SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK MONROE COUNTY KENNETH GLAZER, Individually and as Administrator of the Estates of LAURENCE GLAZER. and JANE GLAZER, deceased, Plaintiff, -against- SOCATA, S.A.S., DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S., DAHER, S.A.S, DAHER AEROSPACE, 8.A.S, SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC., COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC, COLUMBIA AIR SERVICES INC., LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE ‘TOULOUSE SAS, LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE LINDENBERG GBH, LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK GBH, LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC., HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC,, ‘THERMOCOAX SAS, THERMOCOAX ISOPAD GmaH, THERMOCOAX INC., GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., and NEW 51LG LLC. Defendants. 2816 - USS VERIFIED COMPL: (Action for Death and Survival Damages) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED: ‘This action arises out of the September 5, 2014 crash of a Socata TBM 900 aircraft which experienced a catastrophic failure of its cabin pressurization system causing the deaths of Larry and Jane Glazer. ‘The plaintiff herein, KENNETH GLAZER (“Plaintiff”), Individually and as Administrator of the Estates of LAURENCE GLAZER (“LARRY GLAZER”) and JANE GLAZER, deceased, by his attorneys, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, as and for his verified complaint, respectfully alleges:PARTIES 1, Atal relevant times, plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER resided at 11 Babcock Ferms Lane, Pittsford, New York, 14534 in Monroe County. 2. At all relevant times, plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER was the son of decedents LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER. 3. Atthe time of their death, LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER resided together as husband and wife at 35 Heatherstone Lane, Rochester, New York, 14618 in Monroe County. 4. Larry and Jane are survived by their three adult children, Melinda Glazer Maclaren, bom April 11, 1971, Richard Glazer, born July 19, 1973, and Kenneth Glazer, born September 30, 1974, 5. On November 12, 2014, the Surrogate’s Court of the of the State of New York for Monroe County granted Letters Testamentary to plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER to administer the estates of each of his parents, LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER. 6. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant SOCATA, S.A.S. was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France, with its principal place of business at Aéroport de Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénées, 65921 Tarbes Cedex 9, France. 7. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, SOCATA, S.A.S. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an auth ed distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, andliterature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; maintaining direct relationships and contact with owners, including those located in New York State, as the holder of the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through which it communicated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service inform: mand answer questions relating to its aircraft and their component parts. 8. Upon information and belief, defendant SOCATA, S.A.S. designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported the subject model ‘TBM 700N aircraft (s/n: 1003; FAA Registration No, N90OKN), with a marketing designation of “TBM900”, along with its component systems, parts, manuals and instructions (collectively the “Subject Aircraft”). Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S. was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France, with its principal place of business at. Aéroport de Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénées, 65921 Tarbes Cedex 9, France. 10. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money fromthose businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and ‘to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; maintaining direct relationships and-contact with owners, including those located in New York State, as the holder of the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through which it communicated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service information and answer questions relating to its aircraft and their component parts. 11, Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S. designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported the Subject Aircraft and its component systems and parts. 12. Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER, S.A.S. is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France, with its principal place of b ness at Aéroport de Tarbes- Lourdes-Pyrénées, 65921 Tarbes Cedex 9, France. 13. Upon information and belief, a all relevant times, DAHER, S.A.S. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through anauthorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed ‘base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; maintaining direct relationships and contact with owners, including those located in New York State, as the holder of the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of Various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through which it communicated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited to LARRY GLAZER, to Provide important service information and answer questions relating to its aircraft and their component parts, 14, Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER, $.A.S. is the parent and/or successor of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, $.A.$ who designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and supported the Subject Aircraft and/or its component systems and parts, and which assumed or is responsible under applicable law for the liabilities of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, $.A.S,, including but not limited to any negligence, products liability and/or breach of implied warranty relating to products designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed and/or distributed by SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A. 15. Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER AEROSPACE, $.A.S. is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France, with its principal place of business at Zoné Industrielle Sud-Z1 Nord, rue des Perruches, 41400, Montrichard, France16. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, DAHER AEROSPACE, S.A.S. ‘was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for Purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be Purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; maintaining direct relationships and contact with owners, including those located in New York State, as the holder of the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through which it commu sated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service information and answer questions relating to its aircraft and their component parts. 17. Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER. AEROSPACE, S.A.S. is the parent and/or successor of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S who designed, ‘manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported the Subject Aircraft and/or its component systems and parts, and which assumed or is responsible under applicable law for the liabilities of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A... including but not limited to any negligence, products liability and/or breach of implied warrantyrelating to products designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed and/or distributed by SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S. 18. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5,2014, defendant SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC. was a domestic corporation organized under the laws of New York, authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in New York County. 19. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC, was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping produets, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; maintaining direct relationships and contact with owners, including those located in New York State, as the holder of the ‘Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through which it communicated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service information and answer questions relating to its aircraft and their component parts.20. Upon information and belief, defendant SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC. designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported the Subject Aircraft and/or its component systems and parts. 21, Upon information and belief, the defendants SOCATA, S.A.S., DAHER SOCATA, S.AS., DAHER, S.A.S., DAHER AEROSPACE, S.A.S, and SOCATA, RTH AMERICA, INC. (collectively the “Socata Defendants” or “SOCATA”) are inter-related entities that are individually and/or jointly liable for the actions of the other(s) as, among other things, the parent, subsidiary, division, principal, agent, alter ego, successor in interest, and/or joint venturer of the other entities. 22. Upon information and belief, each of the Socata Defendants undertook, or approved the acts or omissions that were taken, or oversaw and/or approved the acts and omissions that were taken by others in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, inspecting, marketing, distributing and/or supporting the Subject Aircraft and/or its component systems and parts. 23. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC. (“Columbia Sales”) was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Connecticut, with its principal place of business at 175 Tower Road, Groton-New London Airport, Groton, CT 06340. 24. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC. was authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in Westchester County. formation and -belief, at all relevant times, COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT. 25. Upon SALES INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including selling aircraft to New York residents and advertising aircraft for sale to New York residents.26. Upon information and belief, deferidant COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC. tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, marketed and/or distributed the Subject Airoraft and/or its component systems and parts, and/or placed the Subject Aircraft into the stream of commerce, 27. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant COLUMBIA AIR SERVICES INC. (“Columbia Services”) was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Connecticut, with its principal place of business at 175 Tower Road, Groton-New London Airport, Groton, CT 06340, 28. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including servicing aircraft owned by New York residents, communicating with individuals in New York with regard to any service provided to New York residents, and advertising its services to New York residents, 29. Upon information and belief, defendant COLUMBIA AIR SERVICES INC. tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, returned to service and/or deemed airworthy the Subject Airoraft and/or its component systems and parts. 30. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE TOULOUSE SAS was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France, with its prineipal place of business at 408 avenue des Ptats-Unis, 31016 Toulouse Cedex 2, France: 31. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR-AFROSPACE ‘TOULOUSE SAS was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts andpay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State ofNew York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of airoraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components. 32. Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE TOULOUSE SAS designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the General Air System Controller (“GASC"), pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(s), over- temperature switch(es), inlet temperature sensor, and/or bleed air leak detector. 33. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE LINDENBERG GMBH was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Germany, with its principal place of business at PRtinderstrafie 50-52, 88161 Lindenberg/Allgdu, Germany. 34. