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Supreme Court of the United States




On Petition for Certiorari to the Arizona Court of Appeals



Nuno M. Rocha


Did action(s) by the respondent in this case violate the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 13th,
or 14th Amendment(s) of the Constitution?

Questions presented ....................................... i
Table of Contents ......................................... i
Table of Authorities .................................... iii
Citation to Opinions below ................................ 1
Jurisdiction .............................................. 1
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved .......... 1
Statement of the Case ..................................... 2
Reasons for granting the petition ......................... 3
A. Opportunities In The Case .......................... 3
1. An Introduction to General Opportunity ......... 3
B. Experiencing Bad Acts in this Case ................. 5
1. My General Experiences in this Case ............ 5
2. General Characteristics of the Bad Acts ........ 8
a. Paradigm of Punishment and Pretense ........ 8
b. Avoiding Accountability Engendering
Specificity ............................... 13
c. Taking Advantage of Ignorance ............. 14
d. Severe Assaults and Lesser Assaults ....... 15

e. My Lens of Perception ..................... 15

3. Abduction ..................................... 16
4. Taking Vehicle Without Justification .......... 17
5. Hostile Individuals Assigned Instead of Counsel 17
6. Attempts to Compel Witness Against Self ....... 19
7. Denying Legal Materials ....................... 21
8. Indictment and a Proceeding Outside the Presence
of Counsel .................................... 22
9. Prolonging Captivity .......................... 23
10. Reading of a False Charge ..................... 24
11. Joint Statement Gambit ........................ 25
12. Implications That I Limited My Defense ........ 26
13. Contradictory and Revised Testimonial Evidence. 27
14. Sentencing .................................... 28
C. Lack of Case Record ............................... 28
D. In Closing ........................................ 30
Conclusion ............................................... 31



Appendix A: Decision of Arizona Court of Appeals

Appendix B: Decision of Yavapai County Superior Court
Appendix C: Decision of Arizona Supreme Court
Appendix D: Constitutional And Statutory Provisions Involved
Appendix E: Petition for Review to Arizona Supreme Court
Appendix F: Motions to Extend Time to File Petition for
Review to Arizona Supreme Court
Appendix G: A Perspective on Conflict Resolution in Society


Appendix H: Revised Testimonial Narratives

Appendix I: Indictment and a Proceeding Outside the Presence
of Counsel Supplement
Appendix J: Joint Statement Gambit Supplement
Appendix K: Reading of False Charge Supplement
Appendix L: Implications That I Limited My Defense Supplement
Appendix M: Additional Bad Acts
Appendix N: Personal Notes Recorded While In Captivity

Cases: (CasesContinued: on page split)
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed.
791 (1935) ...................................... 10, 11, 13
Constitution, statutes, and rules:
U.S. Const.:
Amend. I ........................... Appendix M Page 2
Amend. IV ..................................... 16, 17
Amend. V ...................................... passim
Amend. VI ......................... 17, 22, 23, 24, 26
Amend. VIII ............ 15, 16, 20, Appendix M Page 1
Amend. XIII ........................ Appendix M Page 1
Amend. XIV .................................... passim
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. 1257
et seq.



The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix A
and is unpublished.
The opinion of the Yavapai County Superior Court appears at Appendix B and is

Information about why the court may see fit to defer questions of timeliness may
sections of this petition.
The date on which the highest state court decided my case was January 18, 2011.
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix C.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. 1257(a).


(see Appendix D for full text)
U.S. Const. amend. I.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
U.S. Const. amend. V.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, 1.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. 1257(a)


I ask for the courts understanding if the information contained in this section is
not the sort of information expected this section. I do not have formal legal training and
in a case where fiction was purported to be fact, both during the case proceedings and in
the case records, I am at a loss as to how I should present the "facts" of the case. It seems
as though the REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION section of this petition contains
much specific information about the issues and the cause for review of those issues.
May it hopefully be sufficient to assert that in this execution of this case many
bad acts (which deprived me of liberty, property, and perhaps a bit of life) were
perpetrated upon me and many things were planned and placed in the official record as an
attempt to establish a false legitimacy for the proceedings and for justification of the bad
acts. This attempt at falsifying legitimacy and justification seemed designed so that it
could withstand the scrutiny of persons outside the group perpetrating the bad acts. The
history of the case maintained in the records by the state seems as though it holds that
proceedings in the case were legitimate when they were merely a pretense of legitimate
court proceedings. Cause for reviewing all the issues raised in this petition may be found

in the circumstance of the establishment of such pretense by the state that, in part,
attempted (through procedural manipulation) to deprive me of the ability to properly raise
issues and attempted to deprive me of the ability to seek remedy from the higher courts.
The principles, that generally hold treatment of substantive matters primary over
treatment of procedural matters, support this cause.
In the perpetration of pretense, many dates for prior proceedings were established.
With the legitimacy of the proceedings in question, the dates established by those
proceedings do not seem fit to utilize in procedural questions of timeliness until the court
may address the issue of legitimacy.
With such a circumstance that includes a lack of dates that can be utilized in
questions of timeliness. that includes a lack of established facts, and that includes the
occurrence of manipulations to prohibit the raising of issues, any further declarative
statement of the case may be impossible.


1. An Introduction to General Opportunity
Granting Certiorari in this case offers great opportunity for this court to strengthen
the ability of courts in our nation to perform their function in society. To explain this
opportunity I will first try to lay a foundation for a mutual understanding of that which I
think generally comprises an opportunity for the court. I will try to lay this foundation
and then try to use the foundation to assist in transmitting my sense of the opportunity the

court has in this particular case. To lay the foundation I will employ a metaphor that
includes two national "pillars" which are similar to a set of physical pillars that function
to support a physical structure. Like physical pillars, any national "pillar" would be put
under more pressure if any other "pillar" in the set began to weaken.
I will write of our country's manifestations of judicial principal as the first of
these national "pillars". I will call it the "Judicial Pillar". The second of these national
"pillars" is comprised of manifestations of the execution of law and I will refer to it as the
"Executive Pillar".
I refer to all these manifestations as "pillars" because, just as physical pillars
provide stable support to a structure, the function of the national "pillars" is to help by
providing a good amount of stable support to our nation. Manifestations of judicial
principal (things such as courts, lawyers, legal code, etc... a.k.a. the "Judicial Pillar")
may provide stability to our nation. If courts often bring guidance to conflicts that
effectively moves the conflicts toward outcomes that are not detrimental to society and
it's members, then persons or parties can feel assurance that they may get an effective
outcome to a conflict if they seek a resolution guided by the "Judicial Pillar". With this
assurance there may even be many conflicts outside of courts that are prevented from
fomenting divisiveness and otherwise detrimentally affecting society, even though the
conflicts are not brought into the courts of the "Judicial Pillar". With conflicts resolving
into effective outcomes (inside or outside of courts), society's members can spend their
life's energies in pursuit of things that are more desirable and more prosperous than
conflict. These things may even be things like pursuits of liberty and happiness. It is
with the "Judicial Pillar's" ability to both guide conflicts toward effective outcomes and

provide the assurance that it can guide conflicts toward effective outcomes that the
"Judicial Pillar" functions well within society. A chance to strengthen this type of
functioning of the "Judicial Pillar" is my sense of what it means for the court to generally
have an opportunity in a case. In this current case for which certiorari is sought, there is
an opportunity to render a decision that may substantially bolster the assurance that
parties can get a fair and just outcome if they seek a resolution within the "Judicial
Pillar". Joined to this opportunity is the opportunity for the court to guide, toward an
effective outcome, a conflict involving an individual (myself) who has been treated
cruelly and otherwise greatly wronged. Further joined to this opportunity is the
opportunity to provide guidance to lower courts to help ensure that further wrongs, of the
types in this case, are not perpetrated upon other individuals in our society.

(Note: Appendix G was originally included at this point but was removed due to
word limits. It may clarify some ideas about existential societal danger, assurance of
equitable outcomes, cruelty in punishment, and other ideas about conflict resolution.)


1. My General Experiences In This Case
Now that the foundation for mutual understanding of my perspective on general
opportunity in cases has been laid out (and expanded upon if Appendix G has been read),
I can move on to attempting to transmit the details of how this case may provide
opportunity to the court. Until now, the State of Arizona has characterized the
prosecuting of this case against me as consisting of a series of proper acts and legitimate

court proceedings. The true nature of this case seems closer to a series of criminal acts
committed against me. These acts seem to have been compiled into an intricate and
obfuscatory facade. These obfuscated acts include abductions, assaults, harassments,
threats, intimidation, prolonged captivity, deprivation of food, denials of counsel, false
charges, contradictory and revised testimonial evidence, withholding of court records,
and various other collusions that have inhibited the administration of justice. Some
details in the record of this case reveal the existence of this intricate facade and the
impression that the facade has left throughout the case. Still, many details of the this
intricate facade have been hidden from the court record. Additionally, some attempts
have been made to keep recorded components of this case from reaching the jurisdiction
of supervisory courts. These attempts included acts toward harming the proper raising of
issues to endanger the preservation of claims to be considered on appeal and acts toward
narrowing the scope of remedy I would be permitted to seek in higher courts. Integral to
many of these attempts to inhibit the administration of justice was the assignment of
counselors that behaved in ways more consistent with an interest in undermining my case
than with an interest in providing sincere assistance in the preparation and execution of
my case. In all, the case as it currently stands amounts to an instance of a case where
court proceedings were merely pretenses of legitimate proceedings and the record is
primarily a pretense of a legitimate case record. There were so many bad acts committed
that even manipulation of the existing court record, a record which was manipulated to
serve as a furtherance of pretense to hide bad acts and validate deprivation, has been
unable to completely wipe away an overall impression of those bad acts.

