Prosecution Service that a successful conviction could
be secured.
Further discussion to draw up an action plan is unnecessary and a waste of recourses in the light of the
evidence already produced. The process in any event will be a back covering exercise which would continue,
for example, if the right exercised to appeal a negative outcome.
Even in the unlikely event that the complaint is upheld, none of the consequences set out in the key facts
document appear to hold the force accountable in the way I require, which is to consider the allegations a
police matter for which a proper investigate is undertaken.

Yours sincerely

09/07/2016

Chief Executive & Strategic Director Of Resources


Rob Walsh

www.nelincs.gov.uk
Mr
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

21st December 2015

Dear Mr
RE: Council Tax Account - 5501
Thank you for your correspondence received 17th December 2015 the content of
which has been noted.
Firstly may I apologise that you have not received an answer to your
correspondence received 10th November 2015.
On the 13th November 2015 a reply to your correspondence was ready to send to
you. I enclose this letter for your perusal.
Unfortunately I was taken ill and did not return to the office until the 14th
December 2015.
Due to this the letter enclosed was not posted and I apologise that you did not
receive it.
At this stage the Council has not taken your correspondence as a formal complaint
for the following reasons:
This first part of your complaint relates to the late reply to your correspondence
which I have explained above.

Chief Executive & Strategic Director Of Resources


Rob Walsh

www.nelincs.gov.uk
The second part of your complaint relates to the Council allegedly obtaining a
fraudulent liability order against you. This part of your complaint does not fall
within the scope of the Councils Corporate Complaints procedure as the Liability
Order was granted by the Grimsby Magistrates Court at a hearing that you were
present at.
Once again I apologise for the lateness of the reply and if the above and
enclosed is not satisfactory then the Council will commence with a Stage 1
complaint. However, it should be noted that the main aspects of your complaint
cannot and will not be addressed through the Corporate Feedback Policy for the
reasons above.
I hope that the above clarifies matters for you.
If you have any further queries regards the above then please do not hesitate to
contact me on 01472 325790.
Your sincerely

Neil Smith
Debt Management Manager

Chief Executive & Strategic Director Of Resources


Rob Walsh

www.nelincs.gov.uk
Mr
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

13th November 2015

Dear Mr
RE: Council Tax Account - 5501
Thank you for your correspondence received 10th November 2015 the content of
which has been noted.
You correctly note that at present the balance of your Council Tax Account is
302.00.
You state the following in your correspondence;
'120.00 therefore does not relate to my current year's council tax liability.
60.00 of that sum relates to summons costs from November 2012 which are
suspended pending a high court appeal; the remaining 60.00 relates to a sum
which NELC obtained in an attached claim of costs in a fraudulent application for
liability order. '
With regards to the above statement I can confirm the following:
The 60.00 which you state relates to cost incurred in November 2012 has
already been paid by you. This was made categorically clear to you at your
Liability Hearing on the 30th October 2015. This means that the 60.00 amount is
for your current years liability and is an amount outstanding that needs to be paid
to clear your 2015 / 2016 liability.

Chief Executive & Strategic Director Of Resources


Rob Walsh

www.nelincs.gov.uk
The further 60.00 was for cost incurred in obtaining the Liability order on the
30th October 2015 for non-payment of your current years Council Tax. Again
this amount relates to your current years liability.
Given the information above it would indicate that the full 302.00 relates to your
2015/2016 Council Tax Liability and the reasonable costs incurred in obtaining
the Liability for the period of the 01st April 2015 to the 31st March 2016.
You further state in your correspondence;
'I am writing to make it categorically clear that any payment I make on my
account (whether that sum matches an instalment amount) my express election
is for that payment to be allocated to the current year's liability. This applies also
to future year's, unless there are express instructions (in writing) to the contrary.
The previous explanation above details the amounts outstanding for your 2015/
2016 liability and cost incurred.
You express your election that you wish for your payments to be made to your
current years liability.
As outlined above there are two parts to your indebtedness to the Council.
Firstly the Liability outstanding, it has been proved in Court and a liability order
granted that you had not made payment to your Current years Council tax as per
the statutory instalments and as per the explanation above, it can be clearly seen
that your liability still outstanding for this year is 242.00. This would be the
amount needed to clear the actual liability.
Secondly, as per the explanation above 60.00 of the 302.00 is that of
reasonable cost incurred in obtaining the liability order on the 30th October 2015.
I note that you make your election that any payment made is put towards your
current years liability.

Chief Executive & Strategic Director Of Resources


Rob Walsh

www.nelincs.gov.uk
In answer to your election I can confirm the following, as there is only the 2015/
2016 plus cost outstanding the allocation /appropriation of the 2 payments you
highlight in your correspondence will be made according to your election.
However as these payments will not clear the 2015 / 2016 liability including costs
you may incur further costs if North East Lincolnshire Council wish to pursue
further avenues to recover the outstanding amount due.
With regards to next years and further years Council Tax payments it is your
responsibility to pay as per the statutory instalments outlined on your bill.
At this point there may be more than one liable period outstanding so you will
have to make your election at the time of payment as per the case authorities
relied upon in your Liability Hearing on the 30th October 2015.
If you fail to do so then statutory notices will be served in accordance with the
relevant Council Tax legislation. However I must advise that if you do contact the
Council on receipt of the notice then we will be pleased to action any election you
make at the time.
I am aware at this point that you have been sent a Special Arrangement Letter (I
have enclosed a copy for your perusal) outlining payments to be made to your
outstanding liability and costs and hope that you find the arrangement an
amicable solution to clearing your outstanding liability.
If you require any further clarity regards the above then please do not hesitate to
contact me on 01472 25790.

Your sincerely

Neil Smith
Debt Management Manager

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<caroline.middleton@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
22 December 2015 16:15
Defence to public order charge.pdf; Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015.pdf
Perjury and Incitement to commit Perjury - CO 432/15

Dear Ms Middleton
I have a letter dated 17 December 2015 regarding a complaint I made about the conduct of an officer on 8
November 2015 (reference CO 432/15).
In order to progress the complaint I have been asked to contact you by telephone, however, this means of
communication is not convenient and is why I am making contact by email.
As you may already be aware, the complaint concerns my suspicion of an officer inciting a witness to commit
perjury. Also connected with this is a crime I have reported, about which there is no doubt. The two witnesses
whom I suspect the officer has incited to commit perjury have in fact made false and corrupt statements
material in a case which I have been found guilty to charges that I am innocent of.
I therefore wish to be reassured that these crimes are also to be investigated.
I have attached the witness statement that was submitted to the Magistrates court and the complaint
submitted to Humberside police (Police complaint 8 Nov 2015.pdf).
Yours sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Middleton, Caroline 2389" <Caroline.Middleton@humberside.pnn.police.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
22 December 2015 16:24
RE: Perjury and Incitement to commit Perjury - CO 432/15

Good Afternoon Mr ,
Thank you for your email. Corresponding by email is no issue, I will update the file that this is what you
would prefer.
I will now ensure your file is processed and allocated to an Investigating officer. I will then email you and
update you with who this is and where they are based.
The Investigator will then make contact with you and you will be able to discuss the complaint and agree
what will be investigated within the complaint.
Due to the upcoming Christmas break it will now be the New Year when this file is allocated.
Thank you for contacting us and I hope you have a nice Christmas.
Kind Regards
Caroline
PC 2389 Caroline Middleton
Investigating Officer
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police

09/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
22 December 2015 17:14
Police complaint - 8 Nov 2015.pdf; Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Fw: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Sir/Madam
I have was dragged out of my home by two people impersonating police officer this morning and imprisoned
then taken to court in connection with the case referred to in this email's subject line.
The person sitting on the bench suggested I had failed to appear without good reason on the 15 December
2015. There was good reason for not attending as set out in the email below which was sent to the court.
I have no idea what the prosecution was talking about (I could not hear him). All I know is that I'm expected to
pay several hundred pounds for a charge I'm innocent of. I require details of the hearing that took place today;
for example, who was sitting on the bench? Hwo was prosecuting? Why was I not allowed legal
representation?
That will do for a start.
Your sincerely

.
----- Original Message ----From:
To: hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk
Sent: Friday, December 11, 2015 10:41 AM
Subject: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)
Please acknowledge receipt of this email and ensure the attached is seen (and following emails) by the Legal
Advisor and JPs for a hearing in court 2 on 15 September 2015, at 10:00 am.
For the avoidance of doubt I do not consider District Judge Daniels a fit and proper person to hear the
case. Moreover, I consider the court as a whole should be under investigation for crimes of complicity in
defrauding the public along with Humberside police and North East Lincolnshire Council.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"HU-Grimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
23 December 2015 11:46
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Please provide details of the hearing that took place on 22 December; for example, who was sitting on the
bench? Who was prosecuting? Why was I not allowed legal representation?
I also require the same information regarding the 15 December 2015 hearing.
I would prefer that information sooner rather than later because I wish to report a crime of fraud and consider
all those mentioned are complicit.

09/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
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Attach:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
23 December 2015 17:20
APPEAL.PDF
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr
In response to your e-mail of 23rd December 2015 I can inform you that your case was dealt with by Deputy
District Judge Pascoe.
The Prosecutor was a solicitor employed by the Crown Prosecution Service.
I am unable to assist as to why you were not Legally Represented.
If you wish to appeal to the Crown Court against the conviction/or sentence I attached the required form for
you to complete.
Please note that you have 21 days from 22nd December 2015 in which to appeal

Yours sincerely
G P Townell
Legal Team Manager

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
24 December 2015 10:56
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Ms Jones
Thank you, however, I need to know the name of the CPS solicitor, and if it was the same person who was
prosecuting on the day of the hearing (15 Dec) for which I was found guilty.
Was the judge Andrew Pascoe also on the bench on the 15th?
Who was the solicitor (name not just firm) who was apparently cross examining the witnesses/ arresting
officer, Police Constable Thomas Blake 1131, on the 15th?
I also need details about the two people who falsely claimed they were the police who drove me to court on 22
Dec 2015 (their employment details/self employed/who they are contracted to and their titles etc.)
What have I been found guilty of?
Do I have a criminal record as considered by the system?
If there are any other details that can be considered helpful for me pursue this I would also like those.

Yours sincerely

09/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
24 December 2015 19:50
Fw: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Ms Jones
I have a Notice of fine and collection order regarding my penalty which totals 620. This also explains
that ultimately I may be imprisoned for non-payment.
I will not be paying a penny of this voluntarily as I have not committed the offence that the court has found me
guilty of (why would I).
It seems the majority of the enforcement remedies are not available as I have no car which may be sold, no
income (earnings/benefits) to which an attachment may be made. It would therefore seems likely that I will
end up being imprisoned for non-payment.
It is unlikely that I will make use of the form you have sent which is for appealing to the crown court as I have
absolutely no confidence in the justice system. I have found this out from recent and not so recent civil
cases and of course the present criminal case. Given that I have been up-front about my intention not to pay
the fine, you may want to save any unnecessary enforcement steps and fast track this to the custodial option.
As the form you have sent has been superseded, I have attached the most recent form, i.e., for appealing to
the crown court from a magistrates' court which is now in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Rules, rule
34.3 (2015) as opposed to 63.3.
Your sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Res - Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>
25 December 2015 23:02
Formal Complaint - 25 December 15.pdf
Formal Complaint

Dear Sir/Madam

Please find attached my letter in connection with my formal complaint dated 17 December 2015.

Your sincerely

09/07/2016

North East Lincolnshire Council


Finance Department
Civic Offices Knoll Street
Cleethorpes
North East Lincolnshire
DN35 8LN

XY Xxxxxxx Yyyyy
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
AB12 3XY

25 December 2015
Dear Mr Smith

Re: Council tax Ref: 5501xxxxxx Formal Complaint

I am writing in response to your correspondence of 21 December 2015 and wish to escalate this
matter to a Stage 1 formal complaint.
I dont accept that the councils affairs are run so poorly that if somebody is off sick there are no
contingency measures in place for that persons work to be dealt with. Its almost as if the months
delay in conveying the information was deliberate to secure additional payment(s) that the council
knew would not have been made until the following year had I known the council would allocate
monies to the fraudulent costs.
As you have made your position clear which is that you intend to continue using your position
(presumably unsupervised) to defraud me, I will not be making any more payments in respect of my
2015/16 liability until this situation is resolved. Moreover, concerning my December payment,
which would not have been made had your 13.11.15 letter been sent informing me of your intended
shenanigans, this can be either refunded to me, or if preferred, allocated in respect of my 2016/17
liability.
Turning to the fraudulent liability order application. The council appears to be relying on being
absolved of any wrongdoing on account of it being the court which granted the order. Please
remember that no matter how negligent the court was in granting the order, the Council must take
responsibility for making a decision to submit a false statement in its application to the court in
order to defraud me. The allegation directed at the Council is a distinct matter from the court's
determination and needs to be resolved as such.
The Council applied for a liability order for non-payment of council tax which it had engineered by
misallocating monies to a sum that had arisen from a previous years summons costs which were
disputed and appealed to the High Court. The council suspended that disputed sum pending a court

decision; therefore no payments in respect of the current liability were ever overdue. The case (High
Court) is yet to be determined so the costs still suspended; therefore, under no circumstances was it
a sum to which the Claimant could legitimately allocate payment.
Regarding the application, and specifically in relation to the court hearing of 30 October 2015, the
Council made a statement (material in the proceedings) which it knew to be false, to the effect that
the appeal challenging the costs had been withdrawn. Indisputable evidence was submitted by
myself to support why the statement was untrue and why the Council could not have believed it to
have been true.
In any event, it was so clear to the Council from my demand notice that the suspension had not been
lifted due to the sum appearing on it as a separate balance from the current liability, described as a
sum subject to court proceedings. The Council had even submitted a copy of my current council
tax bill as one of the exhibits (NELC1) to support its witness statement for the court hearing. It is
inexcusable that at the same time as claiming to have no reason to believe that the costs were being
disputed, the council submit an item of evidence to the court that states they are. The relevant part
of the council tax bill states as follows:
Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings
It is clear that the Council is not willing to comply with the laws of appropriation by rejecting my
express instructions which are for payment in any sum to be allocated to my current year's liability
unless there are express instructions (in writing) to the contrary. You have referred to the case
authorities relied upon in the hearing on 30.10.15 in respect of making my election at the time of
payment implying that the way I have expressly elected to allocate payment is not lawful.
Without going into detail that was set out in my supplementary representations for the hearing, it is
worth at least noting the following with regards the law of appropriation (Debtors rights) which are
set out in Chitty on Contracts (31st Edition) Volume 1 at Para 21-061:
It is not essential that the debtor should expressly specify at the time of the payment
which debt or account he intended the payment to be applied to. His intention may be
collected from other circumstances showing that he intended at the time of the payment to
appropriate it to a specific debt or account...

There is really nothing more needs saying. However, if the Council deems the Northgate systems
inflexibility would make allocating payments the way I elect unmanageable, it seems that York City
Council is able to accommodate such flexibility within the same automated system. This is evident
in its reply to queries made on the subject of its systems capabilities (see below):
The system is set up to allocate funds to the appropriate period where payments received
match to instalment plans or special arrangements.
Additionally to this a suite of exception reports are provided to the specialist Recovery
Team and Cashiers Team each morning to review cases of "soft cash" and suspense account
cases. Where a customer contacts the council to request re-allocation of a payment made, or
to advise the period that a future payment should be allocated to then this is recorded on the
notes of the account and manual allocation or re-allocation takes place.
Whilst on this particular subject, it would seem that the Northgate system ought to be set so a nonspecified payment is in any event posted by default to the most current debt, not as the Councils
system is set to post those payments to the oldest. This engineers more indebtedness for the
taxpayer from the irresponsible and excessive use of the court; something more associated with
unscrupulous fly-by-night companies than a local authority. It is with incredulity that the authorities
have allowed such exploitation of the court system for so long.
It should be noted that the case, Devaynes v Noble 1816, in which the Council seeks authority to
support its assertion that unspecified payments are posted correctly (oldest debt) cannot apply in a
system whereby the accounts relate, as they do in council tax, to distinct insulated debts, between
which a plain line of separation could be drawn.
A more recent case, R v Miskin Lower Justices (1953), held that where an amount so obviously
relates to a specific liability, it would be an unwarranted assumption to allocate the payment
elsewhere. It could be drawn from this that where the purpose for which a payment is made is
unspecified it must be carried to that account which it is most beneficial to the debtor to reduce1.
The fact that it would be to the taxpayers detriment if allocated to the oldest debt is sufficient to
infer that the payment is intended to reduce his current years liability. The 1953 case law, clearly
serves, in these circumstances, to protect the taxpayer from the right of appropriation falling on the
Council when its election may be to the taxpayers detriment. It can be concluded that billing
authorities which have their systems set so non-specified payments are posted by default to the most

Walter Pereira's Laws of Ceylon at page 722

current debt is because it would be an unwarranted assumption to allocate monies to a sum in


arrears if it is likely to also put the current year's liability in arrears.
It is not a satisfactory arrangement for the Council to rely on statutory notices being served to alert
the taxpayer that payment has been misallocated. These notices form the necessary steps after
which enforcement may be actionable to the taxpayers detriment. The simplest way to prevent this
occurring and save on unnecessary expenditure would be by setting the system to allocate payments
which do not match a debt instalment to the current year's liability. That is unless the Council have
targets to meet for generating a certain level of court costs income through engineering default.
The Council should recall the numerous communications regarding the disputed outstanding costs,
to which payment was fraudulently diverted, in which it had stated that it had made no decision on
how it would enforce the debt. For example the Council referred to making no decision to enforce
the sum in a response to a letter (14.7.14) but gave an undertaking to give ample notice of any
action it decided on (see below):
With regards to the 60.00 outstanding on your account I can make you aware that it is for
North East Lincolnshire Council to decide on any course of action.
Any action that is taken will of course be relayed to you, giving you ample notice.

Similarly in response to a formal complaint (15.9.14) the investigating officer recommended that
the Council consider the options available to them to recover the outstanding sum and decide on
what would be the appropriate course of action to take but ensure that the Council duly informed
me of any action that is to be taken.
The Council has never given me any notification that it had taken a decision to enforce the sum let
alone what steps it would take. A liability order empowers the Council to recover arrears by such
methods as Attachment of Earnings/Benefits or instructing bailiffs to seize goods. There is nothing
likely to be set out in legislation allowing the Council to adopt a system of deception, as appears to
have happened in this case. In any event, the High Court has not yet made a decision and if it had,
there is no logical reason why it would not have found the liability order to enforce the summons
costs had been obtained unlawfully, because like in R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015]
EWHC 1252 (Admin), the court had insufficient information to determine the reasonableness of
costs claimed.

It goes without saying that financial redress for the maladministration would have better been
considered at the earliest opportunity and not continued to cause gross inconvenience over such a
protracted period of time without remedy. The Council has a responsibility to put right its error and
pay an appropriate amount to compensate for it, especially as it is to such an extent as this. It should
not be necessary to be constantly having to coerce the Council to take the appropriate action; it
should routinely consider this in an attempt to rectify the maladministration.
The council will now hopefully be in a better position to consider its actions and will attend to my
account by removing the costs and offer a significant sum of compensation to reflect the protracted
period of gross inconvenience. As I suggested in my first letter, the Council might want to have the
liability order quashed by making an application to the Magistrates court.
I also expect a reviewed response to the allocation of monies to the years account which I specify.

Yours sincerely

X. Yyyyyy

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
29 December 2015 17:34
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr

In answer to your email sent 24th December 2015, I can inform you that your case on 15th December 2015
was dealt with by Distrist Judge Curtis.
Mr Havery of John Barkers Solicitors was appointed by the court to cross examine the civilian prosecution
witness on your behalf. However as you did not attend court for your Trial Mr Havery was allowed to withdraw
from your case.
You were convicted of an offence control to section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986.
This does mean that you now have a criminal record. I am unable to help you regarding the people who
arrested you on 22nd December 2015, you will need to contact the police for that information.
If you wish to know the names of the prosecutor in court on the 15th and 22nd December 2015 you will have
to contact the local Crown Prosecutor Service in Hull
Yours sincerely

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<enquiries@cps.gsi.gov.uk>
29 December 2015 18:15
Martin Howarth - Grimsby Magistrates' court 22 Dec 2015

Dear Sir/Madam
I don't have an email address for contacting Humberside CPS directly so I hoped you could provide some
information.
With regard to the case reported on the below link, I would like confirmation that the same person prosecuting
on the day reported, Martin Howarth, was prosecuting for the CPS on the earlier hearing on 15 December
2015. If not I would like that person's name providing please.
http://www.grimsbytelegraph.co.uk/Failing-turn-trial-costs-man-620-court-charges/story-28430721detail/story.html

Yours sincerely

10/07/2016

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Attach:
Subject:

"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
29 December 2015 11:47
CO.150432.Let to Mr
.291215.pdf
Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


Dear Mr
Please find attached a letter in relation to the complaint against Police reference number CO 432/15.
Regards
Tony Walmsley
Tony Walmsley 8637
Caseworker
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police HQ
Priory Road
Hull
HU5 5SF
Tel. 01482 578133

10/07/2016

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Humberside Police
Professional Standards Branch
Police Headquarters
Priory Road HU5 5SF
Tel No: 01482 578343
Fax No: 01482 305004
Switchboard: 101
This matter is being dealt with by:
Inspector 982 PARSONS
Grimsby Police station
psb@humberside.pnn.police.uk
www.humberside.police.uk

29 December 2015

CO/432/15
Mr
Grimsby

Dear Mr
With reference to the complaint you made on 8 November 2015 that was previously
held as sub judice I note that the court case against you has now been concluded.
In accordance with the Police Reform Act 2002 as amended by the Police Reform
and Social Responsibility Act 2011 the complaint is considered suitable for Local
Resolution and the file has been forwarded to Inspector Parsons at Grimsby Police
station to be dealt with. You will be contacted in due course.
If you are considering making an appeal in relation to your conviction or sentence
please contact the Professional Standards office on the telephone number above to
discuss the matter.
It is important to note that if you fail to cooperate with the Investigating Officer this
may have an adverse effect on the outcome of your complaint.
Should you change your address before the completion of the enquiry, I would ask
you to notify this office at the above address as soon as possible, to enable us to
keep you updated with the progress of the enquiry.
Yours sincerely,

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Page 1 of 1

From:
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Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Adam (JACO)" <Adam.Jones@jaco.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
30 December 2015 09:06
Transfer of your complaint to the Investigating Team

Dear Mr

I refer to recent correspondence in respect of your concerns about how the JCIO handled your
complaint about District Judge Curtis.
I am writing to inform you that your complaint has today been transferred to our Investigating Team
for consideration and they will be in contact with you shortly.
Yours sincerely,
Adam Jones
JACO

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Harvey, Allan 5521" <Allan.Harvey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
30 December 2015 13:14
FW: Complaint CO/461/15

Mr ,
It appears that my previous e-mail may have been corrupted by the mail delivery system. It should have
read:
I have received the above from Humberside Police Professional Standards branch to respond to you as the
resolving officer. The matter has been determined to be one concerning neglect of duty, but suitable for the
local resolution process.
I am unable to speak to you regarding your complaint as your phone line is unobtainable.
In an effort to progress this matter the investigation plan I propose is:
Deal with the matter as a Local Resolution
Review contents of complaint file
Discuss the matter with Humberside Police Force Solicitors
Seek any relevant response from staff concerned
Instigate any service recovery identified
Write to the complainant with the outcome of the enquiry.
If this is agreeable to you, then can you e-mail me to advise that this is acceptable. As part of the Local
Resolution Process, you have right of appeal of the outcome to the Humberside Police Appeal Body.

I apologise for any typos in the previous mail.


Many thanks

Allan Harvey
Inspector 5521
Force Incident Manager
Hub Command
Humberside Police
Hessle Road Police Station
10/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
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<
@gmail.com>
"Harvey, Allan 5521" <Allan.Harvey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries"
<enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>; <pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
30 December 2015 16:03
Re: Complaint CO/461/15

Mr Harvey
It is my understanding from your correspondence today that the email (and attachment) which I have
confirmation was forwarded to you on 21 December 2015 was not received.
In that correspondence I set out my concerns about the complaint not being considered suitable for Local
Resolution. A statement was attached which provides evidence to support my allegations. A table
itemising around 30 supporting documents is contained in that statement which need to be considered by the
person undertaking any review/investigation. Neither the statement nor the supporting documents have been
referred to which concerns me.
The seriousness of these allegations cannot be over stated nor the consequences if the Council/Court are
allowed to resort to such criminal actions without being challenged.
Action needs taking sooner rather than later to ensure that the immediate consequences of the fraud is
remedied. This will not be achieved by having to complete complaint and subsequent appeal procedures
which guarantee nothing at the end. The appropriate level of investigation can be evaluated after the
immediate risk of the consequences of the crimes have been removed.
The consequences do not stop at the fraudulently obtained court cost. Unnecessary enforcement measures
will follow, incurring additional costs which will accumulate over time to be sufficient in amount that the council
will achieve its vindictive aim and be able to take insolvency, bankruptcy or custodial action.
Will you let me know if you require the correspondence re-sending (with attached statement) which was
originally dated 20 December 2015.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"KEYTE, BEATRICE" <BEATRICE.KEYTE1@jaco.gsi.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
04 January 2016 16:09
160104
First Monthly Update.doc
JACO Complaint: 15-2474

Dear Mr
Please find attached for your attention.
Regards
Beatrice Keyte
Investigating Officer
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman

10/07/2016

Judicial Appointments & Conduct


Ombudsman
Postal Area 9.53
th
9 Floor, The Tower
102 Petty France
London
SW1H 9AJ
DX 152380 Westminster 8

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL


Mr
@gmail.com

04 January 2016

T 020 3334 2900


E beatrice.keyte1@jaco.gsi.gov.uk
www.judicialombudsman.gov.uk

Your ref: 15-2474

Dear Mr

Your complaint
I am writing following Mr Jones recent email concerning your complaint to the
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman. This concerns the process by
which the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) handled your complaint about
District Judge Curtis.
I am the Investigating Officer assigned to consider your case. The process by which
complaints to the Ombudsman are considered can take several months. However, I
will shortly begin to look at your complaint and I will keep you informed of any
progress. If I have not written previously, I will write to you at the beginning of
February to let you know the position.
Yours sincerely,
Beatrice Keyte
Investigating Officer

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
05 January 2016 20:48
Re: Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Dear Mr Walmsley
Thank you for your email and attached letter dated 20 December 2015.
I have been asked to contact the Professional Standards office by phone if considering making an appeal in
relation to my case, however, this means of communication is not convenient and is why I am making contact
by email.
I have not made a decision on whether to make an appeal but exploring the possibilities of doing so.
I want to make the point clear though that if an appeal is made, successful or otherwise, my expectation is for
this matter still to be investigated.
Additional to this, I am still awaiting clarification concerning the crimes I reported regarding two false witness
statements made by members of the public.

Yours sincerely
.

10/07/2016

Page 1 of 2

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
07 January 2016 14:16
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Ms Jones
I have looked at the options which I have available with regards appealing the conviction and there appears
potentially to be three.
It looks as though it would be most appropriate to apply under section 142 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980
(the "1980 Act") to have the court re-open the case.
Electing for the justices to state a case for an appeal to the High Court is probably very unwise as from my
own experience in a civil matter an appeal has still to be put before the Queens Bench even though three
years has passed since the application was made to Grimsby Magistrates. However, the question of law on
which the opinion of the High Court may be sought, and will be referred to later, is in relation to sub-section 2A
of s11 of the 1980 Act.
Appeal to the Crown court
Though it is suggested I may appeal to the Crown court by completing the provided form, it seems that this
option may only be available to a defendant who attended the trial.
I will make my representations therefore in respect of reopening the case under s142 of the 1980 Act.
Reopening case under section 142
Firstly, it was made clear from writing to the court a number of days before the trial to express without
reservation that District Judge Curtis, was not considered 'a fit and proper person to hear the case'.
I have hard evidence relating to a previous matter in support of that claim which was detailed extensively in a
statement to the police. The judge had unequivocally accepted a statement knowing it to be false,
which enabled NE Lincs Council to succeed in defrauding me through court costs claimed in proceedings that
were engineered to that end. The Council had therefore committed perjury to defraud me, and the judge
assisted by turning a blind eye to that breach of legal procedure.
Sub-paragraph 1 of s142 of the 1980 Act provides the following:
"A magistrates court may vary or rescind a sentence or other order imposed or made by it when
dealing with an offender if it appears to the court to be in the interests of justice to do so; and it is
hereby declared that this power extends to replacing a sentence or order which for any reason appears
to be invalid by another which the court has power to impose or make."
Sub-paragraph 2 also has relevance in which the following provides:
"Where a person is convicted by a magistrates court and it subsequently appears to the court that it
would be in the interests of justice that the case should be heard again by different justices, the court
may so direct."
I was asked at the hearing (sentencing) by deputy district judge Andrew Pascoe whether or not I was guilty of
failing to turn up for the trial on the 15 Dec 2015 without good reason. I pleaded not guilty as I considered I
had very good reason for not attending as I had no confidence that I would have had a fair trial knowing that
District Judge Curtis was trying the case. The court was informed in writing on 11 Dec 2015 to made it
categorically clear that I did not consider this judge fit to hear the case.
Sub-section 2A of s11 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980 provides that:
"the court shall not proceed in the absence of the accused if it considers that there is an acceptable

10/07/2016

Page 2 of 2

reason for his failure to appear."


Notwithstanding the provision in sub-section 2A, it appears deputy district judge Andrew Pascoe was not
briefed as he commented that I had a chance to put my side of the story at the trial but did no turn up. This
suggests that mitigating evidence documents I had sent to the court had not been considered in my
conviction.
I had already made it known at the initial hearing that I suspected the arresting officer had incited one of the
witnesses to make a false statement, and what that witness claimed to have seen, he had not. On reading
both members of the public's written statements afterwards which were handed to me minutes before the first
hearing, I can categorically state that they had both lied regarding their claim that I had exposed myself. The
complaint made to the police about PC Thomas Blake who I suspected of inciting perjury, and an account
stating that the two members of the public had both made untrue witness statements, was also sent to the
court on 11 Dec 2015.
It therefore seems contrary to the interests of justice that I had submitted extensive written evidence to the
court, and prohibited from cross-examining the witnesses that at the hearing for sentencing, deputy district
judge Andrew Pascoe said that I had a chance to put my side of the story.
Insufficient information about proceedings
I had assumed the matter would be in the hands of the duty solicitor who had been appointed on being falsely
imprisoned in a cell at Humberside police station (27.8.15), as I had not been informed otherwise. However,
after updating him (Mr Havery) well in advance of the pre-trial on matters there was never a reply.
It was only minutes before being called into the courtroom that I found out from the usher I was not entitled to
legal representation. This was only discovered because I could reply with no certainty on being asked who my
solicitor was. I stated it may have been Mr Havery from John Barkers but because he had not kept in contact
was in doubt. The Crown Prosecution Service's case file was handed to me at this point giving me no
opportunity to read any of it before going into court.
Having no entitlement to legal representation presumably meant the solicitor was under no obligation to
acknowledge my correspondence and therefore the reason why he hadn't. However, in anticipation of being
unrepresented, despite having no background of criminal proceedings, a statement was produced and sent to
the court on the morning of the hearing.
At the pre-trial hearing, a direction was made prohibiting me cross-examining the witnesses in person and
arrangement made for a solicitor to do so. Shortly before the trial (and by chance) I learned that a solicitor had
been arranged but no details given as to who. However, it was confirmed after the final hearing (sentencing)
that Mr Havery, the solicitor who failed to acknowledge my correspondence, on the lead up to the first
hearing, had been appointed. It was also confirmed after more prompting that District judge Curtis allowed Mr
Havery to withdraw from the case and had done so because I had not attended.
It therefore seems contrary to the interests of justice that the solicitor was allowed to withdraw from the case
by the same judge who tried the case who had effectively made me surplus to proceedings by giving
directions at the first hearing prohibiting me from cross-examining the witnesses. Add to this that the Crown
Prosecution Service held no evidence to support the charge, but a guilty verdict found nonetheless, suggests
all the more that the outcome and proceedings were contrary to the interests of justice.
Considering the above I would like confirmation on whether an appeal to the Crown court is permissible in the
circumstances, i.e., I did not attend the trial, and whether there are reasonable grounds to reopen the case.
Yours sincerely
.

10/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
12 January 2016 13:40
Fw: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Ms Jones
I notice the time limit (21 days) has been reached today for appealing to the Crown court. I would like
assurance that this limit will be extended should I decide upon appealing (if eligible) due to the court not yet
replying to my correspondence regarding the matter.
Can you please provide any update regarding this matter.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Harvey, Allan 5521" <Allan.Harvey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
12 January 2016 14:21
Fw: Complaint CO/461/15

Mr Harvey
I would like assurance that the email (see below) sent 30 Dec 15 is receiving attention and would appreciate
being updated of any progress.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Harvey, Allan 5521" <Allan.Harvey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
13 January 2016 08:02
RE: Complaint CO/461/15

Mr ,
You should be receiving my response from the Professional Standards Department imminently.
Kindest regards
Inspector Harvey

10/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
13 January 2016 16:19
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr

Further to your emails of 7.1.16 and 12.1.16, I can confirm that you are able to appeal against your conviction
and sentence even though the Trial took place in your absence.
If you submit your notice of appeal you will need to include the reason why you are asking for permission to
appeal outside the 21 day limit.
The Crown Court Judge will then consider whether to give you leave to appeal out of time.
On the basis that you made a conscious decision not to attend for your Trial in the Magistrates Court, for
reasons that you have expressed in your e-mails I consider that it is not appropriate to re-open the case under
S142 of the Magistrates Court Act 1980
Yours Sincerely
G P Townell
Legal Team Manager

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
13 January 2016 12:51
CO.150461.LR letter.
.130115.pdf; LR Appeal Key Facts.doc
Complaint against Police - CO 461/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


Dear Mr
Please find attached a letter in relation to the complaint against Police which you made on 12 November
2015.
Regards
Tony Walmsley
Tony Walmsley 8637
Caseworker
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police HQ

10/07/2016

NOT PROTECnVELY

MAl

Humberside
Police
Professional Standards Branch
Police Headquarters

PrloryRoad
Hull

HU55SF
Switchboard 101

Te' 01482516101
Fax 01482 305004

CO 461/15

13 January 2016

Dear M,
Humberside Police is committed to providing a quality of service to all members of
the public and I am grateful, therefore, that you have taken the trouble to bring this
matter to our attention. This has been passed to me to assess and respond to you.
Your allegation has been assessed to be one falling under the category of neglect or
failure in duty and has been assessed by the Professional Standards Branch as
being a complaint that can be dealt with under the Local Resolution process.
I note your response to my recent e-mail that you do not wish to engage in this
process. I am able to complete the complaint in this manner and you do have a right
of appeal as indicated below.
I have sought legal advice from our Force Solicitors in respect of the points you
make.
I understand that this matter has been heard in a court of law. The advice I have
obtained is that the issues you raise may be appeal points that could be raised at
any subsequent appeal hearings.
Humberside Police do not investigate allegations of perjury unless a request to do so
comes from the court themselves.
The judge in the case is protected in law for making decisions whilst carrying out
their duties in law courts.
Therefore the advice you were given was correct and you should return to the courts
to argue the points you raise.
I have enclosed for you information

a Fact Sheet entitled "Appealing

NOT PROTECTIVELY

MARKED

against the

NOT PROTECTIVELY

MARKED

Local Resolution process." This document explains how you may appeal to the
Humberside Police Appeal Body in respect of the outcome of the Local Resolution
process.
The appropriate appeal body is the Humberside Police Appeal Body as your
complaint does not relate to the conduct of a senior officer, has not been referred to
the IPee, does not justify criminal or misconduct proceedings and does not arise
from the same incident as a complaint where the IPee would have to deal with any
appeal.
You have 29 days from the date of this letter, within which to make your appeal. You
are advised to post your appeal in good time to ensure it reaches the Humberside
Police Appeal Body before the end of the 29th day. The 29th day is 11 February

2016. Appeals received after 29 days may not be allowed unless there are
exceptional circumstances.
You might want to consider using guaranteed

next-day delivery post service to

ensure that your appeal is received within time.

Your sincerely

AUanHARVEV
Inspector 5521

NOT PROTECTIVELY

MARKED

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<graeme.townell@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
14 January 2016 21:49
NELC costs - 14 Jan 15.pdf; Summons-Cost-Calculation-of-2014-15-for-2015-16.xlsx
Re: North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC) Summons Costs 2015/16

Dear Mr Townell
Please find attached letter regarding North East Lincolnshire Council's court costs, applied in the sum of
60.00 in respect of instituting the complaint (summons).
Attached also is the most recent spreadsheet informing the costs breakdown for 2015/16 applications.
Your sincerely

10/07/2016

Grimsby Magistrates' Court and


Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1NH

xxx xxxxxx
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
XXXX XXX

14 January 2016

Dear Mr Xxxxxx

Re: North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC) Summons Costs 2015/16

I am writing in the matter of NELCs breakdown of Council Tax summons costs. The
calculation is reviewed annually and published on NELCs website to inform taxpayers of the
standard sum it applies, for the relevant tax year. The most recent calculation returns the
standard sum applied in cases for 2015/16. I will send a copy for your reference in case NELC
has not already supplied one.
I have done some research in this area and consequently become familiar with the kind of
expenditure billing authorities in general consider they are entitled to attribute to the costs
recharged to defendants. I have consistently found that billing authorities claim entitlement to
recharge all expenditure which may be considered attributable to recovery and enforcement in
respect of merely applying for a liability order. In the case of NELC, this can probably be best
illustrated in its response to a Freedom of Information request which asked for a breakdown
of its costs. The Decision Notice (ref: FS50400874) at paragraph 15, records the admission
that the costs are set, not at a level to cover the court application, but for recovering Council
Tax, ultimately in a bid to safeguard the taxpayer from having to bear any element of recovery
administration.
the costs raised from the increased Summons costs are to cover the cost of
recovering Council Tax, and do not represent income generation but a saving that
can be made in the cost of the delivery of the service for the benefit of all Council Tax
payers of North East Lincolnshire

As a final safeguard in a series of checks to be satisfied its costs are claimed lawfully, NELC
ensures that the monies raised from them do not exceed the cost of the service. The
service budget, however, refers to the costs reasonably incurred for Council Tax collection

and recovery, and in the period relevant to the request, that was 1.1 million. NELC implies
that because court costs income is within its annual budget for all activity associated with
recovery of Council Tax etc., it considers that its claim is lawful, as reinforced in a rewording
of the above also at paragraph 15 of the Decision Notice:
The monies raised from costs are not greater than the cost of the service. The increase
in summons costs does not represent income generation but a saving that can be
made in the cost of the delivery of the service, that would otherwise ultimately be
passed on to the Council Tax payers of North East Lincolnshire .
A number of authorities have even gone further by admitting explicitly that the cost of
administrating the various recovery methods available to secure payment, once a liability
order has been obtained, is legitimate expenditure to recharge in applying to the court to
enforce the debt. Whether any of that expenditure is included in the calculation would require
a proper breakdown rather than just a rough estimate, though it is more than implied in the
Decision Notice referred to that post liability order work is recharged to the costs. The law is
clear that only costs which have reasonably incurred in obtaining the order are permissible.
Interpreting the law in a way that extends to encompassing all recovery and enforcement
expenditure is generally justified by the fact that it serves to keep the financial burden on the
general taxpayer to a minimum, even though the law in fact provides only for application
costs. NELC has demonstrated this thinking as aforementioned but reinforces it in a report
from February 2014 (Review of Council Tax court costs) which briefly outlines the risks of
either levying a higher level of court costs than recommended or a lower level. The relevance
in this context, was the risk outlined which was associated with opting for a lower level than
recommended, as follows:
Members may choose to levy a lower level of costs than that recommended, however,
this would mean that additional costs incurred by the Council due to non-payment are
borne by those Council Tax payers who pay on time in accordance with their
instalment plan.

Artificially inflating Costs


It is evident from NELCs expenditure breakdown that the standard costs include a significant
subsidy for bad debt. The sum recharged to customers is artificially inflated from the element
of bad debt brought about by defendants, who for example, may have no means to pay. Those

debtors are then being subsidised by those from whom payment is more easily recovered. The
aforementioned report (Review of Council Tax court costs) confirms this, as follows:
The Council recognises the difficulties some residents have encountered in paying
Council Tax as a result of Welfare Reform changes, and as a result has been more
flexible with instalment arrangements. In cases where residents owe a modest amount,
and have subsequently made an arrangement which clears the balance within the
financial year, costs have not been applied. It is anticipated that such action will
continue into 2014/15.