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE. LINDENBERG GmH was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and iriformation, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and 10pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State ofNew York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components. 35. Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE LINDENBERG GmbH designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the GASC, pressure sénsor(s), temperature sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es) and/or inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector. 36. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK GBH was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Germany, with its principal place of business Peter-Domier-Strae 11, 88131 Lindau, Germany. 37. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK GMBH was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving ‘money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, ncomponents, and literature, including service literature, to aireraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components. 38 Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK GMBH designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es) and/or inlet ‘temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector. 39. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC. was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Virginia, with its principal place of business at 1465 Woodland Drive, Saline, Michigan, 48176. 40. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR AEROSPACE. SALINE, INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving, money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, 2components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and pparts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components. 41. Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC. designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector. 42, Upon information and belief, the defendants LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE, TOULOUSE SAS, LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE LINDENBERG GMpH, LIEBHERR- ELEKTRONIK GBH, and LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC. (collectively the “Liebherr Defendants”) are inter-related entities that are individually and/or jointly liable for the actions of the other(s) as among other things the parent, subsidiary, division, principal, agent, alter ego, successor in interest, and/or joint venturer of the other entities. 43. Upon information and belief, each of the Liebherr Defendants undertook, or approved the acts or omissions that were taken, or oversaw and/or approved the acts and omissions that were taken by others in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, inspecting, marketing, distributing, and/or supporting component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, 13including but not limited to the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(8), over- temperature switch(es), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector. 44. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. (“Honeywell”) was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in New York County, with its headquarters at 115 Tabor Road, Morris Plains, New Jersey, 07950. 45. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. was authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in New York County. 46. Upon information and belief, at all’ relevant times, HONEYWELL. INTERNATIONAL, INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, includi availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those 4located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components. 47. Upon information and belief, defendant HONEY WELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to, over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 48, Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant THERMOCOAX SAS was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France, with its principal place of business at 40 Bd Henri Sellier, F 92156 Suresnes Cedex, France. 49. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, THERMOCOAX SAS was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components, 1550. Upon information and belief, defendant THERMOCOAX: SAS designed, ‘manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, 51. Upon information and belief, a all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant THERMOCOAX ISOPAD GMBH was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Germany, with its principal place of business at Englerstrasse 11, D-69 126 He idelberg, Germany. 52. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, THERMOCOAX ISOPAD. GviBH was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, Components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components, 53. Upon information and belief, defendant THERMOCOAX ISOPAD GapH designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or 16supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 54. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant THERMOCOAX INC. was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, with its principal place of business at 6825 Shiloh Road East, Ste B-3, Alpharetta, GA 30005. 58. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, THERMOCOAX INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business ‘opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components, 56. Upon information and belief, defendant THERMOCOAX INC. designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to, the inlet 7temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 57. Upon information and belief, the defendants THERMOCOAX SAS, THERMOCOAX ISOPAD GmBH, and THERMOCOAX INC. (collectively the “Thermocoax. Defendants”) are inter-related entities that are individually and/or jointly liable forthe actions of the other(s) as among other things the parent, subsidiary, division, principal, agent, alter ego, successor in interest, and/or joint venturer of the other entities, 58. Upon information and belief, each of the Thermocoax Defendants undertook, or approved the acts or omissions that were taken, or oversaw and/or approved the acts and omissions that were taken by others in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, inspecting, ‘marketing, distributing, and/or supporting component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 59. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. (“Garmin”) was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Kansas, authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in New York County, with its headquarters at 1200 E 151* Street, Olathe, Kansas 66062. 60. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. was authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in New York County. 6l. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and 18information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving ‘money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its. agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform airoraft maintenance in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and maintaining direct r jonships and contact with product owners, including those located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft components, 62. Upon information and belief, defendant GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed and/or distributed component parts of the Subject Aircraft including, but not limited to, the Subject Aircraft’s G- 1000 Avionics System which includes the Crew Alerting System (“CAS”), 63. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, defendant NEW S1LG LLC was a domestic limited liability company organized under the laws of New York , authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in Monroe County. 64. Upon information and be lief, defendant NEW 51LG LLC owned and operated the ‘Subject Aircraft at the time of the crash. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 65. Venue is proper in Monroe County pursuant to CPLR § 503 in that, among other things, the plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER, a resident of Monroe County as of the date of the 19commencement of this action, was appointed Administer of the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER by the Surrogate’s Court of Monroe County, 66, Jurisdiction over the defendants by the New York State Courts is proper pursuant to CPLR § 302 in that each of the defendants conducts such continuous and substantial business in New York State such that they can be deemed to be residing within the state, and in that LARRY. GLAZER and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and death at issue in this suit are sufficiently related to and/or the result of business conducted by each of the defendants within and/or was specifically directed to New York State. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS Purchase and Delivery of the Subject Aireraft 67. LARRY GLAZER was a highly qualified and experienced pilot who had a commercial pilot’s license and an instrument rating, as well as over 7000 flight hours. He had previously owned two Socata TBM aircraft, a “TBM 700” and a “TBM 850” and was experienced in the TBM aircraft platform and airoraft type, including completing numerous specialized training syllabi specifically geared for the TBM aircraft. 68. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LARRY GLAZER was the President of the TBM Owners and Pilots Association, Inc. (“TBMOPA”), a position he had held since 2012. 69. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, TBMOPA and the Socata Defendants maintained a business relationship, which involved coordinated marketing, including use of “Socata” and “TBM” brand names, logos and other intellectual property for use in marketing and sale of branded merchandise, as well as provision of technical information to TBMOPA members by Socata personnel. 2070. TBMOPA, through LARRY GLAZER as its President, entered into multiple agreements with Socata Defendants formally recognizing their ongoing business relationship. 71. Upon information and belief, due to his role as TBMOPA President, the Socata Defendants regularly communicated with LARRY GLAZER in New York to discuss coordination of Socata business and marketing efforts coordinated with TBMOPA. 72. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants reached out to LARRY GLAZER in New York and, because of his position as TMBOPA President, specifically arranged for him to purchase the first TBM 900 aircraft manufactured by the Socata Defendants, which was the Subject Aircraft. 73. Upon information and belief, after discussion with the Socata Defendants from New York, LARRY GLAZER agreed to purchase the Subject Aircraft as the first TBM 900 aireraft manufactured by the Socata Defendants. 74, Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants arranged for LARRY GLAZER, and/or his assigns, to purchase the Subject Aircraft from Defendant Columbia Sales, which is the Socata Defendants’ agent acting as its dealer and distributor to customers who are located in New York. 75, By an Aircraft Purchase Agreement dated February 19, 2014 between LARRY GLAZER and Defendant Columbia Sales, LARRY GLAZER agreed to purchase the Subject Aircraft. 76. Byan Assignment of Contract dated April 4, 2014, LARRY GLAZER assigned his right to purchase and take delivery of the Subject Aircraft to Defendant NEW 51LG LLC. 77. Upon information and belief, LARRY GLAZER participated in an marketing event for the Socata Defendants commemorating the delivery of the two first TBM 900 aircraft, aincluding the Subject Aircraft, at the Fantasy of Flight Park in Polk City, Florida on March 24, 2014 as part of the “Sun ‘n Fun” aviation fly-in and expo program. 78. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants and Defendant Columbia Sales arranged this event and reached out to LARRY GLAZER in New York to arrange that he participate as the purchaser of one of the first TBM 900 aircraft. 79. In addition to LARRY GLAZER, the following representatives of the Socata Defendants and Defendant Columbia Sales participated in the marketing and sale of the Subject Aircraft to LARRY GLAZER: Stephane Mayer, CEO of DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S., Michel Adam de Villiers, Vice President of Aircraft Sales of DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S., Nicolas Chabert, President of SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC., Patrick Daher, chairman of DAHER, S.A.S. and Ken Dono and Art Maurice of COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC. 80. Upon information and belief, LARRY GLAZER, through Defendant NEW 5ILG LLC, took delivery of the Subject Aircraft, which was registered and based in New York state, in. Groton, Connecticut, on or about April 8, 2014. 