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THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.124699.July31,2003]

BOGOMEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO
VALDEZSR.,respondents.
DECISION
CORONA,J.:

ThisisanappealbycertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourtseekingtoannulandsetasidethedecision[1]datedNovember17,
1995 of the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, which reversed the decision[2] dated November 27, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch IX, which ruled in favor of herein petitioner, BogoMedellin Milling Company, Inc. and dismissed herein private
respondents'complaintforpaymentofcompensationand/orrecoveryofpossessionofrealpropertyanddamageswithapplicationfor
restrainingorderorpreliminaryinjunctionanditsresolutiondatedMarch2,1996denyingpetitioner'smotionforreconsideration.
Theantecedentfactsfollow.
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents Sergio Valdez, Angelina ValdezNovabos, Teresita Argawanon
MangubatandDaylindaArgawanonMelendres(hereaftertheheirs),purchasedfromFelicianaSantillan,onDecember9,1935,aparcel
of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3935 with an area of one hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares, located in Barrio
Dayhagon,Medellin,Cebu.[3]Hetookpossessionofthepropertyanddeclareditfortaxpurposesinhisname.[4]
Priortothesale,however,theentirelengthofthelandfromnorthtosouthwasalreadytraversedinthemiddlebyrailroadtracks
ownedbypetitionerBogoMedellinMillingCo.,Inc.(hereafterBomedco).Thetrackswereusedforhaulingsugarcanefromthefieldsto
petitionerssugarmill.
When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in 1948, herein private respondents inherited the land. However, unknown to them,
BomedcowasabletohavethedisputedmiddlelotwhichwasoccupiedbytherailroadtracksplacedinitsnameintheCadastralSurvey
ofMedellin,Cebuin1965.Theentiresubjectlandwasdividedintothree,namely,CadastralLotNos.953,954and955.LotNos.953
and955remainedinthenameofprivaterespondents.However,LotNo.954,thenarrowlotwheretherailroadtrackslay,wasclaimed
byBomedcoasitsownandwasdeclaredfortaxpurposesinitsname.[5]
It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco on inquiry with the Bureau of
Lands.Throughtheirlawyer,theyimmediatelydemandedthelegalbasisforBomedco'sclaimoverCadastralLotNo.954buttheirletter
ofinquiryaddressedtopetitionerwentunheeded,aswastheirsubsequentdemandforpaymentofcompensationfortheuseoftheland.
[6]

OnJune8,1989,respondentheirsfiledaComplaintforPaymentofCompensationand/orRecoveryofPossessionofRealProperty
andDamageswithApplicationforRestrainingOrder/PreliminaryInjunctionagainstBomedcobeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofCebu.[7]
Respondentheirsallegedthat,beforeshesoldthelandtoValdez,Sr.in1935,SantillangrantedBomedco,in1929,arailroadrightof
wayforaperiodof30years.WhenValdez,Sr.acquiredtheland,herespectedthegrant.Therightofwayexpiredsometimein1959but
respondentheirsallowedBomedcotocontinueusingthelandbecauseoneofthemwasthenanemployeeofthecompany.[8]
Insupportofthecomplaint,theypresentedanancientdocumentanoriginalcopyofthedeedofsalewritteninSpanishanddated
December9,1935[9]toevidencethesaleofthelandtoMagdalenoValdez,Sr.severaloriginalrealestatetaxreceipts[10]including
Real Property Tax Receipt No. 3935[11] dated 1922 in the name of Graciano de los Reyes, husband of Feliciana Santillan, and Real
Property Tax Receipt No. 09491[12] dated 1963 in the name of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. Magdaleno Valdez, Jr. also testified for the
plaintiffsduringthetrial.
Ontheotherhand,BomedcosprincipaldefensewasthatitwastheownerandpossessorofCadastralLotNo.954,havingallegedly
boughtthesamefromFelicianaSantillanin1929,priortothesaleofthepropertybythelattertoMagdalenoValdez,Sr.in1935.Italso
contendedthatplaintiffsclaimwasalreadybarredbyprescriptionandlachesbecauseofBomedcosopenandcontinuouspossessionof
thepropertyformorethan50years.