The bad acts seem to be aligned along a paradigm where the persons committing
the bad acts are overly influenced by a willingness to commit criminal acts while
remaining impulsively focused on the punitive deprivation often associated with the
administration of justice. In many circumstances it seems consideration of whether or not
there was substantial justification for deprivations, as would seemingly be better aligned
with the basic requirements of formal administration of justice in our society, is not
practiced. Further, while the persons acting within this paradigm haphazardly and cruelly
punish persons they suspect, they furtively decry the importance of standardized
processes of judgment that include common principled proceedings. Acts carried out
within this paradigm result in the obliteration of the right to due process. Further, with
the disavowing of even the most basic principles commonly utilized for the formal
administration of justice in our society, the persons acting within the paradigm seem to be
failing to recognize the advantages of the principles comprising stare decisis doctrine
while the beneficial characteristics of stare decisis that extend beyond adherence to case
precedent seem entirely unknown to them. These bad acts fail to take advantage of all
that make doctrines, like stare decisis and due process, forces by which a society is
inoculated against existential threat. Perhaps the strongest created susceptibility to
existential threat results from actions committed within this paradigm when persons
trusted to perform their public duties commit criminal acts and then commit further
criminal acts to avoid consequences for their initial crimes. A court system which either
participates in these criminal acts, is not capable of vindicating the victims of the criminal
acts, or does not provide relief to the victims, facilitates an evisceration of effective
influence on the given conflict and contributes to an evisceration of the assurance that

courts can generally have an effective influence upon conflicts. These are eviscerations
of two primary characteristics of courts that are necessary in order for courts to serve
their function in society.

2. General Characteristics of the Bad Acts

a. Paradigm of Punishment and Pretense

From the day of first contact with the purported authorities of Yavapai County
(until the current day) many persons involved in this case, whether those persons be from
the "Executive Pillar" or the "Judicial Pillar", performed bad acts that seemed to be
aligned to a characteristic paradigm involving inadequately narrow focus on imposing
punitive deprivation. Through my contact with purported criminal justice authorities of
Yavapai County I was thrust into a situation that seemed to involve an odd standard
operating procedure for persons in the area working in criminal justice. This procedure
seemed to use the preliminary assessments made by persons in the "Executive Pillar" as
the determining factor in deciding whether or not a deprivation of liberty or property was
justified. In this situation some persons in the "Executive Pillar" could operate with near
impunity in terms of what they were permitted to do when bringing persons before a
court. It seems that then some persons in the "Judicial Pillar" could then act with near
impunity to play a role in helping validate whatever the "Executive Pillar" had done and
then further validate or mandate any current or future deprivations. Primary in that role
would be acts by the court that were part of a process that coerced accused persons to
sign designed confessions.
It further seems that once some people in the area began to get a better sense of
how I would not easily be coerced into validating bad acts perpetrated against me, they

escalated both their efforts to coerce me to sign a designed confession and their efforts to
contrive an overarching pretense about their actions that would withstand outside
scrutiny. It seems they escalated their efforts because the success of their efforts would
undermine any claims I might make regarding their bad acts while concurrently lending
believability to any claim they would maintain about the justification for deprivation and
punishment they imposed upon me. When the time span of their efforts to coerce me
extended to a longer period of time than the amount of time for which they felt
comfortable keeping me captive, they perpetrated a final pretense of a legitimate
proceeding (a trial) and then released me. The proceedings prior to trial seemed to serve
primarily as a vehicle to dash my hopes of a prompt release and to repeatedly deliver an
ultimatum. This ultimatum was the most common theme I experienced in my visits to
court and demanded that I either provide a signature on the designed confession or else I
would spend more time (usually a month or so) in captivity before being given another
chance to go to court. Upon returning to court the theme would be repeated.
As occurs in every criminal case that comes before a court there was an
interaction that involves both "pillars". This interaction may be the most direct and most
nationally common interaction the "Judicial Pillar" has with the "Executive Pillar". This
interaction involves the prosecutorial representatives of the "Executive Pillar" who
appear before the court in criminal cases. This interaction is rather unique among
interactions between the "pillars". This interaction is not of a nature that deals with
abstract checks and balances offered by each "pillar", it is a direct person to person
interaction and therefore has qualities not found in the other common interactions (other
interactions that generally only entail attempts to adhere to the checks and balances

offered by the other "pillars" through abstract directives). Also, in this interaction the
"Executive Pillar" seeks to influence the "Judicial Pillar" to act in favor of the "Executive
Pillar" and in doing so is acting as an external influence upon the court. The interests of
the "Executive Pillar" represented by a prosecutor in criminal cases can have an
especially strong influence upon a court because, along with the directness of the personto-person interaction and the frequency of the interaction, the "Executive Pillar" has a
significant portion of the societal might imbued into it while the accused party usually
has only the might of a single or a few individuals behind it. Assumptions that a person
deserves deprivations are necessarily made when working in the "Executive Pillar" if the
power of arrest or of incarceration is ever to be used. It seems that in this case the
necessary working assumption of justified deprivation may have spread to the "Judicial
Pillar" and that the nature of the common interaction with the "Executive Pillar" may be
related to this spread.
As a case that is seemingly a pretense of legitimate proceedings, a case precedent
that involves a decision rendered for a case that involved the pretense of a proceeding
may be relevant to this case. When the external influence of the "Executive Pillar" acts
as one of the competing interests in a case and that influence has the effect of moving a
court away from existentially tested foundational principles, there can be an occurrence
of a situation similar to the circumstances in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 294 U.
S. 112. In that case the court stated in its opinion that:
"It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which, in truth, is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction


and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary

demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation."
In this influenced sort of circumstance it may be said that parts of the proceedings
organized toward conflict resolution were not functioning as legitimate proceedings of a
court, but functioning in a way that only seems to be legitimate proceedings of a court. It
may be said that the trial was in fact not a trial, but merely "the pretense of a trial". When
organized proceedings toward conflict resolution are influenced in this manner (where
the favorability of an outcome is geared toward only one party in the conflict), instead of
equal consideration of both parties, effective conflict resolution is not practiced.
While Mooney v. Holohan may not have involved a spread of the assumption that
an accused party deserves deprivation, the case for which certiorari is now sought seems
to involve it. No matter which manifestation of the "Judicial Pillar" or "Executive Pillar"
I found myself facing in the case for which certiorari is sought, it seemed there was
always someone who was interested in directing proceedings towards a predetermined
outcome of the type that would be primarily favorable to the individuals that levied
accusations against me. These directed series of proceedings seemed meant only to end
with some sort of validation of the deprivations imposed upon me. Any court that may
struggle with prevalence of this type of assumption may find guidance in a decision
rendered by the court in this case for which certiorari is sought.
Since the decision in Mooney v. Holohan intimated that that the inclusion of false
testimony to contrive a conviction by way of a court proceeding (a trial) is inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of justice, it seems that proceedings which include
components of false testimony to contrive some other end (which may or may not include
a conviction at trial) may also be inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice so


long as that end is contrary to the purpose of the court. This could allow Mooney v.
Holohan to have bearing on this case even without the narrow finding that the false

testimony in this case delivered a conviction. This is not to say that the false testimony in
this case did not deliver a conviction, it may have. However, it is to say that such a
narrow finding by this court would still potentially fail to addressed the more central
issues in this case that prevented proper administration of justice. Those issues are about
bad acts that erode the effective functioning of a court. Those acts are perpetrated by
persons who are trying to avoid outside notice of their actions and trying to avoid the
personal consequences they may encounter resulting from that outside notice. While
narrow findings often help the court to leave other settle matters undisturbed, in this case
it seems it would only serve to leave disturbing matters unsettled. In this case the false
testimony primarily served the same purpose that the overarching pretense served. That
purpose is, to deprive me (a person they assumed deserved deprivation) and to do so
without accountability for their bad acts, without outside notice of their bad acts, or
without consequence for their bad acts. The purpose of the false testimony was not
simply to deprive me through a conviction. If the persons involved in the bad acts
thought the false testimony would expose the overarching pretense, it seems they may
have not utilized it because it then would have also exposed them to consequence for
perpetrating a pretense and perpetrating their other bad acts. The revised trial testimony,
(which may now still serve to expose a part of the perpetrated pretense) was used in a
way that seems more closely connected to my refusal to validate their actions than it does
to an initial intent to contrive a conviction through false testimony. They appeared to be
avoiding the trial testimony as long as they could, not primarily aiming to use it to


procure a conviction. For the court to address the more inclusive circumstances of these
central issues in a decision could help in settling disturbing circumstances which are
highly disruptive to the functioning of courts in our nation. Maintaining a pretense of
legitimacy in proceedings where that legitimacy is undeserved creates a circumstance that
undermines the assurance individuals can feel, deprives individuals of due process, and
makes it difficult for society to correct the structural deficits inherent in the illegitimate
proceedings. Withholding information from our society's citizens, about how any
functioning of our government is deficient, serves to delay our society's correction of the
deficiency. If the withheld information is never revealed the deficiency continues to
cause serious harm. Further, when considering that it was the opinion of the court in
Mooney v. Holohan that "intimidation" used to contrive a conviction is also is inconsistent

with the rudimentary demands of justice and that intimidation was attempted in this case,
yet a further indication that the acts in this case violated the mandate for due process is
observable. Even though intimidation may not have been necessarily material to the
decision rendered in Mooney v. Holohan, intimidation is present in this case.
b. Avoiding Accountability Engendering Specificity

Another important characteristic of the perpetration of the bad acts was a

reticence on the part of the perpetrators to offer any specifics in the form of spoken or
(especially) written words because of the recognition that offering specifics would
engender accountability and consequence for the speaker, writer, or subject of the words.
The persons preferred to instead first have a sense of what it was that the parties they had
wronged were taking notice of, or what it was about their wrong acts that wronged parties
hoped to expose, so that they could create a fictitious narrative to try and stymie the
efforts of the parties they had wronged. They made the extra efforts to create fictitious

narratives if they felt that additional details were necessary to help stymie the efforts of
the wronged party. This may be exactly why the testimony at trial was the first time I
heard a detailed account of the claims of the deputies for what occurred on the day of the
arrest and the first time I heard any account by the first deputy to arrive at the scene. The
record contains no information about the initial circumstances of the actual first contact
deputies made with me except for the information in the trial testimony. The perpetrators
may have been hoping to avoid ever setting any further specific information (other that
the vague initial narratives) about the events of that day. However, my prolonged
resistance to their coercion necessitated that they create a further significant amount of
paperwork and procedural facade to maintain their pretense.
c. Taking Advantage of Ignorance

