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Ken Glazer, the youngest son and administrator of the estate of the late Larry and Jane Glazer, has filed a wrongful death lawsuit against several aircraft companies stemming from the plane crash that killed his parents on Sept. 5, 2014.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
MONROE COUNTY
KENNETH GLAZER, Individually and as
Administrator of the Estates of LAURENCE GLAZER.
and JANE GLAZER, deceased,
Plaintiff,
-against-
SOCATA, S.A.S., DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S.,
DAHER, S.A.S, DAHER AEROSPACE, 8.A.S,
SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC., COLUMBIA
AIRCRAFT SALES INC, COLUMBIA AIR
SERVICES INC., LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE
‘TOULOUSE SAS, LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE
LINDENBERG GBH, LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK
GBH, LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC.,
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC,,
‘THERMOCOAX SAS, THERMOCOAX ISOPAD
GmaH, THERMOCOAX INC., GARMIN
INTERNATIONAL, INC., and NEW 51LG LLC.
Defendants.
2816 - USS
VERIFIED COMPL:
(Action for Death and Survival
Damages)
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED:
‘This action arises out of the September 5, 2014 crash of a Socata TBM 900 aircraft which
experienced a catastrophic failure of its cabin pressurization system causing the deaths of Larry
and Jane Glazer.
‘The plaintiff herein, KENNETH GLAZER (“Plaintiff”), Individually and as Administrator
of the Estates of LAURENCE GLAZER (“LARRY GLAZER”) and JANE GLAZER, deceased,
by his attorneys, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, as and for his verified complaint, respectfully alleges:PARTIES
1, Atal relevant times, plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER resided at 11 Babcock Ferms
Lane, Pittsford, New York, 14534 in Monroe County.
2. At all relevant times, plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER was the son of decedents
LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER.
3. Atthe time of their death, LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER resided together
as husband and wife at 35 Heatherstone Lane, Rochester, New York, 14618 in Monroe County.
4. Larry and Jane are survived by their three adult children, Melinda Glazer Maclaren,
bom April 11, 1971, Richard Glazer, born July 19, 1973, and Kenneth Glazer, born September 30,
1974,
5. On November 12, 2014, the Surrogate’s Court of the of the State of New York for
Monroe County granted Letters Testamentary to plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER to administer the
estates of each of his parents, LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER.
6. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant SOCATA, S.A.S. was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France, with
its principal place of business at Aéroport de Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénées, 65921 Tarbes Cedex 9,
France.
7. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, SOCATA, S.A.S. was
conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business
opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information,
shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from
those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them,
even through an auth
ed distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, andliterature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and
to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for
purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be
purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components;
maintaining direct relationships and contact with owners, including those located in New York
State, as the holder of the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the
continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through
which it communicated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited
to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service inform:
mand answer questions relating to
its aircraft and their component parts.
8. Upon information and belief, defendant SOCATA, S.A.S. designed, manufactured,
selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported the subject model
‘TBM 700N aircraft (s/n: 1003; FAA Registration No, N90OKN), with a marketing designation of
“TBM900”, along with its component systems, parts, manuals and instructions (collectively the
“Subject Aircraft”).
Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S. was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
France, with its principal place of business at. Aéroport de Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénées, 65921 Tarbes
Cedex 9, France.
10. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S. was
conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business
opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information,
shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money fromthose businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them,
even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and
literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and
‘to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for
purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be
purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components;
maintaining direct relationships and-contact with owners, including those located in New York
State, as the holder of the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the
continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through
which it communicated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited
to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service information and answer questions relating to
its aircraft and their component parts.
11, Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S. designed,
manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported the
Subject Aircraft and its component systems and parts.
12. Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER, S.A.S. is a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of France, with its principal place of b
ness at Aéroport de Tarbes-
Lourdes-Pyrénées, 65921 Tarbes Cedex 9, France.
13. Upon information and belief, a all relevant times, DAHER, S.A.S. was conducting
business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business opportunities here,
advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information, shipping products, parts,
and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from those businesses and
individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them, even through anauthorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and literature, including
service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and to mechanics, fixed
‘base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for purposes including
providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be purchased from the
defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; maintaining direct
relationships and contact with owners, including those located in New York State, as the holder of
the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of
Various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through which it communicated back
and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited to LARRY GLAZER, to
Provide important service information and answer questions relating to its aircraft and their
component parts,
14, Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER, $.A.S. is the parent and/or
successor of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, $.A.$ who designed, manufactured,
selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and supported the Subject Aircraft
and/or its component systems and parts, and which assumed or is responsible under applicable law
for the liabilities of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, $.A.S,, including but not limited
to any negligence, products liability and/or breach of implied warranty relating to products
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed and/or distributed by
SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A.
15. Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER AEROSPACE, $.A.S. is a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of France, with its principal place of business at Zoné
Industrielle Sud-Z1 Nord, rue des Perruches, 41400, Montrichard, France16. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, DAHER AEROSPACE, S.A.S.
‘was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business
opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information,
shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from
those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them,
even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and
literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and
to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for
Purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be
Purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components;
maintaining direct relationships and contact with owners, including those located in New York
State, as the holder of the Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure the
continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website through
which it commu
sated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not limited
to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service information and answer questions relating to
its aircraft and their component parts.
17. Upon information and belief, defendant DAHER. AEROSPACE, S.A.S. is the
parent and/or successor of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S who designed,
‘manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported the
Subject Aircraft and/or its component systems and parts, and which assumed or is responsible
under applicable law for the liabilities of SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A...
including but not limited to any negligence, products liability and/or breach of implied warrantyrelating to products designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed
and/or distributed by SOCATA, S.A.S. and/or DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S.
18. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5,2014,
defendant SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC. was a domestic corporation organized under the
laws of New York, authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in New
York County.
19. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, SOCATA NORTH AMERICA,
INC, was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the
business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and
information, shipping produets, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving
money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and
pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts,
components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State
of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their
components; maintaining direct relationships and contact with owners, including those located in
New York State, as the holder of the ‘Type Certificate with the continuous responsibility to ensure
the continuing airworthiness of various aircraft; and maintaining a highly interactive website
through which it communicated back and forth with owners of Socata Aircraft, including but not
limited to LARRY GLAZER, to provide important service information and answer questions
relating to its aircraft and their component parts.20. Upon information and belief, defendant SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC.
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or
supported the Subject Aircraft and/or its component systems and parts.
21, Upon information and belief, the defendants SOCATA, S.A.S., DAHER SOCATA,
[Link]., DAHER, S.A.S., DAHER AEROSPACE, S.A.S, and SOCATA,
RTH AMERICA,
INC. (collectively the “Socata Defendants” or “SOCATA”) are inter-related entities that are
individually and/or jointly liable for the actions of the other(s) as, among other things, the parent,
subsidiary, division, principal, agent, alter ego, successor in interest, and/or joint venturer of the
other entities.
22. Upon information and belief, each of the Socata Defendants undertook, or approved
the acts or omissions that were taken, or oversaw and/or approved the acts and omissions that were
taken by others in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, inspecting, marketing,
distributing and/or supporting the Subject Aircraft and/or its component systems and parts.
23. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC. (“Columbia Sales”) was a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of Connecticut, with its principal place of business at 175 Tower Road,
Groton-New London Airport, Groton, CT 06340.
24. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT
SALES INC. was authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in
Westchester County.
formation and -belief, at all relevant times, COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT.
25. Upon
SALES INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including selling aircraft to
New York residents and advertising aircraft for sale to New York residents.26. Upon information and belief, deferidant COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC.
tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, marketed and/or distributed the Subject Airoraft and/or its
component systems and parts, and/or placed the Subject Aircraft into the stream of commerce,
27. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant COLUMBIA AIR SERVICES INC. (“Columbia Services”) was a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of Connecticut, with its principal place of business at 175 Tower Road,
Groton-New London Airport, Groton, CT 06340,
28. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT
SALES INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including servicing aircraft
owned by New York residents, communicating with individuals in New York with regard to any
service provided to New York residents, and advertising its services to New York residents,
29. Upon information and belief, defendant COLUMBIA AIR SERVICES INC. tested,
inspected, maintained, repaired, returned to service and/or deemed airworthy the Subject Airoraft
and/or its component systems and parts.
30. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE TOULOUSE SAS was a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of France, with its prineipal place of business at 408 avenue des Ptats-Unis, 31016
Toulouse Cedex 2, France:
31. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR-AFROSPACE
‘TOULOUSE SAS was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing
itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services,
and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving
money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts andpay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts,
components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State
ofNew York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of airoraft and their
components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those
located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of various aircraft components.
32. Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE TOULOUSE
SAS designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or
supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to the
Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the
General Air System Controller (“GASC"), pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(s), over-
temperature switch(es), inlet temperature sensor, and/or bleed air leak detector.
33. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE LINDENBERG GMBH was a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of Germany, with its principal place of business at PRtinderstrafie 50-52,
88161 Lindenberg/Allgdu, Germany.
34. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE.
LINDENBERG GmH was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing
itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services,
and iriformation, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving
money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and
10pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts,
components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State
ofNew York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their
components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those
located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of various aircraft components.
35. Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE
LINDENBERG GmbH designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed,
distributed, and/or supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including
but not limited to the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other
component parts, the GASC, pressure sénsor(s), temperature sensor(s), over-temperature
switch(es) and/or inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector.
36. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK GBH was a foreign corporation organized under the laws
of Germany, with its principal place of business Peter-Domier-Strae 11, 88131 Lindau, Germany.
37. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK
GMBH was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the
business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and
information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving
‘money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and
pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts,
ncomponents, and literature, including service literature, to aireraft owners located within the State
of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their
components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those
located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of various aircraft components.
38 Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR-ELEKTRONIK GMBH
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or
supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the
GASC, pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es) and/or inlet
‘temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector.
39. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC. was a foreign corporation organized under
the laws of Virginia, with its principal place of business at 1465 Woodland Drive, Saline,
Michigan, 48176.
40. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LIEBHERR AEROSPACE.
SALINE, INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself
of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and
information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving,
money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and
pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts,
2components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State
of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
pparts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their
components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those
located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of various aircraft components.
41. Upon information and belief, defendant LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC.
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or
supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to the
Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system which includes, among other component parts, the
GASC, pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), inlet temperature
sensor and/or bleed air leak detector.
42, Upon information and belief, the defendants LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE,
TOULOUSE SAS, LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE LINDENBERG GMpH, LIEBHERR-
ELEKTRONIK GBH, and LIEBHERR AEROSPACE SALINE, INC. (collectively the “Liebherr
Defendants”) are inter-related entities that are individually and/or jointly liable for the actions of
the other(s) as among other things the parent, subsidiary, division, principal, agent, alter ego,
successor in interest, and/or joint venturer of the other entities.
43. Upon information and belief, each of the Liebherr Defendants undertook, or
approved the acts or omissions that were taken, or oversaw and/or approved the acts and omissions
that were taken by others in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, inspecting,
marketing, distributing, and/or supporting component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft,
13including but not limited to the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system which includes,
among other component parts, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), temperature sensor(8), over-
temperature switch(es), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector.
44. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. (“Honeywell”) was a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of Delaware, authorized to do business within the State of New York and
registered in New York County, with its headquarters at 115 Tabor Road, Morris Plains, New
Jersey, 07950.
45. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, HONEYWELL
INTERNATIONAL, INC. was authorized to do business within the State of New York and
registered in New York County.
46. Upon information and belief, at all’ relevant times, HONEYWELL.
INTERNATIONAL, INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, includi
availing itself of the business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts,
services, and information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and
receiving money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and
parts and pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts,
components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State
of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their
components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those
4located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of various aircraft components.
47. Upon information and belief, defendant HONEY WELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported component parts of the Subject Aircraft,
including, but not limited to, over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) used in the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system.
48, Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant THERMOCOAX SAS was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of France,
with its principal place of business at 40 Bd Henri Sellier, F 92156 Suresnes Cedex, France.
49. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, THERMOCOAX SAS was
conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business
opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information,
shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from
those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them,
even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and
literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and
to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for
purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be
purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and
maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New
York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness
of various aircraft components,
1550. Upon information and belief, defendant THERMOCOAX: SAS designed,
‘manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported
component parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to, the inlet temperature sensor
and/or bleed air leak detector used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system,
51. Upon information and belief, a all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant THERMOCOAX ISOPAD GMBH was a foreign corporation organized under the laws
of Germany, with its principal place of business at Englerstrasse 11, D-69 126 He
idelberg,
Germany.
52. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, THERMOCOAX ISOPAD.
GviBH was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the
business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and
information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving
money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and
pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts,
Components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State
of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their
components; and maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those
located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of various aircraft components,
53. Upon information and belief, defendant THERMOCOAX ISOPAD GapH
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or
16supported component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to,
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system.
54. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant THERMOCOAX INC. was a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Delaware,
with its principal place of business at 6825 Shiloh Road East, Ste B-3, Alpharetta, GA 30005.
58. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, THERMOCOAX INC. was
conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the business
‘opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and information,
shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving money from
those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and pay for them,
even through an authorized distributor acting as its agent; supplying parts, components, and
literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State of New York, and
to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance in this state for
purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and parts that can be
purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their components; and
maintaining direct relationships and contact with product owners, including those located in New
York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness
of various aircraft components,
56. Upon information and belief, defendant THERMOCOAX INC. designed,
manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed, distributed, and/or supported
component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft, including, but not limited to, the inlet
7temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector used in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system.
57. Upon information and belief, the defendants THERMOCOAX SAS,
THERMOCOAX ISOPAD GmBH, and THERMOCOAX INC. (collectively the “Thermocoax.
Defendants”) are inter-related entities that are individually and/or jointly liable forthe actions of
the other(s) as among other things the parent, subsidiary, division, principal, agent, alter ego,
successor in interest, and/or joint venturer of the other entities,
58. Upon information and belief, each of the Thermocoax Defendants undertook, or
approved the acts or omissions that were taken, or oversaw and/or approved the acts and omissions
that were taken by others in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, inspecting,
‘marketing, distributing, and/or supporting component systems and/or parts of the Subject Aircraft,
including, but not limited to, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector used in the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system.
59. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. (“Garmin”) was a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of Kansas, authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered
in New York County, with its headquarters at 1200 E 151* Street, Olathe, Kansas 66062.
60. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, GARMIN INTERNATIONAL,
INC. was authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in New York
County.
6l. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, GARMIN INTERNATIONAL,
INC. was conducting business within the State of New York, including: availing itself of the
business opportunities here, advertising the availability of products, parts, services, and
18information, shipping products, parts, and literature into the State of New York, and receiving
‘money from those businesses and individuals in this state who order goods, services and parts and
pay for them, even through an authorized distributor acting as its. agent; supplying parts,
components, and literature, including service literature, to aircraft owners located within the State
of New York, and to mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform airoraft maintenance
in this state for purposes including providing information and knowledge as to the products and
parts that can be purchased from the defendants for the repair or replacement of aircraft and their
components; and maintaining direct r
jonships and contact with product owners, including those
located in New York State, as the entity with the continuous responsibility to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of various aircraft components,
62. Upon information and belief, defendant GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, inspected, marketed and/or distributed
component parts of the Subject Aircraft including, but not limited to, the Subject Aircraft’s G-
1000 Avionics System which includes the Crew Alerting System (“CAS”),
63. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
defendant NEW S1LG LLC was a domestic limited liability company organized under the laws of
New York , authorized to do business within the State of New York and registered in Monroe
County.
64. Upon information and be
lief, defendant NEW 51LG LLC owned and operated the
‘Subject Aircraft at the time of the crash.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
65. Venue is proper in Monroe County pursuant to CPLR § 503 in that, among other
things, the plaintiff KENNETH GLAZER, a resident of Monroe County as of the date of the
19commencement of this action, was appointed Administer of the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and
JANE GLAZER by the Surrogate’s Court of Monroe County,
66, Jurisdiction over the defendants by the New York State Courts is proper pursuant
to CPLR § 302 in that each of the defendants conducts such continuous and substantial business
in New York State such that they can be deemed to be residing within the state, and in that LARRY.
GLAZER and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and death at issue in this suit are sufficiently related to
and/or the result of business conducted by each of the defendants within and/or was specifically
directed to New York State.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
Purchase and Delivery of the Subject Aireraft
67. LARRY GLAZER was a highly qualified and experienced pilot who had a
commercial pilot’s license and an instrument rating, as well as over 7000 flight hours. He had
previously owned two Socata TBM aircraft, a “TBM 700” and a “TBM 850” and was experienced
in the TBM aircraft platform and airoraft type, including completing numerous specialized training
syllabi specifically geared for the TBM aircraft.
68. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, LARRY GLAZER was the
President of the TBM Owners and Pilots Association, Inc. (“TBMOPA”), a position he had held
since 2012.
69. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, TBMOPA and the Socata
Defendants maintained a business relationship, which involved coordinated marketing, including
use of “Socata” and “TBM” brand names, logos and other intellectual property for use in marketing
and sale of branded merchandise, as well as provision of technical information to TBMOPA
members by Socata personnel.
2070. TBMOPA, through LARRY GLAZER as its President, entered into multiple
agreements with Socata Defendants formally recognizing their ongoing business relationship.
71. Upon information and belief, due to his role as TBMOPA President, the Socata
Defendants regularly communicated with LARRY GLAZER in New York to discuss coordination
of Socata business and marketing efforts coordinated with TBMOPA.
72. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants reached out to LARRY
GLAZER in New York and, because of his position as TMBOPA President, specifically arranged
for him to purchase the first TBM 900 aircraft manufactured by the Socata Defendants, which was
the Subject Aircraft.
73. Upon information and belief, after discussion with the Socata Defendants from
New York, LARRY GLAZER agreed to purchase the Subject Aircraft as the first TBM 900 aireraft
manufactured by the Socata Defendants.
74, Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants arranged for LARRY
GLAZER, and/or his assigns, to purchase the Subject Aircraft from Defendant Columbia Sales,
which is the Socata Defendants’ agent acting as its dealer and distributor to customers who are
located in New York.
75, By an Aircraft Purchase Agreement dated February 19, 2014 between LARRY
GLAZER and Defendant Columbia Sales, LARRY GLAZER agreed to purchase the Subject
Aircraft.
76. Byan Assignment of Contract dated April 4, 2014, LARRY GLAZER assigned his
right to purchase and take delivery of the Subject Aircraft to Defendant NEW 51LG LLC.
77. Upon information and belief, LARRY GLAZER participated in an marketing event
for the Socata Defendants commemorating the delivery of the two first TBM 900 aircraft,
aincluding the Subject Aircraft, at the Fantasy of Flight Park in Polk City, Florida on March 24,
2014 as part of the “Sun ‘n Fun” aviation fly-in and expo program.
78. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants and Defendant Columbia Sales
arranged this event and reached out to LARRY GLAZER in New York to arrange that he
participate as the purchaser of one of the first TBM 900 aircraft.
79. In addition to LARRY GLAZER, the following representatives of the Socata
Defendants and Defendant Columbia Sales participated in the marketing and sale of the Subject
Aircraft to LARRY GLAZER: Stephane Mayer, CEO of DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S., Michel Adam
de Villiers, Vice President of Aircraft Sales of DAHER SOCATA, S.A.S., Nicolas Chabert,
President of SOCATA NORTH AMERICA, INC., Patrick Daher, chairman of DAHER, S.A.S.
and Ken Dono and Art Maurice of COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT SALES INC.
80. Upon information and belief, LARRY GLAZER, through Defendant NEW 5ILG
LLC, took delivery of the Subject Aircraft, which was registered and based in New York state, in.
Groton, Connecticut, on or about April 8, 2014.
81. Upon information and belief, on or about June 20, 2014, Defendant Columbia
Services, performed the “First Inspection” of the Subject Aircraft, including inspection, testing
and replacement of components, systems and parts of the Subject Aircraft, including the Subject
Airoraft’s cabin pressurization system,
82. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants reached out to LARRY
GLAZER in New York to, among other things, arrange to include a testimonial from him in
promotional materials for the TBM 900 aircraft, including the 2014 Edition of the TBM 900
Comprehensive Guide.‘The Subject Aireraft
83. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft was serial number 1003, and was
the first model TBM 700N aircraft (designated for marketing purposes as a “TBM 900”) delivered.
by the Socata Defendants.
84. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft, which was capable of flying at a
maximum of 31,000 feet was designed with a pressurized cabin which, like in commercial
airliners, maintains cabin pressurization so that occupants can breathe and maintain consciousness
without the need of supplemental oxygen.
85. Upon inform:
mn and belief, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system
uses high pressure air developed by its turbine engine, called “bleed air” to maintain pressurization
by porting that high pressure air into the cabin as required to maintain proper pressurization of the
cabin,
86. Upon information and belief, the. Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system
‘was equipped with, among other things with a GASC (P/N 82024A040601, S/N 82024-00376)
which are designed and manufactured by the Liebherr Defendants to, among other things, maintain
proper and safe pressurization of the Subject Aireraft’s cabin,
87. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system
was equipped with thermal sensors and over-temperature switches designed and manufactured by
defendant HONEYWELL INTERNANTIONAL, INC. intended to, among other things,
accurately measure “bleed ait” temperature so as to maintain safe and proper operation of the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system.
88. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system,
‘was equipped with inlet temperature sensors designed arid manufactured by the Thermocoax
23Defendants intended to, among other things, accurately measure inlet air temperature so as to
maintain safe and proper operation of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system.
89, Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft was equipped with a Garmin G-
1000 Avionics system, including a CAS, which was designed and manufactured by defendant
GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. to, among other things, war the pilot of a malfunction
and/or dangerous condition involving the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system.
‘The Fatal Flight
90. Upon information and belief, on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER and JANE
GLAZER departed Greater Rochester International Airport (“ROC”), Rochester, New York at
8:26 am in the Subject Aircraft bound for Naples Municipal Airport (“APF”), Naples, Florida.
91. At all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER was a
duly licensed and certificated private pilot.
92, At all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER was
properly certified and current to act as pilot in command for the fatal flight.
93. Upon information and belief, upon departure from ROC air traffic control (“ATC”)
assigned the Subject Aircraft an enroute cruise altitude of 28,000 feet.
94. Upon information and belief, at some time after takeoff, unbeknownst to LARRY
GLAZER the cabin of the Subject Aircraft began to insidiously depressurize.
95. Upon information and belief, at approximately. 10:00 am LARRY GLAZER
contacted ATC and reported “an indication that is not correct in the plane” and requested to
descend to an altitude of 18,000 feet.
96. Upon information and belief, at that time, ATC cleared LARRY GLAZER to
descend to an altitude of 25,000 feet.
2497. Upon information and belief, ATC then instructed LARRY GLAZER to turn the
Subject Aircraft 30 degrees to the left and cleared him to descend to an altitude of 20,000 feet.
98. Upon information and belief, in communications’ between ATC and the Subject
Aircraft, LARRY GLAZER’s speech began to slow down, he started to slur his words, and he
eventually became unresponsive,
99. Upon information and belief, ATC had other nearby aircraft attempt to contact the
Subject Aircraft, but those other aircraft also received no response from the Subject Aircraft.
100, Upon information and belief, after being unable to reach the Subject Aircraft via
radio, an Air National Guard intercept consisting of two fighter jets was dispatched from McEntire
Joint Ni
nal Guard Base in Eastover, South Carolina and intercepted the Subject Aircraft at an
altitude of 25,000 feet about 40 miles northwest of Charleston, South Carolina.
101. Upon information and belief, after the Air National Guard intercept had followed.
the Subject Aircraft for some time, it was relieved by two fighter jets from Homestead Air Force
Base, Homestead, Florida that followed the Subject Aircraft to Andros Island, Bahamas, and
disengaged prior to entering Cuban airspace.
102. Upon information and belief, one of the pilots of the military aircraft dispatched to
intercept the Subject Aircraft saw LARRY GLAZER unconscious in the pilot’s seat with his chest
rising and falling.
103. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft flew through Cuban airspace, and
eventually began to descend from its 25,000-foot altitude after its engine ran out of fuel.
104. Upon information and belief, the last radar data received relating to the Subject
Aircraft was recorded over open water at an altitude of 10,000 feet and 18.3547N latitude and -
76.44049W longitude.
25105. Upon information and belief, the Subject Aircraft impacted open water northeast of
Port Antonio, Jamaica.
106. Upon information and beli
the wreckage of the Subject Aircraft was located off
the eastern coast of Jamaica in approximately 3000 meters of water.
107. Upon information and belief, neither the United States National Transportation
Safety Board (“NTSB”) nor the French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety
(Bureau d'Enquétes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile or “BEA”) were willing to
expend the resources and money necessary to retrieve the wreckage of the Subject Aircraft.
108. Upon information and belief, the Glazer family retained and paid a maritime
salvage retrieval company to locate and retrieve the wreckage of the Subject Aircraft, including
their parents’ remains,
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST
THE SOCATA DEFENDANTS BASED ON NEGLIGENCE
109, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs |
through 108 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
110, Atal relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Socata Defendants owed
a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, marketing,
selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions, procedures and/or wamings for the Subject
Aircraft, including its component systems and parts, so that it was safe for its foreseeable and
intended use by purchasers and users of the Subject Aircraft, including decedents LARRY and
JANE GLAZER.
26111, Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
the Socata Defendants, individually and collectively, were careless, negligent and/or reckless in
their design of, manufacture of, selection of, assembly of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, writing
instructions for, and/or warning for the Subject Aireraft, in that, among other things, they:
a, designed and/or manufactured the Subject Aircraft in a
‘manner that unreasonably and dangerously departed from a
safe design such that it allowed for an insidious
depressurization of the cabin and for inadequate warning of
that depressurization to the pilot;
b. selected and assembled component systems and parts of the
Subject Aircraft, including but not limited to its cabin
pressurization system, in a manner that unreasonably and
dangerously departed from a safe design such that it allowed
for an insidious depressurization of the cabin and for
inadequate warning of that depressurization to the pilot;
©. tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft and its systems,
including its cabin pressurization system, and specifically its
GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature
switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor
and/or bleed air leak detector in a manner that unreasonably
and dangerously failed to discover that it departed from a
safe design such that it allowed for a dangerous and insidious
depressurization of the cabin and a failure to provide
adequate warning of that depressurization to the pilot;
d. ~ designed the Subject Aircraft in a manner that unreasonably
departed ftom the standards used in the aviation industry in
that it failed to adequately protect against dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the cabin and failed to provide
adequate waming of the depressurization to the pilot;
€. provided inadequate and misleading instructions for
‘troubleshooting and/or addressing a cabin depressurization
emergency, including but not limited to, a “bleed temp”
‘warning light which, among other things, failed to direct the
pilot to tum the bleed air (ie. pressurization) back on;
otherwise designed, manufactured, assembled, tested,
marketed and distributed the Subject Aircraft such that it did
27not provide adequate warnings of the danger of an insidious
depressurization of the cabin;
failed to incorporate available technology and/or art that
would have prevented dangerously unsafe depressurization
of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft;
failed to incorporate available technology and/or art that
‘would have safely and timely descended the Subject Aircraft
toa safe altitude and avoided the deadly consequences of the
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the
Subject Aircraft;
failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known risk of
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the TBM
700 model aircraft line;
failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft post-sale by
remedying the dangerous conditions posed by the design of
the cabin pressurization system including, but not limited to,
the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es),
temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air
Jeak detector and/or CAS, as well as the emergency
procedures for a cabin depressurization, including but not
limited to the “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” warning
lights, which allowed the Subject Aircraft to experience a
dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization and/or by failing
to supply adequate instructions or wamings regarding the
same;
failed to select and/or use a GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS,
over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet
temperature sensors and/or bleed air leak detector in the
Subject Aircraft that were capable of sustaining normal
operating conditions under normal or reasonably expected
conditions, including by not dangerously and insidiously
depressurizing the cabin of the Subject Aircraft;
failed to select and/or use other component parts, capable of
sustaining normal and safe operating conditions of the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system under normal
or reasonably expected conditions;
failed to adequately address and/or remedy the risks of injury
due to dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization by failing
28to supply adequate emergency procedures or warnings
regarding the same;
n, failed to adequately wam of the characteristics of the Subject
Aircraft that presented a risk of harm due to dangerously
unsafe cabin depressurization;
©. failed to warn users of the Subject Aircraft of the risk of
dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a
component part failure;
P. failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft of the
likelihood of a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization
given its design
4. failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft of the
likelihood of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization
and/or provide adequate emergency procedures relating to a
cabin depressurization, including but not limited to the
“bleed temp” or “cabin altitude” lights, given the Subject
Airoraft’s design after the Subject Aircraft was sold, even
after the risks of such condition came to the Socata
Defendants’ attention; and
1. took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be
proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which
‘were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and
reasonable prudence.