BomedcosubmittedinevidenceaDeedofSale[13]datedMarch18,1929sevenrealestatetaxreceipts[14]forthepropertycovering
theperiodfrom1930to1985a1929SurveyPlanofprivatelandforBogoMedellinMillingCompany[15]aSurveyNotificationCard[16]
Lot Data Computation for Lot No. 954[17] a Cadastral Map for Medellin Cadastre[18] as well as the testimonies of Vicente Basmayor,
GeodeticEngineerandpropertycustodianforBomedco,andRafaelaA.Belleza,GeodeticEngineerandChiefoftheLandManagement
ServicesoftheDENR,RegionVIII.
InitsdecisiondatedNovember27,1991,thetrialcourt[19] rejected Bomedco's defense of ownership on the basis of a prior sale,
citingthatitsevidenceaxeroxcopyoftheDeedofSaledatedMarch18,1929wasinadmissibleandhadnoprobativevalue.Notonly
wasitnotsignedbythepartiesbutdefendantBomedcoalsofailedtopresenttheoriginalcopywithoutvalidreasonpursuanttoSection
4,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt.[20]
Nonetheless, the trial court held that Bomedco had been in possession of Cadastral Lot No. 954 in good faith for more than 10
years, thus, it had already acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code. It
explained:
Under Article 620 of the Civil Code, CONTINUOUS and APPARENT easements can be acquired by prescription after ten (10) years. The apparent
characteristic of the questioned property being used by defendant as an easement is no longer at issue, because plaintiffs themselves had
acknowledged that the existence of the railway tracks of defendant Bomedco was already known by the late Magdaleno Valdez, herein plaintiffs
predecessor-in-interest, before the late Magdaleno Valdez purchased in 1935 from the late Feliciana Santillan the land described in the Complaint
where defendants railway tracks is traversing [sic] (TSN of February 5, 1991, pp. 7-8). As to the continuity of defendants use of the strip of land as
easement is [sic] also manifest from the continuous and uninterrupted occupation of the questioned property from 1929 up to the date of the ling of
the instant Complaint. In view of the defendants UNINTERRUPTED possession of the strip of land for more than ty (50) years, the Supreme
Courts ruling in the case of Ronquillo, et al. v. Roco, et al. (103 Phil 84) is not applicable. This is because in said case the easement in question was a
strip of dirt road whose possession by the dominant estate occurs only everytime said dirt road was being used by the dominant estate. Such fact
would necessarily show that the easements possession by the dominant estate was never continuous. In the instant case however, there is clear
continuity of defendants possession of the strip of land it had been using as railway tracks. Because the railway tracks which defendant had
constructed on the questioned strip of land had been CONTINUOUSLY occupying said easement. Thus, defendant Bomedcos apparent and
continuous possession of said strip of land in good faith for more than ten (10) years had made defendant owner of said strip of land traversed by its
railway tracks. Because the railway tracks which defendant had constructed on the questioned strip of land had been continuously occupying said

easement [sic]. Thus, defendant Bomedcos apparent and continuous possession of said strip of land in good faith for more than ten (10) years had
made defendant owner of said strip of land traversed by its railway tracks.
RespondentheirselevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppealswhichfoundthatBomedcodidnotacquireownershipoverthelot.It
consequentlyreversedthetrialcourt.InitsdecisiondatedNovember17,1995,theappellatecourtheldthatBomedcoonlyacquiredan
easementofrightofwaybyunopposedandcontinuoususeoftheland,butnotownership,underArticle620oftheCivilCode.
TheappellatecourtfurtherruledthatBomedcosclaimofapriorsaletoitbyFelicianaSantillanwasuntrue.Itspossessionbeingin
bad faith, the applicable prescriptive period in order to acquire ownership over the land was 30 years under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code.Adversepossessionofthepropertystartedonlyin1965whenBomedcoregistereditsclaiminthecadastralsurveyofMedellin.
Sinceonly24yearsfrom1965hadelapsedwhentheheirsfiledacomplaintagainstBomedcoin1989,Bomedcospossessionofthe
landhadnotyetripenedintoownership.