A further important characteristic of the perpetration of the bad acts was the use
of my ignorance of technical procedural matters to ease their ability to structure a
pretense. While I still do not know the extent to which my ignorance was used against
me, I have discovered instances where this was done and I have included them in the
subsequent areas of this section of the petition. Since my understanding of technical
procedural requirements may be my greatest deficit in understanding how procedural law
may or may not have been broken or manipulated in the bad acts imposed upon me, I
have decided to include instances where I merely think my ignorance may have been
used against me so that I may not leave out any details that may be relevant to answering
the questions posed in this petition. Accordingly, I may have included instances that
seem to me could have been technically wrongful but may not seem to this court to be
technically wrongful. One such instance that served to keep me in ignorance is described
in the 7. Denying Legal Materials section on page 21. In the inclusion of those instances

that may not be technically wrongful I ask for the courts understanding. Additionally, the
court may find other plain procedural deficits I have not noticed.
d. Severe Assaults and Lesser Assaults

A particularly disturbing characteristic of the perpetration of the bad acts was the
use of a few severe assaults thinly veiled as legitimate uses of force and frequent stealthy
lesser assaults. The lesser assaults essentially consisted of making unnecessary physical
contact with me at many times and unnecessary manipulations of my clothing or body
during frisks. The lesser assaults seemed meant to degrade me or otherwise incite
behavior that the perpetrators could use in the furtherance of their pretense. These lesser
assaults were perpetrated by my purported counselor, by detention officers, and even by a
person performing a psychological evaluation.
Many acts perpetrated upon in this case were of the physically unnecessary and
violent type. It seems to stands to simple reason since these acts of a criminal nature
cannot be permitted as part of a legitimate process toward deprivation, a violation of the
due process clause occurred. Further, some deprivation occurs simultaneously with each
criminal act. This also seems to plainly be deprivation that occurs without due process.
Further, the use of acts such as these in punitive deprivation seems to be cruel and against
the requirements of the 8th Amendment which intimates that "cruel and unusual
punishments" should not be "inflicted."
e. My Lens of Perception

I ask for the court's forgiveness if my memory fails in a way that it affects my
perception of the claims I make in this petition. With the amount of time that has passed,
the nature of the irregular proceedings, the duress I endured while in captivity, and the
unreliable records I have been provided, it seems some mistakes are bound to find their

way into my writings. I have included personal notes Appendix N recorded during my
time in captivity in Yavapai County jail. I have sometimes reviewed the notes during
efforts to seek remedy for the bad acts. At those times the notes helped to refresh my
memory. However, the notes themselves were sometimes written from memory or
written in an obfuscated manner. They were written this way for various reasons such as
a lack of writing utensils or fears that my writing would alert others to my noticing of
their bad acts.
I also am aware of a possibility that some of the bad acts I experienced can
predispose me toward perceiving heinous intent where there was none or where there was
merely neglect. If this predisposition taints any of my suppositions, I again ask for the
court's forgiveness.
3. Abduction
Much information about the abduction that occurred are in a sub-appendix of
Appendix E. That sub-appendix is called Appendix D. In brief, I was assaulted
repeatedly. These assaults were in the form of being accosted and grabbed, being tazed,
having forced contact made to my clothed genitals, having my arm twisted, and being
forced around while bound with handcuffs. All of this was done under the guise of arrest,
cuffing, and frisking but was done prior to any assertion by the deputies that I had
committed any specific crime. This treatment was plainly cruel and, as punishment, it
seems it is in violation of the 8th Amendment. Beyond violating the 8th Amendment,
there seems to have been violations of the 4th , 5th and 14th Amendments as well.


4. Taking Vehicle Without Justification

Immediately following the violent abduction the deputies arranged to have my
vehicle taken even though they had no justification for doing so. Seemingly this act was
to provide a pretense of a legitimate reason to search the vehicle by way of performing an
"Inventory" search and to then attempt to extort money from me by refusing to give my
vehicle back to me unless I paid to get it back. This act seems to be in violation of the
5th and 14th Amendments as pertaining to my right to due process and my right against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" as mentioned in the 4th Amendment.

5. Hostile Individuals Assigned Instead of Counsel

I was assigned persons purported to be counselors that would help aid in the
execution of my case, but were instead persons hostile to my interests in the case. This
seems to be in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments which grant a right to due
process and the 6th Amendment which grants a right to "Assistance of Counsel". These
purported counselors were integral in the perpetration of the overarching pretense in this
case and in the perpetration of many bad acts that were part of the overarching pretense.
While many details of my experiences with the hostile counselors are explained in
Appendix E, I will now write of some additional incidents and some additional
characteristics of other incidents involving these purported counselors not found in that
There were instances in this case where other persons juggled parts of interactions
with me so that malfeasant persons could avoid substantial consequence for neglecting to
perform duties. A great portion of these instances involved the purported counselors.


Additionally, the purported counselors often facilitated other circumstances to help the
overarching pretense withstand potential scrutiny by persons outside the group of
malfeasant individuals.
On one particular day in court I mentioned to Judge Ralph Hess that I was
concerned with what I may do if I had troubles with my lawyer that would lead to my
seeking new counsel. Judge Hess directed me to correspond with my lawyer if I had such
trouble. In doing so it seems he may have revealed a selective buffer between the court
and its duty to make sure counsel was provided to me. While this direction may
ostensibly seem appropriate because it may be common practice to make sure any
communications I have with court goes through my lawyer, I write that it may have
revealed a selective buffer because in a prior instance the judge spoke with me directly
without a lawyer present although I had already been assigned a lawyer (see 8. Indictment
and a Proceeding Outside the Presence of Counsel on page 21). It may be that he selected

this instance to adhere to common protocol because he realized that, in addition to not
attracting unwanted attention to the court, it helped establish a buffer between the court
and the obvious recognition that the duty the state has to provide counsel was being
neglected. In doing so he may have hoped to help himself and the court avoid substantial
consequence for neglecting the duty to ensure the provision of counsel.
On another day when purported proceedings (for another case against me and
dealing with an extraneous charge of "Failure to Appear" commenced, I was assigned the
same counselor (Moore) that I currently had in the case for which I now seek certiorari. I
do not recall being asked if I wanted that particular counselor for the new case, nor do I
recall being asked if even wanted a counselor at all for the new case (see C. LACK OF


CASE RECORD on page 28). This was a different procedure from how I had originally

been assigned a counselor where I was asked if I wanted counsel. It seems this
assignment, along with ensuring I had a hostile individual assigned to both cases in which
I was being prosecuted, served to continue to maintain a pretense to deny me legal
material. For details of this denial see 7. Denying Legal Materials on page 21. It appears
as though when it suited the purpose of the furthering pretense, I had a say in the
assignment of counsel, and when it did not suit the pretense, I did not.
Since the counselors were integral in many bad acts some details of those acts
may be found in further parts of this B. EXPERIENCING BAD ACTS IN THIS CASE section.

6. Attempts to Compel Witness Against Self

Pressure to be a witness against myself began within 1 day of first being taken
captive (12/31/2007) and occurred prior to any assignment of counsel. It was at a
meeting between myself and some sort of psychological counselor where the suggestion
occurred that agreeing to some kind of a plea confession might be best. This and future
efforts to compel me to be a "witness against" myself seem to violate the 5th
Amendment. In the future these pressures would continued both inside and outside of the
courtroom. In captivity at the jail, or during transfers, guards sometimes spoke of how a
plea would be preferred because the alternative would be worse as evidenced by what
happened to other prisoners. In the area of the courthouse there was a consistent existing
threat of prolonging the captivity I was enduring so long as I continued to refuse to
submit to a designed confession. As previously mentioned, the most consistent theme of
my days in court consisted of being told that if I did not sign a confession I would spend


more time in captivity. Upon returning to court after more time the theme would
eventually repeat.
While in captivity I was ultimately faced with the assertion that I would be
prosecuted for 5 charges in 2 separate cases. Eventually, with what seemed to be
absolutely no change in the circumstances material to the charges, the guise of 3 of the
charges was nevertheless shed. One charge was simply dropped, one case with one
charge was dismissed, and one charge was merely never spoken of again. However
during my time in captivity those charges were used in attempts gain leverage against my
resistance to coercion by the assertion that I would face a near decade of imprisonment if
I continued to refuse to settle the pending matters without a trial. There may never have
been any intention of continuing with these extraneous charges and they may have only
existed to serve as leverage in attempts to coerce my signing of a designed confession.
Compounding the unjust circumstance of captivity was the treatment received in
captivity. This treatment increased my personal cost for continuing to resist the
coercion. There was treatment such as having my pants pulled down, being under
nourished, being denied access to doctors, having my arm wrenched, having my cell floor
flooded with feces laden toilet water, and various other harassments and attempts at
humiliation. These acts seem to be in violation of the 8th Amendment which mentions
"cruel and unusual punishments".
It stands to reason that since all law must adhere to the constitution and that since
all procedural law must generally be followed in order for a court to consider that the
right to due process has be met, any procedure leading to deprivation of life liberty or
property that involves actions in violation of the constitution would then also generally be


in violation of the one or both of the due process clauses in the constitution. In this case
attempts were made to compel me to be a witness against myself. While these efforts
failed, the attempt still seems contrary to what should be avoided in criminal cases
according to the "nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself" portion of the 5th Amendment. Therefore it seems that, among many other
reasons, this process that imposed deprivation and included attempts to compel me to be
a witness against myself (via designed confession) is also a process that is in violation of
the due process clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.

