G.R. No.

192571
April 22, 2014
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE
A. TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T.
YABUT-MISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND
ALLAN G. ALMAZAR, Petitioners,
vs.
PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ
Facts:
1.Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott)] caused
the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper
of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager,
indicating therein the job description for as well as
the duties and responsibilities attendant to the
aforesaid position; this prompted Alcaraz to submit
her application
2.In Abbotts December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was
stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a
probationary status
3.Alcaraz signed an employment contract which
specifically stated, inter alia, that she was to be
placed on probation for a period of six (6) months
4.Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment
orientation where [Allan G. Almazar] informed her
that she had to implement Abbotts Code of
Conduct and office policies on human resources
and finance and that she would be reporting
directly to [Kelly Walsh]
5.NLRC ordered that Alcaraz was illegally dismisseed
due to her status as a regular and not a
probationary employee

6.the CA found that the NLRC did not commit grave

abuse of discretion and denied the certiorari
petition before I
Issue:
Ruling:
it is not the probationary employees job description
but the adequate performance of his duties and
responsibilities which constitutes the inherent and
implied standard for regularization.
if the probationary employee had been fully apprised
by his employer of these duties and responsibilities,
then basic knowledge and common sense dictate that
he must adequately perform the same, else he fails to
pass the probationary trial and may therefore be
subject to termination.
The determination of "adequate performance" is not,
in all cases, measurable by quantitative specification,
such as that of a sales quota in Alcarazs example. It is
also hinged on the qualitative assessment of the
employees work; by its nature, this largely rests on
the
reasonable
exercise
of
the
employers
management prerogative.
In these kinds of occupation, the best that the
employer can do at the time of engagement is to
inform the probationary employee of his duties and
responsibilities and to orient him on how to properly
proceed with the same. The employer cannot bear out

in exacting detail at the beginning of the engagement

what he deems as "quality work" especially since the
probationary employee has yet to submit the required
output.
The same logic applies to a probationary managerial
employee who is tasked to supervise a particular
department, as Alcaraz in this case.1wphi1 It is
hardly possible for the employer, at the time of the
employees engagement, to map into technical
indicators, or convey in precise detail the quality
standards by which the latter should effectively
manage the department. Factors which gauge the
ability of the managerial employee to either deal with
his subordinates (e.g., how to spur their performance,
or command respect and obedience from them), or to
organize office policies, are hardly conveyable at the
outset of the engagement since the employee has yet
to be immersed into the work itself.
once an employer determines that the probationary
employee fails to meet the standards required for his
regularization, the former is not precluded from
dismissing the latter.
The rule is that when a valid cause for termination
exists, the procedural infirmity attending the
termination only warrants the payment of nominal
damages. This was the principle laid down in the
landmark cases of Agabon v. NLRC9 (Agabon) and Jaka
Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot10 (Jaka). In the
assailed Decision, the Court actually extended the
application of the Agabon and Jaka rulings to breaches

of
company
procedure,
notwithstanding
the
employers
compliance
with
the
statutory
requirements under the Labor Code.11 Hence,
although Abbott did not comply with its own
termination procedure, its non-compliance thereof
would not detract from the finding that there subsists
a valid cause to terminate Alcarazs employment.
Abbott, however, was penalized for its contractual
breach and thereby ordered to pay nominal damages.
Alcaraz cannot take refuge in Aliling v. Feliciano12
(Aliling) since the same is not squarely applicable to
the case at bar. The employee in Aliling, a sales
executive, was belatedly informed of his quota
requirement. Thus, considering the nature of his
position, the fact that he was not informed of his sales
quota at the time of his engagement changed the
complexion of his employment.
Contrarily, the nature of Alcaraz's duties and
responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager negates
the application of the foregoing. Records show that
Alcaraz was terminated because she (a) did not
manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the
trust of her staff and to build an effective rapport with
them; (c) failed to train her staff effectively; and (d)
was not able to obtain the knowledge and ability to
make sound judgments on case processing and article
review which were necessary for the proper
performance of her duties.