Andsincetherewasnoshowingthatrespondentheirsortheirpredecessorininterestwaseverpaidcompensationfortheuseof
theland,theappellatecourtawardedcompensationtothem,tobecomputedfromthetimeofdiscoveryoftheadverseactsofBomedco.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its resolution dated March 22, 1996, Bomedco now
interposesbeforeusthispresentappealbycertiorariunderRule45,assigningthefollowingerrors:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
DISMISSING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ORDERED THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THE REASONABLE VALUE OF LOT 954 AND THE AMOUNT OF TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS AS REASONABLE
ATTORNEYS FEES.
PetitionerBomedcoreiteratesitsclaimofownershipofthelandthroughextraordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionunderArticle1137of
theCivilCodeandlachestodefeattheclaimforcompensationorrecoveryofpossessionbyrespondentheirs.Italsosubmitsathird
groundoriginallytenderedbythetrialcourtacquisitionoftheeasementofrightofwaybyprescriptionunderArticle620oftheCivil
Code.
ExtraordinaryAcquisitivePrescription
UnderArt.1137oftheCivilCode
Petitioners claim of ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code cannot be
sustained.
There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in the continuous possession of petitioner since 1929. But
possession,toconstitutethefoundationofaprescriptiveright,mustbepossessionunderaclaimoftitle,thatis,itmustbeadverse.[21]
Unlesscoupledwiththeelementofhostilitytowardsthetrueowner,possession,howeverlong,willnotconfertitlebyprescription.[22]
Afteracarefulreviewoftherecords,weareinclinedtobelievetheversionofrespondentheirsthataneasementofrightofwaywas
actuallygrantedtopetitionerforwhichreasonthelatterwasabletooccupyCadastralLotNo.954.Wecannotdisregardthefactthat,for
theyears1930,1937,1949,1962and1963,petitionerunequivocallydeclaredthepropertytobeacentralrailroadrightofwayorsugar
centralrailroadrightofwayinitsrealestatetaxreceiptswhenitcouldhavedeclaredittobeindustriallandasitdidfortheyears1975
and1985.[23]Insteadofindicatingownershipofthelot,thesereceiptsshowedthatallpetitionerhadwaspossessionbyvirtueoftheright
ofwaygrantedtoit.Wereitnotsoandpetitionerreallyownedtheland,petitionerwouldnothaveconsistentlyusedthephrasescentral
railroadrightofwayandsugarcentralrailroadrightofwayinitstaxdeclarationsuntil1963.Certainlyanownerwouldhavefoundno
needforthesephrases.Apersoncannothaveaneasementonhisownland,sincealltheusesofaneasementarefullycomprehended
inhisgeneralrightofownership.[24]
Whileitistruethat,togetherwithapersonsactualandadversepossessionoftheland,taxdeclarationsconstitutestrongevidence
of ownership of the land occupied by him,[25] this legal precept does not apply in cases where the property is declared to be a mere
easementofrightofway.
Aneasementorservitudeisarealright,constitutedonthecorporealimmovablepropertyofanother,byvirtueofwhichtheowner
hastorefrainfromdoing,ormustallowsomeonetodo,somethingonhisproperty,forthebenefitofanotherthingorperson.Itexists
onlywhentheservientanddominantestatesbelongtotwodifferentowners.Itgivestheholderoftheeasementanincorporealinterest
on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to
another.[26]
Havingheldthepropertybyvirtueofaneasement,petitionercannotnowassertthatitsoccupancysince1929wasintheconceptof
anowner.Neithercanitdeclarethatthe30yearperiodofextraordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionstartedfromthatyear.
Petitioner,however,maintainsthatevenifaservitudewasmerelyimposedonthepropertyinitsfavor,itspossessionimmediately
became adverse to the owner in the late 1950s when the grant was alleged by respondent heirs to have expired. It stresses that,
countingfromthelate1950s(1959asfoundbythetrialcourt),the30yearextraordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionhadalreadysetinby
thetimerespondentheirsmadeaclaimagainstitintheirlettersdatedMarch1andApril6,1989.
Wedonotthinkso.Themereexpirationoftheperiodofeasementin1959didnotconvertpetitionerspossessionintoanadverse
one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possessionisaccompaniedbytheintenttopossessasanowner.[27]Thereshouldbeahostileuseofsuchanatureandexercisedunder
suchcircumstancesastomanifestandgivenoticethatthepossessionisunderaclaimofright.