112. Asa proximate cause of the Socata Defendants’ careless, negligent, and/or reckless
breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed.
113. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants’ breach of its duty to design,
manufacture, select, assemble, test, market, sell, distribute and provide wamings for the Subject
Aireraft and its component systems and/or parts with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of
injury due to a dangerously defective cabin depressurization and/or unsafe emergency procedures
exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be
called willful or wanton.
29114, As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawfal beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including,
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
115. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION FORWRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL,
DAMAGES AGAINST THE SOCATA DEFENDANTS
BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
116. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 115 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
117. The Socata Defendants placed the Subject Aircraft into the stream of commerce.
118, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was in
substantially the same condition as when it left the control of the Socata Defendants,
119, Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, LARRY GLAZER was operating
the Subject Aircraft as intended, and was using it in the manner for which it, and its component
30systems and parts, were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed, and
intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to the Socata Defendants as designer and
manufacturer of the Subject Aircraft
120, Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was defective
and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design, manufacture, selection,
assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of inadequate instructions and/or procedures
and/or by reason of the failure to wam of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other
things, that:
a. the Subject Aircraft was defectively designed in a manner
that allowed a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization to
occur as a result of the defective design and/or manufacture
of, among other things, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over-
temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet
temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or the CAS,
which individually, ot in combination, created or contributed
[Link] insidious and dangerous depressurization of the Subject
Aircraft’s cabin;
b. the checklist procedures regarding the proper response to a
cabin pressurization system emergency including, but not
limited to, a “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” lights in
the Subject Aircraft was defective in that it failed to
adequately instruct a pilot on how to avoid a dangerously
unsafe cabin depressurization and/or to remedy the same;
c. the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate checklist instructions
regarding the proper response to a cabin pressurization
system malfunction including, but not limited to, a “bleed
temp” and/or “cabin altitude” light in the Subject Aircraft,
and failed to direct the pilot to, among other things, switch
the bleed air back on to re-pressurize the cabin of the aircraft;
4d. the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of
alerting the pilot to dangerously unsafe depressurization of
the cabin that were technologically and economically
feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which
could have been adopted at a low cost when compared to the
31risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization
of the aircraft cabin;
the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of
safely descending the subject aircraft to a safe altitude to
avoid the dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin
that were technologically and economically feasible at the
time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have
been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of
harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
airoraft cabin;
the Subject Aircraft’s component parts, including its GASC,
pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch(es),
temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, and/or bleed
air leak detector, were defectively designed and/or
manufactured in a manner that allowed for an insidious and
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the
Subject Aircraft under normal or reasonably expected
conditions;
the Subject Aircraft was designed in a manner that departed
from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it
failed to adequately protect against an insidious and
dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization;
the Subject Aircraft and/or its component paits, including its
GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, —over-temperature
switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor
and/or bleed air leak detector, deviated in manufacture,
construction and composition at the time the product left the
manufacturer's control in a material way from the
manufacturer's specifications or performance standards,
minimum design standards or industry standards and from
otherwise identical model aircraft, including its component
parts;
the Subject Aircraft was designed, manufactured, selected,
assembled, tested, marketed and distributed such that it did
not provide adequate warnings of the risks of dangerously
unsafe cabin depressurization;
the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the
Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe
cabin depressurization in the event of a component part
failure;
32Kk. the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the
Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe
cabin depressurization given its design after the Subject
Aircraft was sold, even after the risks of such
depressurization came to the attention of the Socata
Defendants; and
1. the Subject Aircraft suffered from some other defect in
design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended
use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this
matter.
121. LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the
aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aircraft.
122. Upon information and belief, the Socata Defendants’ design, manufacture, and
failure to provide adequate warnings for the dangerously unsafe Subject Aircraft and its component
systems and/or parts with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously
defective cabin depressurization and/or unsafe emergency procedures exhibits a conscious and
deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.
123. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, forall compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, fumeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
124. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
3compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’ fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFE’S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE
SOCATA DEFENDANTS BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
125, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 124 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
126. Prior to September 5, 2014, the Socata Defendants implicitly warranted and
represented that the Subject Aitcraft and its component parts, including but not limited to the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es),
‘temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or
GASC, including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were
airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed,
manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the
instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that,
the Subject Aircraft and its component parts were free from defects.
127. The Socata Defendants breached said implied warranties in that on September 5,
2014 the Subject Aircraft and its component parts, including but not
cd to the Subject
Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC,
including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were not
34airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed,
manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions,
manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective.
128, Asa proximate cause of the Socata Defendants’ breach of their implied warranty,
LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed.
129. Asa result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
130. As a result of the foregoing, the Socata Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT
COLUMBIA SALES BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
131. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
‘through 130 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length,
35132. Upon information and belief, Defendant Columbia Sales placed the Subject
Aircraft into the stream of commerce by selling it to LARRY GLAZER and his assigns, and
delivering the Subject Aircraft to Defendant NEW 51LG LLC to which LARRY GLAZER had
assigned the rights to purchase the Subject Aircraft.
133. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was in
substantially the same condition as when it left the control of Defendant Columbia Sales.
134. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft was being
operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it, and its component systems
and parts, were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed, and intended to
be used, and in a manner foreseeable to the Socata Defendants as designer and manufacturer of the
Subject Aircraft, and Defendant Columbia Sales as distributor and seller of the Subject Aircraft.
135. Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft, including its
‘component systems and parts, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason
of their defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by
reason of the failure to wam of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other things,
that:
a. the Subject Aircraft was defectively designed in a manner
that allowed a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization to
occur as a result of the defective design and/or manufacture
of, among other things, the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over-
temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet
temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or the CAS
which individually, or in combination, created or contributed
to an insidious and dangerous depressurization of the Subject
Aircraft’s cabin;
b. the checklist procedures regarding the proper response to a
cabin pressurization system emergency including, but not
limited to, a “bleed temp” and/or “cabin altitude” lights in
the Subject Aircraft’ was defective in that it failed to
36adequately instruct a pilot on how to avoid a dangerously
unsafe cabin depressurization and/or to remedy the same;
the Subject Aircraft kicked adequate checklist instructions
regarding the proper response to a cabin pressurization
system malfunction including, but not limited to, a “bleed
temp” and/or “cabin altitude” light in the Subject Aircraft,
and failed to direct the pilot to, among other things, switch
the bleed air back on to re-pressurize the cabin ofthe aircraft;
the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of
preventing dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin
that were technologically and economically feasible at the
time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have
been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of
harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin;
the Subject Aircraft lacked other alternate designs capable of
safely descending the Subject Aircraft to a safe altitude to
avoid the dangerously unsafe. depressurization of the cabin
that were technologically and economically feasible at the
time the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have
been adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of
harm posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin;
the Subject Aircraft’s component parts, including its GASC,
pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch(es),
‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed
air leak detector, were defectively designed and/or
‘manufactured in a manner that allowed for an insidious and
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the
Subject Aircraft under normal or reasonably expected
conditions;
the Subject Aircraft was designed in a manner that departed
from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it
failed to adequately protect against an insidious and
dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization;
the Subject Aircraft and/or its component parts, including its
GASC, pressure sensor(s), CAS, over-temperature switch,
temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor andor bleed
air leak detector, deviated in manufacture, construction and
composition at the time the product left the manufacturer's
37control in a material way from the manufacturer's
specifications or performance standards, minimum design
standards or industry standards and from otherwise identical
model aircraft, including its component parts;
the Subject Aircraft was designed, manufactured, selected,
assembled, tested, marketed and distributed such that it did
not provide adequate warnings of the risks of dangerously
unsafe cabin depressurization;
the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the
Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe
cabin depressurization in the event of a component part
failure;
the Subject Aircraft lacked adequate warnings to users of the
Subject Aircraft of the likelihood of dangerously unsafe
cabin depressurization given its design after the Subject,
Aircraft’ was sold, even after the risks of such
depressurization came to the attention of the Socata
Defendants; and
the Subject Aircraft suffered from some other defect in
design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended
use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this
matter.
LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the
aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aircraft.
Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, which exceed the
jurisdictional limits ofall lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-
judgment interest as allowed by law.
38138, Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and
JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and
suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have
jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT.
)LUMBIA SALES BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
139, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
‘through 138 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
140, Prior to September 5, 2014, Defendant Columbia Sales implicitly warranted and
represented that the Subject Aircraft and its component parts, including but not limited to the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es),
temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or
GASC, including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were
airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed,
manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the
instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that,
the Subject Aircraft and its component parts were free from defects.
141. Defendant Columbia Sales breached said implied warranties in that on September
5, 2014 the Subject Aircraft and its component parts, including but not limited to the Subject
Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es), temperature
39sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC,
including the GASC software, and its G-1000 avionics system, including the CAS, were not
airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed,
manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions,
‘manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective.
142. As a proximate cause of Defendant Columbia Sales’ breach of its implied
warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed,
143. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, forall compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
bbut not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
144, As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Sales is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and
JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and
suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have
jurisdiction,
40AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST
DEFENDANT COLUMBIA SERVICES BASED ON NEGLIGENCE,
145. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 144 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
146. Atal relevant times, Defendant Columbia Services owed a duty of reasonable care
in testing, inspecting, maintaining, servicing, repairing and returning to service the Subject
Aircraft, including its component systems and/or parts, so that it was safe for its foreseeable and
intended use by purchasers and users of the Subject Aircraft, including decedents LARRY and
JANE GLAZER.
147. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
Defendant Columbia Services was careless and/or negligent in its testing, inspecting, maintaining,
servicing and repairing the Subject Aircraft, including its component systems and parts, in that,
among other things, it:
a. failed to properly inspect the Subject Aircraft and its
component systems and/or parts, including the cabin
pressurization system and its component parts;
b. failed to properly service the Subject Aircraft and its
component systems and/or parts, including the cabin
pressurization system and its component parts; .
c. failed to properly test the Subject Aircraft and its component
systems and/or parts, including the cabin pressurization
system arid its component parts; and
4. took and/or failed to take any and all other acts and
omissions to be proven through discovery or at the trial of
this matter, which were in the contravention of the exercise
of due care, and reasonable prudence.
a148. Asa proximate cause of Defendant Columbia Services’ careless, negligent, and/or
reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and
killed,
149, Asaresult of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Services is liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law,
including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual,
moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and
all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as,
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
150. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Columbia Services is liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages under applicable law, including but not limited to LARRY and
JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and emotion pain and
suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have
jurisdiction,
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES.
AGAINST THE LIEBHERR DEFENDANTS FOR NEGLIGENCE
151. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
‘through 150 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
152. At all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Liebherr Defendants
owed a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing,
2ion cabin
marketing, selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions and/or wamings for avia
pressurization systems and their component parts including, but not limited to, the GASC, the
pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature
sensors and/or bleed air leak detector, on the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, and
to reasonably ensure that the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and its component
parts were safe for its/their foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users including
decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER.
153. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
the Liebherr Defendants, individually and collectively, were careless, negligent and/or reckless in.
their design of, manufacture of, selection of, assembly of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, and/or
‘warning about the cabin pressurization system on the Subject Aircraft and its component parts,
including the GASC, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet
temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in that, among other things, they:
a, designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system,
including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s),
over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensors, inlet
temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in an
unreasonable manner such that it allowed for a dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off,
b. manufactured the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensors,
inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in a
manner that departed from its intended design such that it
allowed for dangerously unsafe. depressurization of the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin including as a result of the cabin
“bleed air” being shut off;
©. selected and assembled the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including the GASC and its software,
the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es),
43‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed
air leak detector, in an unreasonable manner such that it
allowed for a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin, including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut off,
tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including the GASC and its software,
the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es),
‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed
air leak detector, in a manner that unreasonably failed to
discover the manner in which it departed from its intended
design such that it allowed dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off,
designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system,
including the GASC and its software, the pressure sensor(s),
over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensors. inlet
‘temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, in a
manner that unreasonably departed from the standards used
in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect
against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft
cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut
off,
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested,
marketed and distributed the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin
pressurization system, including the GASC and its software,
the pressure sensor(s), the over temperature switch(es),
‘temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed
air leak detector, such that it did not provide adequate
‘warnings of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization
of the aircraft cabin;
failed to incorporate into the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including the GASC and its software,
the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es),
temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed
air leak detector, available technology and/or art that would
have prevented dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut off;
designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, and
distributed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
4system, including the GASC and its software, the pressure
sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, knowing or constructively knowing that there was
a flaw in its design, including the software in the GASC, that,
would and did allow a dangerously unsafe depressurization
of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin rendering it unreasonably
dangerous to users;
failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known
dangerously unsafe defect in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including the GASC and its software,
the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es), the
temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed
air leak detector, which led to dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including the GASC and its software,
the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es),
temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed
air leak detector, post-sale by remedying the dangerous
conditions posed by the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system which could, and did, allow it to
experience dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin and/or by failing to supply adequate warnings
regarding the same
failed to design, select and/or use the GASC and its software,
pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(8), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system that was capable of sustaining normal operating
conditions under normal or reasonably expected conditions;
failed to select and/or use component parts, including the
pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature switch(es) and/or
temperature sensor(s), capable of sustaining normal
operation of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system under normal or reasonably expected conditions;
failed to adequately wam of the characteristics of the Subject
Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the GASC
and its software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature
switch(es), the temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature
45sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, that presented a risk of
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a
result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
failed to wam users of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system of the risk of dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin in the event of a
component part failure, including failure of the GASC
software, the pressure sensor(s), the over-temperature
switch(es), the temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature
sensor and/or bleed air leak detector;
failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft cabin
pressurization system of the likelihood of dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design
failed to adequately. warn users of the Subject Aircrafts
cabin pressurization system of the likelihood of dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design
afier the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system was,
put into the stream of commerce, even after the Liebherr
Defendants leamed of the risks of such condition; and
took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be
proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which
were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and
reasonable prudence.