ARMANDO ALILING vs. WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION

G.R. No. 185829 April 25, 2012

Facts:
1.WWWEC) offered to employ petitioner Armando
Aliling (Aliling) as Account Executive (Seafreight
Sales), with the following compensation package.
2.The offer came with a six (6)-month probation
period condition with this express caveat:
Performance during [sic] probationary period shall
be made as basis for confirmation to Regular or
Permanent Status.
3.Training then started. However, instead of a
Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling
to handle Ground Express (GX), a new company
product launched on June 18, 2004 involving
domestic cargo forwarding service for Luzon.
Marketing this product and finding daily contracts
for it formed the core of Alilings new assignment.
4.Barely a month after, Manuel F. San Mateo III (San
Mateo), WWWEC Sales and Marketing Director,
emailed Aliling[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] to
express
dissatisfaction
with
the
latters
performance
5.Thereafter, in a letter of September 25, 2004,[if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif] Joseph R. Lariosa
(Lariosa), Human Resources Manager of WWWEC,
asked Aliling to report to the Human Resources
Department to explain his absence taken without
leave
6.Aliling responded two days later. He denied being
absent on the days in question,

7.Aliling wrote San Mateo stating: Pursuant to your

instruction on September 20, 2004, I hereby
tender my resignation effective October 15, 2004.
While WWWEC took no action on his tender, Aliling
nonetheless demanded reinstatement and a
written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter
dated October 1, 2004[if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif] to management that San Mateo had forced
him to resign.
8.Lariosas response-letter of October 1, 2004,[if !
supportFootnotes][15][endif] informed Aliling that
his case was still in the process of being
evaluated.
On
October
6,
2004,[if
!
supportFootnotes][16][endif] Lariosa again wrote,
this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his
services effective as of that date owing to his nonsatisfactory performance during his probationary
period.
9.Aliling filed a Complaint[if !supportFootnotes][17]
[endif] for illegal dismissal due to forced
resignation, nonpayment of salaries as well as
damages with the NLRC against WWWEC.
10. Appended to the complaint was Alilings
Affidavit
dated
November
12,
2004,[if
!
supportFootnotes][18][endif] in which he stated:
5. At the time of my engagement, respondents did
not make known to me the standards under which
I will qualify as a regular employee.
11. the Labor Arbiter issued on April 25, 2006[if !
supportFootnotes][23][endif] a Decision declaring
Alilings termination as unjustified.

12. Respondents should be ordered to pay

salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of the contract of employment and all
other benefits
13. the NLRC, which affirmed the Decision in toto
14. CA affirm NLRC
Issues:
whether or not petitioner was, during the period
material, a probationary or regular employee
Ruling:
Petitioner is a regular employee

petitioner Aliling, albeit hired from managements

standpoint as a probationary employee, was
deemed a regular employee by force of the
following self-explanatory provisions:
Article 281 of the Labor Code
ART. 281. Probationary employment. Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6)
months from the date the employee started
working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship
agreement stipulating a longer period. The
services of an employee who has been engaged
on a probationary basis may be terminated for a
just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to
the
employee
at
the
time
of
his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to
work after a probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book

VI, Rule VIII-A of the Labor Code

Sec. 6. Probationary employment. There is

probationary employment where the employee,
upon his engagement, is made to undergo a trial
period where the employee determines his fitness
to qualify for regular employment, based on
reasonable standards made known to him at the
time of engagement.