Intheabsenceofanexpressgrantbytheowner,orconductbypetitionersugarmillfromwhichanadverseclaimcanbeimplied,its
possessionofthelotcanonlybepresumedtohavecontinuedinthesamecharacteraswhenitwasacquired(thatis,itpossessedthe
land only by virtue of the original grant of the easement of right of way),[28] or was by mere license or tolerance of the owners
(respondent heirs).[29] It is a fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of
licenseortoleranceoftheowner,nomatterhowlong,donotstarttherunningoftheperiodofprescription.[30]
Afterthegrantofeasementexpiredin1959,petitionerneverperformedanyactincompatiblewiththeownershipofrespondentheirs
overCadastralLotNo.954.Onthecontrary,until1963,petitionercontinuedtodeclarethesugarcentralrailroadrightofwayinitsrealty
taxreceipts,therebydoubtlesslyconcedingtheownershipofrespondentheirs.Respondentsthemselveswereemphaticthattheysimply
toleratedpetitionerscontinueduseofCadastralLotNo.954soasnottojeopardizetheemploymentofoneoftheircoheirsinthesugar
millofpetitioner.[31]
Theonlytimepetitionerassumedalegalpositionadversetorespondentswaswhenitfiledaclaimoverthepropertyin1965during
thecadastralsurveyofMedellin.Sincethen(1965)anduntilthefilingofthecomplaintfortherecoveryofthesubjectlandbeforethe

RTCofCebuin1989,only24yearshadlapsed.Sincetherequired30yearextraordinaryprescriptiveperiodhadnotyetbeencomplied
within1989,petitionerneveracquiredownershipofthesubjectland.
Laches
Neither can petitioner find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The
essenceoflachesisthefailureorneglect,foranunreasonableandunexplainedlengthoftime,todothatwhich,throughduediligence,
could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or
declinedtoassertit.[32]
Its essential elements are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge of defendants acts and after he has had the
opportunitytosue(c)lackofknowledgeornoticebydefendantthatthecomplainantwillasserttherightonwhichhebaseshissuitand
(d)injuryorprejudicetothedefendantintheeventthereliefisaccordedtothecomplainant.[33]
Thesecondelement(whichinturnhasthreeaspects)islackinginthecaseatbar.Theseaspectsare:(a)knowledgeofdefendant's
action,(b)opportunitytosuedefendantafterobtainingsuchknowledgeand(c)delayinthefilingofsuchsuit.[34]
Recordsshowthatrespondentheirsonlylearnedaboutpetitionersclaimontheirpropertywhentheydiscoveredtheinscriptionfor
thecadastralsurveyintherecordsoftheBureauofLandsin1989.Respondentslostnotimeindemandinganexplanationforsaidclaim
in their letters to the petitioner dated March 1, 1989 and April 6, 1989. When petitioner ignored them, they instituted their complaint
beforetheRegionalTrialCourtofCebuCityonJune8,1989.
PetitionersrelianceonCarovs.CourtofAppeals [35]andVda.deAlbertovs.CourtofAppeals [36]ismisplaced.There,lacheswas
applied to bar petitioners from questioning the ownership of the disputed properties precisely because they had knowledge of the
adverseclaimsontheirpropertiesyettarriedforanextraordinaryperiodoftimebeforetakingstepstoprotecttheirrights.
Further,thereisnoabsoluteruleonwhatconstituteslaches.Itisaruleofequityandappliednottopenalizeneglectorsleepingon
ones rights but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case must be decided according to its particular circumstances.[37] It is the
betterrulethatcourts,undertheprincipleofequity,shouldnotbeguidedorboundstrictlybythestatuteoflimitationsorthedoctrineof
lachesifwrongorinjusticewillresult.
ItisclearthatpetitionerneveracquiredownershipoverCadastralLotNo.954whetherbyextraordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionorby
laches.
AcquisitionofEasementofRightofWayBy
PrescriptionUnderArt.620oftheCivilCode
Petitioner contends that, even if it failed to acquire ownership of the subject land, it nevertheless became legally entitled to the
easementofrightofwayoversaidlandbyvirtueofprescriptionunderArticle620oftheCivilCode:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
ThetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsbothupheldthisviewforthereasonthattherailroadrightofwaywas,accordingtothem,
continuousandapparentinnature.Themoreorlesspermanentrailroadtrackswerevisuallyapparentandtheycontinuouslyoccupied
thesubjectstripoflandfrom1959(theyeartheeasementgrantedbyFelicianaSantillantopetitionerexpired).Thus,withthelapseof
the10yearprescriptiveperiodin1969,petitionersupposedlyacquiredtheeasementofrightofwayoverthesubjectland.
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of persons is permanently cemented or
asphalted,thentherightofwayoveritbecomescontinuousinnature.Thereasoningiserroneous.
Undercivillawanditsjurisprudence,easementsareeithercontinuousordiscontinuousaccordingtothemannertheyareexercised,
not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, an easement is
continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage[38] and it is
discontinuousifitisusedatintervalsanddependsontheactofman,liketheeasementofrightofway.[39]
Theeasementofrightofwayisconsidereddiscontinuousbecauseitisexercisedonlyifapersonpassesorsetsfootonsomebody
elsesland.Likearoadforthepassageofvehiclesorpersons,aneasementofrightofwayofrailroadtracksisdiscontinuousbecause
therightisexercisedonlyifandwhenatrainoperatedbyapersonpassesoveranother'sproperty.Inotherwords,theveryexerciseof
theservitudedependsupontheactorinterventionofmanwhichistheveryessenceofdiscontinuouseasements.
Thepresenceofmoreorlesspermanentrailroadtracksdoesnotinanywayconvertthenatureofaneasementofrightofwayto
onethatiscontinuous.Itisnotthepresenceofapparentsignsorphysicalindicationsshowingtheexistenceofaneasement,butrather
themannerofexercisethereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous.The presence of physical or visual
signs only classifies an easement into apparent or nonapparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which
evidencesarighttolightandview)areapparenteasements,whileaneasementofnotbuildingbeyondacertainheightisnonapparent.
[40]

In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make the right of way a continuous one it is only
apparent.Therefore,itcannotbeacquiredbyprescription.[41]InLouisiana,ithasalsobeenheldthatarightofpassageoveranother's
landcannotbeclaimedbyprescriptionbecausethiseasementisdiscontinuousandcanbeestablishedonlybytitle.[42]
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence of an apparent but
discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not,
maybeacquiredonlybytitle.Unfortunately,petitionerBomedconeveracquiredanytitleovertheuseoftherailroadrightofwaywhether
bylaw,donation,testamentarysuccessionorcontract.Itsuseoftherightofway,howeverlong,neverresultedinitsacquisitionofthe
easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired bytitle and not by
prescription.
Tobesure,beginning1959whentheoriginal30yeargrantofrightofwaygiventopetitionerBomedcoexpired,itsoccupationand
useofCadastralLotNo.954cametobebymeretoleranceoftherespondentheirs.Thus,upondemandbysaidheirsin1989forthe
return of the subject land and the removal of the railroad tracks, or, in the alternative, payment of compensation for the use thereof,
petitioner Bomedco which had no title to the land should have returned the possession thereof or should have begun paying
compensationforitsuse.
Butwhenisapartydeemedtoacquiretitleovertheuseofsuchland(thatis,titleovertheeasementofrightofway)?Inatleasttwo
cases,weheldthatif:(a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs for the continued use of the land
undertheprinciplesofvoluntaryeasementsor(b)ithadfiledacaseagainsttheheirsforconfermentonitofalegaleasementofrightof
wayunderArticle629oftheCivilCode,thentitleovertheuseofthelandisdeemedtoexist.Theconfermentofalegaleasementof
rightofwayunderArticle629issubjecttoproofofthefollowing:

(1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) payment of proper indemnity;
(3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, the distance from
the dominant estate to the highway is the shortest.[43]
Noneoftheaboveoptionstoacquiretitleovertherailroadrightofwaywaseverpursuedbypetitionerdespitethefactthatsimple
resourcefulness demanded such initiative, considering the importance of the railway tracks to its business. No doubt, it is unlawfully
occupyingandusingthesubjectstripoflandasarailroadrightofwaywithoutvalidtitleyetitrefusestovacateitevenafterdemandof
theheirs.Furthermore,ittenaciouslyinsistsonownershipthereofdespiteaclearshowingtothecontrary.
