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Saguisag

vs

Executive

Secretary

EDCA is In the Form of an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate Concurrence (Saguisag vs Exec Secretary,
2016)
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA
(Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and
ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US
may undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed
upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the
constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and
facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through
Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the constitutionality
of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of
having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from
general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as
citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be
violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the
Court as citizens suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the
disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has
been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its
incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the
petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which justify setting
aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself,
particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is
behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a
public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise
its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate
concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the
requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction. Read more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere executive
agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements
on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such
and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the implementation of
the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec
25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.

De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the stay of the foreign
troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish. The
EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of
Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.

Suzette Nicolas vs Alberto Romulo


On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said
crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against
our penal laws and the crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between
the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners
appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US
senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a
matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that
executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The
SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As
regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and
this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its
provisions.

NICOLAS VS. ROMULO


Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, member of the US Armed Forces, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape in the RTC of Makati. The court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City Jail until further orders.
On December 19 and 22, 2006, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo and US Ambassador Kristie
Kenney executed agreements that pursuant to the VFA, Smith be returned to the US military custody and be detained
at
the
first
floor,
Rowe
Building,
US
Embassy
Compound.
Petitioner Jovito Salonga, et al. challenged the validity of the said agreements contending that the Philippines should
have custody of Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional since it violates Art. XVlll, Sec. 25 of the
constitution.
Is the VFA constitutional? Granting that it is constitutional, Are the Romulo-Kenney Agreements in accordance with the
provisions
of
the
VFA
itself?
SUGGESTED

ANSWER:

The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
entered into on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006
are
DECLARED
not
in
accordance
with
the
VFA.
VFA

is

Constitutional

The SC ruled that the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States, and the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States does not detract
from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by
the
other
contracting
State.

The issue, the Court said, is whether or not the presence of the US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the
VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State. It is, the Court ruled. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military
exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the Court held. visit
fellester.blogspot.com The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was signed and duly ratified with the
concurrence
of
both
the
Philippine
Senate
and
the
United
States
Senate.
Romulo-Kenney

Agreements

not

in

accord

with

the

VFA

itself

The Court however ruled that the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements
on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such
detention is not by Philippine authorities. Article V, Section 10 of the VFA provides that the confinement or detention
by Philippine authorities of the United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate
Philippines and United States authorities. (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888,
February
11,
2009)
DISSENTING

OPINION

In his dissent, Chief Justice Puno maintained his view in the earlier case of Bayan v. Zamora that the VFA falls short of
the requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution, which provides that the agreement allowing the presence
of foreign military troops in the Philippines must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. For the Chief
Justice, the majority of the Court in Bayan v. Zamora gave undue deference to the statement of former US Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard that US Senate advice and consent was not needed to consider a treaty binding on the US, then
jumped to the conclusion that the US recognized the VFA as a treaty, and that the constitutional requirements had been
satisfied. (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009)

VINUYA VS. ROMULO


FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the
Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during
the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to
assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity
and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology
and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which
is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries,
and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form
of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this
region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of
time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion
to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the
interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international
legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf.
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on
his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to
whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose
behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All
they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress.
All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not
shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between
the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do
not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading

(G.R. No. L14279)


Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
0
FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In
1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able
to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate
the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the
Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred
upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to
as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more
formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this
and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes
or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are
not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to
certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover
such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil
aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of
trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts;
while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were
concluded independently of any legislation.