The approach taken in calculating the costs confirms that standard sum is inflated because of
bad debt. The average individual costs are determined by dividing the gross expenditure by an
estimated number of summons requested where costs applied. There is a significant
difference between the number of summons requested, and the number of summons requested
where costs are applied. The dividing figure used in NELC's 2013/14 (2014/15) calculation
was 10,000, but the figure submitted to the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and
Accountancy relating to the number of summonses issued in 2013/14 was 17,197. Therefore,
at least 42% of taxpayers against whom complaint was made were summonsed without costs
applied. The relevant part of the Councils breakdown is presented as follows:
Gross Recoverable costs
Estimated number of summons requested in 2013/14,
where costs applied
Cost per summons

Cost rounded to nearest

597,160

10,000

59.72

60

If the true number of summons issued (17,197) was substituted for the 10,000 figure above,
the cost per summons, based on the Councils method of calculating the sum (disregarding
other expenditure in question), would return a sum of 34.72.
Viewed from another perspective, NELC has incurred costs in respect of each one of the
17,197 summonses requested; in over 7,000 cases it has been unable to recover that cost from
the defendant summonsed. Instead it has added that expenditure to the costs of those against
whom court proceedings are brought and the costs paid. This means that those taxpayers who

actually pay the costs are paying an inflated sum to either compensate for NELC instituting
the complaint erroneously or subsidise the costs of those others having them waived.
Recovery officers at NELC attended a presentation/workshop in June 2015 hosted by the
Institute of Revenues Rating and Valuation which focussed on the consequences of the
decision in R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin). It is likely
then that NELC would aim to determine the costs in accordance with the principles
highlighted by Mrs Justice Andrews in that High Court judgment. It is particularly with
regard to paragraph 46 of the judgment and reference to artificial inflation of costs that
NELCs breakdown reveals that this is done. In setting out what is and what isnt permissible
expenditure, para 46 of the judgment, strongly implies the approach taken whereby a much
lower figure than the actual number of summonses applied for is substituted into the equation
is not permissible (see below):
In principle, therefore, provided that the right types of costs and expenses are taken
into account, and provided that due consideration is given to the dangers of doublecounting, or of artificial inflation of costs, it may be a legitimate approach....

Standard charge levied in all cases


It is assumed that the Council seeks reliance on the judgment (paras 45-46) in its approach of
levying a standard sum of costs across the board, thus having no obligation to calculate costs
individually on a case by case basis. Though that is the general guidance, it must also be
applied taking on board Mrs Justice Andrews opinion that in principle, it may be a legitimate
approach, 'provided that the right types of costs and expenses are taken into account'.
J Andrews expressed at para 46 that it may be a legitimate approach to apply a standard sum
in all cases. However, if wanting to take that approach (and do so lawfully) the standard sum
would also have to be properly referable to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (regs 34 and 35). If there is any doubt as to what these
regulations provide, clarification has been provided in the Council Tax Practice Note 9:
Recovery and Enforcement, produced by the Department of the Environment (1993) and more
recently in the 2013 Government good practice guide, for the collection of Council Tax
arrears. Both state that the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case is no more
than that reasonably incurred by the authority.

Given that the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case must be no more than
that reasonably incurred by the billing authority, if the Council wanted to take advantage of
streamlining the administration process by applying a standard sum in all cases, in order for it
to be done lawfully, it would need to forfeit each element of expenditure it incurs that is not
common to every application. So in this, and all similar breakdowns, that would account for
the largest element of expenditure.
In other words, a standard sum could not exceed that incurred by the authority in a case where
the least expenditure is attributed. In practice, that would be a taxpayer who simply settles his
outstanding debt on receipt of a summons, but without contacting (thereby burdening) the
Council on any issue. Deriving a figure therefore from the gross costs, which is split between
an estimated number of defendants, can not be lawful; even less so if the number of summons
is reduced to factor in an estimate for those withdrawn, waived and those in respect of
unrecoverable costs.
The least cost case is the only basis on which to determine a standard sum if the aim is to
eliminate the administrative burden of calculating the costs in each case, whilst at the same
time complying with the regulations which require that the costs be no more than that
incurred by the authority in any individual case.
I hope the above information will be of use for the court to determine in future a suitable level
of costs which are in accordance with the relevant provisions.
Should you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

X. Xxxxx

Summons cost calculation (2013/14)

Gross Collection and Recovery expenditure

A0191/
A1549
Council
Tax

A0187/
A1551
Debt
Recovery

A0184
Control
&
Monitoring

798,700

673,000

546,900

Total

2,018,600
-

Less recharges between cost centres that


results in duplication of cost

31,782

Estimated enforcement costs budget codes


LL103 13,600 summons multiplied by 3
Enforcement Costs - staff and overheads (see
debt recovery salaries tab)
Collection costs for taxpayers who pay before
summons issued (see calculation tab)

40,800

40,800

164,372

164,372

575,189

575,189

Estimate of Control and monitoring time on


non council tax summons activity (80%)

437,520

Debt recovery costs for NDR/Housing


Benefit/Sundry debtors (30%)
Gross Recoverable costs (including liability
orders)

140,348

191,730
24%

327,480
49%

Further work to liability order (estimate at 5%


of Gross Recoverable costs)
Gross Recoverable costs
Estimated number of summons requested in 2013/14, where costs applied
Cost per summons
Cost rounded to nearest

31,782

437,520

140,348

109,380
20%

628,589
31%

31,429
597,160
10,000
59.72
60

Council Tax activity levels


Collection
costs non
summons

Gross cost of Council Tax section


Less recharge from debt recovery
Adjusted gross cost

Collection
cost
summons

798,700
-

31,782
766,918

50% of activity on routine billing activity

383,459

383,459

50% of activity on reminders/final bills/queries

383,459

191,730

191,730

575,189

191,730

Estimated no of reminders/final for 2013/14

39,176

Estimated no of council tax summons

13,600

No of reminders not resulting in summons

25,576

48%

No. of calls arising from issue of each summons is at least twice as many as for reminders, therfore
Weighted number of summons

27,200

Adjusted total

52,776

52%

ESTIMATE THAT NON ROUTINE BILLING ACTIVITY IS SPLIT 50/50 BETWEEN


THOSE PAYING ON TIME AND THOSE PROCEEDING TO SUMMONS

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
15 January 2016 11:32
CO.150461.LR letter.
.130115.pdf
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Ms Jones
I don't know at this point whether I'm prepared to enter into the casino justice system by appealing to the
Crown court. As I have stated I do not have faith in the justice system and I am at a distinct disadvantage
because I don't have the money to spend on legal representation. I am horrified at the way this matter has
been dealt with by the Magistrates' court, I was of the opinion that there needed not only evidence to bring a
criminal conviction, but the burden of proof had to be beyond all reasonable doubt.
I have stated that I will not be paying the fine in a previous correspondence. In that matter, I would like to
know whether the date payment of the fine commences is on hold whilst my mind is not made up what action
to take. The first payment (5/week) is due on 19 January 2015 and if this needs to be paid I have decided to
begin making payments to avoid further aggravation which might impede any progress that might be made
regarding what I consider the fraudulent use of the Criminal justice system which I intend to raise with the
authorities.
I have disposed of the payment card I was sent for use of paying the fine via the post office. I am not paying
that way for obvious reasons which are made more obvious by the fact I am not guilty of the charge and was
stitched up by Humberside Police, CPS and Grimsby Magistrates' court. I trust that when, and if I commence
payment of the fine it is possible to do so at the weekly rate via the court fines direct website.
On another matter I sent a letter under cover of an email yesterday to Mr Townell. I would like
acknowledgment of receipt of that email which I sent to this address:( graeme.townell@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk ).
Finally, the attached letter (another letter) is a response from Humberside police regarding its obstruction to
investigate perjury to defraud (committed against me) with indisputable evidence by North East Lincolnshire
Council. I have provided the court with evidence that North East Lincolnshire Council produced a false
witness statement and would like the court to confirm that the crime has in fact taken place and confirm this
with the police.
Your sincerely

10/07/2016

Our Ref:
Enquiries:
Direct Dial:
E-mail:

NEL/1172/1516
Alan French
01472 323767
Alan.French@nelincs.gov.uk

th

19 January 2016

Mr Xxxx Yyyyy
XY Xxxxxxx Yyyyy
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
AB12 3XY
Private and Confidential

Dear Mr Yyyyy
I am writing in response to your stage 1 complaint received on 29 December 2015. As my role of
investigating officer it is my responsibility to investigate your complaint and seek to resolve matters.
I have spoken to relevant personnel and read the supporting documentation as part of the
investigation process. I will now attempt to address each of your concerns in turn.
You will be aware that much of the content of your letter falls outside the scope of the complaints
process as it relates to your recent Liability order. Consequently there are only 2 points raised within
your complaint that can be addressed
1) The late response to your correspondence received 10th November 2015
2) Your election that all payments and future payments are to be made to current years council tax
liability
Complaint 1: The late response to your correspondence received 10th November 2015
Whilst I have found no evidence of your allegation that the delay was a deliberate act designed to
secure additional payments I do find that the council has fallen below its high standards for
responding to correspondence in this matter. The situation is as Mr Smith detailed in his letter 21st
December 2015.
The response had been prepared however it had not yet been sent. I agree that this should have been
picked up before Mr Smith's return from illness
Outcome:
I do uphold this part of your complaint.
Complaint 2: Your election that all payments and future payments are to be made to current
years council tax liability
As you know from the liability hearing 30th October 2015, the research you have undertaken in to
allocation of payments case law and other information on the internet and freedom of information
requests the allocation of payments is made upon payment.
Therefore election to payments may only take place when those payments are made or at any time
from the payment being made until the Council takes legal action to establish the debt.

Information, Governance and Complaints Team


Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, North East Lincolnshire. DN31 1HU

You are aware that the easiest method of making that election is to pay the correct amount at the
th
correct time. As Mr Smith has said in the letter dated 13 November 2015 should you make payments
that will not automatically be allocated to your current year we will be pleased to allocate those
payments to which ever year you elect if made at a suitable time.
As regards your December payment this has been used to reduce your current years liability.
Outcome:
I do uphold this part of your complaint
As part of our efforts to continually improve services we consider learning from complaints to be an
important part of developing our services to the community. Should you feel that your complaint has
not been satisfactorily resolved, you can escalate to stage 2 of our complaints process where it will be
reviewed by a senior officer. Please contact the complaints team should you wish to take your
complaint to the next stage at the address below, by telephone on (01472) 326426 or email rescustomerservices@nelincs.gov.uk.
Yours sincerely

Alan French
North East Lincolnshire Council

Information, Governance and Complaints Team


Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, North East Lincolnshire. DN31 1HU

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<NorthCasework@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
25 January 2016 23:20
Appeal_form_-_LR.pdf
Appealing against the Local Resolution process

Dear Sir/Madam

I have submitted the attached form to Humberside police (Appealing against the Local Resolution
process), but discovered since doing so that an IPCC form exists for the purposes of "Appealing against the
Local Resolution process". It seems the IPCC form would have been more appropriate but that form is not
available on the Humberside police website.
It is clear from the representations on the attached that after researching the appeal process, I consider the
local resolution was the wrong process and an investigation should have been carried out. It is also clear from
the representations that I had no confidence in Humberside police dealing with the matter and wanted another
force to do so.
I would appreciate any guidance, for example would it be possible that the IPCC now deal with my concerns
or if the form I mentioned (Appealing against the Local Resolution process) requires completing and to who
would it be sent?

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
25 January 2016 15:11
Appeal_form_-_LR.pdf; Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Appeal against outcome of local resolution - Ref: CO 461/15

Dear Sir/Madam
Please find appeal against against the outcome of local resolution and supporting document.

Yours sincerely

10/07/2016

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Do you agree with the outcome of the local resolution? Tick one box only.
Yes

No

If your answer is no, please provide further information, continuing on a separate sheet if
necessary.
I dont consider that the complaint was suitable for Local Resolution. This was made
clear in a number of emails which were never addressed as I have set out below.
Request that complaint escalated to the Chief Constable ignored
After being advised on 11.12.15 that the crime I had reported was not a Police matter but
civil, I made it categorically clear that the person against whom the complaint was
directed should be the Chief Constable so that any investigation would not be undertaken
by the force itself (see the following):
From:
To: Morley, Gillian 9614
Sent: November 12, 2015
Subject: Re: Crime Reporting Submission
Dear Ms Morley
I am in disbelief that Humberside police have arrived at the conclusion that fraud is not a police
matter. I have not heard such an absurd statement since the force said the same with regards
bailiff firms defrauding council taxpayers.
Your suggestion that I am put to the expense of enriching the legal profession when I am in any
event contributing to fund the police out of the very tax which the council wishes to defraud from
me has some irony to it.
I am left obviously with no option than to submit a complaint about whoever within the force made
this decision. However, I would much prefer the person against whom I make the complaint to be
the Chief Constable so that any investigation will not be conducted by the force itself in the hope of
removing the 'sham' element which is associated with these matters. Therefore, please escalate
this matter for the attention of the Chief Constable.

Statement produced and request that complaint be investigated by another force


On being advised to collate all evidence to support the allegations by Police Sergeant
Graeme Smithey (email 13.11.15), a significant amount of work was undertaken to
produce a statement. The document, which referred to and listed around 30 other files,
was sent under cover of an email dated 2.12.15 but the supporting documents withheld
3

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awaiting further notification. Presumably the police did not intend seriously considering
the evidence as the other files were never asked for and consequently never sent. The
email (see below) suggested that another police force dealt with the matter for the
reasons highlighted in paragraph 68 of the statement I had attached:
From:
To: Smithey, Graeme 1226
Sent: December 02, 2015
Subject: Re: RECENT CORRESPONDENCE WITH HUMBERSIDE POLICE
Dear Mr Smithey
I have a letter dated 23 November 2015 from DCI Andy Oliver explaining that the Professional
Standards Branch is in receipt of my complaint.
It strikes my that this matter is now consigned to the complaints process which from my experience
will entail a number of years being fobbed off until it can go no further and will be told to F. off
unless I want to try my luck in the casino justice system and challenge the decision in the High
Court.
I have acted on your suggestion by collecting all the evidence etc. and produced a statement. I
have explained in the document (attached) that because of a conflict of interest which exists if
Humberside police were to deal with this matter, it is suggested that another police force does so
(see para 68 for details).
There are a significant number of documents accompanying the statement and will withhold those
until I'm informed further about the matter.

Key facts: local resolution


The information sheet, Key facts: local resolution stated that the person dealing with the
complaint would consider my representations if it was strongly believed that the
complaint should not be dealt with by local resolution. In an email (see below) sent to the
officer allocated the complaint, I expressed my believe that the matter was not suitable to
be dealt with by this process as, among other reasons, perjury was punishable as an
offence whether occurring in criminal or civil proceedings. The consequences were that I
was a victim of Fraud committed by North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC) in
presenting a false witness statement to the court. Again the statement (minus the
supporting files) was attached.

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From:
To: Allan.Harvey@humberside.pnn.police.uk
Sent: December 20, 2015
Subject: Perjury to commit fraud - CO 461/15
Dear Mr Harvey
I have a letter dated 17 December 2015 regarding case reference CO 461/15 which was recorded
8 December 2015. I'm aware that the issue has been considered suitable for Local Resolution and
the file forwarded to yourself to deal with. The matter concerns a complaint about an officer
wrongly informing me that a crime I have reported is a civil matter.
I have read through the information document "Key facts: local resolution" and strongly believe that
this matter is not suitable to be dealt with by this process.
In the period between making my complaint and it being recorded I have done a significant amount
of work putting together a statement after being advised by Police Sergeant Graeme Smithey in an
email 13 November 2015 which contained the following:
"I would advise that you collate all evidence and intelligence that would support the claims
you are making against the court."
For the avoidance of doubt, it might be helpful if I stressed that allegations of perjury were levelled
against North East Lincolnshire Council for presenting a false witness statement, this is additional
to the allegations made about Grimsby Magistrates' Court for perverting the course of justice. As
set out in the introduction of the attached statement, the association with the Civil Jurisdiction.. of
the Magistrates Courts Act, does not make the matter civil. Perjury is punishable as an offence
whether it occurs in criminal or civil proceedings and the consequences are in this case that a false
statement was made in order to commit an act of fraud.
The process described in the 'Key facts' document will not get the result I intend to achieve.
However, the attached statement (and supporting documents) provide the evidence required to
justify that a full investigation is carried out in order to satisfy the Crown Prosecution Service that a
successful conviction could be secured.
Further discussion to draw up an action plan is unnecessary and a waste of recourses in the light
of the evidence already produced. The process in any event will be a back covering exercise which
would continue, for example, if the right exercised to appeal a negative outcome.
Even in the unlikely event that the complaint is upheld, none of the consequences set out in the
key facts document appear to hold the force accountable in the way I require, which is to consider
the allegations a police matter for which a proper investigate is undertaken.

The Inspectors subsequent correspondence (below) suggested that my representations


where not considered and the process as originally proposed would be carried out
regardless. The documents referred to in the statement were not asked for.

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From: "Harvey, Allan 5521"
To:
Sent: December 30, 2015
Subject: FW: Complaint CO/461/15
Mr

I have received the above from Humberside Police Professional Standards branch to respond to
you as the resolving officer. The matter has been determined to be one concerning neglect of duty,
but suitable for the local resolution process.
I am unable to speak to you regarding your complaint as your phone line is unobtainable.
In an effort to progress this matter the investigation plan I propose is:
Deal with the matter as a Local Resolution
Review contents of complaint file
Discuss the matter with Humberside Police Force Solicitors
Seek any relevant response from staff concerned
Instigate any service recovery identified
Write to the complainant with the outcome of the enquiry.
If this is agreeable to you, then can you e-mail me to advise that this is acceptable. As part of the
Local Resolution Process, you have right of appeal of the outcome to the Humberside Police
Appeal Body.

It was assumed that the Inspector had not received my representations and so the
following email sent to express this. The seriousness of the matter was conveyed as well
as the consequences of the police failing to investigate.
From:
To: Harvey, Allan 5521
Sent: December 30, 2015
Subject: Re: Complaint CO/461/15
Mr Harvey
It is my understanding from your correspondence today that the email (and attachment) which I
have confirmation was forwarded to you on 21 December 2015 was not received.
In that correspondence I set out my concerns about the complaint not being considered suitable for
Local Resolution. A statement was attached which provides evidence to support my allegations. A
table itemising around 30 supporting documents is contained in that statement which need to be
considered by the person undertaking any review/investigation. Neither the statement nor the
supporting documents have been referred to which concerns me.

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The seriousness of these allegations cannot be over stated nor the consequences if the
Council/Court are allowed to resort to such criminal actions without being challenged.
Action needs taking sooner rather than later to ensure that the immediate consequences of the
fraud is remedied. This will not be achieved by having to complete complaint and subsequent
appeal procedures which guarantee nothing at the end. The appropriate level of investigation can
be evaluated after the immediate risk of the consequences of the crimes have been removed.
The consequences do not stop at the fraudulently obtained court cost. Unnecessary enforcement
measures will follow, incurring additional costs which will accumulate over time to be sufficient in
amount that the council will achieve its vindictive aim and be able to take insolvency, bankruptcy or
custodial action.
Will you let me know if you require the correspondence re-sending (with attached statement) which
was originally dated 20 December 2015.

The email elicited no response but another sent on 12.1.16 did (the next day) to inform
me that I should be receiving his response from the Professional Standards Department
imminently. That response was sent on 13.1.16 and was the final outcome of the local
resolution process, not a reply to any of my representations. Clearly all my
correspondence had been ignored and the local resolution process completed with the
decision indicating that the force was ignorant or did not have any regard for the Criminal
Justice and Courts Act 2015 (the 2015 Act).

Corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and privileges


An officer commits an offence under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the 2015
Act by failing to exercise a power for the purpose of achieving the detriment of another
person. There has clearly been a failure in exercising police powers by wrongly advising
that the matter does not concern the Police as it is civil. Had the force exercised its
powers and investigated the crime (an open and shut case) NELC would not be entitled
to the fraudulent proceeds, which may potentially be added to with further fraudulent
sums. The failure to exercise its power to investigate has therefore caused me a financial
loss which is likely to continue to my detriment and intensify in the passing of time.

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The suitability test for local resolution
Independent Police Complaints Commissions (IPCC) published practical guidance on
handling complaints etc., includes a test for establishing whether a complaint is suitable
for local resolution or investigation. The relevant part of the test for assessing suitability
for local resolution, as quoted from the August 2014 issue (Focus), is as follows:
The suitability test
A complaint is suitable for local resolution if the appropriate authority is satisfied:
a. the conduct being complained about, even if proven, would not justify criminal or disciplinary
proceedings against the person being complained about...

Applying the IPCC test correctly should have determined the local resolution process
unsuitable and a full investigation carried out instead, because failure to exercise a police
power, combined with that failure causing a financial loss, would justify criminal
proceedings under Section 26 of the 2015 Act. The guidance also states. if there is
doubt about a complaint being suitable for local resolution, err on the side of caution and
conduct an investigation. The following provides clarification:
The test is whether the conduct complained about, even if proven, would not justify criminal or
disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, when considering if the conduct would justify the bringing of
proceedings, there should be no consideration of the strength of the evidence, whether the
complaint is likely to be upheld, or the likeliness of prosecution.
When assessing a complaint using the suitability test, the complaint should be taken at face value,
focusing on the substance of the conduct being complained about. The decision should not be
based on the wording of the complaint alone (the relevant appeal body test is applied in this way).
It also should not be based on reviewing the evidence available and exploring the likely outcome
(the special requirements test on investigations is applied in this way).
The person assessing the complaints seriousness should consider contacting the complainant to
better understand their complaint and to get further information. A mini-investigation to assess the
strength of evidence for the complaint (such as getting custody records, incident logs, speaking to
the officers concerned, etc) should not be conducted. If the evidence does not support the
complaint then the complaint is not upheld following an investigation, it does not make it any more
suitable for local resolution.
It is possible for a complaint that uses exaggerated language to be locally resolved, but the right of
appeal is to the IPCC. It is also possible for a complaint to be deemed unsuitable for local
resolution, but then the appointed investigating officer, upon reviewing the evidence, does not
apply special requirements to the subsequent investigation.

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Do you feel the outcome was a proper outcome?
This means that, for example, you believe the outcome was not appropriate to the
complaint, or the outcome did not reflect the evidence available. Tick one box only.
Yes

No

If your answer is no, please provide further information, continuing on a separate sheet if
necessary.

The outcome was wholly inappropriate as the investigating officer based his response
solely with regard to the court case being that the judges determination was to grant a
liability order. In doing so, the fraudulent application for the liability order made by NELC
which is a criminal allegation in isolation from the judges conduct has been allowed
to avoid scrutiny. The evidence provided is conclusive and to be overlooked strongly
suggests that Humberside police engages in a practice which overlooks its duty to the
taxpayer in favour of shielding the local authority from justice.
The outcome has also wrongly been determined on advice obtained from the Force
Solicitors. That advice was based on the assumption that the issues may be appeal
points that could be raised at any subsequent appeal hearings. The proceedings
involved defending NELCs application for a liability order for non-payment of Council
Tax. In that regard the opportunity exists for the defendant to appeal a decision to the
High Court either by way of a case stated or judicial review. Both are in any event
unreasonable procedures for an ordinary taxpayer to have to embark upon with it likely
taking years (if ever) to succeed in having the case brought before the Queens bench.
Moreover any such appeal would involve civil proceedings and concern a challenge to
the relevant legislation governing Council Tax administration and/or enforcement,
therefore, representations involving criminal law would not be considered appeal points
that could be raised in those proceedings.

.
If you have any documents that support your appeal please list below or attach to them
to this form when submitting your appeal
.
Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
............................................................................................................................

_______________________________________________

RESTRICTED - POLICY

RESTRICTED

HUMBERSIDE

POLICE

APPEAL BODY
Police Headquarters
Priory Road
Hull HU55SF
Tel NO: 01482 578301
Fax No: 01482 305004
Switchboard: 101

j-:)rot'3ctingCommunities, Targeting Criminals, Making a Difference

This matter is being dealt with by:

Abigail Combes
abigail.combes@humberside.pnn.police.uk

Complaint ref: CO/00461/15

26 January 2016

Dear Mr '----_
Thank you for your correspondence relating to an appeal that you have made
regarding the local resolution outcome of your complaint, reference CO/00461/15.
This letter is to formally acknowledge receipt of your appeal, received on 25 January
2016.
You will be contacted again in due course.
If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me on the above telephone
number.

Yours sincerely

Judi HEATON

Chief Superintendent

RESTRICTED

Action Fraud Crime Document


Action Fraud Record

Fraud ID
Fraud CRN
Fraud Type
Fraud Report
Date
First Contact
Method
Caller Type
Enabler Present
Fraud Victim
Support
Requested
Fraud Impact
Level

Fraud
Additional
Information

First Contact
Details
First Contact
Date

-6260261
NFRC160101304675
NFIB 19 - Fraud by Abuse of Position of Trust
2016-01-29T13:52:18.793
In person
I am the victim of fraud
1
No
Significant - impacting on health or financial well being
Grimsby Magistrates' Court, with Humberside Police and the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS) as accomplices have misused the Criminal
Justice system in allowing fabricated evidence to convict me for charges of
which I am innocent in order to defrauded me of a sum of 620. The court
had no evidence whatsoever with which to find a guilty verdict. I believe
the burden of proof is beyond all reasonable doubt in criminal cases and
therefore satisfied that a crime has been committed against me for which
there are very good grounds. It is suspected that Police Constable Thomas
Blake 1131 serving with Humberside Police incited a witness to commit
perjury. There are also very good grounds to suspect that CCTV footage,
which would support my innocence, has been destroyed. The CPS have
had no evidence with which to justify prosecuting the case and therefore
suspect that Mr Martin Howarth, the CPS Solicitor has been corruptly
influenced by Humberside Police/Grimsby Magistrates' court to proceed
with a prosecution where there was no evidence or the evidence fell below
the criminal justice standards which by those standards would be
considered an injustice. I had insufficient information about proceedings
and did not know the position regarding my rights to legal representation
and left to produce representations myself. The case went ahead in my
absence during which I was found guilty. It appears the judge in sentencing
at a later hearing, which I did attend, was not briefed as the mitigating
evidence documents I had sent to the court had not been considered in my
conviction.
False arrest on fabricated charges
2015-08-27TOO:00:00

Reported Police
Station
Reported Police
Reference
Reported To
Other Org
Amount Given
Vulnerability
Prior Victim
Vulnerability
Regular Target
Vulnerability
Risks Losing
Money
Evi Other
Clear period
start date
Disposal date

Humberside Police
C0432/15
No
620
1 - Yes
1 - Yes
1 - Yes
1 - Yes
29/01/2016
27/01/2022

Suspects
Suspect - 1
Suspect Type
Person First Name
Organisation Name
Organisation Type
Address Line 1
Address City
Address County
Address Country
Address Postcode
Contact Details
Org Fax
Contact Details
Org Website
Contact Details
Org Email
Contact Details
Org Tel

A business or other organisation


Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
228 - Other
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
England
DN31 lNH
08707395837
https:/courttribunalfinder.service.gov.uk/courts/grimsby-magistratescourtand-family-court
hu-grimsbymcadmin@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk
01472320444

Suspect - 3
Suspect Type
Person First Name
Organisation Name
Organisation Type
Address Line 1
Address City
Address County

Yes, the next suspect is a business or other organisation


Humberside Police
Humberside Police
3941 - Other
Priory Road
Hull
Humberside

Address Country
Address Postcode
Contact Details Org Website
Contact Details Org Email
Contact Details Org Tel

England
HU55SF
http://www.humberside.police.uk/
enquiries@humberside.pnn.police.uk
01482597600

Suspect - 2
Suspect Type
Person First Name
Organisation Name
Organisation Type
Address Line 1
Address Line 2
Address City
Address County
Address Country
Address Postcode
Contact Details Org Fax
Contact Details Org Tel

Yes, the next suspect is a business or other organisation


Crown Prosecution Service - Humberside
Crown Prosecution Service - Humberside
Other
Earle House
Colonial Street
Hull
Humberside
England
HU28JN
01482621002
01482621000

Victims
Victim - 1
Person Title
Person First Name
Person Last Name
Address Line 1
Address City
Address County
Address Country
Address Postcode
Contact Details Preferred Method
Contact Details Email
Transfers
Transfer - 2
TransferType ID2
Transfer - 1
TransferType ID1
Transfer - 3
TransferType ID3

Mr

Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
England
Email
@gmail.com

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
26 January 2016 10:21
CO.150461.LR letter.
.130115.pdf; Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Fw: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Ms Jones
Is anyone going to reply to my email?
As you will notice I am embroiled in a dispute with Humberside police regarding its unwillingness to carrying
out its duties, i.e., investigating the perjury committed by North East Lincolnshire Council (see attached
"perjury to defraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf").
I would like to know what action (if any) the court is taking regarding the perjury matter now it has the
evidence and knowing the police are neglecting to carry out its duty.
I would like the other matters which have so far not been dealt with also addressing.

Yours sincerely
.

11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"!NorthCasework" <NorthCasework@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
26 January 2016 11:02
Frequently Asked Questions - Non-RAB.pdf
RE: Appealing against the Local Resolution process

Good morning Mr

Many thanks for contacting the IPCC.


I can see from previous emails between yourself and Humberside Police, that you have
copied the IPCC into, that the force are the relevant appeal body for your appeal.
It is for the force, not the IPCC, to decide which organisation should deal with your appeal.
In order to decide whether your appeal should be handled by the chief officer of the police
force or the IPCC, the police force looks at the nature of the complaint(s) that have been
made and applies a legal test [1].
The law [2] explains that if an appeal is made to the IPCC and the relevant appeal body is
the chief officer, the IPCC must forward the appeal to the appropriate authority to consider.
The IPCC must also tell the person who made the appeal that it has done this.
I have attached an information sheet about the appeal process.
Yours sincerely
Megan Morris
Casework Administrator
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
PO Box 473
Sale
M33 0BW
Tel: (+44) 0161 246 8502
Email: northcasework@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk
www.ipcc.gov.uk
IPCC Statutory Guidance on the handling of police complaints

[1]

Regulation 30 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 and Regulation 91 of
the Independent Police Complaints Commission (Complaints and Misconduct) (Contractors)
Regulations 2015.
[2]

Paragraph 31(1) Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002.

11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"!NorthCasework" <NorthCasework@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
26 January 2016 13:06
Appealing_against_the_Local_Resolution_forms.pdf; appeal_about_local_resolution_form.pdf
Re: Appealing against the Local Resolution process

Dear Ms Morris
Thank you for your reply which is helpful.
I realise I could have been clearer regarding the two different appeal forms I was querying. I notice I
mistakenly referred to both of them as the same, i.e., "Appealing against the Local Resolution process".
The other form which I submitted (and attached yesterday) was the equivalent of the IPCC form "Appealing
against the outcome of local resolution".
I would appreciate knowing if it's appropriate that I also complete the form to appeal against the Local
Resolution process as it is evident to me that the Local Resolution was not the correct process elected by
Humberside police.
I have attached both forms which I'm querying for identification and your reference.
I would also like to know if the IPCC gets involved when the force makes errors such as these. I ask because
it did when Humberside police previously recorded complaints into Conduct as Direction and Control
matters.
Your sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
26 January 2016 14:15
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr
26 January 16
In response to your latest e-mail there is nothing to add to my previous e-mail to you.
The court is not taking any action regarding your allegations of perjury.
I have already addressed the issue of appeal and payment of fines

Yours Sincerely
G P Townell

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
26 January 2016 14:45
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell

Why is the court not taking any action about North East Lincolnshire Council committing perjury to defraud me?
Grimsby Magistrates' court appears to be operating as a Kangaroo court.
I have asked about the fine, i.e, whether it is on hold whilst I make up my mind about appealing the court's
decision, which should by rights be overturned on reopening the case under s142 of the Magistrates' courts Act
1980.
There is also the matter of the letter I sent regarding North East Lincolnshire Council's summons costs. Have
you understood the content and suitably arrived at the conclusion that Grimsby Magistrates' court has over the
years abetted the council in fraudulently obtaining hundreds of thousands of pounds?

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Res - Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>
26 January 2016 22:35
Formal Complaint - 26 January 16.pdf
Formal Complaint (NEL/1172/1516)

Dear Sir/Madam

Please find attached my letter escalating my formal complaint to the final stage (NEL/1172/1516).

Your sincerely

11/07/2016

North East Lincolnshire Council


Finance Department
Civic Offices Knoll Street
Cleethorpes
North East Lincolnshire
DN35 8LN

XY Xxxxxxx Yyyyy
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
AB12 3XY

26 January 2016
Dear Mr French
Re: Council tax Ref: 5501xxxxxx Formal Complaint (NEL/1172/1516)
Your response dated 19 January 2016 to my stage 1 complaint has not satisfactorily addressed my
issues and therefore I wish to escalate the matter to the final stage of the formal complaints
procedure.
Regarding my instructions that all payments I make in future are allocated to the current years
liability, Im assuming from the context of your response that you did not uphold this element, even
though your declaration is to the contrary. In any event, I disagree with the councils decision not to
consider these instructions acceptable but do not intend reiterating the points I have already made.
In that matter Im at a loss to know how your perception is that my representations conclude that the
debtor may only elect the account to which payment is allocated at the time it is made.
Turning to the councils 6 weeks delay in responding to my November correspondence. Though this
element has been upheld, my December payment, which I have expressly elected to be allocated to
my 2016-17 account, has been allocated to reduce this years liability. Given that I would never
have made this payment had the information received been sent sooner, then it is reasonable that the
council, which was at fault, should make amends by reallocating the payment or refunding it. The
council must be aware that I intended and intend making no payment to the 60 costs which are
subject to the High Court appeal from 2012/13 nor the fraudulently 60 costs obtained in respect of
the 2015-16 tax year.
Whilst you imply that the issue is a rarity, re falling below its high standards for responding, dont
forget that the response time for dealing with an almost identical issue in October 2014 was 4
weeks.
Liability order
Lastly there is no reason why the council should assert that the concerns raised about the Liability
order falls outside the scope of the complaints process.

The Local Government Act 2003 introduced into the Local Government Finance Act 1992 the
provision enabling the secretary of state to make regulations giving magistrates' courts powers to
quash a liability order if it was satisfied that one should not have been made. The explanatory notes
to the 2003 Act describes the only avenue available for this before the provision which is as
follows:
At present, this can only be achieved on application to a higher court. The cost involved is
unwarranted where there is no dispute about the facts.
I understand the above means a defendant may only appeal a decision to the High Court either by
way of a case stated or judicial review. As implied, both are unreasonable procedures for an
ordinary person to have to embark upon with it likely taking years (if ever) to succeed in having the
case brought before the court. There is no dispute either about the facts in this case.
The application was made because the council had misallocated monies to a sum subject to appeal
on the basis that it believed the case had been withdrawn and the sum no longer suspended. The
appeal had never been withdrawn and the simple fact is that the council could not have believed it
had by the incriminating evidence in the form of Exhibits which supported its witness statement. It
has the minimum duty to apply to the Magistrates to have the liability order quashed as it has been
brought to the councils attention that the application should never have been made.
Moreover, the same can be done with respect to the 2012-13 liability order because it has been
confirmed in the May 2015 High Court ruling, R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015]
EWHC 1252 (Admin), that the liability order was obtained unlawfully.
It should be emphasised that the granting of costs without sufficient relevant information to support
them, did not become unlawful on account of the High Court judgment. Even before 6 May 2015, it
will have been required that the court had before it that information to enable reaching a proper
judicial determination. The position had merely been confirmed in the Tottenham Magistrates case.
Yours sincerely

X. Yyyyyy

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
27 January 2016 12:13
IPCC Ref: 2015/058542

Dear Mr
Thank you for contacting the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). We acknowledge
receipt of your email dated 26 January 2016 regarding the Local Resolution process and the appeal
process.
It may be useful to give you some background to the legislation changes that were implemented in
November 2012. Prior to November 2012 the complaints process was covered by the Police Reform
Act 2002 (PRA). A new act, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (PRSRA), was
passed by Parliament in 2011 and implemented in November 2012. As part of the process Police and
Crime Commissioners were elected throughout the country.
Changes were made to the Local Resolution (LR) Process. Under the old legislation (PRA) the
complainant had to agree to the LR process but there was no right of appeal as to the outcome. There
was a right of appeal against the process for cases where the agreed process had not been followed.
Under the PRSRA the police can choose to use the LR process without the agreement of the
complainant. There is now a right of appeal against the outcome but no appeal right against the
process. There would only be a right of appeal against the LR process if the complaint were made
prior to the 22 November 2012.
LR can be used by police forces to resolve a complaint if the conditions below are met. (the text
below is an extract from the IPCC Statutory Guidance which can be accessed via our web site at
www.ipcc.gov.uk)
A complaint must meet both of the following conditions to be suitable for local resolution:
* the appropriate authority is satisfied that the conduct that is being complained about (even if it
were proved) would not justify bringing criminal or disciplinary proceedings against the person
whose conduct is complained about; and
* the appropriate authority is satisfied that the conduct complained about (even if it were proved)
would not involve the infringement of a person's rights under Article 2 or 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
As such you should use the form "appeal against the outcome of local resolution".
If you believe that the force has made an error and you believe that your complaint did not satisfy the
points above then your first challenge should be to the police. You should state your reasons why the
LR process should not have been used and include your reasons with the appeal. It is then up to the
appeal assessor to review the decision. The IPCC cannot change the decison that has been made.
The IPCC can sometimes contact the force if it can be clearly shown that the police force
(appropriate authority) has failed to reach a correct decision based on the IPCC Statutory Guidance.
This could result in the force changing its decision. The IPCC cannot unilaterally make the force
change its decision.
I hope this is helpful.
Regards
.
John Howarth
Customer Contact Adviser
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
11/07/2016

Page 1 of 3

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
27 January 2016 16:42
CO.150461.LR letter.
.130115.pdf
Re: IPCC Ref: 2015/058542

Dear Mr Howarth
Thank you for your reply which confirms that by stating my reasons why the
LR process should not have been used in my appeal, the action I've taken is
correct.
I don't know whether you have read my appeal; it was attached in an earlier
email. My representations regarding why I considered the LR should not have
been used are below. I have also attached Humberside Police's outcome of the
LR process to put the below into context .
Your sincerely
.

/Quote/
Corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and privileges
An officer commits an offence under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of
the 2015 Act by failing to exercise a power for the purpose of achieving the
detriment of another person. There has clearly been a failure in exercising
police powers by wrongly advising that the matter does not concern the
Police as it is civil. Had the force exercised its powers and investigated
the crime (an open and shut case) [North East Lincolnshire Council] would
not be entitled to the fraudulent proceeds, which may potentially be added
to with further fraudulent sums. The failure to exercise its power to
investigate has therefore caused me a financial loss which is likely to
continue to my detriment and intensify in the passing of time.
The suitability test for local resolution
Independent Police Complaints Commission's (IPCC) published practical
guidance on handling complaints etc., includes a test for establishing
whether a complaint is suitable for local resolution or investigation. The
relevant part of the test for assessing suitability for local resolution, as
quoted from the August 2014 issue (Focus), is as follows:

"The suitability test


A complaint is suitable for local resolution if the appropriate authority
is satisfied:
a. the conduct being complained about, even if proven, would not justify
criminal or disciplinary proceedings against the person being complained
about..."
11/07/2016

Page 2 of 3
Applying the IPCC test correctly should have determined the local resolution
process unsuitable and a full investigation carried out instead, because
failure to exercise a police power, combined with that failure causing a
financial loss, would justify criminal proceedings under Section 26 of the
2015 Act. The guidance also states. 'if there is doubt about a complaint
being suitable for local resolution, err on the side of caution and conduct
an investigation'. The following provides clarification:
"The test is whether the conduct complained about, even if proven, would
not justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, when
considering if the conduct would justify the bringing of proceedings, there
should be no consideration of the strength of the evidence, whether the
complaint is likely to be upheld, or the likeliness of prosecution.
When assessing a complaint using the suitability test, the complaint
should be taken at face value, focusing on the substance of the conduct
being complained about. The decision should not be based on the wording of
the complaint alone (the relevant appeal body test is applied in this way).
It also should not be based on reviewing the evidence available and
exploring the likely outcome (the special requirements test on
investigations is applied in this way).
The person assessing the complaint's seriousness should consider
contacting the complainant to better understand their complaint and to get
further information. A mini-investigation to assess the strength of evidence
for the complaint (such as getting custody records, incident logs, speaking
to the officers concerned, etc) should not be conducted. If the evidence
does not support the complaint then the complaint is not upheld following an
investigation, it does not make it any more suitable for local resolution.
It is possible for a complaint that uses exaggerated language to be
locally resolved, but the right of appeal is to the IPCC. It is also
possible for a complaint to be deemed unsuitable for local resolution, but
then the appointed investigating officer, upon reviewing the evidence, does
not apply special requirements to the subsequent investigation."
Do you feel the outcome was a proper outcome?
The outcome was wholly inappropriate as the investigating officer based his
response solely with regard to the court case being that the judge's
determination was to grant a liability order. In doing so, the fraudulent
application for the liability order made by [North East Lincolnshire
Council] - which is a criminal allegation in isolation from the judge's
conduct - has been allowed to avoid scrutiny. The evidence provided is
conclusive and to be overlooked strongly suggests that Humberside police
engages in a practice which overlooks its duty to the taxpayer in favour of
shielding the local authority from justice.
The outcome has also wrongly been determined on advice obtained from the
'Force Solicitors'. That advice was based on the assumption that the issues
'may be appeal points that could be raised at any subsequent appeal hearings'.
The proceedings involved defending [North East Lincolnshire Council]'s
application for a liability order for non-payment of Council Tax. In that
regard the opportunity exists for the defendant to appeal a decision to the

11/07/2016

Page 3 of 3
High Court either by way of a case stated or judicial review. Both are in
any event unreasonable procedures for an ordinary taxpayer to have to embark
upon with it likely taking years (if ever) to succeed in having the case
brought before the Queens bench. Moreover any such appeal would involve
civil proceedings and concern a challenge to the relevant legislation
governing Council Tax administration and/or enforcement, therefore,
representations involving criminal law would not be considered appeal points
that could be raised in those proceedings.
/End Quote/

11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
27 January 2016 22:40
CO.150461.LR letter.
.130115.pdf; Appeal_form_-_LR.pdf
Corruption within Humberside police force

Dear Sir/Madam

I have copied in a number of emails to the Humberside P&CC regarding my concerns about the force's
handling of complaints/crime reporting and fabricated evidence.
The two main issues are:
1. suspicion that a police officer incited witnesses to commit perjury in order to convict me of charges I'm
innocent of.
2. crime being fobbing off by the force as civil in order not to investigate thus protecting North East
Lincolnshire Council from perjury charges.

