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1. Pefianco v.

322 SCRA 439
Administrative Due Process
FACTS: Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent for
dishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to
furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. It was denied.
HELD: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him.
He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
and the evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent had
been accorded these rights.
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging
rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of








Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme
court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority
to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or

permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the
3. Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 756
J. Gancayo
Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice.
However, this was revoked when his fathers citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and
misrepresentation. Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that
they refused to register as aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said
that the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the CID. They filed a petition
with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of merit.
Their MFR was also denied. Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public documents in
alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this for the sale of real property.
The trial court acquitted him by saying that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened
by Opinion 147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and told them to register as
aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of
Manila. They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias mfr was denied. In their SC petition, they
seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they werent subject to immediate deportation,
the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CAs overstepping of appellate jurisdiction, and the
resolution of the SC didnt make a ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false
1. Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens
Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false
and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by
Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into
the country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive
finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power is
the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is
provided that: No alien shall be deported
without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be
informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in
accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.

On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state.
There is no justification for a private party to intervene.
4. Velasco vs Villegas GR L-24153 14 February 1983
Facts: Petitioners assailed the validity of Ordinance 4964, prohibiting barbershop to conduct
massaging customers in a separate room or in any room in the same building where the operator
of the barbershop and the room of massaging is the same. The contention being that it amounts to
a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process
of law. Lower Court dismissed the petition for declaratory relief.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 4964 is unconstitutional?
Decision: Decision affirmed. Order 4964 is a police power measure in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.
5. City of Manila vs. Laguio

Due Process

Equal Protection

Requisites of a Valid Exercise of Police Power by LGU

The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools
in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as
it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.








The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police

power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded
social ills fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in
Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of
Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places.... Every
house, building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the
prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man
out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires.
The Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council unde
the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
6. White Light Corp V City of Manila
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have
the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons.
The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a
valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual
liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who
goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are
tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may4 be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

7. Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

J. Cruz
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the
station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a
carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court. In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against
the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to
heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper
exercise of legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution
wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of
legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due
process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to
the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was
flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to
its interpretation like a straitjacket. There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a
safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence
as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts
proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a criminal offense
cancelled without hearing. The protection
of the general welfare is the particular function of police
power which both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in
addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception. While 626-A has the same
lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be said that it complies with the existence of a
lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.

Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not
juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice
with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution. The challenged measure was an invalid
exercise of police power because the method to confiscate carabos was oppressive. Due process
was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense and punished
immediately. This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of
powers. The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
8. People v Cayat
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any
other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was
caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00
and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or
mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge.
The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race.
On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them
rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now
enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is,
in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to
raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the
ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

9. Tiu v Ca G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999

J. Panganiban

On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227. This
was for the conversion of former military bases into industrial and commercial uses. Subic was
one of these areas. It was made into a special economic zone.
In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There was also tax
incentives and duty free importation policies under this law.
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97),
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. It said that
On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials,
capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ
On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all
business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A.
No. 7227.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A),
specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative.
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base
shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and
individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw
materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to
equal protection of the laws. This was due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the
entire area of Olongapo. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A
is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the
SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas
mentioned in Section 12 of the law.
Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining the application of R.A. 7227 within
the secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured area is
discriminatory or not owing to a violation of the equal protection clause.
Held. No. Petition dismissed.
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of
Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic
in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the
Subic Naval Base. However, they claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to the naval base
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.

Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose
of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the
same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses.
This was really limited to the military bases as the law's intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked
the BCDA to specifically develop the areas the bases occupied.
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-dutyfree importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no
foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of
resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers.
The target of the law was the big investor who can pour in capital.
Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely
to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to
productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to
extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity
of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no
violation of the constitutional clause.
Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their capital into it.
RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center. There will really be differences between it and the outside zone of Olongapo.
The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and businesses in the zone. They
are similarly treated to contribute to the end gaol of the law.
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief
Officer, with the basic monthly salary8 of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid
vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by
the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines,
serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twentythree days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality
of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section
18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will
receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to
regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever
they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against,
and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
11. Biraogo v Truth Commission
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit
their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However,
PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in
disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or
even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public

office and appropriate funds for its operation;

The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does
not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth

The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting
it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the

It violates the equal protection clause

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is10
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been

constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is
not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
12. Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail
and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive
activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be
issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the
warrant were real properties.
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed
by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of
the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford
vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched
and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by
petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times,
newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines
and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable
words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable.