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*GENERAL SUPERVISON OVER LOCAL GOVTS/ AUTONOMOUS REGION

Pimentel v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order
No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to
enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their
internal revenue allotments.
HELD:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule
out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure
that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely
directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over
local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It
does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no
case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of
the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as


Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce
their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion
of their internal revenue allotments.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372


SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and
colleges,
government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25%
of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the
following
suggested areas:
Xxx
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal
revenue
allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
ISSUE:
WON the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25%
cost reduction program in violation of the LGUS fiscal autonomy and the withholding of 10%
of the LGUS IRA.
HELD:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule
out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure
that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely
directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over
local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It
does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall
in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal
year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of
the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law

NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY VS. PAREDES


(Admin Law, DILG-Liga ng mga Barangay, quasi-legislative power)
Facts:
DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga
Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the
conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set
aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILGs appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal
affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent
judge contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the
different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the
supervisory power of the DILG.

Issue:
WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng mga
Barangay.
Held:
No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity
exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILGs authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules
are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or
replace the same.

*POWER OF APPOINTMENT
BERMUDEZ VS TORRES
Facts:
Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-inCharge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice
Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit
had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was
appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez
refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the
duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the
appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation
of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9,
Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that all provincial and
city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation
of the Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President
can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit
Held:
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one
having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions
of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the
appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of
choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate
officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion
of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an
empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has
done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and
when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the
functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that the
Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their
recommendations.
The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV
of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or

indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the
party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in
nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do
away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary
authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.

BERMUDEZ VS. TORRES


nature of appointing power

There was a vacancy for the post of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac

Bermudez was the 1st Asst Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac, who was a recommended by
DOJ Sec. Guingona.

Quiaoit was the one recommended by Congressman Jose Yap.

FVR appointed Quiaoit. Quiaoit assumed office.

Bermudez refused to vacate the office claiming that the original copy of Quiaoits
appointment had not yet been released by the DOJ Secretary.

Bermudez and Quiaoit were both called to the office of DOJ Secretary. Bermudez was
ordered to wind up his cases and turn-over the office to Quiaoit.

Thus, Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the
appointment lacks the recommendation of the DOJ Sec. Bermudez relies on the Revised Admin
Code stating that prosecutors shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
the DOJ Sec.
ISSUE:
Is the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary absolutely essential to the appointment of Quiaoit
as Prosecutor?
SC: ABSOLUTELY NO.
An appointment to public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having
the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an
office or trust. APPOINTMENT NECESSARILY CALLS FOR AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE APPOINTING POWER.
The power to appoint is essentially discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is the
prerogative of the appointing power. The RIGHT OF CHOICE IS THE HEART OF THE POWER
TO APPOINT.
The President, as HEAD OF GOVT has the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Control means the authority to alter or modify or even nullify or set aside
what a subordinate office has done, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as when
the former deems it to be appropriate.
Hence, the President has the power TO ASSUME DIRECTLY the functions of an executive
department, bureau or office.
The recommendation of the DOJ Secretary should be interpreted to be a MERE ADVICE,
EXHORTATION, INDORSEMENT, which is essentially persuasive in character, NOT BINDING,
NOR OBLIGATORY, upon the President. The recommendation is nothing really more than
advisory in nature.

SARMIENTO V. MISON, G. R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987


Padilla, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being
questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers,

members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is
not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA)
for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires
the confirmation from COA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from COA
is valid.
HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that
needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups
whom the President shall appoint:
Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls, Officers of
the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the
President that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those which does
not require approval from COA:
All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

SARMIENTO VS. MISON


APPOintments which do not need CA confirmation

Petitioners as taxpayers assail constitutionality of Misons appointment as Commisioner


of Bureau of Customs. They contend that the appointment has not been confirmed by the CA.

The Consti provides for 4 groups whom the President shall appoint:
1) head of executive departments, ambassadors, consuls, officers of the AFP with rank of
colonel or naval captain and above, other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this
Constitution:
a) members of the JBC,
b) Chairman / commissioners of CSC, Comelec, COA
c) members of regular consultative commissions.
2) all other officers of Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may vest in the President alone

The first item is uncontested, they clearly require the consent of the CA.

The 2nd, 3rd, 4th items are the ones disputed.

As to the 4th group, it is argued that since a law is needed to vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that the absence of such law, a lowerranked officer has to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the CA.
consequently, higher ranked officers should be appointed by the President, also subject to
confirmation by the CA
ISSUE:
Does the position of Commissioner of BoC require CA confirmation?
SC:VALID APPOINTMENT
The 2nd, 3rd groups do not require CA confirmation. The power to appoint is fundamentally
executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be
strictly construed against them. Such limitation or qualifications must be clearly stated in order
to be recognized. It is only in the first sentence of Sec 16where it is clearly stated that
appointments by the President to the positions enumerated therein require the consent of the
CA.