I will deal with the second issue only in this correspondence as it has not been decided whether the first is to
be appealed to the Crown court
I have hard evidence, detailed extensively in a statement to the police, that North East Lincolnshire Council
committed perjury by making a false statement in order to defraud me through court costs claimed in council
tax proceedings. The judge, in assistance, turned a blind eye to that breach of legal procedure.
I have reported the crime and been told wrongly by the force that it is a civil matter. I'm now being put to the
trouble of going through the complaint and appeal charade which will no doubt end in everyone's time being
wasted and the council evading justice.
As I have stated in a previous correspondence, the consequences do not stop at the fraudulently obtained
court cost. Unnecessary enforcement measures will follow, incurring additional costs which will accumulate
over time to be sufficient in amount that the council will eventually achieve its vindictive aim that could involve
a custodial sentence or bankruptcy.
I have attached the Police outcome to the local resolution process. I stated my reasons why it was not the
appropriate process before it was carried out and have set this out again in the appeal (also attached).
The IPCC have needed to get involved previously regarding the way complaints are handled by Humberside
police and it seems they might have to again.
It should not be necessary for the public who pay for the police service to have to jump through these hoops. If
a crime is reported it should be investigated or at least considered properly for investigation. The evidence
provided is conclusive and to be overlooked strongly suggests that Humberside police engages in a practice
which overlooks its duty to the taxpayer in favour of protecting the local authority from justice.
I would like this matter looked into and hopefully some solution found to the concerns raised.

Yours sincerely

11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
28 January 2016 10:42
IPCC Ref: 2015/058542

Dear Mr
Thank you for contacting the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). We acknowledge
your email dated 27 January 2015.
As stated in your decision letter from Humberside Police your appeal needs to be submitted to the
appeal body at the force. As the IPCC is not the relevant appeal body we are unable to consider your
appeal. For this reasons I have passed the information you have provided to the force who will
contact you regarding your appeal in due course.
Kind regards

Claire Parker
Customer Contact Advisor
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
PO Box 473
Sale
M33 0BW

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"SPOC PCC" <PCC@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
29 January 2016 15:24
RE: Corruption within Humberside police force

Dear Mr , thank you for your email to the Police and Crime Commissioner for Humberside, Matthew
Grove. I acknowledge and respond on his behalf.
Complaints against the police must be handled in accordance with the relevant legislation. In this instance
Humberside Police were the appropriate authority to consider your complaint and the Humberside Police
Appeals Body is the correct body to consider your appeal. The Commissioner is not able to act as an
additional appeal mechanism.
I have contacted Humberside Polices Professional Standards Branch who have confirmed that they have
received your appeal. I trust that you will hear from them shortly.
Although the Commissioner is unable to become involved in the matters that you have raised, please be
assured that he has been briefed on the emails that you have sent.
Yours faithfully
Louise Johnson

11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"SPOC PCC" <PCC@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
31 January 2016 21:34
Re: Corruption within Humberside police force

Dear Ms Johnson
Thank you for your reply. I realise I could have been clearer regarding my correspondence and why I had
attached the Police's outcome letter and my appeal.
I realise that the matters I've become embroiled in are governed by statutory procedures and for that
reason the Commissioner is unable to get involved. However, the existence of the statutory complaints
process should not be seen by the force as an excuse for unaccountability, even though that is in effect what
the statutory process enables.
It can not have been parliament's intention when legislating the relevant Act, that all the concerns of the public
should be opposed as a matter of course merely on account of there being a complaint and series of appeal
processes.
There comes a point when an outside body should consider it appropriate to intervene (not in the
appeal process but the abuse of it). My appeal set out in some detail how the system is being abused and
therefore why it requires scrutiny. The appeal was attached to my 27 January 2016 email to highlight the
failings, not in the hope that it would be dealt with as an alternative or additional appeal.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
01 February 2016 10:36
Fw: Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Dear Mr Walmsley
Re: Matters detailed in below emails
Grimsby Magistrates Court has refused to reopen the case under section 142 of the Magistrates' court Act
1980 and I am receiving no cooperation from the court on matters relating to its decision.
I have therefore for the foreseeable future decided against appealing and would like to know at what stage the
police investigation is
regarding my complaint about Police Constable Thomas Blake.
With regards the two false witness statements made by members of the public, I am still awaiting confirmation
that these crimes have been recorded.
Yours sincerely

11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
01 February 2016 20:25
Re: IPCC Ref: 2015/058542

Dear Ms Parker
Thank you for your reply. I realise I could have been clearer regarding my correspondence and why I had
attached the Police's outcome letter, and in an earlier email, my appeal.
I realise that the matters I've become embroiled in are governed by statutory procedures and for that
reason the IPCC is unable to get involved. However, the existence of the statutory complaints process should
not be seen by the force as an excuse for unaccountability, even though that is in effect what the statutory
process enables.
It can not have been parliament's intention when legislating the relevant Act, that all the concerns of the public
should be opposed as a matter of course merely on account of there being a complaint and series of appeal
processes.
There comes a point when an outside body should consider it appropriate to intervene (not in the
appeal process but the abuse of it). My appeal set out in some detail how the system is being abused and
therefore why it requires scrutiny. The appeal was attached to my 21 January 2016 email to highlight the
failings, not in the hope that it would be dealt with by the IPCC.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"KEYTE, BEATRICE" <BEATRICE.KEYTE1@jaco.gsi.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
02 February 2016 13:39
160202
Second Monthly Update.doc
JACO Complaint: 15-2474

Dear Mr
Please find attached letter for your attention.
Regards
Beatrice Keyte
Investigating Officer
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman

11/07/2016

Judicial Appointments & Conduct


Ombudsman
Postal Area 9.53
th
9 Floor, The Tower
102 Petty France
London
SW1H 9AJ
DX 152380 Westminster 8

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL


Mr
@gmail.com

02 February 2016

T 020 3334 2900


E beatrice.keyte1@jaco.gsi.gov.uk
www.judicialombudsman.gov.uk

Your ref: 15-2474

Dear Mr

Your complaint
I am writing following my previous letter of 4 January 2016 concerning your complaint
to the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman.
I have been investigating your complaint about the process by which the Judicial
Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) handled your complaint about District Judge
Curtis. I have made some preliminary enquiries with the JCIO and am currently
awaiting their reply.
I will continue to keep you informed of any progress and, if I have not written
previously, I will write to you at the beginning of March to let you know the position.
Yours sincerely,
Beatrice Keyte
Investigating Officer

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Res - Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
03 February 2016 11:13
Stage 2 Complaint, Ref 1172_1516

Dear Mr
I am writing to confirm that following your request to the Council received on 27th January 2016, your complaint has now been
escalated to stage 2 of the corporate complaints procedure. It will be investigated by, Susan Harrison on behalf of the Chief Executive.
I can confirm that Susan has had no previous involvement with your case and will conduct a thorough examination of the issues you
have raised. The timescale for responding to this complaint is within 25 working days from the date of this email. If for any reason we
are unable to meet this deadline I will contact you again with a new response date.
To protect your privacy, only service managers and officers involved with the handling and processing of complaints will have access to
the details of the progress of your complaint. The reference number for this complaint is NEL/1172/1516 and, for your own security,
you should quote it whenever you contact us on this matter.
Your complaint will be treated in strict confidence, with all personal information provided processed in accordance with the Data
Protection Act. As part of the investigation we will review the records and information held relevant to your complaint.
I enclose guidelines which explain how your complaint will be handled. If you have any queries, please contact me on the telephone
number above.
Yours sincerely
Adele Beharrell
North East Lincolnshire Council

How Your Complaint Will Be Handled


Stage 1
If it has not been possible to resolve your complaint immediately it will be passed to the feedback officer in the directorate concerned.
Within two working days, you will receive an acknowledgement and the name and contact details of the officer dealing with your
complaint. You will also be told the date you can expect the investigation to be complete, which should be within ten working days. If,
for any reason it becomes apparent that the investigation will take longer, you will be informed of the new date by which you may
expect a full response.
Stage 2
If you are not satisfied with the initial response, you may ask the feedback officer to arrange an investigation on behalf of the chief
executive. This will be carried out by a senior officer who has no previous involvement in your complaint. You will receive an
acknowledgement within two working days. We aim to send a full response to your complaint within twenty-five working days. If, for
any reason it becomes apparent that the investigation will take longer, you will be informed of the new date by which you may expect a
full response.
Local Government Ombudsman
If you have exhausted all stages of the Corporate Complaints process and feel that your complaint has still not been satisfactorily
resolved, you can pursue your issues with the Local Government Ombudsman, an independent body which will look into your
complaint. The Ombudsman will normally expect a complaint to have gone through the Councils own complaints process before
investigating individual cases.
The Local Government Ombudsman
PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0EH
Tel: 0300 0610614
Fax: 0247 6820001

www.lgo.org.uk

11/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>;
<PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
09 February 2016 10:44
Section 1 Magistrates court complaint - draft.pdf
Fw: Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Dear Mr Walmsley
Do you have an update.
Yours sincerely

.
P.S. The attached is the draft of an information I intend to lay before the magistrates' court in order to start a
prosecution in connection with matters raised in complaint CO/461/15. Please forward it to the appropriate
person for comment.

11/07/2016

GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES

xx February 2016

MAGISTRATES COURT (Code 1940)

STARTING A PROSECUTION IN A MAGISTRATES COURT


(Magistrates Courts Act, s 1)

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Failure under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act
2015 to exercise a power for the purpose of achieving the detriment of another person

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
On 11 November 2015, an officer serving with Humberside Police, Gillian Morley, 9614
improperly exercising police powers in responding to a reported offence of perjury to defraud,
by stating that the matter did not concern the Police as it was civil.

STATEMENT OF INFORMANT
1.

On 8 November 2015 the following report was submitted to Humberside Police:


North East Lincolnshire Council produced a false witness statement (thereby
committing perjury) with regards a council tax liability hearing at Grimsby
Magistrates' Court. The District Judge (Daniel Curtis) was aware that the
evidence surrounded a false and corrupt statement, but nevertheless granted the
council a liability order to enforce a fraudulent sum which presently stands at
120.00. This sum is likely to increase if the council appoints its criminal firm of
bailiffs, Rossendales. My allegations are that the council has committed perjury
with the intent to fraudulently obtain money from me by the use of Grimsby
Magistrates court and that Judge Daniel Curtis has perverted the course of justice
by being complicit to that crime.

2.

On 11 November 2015, Humberside Police responded by wrongly stating that the


reported crime (one punishable as an offence whether occurring in criminal or civil
proceedings), was a civil matter, thereby improperly exercising police powers.
With regards to your report that was submitted to Humberside Police on
08/11/2015.....please be advised that this is not a Police matter and is civil which
I suggest you seek further advice from a solicitor/legal advisor.

3.

The crime report followed proceedings instituted by North East Lincolnshire council
(NELC) to enforce council tax liability at Grimsby Magistrates' Court. The original
hearing 2 October 2015 identified issues and so the matter adjourned to 30 October.

4.

NELC diverted payment intended to reduce the indebtedness of the current years
liability to a sum which was outstanding from the 2012/13 tax year thus engineering
default. The outstanding sum was disputed court costs which are under appeal to the High
Court. NELC had suspended the sum pending the court's decision so there was no
justification for engineering default by allocating payment to that sum as the case has yet
to be determined. The appeal has never withdrawn and consequently the costs still
disputed.

5.

On 16 October, NELC served court papers by electronic transfer on the Defendant and
the Magistrates court in respect of the 30 October court hearing. The Witness Statements
content caused the Defendant to suspect a deliberate intent to deceive the court. That
matter was specifically documented in the Defendants representations dated 29 October
where it was also contended the statement made by NELC that it had no further reason to
believe that the costs were being disputed.

6.

NELC had supported its decision to allocate payment to the disputed costs based upon its
claim that it believed the High Court appeal had been withdrawn therefore the suspension
to collect the costs lifted. It is inconceivable that NELC honestly believed this which is
backed up by the exhibits supporting its Witness statement. The Defendants current
council tax bill (exhibit 1) itemised the sum as a separate balance from the current
liability and describes it as a sum subject to court proceedings. NELC had
simultaneously submitted an item of evidence to the court claiming it had no reason to
believe that the costs were still being disputed and another implying that they were
suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. The Council Tax bill expressed this in
the following terms:

Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings
7.

On serving the court papers by electronic transfer, NELC had only been able to
successfully transfer to the Defendant, nine of the fourteen files which made up the
complete set of documents. It was apparent from the context of the 'Witness Statement'
which was successfully transferred that the missing content could be sourced elsewhere,
and NELC therefore informed.

8.

A missing exhibit was identified in the Witness Statement to be a letter on which NELC
relied to justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were being disputed
[because the Defendant had withdrawn the] application for the Judicial review of the
costs'. It was verified by email records that a copy, which was a letter sent to the
Administrative Court Office dated 20th November 2013 had been sent to NELC and
acknowledged by way of a 'read receipt' on 22 November 2013.

9.

There was no obvious disadvantage to not having received this exhibit. The letter,
however did not give any cause to lead NELC to believe that the High Court appeal (case
stated) challenging the summons costs had been withdrawn. The letter was in response to
the Administrative Court's recommendation to withdraw the judicial review claim as the
process had prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case and deemed there no longer
a need for further action on their part as the process of stating a case was underway. The
judicial review claim, which was a separate matter from the application to state a case for
an appeal challenging the costs, was merely the vehicle used to get the Magistrates' court
to conform. The judicial review claim therefore was for a mandatory order, not a 'review
of the costs' and so the case stated appeal challenging the summons costs had never been
withdrawn.

10. It is clear from the context of that letter alone that it was only the judicial review claim
for a mandatory order that was withdrawn and that the High Court appeal challenging the
summons costs was still being pursued.
11. NELC had acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read
receipts' returned on 15 January, 14 February and 23 April 2014 in respect of letters dated
10 January, 13 February and 22 April 2014. Those letters, which were copies of

correspondence sent to the Justices' Clerk contained hard evidence that the high court
appeal was still being pursued, and sent after the judicial review claim for mandatory
order was withdrawn.
12. Acknowledgement of letters being read, regarding the 10 January and 14 February emails
concerned letters sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the failure to deliver the final
signed case stated. The email regarding the 22 April concerned a letter sent to the
Justices Clerk, requesting a certificate to state that the application had been refused.
13. The missing court papers were requested again on 2 November 2015 (after the court
hearing) in readiness for escalating the matter. NELC was successful in transferring them,
and on viewing the exhibit concerning the Administrative Court it was obvious that
contrary to the initial view, not having all the papers was a disadvantage.
14. The exhibit, provided additional evidence that NELC had wilfully made a statement
material in the proceeding, which was known not to be true. The letters were not copies
of the original; it can be confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the contents were
obtained from the same source that recorded publicly everything relevant to the matter.
The source was a public help forum dealing with council tax issues, the same forum
which NELC had sourced the contents of another of its exhibits.
15. The letters contained in the exhibit (revealed 2 November) had been redacted and
matched the entries that were posted on the public forum. The forum is the only place
from which those letters could be sourced in that redacted form. The characteristics of the
letters which NELC submitted to the court were identical to the forum posts.
16. NELC had not sought the original letters and had presumably as a short cut referred to the
website where all correspondence connected with the matter (albeit redacted) where
conveniently in one place. It is likely that if NELC had made use of the forum to produce
its Witness Statement, it would have been informed from the regular updates posted that
the case stated appeal was still very much being pursued. Whether the forum was
regularly consulted by NELC would not be the deciding factor in determining that it
knowingly made a false statement; it would however reinforce the allegations. The crux
of the matter is that the post from which the content was sourced was accompanied with
some commentary (below) which reinforced the matter in itself:

Back almost to square one.


Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely
successful in mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the
draft), it would never have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the
terms of a recognizance at the hearing. It took this process to prompt a response
from the Justices at Grimsby Magistrates' Court.
The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates Court to
agree terms of a recognizance.
17. NELC had made a statement (material in the proceedings) that was known to be false
with the intention of misleading the court to justify misallocating payment to a disputed
sum thereby engineering default for the current year enabling a further court application
for the purposes of fraudulently attaching a claim of costs.
18. It is a matter of public importance that a summons be issued directed to the police officer
to appear before the magistrates' court to answer the information for an offence of
improperly treating perjury as a civil matter.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH
The information of: Mr

, of

Grimsby

I believe the statement contained in this information is true to the best of my knowledge and
belief

Dated this

Signed:

day of February 2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
09 February 2016 18:50
16 02 09 let LGo to PA draft decision cover.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

09 February 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire DC
Please find attached a letter about your complaint for your attention.
Yours sincerely

Colin Oxley
Investigator
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

17/07/2016

9 February 2016

Mr
GRIMSBY

Your ref:
Our ref:

15 016 673

(Please quote our reference when contacting us


and, if using email, put the number in the email subject line)

If telephoning please contact: 0330 4034279


email address: C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk

Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council
The Ombudsman has asked me to assess your complaint to see if it is about a matter we can or
should investigate.
Based on the information I currently have which includes the papers you sent me and the
remaining details of your previous complaint to us, my current view is that we cannot investigate
your complaint.
Your complaint concerns the reasonableness of costs added to your council tax account following
the serving of a summons in September 2012 and the issue of a liability order by the Magistrates
court in November 2012. You disputed the validity of the costs and paid 10 which you considered
a reasonable reflection of the true cost. You also contest the courts decision to grant the liability
order.
You have pursued an appeal to the High Court about this matter but say that to date you have not
had the success which you sought. This has led to considerable expense of time and money. I
have read your views on the Ombudsmans jurisdiction and why you feel that that it is still possible
to investigate your complaint against the Council. I must inform you at this stage that this is
something of a simplification of the Ombudsmans role and that there are several reasons why we
would not investigate this matter now.
With regard to time you feel that delays by the court led to your complete complaint being delayed
in 2015 but that it falls approximately within the 12 month cut off. In fact your entire complaint
stems from the Councils decision to charge a summons fee which you disputed in 2012 and which

PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0E1

www.lgo.org.uk
0300 061 0614

led to the liability order. The time limit to which you refer in your letter relating to section 26(4) of
the Local Government Act (now 26(B)) relates to when the person affected became aware of the
alleged fault in question. This is certainly the actions of September/November 2012, which led to
your original complaint to the LGO in May 2013. Whilst your original complaint was within the 12
month time period allowed for a complaint, it was nearly four years from where we are now.
It is likely that had you come back with your complaint which was considered premature within the
few months required for a reply, it would have been rejected as it concerned a point of law. You
have referred to the Ombudsmans special report on bailiffs fees and their reasonableness. The
matter which you have raised is more complex and is complicated by it being accepted by the
Magistrates Court.
In addition, the very issue on which you have based your entire complaint and the legal
undertakings which you have become involved in amounts to some 60 only. The Ombudsman
provides a free service but she must use public resources carefully. Had your complaint been in
jurisdiction on the above mentioned grounds it still leaves a serious question as to whether the
injustice which you would have claimed at the time in 2012 would warrant investigation. Clearly you
have gone to some considerable expense in time and money since then but this was your own
choice.
Any member of the public who receives a relatively minor penalty for dog-fouling or parking
violations may either pay the penalty or challenge its validity in the courts. The risk is that the
eventual outcome may be unsuccessful but the cost may be significantly greater than the original
penalty. The fact that this matter is unresolved some four years after the event is due to your own
decision to continue pursuit of an outcome at the High Court. For the LGO the matter would have
been outside jurisdiction some years ago and had you resubmitted your 2013 complaint promptly
this would have been made clear to you at the time. It may also have been considered to be of
insufficient injustice to warrant an investigation.
Before I make any decision, I should welcome your comments on what I say in this letter. If you do
wish to comment, please ensure that I receive your response by 18 February. If I have heard
nothing by then, I will make a formal decision not to investigate your complaint for the reasons
explained above. If you need more time to comment, please explain why this is and I will consider
your request.
Yours sincerely

Colin Oxley
Investigator

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
10 February 2016 14:08
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Mr Oxley
Re: Complaint 15 016 673
Thank you for your draft decision dated 9 February 2015.
It is noted that the LGO has not requested the documents which support the complaint and are referenced
throughout. My representations were submitted via the LGO's website which enables only one attached
document. It was necessary therefore to make a decision which to submit and as my complaint was set out on
a separate document there was little choice but to attach that. I expected the LGO would request the
supporting documents and provide an email address to which they could be sent electronically, but that never
happened.
The LGO therefore, to my knowledge, is not in receipt of North East Lincolnshire Council's final response
to the relevant formal complaint. The Council's final response was the document requested on the website
(assuming the complaint would be set out on the online form rather than separately attached). Basing the
amount of content missing, in terms of the number of documents, that amounts to roughly 96% of the
complaint which the LGO does not hold. I am therefore asking that the 18 February date, by which I'm
expected to submit my comments, is set to some time later to allow consideration of the complaint along with
the supporting documents which the LGO did not hold whilst initially considering the submission.
There are some concerns about the direction being taken with which the LGO seeks to justify avoiding
investigating the maladministration. For example, emphasis is being put on the matter involving only 60 and
that the complaint and litigation engaged in has been my own choice. Apart from the issue amounting to
billions of pounds when scaled up, there is a danger of sending out the message that the LGO endorses a
certain amount of theft by the state, providing it is kept below a certain level, owing to the disproportionate
costs of pursuing matters in the courts be that in time or money. Of course that is not acceptable but if it
was, would it be ethical to put a figure, below which the theft is acceptable?
Such attitude also runs the risk of showing acceptance of our justice system not serving the ordinary person
who has no means with which to pursue justice when public bodies take such liberties and is so designed to
benefit only certain classes of society.
Please let me know if you require the supporting documents sending so the whole complaint can be
considered and if so a new date for my comments.

Yours sincerely

17/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
11 February 2016 11:19
Fw: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Mr Oxley
While I await you reply to my 10 Feb correspondence, I would like some clarification of the following in your
draft decision:
"You have referred to the Ombudsmans special report on bailiffs fees and their reasonableness. The
matter which you have raised is more complex and is complicated by it being accepted by the
Magistrates Court."
I understand you are referring to Annex B (page 49) of my complaint in the first sentence above, however, I'm
unsure whether the second sentence then deals with the court costs or bailiff fees. If, as it would be more
likely still be referring to bailiff fees is it possible to elaborate?

Your sincerely
.

17/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk> "Walmsley, Tony 8637"
<Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
13 February 2016 20:44
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell

Re: Quash sentence under section 142 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980
Grimsby Magistrates' Court, with Humberside Police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) as accomplices
have misused the Criminal Justice system in allowing fabricated evidence to convict me for charges of which I
am innocent in order to defrauded me of a sum of 620. The court had no evidence whatsoever with which to
find a guilty verdict.
As the CPS had no evidence with which to justify prosecuting the case it is therefore suspected that Mr Martin
Howarth, the CPS Solicitor has been corruptly influenced by Humberside Police/Grimsby Magistrates' court to
proceed with a prosecution where the evidence fell below the standards which would be expected for a fair trial.
Moreover, I had insufficient information about the proceedings and did not know the position regarding my
rights to legal representation and left to produce representations myself. The case went ahead in my absence
during which I was found guilty and it appears the judge in sentencing at a later hearing, which I did attend,
was not briefed as the mitigating evidence documents I had sent to the court had not been considered in my
conviction.
I believe the burden of proof is beyond all reasonable doubt in criminal cases and therefore satisfied that a
crime has been committed against me for which there are very good grounds. In their witnesses statements I
have copies of, both Arthur and Tammy Johnson lied and it is suspected that Police Constable Thomas Blake
1131 incited at least one of them to commit perjury.
There are also very good grounds to suspect that CCTV footage, which would support my innocence, has been
destroyed. I have since obtained details of the arrangement Humberside police has for monitoring the public
grounds in front of the Victoria Street station. In respect of 27th August 2015 (the day of the alleged matter), a
total of 7 cctv cameras covered relevant areas; one situated in the portacabin (temporary front office) and 6
covering the front of the station. The camera footage (it has been since discovered) is on a loop system and
kept for 90 days. Although when asked for, video footage is retained, Humberside police have stated that no
requests were received on 27th August 2015, and therefore the video footage has been overwritten.
If there were 7 cameras covering the area, it would seem beyond reasonable doubt that video footage, material
in a criminal case, would be available for proving the innocence of someone convicted of an offence alleged to
have been committed there on that date. Notwithstanding, it could not have been known then whether video
footage would have determined the facts, so remaining voluntarily at the scene to help police with their
enquiries, speaks for itself. Being under no obligation to wait for an officer to arrive, reinforces my innocence,
as I was clearly confident that if video footage existed it could not possibly have incriminated me, but more
likely disproved the accusations (paras 4 - 5, defendant's statement 30 Sept 2015). Someone who had been
guilty in the circumstances, with a possibility of being on camera would unlikely have voluntarily remained to
assist.
It is clear that the evidence, which appears to be none, fell short of the standard which would be required by
the criminal justice to meet the criteria of a fair trial. It is therefore expected in the interest of justice that under
section 142 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980, the sentence is quashed.

Your sincerely

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
15 February 2016 16:18
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr
Thank You for your e-mail dated 13th February 2016.
As I have already stated in one of my previous responses to you this not a case where S.142 of
the Magistrates court 1980, should be applied.
You made the deliberate choice not to attend the Trial on the 15th December 2015.On that basis the case
proceeded in your absence.
As you was not present to challenge the evidence of the prosecution witnesses the District Judge found you
guilty of the offence
.
If you now wish to appeal that decision you should complete the appropriate appeal form and ask the Crown
Court to consider allowing you to appeal outside the time limit.
If you submit your appeal and the Crown Court allows you to appeal out of time then the case will be listed
before the Crown Court for an appeal hearing.
That is in effect a re-hearing of the case . You will then be able to attend, challenge the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and given sworn evidence on your own behalf.
I am unable to assist you any further
yours sincerely
G P Townell
Legal Team Manager

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
15 February 2016 16:38
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Do you not understand the seriousness of my allegations?


"Grimsby Magistrates' Court, with Humberside Police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) as
accomplices have misused the Criminal Justice system in allowing fabricated evidence to convict me for
charges of which I am innocent in order to defrauded me of a sum of 620. The court had no evidence
whatsoever with which to find a guilty verdict."

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<h.pook@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
15 February 2016 15:41
Fw: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Sir/Madam

I have been unable to find a general enquiries address for the LGO but found yours in an internet search.
I would like to know whether the below emails are being attended to. I have had no acknowledgement of
either despite requesting a receipt in both my email.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
15 February 2016 17:14
16 02 15 let LGO to PA draft decision .pdf; 16 02 15 let LGO to PA draft decision cover.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

15 February 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire District Council
Please find attached a letter about your complaint for yor attention.
Yours sincerely

Colin Oxley
Investigator
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

21/07/2016

15 February 2016

Mr
GRIMSBY

Your ref:
Our ref:

15 016 673

(Please quote our reference when contacting us


and, if using email, put the number in the email subject line)

If telephoning please contact: 0330 4034279


email address: C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk

Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council
As you know I have been considering your complaint against the Council on behalf of the Local
Government Ombudsman. I sent you my initial decision on your complaint, and I have considered
your comments on it in reply. I have now decided not to investigate your complaint.
I explained in my letter that there are a number of reasons why I consider your complaint to be
outside our jurisdiction. From your previous complaints to the LGO on this matter it is clear that this
matter has been considered in the past and your latest complaint is about the same matter. If you
wish to challenge the legal understanding of what are considered to be reasonable recovery costs
then you must do so in the courts. You applied to the High Court on two occasions and although yo
have not obtained a successful outcome the matter is outside our jurisdiction for these reasons as
well as on the basis of time expired.
You suggested that the LGO has not considered the extensive material which you hold on this
matter. You submitted a complaint which ran to some 62 pages which is more than many
complainants provide during a detailed investigation. This document, together with your previous
complaints is sufficient to show that this is not a matter which we would investigate now. Any
further material would be irrelevant to the jurisdictional points which I explained to you.
With regard to any decision about de minimis complaints in terms of financial loss it is a matter for
the Ombudsman to decide if a matter should be investigated. Section 24A of the Local
Government Act 1974 gives the Ombudsman a general discretion to decide if she should
investigate a complaint. Many complaints concern very minor injustice and also small financial
penalties which would make expenditure of public funds inappropriate in terms of investigation.

PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0E1

www.lgo.org.uk
0300 061 0614

In the case of your complaint the other jurisdictional barriers mean this question is not one which
needed to be considered but in similar cases which fall within jurisdiction that question of injustice
is one which would require consideration. Before I make a final decision, I should welcome your
comments on what I say in the draft decision. Please also take this opportunity to point out any
factual errors in the draft decision.
If you do wish to comment on the draft decision, please ensure that I receive your response by 24
February. If I have heard nothing by then, I will make a formal decision not to investigate your
complaint for the reasons explained in the draft decision. If you need more time to comment,
please explain why this is and I will consider your request.
You will see that I have referred to you as Mr X. This is because we have a commitment to publish
all of our decisions on our website if possible. If you consider that publication of the decision will
identify you, please explain why this is and we will consider whether to make an exception to our
normal policy.
Yours sincerely

Colin Oxley
Investigator

15 February 2016
Complaint reference:
15 016 673
Complaint against:
North East Lincolnshire Council

The Ombudsmans draft decision


Summary: Mr X complained about the Councils summons and liability
order charges for recovery of unpaid council tax in 2012. The
Ombudsman cannot investigate this complaint. Mr X appealed to the
High Court against the Council and the Magistrates Court for granting
the liability order in 2012. He has not received a successful outcome
but any matter on which court proceedings have commenced is
outside the Ombudsmans jurisdiction. In addition Mr X was aware of
the matter more than 12 months before he submitted his current
complaint. The Ombudsman will not exercise her discretion to
investigate this matter now because he made a similar complaint in
2013.

The complaint
1.

The complainant, whom I shall call Mr X, complains about the summons charge
which he received in 2012. He says he paid 10 which he considered a
reasonable reflection of the costs and the Council then obtained a liability order
from the Magistrates Court for the remaining 60 costs. He says the Magistrates
Court is also at fault for issuing the liability order.

The Ombudsmans role and powers


2.

3.

The Ombudsman cannot investigate a complaint if someone has started court


action about the matter. (Local Government Act 1974, section 26(6)(c))
The Ombudsman cannot investigate late complaints unless she decides there are
good reasons. Late complaints are when someone takes more than 12 months to
complain to the Ombudsman about something a council has done. (Local
Government Act 1974, sections 26B and 34D)

How I considered this complaint


4.

I have considered all the information which Mr X submitted with his complaint.

What I found
5.

Mr X received a summons of 70 for unpaid council tax in October 2012. He


considers the cost to be excessive and paid the Council 10 which he says is
appropriate for the cost of recovery. The Council took the matter to the
Magistrates Court in November 2012 and obtained a liability order for the
remaining 60. Mr X says the Court should not have granted the order because
1

he considered the liability was settled and he wrote to inform the court of this. He
attended a court hearing on 2 November but the court granted the order.
6.

7.

8.

9.

Mr X challenged the Court decision and the Clerk informed him that he may only
do so in the High Court. Mr X says he applied to the High Court to challenge the
Council and the Magistrates Courts decisions on 22 November 2012. He says
that despite this and a second judicial review action he has not obtained a
satisfactory result from the High Court.
Mr X asked the Council to quash the liability order in February 2013. The Council
refused to do so because it said the order was valid. Mr X disputes this. In May
2013 he complained to the Ombudsman about the arrears on his account
because they were carried forward to the following financial year. The complaint
was considered premature and we advised Mr X to pursue a formal complaint
with the Council. He did not state in his complaint that he had already taken the
matter to the High Court.
Mr X did not submit a formal complaint to the Council until March 2014. He
disputed the procedure and the outcome of the initial stages. The Council sent a
final decision in September 2014. Mr X did not submit another complaint about
this until 2016.
It is clear that Mr X disputes the charges which the Council makes for serving a
summons for council tax arrears. He challenged the decision of the Council and
Magistrates in 2012 and made two applications to the High Court. The
Ombudsman may not consider matters which are subject to the commencement
of court proceedings, regardless of the outcome. Mr X made a complaint in 2013
but he did not resubmit it until 2016. The Ombudsman would not exercise
discretion on the grounds of time where the complaint subject is outside her
jurisdiction on the grounds of court involvement.

Draft decision
Mr X appealed to the High Court against the Council and the
Magistrates Court for granting the liability order in 2012. He has not
received a successful outcome but any matter on which court
proceedings have commenced is outside the Ombudsmans
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman will not exercise her discretion to
investigate this matter now because he made a similar complaint in
2013.

Investigators draft decision on behalf of the Ombudsman

Draft decision for your comments

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
15 February 2016 16:56
Section 1 Magistrates court complaint - draft.pdf
Fw: Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Dear Mr Walmsley
Are you able to tell me whether it is your decision to ignore my correspondence or if it is out of your control?
For example, regarding communication with Humberside police, does the force have any arrangements in
place to restrict my contact.
If so, I wish to know in what/which way(s) the organisation has restricted contact. For example, this may be by
telephone, email, letter etc., or a combination of these. It may be that the force is refusing to answer emails
without telling me and would like to know if this is the case.
I look forward to your response.
Yours sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
16 February 2016 09:19
RE: Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


Mr
As far as I am aware there is no such policy in place. With regard to the emails you send to me I forward
them on to Inspector Parsons who is dealing with your complaint as I have this one it is not for me to
respond to you as I do not know how his investigation is progressing. In relation to the private prosecution
you are considering taking out I have forwarded that information to our Legal Services Unit for their
information. I do not know when or if they will choose to respond.
Whilst I am well aware of the fact that these matter require resolving at the earliest opportunity please bear
in mind that Inspector Parsons is an operational Inspector and has limited opportunities to respond to your
emails and all those other emails he is in receipt of.
I am not in a position to help you any further at this time regarding these matters other than forwarding
your emails on to who I consider they are relevant to.
Regards
Tony Walmsley

Tony Walmsley 8637


Caseworker
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police HQ

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<h.pook@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
16 February 2016 10:34
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

16 February 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

I trust, since sending your email to me, you have received Mr Oxley's email he sent to you later in
the day.
Yours sincerely

Hilary Pook
Information and Records Manager
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<h.pook@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
16 February 2016 10:34
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Ms Pook
I did receive Mr Oxley's email. Thank you.

Yours sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
22 February 2016 14:45
Response to Ombudsmans draft decision.pdf
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Mr Oxley
Please find attached my representations on the draft decision.

Yours sincerely
.

21/07/2016

Local Government Ombudsman


PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0EH

Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

22 February 2016
Ref: 15 016 673

Dear Mr Oxley

Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council


I am writing in response to your letters of 9 January and 15 February 2016 and wish to submit my
representations on your draft decision which is set out in Annex A of this letter.
It is apparent that you have produced the draft decision before I had the opportunity to comment
fully on your 9 January letter. I trust you received my emails of 10 and 11 February querying your
correspondence which also brought to your attention that the vast majority of the content of my
complaint was not held by the LGO for consideration.
It was hoped that the queries would be addressed before the LGO drafted its decision, but
apparently those emails have been taken to represent my submissions. Whilst I had intended
making my representations after receiving a response, and that opportunity has been missed, the
formal decision whether or not to investigate the complaint has been suspended in order for my
comments on the draft decision to be considered. I will however, make some points here
additional to those representations at Annex A addressing your initial 9 January letter.
I would contest various remarks made in that letter which are in your subsequent letter generally
referred to as jurisdictional barriers. Firstly, the jurisdictional barrier (time limit) which is
being relied on to allow the continued injustice is only apparently relevant because of the
complaint, in my opinion, being improperly linked to the date when the liability order was
obtained by the Council. The complaint submitted to the LGO specifically concerned the Council
failing to address the issues raised in the formal complaint instead it had focussed on
irrelevancies which were geared to achieving its own agenda. The Councils final decision was

dated 15 September 2014 and the complaint to the LGO related to that date (and occurrences of
maladministration since), and therefore not November 2012.
There is a question arising as to why the complaint, which was considered premature in May
2013, has any relevance to the Ombudsmans decision whether to investigate the present one. It
was referred to in my complaint merely to reinforce the degree to which the maladministration
has affected me in terms of gross inconvenience. The LGO complaint in 2013 never concluded as
the Council eventually resolved the issue which in any event specifically concerned monies that
the Council appropriated wrongly causing default and unwarranted recovery action against me.
Other jurisdictional barriers concerned the level of court costs, commencement of court
proceedings in the High Court, and that I contested the Magistrates Courts decision to grant the
liability order. Firstly, summons costs are applied to the taxpayers account prior to the court
hearing, therefore is a matter concerning the Councils actions, not the Courts. Regarding the
commencement of court proceedings, there has never been an outcome and consequently
representations were submitted to highlight the mismanagement of the Magistrates Court and for
the Parliamentary Ombudsman to consider, in what was hoped would be a joint investigation with
the LGO. However, that matter has apparently not formed part of the Ombudsmans decision
making and further supporting documents not considered in the process.
It is now irrelevant that the Ombudsman considers it only my opinion that the Magistrates Court
was at fault for issuing the liability order as the circumstances under which the Council obtained
it has since been determined unlawful; see R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC
1252 (Admin). The Council (Haringey) had not provided the Court with sufficient information to
reach proper judicial determination on whether the costs claimed were reasonably incurred in
accordance with the Regulations. Moreover, the case authority has been since been successfully
applied in Ewing v Highbury Corner Magistrates Court & Anor [2015] EWHC 3788.
Considering the above clarification, which largely renders the jurisdictional barriers irrelevant, it
now seems appropriate to consider what was described in your 15 February letter as the de
minimis complaints in terms of financial loss.
My 10 February email responded briefly to the remarks made regarding the matter involving only
60, and that the complaint and litigation engaged in has been my own choice. Despite the
emphasis on public resources, and that the Ombudsman must use these carefully, I note a

complaint was recently investigated by the Ombudsman regarding a matter involving only 60.
The report, for which the decision date was 9 November 2015, states the following at paragraph
11 of LGO ref: 15 002 847:
The Council refunded the 60 paid by Mr X as a gesture of goodwill. It also paid Mr X a
further 70 which it offset against his council tax account.
The criteria upon which a decision to investigate must have included factors other than merely the
value of the initial financial loss, such as the amount of inconvenience caused, potential loss
failing the Ombudsmans intervention or the need for a decision in the public interest. As far as it
being my own choice to pursue the matter; given that the Council was acting unlawfully this
would seem a reasonable choice, since the alternative would be giving my consent to the Council
to pick my pockets (and others) whenever it pleases. The question also arises as to why the
Ombudsman would hold a view which to any rational person would appear to be endorsing
unscrupulous behaviour towards the public.

Yours sincerely

Annex A
The Ombudsmans draft decision
Summary: Mr X complained about the Councils summons and liability order charges for recovery
of unpaid council tax in 2012. The Ombudsman cannot investigate this complaint. Mr X appealed
to the High Court against the Council and the Magistrates Court for granting the liability order in
2012. He has not received a successful outcome but any matter on which court proceedings have
commenced is outside the Ombudsmans jurisdiction. In addition Mr X was aware of the matter
more than 12 months before he submitted his current complaint. The Ombudsman will not exercise
her discretion to investigate this matter now because he made a similar complaint in 2013.