Probationary
employment
governed by the following rules:

shall

be

xxxx

(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the

employer shall make known to the employee the
standards under which he will qualify as a regular
employee at the time of his engagement. Where no
standards are made known to the employee at that
time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. (Emphasis
supplied.)

the labor arbiter, NLRC and the CA are agreed, on

the basis of documentary evidence adduced, that
respondent WWWEC did not inform petitioner Aliling
of the reasonable standards by which his probation
would be measured against at the time of his

engagement. The Court is loathed to interfere with

this factual determination.
In fine, an employees failure to meet sales or work
quotas falls under the concept of gross inefficiency,
which in turn is analogous to gross neglect of duty
that is a just cause for dismissal under Article 282
of the Code. However, in order for the quota
imposed to be considered a valid productivity
standard and thereby validate a dismissal,
managements prerogative of fixing the quota must
be exercised in good faith for the advancement of
its interest. The duty to prove good faith, however,
rests with WWWEC as part of its burden to show
that the dismissal was for a just cause. WWWEC
must show that such quota was imposed in good
faith. This WWWEC failed to do, perceptibly
because it could not. The fact of the matter is that
the alleged imposition of the quota was a desperate
attempt to lend a semblance of validity to Alilings
illegal dismissal.
Employees
must
be
reminded
that
while
probationary employees do not enjoy permanent
status, they enjoy the constitutional protection of
security of tenure. They can only be terminated for
cause or when they otherwise fail to meet the
reasonable standards made known to them by the
employer at the time of their engagement.
Respondent WWWEC miserably failed to prove the
termination of petitioner was for a just cause nor

was there substantial evidence to demonstrate the

standards were made known to the latter at the
time of his engagement. Hence, petitioners right to
security of tenure was breached.

CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v.

ST.
SCHOLASTICAS
COLLEGE
WESTGROVE
AND/OR
SR.
EDNA
QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents. :
JANUARY 2015 - PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
JURISPRUDENCE
CHANROBLES VIRTUAL LAW LIBRARY
G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015

Facts:
1.Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St.
Scholasticas College Westgrove (SSCW), a
Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching
personnel,
2.the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child
out of wedlock.
3.When SSCW learned of the petitioners pregnancy,
Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCWs
Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter
4. married the father of her child, and was dismissed
by SSCW, in that order.
5.LA) rendered a Decision,16 in NLRC Case No. 617657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by
the petitioner. The LA found that there was a valid
ground for the petitioners dismissal; that her
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a
disgraceful and immoral conduct. The LA
pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic
educational institution, the petitioner is expected

to live up to the Catholic values taught by SSCW to

its students.
6.the NLRC issued a Resolution, 19 which affirmed the
LA Decision
7.The CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and not
the Labor Code which governs the termination of
employment of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of private schools
8.The CA further held that the petitioners dismissal
was a valid exercise of SSCWs management
prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on
erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules
and regulations.

Issue:
whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling
that it is the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code that
governs the termination of employment of teaching
and non-teaching personnel of private schools
whether the petitioners conduct constitutes a ground
for her dismissal
Ruling:
First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of
the instant controversy, was issued by the Secretary of
Education pursuant to BP 232. Section 70 29 of BP 232
vests the Secretary of Education with the authority to
issue rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of BP 232. Concomitantly, Section 57 30

specifically empowers the Department of Education to

promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
administration, supervision and regulation of the
educational system in accordance with the declared
policy of BP 232.
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes
the Secretary of Education to prescribe and impose
such administrative sanction as he may deem
reasonable and appropriate in the implementing rules
and regulations for the [g]ross inefficiency of the
teaching or non-teaching personnel of private
schools.32 Accordingly, contrary to the petitioners
claim, the Court sees no reason to invalidate the
provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94
thereof.
Second Issue:
Dismissal

Validity

of

the

Petitioners

The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of

the petitioners dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of
the
1992
MRPS,
which
provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment In
addition to the just causes enumerated in the Labor
Code, the employment of school personnel, including
faculty, may be terminated for any of the following
causes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;

The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioners

pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is disgraceful and
immoral considering that she is employed in a
Catholic educational institution. In arriving at such
conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the
fact of the petitioners pregnancy vis--vis the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the same.
However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to
support the aforementioned conclusion arrived at by
the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioners
pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not
enough to characterize the petitioners conduct as
disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial
evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations
and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
In Chua-Qua v. Clave,37 the Court stressed that to
constitute immorality, the circumstances of each
particular case must be holistically considered and
evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of
conduct and applicable laws.38 Otherwise stated, it is
not the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct per se that determines whether the same is
disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is
generally accepted by society as respectable or moral.
If the conduct does not conform to what society
generally views as respectable or moral, then the
conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral.

Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is

disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process:
first, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second,
an assessment of the said circumstances vis--vis the
prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society
generally considers moral and respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic
educational institution per se does not absolutely
determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is
disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to
determine whether the petitioners pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.
However, determining what the prevailing norms of
conduct are considered disgraceful or immoral is not
an easy task. An individuals perception of what is
moral or respectable is a confluence of a myriad of
influences, such as religion, family, social status, and a
cacophony of others.
Estrada vs excritor - in determining whether a
particular conduct can be considered as disgraceful
and immoral, the distinction between public and
secular morality on the one hand, and religious
morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. 40 That
the distinction between public and secular morality
and religious morality is important because the
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.

The morality referred to in the law is public and

necessarily secular, not religious x x x. Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence
the civil public order but public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms.
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious
beliefs in formulating public policies and morals,
the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief,
i.e., to a compelled religion, anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or
endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would
not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or
even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
religious freedom therefore requires that government
be neutral in matters of religion; governmental
reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its
proscription of immorality as expressed in
criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes
this
conduct
because
it
is
detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions

upon which depend the existence and progress

of human society and not because the conduct
is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments
based on religion might have a compelling influence
on those engaged in public deliberations over what
actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be
adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence
on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the
temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a
uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest
roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to
pass scrutiny of the religion clauses.
Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or,
necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it pertains to public
and secular morality; it refers to those conducts which
are proscribed because they are detrimental to
conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society.
Anonymous v. Radam
Under these tests, two things may be concluded from
the fact that an unmarried woman gives birth out of
wedlock:
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the

woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for

disgraceful and immoral conduct. It may be a not-soideal situation and may cause complications for both
mother and child but it does not give cause for
administrative sanction. There is no law which
penalizes an unmarried mother under those
circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between
two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation
contravene any fundamental state policy as
expressed in the Constitution, a document that
accommodates various belief systems irrespective
of dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is
himself married to a woman other than the
mother, then there is a cause for administrative
sanction against either the father or the mother.
In such a case, the disgraceful and immoral
conduct consists of having extramarital relations
with a married person. The sanctity of marriage is
constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our
statutes as a special contract of permanent union.
Accordingly, judicial employees have been sanctioned
for their dalliances with married persons or for their own
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.

Both Estrada and Radam are administrative cases

against employees in the civil service. The Court,
however, sees no reason not to apply the doctrines
enunciated in Estrada and Radam in the instant case.
Estrada and Radam also required the Court to
delineate what conducts are considered disgraceful
and/or immoral as would constitute a ground for
dismissal.

It bears stressing that the right of an employee to

security of tenure is protected by the Constitution.
Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be
dismissed unless for cause provided under the Labor
Code and other relevant laws, in this case, the 1992
MRPS. As stated above, when the law refers to
morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular
morality and not religious morality. Thus, the
proscription against disgraceful or immoral conduct
under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made
as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to
public and secular morality. Accordingly, in order for a
conduct to be considered as disgraceful or immoral, it
must be detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other.
The petitioners pregnancy out of
wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral
conduct since she and the father of her
child have no impediment to marry each
other.
It bears stressing that the petitioner and her
boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child,
had no legal impediment to marry. Indeed, even
prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married
her boyfriend, the father of her child. As the
Court held in Radam, there is no law which penalizes
an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct

or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between

two unmarried persons; that neither does such
situation contravene any fundamental state policy
enshrined in the Constitution.