As to the 4th group, the clear and express intent of the constitution was to exclude presidential
appointments from CA confirmation, except the appointments to offices expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec 16.
Thus, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in
the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments. In short the word, ALONE,
appears to be redundant.
It is thus evident that the position of COMMISSIONER OF THE BOC, (a bureau head), is NOT
ONE OF THOSE WITHIN THE FIRST GROUP of appointments where consent of the CA is
required. As already said, the constitution deliberately excluded the position of bureau heads
from the appointments that need the CA confirmation.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
BOC, under Sec 601 of the RA 1937.

SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE


156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the
Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador
Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted
rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
Political Law Appointments Commission on Human Rights Security of Tenure
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the
Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the
designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA)
requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA.
Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she
explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the
COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautistas appointment with the COA, Cory designated
Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautistas
appointment as ad interim.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COAs actions. She impleaded Mallillin.
Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of
the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA
and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as
chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments
are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The
President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in
Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers
of government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. The law which
authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautistas appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political
in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be
made without the participation of the COA. Thus, Corys act of submitting the appointment of
Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the
latters approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission,
the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant as at that time, Bautista
already took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautistas appointment as ad interim. Since the
position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all
appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the
CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is
unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of
the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed that they must have a
term of office. They can only be removed upon cause and with the observance of due process.

BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA


FACTS:
- August 27, 1987: President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as
permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
- December 22, 1988: Bautista took her oath of office to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and
immediately acted as such.
- January 9, 1989: The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to
Bautista requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on
January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review.
- Bautista filed a petition with the Supreme Court.
- While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as
"Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his
appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post.
- Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the
Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista
shall be subsequently removed as well.
ISSUES:
WON the President's appointment is considered constitutional.
WON or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
WON or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989.
HELD:
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The
President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the
Constitution, that she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section
16, Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of
CoA, several government officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides the
appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the
appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without
the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore,
was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized
upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.
Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot
be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the
President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be
removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be
removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due process properly
safeguarded.
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule of law, after petitioner Bautista
had elevated her case to this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an Acting Chairman

for the Commission on Human Rights (pending decision in this case) instead of appointing
another permanent Chairman. The latter course would have added only more legal difficulties to
an already difficult situation.
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and
emoluments of said office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court
against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of the
Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.
Petition granted.

CALDERON VS. CARALE


APPOINTIVE POSITIONS SUBJECT TO CA CONFIRMATION

RA 6715 (the Herrera Veloso Law) was enacted to amend the Labor Code. It provided
that the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC shall be appointed by the President and
subject to CA confirmation

President Aquino thus appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of NLRC.

This was challenged by Calderon who assails the legality of the permanent
appointments made by the President to the respondent Chairman and Commissioners of the
NLRC.

Calderon claims that RA 6715 must be complied with since Congress may by law,
require confirmation by the CA on other officers aside from those mentioned in the Constitution.
He claims that the rulings in Mison and Bautista are not relevant here because there is a law RA
6715 which requires CA confirmation of such appointments.

Solgen on the other hand contends that RA 6715 unduly expands the confirmation
powers of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether Congress can, by law, require CA confirmation of appointments made by the President,
in addition to those expressly mentioned in Sec 16.
SC: NO. UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The NLRC officers fall within the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, or the 3rd group referred to in the
Mison ruling (those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint).
The requirement of CA confirmation on appointments of the officers of the NLRC is
unconstitutional because
1) it amends by legislation the first sentence of the Sec 16 of the Constitution, adding thereto
appointments requiring CA confirmation.
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec 16 of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the CA on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only to the President.
Again, the confirmation of the CA is required only for presidential appointments mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec 16 (or the first group in the Mison ruling). Under the second sentence, the
President maybe authorized to appoint without need for CA confirmation.
Chairman and Members of NLRC NO NEED FOR CA CONFIRMATION.

CALDERON VS CARALE
FACTS:
(1) This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715, stating:

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and
Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Labor and
Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
(2) Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this case
for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without
submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments.The Solicitor
General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code
transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission
on Appointments without constitutional basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of appointments extended by the president to governmentofficers additional to those expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whoseappointments
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715
insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of
the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby
declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
RATIO:
(1) To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
(1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
(2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.
(2) It is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and
not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it interpreted.

MANALO VS SISTOZA
Political Law Law on Public Officers Appointments Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
Civil Law Preliminary Title Duty of Courts in Respecting the Constitutionality of Laws PAssed
By Congress Presumption of Constitutionality; when not enjoyed
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of Interior and
Local Government. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as
to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be appointed. It was provided that the
PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and Chief Superintendents, after
being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
before said officers can take their office.
In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as Directors and Chief
Superintendents within the PNP. Said appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the validity of the appointments made. He

insists that without the confirmation by the Commission, Sistoza et al are acting without
jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of the said law.
Manalo also insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality,
and hence, it must be carried out by the courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid.
HELD:
No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior to this case, as with all other laws,
R.A. 6975 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws enacted by Congress must
be respected by courts and as much as possible, courts must avoid delving into the
constitutionality of a law.
However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that every
law passed by Congress is not repugnant to the Constitution.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group are the only ones whose appointments are required by the Constitution to be
affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. All others need not be confirmed. Officers of the
PNP are not included therein. There is also no merit to the contention that PNP officers are akin
to officers of the armed forces.
Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending the provisions set forth in the
Constitution.
Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate
to strike down such unconstitutionality.

ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.


G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003/ PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENT;
CONFIRMATION BY COA
FACTS:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a
petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office,
which requires confirmation of the COA.
HELD:
Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act
or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is
in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement

and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even
be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does
not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the
Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC).

Pimentel, Jr. vs Ermita,


(Public Officer, Difference Between Ad-Interim and Acting Appointments)
Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their
regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that while
Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant
position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first
having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments
even while Congress is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such
officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him
by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by
reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]
Issue:
WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
while Congress is in session.
Held:
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stopgap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But adinterim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments

are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting


appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are
a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of
one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically
the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere
with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives
power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office.
Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that
office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person
to an office.
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
472 SCRA 587 Political Law Commission on Appointment Ad Interim Appointments vs
Appointments in an Acting Capacity
Law on Public Officers Modes and Kinds of Appointment
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective
departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel
together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel
averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on
Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No.
292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting
capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is
empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issueappointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments
even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue
temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation
shall not exceed one year.
During

the

pendency

of

said

case,

Congress

adjourned

and

GMA

interimappointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

issued ad

HELD:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so
that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not
exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA,
and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also
proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is
the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She
cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter
ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress,
in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her
alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the
permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the
president may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as
long as the President deems that person competent.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity

Ad Interim Appointments

Appointments

in

an

Acting

Capacity

It is a permanent appointment because

Description

it takes effect immediately and can no

Acting appointments are a way

longer be withdrawn by the President

of temporarily filling important

once the appointee has qualified into

offices but, if abused, they can

office. The fact that it is subject to

also be a way of circumventing

confirmation by the COA does not alter

the need for confirmation by the

its permanent character (Matibag vs

Commission on Appointments.

Benipayo)
When
Effective
When Made
Submitted to
the COA

Upon Acceptance by Appointee

Upon Acceptance by Appointee

When Congress is in recess

Any time when there is vacancy

Yes

No

IN RE: VALENZUELA

PROHIBITION AGAINST MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS

On March 30, the president appointed Valenzuela and Vallarta as RTC judges.

Also, appointments to the CA have been made, dated March 11, 1998 (the day before
the constitutional ban on appointments)

May 4, 1998 the Chief Justice received a letter from the President requesting for the
final list of nominees so that the vacancy could be filled up within 90 days from the time the
vacancy occurred (Article VIII Sec 4).

DOJ Secretary Bello requested a GUIDANCE from the Chief Justice, regarding the
possibility of holding an immediate meeting of the JBC to fill up the vacancy.

The Chief Justice replied saying that there are no sessions scheduled for the JBC until
after the May 11 1998 elections. And so they still need to undertake a further study of the matter.
The Chief Justice also said that the list of nominees will follow after the elections. (The CJ
convenes the JBC.)

However, it appears that the Justice Secretary Bello and some members of the JBC held
a secret meeting, and came to an agreement that if the CJ still does not call or convene the
JBC, then they will be constrained to convene in order to fill up the vacancy. And so, Secretary
Bello and the others met regardless of the CJs wishes.

The CJ later received a letter from the President saying that the election-ban provision
on Sec 15 applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch (not
the judiciary). The President also reiterated his request for the final list of nominees
ISSUEs:
How is the requirement of filing up vacancies in the judiciary to be interpreted?
Does the prohibition in Sec 15 come into play? Is the president prohibited from making any
appointments?
SC:
During the period stated in Sec 15, the President is neither required nor allowed to make
appointments to the courts. This means that Article VIII Sec 4 simply means that the President
is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frame provided UNLESS PROHIBITED
BY SECTION 15.
The provision that the vacancy shall be filled within 90 days contrasts with the prohibition under
Sec 15, which is couched in stronger negative language that the President shall not make
appointments.
Sec 15 is directed against 2 types of appointments:
1) those made for buying votes refers to appmts made w/in 2 mos prior to election
2) those made for partisan considerations refers to midnight appmts.
Sec 15 is thus broader. It contemplates not only midnight appointments but also appointments
presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential elections.
Sec 15 allows only a narrow exception, that is, making TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS to
EXECUTIVE POSITOINS when continued vacancies would PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR
ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 obviously made during the
period of the ban. Thus they come within the first prohibition relating to appointments which are
considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election.
While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is not
showing of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointment during the period of
the ban. In fact, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made
within the ban period.
RECAP:
General Rule: Sec 15 Article VII (2-mos ban) prevails over Sec 4 of Article VIII (need to fill up
vacancy 90-days) during the period of the ban which is 2 months before the Presidential
elections, the President is not required to make appointments to fill up vacancies in the judiciary.

Exceptions: temporary appointments to executive when required by public service or public


safety
Note also, this situation arises only once every 6 years!!
IN RE VALENZUELA
FACTS:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City
and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be
expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision
prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
HELD:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments
comes into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of
the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the
filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of
the ban