The complaint raises issues far too numerous and complex to simply say that they involve court
summons costs from a hearing in 2012. The variety of injustices highlighted are in any event
matters of significant public interest and would benefit from the Ombudsmans scrutiny. If the
main subject of the complaint had to be pinned down, it would have to be that the matters raised
in the formal complaint were investigated improperly, with the intention of obfuscating the
salient points to focus on irrelevancies. Although the complaint stemmed from the Councils
maladministration in its application of summons costs (not liability order) with respect to
Council Tax recovery it did not form exclusively the issues of concern. In any event, the
summons costs are applied to the taxpayers account on issuing the summons and therefore
concerned the Councils actions only.
Neither the Magistrates nor High court proceedings were material to the complaint. The content
which set out the courts involvement was included to show the gross inconvenience that those
elements represented of the maladministration which was triggered and continues and so the
matter does not concern the commenced proceedings. Moreover, there has never been an
outcome to those proceedings, successful or otherwise, and is why the administration by
HMCTS was recommended to be jointly investigated in conjunction with the Parliamentary
Ombudsman under powers granted by the Regulatory Reform Act 2001.
The complaint made in 2013 was neither about court costs, Magistrates Court nor High Court
proceedings but specifically about the Council misallocating payment (intended for the then
current years liability) to a previous years account/balance thus engineering default. The
current complaint, which has to some extent been clarified above, but which ultimately seeks to

have the liability order quashed, is another matter. Seeing as the overriding factor on which the
Ombudsman seeks to not exercise her discretion, being that the complaints are both similar,
there is scope for reconsidering the matter now this has been clarified. It was and is open to the
local authority on realising it was made incorrectly to apply to the Magistrates court to have the
order quashed. The simplest way to resolve the matter is for the Council to take that remedy and
for the LGO to use its influence as it is refusing to, especially as the judgment in R (Nicolson) v
Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin) leaves there no question that the
application was made incorrectly.

The complaint
1. The complainant, whom I shall call Mr X, complains about the summons charge which he
received in 2012. He says he paid 10 which he considered a reasonable reflection of the costs
and the Council then obtained a liability order from the Magistrates Court for the remaining
60 costs. He says the Magistrates Court is also at fault for issuing the liability order.

The reference to a charge gives the impression that it may be permissible to set the level as
a penalty, for example to deter a taxpayer from late payment, or for raising revenue
generally. To leave absolutely no doubt, the summons costs do not function to punish late or
non-payment, neither can they function to encourage prompt payment; however, the
complaint clearly gave examples where the Council had set the level of summons costs for
improper purposes like these. It was also detailed in one or more of the supporting
documents (of which none were considered) that in R v Highgate Justices ex parte Petrou
[1954] 1 ALL ER 406 it was held that costs should not exceed the proper costs incurred and
should not be a penalty.
I am not alone in saying that the Magistrates Court is at fault for issuing the liability order. A
recent case concerning matters not dissimilar to the issues raised in my appeal to the High
Court resulted in a successful appeal and judgment praising the appellant and Pro Bono legal
reps for bringing the case before the court. Mrs Justice Andrews described the appeal,
[2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin), as raising 'issues of significant public interest to both council
tax payers and local authorities'. The costs claimed against the defendant in the case were in
excess of 30k and suspect the effort put into obstructing my case, as detailed in one of the

supporting documents (complaint to Advisory Committee) intended to prevent a similar


outcome. It was adjudged that an order for summons costs was unlawful because the court
had insufficient information to determine the reasonableness of costs claimed.
Had the Magistrates Court complied with the rules and the appeal proceeded, it is
completely rational the high court would have made similar judgment, i.e., it would have
found the liability order to enforce the summons costs had been obtained unlawfully. Like in
[2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin), the Council had not provided the Court with sufficient
information to reach proper judicial determination on whether the costs claimed were
reasonably incurred in accordance with the Regulations. Moreover, it is also in my case as in
the one determined, broadly the same inadequate criteria that satisfied Magistrates that the
costs were reasonable as another supporting document sets out (case stated draft).
Crucially, had the Magistrates not sought to obstruct the appeal, the contested costs would
never have formed part of my account balance which has exposed me to a greater risk of
payment default because of the opportunity it has provided the Council for misallocating
monies to that sum.
Finally, the granting of costs without sufficient relevant information to support them, did not
become unlawful on account of the High Court judgment; so before 6 May 2015, it will have
been required that the court had before it that information to enable reaching a proper
judicial determination. The position had merely been confirmed in that case.

The Ombudsmans role and powers

2. The Ombudsman cannot investigate a complaint if someone has started court action about the
matter. (Local Government Act 1974, section 26(6)(c))

Section 26 of the Local Government Act 1974 would not render the complaint invalid to be
considered for investigation as it is not a complaint about the commencement of court action
or what happened in court. Rather it concerns the Councils actions and the resulting gross
inconvenience that continues because of the maladministration.
Even if the commencement of court action could be tenuously linked to the complaint for the
purposes of engaging s26, the Ombudsman has discretion in that regard as a number of

reports acknowledge; for example, paragraph 4 of LGO ref: 14 009 989:


The law says the Ombudsman cannot normally investigate a complaint when
someone could take the matter to court. However, she may decide to investigate if
she considers it would be unreasonable to expect the person to go to court. (Local
Government Act 1974, section 26(6)(c).
The concluding sentence of sub-section 6 of section 26 of the Local Government Act 1974
states as follows:
Provided that a Local Commissioner may conduct an investigation notwithstanding
the existence of such a right or remedy if satisfied that in the particular circumstances
it is not reasonable to expect the person aggrieved to resort or have resorted to it.
Notwithstanding all of the above, the existence of section 26(6)(c) does not mean that a
complaint in its entirety would be invalid merely because there was some connection with
court proceedings. Another report provides a clear example where an investigation was
carried out and the outcome found in the complainants favour, even when a case had gone
to tribunal, see paragraph 35 of LGO ref: 15 000 836:
Mr C argued to the Land Registry that it should not place the charge, for various
reasons. As is normal, the matter then went to a tribunal to consider the appeal. For
the reasons given in paragraph 5, I cannot consider the arguments that were part of
that appeal, even though the tribunal did not eventually have to decide the appeal.
It is in this matter that the supporting documents, if they had been considered, would have
highlighted the true extent of HMCTSs maladministration that involved lying to prevent an
outcome of the proceedings and why it was recommended to be jointly investigated with the
Parliamentary Ombudsman. Despite this; though Im pursuing the available remedy, and
have never withdrawn my appeal, it is reasonable that the Ombudsman would consider the
matter out of my control, and for practical purposes deem that resolve via the High Court is
not a reasonable alternative to the Ombudsmans involvement.

3. The Ombudsman cannot investigate late complaints unless she decides there are good reasons.
Late complaints are when someone takes more than 12 months to complain to the Ombudsman
about something a council has done. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26B and 34D)

Though completing this complaint has exceeded the 12 months time limit, the issues are in
one way or another continuing and it is impossible to fix a date for the purposes of
determining the time limit. The most recent (September 2015), has involved the Council
again misallocation payment to engineer default, but this time resorted to lying to the court
by submitting a false statement to support its reasons for obtaining a liability order. On top
of the gross inconvenience and unwarranted additional court costs this has caused, the
potential consequences are further exposure to bailiff recovery and enforcement fees. These
new issues occurring and relevant information becoming available requiring the need to
update the complaint has meant the necessary delay in submitting these concerns.
Considering this, it would be reasonable that the Ombudsman use discretion, especially
when the delay is a direct result of Grimsby Magistrates court and the Council failing to
cooperate.
The wilful negligence of both the Council and Magistrates court has been sufficiently serious
to constitute professional misconduct which must warrant the appropriate investigation into
the concerns. This is why, what could be considered an inordinate amount of work has gone
into producing the complaint.

How I considered this complaint


4. I have considered all the information which Mr X submitted with his complaint.

The material submitted with the complaint did not include the supporting documents which
are referenced throughout the principle document, therefore the entire complaint has not
been considered. The main document provided a list of 26 supporting documents, above
which it informed the investigator of the importance that all were to be considered, and a
copy requested in case any were missing. They were never requested but it has since been
explained to me that there was enough information contained in the main document for the
Ombudsman to be satisfied that she could not investigate the issues. A significant proportion
of the supporting papers was in connection with the Magistrates Courts maladministration
and so supplied with the intention for consideration in a joint investigation. However, the
Parliamentary Ombudsmans involvement appears never to have been a consideration.

What I found

5. Mr X received a summons of 70 for unpaid council tax in October 2012. He considers the cost
to be excessive and paid the Council 10 which he says is appropriate for the cost of recovery.
The Council took the matter to the Magistrates Court in November 2012 and obtained a
liability order for the remaining 60. Mr X says the Court should not have granted the order
because he considered the liability was settled and he wrote to inform the court of this. He
attended a court hearing on 2 November but the court granted the order.

The demand on the summons was 507.52 of which 70 was summons costs which had
before the courts involvement already been added to my account, the remainder was the
outstanding liability for remainder of the year (437.52). I paid the aggregate of the sum
specified in the summons as the sum outstanding and a sum equal to the costs reasonably
incurred by the Council in connection with the application up to the day of service of the
summons (10) in accordance with reg 34(5) of the Council Tax Regulations. (If the
outstanding balance and an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred is paid or tendered to
the authority, the application shall not be proceeded with).

6. Mr X challenged the Court decision and the Clerk informed him that he may only do so in the
High Court. Mr X says he applied to the High Court to challenge the Council and the
Magistrates Courts decisions on 22 November 2012. He says that despite this and a second
judicial review action he has not obtained a satisfactory result from the High Court.

The initial application to the High Court was by way of a case stated. The second was a
judicial review claim to obtain a mandatory order for the Magistrates to state a case which it
conditioned upon entering into a recognizance, but which I considered denied my access to
justice. I was persuaded to withdraw my judicial review claim (not case stated) by the High
Court as the process prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case. The Clerk to the
Justices, after producing the draft, failed to comply with the remaining process needed to
further proceedings and because of this has to date prevented the case coming before the
Queens Bench. All correspondence since has been ignored by the Clerk except one which
replied with an undertaking to have written communication setting out the position with the
case and advising of the next steps, which was never followed up.

7. Mr X asked the Council to quash the liability order in February 2013. The Council refused to
do so because it said the order was valid. Mr X disputes this. In May 2013 he complained to the
Ombudsman about the arrears on his account because they were carried forward to the
following financial year. The complaint was considered premature and we advised Mr X to
pursue a formal complaint with the Council. He did not state in his complaint that he had
already taken the matter to the High Court.

The Council claimed that the order had been correctly obtained in February 2013 which I
disputed on the grounds that the application should have ceased when the aggregate of the
sum outstanding and an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority was
paid (reg 34(5) of the Council Tax Regulations).
The complaint in May 2013 to the Ombudsman was made prematurely but with it clearly
explained that if I were to exhaust the Councils formal complaints procedure, the issue
would have likely escalated to having to appeal a liability order which could only be done in
the High Court. I had already written to the Council on 22 April 2013 about my concerns
that monies had been misallocated resulting in unnecessary recovery action. The letter,
which had not been replied to, was submitted along with my complaint to the Ombudsman
on 13 May. By the time the Council responded on 5 June 2013 (the Ombudsman 14 June) I
had written a second letter (21 May) informing the Council that the error was partially
resolved and to ask that balances relating to different years were kept separate to avoid
unnecessary court proceedings. The fact there was over a 6 week delay in responding is
negligent, even more so knowing that similar delays have occurred twice since. Importantly
the complaint was about misallocating payments leading to unwarranted recovery, not about
a court appeal or the commencement thereof.
The next time (see Annex E, complaint) more seriously resulted in a summons being served
for non-payment, when again, payments were up to date. In the time it took the Council to
respond to an email querying a reminder notice, this had escalated to a summons. The
council responded 27 days after it was contacted on 12 November 2014 simply stating that
the payments had been reallocated, there was no longer need to go to court, the costs had
been removed and the summons withdrawn. The issue concerned the Councils payment
processing system being set so that payments which did not exactly match instalment
amounts were automatically allocated to the oldest account, thus engineering default for the

current year. Taxpayers struggling to meet payments who owe money from a previous year
are at risk of entering a cycle of being subjected to recovery action and incurring the costs
every year. That anomaly could be largely eliminated by having the system set so that
payments which do not match a debt instalment are allocated to the current year's liability.
There is a flexibilityefficiency tradeoff inherent in the system which relies solely on
automation. Case law has held that the debtor has first choice over allocation of payments
and his election may be express or implied. The system relies on implied payments, and its
limitations means this is achieved exclusively by virtue of the amount exactly matching the
instalment. This of course may not be the only way to imply which debt payment is intended,
for example, if allocating monies to an older balance would likely put the current year's
liability in arrears, it would be implied that payment was intended to reduce the indebtedness
of the current years debt whether or not it matched an instalment.
A number of billing authorities have their systems set so when unspecified payments are
made on an account, those payments are allocated to the current year to ensure that the
debtor does not unnecessarily incur additional recovery costs through a further application
for a liability order. This suggests that those authorities are aware of R v Miskin Lower
Justices (1953) in which it was held that where an amount so obviously relates to a specific
liability, it would be an unwarranted assumption to allocate the payment elsewhere.
Presumably the reason why these councils ensure non recognised payments do not get
allocated to the oldest debt is because it would be an unwarranted assumption to allocate
monies to a sum in arrears if it is likely to also put the current year's liability in arrears.

8. Mr X did not submit a formal complaint to the Council until March 2014. He disputed the
procedure and the outcome of the initial stages. The Council sent a final decision in September
2014. Mr X did not submit another complaint about this until 2016.

The complaint in relation to the final decision in September 2014 was not submitted until 21
January 2016 because I considered the extent of the negligence (both Council and
Magistrates court) was so serious to warrant the level of detail that went into producing the
complaint. Representations to paragraph 3 above set out, to some extent, some of the other
reasons. The completion was delayed significantly owing to the Council wrongly instituted
recovery again in September 2015, requiring the time consuming production of further

representations to defend that action at the Magistrates court.

9. It is clear that Mr X disputes the charges which the Council makes for serving a summons for
council tax arrears. He challenged the decision of the Council and Magistrates in 2012 and
made two applications to the High Court. The Ombudsman may not consider matters which are
subject to the commencement of court proceedings, regardless of the outcome. Mr X made a
complaint in 2013 but he did not resubmit it until 2016. The Ombudsman would not exercise
discretion on the grounds of time where the complaint subject is outside her jurisdiction on the
grounds of court involvement.

The complaint has been wrongly defined (see previous representations). Representations
were submitted relating to the commencement of court proceedings because the
maladministration of the Magistrates court was recommended to be jointly investigated with
the Parliamentary Ombudsman, however, that was omitted to be considered. The
jurisdictional barriers as referred to previously and deemed irrelevant have been explained in
the various representations.

Draft decision
Mr X appealed to the High Court against the Council and the Magistrates Court for granting the
liability order in 2012. He has not received a successful outcome but any matter on which court
proceedings have commenced is outside the Ombudsmans jurisdiction. The Ombudsman will
not exercise her discretion to investigate this matter now because he made a similar complaint
in 2013.

See previous representations concerning the jurisdictional barriers and why it is considered
within the Ombudsmans jurisdiction.

Investigators draft decision on behalf of the Ombudsman.

_________________________________________________
Draft Decision for your comments

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
23 February 2016 19:12
IPCC Reference 2015/058542

Dear Mr
Thank you for contacting the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). We acknowledge
receipt of your emails, partially copied, dated 1,13,15 February 2016, the contents of which have
been filed and noted on the above reference, please quote this in any future correspondence. We
sincerely apologise for the delay in response, this is due to high work volumes at present.
I do note your concerns however I am unable to expand on the advice previously supplied as we have
no legal jurisidiction to become involved in a complaint where we are not the relevant appeal body
for this. I would refer you back to the email of my colleague, John Howarth dated 27 January 2016,
as this details the legislative changes within the complaints system and steps to take if you believe
the force have made an error in the handling of your complaint.
Yours sincerely
Hannah Reek
Customer Contact Adviser
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<J.Burns@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
25 February 2016 17:39
16 02 24 let LGO to PA final decision statement.pdf; 16 02 24 let LGO to PA final decision
cover.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

25 February 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

Please find attached a letter and final decision statement about this complaint.

Yours sincerely

Colin Oxley
Investigator
0330 4034279
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

21/07/2016

24 February 2016

Mr
GRIMSBY

Your ref:
Our ref:

15 016 673

(Please quote our reference when contacting us


and, if using email, put the number in the email subject line)

If telephoning please contact: 0330 4034279


email address: C.Oxley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk

Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council
As you know, I have been considering your complaint against the Council on behalf of the Local
Government Ombudsman. I sent you a draft decision on your complaint, and I have considered
your comments on it in reply. I have now decided not to investigate your complaint.
The enclosed statement sets out my decision and explains my reasons for it. The Ombudsman
must by law tell the Council the decision on your complaint, so I have sent it a copy of the
statement. In the statement I have referred to you as Mr X. I have now closed the case.
We usually publish our decision statements on our website, so they do not contain names or
details that could allow people to identify you or others involved. We normally destroy our record of
your complaint details 12 months after the date of our decision, except for the decision letter and
statement of reasons which we will destroy after five years.
Customer Satisfaction Survey
You may receive a further letter from the LGO in the coming weeks inviting you to complete a short

PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0E1

www.lgo.org.uk
0300 061 0614

Page 2
Mr

questionnaire telling us about your experience of the LGOs service. I hope that you choose to take
part in the survey and contribute your views to the research.
Yours sincerely

Colin Oxley
Investigator
Enc: Decision statement

24 February 2016
Complaint reference:
15 016 673
Complaint against:
North East Lincolnshire Council

The Ombudsmans final decision


Summary: Mr X complained about the Councils summons and liability
order charges for recovery of unpaid council tax in 2012. The
Ombudsman cannot investigate this complaint. Mr X appealed to the
High Court against the Council and the Magistrates Court for granting
the liability order in 2012. He has not received a successful outcome
but any matter on which court proceedings have commenced is
outside the Ombudsmans jurisdiction. In addition Mr X was aware of
the matter more than 12 months before he submitted his current
complaint. The Ombudsman will not exercise her discretion to
investigate this matter now because he made a similar complaint in
2013.

The complaint
1.

The complainant, whom I shall call Mr X, complains about the summons charge
which he received in 2012. He says he paid 10 which he considered a
reasonable reflection of the costs and the Council then obtained a liability order
from the Magistrates Court for the remaining 60 costs. He says the Magistrates
Court is also at fault for issuing the liability order.

The Ombudsmans role and powers


2.

3.

The Ombudsman cannot investigate a complaint if someone has started court


action about the matter. (Local Government Act 1974, section 26(6)(c))
The Ombudsman cannot investigate late complaints unless she decides there are
good reasons. Late complaints are when someone takes more than 12 months to
complain to the Ombudsman about something a council has done. (Local
Government Act 1974, sections 26B and 34D)

How I considered this complaint


4.

I have considered all the information which Mr X submitted with his complaint. He
has also been given the opportunity to comment on the draft decision.

What I found
5.

Mr X received a summons of 70 for unpaid council tax in October 2012. He


considers the cost to be excessive and paid the Council 10 which he says is
appropriate for the cost of recovery. The Council took the matter to the
Magistrates Court in November 2012 and obtained a liability order for the
1

remaining 60. Mr X says the Court should not have granted the order because
he considered the liability was settled and he wrote to inform the court of this. He
attended a court hearing on 2 November but the court granted the order.
6.

7.

8.

9.

Mr X challenged the Court decision and the Clerk informed him that he may only
do so in the High Court. Mr X says he applied to the High Court to challenge the
Council and the Magistrates Courts decisions on 22 November 2012. He says
that despite this and a second judicial review action he has not obtained a
satisfactory result from the High Court.
Mr X asked the Council to quash the liability order in February 2013. The Council
refused to do so because it said the order was valid. Mr X disputes this. In May
2013 he complained to the Ombudsman about the arrears on his account
because they were carried forward to the following financial year. The complaint
was considered premature and we advised Mr X to pursue a formal complaint
with the Council. He did not state in his complaint that he had already taken the
matter to the High Court.
Mr X did not submit a formal complaint to the Council until March 2014. He
disputed the procedure and the outcome of the initial stages. The Council sent a
final decision in September 2014. Mr X did not submit another complaint about
this until 2016.
It is clear that Mr X disputes the charges which the Council makes for serving a
summons for council tax arrears. He challenged the decision of the Council and
Magistrates in 2012 and made two applications to the High Court. The
Ombudsman may not consider matters which are subject to the commencement
of court proceedings, regardless of the outcome. Mr X made a complaint in 2013
but he did not resubmit it until 2016. The Ombudsman would not exercise
discretion on the grounds of time where the complaint subject is outside her
jurisdiction on the grounds of court involvement.

Final decision
10.

Mr X appealed to the High Court against the Council and the Magistrates Court
for granting the liability order in 2012. He has not received a successful outcome
but any matter on which court proceedings have commenced is outside the
Ombudsmans jurisdiction. The Ombudsman will not exercise her discretion to
investigate this matter now because he made a similar complaint in 2013.

Investigators decision on behalf of the Ombudsman

Final decision

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<J.Burns@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
29 February 2016 12:39
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Ms Burns
I would like to point out that the final decision statement is exactly the same as the draft, despite several
inaccuracies being detailed in my representations.
I trust there has been an error and on realising this a final decision statement which takes into account my
comments will be sent shortly.
If there is no error and the complaint has been dealt with negligently I would like to know what options there
are regarding escalating the matter to the person ultimately responsible for allowing the appalling service.
Finally, if the investigator Colin Oxley can not be held responsible for the negligent way the complaint has
been dealt with, I would like to know who is.
Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<J.Burns@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
01 March 2016 13:22
FACTSHEET - G4 Complaints about us.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

01 March 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

Thank you for your email.


Mr Oxley has made his final decision based on the comments you sent in response to the draft
decision. The fact that the final decision is the same as the draft is because Mr Oxley felt your
comments did not change his decision.
I attach a copy of our factsheet which details how to make a complaint about the decision.

Yours sincerely

Jane Burns
Assessment Team Co-ordinator
0330 4034252
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
01 March 2016 15:32
Re: IPCC Reference 2015/058542

Dear Ms Reek
I have to stress that my concerns go far beyond the IPCC's jurisdiction with regards to getting involved in a
particular complaint. There is a systematic abuse of the complaints and appeal process that needs to be
escalated for the attention at the highest level.
There must be some action which can be taken by the IPCC or other body which can make an impact on
reforming the dysfunctional process. I have had too many years of my life taken over with these issues and I
think it's time was taken out of my hands.
I would like some reassurance that there is something being done about it or at least some plans.
Yours sincerely

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
01 March 2016 22:08
Section 1 Magistrates court complaint - draft.pdf
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell
I have some concerns regarding where material was sourced for an article published about my case by the
Grimsby Telegraph on 29 December 2015.
I believe from complaining to the independent regulator of the newspaper and magazine industry (IPSO) that
the newspaper is obliged to accurately report the court proceedings. I know for a fact this was not the case, for
example, the article states as follows:
"
claimed that this was not the case and that he was in the process of reporting to the police
the behaviour of people towards him."
The above was made up, I did not say that. I in fact did state the reasons why I had not attended, however, that
was omitted. Moreover, the newspaper didn't report any of the initial hearing because if it had, readers would
have known that a second was necessary because I categorically stated that the witnesses had lied and I
suspected the police officer had incited them to commit perjury.
To reinforce that the newspaper had not relied on the hearing, the following is not accurate:
"He was given a six-month conditional discharge and was ordered to pay 85 costs, a 520 court
charge and a Government-imposed 15 victims' surcharge."
I distinctly recall the judge omitting to state that there was a 15 victims' surcharge (in sentencing) and
therefore the question arises as to the source. Where did the Grimsby Telegraph obtain this information?

Yours sincerely
.

P.S. Pursuant to s 1 of the Magistrates' courts Act 1980 I have attached an information in draft form to be
lodged (1 March 2016) as the day being received by the court to avoid the possibility of being time barred
under s 127 of the same Act.

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
02 March 2016 15:49
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr
Thank You for your e-mail of 1st March 2016.

I am unable to comment on the accuracy of the report in the Grimsby Telegraph. That is a matter between you
and the newspaper.
What I can say is that the Grimsby Telegraph does have access to the daily court register which contains the
details of the sentences imposed.
The result as recorded on the court file is exactly as reported in the newspaper article.
I note that you have attached a document to your e-mail. I have been advised by a member of the IT
department not to open the attachment, due to the fact that an attachment in a previous email contained a
virus.
However if you send the document to the court in paper form I shall of course consider the contents
Yours sincerely
G P Townell
Legal Team Manager

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 5

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
03 March 2016 12:44
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell
I have looked into the matter regarding an attachment in a previous email containing a virus and found it
unlikely to be the case. As a preliminary step, I have checked out an email I sent to your email address (Fri,
Jan 29, 2016 at 2:04 PM) with the following two attachments:
NELC costs - 14 Jan 15.pdf
Summons-Cost-Calculation-of-2014-15-for-2015-16.xlsx
Regarding my email program and in connection with the specific email, the following message is
recorded "This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software"; in an acknowledgement
message from yourself, the Government Secure Intranet virus scanning service displays the following:
Your message was read on 29 January 2016 14:05:07 UTC.
The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet virus
scanning service supplied by Vodafone in partnership with Symantec. (CCTM Certificate Number
2009/09/0052.) This email has been certified virus free.
In order to investigate this matter further, it would be helpful if you could identify the document which contained
the virus.
In the meantime I will provide the contents of the information I lodged on 1 March 2016 in accordance with s 1
of the Magistrates' courts Act 1980.

Your sincerely
.

GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES

xx February 2016

MAGISTRATES COURT (Code 1940)

STARTING A PROSECUTION IN A MAGISTRATES COURT


(Magistrates Courts Act, s 1)

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Failure under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 to
exercise a power for the purpose of achieving the detriment of another person

21/07/2016

Page 2 of 5
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
On 11 November 2015, an officer serving with Humberside Police, Gillian Morley, 9614 improperly
exercising police powers in responding to a reported offence of perjury to defraud, by stating that the
matter did not concern the Police as it was civil.

STATEMENT OF INFORMANT
1. On 8 November 2015 the following report was submitted to Humberside Police:
North East Lincolnshire Council produced a false witness statement (thereby committing
perjury) with regards a council tax liability hearing at Grimsby Magistrates' Court. The
District Judge (Daniel Curtis) was aware that the evidence surrounded a false and
corrupt statement, but nevertheless granted the council a liability order to enforce a
fraudulent sum which presently stands at 120.00. This sum is likely to increase if the
council appoints its criminal firm of bailiffs, Rossendales. My allegations are that the
council has committed perjury with the intent to fraudulently obtain money from me by
the use of Grimsby Magistrates court and that Judge Daniel Curtis has perverted the
course of justice by being complicit to that crime.
2.

On 11 November 2015, Humberside Police responded by wrongly stating that the reported crime
(one punishable as an offence whether occurring in criminal or civil proceedings), was a civil
matter, thereby improperly exercising police powers.
With regards to your report that was submitted to Humberside Police on
08/11/2015.....please be advised that this is not a Police matter and is civil which I
suggest you seek further advice from a solicitor/legal advisor.

3.

The crime report followed proceedings instituted by North East Lincolnshire council (NELC) to
enforce council tax liability at Grimsby Magistrates' Court. The original hearing 2 October 2015
identified issues and so the matter adjourned to 30 October.

4.

NELC diverted payment intended to reduce the indebtedness of the current years liability to a
sum which was outstanding from the 2012/13 tax year thus engineering default. The outstanding
sum was disputed court costs which are under appeal to the High Court. NELC had suspended
the sum pending the court's decision so there was no justification for engineering default by
allocating payment to that sum as the case has yet to be determined. The appeal has never
withdrawn and consequently the costs still disputed.

5.

On 16 October, NELC served court papers by electronic transfer on the Defendant and the
Magistrates court in respect of the 30 October court hearing. The Witness Statements content
caused the Defendant to suspect a deliberate intent to deceive the court. That matter was
specifically documented in the Defendants representations dated 29 October where it was also
contended the statement made by NELC that it had no further reason to believe that the costs
were being disputed.

21/07/2016

Page 3 of 5
6.

NELC had supported its decision to allocate payment to the disputed costs based upon its claim
that it believed the High Court appeal had been withdrawn therefore the suspension to collect the
costs lifted. It is inconceivable that NELC honestly believed this which is backed up by the
exhibits supporting its Witness statement. The Defendants current council tax bill (exhibit 1)
itemised the sum as a separate balance from the current liability and describes it as a sum
subject to court proceedings. NELC had simultaneously submitted an item of evidence to the
court claiming it had no reason to believe that the costs were still being disputed and another
implying that they were suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. The Council Tax bill
expressed this in the following terms:
Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings

7.

On serving the court papers by electronic transfer, NELC had only been able to successfully
transfer to the Defendant, nine of the fourteen files which made up the complete set of
documents. It was apparent from the context of the 'Witness Statement' which was successfully
transferred that the missing content could be sourced elsewhere, and NELC therefore informed.

8.

A missing exhibit was identified in the Witness Statement to be a letter on which NELC relied to
justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were being disputed [because the
Defendant had withdrawn the] application for the Judicial review of the costs'. It was verified by
email records that a copy, which was a letter sent to the Administrative Court Office dated 20th
November 2013 had been sent to NELC and acknowledged by way of a 'read receipt' on 22
November 2013.

9.

There was no obvious disadvantage to not having received this exhibit. The letter, however did
not give any cause to lead NELC to believe that the High Court appeal (case stated) challenging
the summons costs had been withdrawn. The letter was in response to the Administrative Court's
recommendation to withdraw the judicial review claim as the process had prompted
the Magistrates to produce a draft case and deemed there no longer a need for further action on
their part as the process of stating a case was underway. The judicial review claim, which was a
separate matter from the application to state a case for an appeal challenging the costs, was
merely the vehicle used to get the Magistrates' court to conform. The judicial review claim
therefore was for a mandatory order, not a 'review of the costs' and so the case stated appeal
challenging the summons costs had never been withdrawn.

10. It is clear from the context of that letter alone that it was only the judicial review claim for a
mandatory order that was withdrawn and that the High Court appeal challenging the summons
costs was still being pursued.
11. NELC had acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read receipts' returned
on 15 January, 14 February and 23 April 2014 in respect of letters dated 10 January, 13 February
and 22 April 2014. Those letters, which were copies of correspondence sent to the Justices'
Clerk contained hard evidence that the high court appeal was still being pursued, and sent after
the judicial review claim for mandatory order was withdrawn.
12. Acknowledgement of letters being read, regarding the 10 January and 14 February emails
21/07/2016

Page 4 of 5
concerned letters sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the failure to deliver the final signed case
stated. The email regarding the 22 April concerned a letter sent to the Justices Clerk, requesting
a certificate to state that the application had been refused.
13. The missing court papers were requested again on 2 November 2015 (after the court hearing) in
readiness for escalating the matter. NELC was successful in transferring them, and on viewing
the exhibit concerning the Administrative Court it was obvious that contrary to the initial view,
not having all the papers was a disadvantage.
14. The exhibit, provided additional evidence that NELC had wilfully made a statement material in
the proceeding, which was known not to be true. The letters were not copies of the original; it
can be confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the contents were obtained from the same source
that recorded publicly everything relevant to the matter. The source was a public help forum
dealing with council tax issues, the same forum which NELC had sourced the contents of
another of its exhibits.
15. The letters contained in the exhibit (revealed 2 November) had been redacted and matched the
entries that were posted on the public forum. The forum is the only place from which those
letters could be sourced in that redacted form. The characteristics of the letters which NELC
submitted to the court were identical to the forum posts.
16. NELC had not sought the original letters and had presumably as a short cut referred to the
website where all correspondence connected with the matter (albeit redacted) where
conveniently in one place. It is likely that if NELC had made use of the forum to produce its
Witness Statement, it would have been informed from the regular updates posted that the case
stated appeal was still very much being pursued. Whether the forum was regularly consulted by
NELC would not be the deciding factor in determining that it knowingly made a false statement;
it would however reinforce the allegations. The crux of the matter is that the post from which the
content was sourced was accompanied with some commentary (below) which reinforced the
matter in itself:
Back almost to square one.
Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely successful in
mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the draft), it would never
have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the terms of a recognizance at the
hearing. It took this process to prompt a response from the Justices at Grimsby
Magistrates' Court.
The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates Court to agree
terms of a recognizance.
17. NELC had made a statement (material in the proceedings) that was known to be false with the
intention of misleading the court to justify misallocating payment to a disputed sum thereby
engineering default for the current year enabling a further court application for the purposes of
fraudulently attaching a claim of costs.
18. It is a matter of public importance that a summons be issued directed to the police officer to
appear before the magistrates' court to answer the information for an offence of improperly
treating perjury as a civil matter.
21/07/2016

Page 5 of 5

STATEMENT OF TRUTH
The information of: Mr

, of

Grimsby

I believe the statement contained in this information is true to the best of my knowledge and belief

Dated this

day of February 2016

Signed:

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>;
<PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
04 March 2016 17:09
False witness statements.doc; Conspiracy to defraud.doc
Re: Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Mr Walmsley

I still don't know whether the crime regarding the Johnsons lying in their witness statements has been
recorded and have therefore formally submitted a report (29 February 2016).
I have attached the report as I consider the content to be relevant to the complaint (CO 432/15). Similarly,
another allegation which I submitted on 28 February 2016 contains relevant information and that is also
attached.

Yours sincerely

21/07/2016

Crime report to Humberside Police


29 February 2016
I hold evidence in the form of two witness statements dated 27 August and 1
September 2015 produced by Arthur and Tammy Johnson about which there is no
question that they contain outright lies.
As a consequence I wish to formally report crimes in the matter of perjury with
regards to the witness statements produced by Arthur and Tammy Johnson as they
contain evidence that both witnesses have wilfully perverted the course of justice by
means of false and corrupt statements. Both state without reservation that they had
seen my private parts on the afternoon of 27 August 2015. That, I know to be a
fabrication because at no point in time did any act take place which would have
required the exposure of my penis.
Though the above is just my account, the statements are inconsistent with what was
said before they were produced and with the front office clerk, Mr Warriners account
in his witness statement.
1) Mr Warriner in his witness statement says he was approached by Mr Johnson who
informed him that there is a man pissing up the tree outside. However, by the time
Mr Johnson produced his statement, this changed to it looked like he was going to
have a wee against the tree. This points to Mr Johnson being an unreliable witness as
he had not seen anyone urinating, only assumed he had, which was confirmed inbetween informing Mr Warriner and producing his statement which he changed
accordingly.
2) Arthur Johnson, before accompanying the officer to the tree which he had accused
me of urinating against, stated that he had seen me zipping or unzipping my fly
despite the jeans I wore having buttons. This anomaly was raised with the arresting
officer shortly after the alleged incident took place. However, by the time Arthur
Johnson produced his statement, the reference to operating a zip was omitted. Tammy
Johnson on the other hand did refer to buttons, but this was in her witness statement
made after becoming aware there was no zip (1 Sept 2015). The first being the male
appeared to be unbuttoning his jeans and later untruthfully stated I then saw this
male having unbuttoned his jeans and then describe in graphic detail the alleged
offence, knowing this was a complete fabrication.
I have because of the above crime wrongly been convicted of an offence and
consequently now having a criminal record and incurred a direct financial loss of
620, being the aggregate of the criminal courts charge, costs and victims surcharge.
Ive also had the inconvenience of being wrongfully arrest and falsely imprisoned,
and factoring in the damaged reputation and hundreds of hours engaged in pursuing
this matter, consider in monetary terms this causing me at least a 10k loss.
I am keen to have this matter investigated not least because to the significant financial
loss Ive incurred. Please note that if the force decides against doing so it would
amount to a failure under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the Criminal Justice

and Courts Act 2015 to exercise a power for the purpose of achieving the detriment of
another person.
Further evidence will be on file as an investigation should currently be underway
concerning a complaint about the arresting police officer who is involved in this
matter. The complaint reference is CO 432/15.

Crime report to Humberside Police


28 February 2016

Grimsby Magistrates' Court, with Humberside Police and the Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) as accomplices have misused the Criminal Justice system in allowing
fabricated evidence to convict me for charges of which I am innocent in order to
defrauded me of a sum of 620. The court had no evidence whatsoever with which to
find a guilty verdict.
As the CPS had no evidence with which to justify prosecuting the case it is therefore
suspected that Mr Martin Howarth, the CPS Solicitor has been corruptly influenced
by Humberside Police/Grimsby Magistrates' court to proceed with a prosecution
where the evidence fell below the standards which would be expected for a fair trial.
Moreover, I had insufficient information about the proceedings and did not know the
position regarding my rights to legal representation and left to produce representations
myself. The case went ahead in my absence during which I was found guilty and it
appears the judge in sentencing at a later hearing, which I did attend, was not briefed
as the mitigating evidence documents I had sent to the court had not been considered
in my conviction.
I believe the burden of proof is beyond all reasonable doubt in criminal cases and
therefore satisfied that a crime has been committed against me for which there are
very good grounds. In their witnesses statements I have copies of, both Arthur and
Tammy Johnson lied and it is suspected that Police Constable Thomas Blake 1131
incited at least one of them to commit perjury.
There are also very good grounds to suspect that CCTV footage, which would support
my innocence, has been destroyed. I have since obtained details of the arrangement
Humberside police has for monitoring the public grounds in front of the Victoria
Street station. In respect of 27th August 2015 (the day of the alleged matter), a total of
7 cctv cameras covered relevant areas; one situated in the portacabin (temporary front
office) and 6 covering the front of the station. The camera footage (it has been since
discovered) is on a loop system and kept for 90 days. Although when asked for, video
footage is retained, Humberside police have stated that no requests were received on
27th August 2015, and therefore the video footage has been overwritten.
If there were 7 cameras covering the area, it would seem beyond reasonable doubt
that video footage, material in a criminal case, would be available for proving the
innocence of someone convicted of an offence alleged to have been committed there
on that date. Notwithstanding, it could not have been known then whether video
footage would have determined the facts, so remaining voluntarily at the scene to help
police with their enquiries, speaks for itself. Being under no obligation to wait for an
officer to arrive, reinforces my innocence, as I was clearly confident that if video
footage existed it could not possibly have incriminated me, but more likely disproved
the accusations. Someone who had been guilty in the circumstances, with a possibility
of being on camera would unlikely have voluntarily remained to assist.

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
07 March 2016 15:15
Fw: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell
There is some information I require concerning the matter I raised about Grimsby Telegraph's defamatory
article. You say that the paper has access to the daily court register which contains the details of the sentences
imposed. This would seem privileged information especially as I have not yet been properly informed of the
alleged crime I have been convicted for.
As I have been the one directly affected by the defamation committed by the judges, police, Crown Prosecution
Service, witnesses and the Grimsby Telegraph it would be only proper that I was given that information. I
therefore would like all the information that the Grimsby Telegraph had access to.
It is still not known what the conviction is for. Although Martin Howarth prosecuting could be barely heard at the
sentencing hearing, it sounded like he made reference to the defendant indecently exposing himself and can
only assume that is what I was convicted for (wrongly). However, it seems that the charge to which I have
pleaded not guilty is "using threatening or abusive words or behaviour". The charge which I have pleaded not
guilty to must either be indecent exposure, using threatening words, using abusive words, or
using threatening behaviour. It is of great concern that the justice system is so lacking in its function that it can
allow someone to be convicted in circumstance where evidently the effort put into the stitch-up has
been negligible.
I hope the information that the Grimsby Telegraph had access to will be more specific so I am more informed to
the alleged charges.
On a separate but related matter, I would like to know if the judge (Andrew Pascoe) can, as an afterthought,
add to what he has ordered at the court hearing an additional sum to the order.
Deputy District judge did not state that there was a 15 victims' surcharge but this sum is included on the order
since served.
I would appreciate an update regarding the virus you identified and whether you have taken any action
concerning the information laid.
Yours sincerely
.

13/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
09 March 2016 17:20
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr
Regarding your latest e-mail dated 7th March 2016
I have passed this on to my Line Manager for consideration of your application to lay an information, and your
comments and allegations made against individuals within the Criminal Justice System.