7. Denying Legal Materials

When waiting outside of court one day I asked for access to legal books. The
guard I spoke with directed me to Linda Moore who was also present outside the
courtroom. In the ensuing conversation I was informed that since I was being
represented by Moore, she would need to approve any access legal books/materials. In
spite of my asking for the some of the rules of court, the complete Arizona Constitution,
and all of the statutes which I was accused of breaking, I received only a part of the
Arizona Constitution and the statutes. When a second case commenced while I was still
captive I found renewed hope that I might have access to legal material uncensored by
Moore. This hope was quickly dashed when on the very first day of the case she was
immediately assigned to the case without my input. These denials of legal books/material
helped the proceedings to continue in a manner fraught with pretense and contrary to the
purpose of the technical procedure requirements because it kept me ignorant of the
procedural law requirements.


8. Indictment and a Proceeding Outside the Presence of Counsel

On 8/27/2008 there was an instance where I was directed to participate in a
proceeding where I communicated with Judge Hess outside the presence of counsel even
though I had previously been assigned a counselor in the case on 1/8/2008. This seems to
be in violation of the 6th Amendment which grants a right to "Assistance of Counsel".
The indictment occurred the day after the second time I was required to appear in court
about charges in this case. This seems in violation of the 5th Amendment as is pertains to
being "held to answer" for crimes. Proceedings on the date of 1/1/2008 and 1/8/2008
have subsequently been left off the "Index of the Record" for the case and a warrant that
was issued for my arrest seems to have had it's date changed from 1/8/2008 to 1/9/2008.
Since the case record has been unreliable, I have included additional details of these
particular acts (related to the indictment and this proceeding) that have been previously
provided to me on paper (see Appendix I). These acts also seem to be in violation of the
5th and 14th Amendments as they pertain to due process.
The proceeding that took place on 8/27/2008 occurred on a date that an
arraignment was scheduled, but I was told that the arraignment was vacated. At that
proceeding my bond was rescinded. The record of the proceeding which was furnished
to me did not contain the name of the presiding judge. This omission is consistent with
the juggling of parts of interactions with me to avoid the appropriate consequences for
avoiding duties. The simple omission of a name is much less consequential than the
written admission of participating in a highly questionable proceeding. Also, in leaving
out the name of the judge this is characteristic of persons opting to not include specific
details that may corral them in the future into a circumstance where consequence for their


bad acts may come to pass. Further, the rescinding of bail served to narrow my options
for ending my indefinite captivity to just the one option, signing the designed confession.
Judge Hess would claim at a later proceeding that payment of bail was still a
possibility in the case (see C. LACK OF CASE RECORD on page 28). This may have been
done to weaken his connection to the proceeding where the bail had been rescinded and
the name of the presiding judge had been left off the record.

9. Prolonging Captivity
My purported counselor Linda Moore initiated a procedure to send me to the
Arizona State Hospital. I would later find out that this procedure gave the court an
ostensible reason to restart counting the time which the court was permitted in order to
provide me with a trial. This extension of the time the court had to provide me a trial
occurred almost exactly when the court was about to run out of time to give me a trial.
Although I had been determined to be competent, the court then proceeded to wait nearly
the full amount of procedural time again before finally providing me even the mere
pretense of a trial. These acts had the effect of making me wait twice the maximum
amount of time generally considered appropriate for an incarcerated person and provided
the persons committing bad acts twice the amount of time they had to try to coerce me.
Included in the prolonging of captivity was the greater threat of indefinitely long
captivity by way of the policies regarding inmates at the Arizona State Hospital. The
wait of twice the maximum amount of time generally considered appropriate seems to be
a violation to the 6th Amendment and it's "right to a speedy trial".


In this procedure the first doctor with whom I spoke (Karen Sullivan) claimed she
would inform the court I seemed competent to stand trial but she did not. During her
evaluation she physically contacted me underneath the table at which we sat during the
evaluation. When I made an obvious gestured reaction the first time it happened she
acknowledge the contact and even seemed apologetic. However, it happened again and
she did not acknowledge beyond a what may have been a mischievous expression. This
contact seems very irregular and inappropriate with the general rules regarding contact
with incarcerated persons. Considering the physical impositions to which I was
constantly exposed, I perceived that this contact was possibly part of ongoing attempts to
elicit behavior from me that could be used to bolster the believability of the overarching
pretense the persons committing the bad acts were trying to maintain or to further assail

10. Reading of a False Charge

On the first day of trial the court read a charge that was not part of the charges I
was facing at the trial. Since the case record has been unreliable, I have included
additional details of these particular acts (involving the false charge) that have been
previously provided to me on paper. Those details can be found in Appendix K.
This extraneous charge was a part of the charges that had previously served in
attempts to try to gain leverage to coerce me. Even the purported curative instruction to
the jury about the reading of the charge still seemed to offer prejudicial information. It
seems the instruction added validity to the extraneous charge by introducing the
information that charge against me that had previously existed. Interjecting information


into the minds of the jurors, by way of a purported curative instruction, which tells them
of a prior charge seems prejudicial and not characteristic of a court that sincerely sought
to eliminate the possibility of a jury returning a guilty verdict based in part on
information that may have prejudiced them.
In terms of intentionally narrowing the scope of review possible in my case for
this false charge, the record contains an action at trial by Linda Moore which had the
effect of tending to limit what might be reviewable on appeal. Moore withdrew a motion
for mistrial based on the reading of the false charge. In originally making the motion, she
avoided the appearance of being grossly ineffective for not making the motion. In
withdrawing the motion after it was denied, she tended to limit the reviewability of the
issue on appeal. Further, the withdrawal tended to absolve the Appeal Court of the
necessity to act on a strong reason to overturn the Superior Court's decision.
In effect, these particular acts tended to absolve the court of culpability for the
reading of a false charge, which could only possibly prejudice the jury toward (not away
from) guilt, and then greatly harmed my ability to seek remedy for the reading of the
false charge. These act seem to be in violation of the due process clause of the 5th and
14th Amendments.

11. Joint Statement Gambit

It seems Judge Hess, Linda Moore, and prosecutor Mr. English may have tried to
elicit stipulations of fact using contrived conversation about a joint statement and acted as
though a joint statement had been agreed upon. Since the case record has been
unreliable, I have included additional details of these particular acts (involving the joint


statement gambit) that have been previously provided to me on paper. The additional
details can be found in Appendix J. This gambit seems as though it may have been a
failed attempt to prompt me to enter into a discussion where they might glean some
misleading stipulations they could include in the record. The gleaning of a misleading
stipulation did succeed in an instance described in the next section 12. Implications That I
Limited My Defense on page 26. I describe this instance as a failed attempt because I did

not indulge their attempt in this instance and when it came time for the joint statement to
be presented (as was alluded to in the contrived conversation), the state simply made an
opening statement instead. Adding irregularity to this joint statement gambit is the
condition of part of the record where a transcript strangely includes the indication that an
opening statement was made by the state, but entire content of the opening statement is

12. Implications That I Limited My Defense

Over a period of approximately seven months Lind Moore refused to secure
witnesses that would help my case. This seems to be in violation of the 6th Amendment's
right to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses". During this period I had informed
her that I was not sure if I would testify at trial and there might be persons that could help
my case by testifying. Since the case record has been unreliable, I have included
additional details of these particular acts (involving implications that I limited my
defense) which have previously been provided to me on paper. The additional details can
be found in Appendix L. Near the time I informed her that I had decided not to testify
she told the court that she "wanted to put on the record" a statement asserting that she had


informed me that without my testimony she would be in a limited circumstance of what

she could argue. While it is true that she had informed me of that circumstance, she
seems to have carefully selected a statement that protected her own interest of not
appearing to neglect her duty but did not include the detail of her refusal to secure other
witnesses during the 7 months she was assigned to my case. The significance of that
omitted detail only became obvious to me after a few more years legal experience and
may serve as an example of where my ignorance was used against me as well as an
example of prompting me to enter into a discussion to glean statements from me that
could be easily misleading.

13. Contradictory and Revised Testimonial Evidence

Initial vague and contradictory narratives of the moments in which the state holds
that they discovered activities for which I should be deprived of liberty and property were
repeatedly revised over time. The greatest specificity was only revealed to me during the
testimony at trial. Contained in the testimonies are omissions of important details and the
falsification of others. Some of these omissions and falsifications are plainly
recognizable in the record I was furnished (see Appendix H). Also, my purported
counselor Linda Moore would not allow me to personally discover what the witnesses
(Deputies Clanton and Hutchinson) were claiming and repeated only information already
found in the "Probable Cause Work Sheet" and "Investigation Narrative" when I asked
her what they were claiming. Appendix E contains information about revised testimonial
narratives and the form in which I presented them to Arizona Supreme Court (it includes
the "Probable Cause Work Sheet" and "Investigation Narrative"). The information I


presented to the Arizona Supreme Court contains (near the end) my narrative of some of
my experiences in the hours of the "arrest". These acts of revision seem to violate the
due process clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.

14. Sentencing
Sentencing in this case also included some irregularities. There was a sentence of
approximately 294 days in jail plus 1 year of probation Appendix B although the judge
said 1 year of probation was the mandatory sentence. Also, Linda Moore failed to argue
any mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase of the proceedings. Further,
the court asked if I could afford to pay the fines (which I could not) and settled upon a
fine amount and fee schedule only after a third party proclaimed an ability to pay the
fines (see C. LACK OF CASE RECORD on page 28).