GO TEK v DEPORTATION BOARD


FACTS
Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation after a search of an office in Sta Cruz, Manila. He was
alleged to have with him at the time of the arrest fakedollar checks in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Court
which rendered him an undesirable alien.- Th e Ch i e f P r o se c u t o r o f t h e De p o r t a t i o n f i l e d a c o m p l a in t
a g a in s t G o Tek wi t h a p ra ye r t h a t a f t e r t h e t r i a l t h e D e p o r t a t io n B o a r d r e c o m m e n d t o t h e
P re s i d e n t o f t h e Philippines Go Teks immediate deportation as his presence in this country having been, and will
always be a menace to the peace. welfare, and security of the community.- Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him and that the Board had no
jurisdiction to trythe case in view of the ruling in
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board
,
118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deported only on the grounds specified in the law.- The Board denied the motion. They
reasoned that it was not necessary for an alien to be convicted before the State can exercise its right to deport said
alien. Besides theBoard is only a fact finding body whose function is to report and recommend to the President in
whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien.- The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writ of
prohibition against the Board.- Hence this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE/S
WON the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not specified in Section 37 of
the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.
HELD
Yes.- A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of the instant
prohibition action of Go Tek. The President's power to deportaliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation
are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code:- SEC. 69.
Deportation of subject of foreign power.
A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled, or excluded from
saidIslands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator, conducted by
said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground uponwhich such action is contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three daysfor
the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposingwitnesses.- On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law
Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination
by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of theground for deportation as charged against the alien."- So, under
existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the RevisedAdministrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration
upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua CheeGan vsDeportation Board,
supra
).- The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed.
960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise bythe Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary
for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.
Disposition
CFI decision is reversed and set aside
Deportation of Undesirable AliensBook III, Chapter 3, Sec. 8, Revised Administrative Code of 1987
The President shall have the power to deport aliens subject to the requirements of due process.

GO TEK VS DEPORTATION BOARD

Facts:-the Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek, a Chinaman, residing in
Ilagan, Isabela and in Sta. Cruz, Manila.-it was alleged in the complaint that in December 1963, a number of NBI
agents searched an office on O' Donnel St. in Sta. Cruz, which was believed to be theheadquarters of a guerilla unit of
the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and among those arrested was Go Tek.- Go Tek was
an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.- Also, as further alleged, there
were several fake dollars found in his possession and that he had violated Art. 168 of the RPC and rendered himself
anundesirable alien.-The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to the President of the
Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirablealien, and that "his presence in this country having
been, and will always be and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of the community".-Go Tek filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him in the city
fiscal's office of Manila for violation of Article 168.He contended that the board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view
of the obiter dictum in
Qua Chee Gan
that the boardmay deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law.-The Board, in its resolution of April 21, 1964
denied Go Tek's motion. The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State myexercise its
rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report
and recommendation to thePresident in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation
proceeding.-Go Tek filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition action against the Board.

- CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek, citing the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan, stating that mere possession of fake dollars is
not a ground for deportation under theImmigration Law; and that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be
deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a termof one year or more for a crime involving
moral turpitude a conviction is and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168,the
deportation was premature.-The Board appealed to the SC alleging that the decision was contrary to law.-The parties
stipulated that the Deportation Board is an agency of the President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of
undesirable aliens and toreport and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein.Issue: Whether the
President has the power to deport undesirable aliens?Ruling: Yes.The President's power to deport aliens and the
investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code:SEC. 69.
Deportation of subject of foreign power.
A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deportedexpelled, or excluded from said
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator,conducted by said
Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the
personconcerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three
days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examinethe opposing witnesses.On the other hand, section 37 of the
Immigration Law provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien." Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specifiedin section 37.So, under
existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected(1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration
upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law.The State has the
inherent power to deport undesirable aliens .That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems
such action necessaryfor the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation". According to Justice Johnson, that
when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continuedin the country is injurious to the public interest, he
may, even in the absence of express law, deport them. The right of a country to expel or deport aliensbecause their
continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified .The Deportation Board is composed
of the Undersecretary of Justice as chairman , the solicitor General, and a representative of the Secretary of
NationalDefense (Executive Order No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M).Section 69 and Executive Order No.
398 provides that, the Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation. Paragraph (a) of Executive
Order No. 398 merely provides that "the Deportation Board,
motu proprio
or upon complaint of any person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code to determine whether a subject of a foreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable
alien or not,and thereafter to recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien.As observed
by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the
intention of the law is to grantthe Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the
country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts
upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final andexecutory."The
reasons may be summed up in a single word: the public interest. Also, It is fundamental that an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case.

BELTRAN VS. MAKASIAR


Facts:

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal

proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on
press freedom.

Issues:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for
his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held:

(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of
submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that
the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the chilling effect
point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)