Yours Sincerely
G P Townell
Legal Team Manager

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"KEYTE, BEATRICE" <BEATRICE.KEYTE1@jaco.gsi.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
09 March 2016 13:56
160309
Third Monthly Update.doc
15-2427: JACO Complaint Update

Dear Mr
Please find attached letter for your attention.
Regards
Beatrice Keyte
Investigating Officer
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman

13/07/2016

Judicial Appointments & Conduct


Ombudsman
Postal Area 9.53
th
9 Floor, The Tower
102 Petty France
London
SW1H 9AJ
DX 152380 Westminster 8

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL


Mr
@gmail.com

09 March 2016

T 020 3334 2900


E beatrice.keyte1@jaco.gsi.gov.uk
www.judicialombudsman.gov.uk

Your ref: 15-2474

Dear Mr

Your complaint
I am writing following my previous letter of 2 February 2016 concerning your
complaint to the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman.
I have received a response to my preliminary enquiries from the JCIO and anticipate
that the Ombudsman will be able to write to you in the next couple of weeks.
In the meantime, this is my last day in the office before taking maternity leave, so if
you have any further queries I would be grateful if you could direct them to John
Critchfield (john.critchfield@jaco.gsi.gov.uk).
Yours sincerely,

Beatrice Keyte
Investigating Officer

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"SPOC Command Hub - Customer Service Desk" <SPOCCommandHubCustomerServiceDesk@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
09 March 2016 18:21
Complaint

Mr ,
We have received your email regarding the complaint you have submitted. Log 624 02/03/2016 refers.
Please could you reply to this email with a contact number that we can contact you on in order to be able to
discuss this with you,
Thank you
PS 2488 Lawson
Customer Service Desk
Hessle PS

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"SPOC Command Hub - Customer Service Desk" <SPOCCommandHubCustomerServiceDesk@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
09 March 2016 21:08
Re: Complaint

Mr Lawson
I'm unsure which email you are referring to. My records don't show any sent to Humberside police on 2 March
2016.
Does this concern either of the reports I submitted, one 28th and the other on the 29th February 2016?
With regards providing a telephone contact number, this means of communication is not convenient (I have no
land line) and is why I try to keep all communications in writing.
If this is unavoidable I have a mobile number I could provide but the operation is unreliable and therefore no
guarantee it will be possible to contact me.
Yours sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Res - Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>
09 March 2016 21:22
Re: Stage 2 Complaint, Ref 1172_1516

Dear Ms Beharrell
I expected to have had the final response to my complaint by today (25 working days).
Your sincerely
.

15/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
10 March 2016 15:46
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell

I hold evidence in the form of two witness statements dated 27 August and 1 September 2015 produced by
Arthur and Tammy Johnson about which there is no question that they contain outright lies.
The witness statements are contained in the Crown Prosecution Service's case bundle which was handed to
me minutes before the hearing at Grimsby Magistrates court on 30 September 2015.
The police are aware of my allegations but have so far avoided recording the matter as a reported crime. As a
consequence I have formally reported this to Humberside police as perjury on 29 February 2016.
The statements are inconsistent with what was said before they were produced and with the front office clerk,
Mr Warriners account in his witness statement (also part of the CPS case bundle):
1) Mr Warriner in his witness statement says he was approached by Mr Johnson who informed him that there
is a man pissing up the tree outside. However, by the time Mr Johnson produced his statement, this changed
to it looked like he was going to have a wee against the tree. This points to Mr Johnson being an unreliable
witness as he had not seen anyone urinating, only assumed he had, which was confirmed in-between
informing Mr Warriner and producing his statement which he changed accordingly.
2) Arthur Johnson, before accompanying the officer to the tree which he had accused me of urinating against,
stated that he had seen me zipping or unzipping my fly despite the jeans I wore having buttons. This anomaly
was raised with the arresting officer shortly after the alleged incident took place. However, by the time Arthur
Johnson produced his statement, the reference to operating a zip was omitted. Tammy Johnson on the other
hand did refer to buttons, but this was in her witness statement made after becoming aware there was no zip
(1 Sept 2015). The first being the male appeared to be unbuttoning his jeans and later untruthfully stated I
then saw this male having unbuttoned his jeans and then describe in graphic detail the alleged offence,
knowing this was a complete fabrication.
I have because of the above crime wrongly been convicted of an offence and consequently now having a
criminal record and incurred a direct financial loss of 620, being the aggregate of the criminal courts charge,
costs and victims surcharge. Ive also had the inconvenience of being wrongfully arrested and falsely
imprisoned, and factoring in the damaged reputation and hundreds of hours engaged in pursuing this matter,
consider (if you can quantify this in monetary terms) have been caused at least a 10k loss.
Given the burden of proof required for criminal convictions, I am at a loss to know why Humberside police
even considered referring this matter to the CPS and even more bewildered that the CPS, considering the
flawed witness statements, have pursued the case knowing that under proper scrutiny there could be no
prospects of a successful prosecution.

Your sincerely

15/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Res - Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
10 March 2016 16:13
RE: Stage 2 Complaint, Ref 1172_1516

Dear Mr
Please accept my apologies for the delay. It is currently with the Chief Executive and will be sent out as soon
as possible.
Kind regards
Ian Hollingsworth

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
10 March 2016 20:23
Fw: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell
I have taken a brief look at part 37 of the Criminal Procedure Rules, which from what I can gather came into
force on 6 April 2015 and may have been relevant to my case.
Before anymore time is taken setting out why I contest the procedure in my case, I would like it confirming that
these rules were in fact relevant and if so was it rule 37.9 (Single justice procedure: special rules) that applied
or rule 37.12 (Procedure where a party is absent).

Yours sincerely

15/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
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Sent:
Subject:

"SPOC Command Hub - Customer Service Desk" <SPOCCommandHubCustomerServiceDesk@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
11 March 2016 20:08
FW: Complaint [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR

Mr ,
Log 624 02/03/16 does refer to the two emails you sent on 28th and 29th February 2016.
I requested a telephone number in order to discuss your emails, however if this is not convenient for you
then I will update you by email in order that you have things in writing.
Humberside Police do not investigate allegations of perjury unless a request to do so comes from the court
themselves.
We would advise you to raise these points with the courts who can review and action accordingly.
I will also refer you to the letter sent to yourself by our Professional Standards Unit dated 13th January 2016
which also advised you of this following your previous complaint.
Our Professional Standards Branch are aware of your further emails dated 28th and 29th February 2016 and
this email thread will also be documented on log 624 02/03/16 that corresponds to your complaint.
Regards,
PS 2488 LAWSON.

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"SPOC Command Hub - Customer Service Desk" <SPOCCommandHubCustomerServiceDesk@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
11 March 2016 20:51
Re: Complaint [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

Mr Lawson
I suggest Humberside police contact the court. I've done that already regarding the false statement made by
North East Lincolnshire Council and in doing so completely wasted my time.
Along with other council tax payers I fund Humberside police to investigate crimes which it squanders on its
solicitor and staff to find loopholes to get out of doing.

Yours sincerely
.

15/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
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Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
14 March 2016 18:08
RE: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Hi Mr
In reply to your latest e-mail dated 10th March 16
I can confirm that rule 37.9 of the Criminal Procedure Rules did not apply in your case.
Rule 37.12 was applied to the extent that the District Judge made the decision to proceed with the Trial in your
absence

Yours sincerely
G P Townell
Legal Team Manager

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"Res - Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>


<
@gmail.com>
15 March 2016 09:17
Mr - Stage 2 - 140316.pdf
RE: Stage 2 Complaint, Ref 1172_1516

Dear Mr
Please find attached a stage 2 response in respect of complaint, reference 1172_1516.
Should you require any further assistance please do contact me.
Kind regards
Adele Beharrell, Technical Professional Advisor, Elections and Complaints Team, North East Lincolnshire Council

15/07/2016

14th March 2016


PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Xxxx Yyyyy
XY Xxxxxxx Yyyyy
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
AB12 3XY

www.nelincs.gov.uk
Chief Executive
Rob Walsh

Dear Mr Yyyyy,
I refer to the letter dated 03 February 2016 in which it was confirmed that your complaint had
been escalated to the final stage of the Council's complaints procedure. The issues you have
raised have been investigated which has included a review of the stage 1 response. This
investigation has been undertaken independently of the officers that have previously handled
your complaint.
The enclosed investigating officer's report details the findings of this investigation which I
consider has been correctly and fairly carried out in accordance with the Council's Feedback
Policy. Please accept our apologies for the element of your complaint which was found to be
upheld.
If you are not satisfied with this response and the outcome of your complaint, you have the right
to take the matter to the Local Government Ombudsman, whose contact details are as follows:
LGO Advice Team
The Local Government Ombudsman
PO Box 4771
Coventry CV40EH
Tel: 0845 602 1983
Fax: 024 7682 0001
I would like to thank you for bringing these issues to the Council's attention. This has been, of
necessity, a formal response driven by our Feedback Policy and procedures, designed to
ensure full, fair and impartial examination of concerns which arise. I am personally always very
keen to see how we can improve our services and learning from complaints is one way of
achieving this. Although you may not be happy about all aspects of my conclusions, I am
hoping you will accept that this matter has had proper consideration.
Yours sincerely

Rob Walsh
Chief Executive
Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, North East Lincolnshire. DN31 1HU
Telephone (01472) 324700 email: rob.walsh@nelincs.gov.uk

North East Lincolnshire Council


Stage 2 Corporate Complaint Investigation
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Assistant Director:

Sally Jack (Assistant Director Joint Delivery)

Service Area:

Council Tax

Investigating Officer:

Susan Harrison (Customer Management Service Manager)

Complaint Reference:

NEL/1172/1516

Final decision of Investigating Officer:


The complaint is partially upheld with respect to the delays in receiving a response to correspondence.
Summary of complaint:
Mr Yyyyys formal complaint dated 26th January 2016 is summarised below:
1. The Councils 6 week delay in responding to his correspondence dated 10th November 2015
2. The Council asserts that the concerns raised about the Liability Order falls outside the scope of
the complaints process
How the complaint was considered:
Susan Harrison, Investigating Officer, considered the complaint by conducting:
A full review of the documents provided in relation to all stages of Mr Yyyyys complaint:

Allocation of Payments letter dated 13th November 2015

Allocation of Payments cover letter dated 13th November 2015

Formal complaint letter dated 25th December 2015

Formal complaint Response dated 19 January 2016

th
Request to escalate to Stage 2 letter dated 26 January 2016

th

Susan Harrison interviewed:

Debt Management Manager on Monday, 8th February 2016

Court Enforcement Manager on Monday, 8th February 2016

Information Governance and Complaints Officer, Monday, 8th February 2016

The Council's Corporate Feedback Policy V032, Section B:3


The Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) Decision Statement, Ref No 15016673 dated 24th February
2016.
It was not considered necessary to meet the complainant as the letters of complaint and background
information provided enough detail to ensure full consideration of the issues.

Findings:
1. The Councils 6 week delay in responding to his correspondence dated 10th November 2015. Mr N
Smith responded to Mr Yyyyyy by letter offering an apology dated 21st December 2015.
Furthermore this was upheld at stage 1 of the complaints process and communicated to Mr
Yyyyy in a formal letter dated 29th January 2016. The Council did fall below its high standards for
responding to correspondence in this matter and for that the Council apologises again.
This complaint remains upheld.
2. The Council asserts that the concerns raised about the Liability Order falls outside the scope of
the complaints process. The Council's Corporate Feedback Policy V032, Appendix B:3 states that
"a complaint that is being dealt with or was previously dealt with by legal proceedings is
outside the scope of the Council's complaints process. As a result of Mr Yyyyyy prematurely
lodging a complaint with the LGO prior to the findings of the Council's investigations, the Council
finds the same as the LGO in its Decision Statement, Ref No 15016673 dated 24th February 2016.
The Ombudsman may not consider matters which are subject to the commencement of court
proceedings, regardless of the outcome. The Council considers that Mr Yyyyys complaints
have been appropriately dealt with by the LGO and therefore the Council fully agrees with the
Ombudsmans final decision.
This complaint is not upheld
Details of final recommendations:
This investigation has found that the Council acted in accordance with the Regulations and Guidance at
all times.
The recommendation is that, wherever it is possible, for teams to share deadlines where they are likely
to occur during periods of absence. It is acknowledged, however, that where absence is unexpected this
may not always be met.
Mr Yyyyy has asked that complaints be responded to within prescribed deadlines and the Council will
strive to achieve this, wherever possible. Mr Yyyyy has been given an apology for the delay in
responding to his initial communication on 10th November 2015. It should also be highlighted that
although this delay should not have happened it has had no detrimental impact on the complainant.
Mr Yyyyy has asked for his concerns raised in relation to the Liability Order to be considered within the
Councils complaint process. The Council is in agreement with the LGO that they may not consider
matters which are subject to the commencement of court proceedings, regardless of the outcome.
Investigators decision on behalf of the Chief Executive:
Susan Harrison
Assistant Director:
Sally Jack

COMPLAINT TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT


OMBUDSMAN

Part III of the Local Government Act 1974

21 March 2016

AGAINST
NORTH EAST LINCOLNSHIRE COUNCIL

List of Annexes:
Annex A

Councils 14 March 2016 final response

Annex B

10 November 2015 email query to Council

Annex C

17 December 2015 formal complaint letter to Council

Annex D

Councils 21 December 2015 cover letter

Annex E

Councils 13 November 2015 response

Annex F

25 December 2015 second formal complaint letter to Council

Annex G

Councils 19 January 2016 first stage formal complaint response

Annex H

26 January 2016 third formal complaint letter to Council

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE BODY DID WRONG?


The complaint surrounds North East Lincolnshire Council (the Council) engineering
default in circumstances where payments were made in sufficient amount to meet the legal
obligation I was under to pay the sums set out on the demand notice relating to my 2015/16
Council Tax liability.
The Council misallocated payments to a previous years balance, thus leaving a shortfall in
respect of the current years account (that which the payment was intended). The presumed
cause being that an instalment was met from two transactions, and with neither payment

matching the instalment amount set for the current council tax year the system automatically
posted it to the oldest balance. Payment however at least covered the amount owed at all
times and was for part of the period in credit.
The Councils right to appropriate payment did not arise on account of the transaction not
matching an instalment amount (not if doing so put the current year's liability in arrears).
According to established appropriation laws, a debtors election may take an implied form, as
well as expressed. Therefore, where payment is unspecified, it would be implied that the
payment was intended for the account most beneficial to the debtor to reduce, which would
clearly be the current year's, if allocating monies to another balance would put the current
years account in arrears.
R v Miskin Lower Justices (1953) held that where an amount so obviously relates to a specific
liability, it would be an unwarranted assumption to allocate the payment elsewhere. Billing
Authorities are able to set parameters in their revenue system so when payment amounts are
not recognised, monies are allocated to the current year. The anomalies caused by automation
are largely eliminated because of this since it ensures debtors do not incur additional costs
through subsequent recovery applications. This is in agreement with the judgment in R v
Miskin Lower justices, as it would be an unwarranted assumption to allocate monies to a sum
in arrears if it is likely to also put the current year's liability in arrears.
Note:
A process that relies on automation such as the council tax payments system, will inevitably
present a flexibilityefficiency tradeoff. Having the system set so unmatched payments are
posted to the most recent account has to achieve greater compliance with the general
principles which allow for implied payments, simply because the authority could not
reasonably assume that the debtor would elect the oldest balance, knowing his current due
payment was deficient and incur further expense. This approach would, for reasons selfevident, require less manual adjustment with respect to reallocating unmatched payments
rendering the automated aspect of the process more compliant with the judgment in R v
Miskin Lower justices.
It is apparently standard practice, whichever way their systems are set, for billing authorities
to regularly check unmatched payments to ascertain which account payment is intended, if
there are arrears outstanding. However, what fundamentally matters (after initial payment

allocation) is for the appropriation of those unmatched to the current year's liability if
allocating payment to the oldest debt would put the current year's liability also in arrears.
Balance suspended from enforcement
The balance to which monies were misallocated by the council was in any event suspended
from enforcement. Therefore, notwithstanding that the councils right to appropriate payment
did not arise, even if it had for whatever reason, it should have become immediately obvious
from the account notes that the sum was subject to court proceedings. As there has been no
outcome yet to the proceedings the suspension has not been lifted and the sum remains
suspended. It was clear from my current council tax bill alone that the suspension had not
been lifted as it was itemised separately and described as a sum subject to court
proceedings. The relevant part of the council tax bill states under the header Memorandum
Note as follows:
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings
Linking matter of complaint to court proceedings
The Council has refused to address the complaint with the justification being that it raises
matters about a Liability Order and so falls outside the scope of the complaints process.
It has been reiterated over the course of the complaint that the matter concerns payment
misallocation. The council has taken it upon itself to redefine the matter so it appears to
concern court proceedings for the obvious reason that it can deny me the opportunity of a just
outcome to the formal complaint. Moreover, there is evidence this has been done in
anticipating that the matter will be escalated to the LGO in the hope that its handiwork will
fall in the hands of an acquiescent officer assigned to preliminary assess the complaint.
The summons charge, to which no further sum is added on being granted the liability order,
was applied to my account on or around the 15 September 2015, approximately two weeks
before the application for a liability order was made to the Magistrates court. Therefore, the
summons charge, which the council is claiming to be the matter of complaint, even if it was,
concerned solely its actions, as the court has no jurisdiction over costs until the case is
brought before the court.

Other matters
It would be negligent if I omitted to point out the disingenuous claim by the council which
implies that its failure in responding within a reasonable time-frame is a rarity. I have from
the same department had to wait four weeks for a reply in relation to a previous matter and
even after the council had made the claim in its first stage response, the final response
exceeded its own deadline by a week.
The matter regarding my election for all payments to be allocated to the current year's
liability, whether or not a sum matches an instalment amount, which was improperly
addressed in the first stage response (and contended), was entirely ignored in the final
response.

HOW HAS THIS AFFECTED YOU?


The error has caused the inconvenience of having to dispute the council's actions and the
subsequent refusal to cooperate has caused the need to escalate the matter via the councils
formal complaints mechanism and of course enter into a complaint with the LGO. These
actions alone have taken a significant amount of time and caused gross inconvenience.
However the further consequences, which I would be prudent not to refer to in this complaint,
have added substantially to that gross inconvenience.

WHATDO YOU THINK THE BODY SHOULD DO TO PUT THINGS RIGHT?


The council was not entitled to allocate payment to the balance it did and therefore it should
be reallocated to the account to which it was intended.
According to the council, there is an outstanding sum of 211 in respect of my 2015/16
council tax liability. If the effects of the error were put right, it would require that the
misallocated payment of 60 is reallocated to the 2015/16 account (restoring the previous
outstanding balance); the 60 penalty added September 2015 would have been invalid and so
require removing from my account. The remaining sum outstanding would be 91 which I
would then be able to settle without fear of further maladministration attributable to the
council allocating it wrongly.
The council has implied in its 13 November 2015 letter that it does not intend allocating all

future payments in accordance with my election. In order to clarify this I instructed the
council, as I am lawfully entitled, that unless there were express instructions (in writing) to
the contrary, payment should be allocated to the current year's liability, whether or not a sum
matches an instalment amount.
The seriousness of the failure to take these measures can not be over stated. Prompt action is
required to ensure that the immediate consequences of the error are remedied and also to
prevent unwarranted enforcement measures that may otherwise follow. Should the error not
be remedied it is likely a constant cycle of recovery action will result, incurring additional
costs which will accumulate over time to be sufficient in amount that the council will achieve
its clearly vindictive aim of justifying taking action such as bankruptcy or imposing a
custodial sentence.
It would be reasonable to expect the council offer payment of a suitable amount firstly as
compensation for the error, and secondly for its intransigence by refusing to cooperate,
causing the added inconvenience I'm being put to.

Annex A H
Omitted
Request complete paper

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Walmsley, Tony 8637" <Tony.Walmsley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
24 March 2016 09:41
RE: Complaint against Police - CO 432/15 [NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR]

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED - NO DESCRIPTOR


Mr
I have forwarded your email to Inspector Parsons to address.
I can advise you though that the offence if perjury is not a victim based crime and therefore the allegations
made within your complaint against Police have not been recorded as a crime. If you believe the evidence
against you is false then the correct place to challenge it is through the appeal process at court.
Regards
Tony Walmsley

Tony Walmsley 8637


Caseworker
Professional Standards Branch
Humberside Police HQ
Priory Road
Hull
HU5 5SF

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<noreply@actionfraud.police.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
28 March 2016 08:35
NFRC160101304675.pdf
Action Fraud Letter

Please find attached a letter in relation to the matter that you reported to Action Fraud.
Please do not reply to this e mail as the address noreply@actionfraud.police.uk is not monitored.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<noreply@actionfraud.police.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
29 March 2016 11:15
NFRC151001196853.pdf
Action Fraud Letter

Please find attached a letter in relation to the matter that you reported to Action Fraud.
Please do not reply to this e mail as the address noreply@actionfraud.police.uk is not monitored.

17/07/2016

Mr
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

25 March 2016
Dear Mr
NFRC160101304675
Due to unforeseen circumstances and the changeover of the Action Fraud service provider, there has been a
delay in sending out a letter to you. Please be assured this delay has not impacted the assessment or progress
of your report. We apologise for any inconvenience this may have caused.
Im writing to update you on the current position of your report.
The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) collects information from reports and puts information it receives
to the most effective possible use, either through investigating crime or using the information to disrupt and
prevent future criminal activity.
Your report has been assessed by the NFIB and the information you have provided has helped the police to
begin taking steps to disrupt the activities of suspected criminals. This activity could result in the closure of:

Fraudulent websites,
Telephone numbers,
Bank accounts.

Unfortunately we cannot provide further information about this. One of the reasons is due to the sensitive nature
of police work which cannot always be made public.
It can take time for disruption requests to be fully processed, so please be assured this is happening and no
further action is required on your part.
The NFIB has not closed your report following this. As hundreds of new reports of fraud are gathered every day
and added to our systems, any common links with existing reports will be picked up and can lead to new
investigative opportunities. The NFIB work closely with other regulators in the UK and abroad, to stop
fraudsters. We also use all reports to inform our prevention activity to reduce the number of victims of fraud.
Please note we send out prevention messages on a regular basis to people who register on our partner website,
www.actionfraudalert.co.uk. If you would like to receive warning messages about new and emerging crime
types in order to keep criminals at arms length, then we would invite you to spend a couple of minutes to
register on this site.
Thank you again for taking the time to report this matter to us.
Yours sincerely

Matthew Bradford
Director NFIB

Action Fraud is the UKs national reporting centre for fraud and internet crime.

Mr
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

28 March 2016
Dear Mr
RE: NFRC151001196853
Due to unforeseen circumstances and the changeover of the Action Fraud service provider, there has been a
delay in sending out a letter to you. Please be assured this delay has not impacted the assessment or
progress of your report. We apologise for any inconvenience this may have caused.
Im writing to update you on the current position of your report.
When the report was made to us, we recorded the incident in our database as a fraud crime. However, since
then, the circumstances have been reviewed in accordance with Home Office rules governing how police
record all crime. As a result, the NFIB has decided that on this occasion we are no longer recording the
incident you have reported as a crime.
There are a number of reasons this can happen, such as additional information coming to light that confirms
no crime in law took place, or because the incident had previously been recorded as a crime in another
report. Please be reassured that your report remains registered with the NFIB.
If you have any queries regarding this letter, please email Action Fraud at contact@actionfraud.police.uk,
please state your NFRC reference number and your name in your email.
If you would like more information on how to protect yourself from fraud, there is information on the Action
Fraud website at www.actionfraud.police.uk/support_for_you or you can call them on 0300 123 2040.
Alternatively you can call your local police on 101.
Please note we send out prevention messages on a regular basis to people who register on our partner
website, www.actionfraudalert.co.uk. If you would like to receive warning messages about new and
emerging crime types in order to keep criminals at arms length, then we would invite you to spend a couple
of minutes to register on this site.
Thank you again for taking the time to report this matter to us.
Yours sincerely

Matthew Bradford
Director NFIB

Action Fraud is the UKs national reporting centre for fraud and internet crime.

Page 1 of 2

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
28 March 2016 14:17
Re: Hearing 10:00 am 15 December 2015 (Court Room 2)

Dear Mr Townell
Thank you for your response regarding the rules that were relevant in my case. I will turn to that matter after
bringing to your attention some of the issues I've raised but still await a response.
You stated in your 9 March 2016 email that my application to start a prosecution under s1 of the Magistrates'
Courts Act has been passed to your Line Manager for consideration along with my comments and allegations
about a conspiracy. I would appreciate if you could update me on any progress being made and let me know
who your Line Manager is or at least his or her position/title. I trust that the application (hard copy) I sent dated
8 March 2016 arrived in your office and if so could you please confirm this.
Another matter is the 15 victims' surcharge which at the hearing on 22 December 2015, Deputy district judge
Andrew Pascoe did not impose, but despite this has been included in my 'Notice of fine and collection order'. I
questioned whether it was permissible as an afterthought to add an additional sum to the order which was not
ordered at the court hearing. This related to my email 7 March 2016 in which I also asked for the same
information the Grimsby Telegraph had access to because of the article it published including content which I
don't recall from the court hearing. I did not have any confirmation regarding the virus you identified and
therefore have been unable to take steps to avoid the issue reoccurring.
Further discoveries
You will have gathered from my 10 March 2016 email that I recently became aware of Criminal Procedure
Rules which I consider relevant to proceedings in my case. The Rules in force at the time were Part 37 (Trial
and Sentence in a Magistrates Court). These have been renumbered and now Part 24 of the Criminal
Procedure Rules 2015.
The Criminal Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2015 amended Part 37 of the 2014 Rules, introducing a
new provision, Single justice procedure: special rules inserted as Rule 37.9; Part 37.11 (Procedure where a
party is absent) became Part 37.12. Consequently, this Part was amended inserting the provision that the rule
does not apply where the court tries a case under rule 37.9 (Single justice procedure: special rules). The
procedure is prescribed by sections 16A to 16D of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 (Trial by single justice on
the papers).
The amendment Rules came into force on 6th April 2015 and so applied by the time my case was underway.
However, you have confirmed that my case was not dealt with under the single justice procedure where rule
37.9 would have applied and the relevant rule was 37.12 (Procedure where a party is absent).
Under the circumstances, a trial on the papers would have been the procedure most in the interest of justice to
have taken and is questioned why it was not, given I was disadvantaged by having no legal representation and
completely in the dark as to my rights. Trying the case on the papers would have been the fairer option as I
had submitted various documents of mitigating evidence. This, in a small way would have compensated for my
ignorance of the court system for which Im certain the court has exploited to my detriment in open court. Being
unable to ignore the submission and set against the prosecutions lack of evidence and the questionable,
inconsistent witness statements, it is inconceivable that the court could have found a verdict of guilt.
In any event, the procedure set out under rule 37.12 (where a party is absent) does not give the court power to
find a guilty verdict merely on account of the defendants absence. Sub-paragraph 3 states that were the
defendant is absent the court must proceed as if the defendant were present and had pleaded not guilty. That
would not have entailed the judge allowing the solicitor, who had been appointed to cross-examine the police
and witnesses to withdraw from the case (I was prohibited from doing so), nor would the absence have justified
the court dismissing for consideration the documents submitted as mitigating evidence.
The overall impression was that the court, despite what really happened, was intent on finding a guilty verdict,
but this was also part of a conspiracy with the police and CPS who had set out to falsely criminalise and
defraud me. Additional to my representations, particularly my 13 February 2016 email, it has since been
discovered that the bundle I was handed by the usher minutes before the court hearing on 30 September 2015,
contained documents, which appearing by their nature, should have been served in a prescribed manner by

21/07/2016

Page 2 of 2

the court, police and/or CPS for which there was, I suspect a legal duty. That procedure would not have
entailed passing papers to me last minute which were material in the case and requiring acting on with no
explanation as to their importance.
A letter, apparently produced from a template used by the CPS was in among the papers I was handed by the
usher which contained what appeared largely irrelevant computer printouts compiled by the CPS. The letter
dated 22 September 2015 was discovered at around the same time I became aware of the relevant Criminal
Procedure Rules.
It is reasonable to assume that I should have been served this and other letters and because they concerned
a matter as serious as a criminal trial, I should have been alerted to any implications of not being legally
represented. The letters reference was as follows:
"LETTER TO DEFENCE WHERE THERE IS MATERIAL TO DISCLOSE (MAGISTRATES' COURT)"
The opening paragraph suggested that if I was not aware of the letter I would be disadvantage because the
material it referred to was considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution, as quoted below:
I am required to disclose to you any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed, and
which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution or of
assisting the accused's case.
The letter also set out the legal requirement for submitting a defence statement among other instructions. This
correspondence, though dated 22 September 2015 was in my possession only minutes before the 30
September hearing, and in any event, because it was buried among irrelevant papers was not seen; that is
until March 2016 when I furthered my investigations into the conspiracy I suspected.
The failure to explain and correctly serve these documents reinforces my assertion that the authorities were
complicit in disadvantaging me to the greatest extent possible as a means to succeed in falsely criminalising
and defrauding me.
A further denial of my rights was in evidence in respect of the sentencing hearing on 22 December. After two
people who I suspect falsely claimed they were the police hammered on my door and coerced me into
attending court, I was imprisoned and told while awaiting the hearing that I would have access to the duty
solicitor. That never happened and I was handcuffed and led to the courtroom to witness Grimsby Magistrates
court, the CPS and Deputy district judge Andrew Pascoe blatantly defraud me and impose falsely a criminal
conviction.

Yours sincerely

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<J.Burns@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
28 March 2016 16:40
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673 (COMPLAINT)

Dear Ms Burns
Complaint
I note from various items of correspondence that the Ombudsman is mindful of using public resources
sparingly which suggests to me that the vast majority of complaints have to be filtered out. I guess this is
enabled by the fact that the LGO, being a statutory complaints process, can apply the law so that one or a
number of exemptions can be applied to justify rejecting a complaint based upon it being outside the
organisation's jurisdiction. The statutory nature of the process serves as protection for the organisation from
those already aggrieved by their council who are further let-down by the LGO as it is able to threaten them
with the prospects of having to enter the casino justice system (judicial review) if they disagree with its
decision.
The law has been enacted to enable its application with such flexibility that the same complaint could either
fall within the LGO's remit and be accepted for investigation or be considered outside its remit and be
rejected. The law can therefore be applied so that complaints which are valid and cause the aggrieved person
undue amount of injustice, can if the organisation has no desire to address it, call up the law to back up its
decision. Anyone taking the only action open to them which is the High Court would not, in my mind stand a
chance of success because the law covers all angles in favour of the LGO. A system which I assume is in
place to provide a safety net for the oppression of local authorities must be questioned in respect to why its
function relies on having the ability to magnify the injustice infinitely by inviting litigation in the High Court.
The organisation appears not to provide any deterrent to local authorities from causing injustice to its
residents, presumably because they know that the probability is low with regard to complaints made against
them being investigated and upheld. A change in policy, which involves a tougher approach might not only
improve the attitude of local government but have the affect of lessening the strain on resources as the
number of complaints escalated to the organisation would likely plummet.
Regarding my complaint specifically, I can hardly add more to what I have already submitted in my
representations. They have in my mind been completely ignored and can not possibly see how the LGO, if this
is typical of all cases, can claim to be acting in the interest of taxpayers who are affected by oppressive
councils. The existence of the Ombudsman in my case has clearly made the gross injustice suffered at the
hands of the council at least ten times as bad.
Yours sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<J.Burns@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
29 March 2016 11:39
16 02 29 LTR LGO to PA - PDR ack.pdf
RE: Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673 (COMPLAINT)

Dear Mr
Please find letter attached.
Yours sincerely
Jane Burns (Mrs)
Assessment Team Co-ordinator

21/07/2016

Local Government

OMBUDSMAN
29 March 2016

Mr
GRIMSBY

Your ref:
Our ref:

15 016 673

(Please quote our reference when contacting us and,


if using email, put the number in the email subject line)

If telephoning please contact: 0330 403 4725


email address: A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk

Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council
Thank you for your email of 28 March and we note that you are unhappy with the decision made on
your complaint by Mr Oxley. Your email will be considered by Mr Hobley who is an Assessment
Team Leader in a different team to that of Mr Oxley. Mr Hobley has not previously been involved
in the complaint.
Mr Hobley will respond to you as soon as possible and hopefully by 25 April. His decision will be
final.
Yours sincerely

Jane Burns (Mrs)


Assessment Team Co-ordinator

PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0E1

www.lgo.org.uk
0300 061 0614

Page 1 of 1

From:
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Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
31 March 2016 13:39
16 03 31 LTR to PA review decision.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673 (COMPLAINT)

31 March 2016
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

Please find attached a letter about this complaint.

Yours sincerely

Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader
0330 403 4725
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

21/07/2016

Local Government

OMBUDSMAN
31 March 2016

Mr
GRIMSBY

Our ref:

15 016 673

(Please quote our reference when contacting us and, if using email, put the number in the email subject line)

If telephoning please contact: 0330 403 4725


email address: A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk

Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council
The Ombudsman has asked me to review Mr Oxleys decision on your complaint to make sure this
was justified by the evidence.
Mr Oxley has the delegated authority of the Ombudsman to make decisions on her behalf. His
decisions carry the same weight in law as decisions made by the Ombudsman herself and can
only be challenged by judicial review. There is no right of appeal, but we offer one internal review
to consider whether the decision has been made.
I have reviewed how Mr Oxley handled the case to make sure that his decision was justified by the
evidence. After reviewing the file and looking carefully at what you have said, I appreciate you may
be disappointed, but I support the decision to close your complaint.
Your complaint is, in summary, that the Council made a charge of 70 for the issue of a council tax
summons. You disputed the level of the charge. You took legal action against the court in the High
Court by way of case stated. You then issued judicial review proceedings, which you later
withdrew. You suggested the question costs should be jointly investigated by the Local
Government Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Ombudsman.
Schedule 5, paragraph 1 of the Local Government Act 1974 says the Local Government
Ombudsman may not investigate The commencement or conduct of civil or criminal proceedings
before any court of law.
The issue of the summons with the costs was commencement of proceedings and so this is out of
the Ombudsmans jurisdiction and she cannot look at the costs or what happened in court

PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0E1

www.lgo.org.uk
0300 061 0614

You may dispute our understanding of our jurisdiction, but you have also taken legal action against
the actions of the court. Although technically this action was not against the Council this would be
a reason, were the summons costs in jurisdiction, (which they are not) for the Ombudsman to
exercise her general discretion (under Section 24A(6) of the 1974 Act) not to investigate.
This would be by analogy with the legal restriction (in Section 26(6)(c) of the 1974 Act) which
means she cannot investigate if someone has used a right to challenge a councils decision in
court. This principal was confirmed by the case of R v The Commissioner for Local Administration
ex parte PH (sometimes ex parte H) 1998 (Ex parte PH) where the judge said
"Finally, it is plain that the intention underlying the Act of 1974 was to provide redress for
those people who were denied the possibility of resort to redress of any kind in respect of
maladministration by a local authority in exercise of its administrative powers. It can hardly
have been the intention of Parliament to have provided two remedies, one substantive by
way of judicial review and one compensatory by way of the local commissioner."
"Where a party has ventilated a grievance by means of judicial review it was not
contemplated that they should enjoy an alternative, let alone an additional right by way of
complaint to a local government commissioner."
And also in R (Scholarstica Umo) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England [2003]
EWHC 3202 (Admin) where the judge said To commence proceedings by Judicial Review will, as
a result of the statutory structure, deprive the Ombudsman of jurisdiction thereafter to investigate.
Concerning the exercise of our discretion I would refer you to R (on the application of Doy) v
Commission for Local Administration in England [2002] Env. L.R. 11 where the judge found that
decisions of the Commissioners are subject to review, but the Commissioners are given a very
wide discretion and the courts can only set aside their decisions if they are wrong in law,
irrespective of the fact that any particular Judge would have come to a different decision.
So Mr Oxley was right to say this was not a matter we could investigate.
Because Mr Oxley properly considered your complaint, I will not overturn the decision which he
made on behalf of the Ombudsman under her delegated authority. Therefore, although I recognise
that this will disappoint you, the decision must stand.
I understand you may continue to disagree. Our process allows for one review of a decision, and
this is that review. We have now finished considering your complaint and the decision is final.
Your remaining means of challenging our decision is through judicial review in the High Court.
Please take some advice before considering taking such action as the Ombudsman will as a
publicly funded body to seek to recover our reasonable costs in defending unsuccessful
applications.

The case remains closed and we shall not write about or discuss it further because we cannot
justify the cost of continuing to communicate with people whose cases we have closed. We shall
note any further contact from you, but we will not acknowledge it or reply unless it clearly
contains new information which we decide has a bearing on our decision.
Yours sincerely

Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<enquiries@grimsby.crowncourt.gsi.gov.uk>
06 April 2016 12:56
Appeal decision from Magistrates' court

Dear Sir/Madam
I have a decision I wish to appeal to the Crown Court and believe I can serve the application form
electronically.
Could you please specify which email address is the appropriate one as there are a number on the website I
have found and none are obvious to me.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Grimsby Crown, Enquiries" <enquiries@grimsby.crowncourt.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
06 April 2016 14:18
RE: Appeal decision from Magistrates' court

Good Afternoon,
Any applications to appeal a Magistrates Court decision have to be sent to the Magistrates
Court. Please contact them on 01472 320444 and they will be able to assist you further.
Regards

Kerrigan Brown
Administration Section
Great Grimsby Combined Court Centre
Crown Court
Town Hall Square
Grimsby
DN31 1HX
Telephone 01472 265262

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<C.Upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
11 April 2016 09:52
16 04 11 to Mr
with draft decision.pdf; 16 04 11 Draft decision.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15020295 N E Lincs

11 April 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 020 295
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

Please find attached a letter about this complaint.

Yours sincerely

Chris Upjohn
Investigator, Assessment Team
0330 403 4676
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

21/07/2016

Local Government

OMBUDSMAN
11 April 2016
Mr
GRIMSBY

Our ref:

15 020 295

(Please quote our reference when contacting us and, if using email, put the number in the email subject line)

Contact Chris Upjohn on 0330 403 4676 or by email to c.upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk

Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council
The Ombudsman has asked me to assess your complaint to see if it is about a matter we can or
should investigate. Based on the information I have, my current view is that we should not
investigate your complaint. The enclosed draft decision explains how and why I have reached this
view.
Before I make a final decision, I should welcome your comments on what I say in the draft
decision. If you do wish to comment, please ensure that I receive your response by 20 April 2016.
If I have heard nothing by then, I will likely make a formal decision not to investigate your complaint
for the reasons explained in the draft decision. If you need more time to comment, please explain
why this is and I will consider your request.
You will see that I have referred to you as Mr B in the statement. This is because we have a
commitment to publish all of our decisions on our website if possible. If you consider that
publication of the decision will identify you, please explain why this is and we will consider whether
to make an exception to our normal policy.
Yours sincerely

Chris Upjohn
Investigator, Assessment Team

PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0E1

www.lgo.org.uk
0300 061 0614

11 April 2016
Complaint reference:
15 020 295
Complaint against:
North East Lincolnshire Council

The Ombudsmans draft decision


Summary: The Ombudsman should not investigate this complaint that
the Council allocated council tax payments to the wrong account. The
courts are better placed to deal with this matter.

The complaint
1.

The complainant, who I refer to here as Mr B, has complained the Council has
allocated council tax payments to the wrong account.

The Ombudsmans role and powers


2.

The Ombudsman provides a free service, but must use public money carefully.
She may decide not to start or continue with an investigation if, for example, she
believes another body is better placed to deal with the matter. (Local Government Act
1974, section 24A(6))

How I considered this complaint


3.

I have considered what Mr B said in his complaint.

What I found
4.

5.

Mr B says he made payments to his council tax account for 2015/16 but the
Council allocated these to the account for an earlier year. He says the Council did
not follow the law when doing this.
Because the Council believed Mr B had not made the required payments for
2015/16, it applied to the magistrates court for a liability order.

Draft decision
6.

Mr B believes the Councils actions are wrong in law. The Ombudsman cannot
decide the law, only the courts can do that. My current view is that Mr B could
have put any arguments about the Councils actions to the magistrates court
which was better placed to deal with this matter. For this reason, the Ombudsman
should not investigate this complaint.
Investigators draft decision on behalf of the Ombudsman

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
12 April 2016 12:30
Representations on final decision review.pdf
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Mr Hobley

Ref: 15 016 673


Please find representations on the final decision review.

Yours sincerely

21/07/2016

Local Government Ombudsman


PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0EH

Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

12 April 2016
Ref: 15 016 673

Dear Mr Hobley

Representations on final decision review


1. The complaint to the LGO concerned first and foremost the councils mishandling of the
complaint, by which I mean the matters raised were not investigated properly. Irrelevancies
were focused on which had the overall affect of leaving the salient points unaddressed.

2. Leaving that aside, there are several matters which can be separated from those relating to the
commencement of court proceedings, notably the Council engineering default by
misallocating payment to a previous years account which was clearly intended to reduce the
current years liability. The delay and sometimes complete failure in responding to queries
amounts to maladministration and has been a common theme highlighted throughout the
complaint.