I have sometimes included references to this section at other places in this petition
for instances where I have no record to which I can refer . As much as I would prefer a
reliable record to which I could refer, I do not have one nor am I certain that any record
the court or myself might acquire would be reliable.
When utilizing the record that may be forwarded to the court (if the court seeks it
from the state of Arizona), please be acutely aware of the potential that the record may
contain fictitious information or that it could have been retroactively created/edited after
completion of the proceedings for which the record purportedly gives account. In
anticipation of the possibility of further revision I have included relevant parts of the


record I have previously been furnished. I have placed these parts in the appendices and
made notations where appropriate to help inform the court of the existence of each
relevant appendix. I have included these parts because I do not wish for the court to be
bound by whatever pretense the state may offer up via a newly contrived record.
In seeking to find remedies for the bad acts relevant to this case I have often been
in contact with authorities of Yavapai County and the State of Arizona. As of yet I have
found no remedies. In preparation of this petition, and in hopes of finding out what
exactly the county was claiming had occurred (claims which might be contributing to my
inability to get help from any authorities of Arizona), I requested records related to this
case. I encountered delays, denials, and obstructions. I did receive paperwork and it is
sometimes referenced in this petition. Additionally, I kept nearly all of the paperwork I
was given prior to my release from captivity. Still, even the process of acquiring
paperwork while I was incarcerated was tainted with delay and obstruction. The same
goes for my requests for records from my appeal counselor David Goldberg. To this day
it seems I have not been provided a complete record. I have already mentioned two
notable omissions I personally noticed in the record (see 11. Joint Statement Gambit on
page 25 and 8. Indictment and a Proceeding Outside the Presence of Counsel on page 21).
Also, I have been told that I could have transcripts of other parts of the
proceedings (aside from the trial which was transcribed and sent to the appeal court in
AZ) but the cost of the transcript was prohibitive. In spite of my indigent status in the
case I was told that the I might be charged upwards of thousands of dollars to get the
transcripts. Considering the irregularities already present in the transcripts I already have
seen, I feel lack of assurance regarding the accuracy of the as of yet undiscovered


transcripts. The prospect of making such a payment and then receiving further irregular
transcripts is daunting. It would hobble my finances and therefore hobble many other
efforts I may make at attaining remedy for the bad acts.
The charging of thousands of dollars (to a party declared indigent in a case) for
specific transcripts of what has transpired seems a furtherance of the resistance to
offering specifics because of the recognition that offering the specifics will engender
accountability and consequence. To the perpetrators of these bad acts it may seem that
things such as delaying, denying, and charging an indigent party substantial amounts of
money for records are as acceptable a means to that end (of avoiding accountability and
consequence) as any other.

(Note: Some instances of bad acts were removed due to word limits. Details of
those instances can be found in Appendix M.)

The court might now begin proceedings that provide guidance toward a just
resolution for a great wrong perpetuated on an individual (myself). To this end, of a
more directly personal nature, I ask that the court take the opportunity (with whatever
action it can) to remedy any unjust deprivations it finds.
The court might also now begin proceedings that ultimately help settle some
disturbing matters involving the cruel assailing of individuals assumed to be deserving of
deprivation and involving concealment of the cruel assailing. By helping initiate a
societal correction for this type of governmental deficiency, the court may help bolster


the assurance individuals can feel when they are involved in conflicts while also helping
prevent the future cruel treatment of many individuals. Cruelty compromises the
assurance that individuals can feel. Cruelty deepens divisions between people. The
United States, it's people, and it's society are stronger without it.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
Nuno M. Rocha

October 20, 2014




Decision of Arizona Court of Appeals .......................... 1


See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

FILED: 04/29/10




No. 1 CA-CR 09-0425

(Not for Publication
Rule 111, Rules of the
Arizona Supreme Court)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

Cause No. CR2008-0034
The Honorable Ralph Matthew Hess, Judge Pro Tempore

Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General

Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel
And Aaron J. Moskowitz, Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section
Attorneys for Appellee
David Goldberg, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant


Fort Collins, CO

B R O W N, Judge

Nuno Miguel Rocha appeals his conviction and sentence

for possession of marijuana.

For the reasons that follow, we

find no reversible error and therefore affirm.









marijuana for sale, a class 4 felony, in violation of Arizona




















class 6 felony, in violation of A.R.S. 13-3415(A) (2010) after











found four small baggies containing a usable amount of marijuana

in the center console of his van.

The court dismissed the

charge of possession for sale before trial at the request of the

State on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.






convicted him of possession of marijuana.






The jury



The court suspended




probation and 294 days in jail, with credit for 294 days served.
Rocha timely appealed.










discretion in denying a mistrial after the court incorrectly

advised the jury at the start of trial that Rocha had been
charged with possession of marijuana for sale.

The error arose

when the court clerk read the original indictment to the jury at
the start of trial, instead of the indictment reflecting the
dismissal of the charge for possession of marijuana for sale.
Immediately following the error, defense counsel approached the
bench and moved for a mistrial.

Following a bench conference at

which possible curative instructions were discussed, the court

advised the jury that defendant had been charged with only two
offenses, not three, as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, the indictment that
was read to you included three counts. Only
two counts are actually being tried in this
So Count One, which was read by the clerk,
has been dismissed upon motion of the State
because the State determined that there was
no basis to proceed with that count.
therefore, Count One was dismissed.
The only two counts that are being presented
to you for determination are Count Two and
Count Three as have been read by the clerk.
The court then re-read the two counts presented for the jurys
consideration, and reiterated that [t]hese are the two counts
with which the State is now charging Mr. Rocha.

Mr. Rocha has

pled not guilty to both of those charges.






The following day,




curative and she did not think at this point that we need to
consider a mistrial.

The court then reaffirmed its denial of

the mistrial, reasoning that defense counsel had brought the

misreading to the courts attention immediately, the court had






















relate to the two remaining charges.


A declaration of mistrial is the most dramatic remedy

for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that
justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new
trial granted.

State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 570, 43, 74

P.3d 231, 244 (2003) (citation omitted).

In determining whether










whether the testimony called the jurors attention to matters

that they would not be justified in considering in reaching a
verdict; and (2) the probability, under the circumstances, that
the testimony influenced the jurors.

State v. Bailey, 160 Ariz.

277, 279, 772 P.2d 1130, 1132 (1989) (citing State v. Hallman,
137 Ariz. 31, 37, 668 P.2d 874, 880 (1983)).
















sufficient, we review his objection on appeal for fundamental

error only.

See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, 19,

115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005) (noting that fundamental error review
applies when a defendant fails to object to the alleged error at

Rocha thus bears the burden of establishing that the

trial court erred, that the error was fundamental, and that the
error caused him prejudice.

Id. at 568, 22, 115 P.3d at 608.

Error is fundamental only when it reaches the foundation of a















possibly have received a fair trial.








Id. at 567, 19, 115 P.3d


mistrial for abuse of discretion.






State v. Jones, 197 Ariz.

290, 304, 32, 4 P.3d 345, 359 (2000).

The trial judges

discretion is broad . . . because he is in the best position to

determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome
of the trial.

Id. (citations omitted).

We find no abuse of discretion, much less fundamental

error, in the trial courts failure to declare a mistrial.


court told









indictment that the possession of marijuana for sale count had

been dimissed because the State determined there was no basis
to proceed with that count.

The court then re-read to the jury













The court further instructed the jury, both in

its preliminary instructions and in its final instructions, that

Rocha was presumed by law to be innocent, and [y]ou must decide
the facts only from the evidence presented in court . . . A
charge is not evidence[.]




You must not think that Mr. Rocha is



followed the courts instructions.





See State v. LeBlanc, 186

Ariz. 437, 439, 924 P.2d 441, 443 (1996).

We cannot say that

the court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial in light

of the curative instruction, as well as the other instructions
that provided that a conviction must be based on evidence, and
the charges were not evidence.

Cf. State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz.

314, 320, 878 P.2d 1352, 1358 (1994) (holding that instruction
that indictment was not evidence against the accused and raised
no inference of guilt or innocence was sufficient to avoid any
prejudice from reading of surplus words from indictment); State
v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 174, 800 P.2d 1260, 1282 (1990)




















immediate corrective instruction was sufficiently curative, and

a mistrial was not warranted.

The cases cited by Rocha on appeal for the proposition

that a mistrial was required are inapposite, as the trial court






charges not before them.







See Hurst v. United States, 337 F.2d

678, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that the judge reversibly
erred in allowing admission of evidence of prior indictments of
defendant, several of which had been dismissed, ostensibly to


criminal history);







Sides v. State, 99 S.E.2d 884, 886-87 (Ga.

1957) (holding that it was reversible error for the court to

have arraigned defendant in front of jury on charges not before
this jury, on record that showed the judge failed to instruct
jury to disregard the other indictments); Thrash v. State, 283
S.E.2d 611, 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing conviction for
criminal damage on the basis that the jurors had learned from
outside sources that defendant had previously been indicted for
arson, and they mistakenly believed that he had been convicted
of that crime).

We find no abuse of discretion in this case in

which the trial court appropriately advised the jury that the
charge of possession of marijuana for sale had previously been









error was either fundamental or prejudicial, as required for

reversal on fundamental error review.

Rochas only defense at

trial was that the State had failed to demonstrate beyond a

reasonable doubt that he knew that there was marijuana in the




possessed it.







On this record, the erroneous reading of a charge

of possession of marijuana for sale, immediately corrected, was

not fundamental error because it did not reach the foundation of









defense, or constitute an error of such magnitude that he could

not possibly have received a fair trial.

See Henderson, 210

Ariz. at 567, 19, 115 P.3d at 607.


Nor has Rocha established the necessary prejudice.


offers only speculation that the jury was more likely to convict
him of possession of marijuana after hearing he had originally










evidenced by its acquittal of him on the charge of possession of







establish prejudice on fundamental error review.



See State v.

Munninger, 213 Ariz. 393, 397, 14, 142 P.3d 701, 705 (App.








prejudice and that the burden of proving prejudice is on the










conviction and sentence.



PATRICK IRVINE, Presiding Judge




Decision of Yavapai County Superior Court ..................... 1



Decision of Arizona Supreme Court ............................. 1



Consitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ............... 1




Amendment 1
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
Amendment 4
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment 5
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment 6
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Amendment 8
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
Amendment 13 - Section 1
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Amendment 14 - Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.


28 U.S.C. 1257(a)
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the
validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the
validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant
to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties
or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.