81. Upon information and belief, on or about June 20, 2014, Defendant Columbia Services, performed the “First Inspection” of the Subject Aircraft, including inspection, testing and replacement of components, systems and parts of the Subject Aircraft, including the Subject Airoraft’s cabin pressurization system, 82. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants reached out to LARRY GLAZER in New York to, among other things, arrange to include a testimonial from him in promotional materials for the TBM 900 aircraft, including the 2014 Edition of the TBM 900 Comprehensive Guide.‘The Subject Aireraft 83. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft was serial number 1003, and was the first model TBM 700N aircraft (designated for marketing purposes as a “TBM 900”) delivered. by the Socata Defendants. 84. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft, which was capable of flying at a maximum of 31,000 feet was designed with a pressurized cabin which, like in commercial airliners, maintains cabin pressurization so that occupants can breathe and maintain consciousness without the need of supplemental oxygen. 85. Upon inform: mn and belief, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system uses high pressure air developed by its turbine engine, called “bleed air” to maintain pressurization by porting that high pressure air into the cabin as required to maintain proper pressurization of the cabin, 86. Upon information and belief, the. Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system ‘was equipped with, among other things with a GASC (P/N 82024A040601, S/N 82024-00376) which are designed and manufactured by the Liebherr Defendants to, among other things, maintain proper and safe pressurization of the Subject Aireraft’s cabin, 87. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system was equipped with thermal sensors and over-temperature switches designed and manufactured by defendant HONEYWELL INTERNANTIONAL, INC. intended to, among other things, accurately measure “bleed ait” temperature so as to maintain safe and proper operation of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 88. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, ‘was equipped with inlet temperature sensors designed arid manufactured by the Thermocoax 23Defendants intended to, among other things, accurately measure inlet air temperature so as to maintain safe and proper operation of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 89, Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft was equipped with a Garmin G- 1000 Avionics system, including a CAS, which was designed and manufactured by defendant GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. to, among other things, war the pilot of a malfunction and/or dangerous condition involving the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. ‘The Fatal Flight 90. Upon information and belief, on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER departed Greater Rochester International Airport (“ROC”), Rochester, New York at 8:26 am in the Subject Aircraft bound for Naples Municipal Airport (“APF”), Naples, Florida. 91. At all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER was a duly licensed and certificated private pilot. 92, At all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER was properly certified and current to act as pilot in command for the fatal flight. 93. Upon information and belief, upon departure from ROC air traffic control (“ATC”) assigned the Subject Aircraft an enroute cruise altitude of 28,000 feet. 94. Upon information and belief, at some time after takeoff, unbeknownst to LARRY GLAZER the cabin of the Subject Aircraft began to insidiously depressurize. 95. Upon information and belief, at approximately. 10:00 am LARRY GLAZER contacted ATC and reported “an indication that is not correct in the plane” and requested to descend to an altitude of 18,000 feet. 96. Upon information and belief, at that time, ATC cleared LARRY GLAZER to descend to an altitude of 25,000 feet. 2497. Upon information and belief, ATC then instructed LARRY GLAZER to turn the Subject Aircraft 30 degrees to the left and cleared him to descend to an altitude of 20,000 feet. 98. Upon information and belief, in communications’ between ATC and the Subject Aircraft, LARRY GLAZER’s speech began to slow down, he started to slur his words, and he eventually became unresponsive, 99. Upon information and belief, ATC had other nearby aircraft attempt to contact the Subject Aircraft, but those other aircraft also received no response from the Subject Aircraft. 100, Upon information and belief, after being unable to reach the Subject Aircraft via radio, an Air National Guard intercept consisting of two fighter jets was dispatched from McEntire Joint Ni nal Guard Base in Eastover, South Carolina and intercepted the Subject Aircraft at an altitude of 25,000 feet about 40 miles northwest of Charleston, South Carolina. 101. Upon information and belief, after the Air National Guard intercept had followed. the Subject Aircraft for some time, it was relieved by two fighter jets from Homestead Air Force Base, Homestead, Florida that followed the Subject Aircraft to Andros Island, Bahamas, and disengaged prior to entering Cuban airspace. 102. Upon information and belief, one of the pilots of the military aircraft dispatched to intercept the Subject Aircraft saw LARRY GLAZER unconscious in the pilot’s seat with his chest rising and falling. 103. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft flew through Cuban airspace, and eventually began to descend from its 25,000-foot altitude after its engine ran out of fuel. 104. Upon information and belief, the last radar data received relating to the Subject Aircraft was recorded over open water at an altitude of 10,000 feet and 18.3547N latitude and - 76.44049W longitude. 25105. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft impacted open water northeast of Port Antonio, Jamaica. 106. Upon information and beli the wreckage of the Subject Aircraft was located off the eastern coast of Jamaica in approximately 3000 meters of water. 107. Upon information and belief, neither the United States National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) nor the French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (Bureau d'Enquétes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile or “BEA”) were willing to expend the resources and money necessary to retrieve the wreckage of the Subject Aircraft. 108. Upon information and belief, the Glazer family retained and paid a maritime salvage retrieval company to locate and retrieve the wreckage of the Subject Aircraft, including their parents’ remains, AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE SOCATA DEFENDANTS BASED ON NEGLIGENCE 109, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs | through 108 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 110, Atal relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Socata Defendants owed a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, marketing, selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions, procedures and/or wamings for the Subject Aircraft, including its component systems and parts, so that it was safe for its foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users of the Subject Aircraft, including decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER. 26111, Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Socata Defendants, individually and collectively, were careless, negligent and/or reckless in their design of, manufacture of, selection of, assembly of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, writing instructions for, and/or warning for the Subject Aireraft, in that, among other things, they: a, designed and/or manufactured the Subject Aircraft in a ‘manner that unreasonably and dangerously departed from a safe design such that it allowed for an insidious depressurization of the cabin and for inadequate warning of that depressurization to the pilot; b. selected and assembled component systems and parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to its cabin pressurization system, in a manner that unreasonably and dangerously departed from a safe design such that it allowed for an insidious depressurization of the cabin and for inadequate warning of that depressurization to the pilot; ©. tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft and its systems, including its cabin pressurization system, and specifically its GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in a manner that unreasonably and dangerously failed to discover that it departed from a safe design such that it allowed for a dangerous and insidious depressurization of the cabin and a failure to provide adequate warning of that depressurization to the pilot; d. ~ designed the Subject Aircraft in a manner that unreasonably departed ftom the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin and failed to provide adequate waming of the depressurization to the pilot; €. provided inadequate and misleading instructions for ‘troubleshooting and/or addressing a cabin depressurization emergency, including but not limited to, a “bleed temp” ‘warning light which, among other things, failed to direct the pilot to tum the bleed air (ie. pressurization) back on; otherwise designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed the Subject Aircraft such that it did 27not provide adequate warnings of the danger of an insidious depressurization of the cabin; failed to incorporate available technology and/or art that would have prevented dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft; failed to incorporate available technology and/or art that ‘would have safely and timely descended the Subject Aircraft toa safe altitude and avoided the deadly consequences of the dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft; failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the TBM 700 model aircraft line; failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft post-sale by remedying the dangerous conditions posed by the design of the cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air Jeak detector and/or CAS, as well as the emergency procedures for a cabin depressurization, including but not limited to the “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” warning lights, which allowed the Subject Aircraft to experience a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization and/or by failing to supply adequate instructions or wamings regarding the same; failed to select and/or use a GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensors and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft that were capable of sustaining normal operating conditions under normal or reasonably expected conditions, including by not dangerously and insidiously depressurizing the cabin of the Subject Aircraft; failed to select and/or use other component parts, capable of sustaining normal and safe operating conditions of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system under normal or reasonably expected conditions; failed to adequately address and/or remedy the risks of injury due to dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization by failing 28to supply adequate emergency procedures or warnings regarding the same; n, failed to adequately wam of the characteristics of the Subject Aircraft that presented a risk of harm due to dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization; ©. failed to warn users of the Subject Aircraft of the risk of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a component part failure; P. failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization given its design 4. failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization and/or provide adequate emergency procedures relating to a cabin depressurization, including but not limited to the “bleed temp” or “cabin altitude” lights, given the Subject Airoraft’s design after the Subject Aircraft was sold, even after the risks of such condition came to the Socata Defendants’ attention; and 1. took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which ‘were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable prudence. 112. Asa proximate cause of the Socata Defendants’ careless, negligent, and/or reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 113. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants’ breach of its duty to design, manufacture, select, assemble, test, market, sell, distribute and provide wamings for the Subject Aireraft and its component systems and/or parts with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously defective cabin depressurization and/or unsafe emergency procedures exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton. 29114, As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawfal beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including, but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 115. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FORWRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL, DAMAGES AGAINST THE SOCATA DEFENDANTS BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 116. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 115 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 117. The Socata Defendants placed the Subject Aircraft into the stream of commerce. 118, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was in substantially the same condition as when it left the control of the Socata Defendants, 119, Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER was operating the Subject Aircraft as intended, and was using it in the manner for which it, and its component 30systems and parts, were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to the Socata Defendants as designer and manufacturer of the Subject Aircraft 120, Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of inadequate instructions and/or procedures and/or by reason of the failure to wam of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other things, that: a. the Subject Aircraft was defectively designed in a manner that allowed a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization to occur as a result of the defective design and/or manufacture of, among other things, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over- temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or the CAS, which individually, ot in combination, created or contributed to.an insidious and dangerous depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin; b. the checklist procedures regarding the proper response to a cabin pressurization system emergency including, but not limited to, a “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” lights in the Subject Aircraft was defective in that it failed to adequately instruct a pilot on how to avoid a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization and/or to remedy the same; c. the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate checklist instructions regarding the proper response to a cabin pressurization system malfunction including, but not limited to, a “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” light in the Subject Aircraft, and failed to direct the pilot to, among other things, switch the bleed air back on to re-pressurize the cabin of the aircraft; 4d. the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of alerting the pilot to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the 31risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of safely descending the subject aircraft to a safe altitude to avoid the dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the airoraft cabin; the Subject Aircraft’s component parts, including its GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, and/or bleed air leak detector, were defectively designed and/or manufactured in a manner that allowed for an insidious and dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft under normal or reasonably expected conditions; the Subject Aircraft was designed in a manner that departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against an insidious and dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization; the Subject Aircraft and/or its component paits, including its GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, —over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, deviated in manufacture, construction and composition at the time the product left the manufacturer's control in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards, minimum design standards or industry standards and from otherwise identical model aircraft, including its component parts; the Subject Aircraft was designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed such that it did not provide adequate warnings of the risks of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization; the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a component part failure; 32Kk. the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization given its design after the Subject Aircraft was sold, even after the risks of such depressurization came to the attention of the Socata Defendants; and 1. the Subject Aircraft suffered from some other defect in design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter. 121. LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aircraft. 122. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants’ design, manufacture, and failure to provide adequate warnings for the dangerously unsafe Subject Aircraft and its component systems and/or parts with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously defective cabin depressurization and/or unsafe emergency procedures exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton. 123. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, forall compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, fumeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 124. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all 3compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’ fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFE’S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE SOCATA DEFENDANTS BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 125, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 124 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 126. Prior to September 5, 2014, the Socata Defendants implicitly warranted and represented that the Subject Aitcraft and its component parts, including but not limited to the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es), ‘temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that, the Subject Aircraft and its component parts were free from defects. 127. The Socata Defendants breached said implied warranties in that on September 5, 2014 the Subject Aircraft and its component parts, including but not cd to the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were not 34airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective. 128, Asa proximate cause of the Socata Defendants’ breach of their implied warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 129. Asa result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 130. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT COLUMBIA SALES BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 131. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 ‘through 130 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length, 35132. Upon information and belief, Defendant Columbia Sales placed the Subject Aircraft into the stream of commerce by selling it to LARRY GLAZER and his assigns, and delivering the Subject Aircraft to Defendant NEW 51LG LLC to which LARRY GLAZER had assigned the rights to purchase the Subject Aircraft. 133. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was in substantially the same condition as when it left the control of Defendant Columbia Sales. 134. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it, and its component systems and parts, were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to the Socata Defendants as designer and manufacturer of the Subject Aircraft, and Defendant Columbia Sales as distributor and seller of the Subject Aircraft. 135. Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft, including its ‘component systems and parts, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of their defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of the failure to wam of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other things, that: a. the Subject Aircraft was defectively designed in a manner that allowed a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization to occur as a result of the defective design and/or manufacture of, among other things, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over- temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or the CAS which individually, or in combination, created or contributed to an insidious and dangerous depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin; b. the checklist procedures regarding the proper response to a cabin pressurization system emergency including, but not limited to, a “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” lights in the Subject Aircraft’ was defective in that it failed to 36adequately instruct a pilot on how to avoid a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization and/or to remedy the same; the Subject Aircraft kicked adequate checklist instructions regarding the proper response to a cabin pressurization system malfunction including, but not limited to, a “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” light in the Subject Aircraft, and failed to direct the pilot to, among other things, switch the bleed air back on to re-pressurize the cabin ofthe aircraft; the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of preventing dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of safely descending the Subject Aircraft to a safe altitude to avoid the dangerously unsafe. depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; the Subject Aircraft’s component parts, including its GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch(es), ‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, were defectively designed and/or ‘manufactured in a manner that allowed for an insidious and dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft under normal or reasonably expected conditions; the Subject Aircraft was designed in a manner that departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against an insidious and dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization; the Subject Aircraft and/or its component parts, including its GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch, temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor andor bleed air leak detector, deviated in manufacture, construction and composition at the time the product left the manufacturer's 37control in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards, minimum design standards or industry standards and from otherwise identical model aircraft, including its component parts; the Subject Aircraft was designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed such that it did not provide adequate warnings of the risks of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization; the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a component part failure; the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization given its design after the Subject, Aircraft’ was sold, even after the risks of such depressurization came to the attention of the Socata Defendants; and the Subject Aircraft suffered from some other defect in design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter. LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aircraft. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, which exceed the jurisdictional limits ofall lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post- judgment interest as allowed by law. 38138, Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT. )LUMBIA SALES BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 139, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 ‘through 138 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 140, Prior to September 5, 2014, Defendant Columbia Sales implicitly warranted and represented that the Subject Aircraft and its component parts, including but not limited to the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that, the Subject Aircraft and its component parts were free from defects. 141. Defendant Columbia Sales breached said implied warranties in that on September 5, 2014 the Subject Aircraft and its component parts, including but not limited to the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es), temperature 39sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were not airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, ‘manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective. 142. As a proximate cause of Defendant Columbia Sales’ breach of its implied warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed, 143. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, forall compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including bbut not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 144, As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, 40AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT COLUMBIA SERVICES BASED ON NEGLIGENCE, 145. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 144 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 146. Atal relevant times, Defendant Columbia Services owed a duty of reasonable care in testing, inspecting, maintaining, servicing, repairing and returning to service the Subject Aircraft, including its component systems and/or parts, so that it was safe for its foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users of the Subject Aircraft, including decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER. 147. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant Columbia Services was careless and/or negligent in its testing, inspecting, maintaining, servicing and repairing the Subject Aircraft, including its component systems and parts, in that, among other things, it: a. failed to properly inspect the Subject Aircraft and its component systems and/or parts, including the cabin pressurization system and its component parts; b. failed to properly service the Subject Aircraft and its component systems and/or parts, including the cabin pressurization system and its component parts; . c. failed to properly test the Subject Aircraft and its component systems and/or parts, including the cabin pressurization system arid its component parts; and 4. took and/or failed to take any and all other acts and omissions to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable prudence. a148. Asa proximate cause of Defendant Columbia Services’ careless, negligent, and/or reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed, 149, Asaresult of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Services is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as, exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 150. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Services is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES. AGAINST THE LIEBHERR DEFENDANTS FOR NEGLIGENCE 151. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 ‘through 150 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 152. At all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Liebherr Defendants owed a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, 2ion cabin marketing, selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions and/or wamings for avia pressurization systems and their component parts including, but not limited to, the GASC, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensors and/or bleed air leak detector, on the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, and to reasonably ensure that the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts were safe for its/their foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users including decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER. 153. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Liebherr Defendants, individually and collectively, were careless, negligent and/or reckless in. their design of, manufacture of, selection of, assembly of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, and/or ‘warning about the cabin pressurization system on the Subject Aircraft and its component parts, including the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in that, among other things, they: a, designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensors, inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in an unreasonable manner such that it allowed for a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off, b. manufactured the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensors, inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in a manner that departed from its intended design such that it allowed for dangerously unsafe. depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; ©. selected and assembled the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), 43‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in an unreasonable manner such that it allowed for a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin, including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off, tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), ‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in a manner that unreasonably failed to discover the manner in which it departed from its intended design such that it allowed dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off, designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensors. inlet ‘temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in a manner that unreasonably departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off, designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over temperature switch(es), ‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, such that it did not provide adequate ‘warnings of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; failed to incorporate into the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, available technology and/or art that would have prevented dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, and distributed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization 4system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, knowing or constructively knowing that there was a flaw in its design, including the software in the GASC, that, would and did allow a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin rendering it unreasonably dangerous to users; failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known dangerously unsafe defect in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), the temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, which led to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, post-sale by remedying the dangerous conditions posed by the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system which could, and did, allow it to experience dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin and/or by failing to supply adequate warnings regarding the same failed to design, select and/or use the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(8), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system that was capable of sustaining normal operating conditions under normal or reasonably expected conditions; failed to select and/or use component parts, including the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s), capable of sustaining normal operation of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system under normal or reasonably expected conditions; failed to adequately wam of the characteristics of the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), the temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature 45sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, that presented a risk of unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; failed to wam users of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin in the event of a component part failure, including failure of the GASC software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), the temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector; failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft cabin pressurization system of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design failed to adequately. warn users of the Subject Aircrafts cabin pressurization system of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design afier the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system was, put into the stream of commerce, even after the Liebherr Defendants leamed of the risks of such condition; and took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable prudence. ‘As a proximate cause of the Liebherr Defendants’ careless, negligent, and/or reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and Upon information and belief, the Liebherr Defendants’ breach of their duty to design, manufacture, select, assemble, test, market, sell, distribute and provide warnings for the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and/or its component parts, including the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously defective cabin depressurization and/or unsafe emergency procedures exhibits a 46conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton. 156, Asa result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post judgment interest as allowed by law. 157, Asa result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and ‘emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE LIEBHERR DEFENDANTS BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 158, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 157 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 159. Upon information and belief, the Liebherr Defendants placed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin. pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over~ a7temperature switches), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, into the stream of commerce by providing and/or selling it to the Socata Defendants. 160. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, were in substantially the same condition as when it left the control of the Liebherr Defendants. 161, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, was being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it and its component parts were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed , and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to the Liebherr Defendants as designer and manufacturer of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector. 162, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts, including but not limited to its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of the failure to warn of the same through wamings and cautions, in, among other things, that: a, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak 48detector, were defectively designed in a manner that allowed a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aireraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off; the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, were defectively manufactured in a manner that departed from its intended design such that it allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over- temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, was designed in a manner that departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over- temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, lacked other alternate designs capable of preventing dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system was sold, and the costs of adopting them were low compared to the risk of ‘harm; the software for the GASC in Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system was designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system was designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin under normal or reasonably expected conditions; the component parts of Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature 49switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor andior bleed air leak detector, were designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin under normal or reasonably expected conditions; the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, were designed in a manner that departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against. dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off; the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, its GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, deviated in construction and composition at the time the product left the manufacturer's control in a material ‘way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards, minimum design standards, industry design standards and/or from otherwise identical model cabin pressurization systems; the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, was designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, marketed and-distributed such that it did not provide adequate warnings of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off; the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature _switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, lacked adequate wamings to users of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; 501, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, lacked adequate warnings about the dangerous characteristics of the product that presented a risk of harm, including dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; m. the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, lacked adequate warnings to users ofthe likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin in the event of a component part failure including that the cabin “bleed ait” could be shut o! n. the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switches), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabi given its design after the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system was placed into the stream of commerce, even after the Liebherr Defendants learned of the risks of such condition; and ©. the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system suffered from some other defect in design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter. 163. LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries deaths were proximately caused by the aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aireraft’s, cabin pressurization system. 