Is a part of the complaint separable from the matter which has been litigated?
3. LGO Guidance1 suggests that an investigator with delegated authority to make decisions
would be required to identify aspects of complaint which are separable from appeal matters,
and those that can, be will be within jurisdiction even when a complainant has resorted to
court proceedings.

4. I am aware from a report on an investigation into Newham Borough Council (ref 08 019 113)
that the ombudsman retains jurisdiction to investigate administrative actions prior to the issue
1

Guidance on jurisdiction June 2015

of court proceedings. That would tie in with the LGO Guidance where it deals with the
commencement of proceedings under Schedule 5 of the Local Government Act 1974 (the
1974 Act) and the claim made that the LGO has found fault with councils obtaining
Liability Orders from the courts for unpaid Council Tax where they should not have done.
Furthermore, listed among the matters that are IN jurisdiction under the same heading is the
process leading up to the councils decision to commence proceedings.

R v The Commissioner for Local Administration ex parte PH [1999] EWCA Civ 916

5. Specifically regarding the above case, the matter upon which Turner J based his judgment
appears to have been on the grounds that the complainant had no entitlement to seek
compensation via the Ombudsman because the applicant had resorted to a remedy in court and
the matter settled by way of a consent order in the applicants favour. In my case, although a
remedy has been exercised, none has been reached, nor has there been a ruling on the matter
appealed, which if there had been, would if the proceedings were on the same point, put the
complaint out of the Ombudsmans jurisdiction.

6. I understand in circumstances similar to my case the Ombudsman follows counsel opinion


with regards exercising discretion. This means that the Ombudsman does not exercise her
discretion once a complainant has made an application to the court irrespective of what then
happens. Though this would apply even if the application is rejected or withdrawn before the
hearing, I would question whether as a blanket approach, the courts would accept this
argument. It is conceivable that in a case similar to mine where the application has neither
been rejected nor withdrawn that a court would deem there a greater reason for discretion
being used because the Magistrates court, by ensuring the remedy resorted to is impossible to
reach, is causing additional injustice.
Note: The equivalent legislation2 setting out the LGOs powers (1974 Act) contains the same
provision (s26(6)(c) / Schedule 5 para 1) with regards seeking a remedy through the courts.
However, where the LGO interprets this as having no jurisdiction, merely on account of the
complainant commencing proceedings, the Welsh Ombudsman (and it seems the PHSO) only
2

The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 Section 9(1)(c) / Schedule 2 para 2. The Parliamentary
Commissioner Act 1967 Section 5(2)(b) / Schedule 3 para 6. The Health Service Commissioners Act 1993
Section 4(1)(b).

considers this a jurisdiction barrier where a legal remedy has been sought and one obtained. It
therefore goes that an applicant who has been unable to obtain a remedy may have recourse to
the ombudsmen who may then be free to exercise discretion to investigate a complaint.

Possibility of joint working with Parliamentary Ombudsman (PHSO)

7. The final review summarises my complaint as follows, despite extensive representations


contesting this interpretation:
Your complaint is, in summary, that the Council made a charge of 70 for the issue of a
council tax summons. You disputed the level of the charge. You took legal action
against the court in the High Court by way of case stated. You then issued judicial
review proceedings, which you later withdrew. You suggested the question costs should
be jointly investigated by the Local Government Ombudsman and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman.
8. There is little merit reiterating what has already been submitted in my representations but one
material inaccuracy concerning the suggestion of a joint investigation with the PHSO needs
highlighting. The summary above states that I suggested the costs should be jointly
investigated, though the question of costs, in reference to the PHSOs involvement was not
the remedy I sought. Paragraph 2 in my complaint contained the following:
It is therefore suggested that the main body of the complaint and the matter of the
Magistrates court perverting the course of justice are jointly investigated in conjunction
with the Parliamentary Ombudsman under powers granted by 2007 Regulatory Reform
legislation.
9. The reference to perverting the course of justice was not a reference to costs but to the
Magistrates Courts mismanagement of the application (case stated) that has resulted in the
failure to reach an outcome (see Annex A). This is clarified a number of times in the
representations on the Ombudsmans draft decision. On every occasion (example below) the
reference is clearly to the Magistrates Courts maladministration:
It is in this matter that the supporting documents, if they had been considered, would
have highlighted the true extent of HMCTSs maladministration that involved lying to
prevent an outcome of the proceedings and why it was recommended to be jointly
investigated with the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Despite this; though Im pursuing the
available remedy, and have never withdrawn my appeal, it is reasonable that the

Ombudsman would consider the matter out of my control, and for practical purposes
deem that resolve via the High Court is not a reasonable alternative to the Ombudsmans
involvement.
10.

The gross injustice caused by the combined maladministration of these two bodies could not
in my mind be more suited to be jointly investigated by the LGO and PHSO.

Where the relevant legal proceedings have been instigated by the council

11.

Schedule 5 of the 1974 Act is cited in the review to justify not investigating with regard to
the council taking the matter to court, i.e., para 1 (Sch 5) says the Ombudsman may not
investigate the commencement or conduct of civil or criminal proceedings before any court
of law. The relevant paragraph (the review) is quoted below:
The issue of the summons with the costs was commencement of proceedings and so
this is out of the Ombudsmans jurisdiction and she cannot look at the costs or what
happened in court.

12.

The guidance however states that s26(6)(c) does not apply where the proceedings have been
instigated by the council, though if the matter has been considered by the court it may be
appropriate not to investigate under s24A(6). In these circumstances the investigator must
consider the courts decision and presumably would need to take into account aspects of
complaint which are separable and the process leading up to the councils decision (see
above paras 1-4).

13.

The guidance then advises that where in the course of such proceedings the complainant
has made a counterclaim against the council in relation to the subject matter of his
complaint, s/he may be treated as having exercised an alternative remedy under s26(6)(c).
But to properly determining that the bar should apply would also require taking into account
aspects of complaint which are separable etc. etc., and the point (para 6 above) about
people who are denied the possibility of redress i.e., where the application has neither been
rejected nor withdrawn3.

The review cites R (Scholarstica Umo) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England [2003] EWHC 3202
(Admin) to endorse its decision of having no jurisdiction, merely on account of the complainant commencing
proceedings. However, in that case the claimant was refused permission to apply for judicial review and so does not
relate to a case where the application has neither been rejected nor withdrawn.

14.

Regarding a counterclaim against the council, the remedy sought, although summons costs
factored into representations, the questions of law on which the opinion of the High Court
was sought, did not centre on the level of the charge (See Annex B).

15.

Finally, it is underestimating the extent of the injustice caused by the maladministration to


say that it amounts to a mere 60 when clearly that is just the starting point and the knockon affects are potentially far more serious. I have been pursuing these issues with the
council over a protracted period and therefore it is necessary to examine events over the
whole period, so as to appreciate the full extent of the maladministration and injustice.

Yours sincerely

Annex A

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CO Ref: CO/

/2014

QUEENS BENCH DIVISION


ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

BETWEEN:

Appellant
and
NORTH EAST LINCOLNSHIRE COUNCIL
Respondent

CHRONOLOGY

19.

The billing authority sent a Council Tax reminder dated 12.9.12 in respect of a missed
instalment which was due on 1.9.13. It warned that instalments would be withdrawn if the
account not brought up to date, and if following that the balance was not paid immediately,
a summons would be issued (incurring costs) without further notice.

20.

Neither demand was met so on 17.10.12 a summons was served on the Appellant to appear
before the Magistrates Court on 2.11.12 to answer the said complaint. It was stated
alternatively that all further proceedings would be stopped if the amount outstanding
including summons costs was paid before the date of the hearing.

21.

Payment was made on 17.10.12 which included the outstanding Council Tax liability and an
amount in respect of reasonable costs incurred (albeit a lesser sum than was stated on the
summons as the costs element). The authority was notified by letter under cover of an email
and sought whether it would proceed to obtain a court order to enable enforcement of the
element of costs which the council may have considered was unpaid.

22.

On 17.10.12 the billing authority acknowledge receipt of the letter, and advised that it had
been forwarded to its Court Enforcement Officers to deal with. There was no further
response in relation to the issues raised so assumed it would proceed to obtain a liability
order.

23.

On 26.10.12 the Magistrates Court was notified that the liability had been settled and
advised that unless the application for a liability order was withdrawn the complaint would
be defended at the hearing of 2.11.12. A summary accompanied the letter to support several
documents asserting that the sum sought by the billing authority was an unreasonable claim
for costs.

24.

On 28.10.12 an assessment of costs incurred in pursuance of the defence was submitted to


the Magistrates Court.

25.

The complaint was heard in the Magistrates Court on 2.11.12 where the bench granted a
liability order in respect of the costs which the billing authority claimed were incurred.

26.

On 5.11.12 the Magistrates Court was contacted by email expressing the wish to appeal the
courts decision to grant a liability order and request to have details forwarded of the
relevant person to correspond with on the matter.

27.

The court responded in a letter dated 6.11.12 advising that a Liability Order could only be
challenged by an appeal to the High Court by way of either a case stated on a point of law or
a judicial review and strongly suggested taking legal advice.

28.

On 16.11.12 the court was contacted by email in regards appealing by way of a case stated
and to advise that seeking legal advice was not viable because of unemployment and having
no entitlement to benefit.

29.

The court responded by email on 19.11.12 and clarified some points raised and advised that
in certain circumstances it is possible to apply for fee remission.

30.

On 20.11.12 the court was contacted by email querying the relevant Criminal Procedure
Rules and again on the 21.11.12 to obtain particulars of the Liability Order hearing as were
required to complete the prescribed form to state a case.

31.

The court responded in two separate emails on 21.11.12. The first advised it could not
provide assistance with the appeal and the second, advising that case references were not
allocated in Council Tax cases.

32.

On 22.11.12 the application to state a case for an appeal to the high court was served on
both parties, that is, the billing authority and Magistrates' Court, within the time limits laid
out in the Criminal Procedure Rules.

33.

The Deputy Justices Clerk acknowledged receipt of the application in a letter dated
22.11.12 and advised that once the documentation had been considered further contact
would be made.

34.

There was no communication and on 28.12.12 an attempt to contact the Deputy Justices
Clerk was made by email, however, a 'delivery failure' notice was generated and returned.
An attempt was made under advice to contact the Justices' Clerk for Humber & South
Yorkshire for which there was no response. Further attempts to make contact on 10.1.13
were also unsuccessful in both cases.

35.

The court made contact on 14.1.13 where it transpired that the Deputy Justices' Clerk who
had been dealing with the appeal had left HMCTS at the end of 2012. The Legal Team
Manager stated in his email that he would make enquiries into what was happening with the
application and update as soon as possible.

36.

The matter had been put in the hands of the Justices' Clerk for Humber & South Yorkshire,
who in a letter dated 24.1.13 advised that the Justices require recognizance to be entered
into in the sum of 500 and outlined the conditions of recognizance.

37.

The Justices' Clerk was contacted on 6.2.13 by email with the billing authority and Grimsby
Magistrates Courts Legal Team Manager copied in. An attached letter to the Justices Clerk
dated 5.2.13 highlighted that the recognizance should be set at a level which does not deny a
person access to justice and that the proposed sum effectively would. Alternative remedies
were suggested, which in the case of the court, was to set aside the liability order, and for
the billing authority, to apply for the order to be quashed.

38.

On 8.2.13 the billing authority replied stating it was not prepared to apply to the Magistrates
Court to quash the liability order as it was correctly obtained. This was disputed in a letter
dated 14.2.13, on the grounds that the application should have ceased when the aggregate of
the sum outstanding and an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority
was paid.

39.

The Justices' Clerk was contacted twice by email in February 2013, once on the 19th and
again on the 26th to prompt a response to the letter dated 5.2.13.

40.

There was no communication from the Justices Clerk and on 23.3.13 the Administrative
Court Office was contacted by letter to make preliminary enquiries about a mandatory order
requiring the Justices to state a case for an appeal to the High Court.

41.

The Justices' Clerk was again contacted by email on 27.3.13 to prompt a response to the
letter dated 5.2.13, but the concerns raised regarding the recognizance were never
addressed.

42.

A Pre-Action letter dated 29.4.13 was sent to the Justices Clerk advising that it was
intended that an application would be made for permission to bring judicial review
proceedings for a mandatory order requiring the Justices to state a case.

43.

The application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings was submitted on
31.5.13 as a consequence of there being no response from the Justices Clerk in relation to
the 5.2.13 and 29.4.13 letters. Similarly, there had been no response from the billing
authority to the 14.2.13 letter.

44.

Sealed copies of the judicial review application (seal date 12.6.13) were received on
17.6.13, along with directions to proceed with the claim.

45.

The Justices' Clerk was contacted by email on 18.6.13 to establish whether the court was
willing to accept service by email and if so, to specify the address to which it must be sent.

46.

On 18.6.13, sealed copies of the judicial review claim forms and accompanying documents
were served on the defendant and interested parties in accordance with the relevant Civil
Procedure Rules. In the absence of confirmation from the Justices' Clerk, a hard copy was
posted in addition to that sent electronically in anticipation of the court accepting service by
e-mail.

47.

Justices' Clerk contacted by email on 19.6.13 to confirm whether the Certificate of Service
should be lodged in respect of documents served at Grimsby Magistrates' court or those
served at Doncaster Magistrates' court (where the Justices Clerk for Humber & South
Yorkshire was based).

48.

There was no confirmation from the Justices Clerk in regards the location, so on 19.6.13,
the Certificate of Service was lodged in the Administrative Court in respect of documents
served at Grimsby Magistrates' court.

49.

Confirmation received on 16.7.13 that the Magistrates' Court had lodged the
Acknowledgement of Service (dated 8.7.13) with the Administrative Court, in regards the
claim for judicial review. The defendant Court gave an undertaking that it would serve the
draft case within fourteen days of the date of the acknowledgement of service.

Note: It was not until this document was lodged that it was made known by the Clerk that
the question of the appropriateness of the recognizance and/or the amount could have been
considered by the court had an arrangement been made to appear before the defendant
court to enter into a recognizance.
50.

A letter sent by the billing authority dated 19.7.13 advised that the disputed court costs were
suspended, and dependent on the outcome of the proceedings, would either be withdrawn or
remain outstanding with the council.

51.

The draft case, together with a statement of the delay for its production, both dated 22.7.13,
were received on 30.7.13. These were accompanied with a covering letter dated 24.7.13,
advising that any written representations upon its content, would, in accordance with rule
77(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981, require submitting within 21 days from receipt
of the draft case.

52.

On 19.8.13, representations upon the content of the draft case were served together with
letter advising that the Court had (from the latest day on which representations may be
made) 21 days to state and sign the case in accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates'
Courts Rules 1981. At the same time, a copy was served on the billing authority.

53.

The Justices' Clerk was contacted by email on 3.9.13 and a request made for a copy to be
sent of the liability order (as supporting document), stamped by the court, for the purposes
of complying with the Civil Procedure Rules.
Note: Practice Direction 52E requires that within 10 days of the court serving the Case
Stated (anticipated on or before 10.9.13) the appellant's notice along with supporting
documents require lodging with the appeal court.

54.

An order from the High Court in the matter of the application for judicial review was
received on 6.9.13. The administrative court required updating with what had happened
after the defendant court undertook to serve a draft of a Case stated within 14 days of the
Acknowledgement of service. A reply was sent the same day and copies sent to the
interested parties stating that the draft Case had been served and representations made on
the draft case.

55.

On 9.9.13, the billing authority as "interested party" to the judicial review claim submitted
representations expressing that it fully supported the defendant courts submission.

56.

The administrative court wrote on 12.11.13 proposing that the judicial review claim be
withdrawn because there no longer appeared a need for further action on the part of the
High Court as the draft Case had been served.

57.

On 20.11.13, the administrative court was notified of the wish to withdraw the judicial
review claim.

58.

Note: The final signed Case anticipated on or before 10.9.13 had not been served. There had
been no acknowledgement of neither the written representations made upon the content of
the draft case nor letter advising of the time limits stipulated in the relevant rules to serve
the finalised Case.
The Justices' Clerk was contacted by letter under cover of email on 10.1.14 enquiring into
why it was that the justices had not served the Case in accordance with the relevant rules.
Note: In accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981, service of the final
signed Case had overrun the 10.9.13 deadline by 4 months. There was no response.

59.

The Justices' Clerk was contacted again by letter under cover of an email on 13.2.14 to
arrange a recognizance hearing in order that the appropriateness and/or the amount may be
considered and agreed.
Note: No response from the Clerk meant second guessing why the case had not been
delivered and assumed the reason may have been because the judicial review claim only
prompted the court to give an undertaking to serve the draft case only and not deliver the
final case until recognizance had been agreed.

60.

There was no communication from the Justices Clerk in the matter of the recognizance so
on 3.3.14 contacted the Humber and South Yorkshire Magistrates Court by phone and spoke
to the Justices Clerk's assistant (Legal Admin Team Leader) where it was confirmed that a
message would be left for the Justices Clerk to make contact that day.

61.

Telephoned the Court on the morning of 5.3.14 as there was still no contact and spoke to a
team member from the Judicial Support Unit who ensured a message would reach the
Justices Clerk who was due in later. A second call was made on the afternoon of 5.3.14
where a different member of the Judicial Support Unit took the call and confirmed that the
message had been passed on but the Clerk was again not at the premises so unavailable.

62.

The Clerk to Justices made contact on 6.3.14, stating in an email that either that day or the
following (7.3.14) the position regarding the case (advising on the next steps) would be set
out and communicated in writing.

Note: There was no communication from the Justices Clerk advising on the next steps
which on top of the obstruction already encountered seemed to confirm that Humber and
South Yorkshire Magistrates Court was a rogue unit.
63.

Telephoned the court again on 19.3.14 (for the record) to be told again that the Clerk was
not at the premises.
Note: Similarly there was no communication in response to this call from the Justices Clerk
advising on the next steps.

64.

Telephoned again on 28.3.14 (as a formality) to be advised that the Clerk was not available
but would be left a message.
Note: No response or any communication on this occasion.

65.

The Justices' Clerk was contacted by letter under cover of an email on 22.4.14 requesting
the production of a Certificate of refusal to state a case under section 111(5) of the
Magistrates Court's Act 1980.
Note: There has neither been a Certificate of refusal to state a case provided nor any reply to
this communication to date.

66.

The Justices' Clerk was contacted by email on 9.7.14 to enquire into whether Her Majestys
Courts and Tribunals Service had any arrangements in place to restrict the Appellants
contact with Humber and South Yorkshire, and if so in what way.
Note: There has been no reply to this communication to date.

67.

On 2.9.14 a judicial complaint was submitted to the relevant Advisory Committee (the
AC) with the grounds of complaint cited as perverting the course of justice. The events
outlined up to paras 48 in this Chronology were provided as evidence.
Note: There has been no reply to this communication to date. It is understood that the
Secretary to the AC for the Humber to whom the complaint was addressed, and against
whom allegations were made is also the Justices Clerk involved in the present case.

68.

On 14.5.15 an enquiry was made with the Magistrates HR Team to establish why there had
not been acknowledgement regarding the complaint. The AC Secretary was not contacted as
it was deemed that eliciting a response would be unlikely. However, there was no advantage
gained, as the HR Team merely forwarded the email to the Committee Secretary.
Note: The Committee Secretary did not reply.

69.

On 25.6.15 concerns were raised with the Head of the Judicial Conduct Investigations
Office (JCIO) who responded on 29.6.15 stating that she had contacted the Committee

Secretary in the hope she would make contact directly. It was suggested complaining to the
Judicial Appointment and Conduct Ombudsman (JACO) if the handling of the complaint
remained unsatisfactory.
Note: The Committee Secretary did not reply.
70.

JACO was contacted expressing the wish to escalate a complaint, first on 8.8.15 and again
on the 19.8.15 after receiving no acknowledgement.
Note: There has been no reply from the Ombudsman to date.

71.

JACO eventually replied in a letter dated 14.12.15 in which an apology was given for the 4
month delay in responding. The Ombudsmans remit was also set out, some of which
permitted him to consider the delay in investigating the AC complaint submitted more than
a year earlier on 2.9.14.

72.

On 18.12.15 permission was given to JACOs Office to disclose the complaint and
correspondence to the AC and confirmed that the AC had not responded to any
correspondence about the matter and the case still unresolved requesting therefore that the
Ombudsman consider the process by which the AC handled the matter so far. JACOs
Office stated in an email sent on 22.12.15 that the complaint file would be requested from
the AC and an update given after it had been received and considered.

73.

JACO made contact on 23.1.16 informing the Appellant that the complaint file had been
obtained from the AC and apologised for the delay that was down to the significant amount
of time obtaining it. It transpired that the AC had three letters on file that were sent to the
Appellant in response to his correspondence to them (AC), JCIO and JACO. Though the
Appellant had not received the letters when allegedly sent, he has had possession since
JACO attached copies (23.1.16).

74.

The first letter dated 16.9.14 which is claimed to have been sent in response to the Judicial
complaint (2.9.14) had been a letter dismissing the complaint as it did not raise a question of
misconduct. It further stated that a certificate of refusal to state a case was not issued by the
Justices because they did state a case for the consideration of the Administrative Court and
the final case has been sent to the Appellant.

Note: The Appellant received neither the letter nor the final case referred to in that letter.
Moreover, there was no copy of the case stated sent by JACO presumably because the
complaint file obtained from the AC did not contain the document.
75.

The second and third letters claimed to have been sent were in connection with the Judicial
Office and then JCIO prompting a response from the AC and were dated 29.5.15 and 6.7.15
respectively. Both copies state: This matter was responded to by the Humber Advisory
Committee on 16 September 2014 and I enclose herewith a further copy of that reply.
Note: The Appellant received neither of these letters, consequently the 16.9.14 letter that
was never received was claimed to have been sent on three occasions.

76.

On 25.2.16 the Appellant contacted the Justices' Clerk by email to advise her that he had not
received and was unaware of the letters she claimed to have sent, dated 16.9.14, 29.5.15,
6.7.15 and the final case stated referred to in the 16.9.14 letter. She was also advised that
JACO had sent copies of the three letters, though not one of the case stated, and would
therefore like that sent in order that the Appellant may proceed with his application to the
High Court.
Note: The Justices' Clerk has never replied to or acknowledged this correspondence.

Annex B
(Content of Skeleton Argument relevant to these representations)

SUBMISSIONS

Questions for the High Court

19.

The questions of law on which the opinion of the High Court is sought were presented to the
Magistrates court on 22.11.12 in accordance with the relevant Criminal Procedure Rules, in
the following terms:
The questions focus on two principle points of law with regards regulation 34 of the
Council Tax regulations (SI 1992/613).
Those points being, whether
i)

costs being disputed as unreasonable should have been awarded by the


court without evidence from the council to support them.

ii) costs specifically incurred by the council for obtaining the liability order
should have been charged at the summons issuing stage.
20.

In Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates it was held unlawful for the court to award costs
without having sufficient relevant information from the billing authority to support them.
Consequently the first question of law in the present case appears to be resolved in the
judgment at paragraph 61 which states as follows:
This application for judicial review of the decision taken by the Magistrates must
therefore succeed. I was told that since the hearing the order for costs against the
Claimant has been withdrawn, but that does not render the proceedings academic; as I
have said, it raises issues of wider public importance. Had the order not been
withdrawn, I would have quashed it. Since it has been withdrawn, I will declare that
the order was unlawful, because:
i)

the Magistrates did not have sufficient relevant information before them to
reach a proper judicial determination of whether the costs claimed
represented costs reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining the
liability order;

ii) the Magistrates erred in law by failing to make further inquiries into how
the 125 was computed and what elements it comprised; and

iii) the Claimant was denied a fair opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of
the order before it was made, by reason of the failure to answer his requests
for the provision of information as to how the sum of 125 was arrived at.
21.

Put in context of the present case it is evident that the Council merely informed the
Magistrates' Court of the standard sum it had decided it would impose as costs and provided
no evidence as to how they were arrived at, and what costs they represented (see below
paras 45-46).

22.

Though the court enquired into how the costs were justified at the hearing on 2.11.12, the
Council simply offered that it was not required to justify costs to the court and had never
submitted a breakdown. It was however stated generally that they covered Council Tax
collection and recovery, IT systems, employment of staff and HMCTS for the use of their
facilities.

Page 1 of 2

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

Dear Mr

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
12 April 2016 15:50
Mr
letter 12 April 2016.doc

Thank you for your email of 28 March 2016.


I apologise for the tardy response but the recipient of the original email has been on leave for 2
weeks and only returned to work yesterday.
Regarding your application to start a prosecution, this matter is currently being dealt with by my
Line Manager, Jodie Morris, Legal Team Manager, and the Clerk to the Justices, Alison Watts. You
will be contacted in the near future with a date to attend court to apply for proceedings to be
commenced by way of summons. I confirm that I have the hard copy of your application.
Regarding the victim surcharge I have checked with the Court Associate who was sitting with Mr
Pascoe on 22 December 2015 and she has confirmed that Mr Pascoe did indeed announce the victim
surcharge. She specifically remembers you asking what it meant.
Regarding the virus previously mentioned I have heard no more about this which would suggest that
the problem has been resolved.
Regarding the trial on 15 December 2015 I feel that there is little more that I can add to what I have
already told you. The criminal trial system in this country is based on the best evidence being given
by witnesses for the prosecution and defence in court in person. The prosecution witnesses swear a
religious oath or make a solemn declaration to tell the truth. What they say in the witness box is
subject to challenge by the defendant or his legal representative. The defendant then has his
opportunity to give his evidence in the same way and is subject to challenge by the prosecutor. The
court has then to assess the evidence and decide whether the prosecution has proved the case beyond
reasonable doubt.
I have made the point in previous emails that, for whatever reason, you made the conscious choice
not to attend court for your trial. The solicitor who attended to cross examine the prosecution
witnesses on your behalf had no option but to withdraw from the case as you were not there to tell
him what questions to ask.
You were told when the trial was fixed that if you failed to attend for your trial two things could
happen:
1 You could be found guilty in your absence and
2 A warrant could be issued for your arrest.
If you had attended for your trial you would have been able to give instructions to the solicitor to
enable him to challenge the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses and you would have been
able to give evidence on your own behalf.
Of course you are correct when you say that the court cannot find a guilty verdict merely on account
of the defendants absence. The court makes its decision based on the evidence it hears and that is
exactly what happened in your case.
The prosecution is obliged to serve on you the details of its case, including anything that might be
21/07/2016

Page 2 of 2

considered capable of undermining its case. That is exactly what happened in your case. You were
given the documents at the first hearing. I fail to understand how you can suggest fraud and
conspiracy when you were served with all the paperwork but simply failed to read it. There was
ample time between the first hearing and the trial date for you to obtain the advice of a solicitor if
you felt that was necessary.
As for your final paragraph, if you believe that two people falsely claiming to be police coerced you
into attending court then you need to raise the matter with the police.
I cannot explain why you were not given access to the duty solicitor on the day but the District Judge
simply sentenced you for the offence of which you had been convicted in your absence. There was
no question of defrauding you or imposing falsely a criminal conviction as you suggest.
I have on more than one occasion informed you as to your option of appeal against conviction and
sentence to the Crown Court.
I trust that this answers the matters raised in your email.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

21/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>; "Grimsby Crown, Enquiries"
<enquiries@grimsby.crowncourt.gsi.gov.uk>
12 April 2016 16:41
Appeal to crown court.pdf
Appeal form

Dear Mr Townell
Please find attached completed appeal form dated 12 April 2016.

Yours sincerely
.

21/07/2016

APPEAL TO THE CROWN COURT FROM A MAGISTRATES COURT


(Criminal Procedure Rules, rule 34.3)
Case details
Name of defendant: Mr Xxx Yyyy
Address: 00 Xxxxx Xxxxx, Grimsby
Email address: @gmail.com
Phone:

N/A

Mobile: N/A

Appeal from Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates Court


Magistrates court case reference number: 16AY/2837/15
Appeal to the Crown Court at Grimsby

This is an appeal to the Crown Court about:


I was convicted of an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 on 22 December 2015, though I can
not say with any certainty whether the offence relates to indecent exposure, using threatening words, using
abusive words or using threatening behaviour. The arresting officer alleged indecent exposure but I would expect
Humberside Police, on realising the improbability this was the case may have determined the offence differently.
I have asked the magistrates court to reconsider my case

Yes

No

You may not need to appeal. Sometimes a magistrates court can change a decision which it has made, under
section 142 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980. Ask at the magistrates court office.

I need an extension of time for this appeal

Yes

No

See the time limits listed below. If your appeal is late, you must answer question 1, on the other side of this form.
Only the Crown Court can extend the 21 day time limit for appeal.
Use this form ONLY for an appeal to the Crown Court about conviction, sentence, etc. under Criminal Procedure
Rules Part 34. There is a different form for applying or appealing to the Crown Court after a magistrates court
has made a decision about bail, under Criminal Procedure Rule 14.8.

1. Complete the boxes above and give the details required in the boxes below. If you use an
1

electronic version of this form, the boxes will expand . If you use a paper version and need more space, you may
attach extra sheets.

2. Sign and date the completed form.


3. Send a copy of the completed form to:
(a) the magistrates court, and
(b) the other party to the case (e.g. the prosecutor, if you are the defendant).
You must send this form so as to reach the recipients not more than 21 days after:
the date you were sentenced or your sentence was deferred (whichever was earlier), if your appeal is
against conviction or against a finding of guilt,
the date you were sentenced, if your appeal is against sentence, or
in any other case, the date of the order or failure to make an order about which you want to appeal.

Forms for use with the Rules are at: www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/formspage.

1) Extension of time (if you need one: see the notes on the front page). My appeal is late because:
Explain why your appeal is late. Attach copies of any letters or other documents you want the court to see.

The application has exceeded the 21 day time limit for the reasons briefly set out below:
I am not a solicitor, lawyer or anything similar which would provide me with the required knowledge to be able
to navigate these proceedings, neither have I been given any information regarding my rights to legal
representation. Im therefore out of my depth and have had to fumble my way around in the hope I stumble upon
an approach which may allow me to produce this appeal after having this unfortunate matter dropped on me.
I have embarked upon a time consuming process to provide evidence to persuade the Magistrates court that it
would be appropriate that the case is reopened. This has involved my own research and investigations (obtaining
information via the Freedom of Information for example) but proved unsuccessful in changing the view of the
court. It is therefore, despite the sound reasoning, unlikely that the Magistrates court will agree to reopen the
case under section 142 the Magistrates' court Act 1980 under any circumstances.
It is without doubt this situation has arisen because the authorities have been able to rely on my ignorance as to
my legal rights and have been able to keep from me knowing about papers which I should have been served and
alerted to their importance. To avoid any possibility of a repeat performance and in order to achieve justice I
expect that at no cost to myself I am allowed legal representation.

2) The issues in this case are:

Magistrates court refusing to reopen case under section 142


The option most appropriate with regards appealing the conviction appeared to be to apply under section 142 of
the Magistrates' court Act 1980 (the "1980 Act") to have the court re-open the case for the reasons set out below:
I did not attend the trial on 15 December 2015, after discovering who would be trying the case. It was expressed
without reservation by writing to the court a number of days before the trial that I did not consider the Judge, 'a
fit and proper person to hear the case'. My assertion was founded on hard evidence relating to a previous matter
where the judge had unequivocally accepted a statement knowing it to be false, which enabled the claimant,
North East Lincolnshire Council to succeed in defrauding me through court costs claimed in proceedings that
were engineered to that end. The Council had therefore committed perjury to defraud me, and the judge assisted
by turning a blind eye to that breach of legal procedure.
Sub-paragraph 1 of s142 of the 1980 Act provides the following:
"A magistrates court may vary or rescind a sentence or other order imposed or made by it when dealing
with an offender if it appears to the court to be in the interests of justice to do so; and it is hereby
declared that this power extends to replacing a sentence or order which for any reason appears to be
invalid by another which the court has power to impose or make."
Sub-paragraph 2 also has relevance in which the following provides:
"Where a person is convicted by a magistrates court and it subsequently appears to the court that it
would be in the interests of justice that the case should be heard again by different justices, the court
may so direct."
I was asked at the 22 December hearing (sentencing) by deputy district judge Andrew Pascoe whether or not I
was guilty of failing to turn up for the trial on the 15 Dec 2015 without good reason. I pleaded not guilty as I
considered I had very good reason for not attending as I had no confidence in the judge trying the case fairly.
The court was informed in writing on 11 Dec 2015 as aforementioned.

Sub-section 2A of s11 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980 provides that:


"the court shall not proceed in the absence of the accused if it considers that there is an acceptable
reason for his failure to appear."
Notwithstanding the provision in sub-section 2A, there was no evidence that judge Andrew Pascoe was briefed
as he commented, after Id raised my objection to being found guilty when innocent, that I had a chance to put
my side of the story at the trial but did no turn up. This suggests that mitigating evidence documents, in which
my side of the story had been extensively set out and which had been sent to the court had not been considered in
my conviction.
I had already made it known at the initial hearing that I suspected the arresting officer had incited one of the
witnesses to make a false statement, and what that witness claimed to have seen, he had not. On reading both
members of the public's written statements afterwards which were handed to me minutes before the first hearing,
I can categorically state that they had both lied regarding their claim that I had indecently exposed myself. The
complaint made to the police about PC Thomas Blake who I suspected of inciting perjury, and an account stating
that the two members of the public had both made untrue witness statements, was also sent to the court on 11
Dec 2015.
It therefore seems contrary to the interests of justice that I had submitted extensive written evidence to the court,
and prohibited from cross-examining the witnesses that at the hearing for sentencing, deputy district judge
Andrew Pascoe said that I had a chance to put my side of the story.

Insufficient information about proceedings


I had assumed the matter would be in the hands of the duty solicitor who had been appointed on being falsely
imprisoned in a cell at Humberside police station (27.8.15), as I had not been informed otherwise. However, after
updating him (Mr Havery) well in advance of the 30th of September court appearance on the proceedings there
was never a reply.
Only minutes before being called into the courtroom did I find out from the usher I was not entitled to legal
representation. This was only discovered because I could reply with no certainty on being asked who my
solicitor was. I stated it may have been Mr Havery from John Barkers but because he had not kept in contact, i.e.,
replied to my correspondence, I was in doubt. The Crown Prosecution Service's case file was handed to me at
this point giving me no opportunity to read any of it before going into court.
Having no entitlement to legal representation presumably meant the solicitor was under no obligation to
acknowledge my correspondence and therefore the reason why he hadn't. However, in anticipation of being
unrepresented, despite having no background of criminal proceedings, and unsure if this was the correct
procedure, a statement was produced and sent to the court on the morning of the hearing.
At the 30th September hearing, a direction was made prohibiting me cross-examining the witnesses in person and
arrangement made for a solicitor to do so. Shortly before the 15th December hearing (and by chance) I learned
that a solicitor had been arranged but no details given as to who. However, it was confirmed after the 22
December hearing (sentencing) that Mr Havery, the solicitor who failed to acknowledge my correspondence, on
the lead up to the first hearing, had been appointed. It was also confirmed after more prompting that District
judge Curtis allowed Mr Havery to withdraw from the case and had done so because I had not attended.
It therefore seems contrary to the interests of justice that the solicitor was allowed to withdraw from the case by
the same judge who tried the case who had effectively made me surplus to proceedings by giving directions at
the first hearing prohibiting me from cross-examining the witnesses. Add to this that the Crown Prosecution
Service held no evidence to support the charge, but a guilty verdict found nonetheless, suggests all the more that
the outcome and proceedings were contrary to the interests of justice.
The above formed the basis of my initial representations submitted to the Magistrates court on 7 January 2016

for considering whether there were reasonable grounds to reopen the case under section 142.
Request to quash sentence under section 142 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980
I submitted further representations to the Magistrates court on 13 February 2016 after obtaining information
relating to CCTV coverage which reinforced my already held suspicions that the prosecution was part of a
conspiracy. My statement submitted to the court (30.9.15) sets out in paragraphs 30-37 the dispute Ive been
engaged in with Humberside police since 2009. It seems feasible that these circumstances have motivated the
force to seize the opportunity to exploit the criminal justice system, in the first instance with the arresting officer
encouraging the witness to make false allegations to aid a criminal case against me.
As I set out in my 13 February 2016 correspondence, Grimsby Magistrates' Court, with Humberside Police and
the CPS as accomplices have misused the Criminal Justice system in allowing fabricated evidence to convict me
for charges of which I am innocent in order to defraud me of a sum of 620. The court had no evidence
whatsoever with which to find a guilty verdict.
As the CPS had no evidence with which to justify prosecuting the case it is therefore suspected that Mr Martin
Howarth, the CPS Solicitor has been corruptly influenced by Humberside Police/Grimsby Magistrates' court to
proceed with a prosecution where the evidence fell below the standards which would be expected for a fair trial.
Moreover, I had insufficient information about the proceedings and did not know the position regarding my
rights to legal representation and left to produce representations myself. The case went ahead in my absence
during which I was found guilty and it appears the judge in sentencing at a later hearing, which I did attend, was
not briefed as the mitigating evidence documents I had sent to the court had not been considered in my
conviction.
I believe the burden of proof is beyond all reasonable doubt in criminal cases and therefore satisfied that a crime
has been committed against me for which there are very good grounds. In their witness statements I have copies
of, both Arthur and Tammy Johnson lied and it is suspected that Police Constable Thomas Blake 1131 incited at
least one of them to commit perjury.
There are also very good grounds to suspect that CCTV footage, which would support my innocence, has been
destroyed. I have since obtained details of the arrangement Humberside police has for monitoring the public
grounds in front of the Victoria Street station. In respect of 27th August 2015 (the day of the alleged matter), a
total of 7 CCTV cameras covered relevant areas; one situated in the portacabin (temporary front office) and 6
covering the front of the station. The camera footage (it has been since discovered) is on a loop system and kept
for 90 days. I have learned that when asked for, video footage is retained, although Humberside police have
stated that no requests were received on 27th August 2015, and therefore the video footage has been overwritten.
If there were 7 cameras covering the area, it would seem beyond reasonable doubt that video footage, material in
a criminal case, would be available for proving the innocence of someone convicted of an offence alleged to
have been committed there on that date. Notwithstanding this, it could not have been known then whether video
footage would have determined the truth, so the fact I had voluntarily remained at the scene to help police with
their enquiries, speaks for itself. Being under no obligation to wait for an officer to arrive, reinforces the fact that
I was innocence, as I was clearly confident that if video footage existed it could not possibly have incriminated
me, but more likely disproved the accusations (paras 4 - 5, defendant's statement 30 Sept 2015). Someone who
had been guilty in the circumstances, with a possibility of being on camera would unlikely have voluntarily
remained to assist.
It is clear that the evidence (which appears to be none) fell short of the standard which would be required by the
criminal justice system to meet the criteria of a fair trial. It is therefore expected in the interest of justice that
under section 142 of the Magistrates' court Act 1980, the sentence is quashed.
Inconsistent witness statements
I submitted further representations to the Magistrates court on 10 March 2016 after identifying some
inconsistencies which supported the fact that both the civilian witnesses had committed perjury. I hold evidence
in the form of two witness statements dated 27 August and 1 September 2015 produced by Arthur and Tammy

Johnson about which there is no question that they contain outright lies. The witness statements are contained in
the CPS's case bundle which was handed to me minutes before the hearing at Grimsby Magistrates court on 30
September 2015.
The police are aware of my allegations but have so far avoided recording the matter as a reported crime. As a
consequence I have formally reported this to Humberside police as perjury on 29 February 2016.
The statements are inconsistent with what was said before they were produced and with the front office clerk, Mr
Warriners account in his witness statement (also part of the CPS case bundle):
1) Mr Warriner in his witness statement says he was approached by Mr Johnson who informed him that there is
a man pissing up the tree outside. However, by the time Mr Johnson produced his statement, this changed to it
looked like he was going to have a wee against the tree. This points to Mr Johnson being an unreliable witness
as he had not seen anyone urinating, only assumed he had, which was confirmed in-between informing Mr
Warriner and producing his statement which he changed accordingly.
2) Arthur Johnson, before accompanying the officer to the tree which he had accused me of urinating against,
stated that he had seen me zipping or unzipping my fly despite the jeans I wore having buttons. This anomaly
was raised with the arresting officer shortly after the alleged incident took place. However, by the time Arthur
Johnson produced his statement, the reference to operating a zip was omitted. Tammy Johnson on the other hand
did refer to buttons, but this was in her witness statement made after becoming aware there was no zip (1 Sept
2015). The first being the male appeared to be unbuttoning his jeans and later untruthfully stated I then saw
this male having unbuttoned his jeans and then describe in graphic detail the alleged offence, knowing this was
a complete fabrication.