WethusupholdthegrantbytheCourtofAppealsofattorneysfeesintheamountofP10,000consideringtheevidentbadfaithof
petitionerinrefusingrespondentsjustandlawfulclaims,compellingthelattertolitigate.[44]
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.TheappealeddecisiondatedNovember17,1995andresolutiondatedMarch2,1996ofthe
CourtofAppealsareAFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATION.PetitionerBogoMedellinMillingCompany,Inc.isherebyorderedtovacatethe
subjectstripoflanddenominatedasCadastralLotNo.954,removeitsrailwaytracksthereonandreturnitspossessiontotheprivate
respondents,theheirsofMagdalenoValdez,Sr.Itisalsoherebyorderedtopayprivaterespondentsattorney'sfeesintheamountof
P10,000.
SOORDERED.
Puno,(Chairman),Panganiban,andCarpioMorales,JJ.,concur.
SandovalGutierrez,J.,onofficialleave.
[1]PennedbyAssociateJusticeCeliaLipanaReyesandconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesAlfredoL.BenipayoandCoronaIbaySomera.
[2]PennedbyPresidingJudgeBenignoG.Gaviola.
[3]ExhibitA,FolderofPlaintiffsExhibits,p.1.
[4]ExhibitsB,B1,B4andD,FolderofPlaintiffsExhibits,pp.24,6.
[5]ExhibitH,FolderofPlaintiffsExhibits,p.11.
[6]ExhibitsEandF,Id.atpp.7,89.
[7]Records,pp.17.
[8]ExhibitsY,FolderofPlaintiffsExhibits,pp.102103.
[9]ExhibitA,Id.atp.1.
[10]ExhibitsB,B1,B2,B3andB4,Id.atpp.24.
[11]ExhibitC,Id.atp.5.
[12]ExhibitD,Id.atp.6.
[13]Exhibit1,FolderofDefendantsExhibits,pp.89.
[14]Exhibits2,3,4,5,6,7and8,Id.atpp.1015.
[15]Exhibit9,Id.atp.17.
[16]Exhibit10,Id.atp.18.

[17]Exhibit11,Id.atp.19.
[18]Exhibit12,Id.atpp.2021.
[19]PresidingJudgeBenignoG.Gaviola.
[20]Rollo,p.39.
[21]Ordoezvs.CourtofAppeals,188SCRA109[1990].
[22]Cequeavs.Bolante,330SCRA216[2000].
[23]FolderofDefendantsOfferofExhibits,pp.1016.
[24]Articles428and437,CivilCode.
[25]DBPvs.CourtofAppeals,331SCRA267[2000]Article233,CivilCode.
[26]2TOLENTINO,CIVILCODE353354[1992].
[27]CompaiaAgriculadeUltramarvs.Domingo,6Phil246[1906].
[28]Article529,CivilCode.
[29]ManilaElectricCompanyvs.IAC,174SCRA313[1989].
[30]Article1119,CivilCode.
[31]ExhibitY,Records,pp.102103.
[32]Espaovs.CourtofAppeals,268SCRA511[1997].
[33]Avisadovs.Rumbaua,354SCRA245[2001].
[34]CatholicBishopofBalangavs.CA,264SCRA181[1996].
[35]180SCRA401[1989].
[36]173SCRA436[1989].
[37]Villanuevavs.CourtofAppeals,330SCRA349[2000].
[38]3PARAS,CIVILCODEOFTHEPHILIPPINESANNOTATED597598(13thed.,1994)Articles615and646,CivilCode.
[39]Ibid.

[40]Supranote26,358.
[41]Ibid.at365,citingSentencia(Cuba)ofDecember14,1928.
[42]Ibid.,citingBroussardvs.Etie,11La.394Burgasvs.Stontz,174La.586,141So.67.
[43]BacolodMurciaMillingCo.,Inc.,et.al.vs.CapitalSubd.Inc.,et.al.,124SCRA128[1966]TalisaySilayMillingCo.,Inc.vs.CFIofNegrosOccidental,et.al.,

149SCRA676[1971].
[44]Article2208(2)(5),CivilCodeSongcuanvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,191SCRA1[1990].