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FORECLOSURE

A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of ownership of the property in the name of the purchaser. It is settled
that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of
one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any time following
the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required in
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as
confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of
the court.
The law on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage provides that a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale may take possession
of the foreclosed property even before the expiration of the redemption period, provided he furnishes the necessary bond.
Possession of the property may be obtained by filing an ex parte motion with the regional trial court of the province or place where
the property is situated. Upon filing of the motion and the required bond, it becomes a ministerial duty of the court to order the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. After the expiration of the one-year period without redemption being
effected by the property owner, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute. The basis
of this right to possession is the purchasers ownership of the property. Mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ
of possession would suffice, and no bond is required.
It is worthy of note that the pendency of the case for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings is not a bar to the issuance of the
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writ of possession. Pending such proceedings whose subject is the validity of the foreclosure proceedings, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of property. Until such time the foreclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of
possession is ministerial on the part of the RTC of Pili.
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place
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and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. The goal of
the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of the auction sale. This is why publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is required.
It bears emphasis that, for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite
publication has the burden of proving the same.
The key element in both cases is still general circulation of the newspaper in the place where the property is located.
As held by the Supreme Court in Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc.,personal notice to the mortgagor is not
necessary for the validity of the foreclosure proceedings, thus:
"The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public
generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to
secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated,
not for the mortgagors benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated.
NO. No such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or
banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed by an order of the court. . . shall operate to divest the
rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.' There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial
foreclosure sale 'when confirmed be an order of the court. . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to
vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such rights exceptionally 'allowed
by law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts

No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any
judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the
foreclosure sale which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after
registration of the foreclosure sale exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is
recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from
the registration of the sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale.
EXPROPRIATION
Thus, in determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider the following factors: (1) the acquisition cost of
the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the
owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the non-payment of taxes
or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, any.
There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate
under consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from
receipt of claimfolder.
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property; A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice.
DECLARATORY RELIEF
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised
in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the
general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the
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circumstances.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have
been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of
one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate
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relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent
was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet
title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under
[the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is
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merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and
explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or
possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00
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The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. It is not
among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are
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involved. Similarly, the Rules of Court is explicit that such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial
Court.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
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legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. We find that the
Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these requirements
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance,
for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given
the force and effect of law
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Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if
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only questions of law are involved. True, we have said that such a petition may be treated as one for
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prohibition or mandamus if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved; but the
exercise of such discretion presupposes, at the outset, that the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.
. It was highly irregular and totally unwarranted for respondent court to have allowed said third-party complaint. The
circumstances surrounding the allowance and admission thereof indicate that respondent court's action was hasty,
baseless and arbitrary.

It must be noted that the reason for the law requiring the joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to do so would
deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they
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would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the Identical issue. In the case at bar, although it is true that any
declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties because the question involved is
the power of the Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question. Whether or not they are impleaded, any
determination of the controversy would be binding upon the squatters.
The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case cannot defeat
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
which says that the non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration is a
jurisdictional defect. Said section merely states that "All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules,
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action.