I have because of the above crime wrongly been convicted of an offence and consequently now having a
criminal record and incurred a direct financial loss of 620, being the aggregate of the criminal courts charge,
costs and victims surcharge. Ive also had the inconvenience of being wrongfully arrested and falsely
imprisoned, and factoring in the damaged reputation and hundreds of hours engaged in pursuing this matter,
consider (if you can quantify this in monetary terms) have been caused at least a 10k loss.
Given the burden of proof required for criminal convictions, I am at a loss to know why Humberside police even
considered referring this matter to the CPS and even more bewildered that the CPS, considering the flawed
witness statements, have pursued the case knowing that under proper scrutiny there could be no prospects of a
successful prosecution.
Recent awareness of additional concerns
On or around 10 March 2016 I became aware of Criminal Procedure Rules which I consider relevant to
proceedings in my case. The Rules in force at the time were Part 37 (Trial and Sentence in a Magistrates Court).
These have been renumbered and now Part 24 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015. The Criminal Procedure
(Amendment No. 2) Rules 2015 amended Part 37 of the 2014 Rules, introducing a new provision, Single justice
procedure: special rules inserted as Rule 37.9; Part 37.11 (Procedure where a party is absent) became Part
37.12. Consequently, this Part was amended inserting the provision that the rule does not apply where the court
tries a case under rule 37.9 (Single justice procedure: special rules). The procedure is prescribed by sections
16A to 16D of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 (Trial by single justice on the papers).
The amendment Rules came into force on 6th April 2015 and so applied by the time my case was underway.
It was confirmed after consulting the Magistrates court on 10 March 2016 that my case was not dealt with under
the single justice procedure where rule 37.9 would have applied and the relevant rule was 37.12 (Procedure
where a party is absent).
Under the circumstances, a trial on the papers would have been the procedure most in the interest of justice to
have taken and is questioned why it was not, given that I was disadvantaged by having no legal representation
and completely in the dark as to my rights, if indeed I had any. Trying the case on the papers would have been
the fairer option as I had submitted various documents of mitigating evidence. This, in a small way would have

compensated for my ignorance of the court system for which Im certain the court has exploited to my detriment
in open court. Being unable to ignore the submission and set against the prosecutions lack of evidence and the
questionable, inconsistent witness statements, it is inconceivable that the court could have found a verdict of
guilt.
In any event, the procedure set out under rule 37.12 (where a party is absent) does not give the court power to
find a guilty verdict merely on account of the defendants absence. Sub-paragraph 3 states that were the
defendant is absent the court must proceed as if the defendant were present and had pleaded not guilty. That
would not have entailed the judge allowing the solicitor, who had been appointed to cross-examine the police
and witnesses to withdraw from the case (I was prohibited from doing so), nor would the absence have justified
the court dismissing for consideration the documents submitted as mitigating evidence.
The overall impression was that the court, despite what really happened, was intent on finding a guilty verdict,
but this was also part of a conspiracy with the police and CPS who had set out to falsely criminalise and defraud
me. Additional to those representations to the Magistrates court (13 February 2016) it has since been discovered
that the bundle I was handed by the usher minutes before the court hearing on 30 September 2015, contained
documents, which appearing by their nature, should have been served in a prescribed manner by the court, police
and/or CPS for which there was, I suspect a legal duty. That procedure would not have entailed passing papers to
the accused last minute which were material in the case and requiring acting on with no explanation as to their
importance.
A letter, apparently produced from a template used by the CPS was in among the papers I was handed by the
usher which contained what appeared largely irrelevant computer printouts compiled by the CPS. The letter
dated 22 September 2015 was discovered at around the same time (10 March 2016) I became aware of the
relevant Criminal Procedure Rules.
It is reasonable to assume that I should have been served this and other letters and because they concerned a
matter as serious as a criminal trial, I should have been alerted to any implications of not being legally
represented. The letters reference was as follows:
"LETTER TO DEFENCE WHERE THERE IS MATERIAL TO DISCLOSE (MAGISTRATES'
COURT)"
The opening paragraph suggested that if I was not aware of the letter I would be disadvantaged because the
material it referred to was considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution, as quoted below:
I am required to disclose to you any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed, and
which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution or of
assisting the accused's case.
The letter also set out the legal requirement for submitting a defence statement among other instructions. This
correspondence, though dated 22 September 2015 was in my possession only minutes before the 30 September
hearing, and in any event, because it was buried among irrelevant papers was not seen; that is until March 2016
when I furthered my investigations into the conspiracy I suspected.
The failure to explain and correctly serve these documents reinforces my assertion that the authorities were
complicit in disadvantaging me to the greatest extent possible as a means to succeed in falsely criminalising and
defrauding me.
A further denial of my rights was in evidence in respect of the sentencing hearing on 22 December. After two
people who I suspect falsely claimed they were the police hammered on my door and coerced me into attending
court, I was imprisoned and told while awaiting the hearing that I would have access to the duty solicitor. That
never happened and I was handcuffed and led to the courtroom to witness Grimsby Magistrates court, the CPS
and Deputy district judge Andrew Pascoe blatantly defraud me and impose falsely a criminal conviction.

3) Appeal against conviction: case management in the Crown Court.


Only answer these questions if you are appealing against conviction or a finding of guilt.

How long did the trial last in the magistrates court ?


I do not know what the trial refers to (there were three hearings in total). Though I have no experience of
criminal trials I expect that what occurred in relation to my case had no resemblance to a proper trial. In any
event I did not attend the hearing which was probably the trial hearing.
Which of the prosecution witnesses in the magistrates court do you want to ask questions if
they are witnesses again in the Crown Court ? Name them:
I have no wish to ask questions, rather I accuse both Arthur and Tammy Johnson of lying in their witness
statements and suspect that Police Constable Thomas Blake 1131 incited at least one of them to do so.
I fully expect in any event that at no cost to myself I am permitted independent legal representation and so that
person, if required can ask those witnesses questions.
How long do you expect the appeal to take in the Crown Court ?
My lack of experience in these matters precludes me from being able to make even the wildest guess.
4) Other applications. I am also applying for:
pending my appeal, the suspension of my disqualification e.g. from driving.
You can ONLY apply for the suspension of a disqualification imposed in this case.

pending my appeal, bail.


Give reasons for any application you are making:

I want my application(s) considered by

the magistrates court

the Crown Court

Each court can consider these applications. You can apply to both.

Signed2:

defendant

Date: 12 April 2016

2
If you use an electronic version of this form, you may instead authenticate it electronically (e.g. by sending it from an email address
recognisable to the recipient). See Criminal Procedure Rules, rule 5.3.

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
13 April 2016 18:18
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

13 April 2016
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

I note your comments on my review of Mr Oxley's decision, but have nothing further to say. If you
wish to challenge Mr Oxley's decision I suggest you seek legal advice before starting judicial review
proceedings.
Yours sincerely

Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader
0330 403 4725
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
13 April 2016 18:36
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Mr Hobley
Any further action taken over this won't be via the casino justice system, it will be a report to the fraud squad
for the 15 million annually the LGO thieves from the taxpayer.

Yours sincerely
.

07/08/2016

Grimsby Combined Courts Centre


and District Registry of the High
Court
Town Hall Square
Grimsby
N E Lincs
DN31 1HX
DX 702007 Grimsby 3

Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

Telephone: 01472 265200 ( County)


01472 265250 ( Crown)
Fax
: 01264 347995 (County)
01264 785006 (Family)
01264 785007 (Crown)
Minicom VII 0191 478 1476
Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing
www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk

Date: 15th April 2016

Our ref: App/oot


Your ref:

Dear Mr

Your application for leave to appeal out of time has been refused by His Honour Judge
Bury for the grounds below:
1. You deliberately absented yourself from trial.
2. No adequate reason has been put forward as to the appeal is almost 3 months
out of time.

Yours sincerely,

J Willerton
Grimsby Crown Court

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"HU-Grimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
18 April 2016 14:03
Mr
Letter 18 April 2016.doc
FW: Mr

Hi Mr
Please see attachment

Regards
Debbie

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

07/08/2016

Julie Collins
Courts & Tribunal Manager
Humber & South Yorkshire Area
A Watts
Clerk to the Justices
Grimsby Magistrates Court
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HN

Mr

,
Grimsby

T 01472 320444
Minicom VII not available
(Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing)
www.justice.gov.uk

Our ref: GT
18 April 2016

Dear Mr

As promised in my email sent to you last week I am writing to update you on your
application to start a prosecution in a Magistrates Court.
The decision has been made to list your application before a professional magistrate.
In accordance with section 1 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 the magistrate will
apply his mind to the information and go through the judicial exercise of deciding
whether or not a summons ought to be issued.
You should therefore attend in person at Grimsby Magistrates court on Tuesday, 26th
April 2016, at 9.30 in the morning in order to lay your information.
You should bring with you any evidence in your possession that an offence has been
committed under section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.
You will of course have the opportunity to address the magistrate personally and
answer any questions he may have.
On arrival at court please give your name to an usher or member of security staff who
will direct you to the appropriate court room.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

Page 1 of 1

From:
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<
@gmail.com>
<C.Upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
19 April 2016 20:22
Response to Ombudsmans draft decision.pdf
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15020295 N E Lincs

Dear Mr Upjohn
Please find attached my representations on the draft decision.

Yours sincerely
.

07/08/2016

Local Government Ombudsman


PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0EH

Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

19 April 2016

Ref: 15 020 295

Dear Mr Upjohn

Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council


I am writing in response to your letter of 11 April 2016 and wish to submit my representations on
your draft decision which is set out in Annex A of this letter.

Yours sincerely

Annex A

The Ombudsmans draft decision


Summary: The Ombudsman should not investigate this complaint that the Council allocated
council tax payments to the wrong account. The courts are better placed to deal with this matter.

Simply stating that the courts are better placed to deal with this indicates that insufficient
consideration has been given to the matter. The statement is unhelpful as no available court
process has been conveyed to advise of the remedy, nor is any explanation offered for why the
courts are better placed to deal with it.
The available court process in all probability has not been considered because if it had, the likely
conclusion would be that the only remedy would be via the High Court either by a claim for
judicial review or an appeal by way of a case stated. Clearly with all that that entails it would not
be reasonable to expect that such litigation was resorted to.
In that regard, the Ombudsman has discretion as a number of reports acknowledge; for example,
paragraph 4 of LGO ref: 14 009 989:
The law says the Ombudsman cannot normally investigate a complaint when someone
could take the matter to court. However, she may decide to investigate if she considers it
would be unreasonable to expect the person to go to court. (Local Government Act 1974,
section 26(6)(c).
The concluding sentence of sub-section 6 of section 26 of the Local Government Act 1974 states
as follows:
Provided that a Local Commissioner may conduct an investigation notwithstanding the
existence of such a right or remedy if satisfied that in the particular circumstances it is
not reasonable to expect the person aggrieved to resort or have resorted to it.
Additionally, LGO Guidance on jurisdiction (commencement of proceedings) introduces the
idea that court proceedings may be the injustice as opposed to the fault, particularly concerning
cases where, had no fault occurred, court proceedings could have been avoided. The relevant
paragraph is as follows:

The exclusion of court proceedings from the Ombudsmans jurisdiction was intended to
prevent us considering those matters decided by the courts using different evidential
standards, and applying the more restrictive test of legality as opposed to
maladministration. But there is no prohibition of an investigation about whether, had
fault not occurred, court proceedings could have been avoided. This is because, in such
cases the court proceedings are the injustice as opposed to the fault. We have in the past
criticised councils for taking bankruptcy proceedings where even though the
application was successful we did not feel it was a proportionate response to
enforcement of a debt, given the prohibitive nature of the costs involved for the person
being made bankrupt. We have also found fault with councils obtaining Liability Orders
from the courts for unpaid Council Tax where they should not have done so.
The relevant fact sheet (Council Tax) on the LGO website under heading ...what will the
Ombudsman look for?, mainly covers aspects pertinent to this complaint. Those under that
heading which are relevant, are quoted as follows:
We consider whether the council has done something wrong in the way it went about
dealing with your council tax account which has caused you problems. Some issues we can
look at are if the council:
.........

failed to act on information you provided (especially where this affects your liability
for council tax or your entitlement to discounts or exemptions)

delayed in dealing with disputes

made mistakes in dealing with your payments (such as failing to credit them to your
account, allocating them to the wrong account, or failing to pay in council tax support
you have been awarded)

continued to take recovery action against you when it shouldnt (such as when you
have already paid off the debt, or you are keeping to an agreed arrangement to pay
the debt)

.........

The complaint
1. The complainant, who I refer to here as Mr B, has complained the Council has allocated
council tax payments to the wrong account.

The Ombudsmans role and powers

2. The Ombudsman provides a free service, but must use public money carefully. She may decide
not to start or continue with an investigation if, for example, she believes another body is better
placed to deal with the matter. (Local Government Act 1974, section 24A(6)).

As almost all council decisions can be challenged in the courts, this reasoning could be
viewed as an abuse of the Ombudsmans discretionary powers given that it may be applied
in almost every case where, for example, the investigator is under pressure to filter out
complaints. With regards the use of public money, the fact that as a taxpayer I have
contributed to funding the service makes a greater argument that the injustice I have been
caused is investigated and should not have to resort to alternative costly remedies. LGO
Guidance on Jurisdiction states with relevance to this point as follows:
Almost any decision by a public body is actionable in the courts. As we are publicly
funded to decide complaints of maladministration causing injustice, we should not be
unduly prescriptive in relying on the availability of alternative remedies. Unlike
many alternative remedies, the LGO is free to use, does not normally require expert
representation, and we do not impose costs on those whose cases we do not uphold.
Having been alerted to council officers who are using their public office as a means to carry
out personal vendettas, if the organisation were in these circumstances to exercise discretion
not to investigate there must be factored into that decision what risk it would pose as to the
organisations reputation.

How I considered this complaint


3. I have considered what Mr B said in his complaint.

One important aspect of the complaint apparently overlooked is the Council flatly refusing to
address the grievance (except the delay) with the justification being that it raised matters
about a Liability Order and so was outside the scope of the complaints process. This is
wholly inexcusable because regardless of the courts decision, the council is entitled to apply

to the same court which granted the order to have it quashed if it came to light afterwards
that the application should not have been made. The Council is exploiting the court granting
the order to circumvent scrutiny, when fully aware that it was seriously at fault in its actions.

What I found
4. Mr B says he made payments to his council tax account for 2015/16 but the Council allocated
these to the account for an earlier year. He says the Council did not follow the law when doing
this.

This over simplifies as well as misrepresents the complaint and is what I had predicted the
Council would rely on to get away with being exposed for what is essentially gross error.
Presumably the Effective Complaint Handling courses offered at a fee by the LGO to local
authorities include content informing them how best to produce their responses so on being
considered, the Ombudsman will have material to which may be referred in order to reject
the complaint based upon it being outside her jurisdiction.
LGO Guidance suggests that an investigator with delegated authority to make decisions
would be required to identify aspects of complaint which are separable from points on law,
and those that can, be will be within jurisdiction. So, to give just two examples where the
matters can be positively separated from questions of law are:i)

The balance to which monies were misallocated by the council was suspended
from enforcement, therefore it was maladministration that has caused the injustice

ii)

Councils 6 week delay in responding to correspondence was to my detriment, as


this enabled the council to misallocate further monies during that period, and even
though admitting its error, has refused to allocate it to the account I requested.

Moreover, it is evident from a report on an investigation into Newham BC (ref 08 019 113)
that the ombudsman retains jurisdiction to investigate administrative actions prior to the
issue of court proceedings. This ties in with the Guidance where it deals with the
aforementioned commencement of proceedings and the claim made that the LGO has
found fault with councils obtaining Liability Orders from the courts for unpaid Council Tax
where they should not have done. Furthermore, listed among the matters that are IN

jurisdiction under the same heading is the process leading up to the councils decision to
commence proceedings.

5. Because the Council believed Mr B had not made the required payments for 2015/16, it applied
to the magistrates court for a liability order.

The Council was fully aware that the balance to which monies were misallocated was
suspended from enforcement by the simple fact that the appeal to which the sum related had
not been determined. The council had written in this matter to the effect that until there was
an outcome to the proceedings the sum was suspended.

Draft decision

6. Mr B believes the Councils actions are wrong in law. The Ombudsman cannot decide the law,
only the courts can do that. My current view is that Mr B could have put any arguments about
the Councils actions to the magistrates court which was better placed to deal with this matter.
For this reason, the Ombudsman should not investigate this complaint.

The complaint partly surrounded the Councils unlawful actions and evidence of that was
supported in my representations. However, what matters as far as the Ombudsman is
concerned is the part of the complaint that is attributable to maladministration which even
considered alone effectively accounts for the entire injustice. An investigation into the
Councils unlawful actions would clearly be beneficial, but one into the maladministration in
its own right would be capable of providing the remedy sought. To reiterate an earlier point,
matters can be positively separated from questions of law, which is endorsed in R v Local
Commissioner etc [2000] EWCA) Civ 54 where at paragraph 47 of that judgment it states, so
far as is relevant, the following:
The Commissioner's power is to investigate and report on maladministration; not to
determine whether conduct has been unlawful. So there is no reason why, when
exercising the power to investigate and report, (which has been conferred on him by
the 1974 Act) he should, necessarily, be constrained by the legal principles which
would be applicable if he were carrying out the different task (for which he has no
mandate) of determining whether conduct has been unlawful.

The fact sheet referred to earlier but under heading what happens if the Ombudsman finds
that the council was at fault?, could in almost every sense be applicable to this complaint:
We cannot decide whether you are liable to pay council tax or whether you are entitled
to exemptions or discounts. But, if we find that something has gone wrong in the way the
council dealt with your council tax account we can ask it to:

take action to put the matter right, such as correcting mistakes on council tax
records and issuing the right bills and demands

ensure that payments you have made or council tax support awards are properly
paid into your account

deal with your correspondence or appeal

withdraw a summons or bailiffs and waive costs where appropriate, or

pay compensation. Whether we ask for compensation and the amount we


recommend will depend on how you have been affected by what has gone wrong.
For example if you have received any unnecessary summonses, liability orders or
bailiffs visits because of the councils errors.

Where we find fault with the councils procedures we will often recommend that the
council makes changes so the same problem does not occur again in the future.
Examples of some complaints we have considered
Ms Y set up a standing order to pay her council tax. There was no council tax
reference number on the standing order form so the council did not allocate her
payments to her account. The council knew about the mistake, and Ms Y provided
proof of payment several times. However, it took the council six years to resolve the
problem. Meantime the council continued to take legal action against her for money
she did not owe. The Ombudsman asked the council to pay Ms Y 1,800 for the
many summonses, liability orders and bailiffs' letters she had received and for her
efforts in pursuing her complaint over a long period. The council also agreed to make
changes to its process for dealing with missing payments

Investigators draft decision on behalf of the Ombudsman.

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<C.Upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
20 April 2016 13:36
16 04 20 to Mr
with decision.pdf; 16 04 20 decision.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15020295 NE Lincs

20 April 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 020 295
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

Please find attached a letter about this complaint.

Yours sincerely

Chris Upjohn
Investigator, Assessment Team
0330 403 4676
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

07/08/2016

Local Government

OMBUDSMAN
20 April 2016
BY EMAIL ONLY

Mr
GRIMSBY

Our ref:

15 020 295

(Please quote our reference when contacting us and, if using email, put the number in the email subject header)

Contact Chris Upjohn on 0330 403 4676 or by email to c.upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk

Dear Mr
Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council
Thank you for your comments on my draft decision. I have considered what you said but I have
decided we will not consider your complaint further.
Thank you, in any case, for bringing your concerns to our attention. The Local Government Act
1974 requires the Ombudsman to tell the Council of the decision on your complaint and so I have
sent a copy of the statement to the Chief Executive.
We normally destroy our record of your complaint details 12 months after the date of our decision,
except for the decision letter and statement of reasons which we will destroy after five years.
Customer Satisfaction Survey
You may receive a further letter from the LGO in the coming weeks inviting you to complete a short
questionnaire telling us about your experience of the LGOs service. I hope that you choose to take
part in the survey and contribute your views to the research.
Yours sincerely

Chris Upjohn
Investigator, Assessment Team

PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0E1

www.lgo.org.uk
0300 061 0614

20 April 2016
Complaint reference:
15 020 295
Complaint against:
North East Lincolnshire Council

The Ombudsmans final decision


Summary: The Ombudsman will not investigate this complaint that the
Council allocated council tax payments to the wrong account. The
courts are better placed to deal with this matter.

The complaint
1.

The complainant, who I refer to here as Mr B, has complained the Council has
allocated council tax payments to the wrong account.

The Ombudsmans role and powers


2.

The Ombudsman provides a free service, but must use public money carefully.
She may decide not to start or continue with an investigation if, for example, she
believes another body is better placed to deal with the matter. (Local Government Act
1974, section 24A(6))

How I considered this complaint


3.

I have considered what Mr B said in his complaint. Mr B also commented on a


draft before I made this decision.

What I found
4.

5.

Mr B says he made payments to his council tax account for 2015/16 but the
Council allocated these to the account for an earlier year. He says the Council did
not follow the law when doing this.
Because the Council believed Mr B had not made the required payments for
2015/16, it applied to the magistrates court for a liability order.

Final decision
6.

Mr B believes the Councils actions are wrong in law. The Ombudsman cannot
decide the law, only the courts can do that. Mr B could have put any arguments
about the Councils actions to the magistrates court which was better placed to
deal with this matter. For this reason, the Ombudsman will not investigate this
complaint.
Investigators decision on behalf of the Ombudsman

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<C.Upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
20 April 2016 14:08
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15020295 N E Lincs

Dear Mr Upjohn
Please have this independently reviewed.

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<C.Upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
20 April 2016 14:45
Review request form.pdf
Confidential: Case ID - 15020295

20 April 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 020 295
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

I attach a review request form.

Yours sincerely

Chris Upjohn
Investigator, Assessment Team
0330 403 4676
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<C.Upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
20 April 2016 14:54
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15020295

I didn't need a form to review a recent charade. Are you just being awkward?

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<C.Upjohn@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
20 April 2016 15:14
Confidential: Case ID - 15020295

20 April 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 020 295
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

This is a new procedure introduced from 18 April 2016.

Yours sincerely

Chris Upjohn
Investigator, Assessment Team
0330 403 4676
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 2

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<peter.hanmer@nelincs.gov.uk>
<Tony.Maione@Nelincs.gov.uk>; <rob.walsh@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Res - Customer Services" <ResCustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>
21 April 2016 13:00
7 Nov 2015 - ocj-complaint-0913.pdf; Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf; Section 1
Magistrates court complaint - draft.pdf
False statement to defraud through council tax liability application

Dear Mr Hanmer

False statement to defraud through council tax liability application


North East Lincolnshire Council is already aware through being alerted in a formal complaint regarding one of
it's employees (Court Enforcement officer) committing a fraud offence against me.
In brief, the council made an application to Grimsby Magistrates' court to obtain a Council Tax liability order
relating to Council Tax (2015/16). Payments were made in sufficient amount to meet the legal obligation to
pay the sums set out on the demand notice and so my account was never in arrears.
The Council engineered a 'non-payment' scenario, by allocating monies to a disputed sum which related to a
previous year's account that was under appeal to the High Court. That sum was suspended pending the
court's decision which has yet to be concluded. The council allocate monies to the wrong account
attributing that decision to believing that the sum was no longer being disputed because the appeal had been
withdrawn. I have evidence to support that this claim (included in the witness statement) was untrue, not on
account of it never being withdrawn (though it hasn't), but specifically because it is beyond all reasonable
doubt that the council knew it had not been withdrawn. The council officer had therefore wilfully made a
statement material in the proceeding, which he knew was not true.
The Corporate Feedback procedure was evidently not the appropriate avenue to have the criminal element of
my complaint dealt with as the Council flatly refused to address it, asserting that the concerns raised fell
outside the scope of the complaints process. The Chief Executive, Rob Walsh must be ultimately responsible
as he is aware of the criminal allegations and has not, to my knowledge, acted on them. The letter
accompanying the final response to the complaint signed by the Chief Executive contained the following
statement (Ref: NEL/1172/1516):
"The enclosed investigating officer's report details the findings of this investigation which I consider has
been correctly and fairly carried out in accordance with the Council's Feedback Policy."
I have since made enquiries into the Councils policy on fraud and now aware of the approach it takes in
dealing with these matters. I have accessed the relevant documents, whistleblowing policy, anti fraud
framework and the fraud response plan etc. Given that my complaint alleged fraud and the council refused to
address it, details should have been referred to the Audit, Risk, Insurance and Corporate Fraud team
immediately in accordance with the 'Fraud Response Plan' (see relevant para below):
"Complaints officers should consider all allegations of irregularity that may be included in a complaint or
comment and refer all cases to the Audit, Risk, Insurance and Corporate Fraud team immediately on
receipt. Allegations of this nature should be treated through this policy rather than the corporate
complaints procedure as the timetable for investigating and reporting on complaints does not apply to
complaints of financial misconduct."
I assume the policy was not adhered to as I've not been notified of commencement of an investigation or
whether the matter has been referred to the police. However, I suspect the council has not informed the police
as my own contact with the force has led to no evidence that that is the case.
Though it is unlikely any action has been taken concerning this matter, I would like informing of what steps the
council has taken, if in fact I have assumed wrongly.
In any event, please take this email as an instruction for an investigation to be carried out in accordance with
the council's whistleblowing policy. For your information I have instituted proceedings pursuant to s.1 of the

30/07/2016

Page 2 of 2

Magistrates' courts Act 1980 in this matter and a hearing is set for 29 April 2016 for the evidence to be
considered by the court.
In addition, please find attached documents (listed below) which when accompanied by the council's witness
statement and exhibit documents, re 30 October 2015 court hearing, will be all the evidence required. In
accordance with the council's Fraud Response Plan I would expect, subject to legal constraints, that I'm
informed about how the matter is being addressed.
Attached Documents
1. Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15
2. 7 Nov 2015 ocj-complaint-0913 (See from heading Annex A to C)
3. Section 1 Magistrates court complaint - draft
Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"HU-Grimsbymclist" <hu-grimsbymclist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
21 April 2016 17:20
Re: Mr

Dear Mr Townell
Thank you for your letter concerning my application to start a prosecution.
Regarding the hearing and the date set to lay the information, my
understanding was that an information was laid as soon as it is received in
the clerk's office, which was in effect 8 March 2016. In any event, it is
likely, given the absence of a level playing field that as a member of the
public, up against a body having access to public money for legal
representation, the chances of a successful outcome would be zero, no matter
how concrete the evidence.
I have taken the step of laying an information as a last resort, since being
met with a lack of will on the part of public bodies funded by the taxpayer
to deal with matters like this on their behalf. It has been an essential
move to get this serious matter of fraud and corruption out in the open and
hopefully taken seriously. However, the time, stress and expense in doing
this has gone far beyond what a member of the public should reasonably be
expected to commit in subsidising the services that our taxes fund.
Of course, to carry on any further with this by myself would be completely
insane as the potential financial loss would be far beyond my means and
would in all probability result in the loss of my home, and it is therefore
suggested alternatively that all evidence I hold is made available and the
case referred to the Crown Prosecution Service. This looks to be a realistic
proposal because, for example, a justices' clerk may refer a private
prosecution to the CPS under s.7(4) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
On another point related to this matter it may be relevant to inform you
that I have contacted North East Lincolnshire Council today after looking
into how matters of fraud should be dealt with and it appears that this
matter has not been dealt with in accordance with its own policies. Of
course it is too early in the day to know whether the council will act on my
instructions to carry out an investigation into fraud and corruption in
accordance with it's whistleblowing policy, but this has to be a potential
remedy.

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
22 April 2016 13:55
Mr
Letter 22 April 2016.doc
Mr
Letter 22 April 2016.doc

Please find attachment


Debbie

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

30/07/2016

Julie Collins
Courts & Tribunal Manager
Humber & South Yorkshire Area
A Watts
Clerk to the Justices
Grimsby Magistrates Court
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HN

Mr

,
Grimsby

T 01472 320444
Minicom VII not available
(Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing)
www.justice.gov.uk

Our ref: GT
22 April 2016

Dear Mr

Thank you for latest email.


As section 1 (1) of the Magistrates Court Act 1980 states, on an information being laid,
a justice of the peace may issue a summons directing the person suspected of having
committed an offence to appear before a magistrates court.
In the case of an information being laid by a private individual it is normal for that
individual to appear before a justice in person to put forward his argument for why a
summons should be issued.
If after hearing from you and considering your application the justice feels that a
summons should not be issued then he will give you his reasons for that decision.
If the justice decides to issue a summons then a hearing date will be set for the person
named in the summons to attend court.
If you fail to attend court on Tuesday the magistrate may decide in your absence that a
summons should not be issued and the matter will go no further.
I should be obliged if you would let me know if you will be attending on Tuesday.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
25 April 2016 08:35
Re: Mr
Letter 22 April 2016.doc

Dear Mr Townell
Your email (22 April) for some reason went into my spam folder and wasn't seen until too late to reply on Friday.
I have however over the weekend been putting together a statement of evidence and collated relevant items
of correspondence/statements. In light of this evidence, I don't see how if it is considered that any other
conclusion could be arrived at than my allegations are true.
I hope to have all this complete late this morning and serve the documents by email.
I will not be attending tomorrow but I firmly believe the evidence speaks for itself

Yours sincerely

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
25 April 2016 13:16
Exhibit 6.pdf; Statement of evidence.pdf; Exhibit 1.pdf; Exhibit 2.pdf; Exhibit 3.pdf; Exhibit 4.pdf;
Exhibit 5.pdf
Re: Mr
Letter 22 April 2016.doc

Dear Mr Townell
There are 22 documents in total that require transferring regarding the information laid on 8 March 2016.
In order to avoid any technical problems I will attach them in a number of emails.

Files are as follows:


Exhibit 1 to 21 (pdf)
Statement of evidence.pdf

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES

Application to start a prosecution


(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)

MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940)

Listed: 26 April 2016

Prosecution
v
Humberside Police
Defendant

STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE

LIST OF EXHIBITS
No

DATE

DESCRIPTION

FILE

8 March 2016 Magistrates Courts Act, s 1 (Information)

Exhibit 1

12 Nov 2015

Email from Humb Police

Exhibit 2

12 Nov 2015

Email to Humb Police

Exhibit 3

13 Nov 2015

Email from Humb Police

Exhibit 4

2 Dec 2015

Evidence supporting allegations

Exhibit 5

8 Dec 2015

Humb Police confirming recording of complaint

Exhibit 6

13 Jan 2016

Humb Police outcome of complaint

Exhibit 7

25 Jan 2016

Appeal against outcome of complaint

Exhibit 8

19 July 2013

10

October 2015 Councils Witness Statement

11

Nov 2013

12

October 2015 Councils Exhibit (NELC12)

13

20 Nov 2013

Original letter to Administrative Court

Exhibit 13

14

25 Nov 2013

Original letter from Administrative Court

Exhibit 14

15

15 Jan 2014

Email Read Receipt from Council

Exhibit 15

16

14 Feb 2014

Email Read Receipt from Council

Exhibit 16

17

23 April 2014 Email Read Receipt from Council

Exhibit 17

18

10 Jan 2014

Letter to the Justices Clerk (query delivery of case)

Exhibit 18

19

13 Feb 2014

Letter to the Justices Clerk (query delivery of case)

Exhibit 19

20

22 April 2014 Letter to the Justices Clerk (requesting certificate)

21

1.

Costs suspended until outcome of proceedings

Screen shots of internet forum posts

S 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015

Exhibit 9
Exhibit 10
Exhibit 11
Exhibit 12

Exhibit 20
Exhibit 21

This statement and the above listed provides evidence to support the information laid on
8.3.16 [Exhibit 1].

2.

On 12.11.15, Humberside Police (HP) responded by stating that a reported crime (one
punishable as an offence whether occurring in criminal or civil proceedings), was a civil
matter [Exhibit 2].

3.

An email expressing dissatisfaction with HPs response was sent 12.11.15 stating that a
complaint would be submitted about whoever within the force made the decision. A
request was made for the matter to be escalated for the attention of the Chief Constable
so dissatisfaction of a subsequent decision would be subject to external scrutiny rather
than the force investigating itself. [Exhibit 3].

4.

HP made contact on 13.11.15, advising that all evidence should be collated to support
the allegations [Exhibit 4]. HP confirmed in a letter dated 23.11.15 that the Professional
Standards Branch was in receipt of the complaint. The advice was acted on regarding
the evidence and a statement produce dated 2.12.15 [Exhibit 5]. A number of
supporting documents were indexed but withheld awaiting assurance that they would be
considered but the documents were never asked for.

5.

A letter dated 8.12.15 from HP confirmed that the matter had been formally recorded
(CO 461/15) and enclose a copy of the complainant report [Exhibit 6]. The letter
(outcome) in relation to the complaint was sent on 13.1.16 [Exhibit 7] stating that
unless a request comes from the court, HP do not investigate allegations of perjury and
was a matter to be argued with the court.

6.

On 15.1.16 Grimsby Magistrates court was forwarded HPs outcome letter and asked if
it would confirm that the North East Lincolnshire Council (the Council) had in fact
produced a false witness statement and inform HP (the court had been forwarded the
statement [Exhibit 5] on 11.12.15). The court replied in this matter on 26.1.16 stating
that it would not be taking any action regarding the allegations of perjury.

7.

An appeal against the outcome of local resolution was submitted on 25.1.16 [Exhibit 8]
but to date there has been no update in relation to any progress made.

Exhibits supporting false statement


8.

In summary, the council applied to the Magistrates' court to obtain a Council Tax
liability order relating to the 2015/16 tax year. Payments were made in sufficient
amount to meet the legal obligation to pay the sums set out on the demand notice and so
the account was never in arrears.

9.

The Council engineered a 'non-payment' scenario, by allocating monies to a disputed


sum which related to a previous year's account that was under appeal to the High Court.
That sum was suspended [Exhibit 9] pending the court's decision which has yet to be
concluded. The Council allocate monies to the wrong account attributing that decision
to believing that the sum was no longer disputed because the appeal had been withdrawn
(paras 69 & 73 of the Councils Witness Statement submitted for Council Tax liability
hearing 30.10.15 [Exhibit 10]).

10.

Evidence held supports that this claim was untrue, not on account of the appeal never
being withdrawn (though it hasn't), but specifically because it is beyond all reasonable
doubt that the council knew it had not been withdrawn. The Council posted monies to
the suspended account on the premise that it believed the appeal had been withdrawn
and therefore did so fraudulently.

11.

It is beyond reasonable doubt that two internet forum posts [Exhibit 11] were the source
of one of the Councils exhibits (NELC12) referred to in its Witness Statement for
Council Tax liability hearing 30.10.15 [Exhibit 12]. These were two letters on which
the Council sought to rely in justifying having no further reason to believe that the
costs were being disputed because the application for the Judicial review of the costs'
had been withdrawn.

12.

The original letters one dated 20.11.13 [Exhibit 13] was in response to the
Administrative Court's recommendation to withdraw the judicial review claim as the
process had prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case and deemed there no
longer a need for further action on their part as the process of stating a case was
underway.
Note: The judicial review claim, which was a separate matter from the application to
state a case for an appeal challenging the costs, was merely the vehicle used to get the
Magistrates' court to comply with the procedure. The judicial review claim therefore
was for a mandatory order, not a 'review of the costs' and so the case stated appeal
challenging the summons costs had not been withdrawn.
The other letter dated 25.11.13 [Exhibit 14] was the Administrative Court's response to
confirm that the letter to withdraw had been accepted and the Court file closed.

13.

The letters contained in the Councils submission had been redacted and matched the
entries that were posted on the public forum. The forum is the only place from which
those letters could be sourced in that form. The characteristics (redaction, formatting
etc.) of the letters which the Council submitted to the court were identical to the forum
posts [Exhibit 10].

14.

The Council had for some reason not sought the original letters and made use of the
website where every correspondence connected with the matter (albeit redacted) could
be conveniently accessed. It is likely that if the Council had made use of the forum to

produce its submission, it would have been informed from the regular updates posted
that the case stated appeal was still being pursued. Even if the forum was not regularly
viewed it was enough that it did once to source content to be certain that it knowingly
made a false statement. The crux of the matter is that one of the posts from which the
content was sourced [Exhibit 11] (though omitted) had the following commentary
accompanying it which reinforced the matter in itself:
Back almost to square one.
Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely
successful in mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the
draft), it would never have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the
terms of a recognizance at the hearing. It took this process to prompt a response
from the Justices at Grimsby Magistrates' Court.
The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates' Court to
agree terms of a recognizance.

Receipt of correspondence acknowledged after judicial review claim withdrawn


15.

The Council had acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read
receipts' returned on 15 January [Exhibit 15], 14 February [Exhibit 16] and 23 April
2014 [Exhibit 17] in respect of letters dated 10 January [Exhibit 18], 13 February
[Exhibit 19] and 22 April 2014 [Exhibit 20]. Those letters, which were copies of
correspondence sent to the Justices' Clerk concerned matters that left no doubt that the
high court appeal was still being pursued, and sent after the judicial review claim for
mandatory order was withdrawn.

16.

The appropriation of monies was supported by the Council on the basis that it believed
the appeal had been withdrawn, and on that basis alone. The council officer had
therefore wilfully made a statement material in the proceeding, which he knew was
untrue. As a consequence the Council now has a court order enabling it to enforce a
fraudulently obtained sum, which is likely to accumulate because of additional costs
which will over time to be sufficient in amount so the council will claim justification in
taking measures such as bankruptcy, charging order or applying for a custodial sentence.

Improper exercise of police powers and privileges


17.

HPs decision not to act, especially in light of the indisputable evidence must amount to
improperly exercising police powers under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 [Exhibit 21] as clearly the failure to exercise a
power is to the detriment of another person.

18.

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated this 25th day of April 2016

Signed:

Exhibits 1 21
Omitted
Request complete paper

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
25 April 2016 15:02
Mr
Letter 25 April 2016.doc

Hi Mr
Please see letter below
Regards
Debbie
Julie Collins
Courts & Tribunal Manager
Humber & South Yorkshire Area
A Watts
Clerk to the Justices
Grimsby Magistrates Court
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HN

Mr N
,
Grimsby

,
,

T 01472 320444
Minicom VII not available
(Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing)
www.justice.gov.uk

Our ref: GT
25 April 2016

Dear Mr

Thank you for latest emails and for informing me that you will not be attending court tomorrow.
I will ensure that the magistrate is provided with all the documentation you have sent in today.
I will notify you of the outcome.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
28 April 2016 10:01
Mr
Letter 28 April 2016.doc; Mr

.doc

Hi Mr
Please find attachment

Regards
Debbie

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

30/07/2016

Julie Collins
Courts & Tribunal Manager
Humber & South Yorkshire Area
A Watts
Clerk to the Justices
Grimsby Magistrates Court
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HN

Mr

,
Grimsby

T 01472 320444
Minicom VII not available
(Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing)
www.justice.gov.uk

Our ref: GT
28 April 2016

Dear Mr

I write to inform you that your application to commence criminal proceedings was
considered by Deputy District Judge Hayles on Tuesday 26 April 2016.
Having considered all your documentation the Judge refused to issue a summons.
I have attached a copy of his reasons for your information.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

Mr
Application by an individual to commence criminal proceedings by
issue of summons.
This is an application by
to lay an information for the issue of a summons
alleging an offence under section 26. Criminal Justice & Courts Act 2015 against
Gillian Morley of the Humberside Police.
1). Mr
has been invited to attend Grimsby Magistrates Court for an ex
parte private hearing and has declined the invitation.
2). I have read statements of evidence by Mr
dated 2nd December 2015
th
and 25 April 2016, together with those exhibits which were sent to the Clerk to the
Justices.
3). I find that Mr
is aggrieved at a decision of the Grimsby Magistrates
Court in October 2015 making or confirming a liability order in respect of allegedly
unpaid council tax. He complains that the order was achieved because a Local
Authority officer gave perjured evidence. He is aggrieved as well that the District
Judge (Magistrates Court) hearing and making the liability order was complicit in the
perjury and thus himself was guilty of perverting the course of justice.
4). I am told that no appeal has been lodged.
5). Mr
invited the Police to investigate the alleged perjury. The Police
declined to. On 11th November 2015 Gillian Morley informed Mr
that the
matter did not concern the police as it was a civil matter.
6). Mr
complained that the decision of the Police not to investigate was an
improper exercise of a power in accordance with section 26 of Criminal Justice &
Courts Act 2015, and that that failure to investigate triggers his current application.
7). Mr

has made a complaint to the Police. That has been rejected and Mr
is aggrieved by that.