‘As a proximate cause of the Liebherr Defendants’ careless, negligent, and/or
reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and
Upon information and belief, the Liebherr Defendants’ breach of their duty to
design, manufacture, select, assemble, test, market, sell, distribute and provide warnings for the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and/or its component parts, including the GASC,
pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor
and/or bleed air leak detector, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a
dangerously defective cabin depressurization and/or unsafe emergency procedures exhibits a
46conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called
willful or wanton.
156, Asa result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post judgment interest as allowed by law.
157, Asa result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
‘emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE
LIEBHERR DEFENDANTS BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
158, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 157 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
159. Upon information and belief, the Liebherr Defendants placed the Subject Aircraft’s
cabin. pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over~
a7temperature switches), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, into the stream of commerce by providing and/or selling it to the Socata Defendants.
160. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature
switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, were in
substantially the same condition as when it left the control of the Liebherr Defendants.
161, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature
switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, was
being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it and its component parts
were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested, distributed , and intended to be used,
and in a manner foreseeable to the Liebherr Defendants as designer and manufacturer of the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including its GASC and software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector.
162, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system and its component parts, including but not limited to its GASC and software,
pressure sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor
and/or bleed air leak detector, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason
of its defective design, manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason
of the failure to warn of the same through wamings and cautions, in, among other things, that:
a, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
48detector, were defectively designed in a manner that allowed
a dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aireraft cabin
including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off;
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, were defectively manufactured in a manner that
departed from its intended design such that it allowed for
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including
the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-
temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet
temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, was
designed in a manner that departed from the standards used
in the aviation industry in that it failed to adequately protect
against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft
cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut
off;
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including
the GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-
temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet
temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, lacked
other alternate designs capable of preventing dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin that were
technologically and economically feasible at the time the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system was sold, and
the costs of adopting them were low compared to the risk of
‘harm;
the software for the GASC in Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system was designed in a manner that allowed
for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin;
the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system was
designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin under normal or
reasonably expected conditions;
the component parts of Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system including, but not limited to, the
GASC and its software, pressure sensor(s), over-temperature
49switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor
andior bleed air leak detector, were designed in a manner
that allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin under normal or reasonably expected
conditions;
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, were designed in a manner that departed from the
standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to
adequately protect against. dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off;
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, its GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, deviated in construction and composition at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control in a material
‘way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance
standards, minimum design standards, industry design
standards and/or from otherwise identical model cabin
pressurization systems;
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, was designed, manufactured, assembled, tested,
marketed and-distributed such that it did not provide
adequate warnings of the risk of dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off;
the Subject Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature _switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, lacked adequate wamings to users of the likelihood
of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
501, the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, lacked adequate warnings about the dangerous
characteristics of the product that presented a risk of harm,
including dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft
cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut
off;
m. the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switch(es), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, lacked adequate warnings to users ofthe likelihood
of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
in the event of a component part failure including that the
cabin “bleed ait” could be shut o!
n. the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system including,
but not limited to, the GASC and its software, pressure
sensor(s), over-temperature switches), temperature
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood
of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabi
given its design after the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system was placed into the stream of
commerce, even after the Liebherr Defendants learned of the
risks of such condition; and
©. the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system suffered
from some other defect in design, manufacture and/or
warning that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous
for its normal or intended use to be proven through discovery
or at the trial of this matter.
163. LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries deaths were proximately caused by the
aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aireraft’s,
cabin pressurization system.
164. Upon information and belief, the Liebherr Defendants’ design, manufacture, and
failure to provide adequate warnings for the dangerously unsafe cabin pressurization system and/or
SLits component parts including, but not limited to, its GASC and software, pressure sensor(s), over-
temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously defective
cabin depressurization exhibited a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such
that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.
165, As a result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, forall compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
bbut not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
166. Asa result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction,
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE LIEBHERR
DEFENDANTS BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY,
167. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 166 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
52168. Prior to September 5, 2014, the Liebherr Defendants iniplicitly warranted and
represented that the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts,
including but not limited to its over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), pressure
sensor(s), inlet temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC
software, were airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they
‘were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and
that the instructions, manuals and wamings which had been issued were adequate and safe, and
further that the Subject Aircraft and its component parts were free from defects.
169, The Liebherr Defendants breached said implied warranties in that on September 5,
2014 the Subject Aircrait’s cabin pressurization system and its component parts, including but not
limited to its over-temperature switch(es), temperature sensor(s), pressure sensor(s), inlet
temperature sensor, bleed air leak detector and/or GASC, including the GASC software, were not
airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed,
manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions,
manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective
170. Asa proximate cause of the Liebherr Defendants’ breach of their implied warranty,
LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed.
171, As a result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
33exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
172. As a result of the foregoing, the Liebherr Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST
DEFENDANT HONEYWELL BASED ON NEGLIGENCE
173. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 172 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
174, Atal relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant Honeywell owed
a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, testing, marketing, selling, distributing,
and/or issuing instructions and/or warnings for a product that was safe for its foreseeable and
intended use by purchasers and users of component parts of the Subject Aircrafts cabin
pressurization system, including the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s),
including to decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER.
175. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
Defendant Honeywell was careless, negligent and/or reckless in its design of, manufacture of,
testing of, sale of, distribution of, and/or warning about the component parts of the Subject
sfAircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s), in that, among other things, it
a designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
b. manufactured the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization
system's over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in a manner that departed from its intended design
such that it allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization
of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed
air” being shut off;
©. tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or
‘temperature sensor(s) in a manner that failed to discover any
manner in which they departed from its intended design such
that it allowed dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut o
4. designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in a manner that departed from the standards used
in the aviation industry in that they failed to adequately
protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut off;
©. failed to incorporate into the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system's over-temperature switch(es) and/or
‘temperature sensor(s) design, available technology and/or
art that would have prevented dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
{ designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, and distributed
the Subject Aircraft's cabin pressurization system’s over-
temperature switch(es) and/or temperature _sensor(s)
knowing that there was a flaw in its design such that it caused
it to be unreasonably dangerous to users;
58failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known
dangerously unsafe defect in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system's over-temperature switch(es) and/or
temperature sensor(s) which led to dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or
temperature sensor(s) post-sale by remedying the dangerous
conditions posed by the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or
temperature sensor(s) which. could, and did, allow a
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
and/or by failing to supply adequate warnings regarding the
same;
failed to design, manufacture and/or select over-temperature
switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) for the Subject
Aireraft’s cabin pressurization system that were capable of
sustaining normal operating conditions under normal or
reasonably expected conditions;
failed to adequately wam of the characteristics ofthe Subject
Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature
switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) that presented a risk
of unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as
a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off,
failed to wam users of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system of the risk of dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin in the event of over-
temperature switch(es)’ and/or temperature sensor(s)"
failure including causing the cabin “bleed air” to be shut off;
failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft cabin
pressurization system of the likelihood of a dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given the design
of the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s);
failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s
cabin pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es)
and/or temperature sensor(s) of the likelihood of
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
given its design after the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
56pressurization system’s over-temperature switch(es) and/or
‘temperature sensor(s) that were put into the stream of
commerce, even after Defendant Honeywell leamed of the
risks of such condition; and
n, took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be
proven through discovery or atthe trial of this matter, which
were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and
reasonable prudence.