Petition for Review to Arizona Supreme Court .................. 1
Appendix A: Probable Cause Worksheet ....................... (14)
Appendix B: Investigation Narrative ........................ (15)
Appendix C: Grand Jury Testimony ........................... (16)
Appendix D: A Personal Narrative of the Arrest ............. (19)
Declaration of Served Documents ............................ (22)


State of Arizona,
| No. 1CA-CR 09-0425
Nuno Miguel Rocha,
________________________ |
Nuno Miguel Rocha, Appellant, petitions the Supreme Court of Arizona to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter.

Nuno Rocha
Pro Se

18258 W. Mauna Loa Ln.

Surprise, AZ 85388

The issues to be raised in this Petition for Review might not be put forth in a way that
is entirely familiar to the court. This petition is written by an individual, untrained in law, who
has now decided to represent himself in the matter before the court. That individual is
myself, Nuno Rocha. I have included a copy of the Opening Brief sent to the Court of
Appeals. That, I imagine, is familiar. I maintain that the Court of Appeals made a decision
that is not in the best interests of justice. That, I imagine, is also familiar. However, I do not
maintain that the court's decision was not in the best interest of justice because they
decided poorly on the issue that was raised in the brief. I do not even maintain with any
certainty that the appeals court decided incorrectly on the issue raised in the brief. The
court may or may not have decided incorrectly. I do not feel I can provide an absolute
determination on that issue. I have little knowledge of the precedent, procedure, and
protocol involved in deciding a matter such as that. I can only confidently say that it
seemed unfair because the jury was presented with information that implied I might have
committed a crime more serious than the crimes for which they were to return a verdict.
During the first reading of the indictment against me, they were presented inaccurate
information. This information, like any accusation, contains inherent implications. This
accusation's implications affected each juror throughout the rest of the proceedings and I
had no avenue to present any defense or evidence against those implications. Still, this
petition is not primarily about that issue. It is primarily about frequent unjust circumstances
in which I found myself throughout this case. Circumstances that began at the very first

contact I had with authorities in Yavapai County on 12/31/2007. These and other
authorities contributed to, and were often involved in, creating circumstances that are better
described as a crime against me, than they are as case against me. This, I imagine, is less
familiar. The rights violated in this purported case are recognizable to any decently
informed, civically-minded citizen. Since I am now representing myself, I consider this
characteristic of the rights violations to be fortunate because, at best, I can consider myself
a decently informed, civically-minded citizen in matters of law. Accordingly, I may be able
to prepare a petition that sees my pursuit of justice come to fruition. Further, if a civicallyminded citizen had intimate knowledge and experience of the circumstances I was put
through, that citizen could and would understand that infringements upon rights in this case
were plentiful and severe. Still, even without particular intimate knowledge of those
circumstances which would support my claims of injustice, there still could be an
understanding of violations of rights. Rights that should protect all citizens. Unfortunately, I
received little of the protections those rights were designed to provide. From my first
unexpected contact with an officer leaning into and looking around my vehicle, to physical
assaults, and ultimately to complex collusion, my rights seemed to be nowhere on the
minds of my captors except when the infringement upon those rights threatened to become
apparent to those outside their circles of collusion.
The Enigma of Establishing Probable Cause
This enigma begins on the day of arrest, 12/31/2007, and includes abnormalities in

the establishment of probable cause for a search, an arrest, and a Grand Jury indictment.
The Probable Cause Worksheet - 12/31/2007
According to Deputy Clanton, on the Probable Cause Worksheet, she responded to
a suspicious vehicle call on a road just east of I-17. She contacted me. I had a warrant out
for my arrest. I was arrested. A search ensued.
The Investigation Narrative - 12/31/2007
According to the Investigation Narrative, also authored by Kay Clanton, Sgt.
Hutchinson had already arrived on scene prior to her arrival. She received my driver's
license from him. A warrant was discovered. I was arrested. A search ensued.
The Grand Jury Testimony - 1/9/2008
Deputy Shane Weber, an officer not involved in the arrest, provided the only
testimony at the Grand Jury Hearing. According to the questions and answers in the
hearing, Deputy Clanton made a traffic stop and Deputy Clanton stopped the vehicle
because the defendant driving had a valid warrant for his arrest. A search ensued.
Testimony At Trial 5/19/2009 and 5/20/2009
According to Deputy Clanton's testimony at trial, she received call about a vehicle
with a suspicious smell coming from it. She intrinsically suspected it would be a lab for
creating illegal substances. She contacted Sgt. Hutchinson when she arrived and then
obtained my driver's license. She discovered a warrant for my arrest. In attempting to
arrest me, she found reason to draw her Tazer but did not fire it. I was handcuffed and

searched. No contraband was found. I was then placed in the back of her patrol car. A
search ensued. Upon cross examination Clanton admitted she may have fired her Tazer.
According to Sgt. Hutchinson's testimony, he overheard dispatch's communication
with Deputy Clanton. He arrived first on scene, but never wrote a report. Upon arrival he
could not see into the vehicle. He knocked several times loudly. He yelled. He shook the
vehicle. He checked for strange odors and found none. He opened my door. He asked me
to step out. I did. I provided identification when asked for it. He said Deputy Clanton then
arrived. She obtained my driver's license and informed him there was probable cause for
an arrest. He indicated that while attempting to place cuffs on me, Clanton drew her Tazer
and attempted to make a dry stun to gain electrical pain compliance, but her Tazer
malfunctioned. Nevertheless, cuffs were applied. I was searched. No contraband was
found. I was put into Deputy Clanton's patrol car. A search ensued.
Non-Existent and/or Hostile and/or Ineffective Counsel
I served three separate stays in jail based on the charges in this case. In total, I
spent 294 days in jail. Approximately 280 days were before the first day of my jury trial. I
never waived statutory time. I left jail on on the day of my sentencing, 6/1/2009.
Non-Existent Counsel
The duration of my first stint in jail was approximately 1 day. This stay was served in
Yavapai County Jail at the Prescott location. During this stay I was ushered into a room to
speak with a person that had some claim to psychological expertise. Perhaps it was a

counselor. This person attempted to convince me that I should accept a plea bargain. This
conversation occurred prior to any conversation I had with counsel. The duration of my
second stint in jail was approximately 13 days. This stay was served in Los Angeles
County Jail and I was released into the City of Los Angeles. The duration of my third stay in
jail was approximately 280 days (This was to be my last stay). This stay was split between
3 locations in Arizona. The locations were Yavapai County Jail in Prescott, Yavapai
County Jail in Camp Verde, and the Arizona State Hospital. On average, I was transferred
more than 2 times a month for 8 months. It was during this third stay, and often during
transfers, that numerous detention officers offered their opinions about the course my case
should or would take. Often these opinions would take the form of words belittling me for
not accepting a plea or explaining how I was making things difficult on myself and how I
would spend a lot more time in jail if I did not take a plea. These opinions were almost
exclusively offered outside of the presence of my lawyer. My first discussion with a judge in
Yavapai County during my third stay in jail occurred on 8/27/2008. I spoke with Judge
Ralph Hess over a video phone. I was instructed that our discussion was not a hearing
and that my bond was rescinded. Additionally, an order I had for an arraignment on
8/27/2008 was vacated at this non-hearing. Although I had a public defender appointed to
me for this case on 1/8/2008, I had no representation during this non-hearing.
Casey Martin
Casey Martin was the first counsel appointed to me on my third stay in jail. I first

spoke with him on 9/2/2008. It was with Casey that I stood before Judge Kiger for my
Early Disposition Conference. At this conference I was informed that a Preliminary
Hearing was not applicable in my case. Both Casey and the judge were in agreement on
this (I ultimately never did get a Preliminary Hearing in this case). Casey promised me he'd
file a motion to have me released. I received no indication he ever filed any motions.
Additionally, I was provided no notification of important dates and deadlines for my case. I
was merely given a 2 inch by 4 inch pink slip of paper informing me of my next court date
and time (I have since found no evidence that important dates and deadlines were ever set
at this time). When attempting to contact Casey on 9/9/2008, I found out that a request of
his to be removed from my case had been granted.
Linda Moore
Linda Moore was the second counsel appointed to me on my third stay in jail. This
was the counsel that would ultimately be with me through my trial. I was first able to speak
with Linda about details of my case on 10/14/2008. We would speak only infrequently in
the coming months. Eventually, the the sum of the number of times she either ignored me,
yelled at me, or lied to me, would come to reside in the multiple dozens. During these
unprofessional behaviors she would also come to eventually miss a court date, refuse to
give me access to paperwork while claiming she had given me all the paperwork she had
regarding my case, accuse me of taking actions I had never taken and then deny having
made those accusations to begin with. She once told me she would not meet with me and

would not consider my input on which motions to file. She made no substantial efforts to
secure information that I deserved to have according to the rules governing disclosure. In
one particular instance I asked for information regarding the actions Sgt. Hutchinson
claimed he took when he first arrived on scene. I was denied this information. It is also not
in any of the preliminary paperwork related to my case. I would eventually come to hear
this information only when the officer took the stand (That is also when I figured out why the
information was not previously disclosed). In another instance she filed a motion under the
false pretense that I had requested it. That motion directly contributed to my spending an
additional four months in jail. After filing that motion she hid it from me by not including it in
the paperwork she sent me. She once informed me that the Pro Tem attribute attached to
the court meant that judge in my case was temporarily assigned. She claimed that another
judge would be overseeing the jury trial portion of the case. She told me this when I
mentioned concerns about the judge's performance. Later she denied having said any
such thing when I questioned her about it at the beginning of the jury trial. She repeatedly
refused to accept my assertions that any witnesses I could call would assist my case. I see
no record that she ever filed a motion to suppress, nor did she choose to raise a defense of
illegal search even though police and court documentation had demonstrated
inconsistencies and contradictions in accounts of the day of the arrest. In fact, she had
become irate when I mentioned my concerns about what happened on the day of the arrest.
These concerns included assaults and the legality of the search. Considering all that, she