8). I have referred myself to Stones Justices manual; and to R v West London
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Khan (1979) and in particular to the
explanation to the approach to issuing a summons by Lord Widgery C.J.
9). I have a discretion whether or not to issue a summons. I do not issue a summon
because the application is vexatious
(a) Mr
seeks to proceed on an offence that is not designed for this
type of circumstance. Further the application overlooks the reasonable person
test in sections 26(4)(b) and 26 (5)(c).
(b) His grievance is really about the October 2015 order and the evidence of
the Local Authority.
(c) He has had the opportunity to appeal the October 2015 decision but he
has chosen not to.
(d) He appears to be using this application as a collateral attack to (b) above.
N P Hayles

Deputy District Judge (MC)


26/04/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<H.Pook@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
03 May 2016 16:04
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673 - FOI requests

03 May 2016
Your ref:
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr
With reference to the two Freedom of Information requests you have made, when I pointed out that
we could not deal with your requests as FOI requests because all parties to an Ombudsman
investigation are required by law to keep the investigation private - this applies to the complainant
as well. Please do not publish correspondence between us - any such publication is a breach of the
Local Government Act 1974.
If you have concerns about your complaints to us you should contact the investigator, although I
note that the decision on this case has already been reviewed (by the Assessment Team Leader)
and you have been advised that if you remain unhappy your only recourse is to seek judicial review.
The Ombudsman (Dr Jane Martin) has not been directly involved in this case. The Assessment
Team leader is the most senior person to be involved.

Yours sincerely

Hilary Pook
Information and Records Manager
0330 403 4734
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<H.Pook@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
03 May 2016 17:12
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673 - FOI requests

Dear Ms Pook
I would like you to refer both matters to the Ombudsman (Dr Jane Martin) so I'm able to name her personally
when I report to the police that the taxpayer funding of the LGO is being fraudulently obtained.
Yours sincerely
.

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
03 May 2016 22:03
Appeal_form_-_LR.pdf; Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
Fw: Appeal against outcome of local resolution - Ref: CO 461/15

Dear Sir/Madam
Is there any information/update regarding the progress of this matter?
Some information I have discovered on the Crown Prosecution Service's website states that the police do not
have to be instructed by the court to investigate perjury, which is what Humberside police claims to be its policy,
see below:
"I understand that this matter has been heard in a court of law. The advice I have obtained is that the
issues you raise may be appeal points that could be raised at any subsequent appeal hearings.
Humberside Police do not investigate allegations of perjury unless a request to do so comes from the
court themselves."

Crown Prosecution Service's website


http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/judicial_comments/#o
Cases Involving Allegations of Perjury
"Where a judge or magistrate believes that some evidence adduced at trial is perjured s/he can
recommend that there should be a police investigation.
The absence of such recommendation does not mean that there is no justification for an investigation."
Also, the police force is making spurious statements because the matter is criminal and not something you can
appeal to another judge in civil proceedings.
I trust the above will be considered in the appeal.
Your sincerely

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
05 May 2016 13:14
Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

05 May 2016
Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

Ms Pook has asked me to reply your email asking this be refered to Dr Martin. Dr Martin, has
delegated her authority to decide complaints to her staff. There is provision for a senior office to
review decisions on cases, but there is no provision for a further review or for the Ombudsman
herself to reply to correspondence about decisions we have already made. I should add the
Ombudsman is not accountable to a government minister for the decisions she and her staff make
on complaints.
Mr Oxley's decision has been confirmed by my review. The only way to challenge an Ombudsman
decision is through the courts by judicial review, not by continuing to write to the Ombudsmans
office. I strongly advise you to take legal advice before statinga judicial review of our decision.
We shall read any further correspondence but we shall not acknowledge or reply to it unless we
decide it contains genuinely new information which affects the decision we have made on the case.
Yours sincerely

Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader
0330 403 4725
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
06 May 2016 16:09
applying-for-judicial-review.pdf; Mr
Letter 06 May 2016.doc

Hi Mr
Please find attachment

Regards
Debbie

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court

30/07/2016

Julie Collins
Courts & Tribunal Manager
Humber & South Yorkshire Area
A Watts
Clerk to the Justices
Grimsby Magistrates Court
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HN

Mr

,
Grimsby

T 01472 320444
Minicom VII not available
(Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing)
www.justice.gov.uk

Our ref: GT
06 May 2016

Dear Mr

I write in respect of your recent email to the Data Access & Compliance Unit under the
name fFaudwAtch UK.
The matter has been passed to me as this is not a Freedom of Information case.
There is no information to impart as you have already been sent the reasons for the
decision made by Deputy District Judge Hayles on 26 April 2016.
If you are aggrieved by the decision not to issue a summons you can apply for judicial
review of that decision.
You may wish to take independent legal advice before taking such a course of action.
I have sent you an attached guide which sets out the different stages in the procedure,
along with information on fees and costs.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

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<
@gmail.com>
"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
09 May 2016 17:57
Re: Mr
letter 12 April 2016.doc

Dear Mr Townell
Now I have made reasonable attempts to pursue an appeal to the Crown court as you recommended without
success, I am now able to resume my attempts to get answers regarding the criminal way the court, police,
CPS and judges have dealt with this matter.
I will add to those already accused of criminal offences the Circuit Judge Mark Bury who appears as biased as
district judge Daniel Curtis and deputy district judge Andrew Pascoe. Regarding North East Lincolnshire
Council's court enforcement manager committing perjury to defraud me, Deputy District Judge Nicholas
Hayles would seem to be equally biased due to his determination, considering he was in possession of
conclusive evidence. The opinion I hold of judges, from my experience of them, is that they are all biased.
However, it might just be those judges who I have found to be biased have been influenced by Alison Watts,
Clerk to the Justices of Humber & South Yorkshire, who I have evidence of being unfit for public office.
You appear to be in complete denial about how criminally I view the way Grimsby Magistrates' court
operates. I would have hoped that was expressed clearly enough before the trial, which accounted for why I
was not prepared to stand before that same judge who I'd complained about just before the hearing to the
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office and reported the matter of complaint as a crime to the police.
Your defence of the proceedings does not take into account my representations. The witnesses lied in their
statements and it would appear that Humberside police incited them to produce false statements, yet you
imply that it was reasonable to expect that I incur the cost of appointing a solicitor as a consequence of the
corrupt police force.
It is then implied that mitigating evidence, submitted in writing is not admissible, perhaps because it would be
less easy for the judge to manipulate the minds of attendees by justifying to them his preferred guilty verdict
which the concealment of those representations enables. Had the judge properly considered the evidence,
particularly the obviously inconsistent witness statements, that should have alerted him to the conviction
being unsafe and that the prosecution were unable to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no reason why the Magistrates' court, now that an appeal to the Crown court has been made and
refused, can not overturn the decision under s142 of the Magistrates' courts Act 1980. Considering all the
evidence the court now holds as to the conviction being unsafe, it can only be concluded that a refusal to
overturn the conviction would be on account of the embarrassment it would cause the court if it were to do so.
Victim surcharge
I would like more information about the victim surcharge which I have stated was NOT an amount ordered by
the judge at the court hearing on 22 December 2015. You have stated that the Court Associate who was
sitting with the judge confirmed that he did announce the victim surcharge as she specifically remembered me
asking what it meant. I would like providing the name of the Court Associate and for her to make a written
statement of truth that the order was made verbally at the hearing and I did in fact ask what the victim
surcharge meant.

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:

Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<peter.hanmer@nelincs.gov.uk>
<Tony.Maione@Nelincs.gov.uk>; <rob.walsh@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Res - Customer Services" <ResCustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>; <christina.mcgilligan@nelincs.gov.uk>;
<philip.jackson@nelincs.gov.uk>
10 May 2016 13:15
7 Nov 2015 - ocj-complaint-0913.pdf; Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf; Section 1
Magistrates court complaint - draft.pdf
Fw: False statement to defraud through council tax liability application

Dear Mr Hanmer
I would like to know what progress has been made regarding one of NELC's employees committing perjury
to defraud me.
I have had no reply in almost three weeks and would have expected to have had at least acknowledgement
after a day or so.
Yours sincerely
.

The Police and Crime Commissioner for


Humberside
Pacific Exchange
40 High Street
Hull
HU1 1PS

Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

Dear Mr Hunter

Re: Negligence in Humberside Polices handling of crime allegations


I wrote to Mr Grove with optimism in January 2013 believing that with Humberside Police
being held to account by an elected Commissioner, the public would have a more effective
means of seeking redress than when the Police Authority was responsible.
It was apparent soon enough that the elected Commissioner didnt have the powers to do what
the public perhaps believe he could. Either that, or the route of least resistance was taken,
which in my case was to suggest considering civil redress as a remedy for concerns raised
about the Chief Constable failing to address the corruption in handling fraud allegations i.e.,
refusing to investigate and subsequently mishandling complaints and appeals.
It is illogical when you consider the forces limited resources that at the same time an unpaid
taxpayer has supplied concrete evidence to prove a crime for that person to be fobbed-off and
lied to with appeals prolonging over several years with no substance to back up negative
outcomes when a decision has eventually been made. The fact that this is happening raises the
question of whether the force has its hands tied, to the point where an investigation into local
government is a no go area, i.e., the force operates on a discriminatory basis.
None of these issues have been resolved; rather further more serious matters have arisen since
where similarly there appears no end in sight, being again embroiled in continual dispute with
the force. The force is again failing to resolve the concerns with paperwork being diverted
through the same sham process where it is predicted that in a year or two the force will have
done nothing except cover for the authorities and to have added to the years of my time that
the police have already wasted.

The most serious matter concerns Humberside police stitching me up with fabricated evidence
(now having a criminal record and a 600+ fine to pay) for an offence I am innocent of. The
suspected motivation being that I had got on the wrong side of the police by highlighting
matters in which the force is complicit concerning substantial fraud. In relation to this there
has been no outcome and probably not even any steps taken to investigate the police officer
complained about for incitement of perjury over the 6 month period since the matter was
formally reported. Humberside police also refuses to record as a crime the reported incident,
i.e., that submitted about two witnesses lying in their witness statements.
Another matter arising relates to the force responding to a reported crime (perjury to defraud)
by stating that such a crime, one punishable as an offence whether occurring in criminal or
civil proceedings, was a civil matter. North East Lincolnshire Council obtained a liability
order for non-payment of council tax and evidence is held that it lied to the court in a witness
statement to do so and consequently costs awarded to the council were obtained fraudulently.
A request was made for the matter to be escalated for the attention of the Chief Constable in
order that the anticipated dissatisfaction of a subsequent decision would be subject to external
scrutiny rather than the force investigating itself. The force proceeded regardless and the
matter dealt with under the Local Resolution process with the outcome (13 January 2016)
stating that the issues may be appeal points that could be raised at any subsequent appeal
hearings and that the force did not investigate allegations of perjury unless a request to do so
comes from the court.
These were spurious statements because the matter is criminal and not something you can
appeal to another judge in civil proceedings. In any event, the Crown Prosecution Service's
website states that the police do not have to be instructed by the court to investigate perjury.
Cases Involving Allegations of Perjury
Where a judge or magistrate believes that some evidence adduced at trial is perjured
s/he can recommend that there should be a police investigation.
The absence of such recommendation does not mean that there is no justification for
an investigation.

The outcome of Local Resolution process has been appealed with the paperwork submitted 25
January 2016 but six months from the original complaint being made on 12 November 2015
there is still no outcome or any update.
When a member of the public is deemed to have committed an offence (even without or with
fabricated evidence) a criminal prosecution is it instituted. However, when it's a council
officer committing perjury to defraud a member of the public even when there is concrete
evidence, the force falls over itself to protect the council officer from the justice system.
My evidence goes far beyond what would be required to prove the perjury case against the
council, yet a blind eye is turned to that crime. On the other hand, the CPS gets away with
having successfully secured a prosecution against me on fabricated evidence that even an
untrained person would have spotted inconsistencies.
It is no revelation to declare that police officers having to investigate their colleagues fuels the
problem, but there is a systematic abuse of the complaints and appeal process that needs to be
escalated for the attention at the highest level. There must be some action which can be taken
which can make an impact on reforming the dysfunctional process. Though the process is
governed by statutory procedures and for that reason outside interference is restricted, the
existence of the statutory complaints process should not be seen by the force as an excuse for
unaccountability, even though that is in effect what the process enables.
It can not have been parliament's intention when legislating the relevant Act, that all the
concerns of the public should be opposed as a matter of course merely on account of there
being a complaint and series of appeal processes. There comes a point when an outside body
should consider it appropriate to intervene, if not the appeal process, at least the abuse of it.
It appears you have been elected on what could be interpreted to be an undertaking, in part, to
root out the corruption within Humberside Police. I would like therefore to see evidence of
that with an investigation into the (invisible) Chief Constable's failings who has apparently in
order to make life easy for herself, adopted the Ostrich approach rather than confronting
failings and providing the public who pay her salary the service theyve paid for.

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

From:
To:
Cc:

Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"Maione, Tony" <Tony.Maione@Nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
"Hanmer, Peter" <Peter.Hanmer@nlbusinessconnect.co.uk>; "Cllr - Jackson, Philip"
<philip.jackson@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Cllr - McGilligan-Fell, Christina"
<Christina.McGilliganFell@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Res - Customer Services" <ResCustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Marsh, Mary" <Mary.Marsh@nelincs.gov.uk>
12 May 2016 15:19
Letter Mr
110615.doc
RE: False statement to defraud through council tax liability application

Dear Mr
Please find attached a response to your email below

Kind regards
Tony
Tony Maione, Solicitor
Assistant Director Law and Monitoring Officer
North East Lincolnshire Council
Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, DN31 1HU DX13536 Grimsby 1
: 01472 324373 or 07799 821348
: Tony.Maione@nelincs.gov.uk

30/07/2016

Your Ref:
Our ref: TM / 020503
If telephoning or calling please ask for: Tony Maione
Tel:

01472 324373

e-mail:

tony.maione@nelincs.gov.uk

11 May 2016
Mr

@gmail.com

Tony Maione - Monitoring Officer and


Chief Legal Officer Law
Solicitor, LL.B. (Hons), LL.M.

Dear Mr
Re: Claims of false statement to defraud through council tax liability application
I have reviewed your email dated 21 April 2016 and as you have commenced legal
proceedings in relation to this matter and as perjury allegations are matter for the court,
the Council is of the opinion that this issue should be dealt with via the court process in
this instance.
The Council would like to confirm that the address for service of any legal documents is:
Tony Maione, Chief Legal Officer
Legal Services
North East Lincolnshire Council
Municipal Offices,
Town Hall Square,
Grimsby,
North East Lincolnshire,
DN31 1HU.
Yours sincerely

Tony Maione, Solicitor


Chief Legal Officer and Monitoring Officer

Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, North East Lincolnshire, DN31 1HU
Telephone (01472) 313131 Fax (01472) 324022, DX13536, Grimsby 1

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Cc:

Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Hanmer, Peter" <Peter.Hanmer@nlbusinessconnect.co.uk>; <peter.hanmer@nelincs.gov.uk>
"Maione, Tony" <Tony.Maione@Nelincs.gov.uk>; "Cllr - Jackson, Philip"
<philip.jackson@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Cllr - McGilligan-Fell, Christina"
<Christina.McGilliganFell@nelincs.gov.uk>; <christina.mcgilligan-fell@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Res Customer Services" <Res-CustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Marsh, Mary"
<Mary.Marsh@nelincs.gov.uk>; <rob.walsh@nelincs.gov.uk>
13 May 2016 17:04
Letter Mr
110615.doc
Re: False statement to defraud through council tax liability application

Dear Mr Hanmer
Neither of my emails (see below) have been responded to or acknowledged, however, Tony Maione, North
East Lincolnshire Council's Chief Legal and Monitoring Officer, has taken it upon himself to respond on your
behalf (see attached) on 11 May 2016.
Mr Maione is exploiting the legal proceedings I commenced in order for the council to avoid its duty of
investigating the fraud under its own policy. This approach is clearly inappropriate as his function is to ensure
the law is complied with in all the authority's decision making. The Council obviously sees his role differently,
which in this matter is to bailout the council for committing a criminal offence against one of what are termed
customers.
Presumably the Council has deliberately delayed its response with the purpose being so it could be certain that
the judge, in relation to the information laid, exercised his discretion by not issuing a summons for the purpose
of bringing before the court the officer who wrongly stated perjury was not a matter for the police.
Notwithstanding that the police and judge have justified their decisions on entirely spurious grounds, the
decision to institute proceedings was made before the discovering that the alleged fraud should have been
referred by complaints officers immediately to yourself when my formal complaint was submitted, as set out in
my April 21 email.
This matter has highlighted further concerns about the inconsistency in the way the authority applies
its policies, which suggests the taxpayer is being unnecessarily burdened in respect of the resources dedicated
for their development and salaries attributed to the team supporting them.
I trust now that the council's failure has been highlighted, the procedure can commence in accordance with the
'Fraud Response Plan' as detailed in my April 21 email and as service manager you inform me of the steps
being taken to address the matter.

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

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From:
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Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
16 May 2016 13:05
Rossendales 11 May 2016.pdf
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Mr Hobley

Complaint Reference 15 020 295

I think you should be informed that North East Lincolnshire Council has appointed Rossendales bailiffs to
enforce the alleged outstanding Council Tax (see attached letter). The Council has this power only on account
of being successful in hoodwinking the judge that it had been a legitimate approach to divert monies intended
for the current year's account to another sum which it had agreed in writing was suspended whilst being
disputed.
Although the schedule of fees referred to in the letter was not enclosed as stated, I believe those fees are
likely to amount to 310, comprising a 75 compliance fee and 235 enforcement charge which when added
to the unwarranted summons costs will amount to 430 the sum which I will potentially be out of pocket.
If you refer to my complaint 21 March 2016 under the heading "what do you think the body should do to put
things right", my prediction has the makings of being very accurate (see quoted paragraph).
"The seriousness of the failure to take these measures can not be over stated. Prompt action is required
to ensure that the immediate consequences of the error are remedied and also to prevent unwarranted
enforcement measures that may otherwise follow. Should the error not be remedied it is likely a
constant cycle of recovery action will result, incurring additional costs which will accumulate over time to
be sufficient in amount that the council will achieve its clearly vindictive aim of justifying taking action
such as bankruptcy or imposing a custodial sentence."
It is not feasible that Rossendales will be successful in recovering any of this from me as the only option
available to them is to take control of a vehicle as it is not obligatory to let a bailiff into your home. As I do not
currently own a car that option is out. The Council does not have the option of taking monies from my income
because I have none whatsoever, only outgoings.
I see the only option available, after the likely failure of Rossendales, will be for the Council to apply to the
court for committal and will predictably strengthen its case with the argument that I had escalated the matter to
the LGO and had an unsuccessful outcome and so claim that the LGO endorsed the council's actions. This
would of course be a distortion because my complaint was well founded, and would if the organisation had
investigated, found that the council was at fault and my account had been maladministered. It was also in
possession of enough evidence within the content of the complaint to have had legitimate cause to raise
concerns via the Councils legal department regarding fraud.
In anticipation of having to defend myself in court at a potential committal hearing I request that a letter is
produced explaining that the reason why the Ombudsman did not investigate my complaint was not because it
lacked merit and would unlikely find fault with the council, but because the organisation has only finite
resources and so does not extend to investigating every complaint.

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

PO Box 324
Rossendale
BB4 0GE

Mr

Tel:
Fax:
Email:

Grimsby

Calls may be recorded/monitored for quality control and training purposes

2845/3371/1/4/504/940163

0844701 3980
0844 701 3982
enquiries@rossendales.com

Calls to our 0845 numbers cost 2p per minute and calls to our 0844 numbers cost
6p per minute, plus your phone company's access Charge.

Re Address
Grimsby

Date: 11th May 2016


Rossendafes Ltd on behalf of North East Lincolnshire Council Revenues & Benefits
Service - C Tax - TCE Ref: 5501
Rossendales Ref: 28628956
All enquiries concerning this document MUST be made to Rossendales Ltd., not
North East Lincolnshire Council Revenues & Benefits Service
COUNCIL TAX NOTICE OF ISSUE OF LIABILITY ORDER
INFORMATION PRELIMINARY TO DISTRESS
Following an application made by North East Lincolnshire Council a liability order was issued against you on
30/10/2015 in respect of unpaid Council Tax of 211.00 (including costs).
The balance outstanding in respect of the order is 211.00.
You must pay this sum IN FUll immediately and direct to Rossendales Ltd., NOT THE COUNCIL.

To make immediate payment call our 24 hour automated


payment line 0845 078 1194 quoting 28628956
Please note that any other amounts you may owe to the Council that are not covered by this liability order
need to be paid as previously advised. Details on how to pay the amount shown above are explained on the
enclosed leaflet.
If you cannot pay in full or dispute the amount due then either write to us at the address above or telephone
us on 0844 701 3980 immediately.
If payment is not made in full within 14 days from the date of this notice, then distress may be levied upon
your possessions. This means that we can list and remove your belongings and sell them at public auction to
pay the amount which you owe.
If you want us to consider a payment arrangement you must complete the enclosed questionnaire in full,
including details of your offer, and send-it to us, NOT THE COUNCIL, within 7 days. If we accept your offer
we will write to you to confirm this within 7 days of receiving your offer. If your offer is unacceptable we will
visit to levy distress, and you will have to pay extra fees as shown on the enclosed schedule.

ROSSENDALES LTD

Registered in England No 1501584 VAT Reg No 354 703165


Rossendales limited registered office: Rutland House, 8th Floor, 148 Edmund Street, Birmingham, B3 2JR
Authorised and Regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority for accounts formed under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (amended 2006)

Page 1 of 1

From:
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Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
<pcc@humberside.pnn.police.uk>; "!enquiries" <enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk>
16 May 2016 16:34
Rossendales 11 May 2016.pdf
Re: Appeal against outcome of local resolution - Ref: CO 461/15

Dear Sir/Madam

Further to my 3rd May 2016 email, is there any information/update regarding the progress of this matter?
Additional information
I think you should be informed that North East Lincolnshire Council has appointed Rossendales bailiffs to
enforce the alleged outstanding Council Tax (see attached letter). The Council has this power only on account
of being successful in hoodwinking the judge that it had been a legitimate approach to divert monies intended
for the current year's account to another sum which it had agreed in writing was suspended whilst being
disputed.
Although the schedule of fees referred to in the letter was not enclosed as stated, I believe those fees are
likely to amount to 310, comprising a 75 compliance fee and 235 enforcement charge which when added
to the unwarranted summons costs will amount to 430 the sum which I will potentially be out of pocket.
If you refer to my 30 December 2015 email to Inspector Allan Harvey on this matter, my prediction has the
makings of being very accurate (see quoted paragraphs):
"Action needs taking sooner rather than later to ensure that the immediate consequences of the fraud
is remedied. This will not be achieved by having to complete complaint and subsequent appeal
procedures which guarantee nothing at the end. The appropriate level of investigation can be
evaluated after the immediate risk of the consequences of the crimes have been removed.
The consequences do not stop at the fraudulently obtained court cost. Unnecessary enforcement
measures will follow, incurring additional costs which will accumulate over time to be sufficient in
amount that the council will achieve its vindictive aim and be able to take insolvency, bankruptcy or
custodial action."
It is not feasible that Rossendales will be successful in recovering any of this from me as the only option
available to them is to take control of a vehicle as it is not obligatory to let a bailiff into your home. As I do not
currently own a car that option is out. The Council is unable to take monies from my income because I have
none whatsoever, only outgoings.
I see the only alternative available, after the likely failure of Rossendales, will be for the Council to apply to the
court for committal and will predictably strengthen its case with the argument that I had reported the matter as
a crime but the police would not investigate and so claim that Humberside police endorsed the council's
actions. This would of course be a distortion because there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic
prospect of conviction against the Council which would have not been in doubt had the force investigated.
In anticipation of having to defend myself in court at a potential committal hearing I request that a letter is
produced explaining that the reason why Humberside police did not investigate my allegations was not
because there was no realistic prospect of conviction, but because the force has only finite resources which
do not extend to investigating every crime or it had its hands tied by whatever restrictions are laid down by the
government.

Yours sincerely
.

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<

@gmail.com>

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

16 May 2016 21:44


Rossendales 11 May 2016.pdf
Mr

Letter 22 April 2016.doc

Dear Mr Townell
Additional information
I think you should be informed that North East Lincolnshire Council has appointed Rossendales bailiffs to
enforce the alleged outstanding Council Tax (see attached letter). The Council has this power only on account
of being successful in hoodwinking the judge that it had been a legitimate approach to divert monies intended
for the current year's account to another sum which it had agreed in writing was suspended whilst being
disputed.
Although the schedule of fees referred to in the letter was not enclosed as stated, I believe those fees are
likely to amount to 310, comprising a 75 compliance fee and 235 enforcement charge which when added
to the unwarranted summons costs will amount to 430 the sum which I will potentially be out of pocket.
In reference to an email I sent on 30 December 2015 to Inspector Allan Harvey regarding this matter, my
prediction has the makings of being very accurate (see quoted paragraphs):
"Action needs taking sooner rather than later to ensure that the immediate consequences of the fraud
is remedied. This will not be achieved by having to complete complaint and subsequent appeal
procedures which guarantee nothing at the end. The appropriate level of investigation can be
evaluated after the immediate risk of the consequences of the crimes have been removed.
The consequences do not stop at the fraudulently obtained court cost. Unnecessary enforcement
measures will follow, incurring additional costs which will accumulate over time to be sufficient in
amount that the council will achieve its vindictive aim and be able to take insolvency, bankruptcy or
custodial action."
It is not feasible that Rossendales will be successful in recovering any of this from me as the only option
available to them is to take control of a vehicle as it is not obligatory to let a bailiff into your home. As I do not
currently own a car that option is out. The Council is unable to take monies from my income because I have
none whatsoever, only outgoings.
I see the only alternative available, after the likely failure of Rossendales, will be for the Council to apply to the
court for committal and will predictably strengthen its case with the argument that I had reported the matter as
a crime but the police would not investigate and so claim that Humberside police endorsed the council's
actions. This would of course be a distortion because there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic
prospect of conviction against the Council which would have not been in doubt had the force investigated.
The unwillingness of the police to investigate was attributed to the following in a letter dated 13 January 2016
which I forwarded to the court on 19 & 26 of January that stated "Humberside Police do not investigate
allegations of perjury unless a request to do so comes from the court themselves." On 26 January you
responded uncooperatively saying that "the court is not taking any action regarding your allegations of
perjury".
In anticipation of having to defend myself in court at a potential committal hearing I request that a letter is
produced explaining that the reason why Humberside police did not investigate my allegations was not
because there was no realistic prospect of conviction, but because the court was unwilling to cooperate by
requesting the Police investigate.

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
17 May 2016 10:43
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

17 May 2016
Our ref: 15 020 295
Dear Mr
You have our decision statements which say why we are not investigating your complaints.
Yours sincerely
Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader
0330 403 4725
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
17 May 2016 15:53
Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673

Dear Mr Hobley
I would like to know whether the Ombudsman raised concerns via North East Lincolnshire Councils legal
department regarding fraud. As I stated in my 16 May email the Ombudsman was in possession of enough
evidence within the content of the complaint to have had legitimate cause to.

Yours sincerely

30/07/2016

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From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Horton, Louise 8426" <Louise.Horton@humberside.pnn.police.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
18 May 2016 14:44
RE: Appeal against outcome of local resolution - Ref: CO 461/15 [RESTRICTED - NO
DESCRIPTOR]

RESTRICTED - NO DESCRIPTOR
Good Afternoon
Thank you for the additional information provided in relation to CO/461/15 and your appeal.
As this is now an appeal the paperwork and your subsequent emails have been forwarded to the
Humberside Police Appeals Body who are now looking into your appeal.
I have also forwarded the below and attached information to them to assist them with the appeal
Many thanks
Louise Horton
PSB Admin
Humberside Police
Priory Road

30/07/2016

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From:
To:
Cc:

Sent:
Subject:

"Maione, Tony" <Tony.Maione@Nelincs.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
"Cllr - Jackson, Philip" <philip.jackson@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Cllr - McGilligan-Fell, Christina"
<Christina.McGilliganFell@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Cllr - McGilligan-Fell, Christina"
<Christina.McGilliganFell@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Res - Customer Services" <ResCustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Marsh, Mary" <Mary.Marsh@nelincs.gov.uk> "Walsh, Rob"
<Rob.Walsh@Nelincs.gov.uk>;"Hanmer, Peter" <Peter.Hanmer@nlbusinessconnect.co.uk>
18 May 2016 16:43
RE: False statement to defraud through council tax liability application

Dear Mr

Thank you for your email of 13 May 2016 to my colleague Mr Hanmer. I have reviewed the
Councils Whistleblowing (Raising a Concern) Policy (the Policy) in terms of the Councils
response to you on the matters you have raised. The procedure that has been followed in
this matter is considered to be in line with the Policy. The policy provides that upon receipt
of a potential Whistleblowing matter that it be referred to myself for consideration and
discussion with Mr Hanmer, Head of Audit and Assurance and other relevant colleagues. I
can confirm that this consideration and discussion duly took place prior to my letter to you of
11 May 2016 and that our Whistleblowing arrangements are subject to regular review.
Opportunities to learn from matters raised by members of the public, such as yourself, are
taken and accordingly the Audit team are considering your correspondence. The Audit team
will consider issues, if any, that havent already been dealt with via the Councils complaints
procedure.
As your correspondence contained serious allegations including perjury, this matter was
passed to me which is standard practice. It is right and proper for you to pursue allegations
of this nature through the Courts. You will no doubt appreciate that making allegations
including perjury which are found to be unsubstantiated and/or not evidenced is itself a
serious matter.
Yours sincerely
Tony
Tony Maione, Solicitor
Assistant Director Law and Monitoring Officer
North East Lincolnshire Council
Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, DN31 1HU DX13536 Grimsby 1
: 01472 324373 or 07799 821348
: Tony.Maione@nelincs.gov.uk

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

<A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk>
<
@gmail.com>
19 May 2016 14:40
Confidential: Case ID - 15020295

19 May 2016
Our ref: 15 020 295
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)
Dear Mr

You have the decision statement on your case. As we did not investigate we have not have not told
the Council's legal Department about any alleged fraud.
As a publicly funded body we cannot justify continuing to correspondence about complaints we have
decided. You have been told how to ask for a review of the decision on your case. If you do that we
will respond to you. We will also reply to any legal action or DPA/FOI requests. Other than that any
further correspondence from you about this complaint will be read, but not acknowledged or replied
to.

Yours sincerely

Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader
0330 403 4725
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

30/07/2016

Page 1 of 2

From:
To:
Cc:

Sent:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
"Maione, Tony" <Tony.Maione@Nelincs.gov.uk>
"Cllr - Jackson, Philip" <philip.jackson@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Cllr - McGilligan-Fell, Christina"
<Christina.McGilliganFell@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Res - Customer Services" <ResCustomerServices@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Marsh, Mary" <Mary.Marsh@nelincs.gov.uk> "Walsh, Rob"
<Rob.Walsh@Nelincs.gov.uk>;"Hanmer, Peter" <Peter.Hanmer@nlbusinessconnect.co.uk>;
<peter.hanmer@nelincs.gov.uk>; <christina.mcgilligan-fell@nelincs.gov.uk>
22 May 2016 18:16
Re: False statement to defraud through council tax liability application

Dear Mr Maione
Further to your 18 May email I am trying to establish the council's position in relation to the chart setting out
how concerns can be raised (Appendix two, whistleblowing policy). I would therefore like it confirming whether
or not your correspondence is effectively the final decision after checks have been made to determine 'if
concern falls within the Whistleblowing policy'.
My interpretation of your comments is that you have made the final decision and that decision is no, the
consequences being that the matter will be kept from the scrutiny of the police, Local Government
Ombudsman and/or the external auditor for example. Rather, the matter will be confined within the council
thus enabling a cover-up by one of its bogus internal procedures allowing the department unhindered to
pursue the kind of criminal activity that I have been a victim of.
If how I have described above is the correct interpretation, I am in no doubt that the statutory function, which
you as Monitoring Officer (a public office holder) have a duty to carry out, is not being fulfilled in the
way defined in law.
The role entails specifically ensuring that the Council, its Officers, etc., maintain the highest standards of
conduct and reporting on matters that are, or are likely to be, illegal or amount to maladministration.

Unsubstantiated allegations
I assume by emphasising the seriousness of the matter if my allegations were found to be unsubstantiated
etc., you are implying a threat. If you have considered the evidence, which I assume you have, you will know
that the scenario suggested makes no sense as my evidence supports the allegations beyond all doubt.
Rather than implying that my allegation may be false or malicious the focus ought to be on the council's failure
to appoint an officer who is prepared to perform the statutory duties which are conferred on a monitoring
officer by virtue of Part III of the Local Government Act 2000.

Failure of Complaints officers to refer matters concerning fraud


There is a serious failure of complaints officers adhering to the Whistleblowing policy in not referring matters
immediately concerning fraud to the Audit, Risk, Insurance and Corporate Fraud team. This has been evident
in the present case which because of the failure has led to an inordinate amount of injustice. For example,
intervention would have rendered the completion of the Corporate Feedback procedure unnecessary, plus
saved unnecessarily engaging in lengthy representations to the Local Government Ombudsman.
This matter should have been referred to the Corporate Fraud team in November 2015 further to my
correspondence on the 10th alleging that the council fraudulently obtained a liability order from the court in
order to enforce a sum which, if it had conducted its affairs lawfully would not be entitled. The same can be
said for an earlier submission dated 15 March 2014 concerning a related issue that also led to an inordinate
amount of injustice.
In both cases the Chief Executive endorsed the investigating officer's reports, declaring that he had
considered the findings of the investigations to have been correctly and fairly carried out and for such
acquiescence he should be held accountable.

The council's position


30/07/2016

Page 2 of 2

I would like, as set out at the beginning of this email, the council's position clarifying in this matter, e.g., has
the council no intention of taking the matter seriously and internally processing it, or has it, or will it be taking
the appropriate steps and referring it to the police?

Yours sincerely
.

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:

"Jones, Debbie" <debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

<
@gmail.com>
23 May 2016 13:29
Mr
Letter 20 May 2016.doc

Please find attachment

Regards
Debbie

Debbie Jones
Listings
Grimsby Magistrates' Court
Tel : 01472 592406
Goldfax number : 0870 739 5771
Email: debbie.jones2@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk

30/07/2016

Julie Collins
Courts & Tribunal Manager
Humber & South Yorkshire Area
A Watts
Clerk to the Justices
Grimsby Magistrates Court
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HN

Mr

,
Grimsby

T 01472 320444
Minicom VII not available
(Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing)
www.justice.gov.uk

Our ref: GT
20 May 2016

Dear Mr

I write in response to your latest two emails to me, the first sent on 9 May 2016 and the
second on 16 May 2016.
With regard to your first email I have already informed you that the court is not
prepared to reopen your criminal case. That is because you deliberately chose not to
attend your trial.
Frankly I can only describe your comments in respect of dedicated and hard working
professionals within Her Majestys Courts Service as outrageous.
With regard to your second email, that relates simply to an issue of non payment of
council tax. Should that matter result ultimately in a court hearing you will be given the
opportunity to attend court for an inquiry into your financial circumstances. At such a
hearing the court will deal with that issue and that issue alone.
I am unable to help you any further.
Yours sincerely,
Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

Notice of Enforcement
This notice must be given by the enforcement agent or the enforcement agent's office.

Please read this notice - it is important


1441/4091/1/3/536/954663

Mr
Grimsby

Date notice issued


Enforcement agent
reference number

About this notice

25th May 2016

28628956

You have been sent this notice of enforcement because you have not paid money that you owe.

Who you owe money to

North East Lincolnshire Council

The amount you owe them

211.00

Their ref./account no.


(if applicable)

Enforcement
details

5501

Details of the court judgement or order or enforcement power by virtue of which the debt is enforceable
A Liability Order has been granted against you on the 30/10/2015 for non payment of Council
Tax and costs at

Sum outstanding

, Grimsby,

Debt

Interest

Compliance stage fee

Total sum
outstanding

211.00

0.00

75.00

286.00
(as at the date of this notice)

Registered in England and Wales No 1501584 VAT Reg No 354 703 165
Rossendales limited registered office: Rutland House, 8th Floor, 148 Edmund Street, Birmingham, B3 2JR

When to make

You must pay, or agree a payment arrangement with the enforcement agent, by:

payment
Date

8th June 2016

Time

23:59

If you do not pay

If you do not pay or agree a payment arrangement by the date above, an enforcement agent will visit
you and may seize your belongings - this is called 'taking control'. These belongings may then be
sold to pay the money you owe. These actions will increase the costs of enforcement and these costs
will be added to the amount already owed.

Possible
additional fees
and expenses of
enforcement

If the sum outstanding remains unpaid or you have not agreed a payment arrangement by the date
and time above you may be charged the following (enforcement agent to detail further possible fees
and expenses

Stage

Amount

Enforcement Agent Visit to Take Control of Goods

235.00 + if the debt is above


1500, 7.5% of the amount
above 1500

Enforcement Visit to Remove Goods

110.00 + if the debt is above


1500, 7.5% of the amount
above 1500

Where Removal and sale takes place


Storage Costs
Locksmiths costs
Any relevant Court Application fees

Actual costs
Actual costs
Actual fees

Auctioneers costs where the sale is held on the


Auctioneers premises
Auctioneers Commission

Auctioneers out of pocket expenses


Reasonable Advertising costs

Not exceeding 15% of the


sum realised
Actual costs
Actual costs

Auctioneers costs where the sale is held on


other
premises
Auctioneers Commission
Auctioneers out of pocket expenses
Reasonable Advertising costs
Internet auction costs
In some circumstances exceptional costs will apply

Not exceeding 7.5% of the


sum realised
Actual costs
Actual costs
Actual costs
Agreed by Court

Page 1 of 1

From:
To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

<
@gmail.com>
<inbox@jcio.gsi.gov.uk>
25 May 2016 20:36
25 May 2016 - ocj-complaint-0913 pascoe.pdf; 25 May 2016 - ocj-complaint-0913 Curtis.pdf
Judicial conduct - ocj-complaint-0913

Dear Sir/Madam
Please find attached two completed Judicial Conduct Complaint forms (form 09.13).
If you require any further information please don't hesitate to ask.
Yours sincerely
.

30/07/2016

Judicial Conduct
Investigations Office
___________

Complaint form
Thank you for sending us details of your complaint.
Below is a copy of the details you supplied, please keep this form for your records.
When we reply you we will provide you with a unique case reference number. In the meantime, if you
need to contact us, please quote the reference number provided here.
Date form submitted

25 May 2016

Your details
Title

Mr

First name
Last name
Address
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire

Postcode

Daytime telephone

None
@gmail.com

Email
Details about your case
Type of judicial
office holder

District Judge (Magistrates Court)

Name of judicial
office holder

Daniel Curtis

Name of the court


or tribunal

Grimsby Magistrates Court

Case number

16AY/2837/15

Is your case still


ongoing

No

JCIO Complaint form (09.13)

Date of Hearing

15 December 2015

Brief description of your complaint

Category
of complaint

Professional Misconduct

Description of your complaint

Introduction
I am the victim of what I believe has been an opportunist stitch-up by Humberside police with the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS) and Grimsby Magistrates' Court, as accomplices. The evidence points to a
conspiracy in which all three organisations have misused the Criminal Justice system in allowing fabricated
evidence to convict me for charges of which I am innocent in order to defraud me of a sum of 620 and burden
me with a criminal record. I suspect the motivation is that I had got on the wrong side of the police by
highlighting matters in which the force is complicit concerning substantial fraud.
The most recent correspondence to Grimsby Magistrates court regarding my complaint was 9 May 2016.

Background to case
The trial date was 15 December 2015 which was set at what I assume was a pre-trial hearing on 30 September
2015. I attended the earlier hearing and pleaded not guilty and stated that I believed the arresting officer had
incited witnesses to commit perjury and that the witnesses had lied.
I did not attend the trial on 15 December 2015 after discovering who would be trying the case as I was not
prepared to stand before the same judge who I'd complained about only weeks before the hearing (7
November) to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (ref: 22905/2015) and reported the matter of complaint
as a crime to the police.
It was expressed without reservation by writing to the court a number of days before the trial that I did not
consider the Judge, 'a fit and proper person to hear the case'. My assertion was founded on hard evidence
relating to the matter referred to above where the judge had unequivocally accepted a statement knowing it to
be false, which enabled the claimant, North East Lincolnshire Council to succeed in defrauding me through
court costs claimed in proceedings that were engineered to that end. The Council had therefore committed
perjury to defraud me, and the judge assisted by turning a blind eye to that breach of legal procedure.
Along with the correspondence expressing my opinion about the Judge, the court was sent copies of emails
sent to Humberside police regarding the allegations made against the judge and a signed statement of truth
containing extensively set out evidence (dated 2 December 2015). The court was also sent the complaint made
to the police about PC Thomas Blake who I suspected of inciting perjury, and an account stating that the two
members of the public had both made untrue witness statements. All these were sent to the court on 11
December 2015.

Pre-trial events
(Insufficient information about proceedings)
I had assumed the matter would be in the hands of the duty solicitor who had been appointed on being falsely
imprisoned in a cell at Humberside police station (27.8.15), as I had not been informed otherwise. However,
after updating him