164. Upon information and belief, the Liebherr Defendants’ design, manufacture, and failure to provide adequate warnings for the dangerously unsafe cabin pressurization system and/or SLits component parts including, but not limited to, its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over- temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously defective cabin depressurization exhibited a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton. 165, As a result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, forall compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including bbut not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 166. Asa result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE LIEBHERR DEFENDANTS BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY, 167. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 166 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 52168. Prior to September 5, 2014, the Liebherr Defendants iniplicitly warranted and represented that the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts, including but not limited to its over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC software, were airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they ‘were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and wamings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that the Subject Aircraft and its component parts were free from defects. 169, The Liebherr Defendants breached said implied warranties in that on September 5, 2014 the Subject Aircrait’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts, including but not limited to its over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC software, were not airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective 170. Asa proximate cause of the Liebherr Defendants’ breach of their implied warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 171, As a result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as 33exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 172. As a result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT HONEYWELL BASED ON NEGLIGENCE 173. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 172 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 174, Atal relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant Honeywell owed a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, testing, marketing, selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions and/or warnings for a product that was safe for its foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users of component parts of the Subject Aircrafts cabin pressurization system, including the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s), including to decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER. 175. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant Honeywell was careless, negligent and/or reckless in its design of, manufacture of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, and/or warning about the component parts of the Subject sfAircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s), in that, among other things, it a designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; b. manufactured the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system's over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in a manner that departed from its intended design such that it allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; ©. tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or ‘temperature sensor(s) in a manner that failed to discover any manner in which they departed from its intended design such that it allowed dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut o 4. designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in a manner that departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that they failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; ©. failed to incorporate into the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system's over-temperature switch(es) and/or ‘temperature sensor(s) design, available technology and/or art that would have prevented dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; { designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, and distributed the Subject Aircraft's cabin pressurization system’s over- temperature switch(es) and/or temperature _sensor(s) knowing that there was a flaw in its design such that it caused it to be unreasonably dangerous to users; 58failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known dangerously unsafe defect in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system's over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) which led to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) post-sale by remedying the dangerous conditions posed by the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) which. could, and did, allow a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin and/or by failing to supply adequate warnings regarding the same; failed to design, manufacture and/or select over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) for the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system that were capable of sustaining normal operating conditions under normal or reasonably expected conditions; failed to adequately wam of the characteristics ofthe Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) that presented a risk of unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off, failed to wam users of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin in the event of over- temperature switch(es)’ and/or temperature sensor(s)" failure including causing the cabin “bleed air” to be shut off; failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft cabin pressurization system of the likelihood of a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given the design of the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s); failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design after the Subject Aircraft’s cabin 56pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or ‘temperature sensor(s) that were put into the stream of commerce, even after Defendant Honeywell leamed of the risks of such condition; and n, took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be proven through discovery or atthe trial of this matter, which were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable prudence. 176. As a proximate cause of the Defendant Honeywell’s careless, negligent, and/or reckless breach of its duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. , 177. Upon information and belief, Defendants Honeywell’s breach of its duty to design, manufacture, market, sell, distribute and provide warnings for, among other things, the over- temperature switch(¢s) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the ‘conduct may be called willful or wanton. 178. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including, but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 179. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all 51‘ compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and tional limits of all lower courts which would emotion pain end suffering, which exceed the juris otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT HONEYWELL BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 180. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 179 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 181. Upon information and belief, Defendant Honeywell placed, among other things, the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system into the stream of commerce by selling and/or providing them to the Liebherr Defendants. 182, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in Subject A ircraft’s cabin pressurization system were in substantially the same condition as when they left the control of Defendant Honeywell. 183, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft's cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s), was being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it and its over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to Defendant Honeywell as designer and manufacturer of, among other things, the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 58184. Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, among other things, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of the failure to warn of the same through wamings and cautions, in, among other things, that: the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were defectively designed in a manner that allowed dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off: b. the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircrait’s cabin pressurization system were defectively manufactured in a manner that departed from their intended design such that they allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; © the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were designed in a manner that departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that they failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off; 4. the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked other alternate designs capable of preventing dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were sold, and the costs of adopting them were low compared to the risk of harm; © the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircrait’s cabin pressurization system were designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin under normal or reasonably expected conditions; 59the component parts of over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft's cabin pressurization system were designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin. under normal or reasonably expected conditions; the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system deviated in construction and composition at the time the products left the manufacturer's control in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards, minimum design standards, industry design standards and/or from otherwise identical model cabin pressurization systems; the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed such that they did not provide adequate warnings of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off; the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off; the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked adequate warnings about the dangerous characteristics of the product that presented a risk of harm, including dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design after the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft's cabin pressurization system were placed into the stream of 60188. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT HONEYWELL BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 189, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 188 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 190. Prior to September 5, 2014, Defendant Honeywell implicitly warranted and represented that the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject A\rcraft’s cabin pressurization system and other component parts were airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and wamings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts were free from defects. 191. Defendant Honeywell breached said implied warranties in that on September 5, 2014 the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and other component parts were not airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, 2distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective. 192. As a proximate cause of Defendant Honeywell's breach of its implied warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 193. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all awful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest. 194, As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE THERMOCOAX DEFENDANTS BASED ON NEGLIGENCE 195. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 194 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 63196. Atall relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Thermocoax Defendants owed a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, testing, marketing, selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions and/or wamings for a product that was safe for its foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users of component parts of the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, including to decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER. 197. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Thermocoax Defendants weie careless, negligent and/or reckless in their design of, manufacture of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, and/or waming about the component parts of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in that, among other things, it: designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; d. manufactured the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system's inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in a manner that departed from its intended design such that it allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; © tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in a manner that failed to discover any manner in which they departed from its intended design such that it allowed dangerously unsafe depressutization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; 4. designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in a manner that departed from the standards used 64in the aviation industry in that they failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; failed to incorporate into the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or Dleed air leak detector design, available technology and/or art that would have prevented dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off, designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, and distributed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector knowing that there was a flaw in its design such that it caused it to be unreasonably dangerous to users; failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known dangerously unsafe defect in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, which led to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s cabi pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector post-sale by remedying the dangerous conditions posed by the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, which could, and did, allow a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin and/or by failing to supply adequate warnings regarding the same; failed to design, manufacture and/or select an inlet ‘temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector for the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system that was capable of sustaining normal operating conditions under normal or reasonably expected conditions; failed to adequately war of the characteristics of the Subject, Aircrafts cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector that presented a risk of unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off, 65k. failed to wam users of the Subject’ Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin in the event of inlet temperature sensor's and/or bleed air leak detector’s failure including causing the cabin “bleed air” to be shut off; 1. failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aireraft cabin pressurization system of the likelihood of a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given the design of the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector; failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design after the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector that were put into the stream of commerce, even after the Thermocoax Defendants learned of the risks of such condition; and n. took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable prudence. 198. As a proximate cause of the Thermocoax Defendants’ careless, negligent, and/or reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 199. Upon information and belief, the Thermocoax Defendants’ breach of their duty to design, manufacture, market, sell, distribute and provide warnings for, among other things, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously unsafe cabin. depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton, 66200. As.aresult of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death’ damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of s , grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 201. Asa result of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE. THERMOCOAX DEFENDANTS BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 202. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 201 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 203. Upon information and belief, the Thermocoax Defendants placed, among other things, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system into the stream of commerce by selling and/or providing them to the Liebherr Defendants. 67204, Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were in substantially the same condition as when they left the control of the Thermocoax Defendants 205. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, was being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it and its inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to the Thermocoax Defendants as designer and manufacturer of, among other things, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system. 206. Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, among other things, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of the failure to warn of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other things, that: a. the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were defectively designed in a manner that allowed a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off, b. the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were defectively manufactured in a manner that departed from their intended design such that they allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were designed in a manner that departed from the standards used 68in the aviation industry in that they failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked other alternate designs capable of preventing dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were sold, and the costs of adopting them were low compared to the risk of harm; the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in. the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin under normal or reasonably expected conditions; the component parts of the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aireraft cabin under normal or reasonably expected conditions; the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system deviated in construction and composition at the time the products left the manufacturer's control in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards, ‘minimum design standards, industry design standards and/or from otherwise identical model cabin pressurization systems; the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed such that they did not provide adequate warnings of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; 6pressurization system. the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked adequate warnings about the dangerous characteristics of the product that presented a risk of harm, including dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off; the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design after the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were placed into the stream of commerce, even after the ‘Thermocoax Defendants learned of the risks of such condition; and the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, or some other Thermocoax product in the Subject Aircrait’s cabin pressurization system suffered from some other defect in design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter. LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of, among other things, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin’s Upon information and belief, the Thermocoax Defendants’ design, manufacture, and failure to provide adequate warnings for, among other things, the dangerously unsafe inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of serious injury or 70death due to a dangerous cabin depressurization exhibited a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton. 209. Asa result of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, oss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 210. As aresult of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’ fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE ‘THERMOCOAX DEFENDANTS BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 211. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 210 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 212. Prior to September 5, 2014, the Themocoax Defendants implicitly warranted and represented that the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and other component parts were airworthy, of merchantable quality, nfit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that the component parts of Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were free from defects. 213. The Thermocoax Defendants breached said implied warranties in that on September 5, 2014 the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and other component parts were not airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, manuals and ‘warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective. 214. As a proximate cause of the Thermocoax Defendants’ breach of their implied warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 215. Asaresult of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintif'and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as, exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest. 216. As arresult of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and nemotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION, FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT GARMIN BASED ON NEGLIGEN 217. Plait iff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 216 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 218. Atall relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant Garmin owed a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, marketing, selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions, procedures and/or warnings for the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionies system, including its CAS, so that it was safe for its foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users of the Subject Aircraft, including decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER. 219. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant Garmin was careless, negligent and/or reckless in its design of, manufacture of, selection of, assembly of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, writing instructions for, and/or warning, for the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, in that, among other things, they: a, designed and/or manufactured the Subject Aireraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, in a manner that unreasonably and dangerously departed from a safe design such that it allowed for an insidious depressurization of the cabin without adequate warming of that depressurization to the pilot; b. selected and assembled component systems and parts of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, in a manner that unreasonably and dangerously Bdeparted from a safe design such that it allowed for an insidious depressurization of the cabin without adequate ‘warning of that depressurization to the pilot; tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, in a manner that unreasonably and dangerously failed to discover that it departed from a safe design such that it allowed for a dangerous and insidious depressurization of the cabin and failed to provide adequate ‘warning of that depressurization to the pilot; designed the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, in a manner that unreasonably departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin and failed to provide adequate ‘warning of the depressurization to the pilot; otherwise designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, such that it did not provide adequate warnings of the danger of an insidious depressurization of the cabin; failed to incorporate available technology and/or art into the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, that would have prevented or provided adequate warnings of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft; failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known risk of inadequate warning of a _— dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin by the G-1000 avionics system, including its CA failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, post-sale by remedying the dangerous conditions posed by the design of the G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, which allowed the Subject Aircraft to experience a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization without adequate warning to the pilot and/or by failing to supply adequate instructions or warnings regarding the same; 4failed to select and/or use other component parts, capable of sustaining normal and safe operating conditions of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, under normal or reasonably expected conditions; failed to adequately warn of the characteristics of the Subject Aircrafi’s G-1000 avionies system, including its CAS, that presented a risk of harm due to dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization; failed to warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, of the risk of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a ‘component part failure; failed to adequately wam users of the Subject Aircraft’s G- 1000 avionics system, including its CAS, of the likelihood of a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization given its design failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s G- 1000 avionics system, including its CAS, of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization given the Subject Aircraft’s design after the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system was sold, even after the risks of such condition came to Defendant Garmin’s attention; failed to incorporate available technology and/or art into the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, that would have prevented dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft or provided adequate warning to the pilot of such condition; failed to incorporate available technology and/or art into the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system that would have safely and timely descended the Subject Aircraft to a safe altitude and avoided the deadly consequences of the dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft; and took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which ‘were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable prudence. 8220. As a proximate cause of Defendant Garmin's careless, negligent, and/or reckle: breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 221. Upon information and belief, Defendant Garmin’s breach of its duity to design, manufacture, select, assemble, test, market, sell, distribute and/or provide adequate warnings for the Subject Aircrafi’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including, its CAS, and its component parts, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to dangerous cabin depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton. 222. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as. well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 223. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendants Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. 16AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S SEVENTEENTH CAUSE, OF ACTION FORWRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT GARMIN BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 224. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 223 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 225. Defendant Garmin placed the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system into the stream of commerce. 226. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, was in substantially the same condition as when it left the control of Defendant Garmin. 227. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, was being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it was designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to Defendant Garmin as designer and manufacturer of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system. 228. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, was defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of inadequate instructions and/or procedures and/or by reason of the failure to warn of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other things, the a, the Subject Aircraf’s G-1000 avionics system was defectively designed in a manner that allowed a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization to occur as a result of the 1defective design and/or manufacture of, among other things, the CAS which created or contributed to an insidious and dangerous depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin ; the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionies system, including its CAS, lacked other alternate designs capable of preventing dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the tisk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; i the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, lacked other altemate designs capable of alerting the pilot to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system lacked other alternate designs capable of safely descending the subject aircraft to a safe altitude to avoid the dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aireraft cabin; ‘the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, lacked other alternate designs capable of alerting the pilot to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system was sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin; the Subject Aireraft’s G-1000 avionics system’s component parts, including those making up its CAS, were designed and/or manufactured in a manner that allowed for an insidious and dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft under normal or reasonably expected conditions; Bthe Subject Aiteraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, was designed in a manner that departed from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect against an insidious and dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization or adequately alert the pilot of the same; the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, deviated in construction and composition at the time the product left the manufacturer's control in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards, minimum design standards or industry standards and from otherwise identical model aircraft, including its component parts; the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS was designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, marketed and distributed such that it did not provide adequate warnings of the risks of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization without adequate alerting to the pilot; the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a component part failure; the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization without adequate alerting to the pilot, given its design after the Subject Aireraft’s G-1000 avionics system was sold, even after the risks of such depressurization came to the attention of Defendant Garmin; and the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, suffered from some other defect in design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter. 9229, LARRY and JANE GLAZER’ injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aircrafts G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS. 230. Upon information and belief, Defendant Garmin’s design, manufacture, and failure to provide adequate wamings for the dangerously unsafe G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously defective cabin depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate ‘egard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton, 231. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest. 232, Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. 80AS AND FOR PLAINTIFE’S EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT GARMIN BASED ON BREACH OF I 233. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 ‘through 232 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 234. Prior to September 5, 2014, Defendant Garmin implicitly warranted and represented that the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, was airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which it was designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that the Subject Aircrafts G-1000 avionics system and its component parts were free from defects. 235. Defendant Garmin breached said implied warranties in that on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, was not airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which it was designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective. 236. As a proximate cause of Defendant Garmin’s breach of their implied warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed. 237. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendants Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages inder applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and 81physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest. 238. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not, limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT NEW 51LG LLC BASED ON NEGLIGENCE 239. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 238 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set forth herein at length. 240, Atall relevant times, Defendant NEW 51LG LLC, as owner and operator of the Subject Aircraft, owed a duty of reasonable care in the conduct of its business to , among other things, provide an airworthy aircraft to users and passengers of the Subject Aircraft, including decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER. 241. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant NEW 51LG LLC breached its duties of care and was careless and/or negligent in that, among other things, it: provided an unairworthy aircraft to users and passengers of the Subject Airor 82b. took and/or failed to take any and all other acts and omissions to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable prudence: 242. As a proximate cause of Defendant NEW 51L.G LLC’s careless, negligent, and/or reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed 243. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant NEW SILG LLC is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful: beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest. 244, As a result of the foregoing, Defendant NEW 51LG LLC is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. [Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank] 83WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, KENNETH GLAZER, Individually and as Administrator of the Estates of his parents, LARRY and JANE GLAZER, deceased, and on behalf of all beneficiaries entitled to recover under applicable law, including his siblings Melinda Glazer Maclaren and Richard Glazer, demands judgment against defendants, individually and in aggregate, in a sum exceeding the jurisdiction of all lower Courts, together with the costs and disbursements of this action plus any and all further relief the Court may find just and proper. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. Dated: New York, New York August 29, 2016 Daniel O. Rose Steven R. Pounian Evan Katin-Borland 750 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 ‘Tel: (212) 687-8181 Fax: (212) 972-9432 drose@kreindler.com ekatinborland@kreindler.com Attorneys for Plaintiff BE 32 Wd OF ony Di 84 @aisVERIFICATION OF ATTORNEY STATE OF NEWYORK) ys COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) DANIEL ROSE, being duly sworn, deposes and says: Jam an attomey for the plaintiff in the within action; I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint and know the contents thereof; the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true. Plaintiff does not presently reside in New York Count therefore, I am submitting the Verification for this Complaint\ Daniel O. Rose Sworn to before me this 29" day of August 2016 Zenit R. z Notary Public zone ieee x Comlanen Spr carieens 29 = 3 8 2 2 28 83114