did not even raise an objection when she was directly asked if she objected to the
introduction of some evidence procured on the day of the arrest. Upon conviction she
neglected to discuss the topic of mitigating circumstances with me and did not present any
mitigating circumstances at my sentencing.
David Goldberg
David Goldberg was appointed as counsel to represent me in my appeal of the
judgment in this case. In his poorly argued Opening Brief, he refused to raise any of the
issues I discussed with him. He told me to skip filing a Petition for Review. He informed me
no new issue could be raised in such a petition. I've since read materials that contradict his
assertion and am now attempting to raise some of those issues myself.
Cruel, Unusual, and Coercive
If the court could gain access to the details in the intricate records and surveillance
data kept at Yavapai County Jail in addition to transcripts of all hearings and all paperwork
associated with my case, it would find some facts about my time there that might be
troubling to the court. For instance, I am 6 feet tall and in my time there I went form a
weight of approximately 160 lbs. to approximately 133 lbs. On the days my jury trial was
held, I spent up to 6.5 hours in shackles. I was given even less food to fuel my body during
the times my trial was occurring than I would have been given at the same times on other
days during my incarceration. On days when I would go to trial, I would be awoken hours
earlier than on other days and I would be transported in shackles during the predawn

morning and placed in areas without beds. This ensured a less restful experience on my
trial days than I would regularly have. I was kept indoors for up to 2 months at a time. At
one point I was not given a change of clothes for 2 weeks. I spent 2 weeks in lockdown
without so much as a chance to discuss the reason with the person who ordered I be sent
there, never mind being given a fair hearing. While being carried to a lockdown cell, my
pants were pulled down and I was laid face down on the floor. I was called shy when I
pulled them back up. This was followed by a detention officer stepping on my back and
leaving his foot there for a while. When being placed in the lockdown cell my arm was
turned behind my back in a way that caused cartilage damage. I eventually was taken to
the infirmary for the injury. The nurse recognized the damage, but offered only ibuprofen or
aspirin for treatment. When requesting an examination by a medical doctor I was denied.
Although I asked on at least two separate occasions for separate concerns, I was not
allowed to see a doctor in my entire time at Yavapai County Jail. My trial was delayed time
and time again. It was only after I filed a grievance about the amount of time that I had
been waiting for trial (over 250 days) that the delays finally stopped. When I finally was
given a trial I had only 3 days notice prior to the date. I was physically harassed during
quite a few pat downs. I was subjected to approximately 10 strip searches during my time
there. A female detention officer made suggestive comments while an inmate showered
(the showers offer little privacy). On the first day I spent in Yavapai County jail (the day of
the assaults and arrest), I was placed in a garment that left me abnormally exposed. I was

given no pants or undergarments. I was told this garment was being utilized to protect me.
The conditions of overcrowding (a consistent problem) reached a pinnacle for me on the
night of 2-22-09 when 25 people shared 16 beds and a floor. On the floor were 4 inmates
on stack-a-bunks and 5 with only mattress pads. It was so crowded that all the floorspace
in the cells was filled. Two cell doors had to be left open all night so that the half-dozen
inmates on the floor of the shared eating space could have access to bathrooms in the cell
sleeping areas during the night. There was one instance where I had water from an
overflowing toilet drop on me through a crack in the ceiling from the cell above mine. In
another toilet related incident, I called the control room to request a plunger for my clogged
toilet because it would overflow if it was flushed before I cleared it. They proceeded to flush
the toilet remotely form the control room. They flushed it twice. The toilet overflowed and
spread feces throughout the cell. Four to five scheduled disruptions of sleep were a daily
occurrence. There were a much greater number of sleep disruptions if one were to count
the slamming of the heavy metal doors that could be sometimes heard 20 times in a night. I
endured about 260 days of these types of treatments while being pressured to surrender
my right to a trial by jury. All of this while supposedly being presumed innocent.
In Conclusion
It is my understanding that this court has limitations on the type of information it can
use when deciding whether or not to review this case. It seems that parties involved in this
case took special care to ensure that my ability to gain justice through the higher courts

would be greatly hindered. I hope the Supreme Court of Arizona has the power and
inclination to thwart that sort of manipulation of the system. I have tried to focus on those
issues that I think are most important for the court to be informed about. The treatments I
received during this case seem to be in violation of Sections 2.1, 8, 11, 15, 24, and 32 of
the Arizona Constitution and the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th Amendments of the United States
Constitution. I think the court can decide it is interested in discovering more about this
case. To serve that purpose efficiently, I have included supplementary materials. I suspect
that if the court is inclined to review all the included materials and can gain access to all the
other materials I mentioned, but have been unable to procure, it can take a stronger
position on this case. The type of position I think this case deserves. A position that would
render the entire case null and void. Please, in the interests of justice, do what you can.
Thank you.


A) The Probable Cause Worksheet


1 page

B) The Investigation Narrative


2 pages

C) The Grand Jury Testimony


4 pages

D) A Personal Narrative of the Arrest


3 pages

Appendix (D)

My Experience on the Day of the Arrest

I sat before my laptop computer in my custom conversion van writing computer
code. I had personally outfitted this vehicle with household electricity, wireless internet, a
solar electrical panel, and numerous other amenities. Part of my conversion of the vehicle
included adding plentiful insulation. I had created some insulation specifically for my
windows. These removable cloth encased panels fit snugly against the glass and could
provide an added benefit of privacy. On this day, in the middle of winter, I had employed the
use of these panels. My car was parked near a pull-out area along I-17. This open space
often served as a rest stop for travelers. I heard some barely audible noises coming from
the surrounding area. I had heard some similar noises in the previous half hour or so. At
the time, these noises were of little consequence to me. I presumed that they were other
travelers. Within a minute or so of the last time I heard the subtle sounds there was a
police officer with the upper half of his body inside my van. I would later find out his name
was John Hutchinson. He was now looking right at me. He had opened the driver side
door. I was distraught and taken aback. He inquired if I would step out of the van and I
obliged. He requested identification and I found and provided my driver's license. Soon
another officer joined us. I would later find out her name was Kay Clanton. After the
passing of some minutes I was informed that the officers were under the impression that I
had a warrant out for my arrest. My opinion was contrary to this assertion. Accordingly, I
Appendix D-1

stated I did not have any warrants out for my arrest. I inquired about the specific nature of
the warrant. I was given no such information. The officers proceeded to move toward me.
I raised my hands while keeping my elbows elbow near my hips and my open palms facing
away from me. I assumed this position in defense of myself and in an expression of
innocence. As I looked back and forth from one officer to another I stood in wonder of what
would happen as they slowly approached. Once they were close enough to grab my arms,
they did. I stood still. I continued to look back and forth from one officer to another. Upon
looking one time to the officer on my left, I saw a tazer precariously close to my neck. I
instinctively moved my head and neck away from the unexpected danger and then received
a series of jolts to my neck and back. Things became a bit fuzzy for a few moments and I
found myself with my arms behind my back uttering what I think was alright, alright. Still
somewhat stunned I ended up on the driver side of a police car. I may have been placed in
the backseat of the car for a moment or the second search of my person may have
occurred before I was placed in the back seat. Either way I was searched by Deputy
Clanton while two male officers held me. During the part of the frisk where her hands rose
toward my waist as she moved along my leg she made intentional, unnecessary, and
inappropriate contact with my genitals. Soon after, I was placed into the police car. I was
left alone their for a minute and the the female officer returned, opened the door, and told
me I did not have a warrant out for my arrest. My first instinct was to move toward the open
door so I could be free of my captors, but then the sexual assault that had just taken place
Appendix D-2

re-entered my thoughts. I hesitated. In the next moments she closed the door and left. I
remained in the car and waited in anticipation of what would happen next. The officer
returned and now informed me that I did have a warrant. At some point after that she asked
if I wanted my van to be towed. I declined. Eventually it looked as though some officers
were searching further through my van. On a couple of returns, Clanton brought a few
items of mine back to the patrol car I was siting in. She ignored anything I said during these
two returns. After some time she drove the car to what I would later find out was called a
substation. We were there for less than an hour before I was instructed to stand up. We
were going to be moving again. On the way to the vehicle she had a hold of my right arm.
She gave it a slight but sturdy twist. I had previously informed her that I had injured that
arm and she seemed to be utilizing that information to inflict further pain upon me. We went
to the primary jail and I was processed in.

Appendix D-3

2 Copies of the foregoing were hand delivered on 9-3-2010 to

Attorney General's Office
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007
On this 3rd day of September, 2010


Nuno Rocha
Pro Se
18258 W. Mauna Loa Ln.
Surprise, AZ 85388



1st Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for Review to
Arizona Supreme Court ..................................... 1
2nd Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for Review to
Arizona Supreme Court ..................................... 3
3rd Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for Review to
Arizona Supreme Court ..................................... 5



A Perspective on Conflict Resolution in Society ............... 1


To help inform the court about the nature of the guidance it may provide to
subordinate courts, I will now expand upon ideas related to my sense of what it means for
the court to generally have an opportunity in a case.
I think there is a particular hereditary lineage of legality that extends all the way
back to the initial efforts of written English language law. I think this lineage is
characterized by of efforts to enact effective conflict resolution. While also protecting
individual and societal resource, these efforts had much emphasis placed on minimizing
personal reprisal and cruelty. I think where there were organized societal efforts to
minimize cruelty, and those efforts were effective, the societies practicing the efforts
tended to be much more successfully prosperous. I think it sometimes was, and
sometimes still is, understood that personal reprisal and cruelty are closely linked. I think
it was known that cruelty readily escalated conflicts and that escalated conflicts caused
great trouble for a community. I think that targeting paradigms of cruel behavior for
eliminatory focus was important in keeping people willingly invested in a set of rules that
served to help resolve conflicts and give people reasonably equitable outcomes to the
conflicts. I think the inclusion of a clause in the U.S. constitution addressing the
existence of cruelty in punishment, a clause explicitly disallowing it, is a testament to the
importance of controlling the cruelty that often taints any form of punishment. Further, I
think this inclusion is a testament to an understanding that the framers of the constitution
had about the severe consequences a society would experience if cruelty was a significant

part of general punishment. I think that when cruel punishment permeates parts of
society, conflicts escalate and schisms form. Without the schismatic divisions cruelty
engenders, unified societal efforts can thrive and members of a community can grow
together in an increasingly strong society. Some of the earliest recorded English
language history about law and justice has information about conflict resolution's
advancement from a circumstance of very severe and costly outcomes to a circumstance
of outcomes that allow for increasing amounts of a society's life energies to be spent
towards prosperity. This circumstance of severe and costly outcomes was a circumstance
where outcome resolution was primarily guided simply by individual might and personal
reprisal desires.
A simple conflict in human history (prior to substantially organized justice) may
have included a first human wanting what a second human possessed. The first human
might attempt to resolve this conflict by trying to take what they wanted. If the second
human was able to stop the first human from depriving them of the thing, this may have
been how the conflict resolved. If the first human was instead able to take it, this may be
how the conflict resolved. With this simple circumstance of human conflict, the only
rights a person or group would have against being deprived, would be the right which
they could forcefully secure for themselves. This may be the part of the reason the
phrase "Might Makes Right" has found significant popularity. Whomever it is that has
the greater "might" is able to secure the "right" to not be deprived of what they want. It is
easy to see how this type of primarily forceful feuding to resolve conflicts can lead to
costly outcomes for all parties involved. In the history of English law there are signs of
early attempts to minimize the societal cost of this type of conflict resolution:

"The Anglo-Saxons are the first inhabitants of whose legal usages anything is
known, because they were the first to introduce written laws. The earliest
surviving English legislation... ...appeared in about 600 A.D. ...The AngloSaxon codes did not 'codify' existing customs, let alone make new law. They
were directed at readers who could be presumed to know the customs already,
and offered fixed rules to govern situations which must previously have rested
on discretion. Prominent in them, as in most Celtic and Germanic codes, was
the fixing of the blood-money payable in lieu of feuding." (J.H.Baker, An
Introduction to English Legal History 4th Ed. (2002) Pages 2-3)

It seems that these early laws may have assigned fixed amounts of money that
were due to parties in a feudal type of conflict depending on the circumstances of the
conflict. This payment would presumably serve to help end the feud and in this way limit
the severe cost of a prolonged conflict.
However, it stands to reason that if any party in the conflict did not feel satisfied
with the blood-money resolution, the enforcement of the mandate of the law still required
some might. It seems communities attempted to use aggregate might of their community
to meet this requirement. In order to effectively aggregate the might of individuals in a
community, an organized effort is needed. In the areas served by the earliest surviving
English legislation at the time the legislation was in effect, the societal might was
organized under the command of a king. The king himself may have had of great
personal might, but it would have been the organized collection and subsequent use of
resources that would give the king the ability to use the aggregate might of the
community to force a resolution of blood-money in lieu of feuding. One man could not,
alone, force a resolution upon a feud involving a great number of people. The likely size
a society can attain that depends on the might of one man to personally settle conflicts is
vastly smaller than even the fledgling societies served by the earliest surviving English

In a society that rises to a substantial population size and level of prosperity, a

society that includes members who are prosperous enough to generate resources beyond
the amount of resources required to merely survive, members are able to contribute some
resources to organized efforts of societal force. An effective king may have provided
effective enforcement of law by using the contributed resources (such as crops or tax
money) to sustain a group of people responsible for enforcing law. These people would
be the physical manifestation and personification of the communal or societal might.
It stands to reason that people in such a society might willingly participate in such
organized efforts if the utilized societal might would help ensure that they would not be
arbitrarily or capriciously deprived of resources they labored to grow or collect. This sort
of arbitrary deprivation may have often happened in a society where any individual that
had greater force of might could take what they wanted. With the effectively organized
use of societal might, much power was taken away from those individual who merely had
the greatest physical might, and distributed a bit of that power to all the members of the
The organization of societal might was not ultimately limited to the enforcement
of money in lieu of feuding. Many other organizational principles also formed. The
societies that used their organized might most effectively to protect the rights of people,
and thereby permitted the people to continue to focus on prosperous efforts, were the
societies that grew vigorously. It also stands to reason that organizational ideas that did
not use societal might effectively tended to either be replaced by other ideas or otherwise
those societies simply tended to wither away due to the costs of ineffective use of their
collectively contributed resources. Through the attrition of organizational ideas (through

replacement ideas or withering away of the existence societies using the ideas), the
fledgling societies utilizing English language law that continued to grow were the
societies that tended to retain the best ideas conceived by the people of those areas.
Over time a more stable and reliable organizational scheme for the use of societal
might developed and the geographic size of the society served by the scheme grew
comparable to the size of modern day England with all the people of organized under one
organized framework of law that could provide a substantial counterbalance to personal
reprisal desires and individual "Might makes Right" conflict resolution.
Stare decisis seems to be a longstanding and widespread doctrine that manages
organized efforts in a way that retains and adheres to prior effective ideas for organizing
society as those organizing ideas relate to conflict resolution. Stare decisis manages
those ideas in a way which takes challenges to those ideas into consideration and then
documents the rationale by which courts have determined which guiding ideas should
continue on to serve as guiding precedents for future conflict resolution. In doing so
stare decisis is a societal organization idea that manages other ideas in a feedback
between the members of the courts, members of the society, and the historical transcribed
experiences of the court. Further, principles of stare decisis manage this feedback in a
way that helps compare individual ideas and permits the ideas with the more primary
beneficial effects to continue with a calculated level of regard. Over time the
longstanding ideas that survive in this managed feedback can continue to have their
effects while less tested ideas, or ideas of shorter duration, are permitted less effect on
society in a conscious and directed effort that emulates existential attrition but gives
society a series of buffers with which it braces itself against the more direct existential

dangers of natural existential attrition. It is with these characteristics of stare decisis,

which involve the survival and elevation of the most well suited organizational ideas, that
it seems some of the greatest powers of stare decisis lay.
Due process, with it's mention in Magna Carta, has it's roots in a fledgling society
(which was ruled by a king) and involved the organizing of a process that was necessarily
deemed (by many) to be fair enough to serve in guidance of conflict resolution in a way
that the guidance produced reasonably equitable outcomes. Even in individual personal
conflicts people are incentivized to resolve more amicably if they are assured that going
through the trouble of seeking help, from whichever type of organized conflict resolution
is available to them at the time, will yield a rather equitable outcome. Individuals will
spare themselves the trouble of seeking that help if possible, and perhaps only go if the
other party wants what seems to be a terribly inequitable outcome. The party seeking the
inequitable outcome is incentivized toward equity because the opposing side in the
conflict can always go through that trouble in order to get a more equitable outcome if
necessary. This way personal desires that individuals have, which might lead to
attempting inequitable outcomes, become blunted. The desires become blunted because
seeking an inequitable outcome means the other person may go and seek an equitable
outcome supported by the force of aggregate societal might. Further, during conflict
some deprivation occurs simultaneously with any criminal act. The similarities in the
ideas that a process is due to an individual prior to deprivation (as is found in the 5th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution) and that an act of deprivation is generally criminal,
do not seem coincidental. It seems that the requirement for a process sprung forth from a
recognition that at times when deprivation might not be detrimental to society, because it

would help settle a conflict, a standard process for determining the appropriateness and
severity of the deprivation would help ensure the effectiveness of using aggregate societal
might to enforce the deprivation. While historical due process survived an existential
attrition (as any longstanding and widespread societal organization idea must), modern
due process doctrine has it's component parts further refined by the additional powers of
stare decisis.



Probable Cause Worksheet #1 ................................... 1
Probable Cause Worksheet #2 ................................... 2
Investigation Narrative ....................................... 3
Grand Jury Testimony Transcript ............................... 5
Kay Clanton Testimony ~ Trial Day 1 Page 64 - 102 ........... (8)
John Hutchinson Testimony ~ Trial Day 2 Page 21 - 38 ....... (48)

Kay Clanton Testimony (Trial Day 1 - 39 Pages)


John Hutchinson Testimony (Trial Day 2 - 19 Pages)



Early Disposition Hearing ..................................... 1
Indictment .................................................... 2
Warrant For Arrest ............................................ 3
Order for Arraignment ......................................... 4
Initial Appearance ............................................ 6
Index of Record ............................................... 7



Trial Day 1 Transcript Pages 16 - 18 ~ Gambit ............... (1)
Trial Day 1 Transcript Page 51 ~ No Stipulations ............ (4)
Trial Day 1 Transcript Page 63 ~ Omitted Opening Statement .. (5)



Trial Day 1 Transcript Pages 43 - 48 ........................ (1)
Trial Day 2 Transcript Pages 3 - 5 .......................... (7)



Trial Day 2 Transcript Pages 42 - 44 ........................ (1)


Additional Bad Acts ........................................... 1


(Note: These acts were originally included in the REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
PETITION section of this petition but were removed due to word limits.)

My captors provided me insufficient sustenance and logged debt in my name for
each day I was kept in captivity. There was a standing offer to provide further sustenance
if I paid for it. The debt logged in my name would be used to extract additional monies
from me if I chose to try to pay for further sustenance because any monies I provided for
sustenance would first have the amount of the logged debt subtracted.
My captors also made 2 offers which would result in my release if I paid an
amount of money they had predetermined. These offers were given the ostensible title of
Upon release from captivity I was ordered to furnish further monies within a
given time span or have negative entries permanently ensconced in my criminal record.
These acts related to extortion seem to be in violation of the 8th Amendment.

Used for Labor

While in captivity I was required to clean areas commonly used by many of the
individuals also in captivity. This was a general requirement of all persons being held
captive and seems to be in violation of the 13th Amendment as it pertains to "involuntary

Denied a Vote
While in captivity I requested an opportunity to cast a vote in the ongoing national
election. Although the election was ongoing, I was told it was too late for me to cast a
vote. This seems to be in violation of the 1st Amendment as it pertains to "freedom of



General Notes ................................................. 1
Handwritten Calendar ......................................... 37