176. As a proximate cause of the Defendant Honeywell’s careless, negligent, and/or
reckless breach of its duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and
killed. ,
177. Upon information and belief, Defendants Honeywell’s breach of its duty to design,
manufacture, market, sell, distribute and provide warnings for, among other things, the over-
temperature switch(¢s) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously unsafe cabin
depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the
‘conduct may be called willful or wanton.
178. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including,
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
179. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
51‘
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
tional limits of all lower courts which would
emotion pain end suffering, which exceed the juris
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST
DEFENDANT HONEYWELL BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
180. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 179 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
181. Upon information and belief, Defendant Honeywell placed, among other things, the
over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system into the stream of commerce by selling and/or providing them to the
Liebherr Defendants.
182, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the over-temperature switch(es)
and/or temperature sensor(s) in Subject A ircraft’s cabin pressurization system were in substantially
the same condition as when they left the control of Defendant Honeywell.
183, At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft's cabin
pressurization system, including its over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s), was
being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it and its over-temperature
switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested,
distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to Defendant Honeywell as
designer and manufacturer of, among other things, the over-temperature switch(es) and/or
temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system.
58184. Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the over-temperature switch(es)
and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, among other
things, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design,
manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of the failure to warn
of the same through wamings and cautions, in, among other things, that:
the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system were defectively designed in a manner that allowed
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off:
b. the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircrait’s cabin pressurization
system were defectively manufactured in a manner that
departed from their intended design such that they allowed
for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
© the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system were designed in a manner that departed from the
standards used in the aviation industry in that they failed to
adequately protect against dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off;
4. the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system lacked other alternate designs capable of preventing
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin that
were technologically and economically feasible at the time
the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system were sold, and the costs of adopting them were low
compared to the risk of harm;
© the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircrait’s cabin pressurization
system were designed in a manner that allowed for
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
under normal or reasonably expected conditions;
59the component parts of over-temperature switch(es) and/or
temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft's cabin
pressurization system were designed in a manner that
allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin. under normal or reasonably expected
conditions;
the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system deviated in construction and composition at the time
the products left the manufacturer's control in a material way
from the manufacturer's specifications or performance
standards, minimum design standards, industry design
standards and/or from otherwise identical model cabin
pressurization systems;
the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested,
marketed and distributed such that they did not provide
adequate warnings of the risk of dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off;
the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood
of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
including as a result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off;
the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system lacked adequate warnings about the dangerous
characteristics of the product that presented a risk of harm,
including dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft
cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut
off;
the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature
sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system lacked adequate warnings to users of the likelihood
of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
given its design after the over-temperature switch(es) and/or
temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft's cabin
pressurization system were placed into the stream of
60188. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT
HONEYWELL BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
189, Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 188 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
190. Prior to September 5, 2014, Defendant Honeywell implicitly warranted and
represented that the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject
A\rcraft’s cabin pressurization system and other component parts were airworthy, of merchantable
quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled,
tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and wamings
which had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system and its component parts were free from defects.
191. Defendant Honeywell breached said implied warranties in that on September 5,
2014 the over-temperature switch(es) and/or temperature sensor(s) in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system and other component parts were not airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit
and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced,
2distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued
were not adequate and safe, but were defective.
192. As a proximate cause of Defendant Honeywell's breach of its implied warranty,
LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed.
193. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all
awful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including
but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest.
194, As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Honeywell is liable to Plaintiff and all
lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST
THE THERMOCOAX DEFENDANTS BASED ON NEGLIGENCE
195. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 194 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
63196. Atall relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, the Thermocoax Defendants
owed a duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, testing, marketing, selling,
distributing, and/or issuing instructions and/or wamings for a product that was safe for its
foreseeable and intended use by purchasers and users of component parts of the Subject Aireraft’s
cabin pressurization system, including the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector,
including to decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER.
197. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
the Thermocoax Defendants weie careless, negligent and/or reckless in their design of,
manufacture of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, and/or waming about the component parts of
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, including the inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector, in that, among other things, it:
designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
d. manufactured the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system's inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector in a manner that departed from its intended design
such that it allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization
of the aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed
air” being shut off;
© tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector in a manner that failed to discover any
manner in which they departed from its intended design such
that it allowed dangerously unsafe depressutization of the
aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut off;
4. designed the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector in a manner that departed from the standards used
64in the aviation industry in that they failed to adequately
protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut off;
failed to incorporate into the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or
Dleed air leak detector design, available technology and/or
art that would have prevented dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off,
designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, and distributed
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system’s inlet
temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector knowing
that there was a flaw in its design such that it caused it to be
unreasonably dangerous to users;
failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known
dangerously unsafe defect in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector, which led to dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a result of
the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s cabi
pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector post-sale by remedying the dangerous
conditions posed by the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector, which could, and did, allow a
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
and/or by failing to supply adequate warnings regarding the
same;
failed to design, manufacture and/or select an inlet
‘temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector for the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system that was
capable of sustaining normal operating conditions under
normal or reasonably expected conditions;
failed to adequately war of the characteristics of the Subject,
Aircrafts cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature
sensor and/or bleed air leak detector that presented a risk of
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a
result of the cabin “bleed ait” being shut off,
65k. failed to wam users of the Subject’ Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system of the risk of dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin in the event of inlet
temperature sensor's and/or bleed air leak detector’s failure
including causing the cabin “bleed air” to be shut off;
1. failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aireraft cabin
pressurization system of the likelihood of a dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given the design
of the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector;
failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s
cabin pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor
and/or bleed air leak detector of the likelihood of
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin
given its design after the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system’s inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector that were put into the stream of
commerce, even after the Thermocoax Defendants learned
of the risks of such condition; and
n. took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be
proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which
were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and
reasonable prudence.
198. As a proximate cause of the Thermocoax Defendants’ careless, negligent, and/or
reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and
killed.
199. Upon information and belief, the Thermocoax Defendants’ breach of their duty to
design, manufacture, market, sell, distribute and provide warnings for, among other things, the
inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to a dangerously unsafe cabin.
depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of others such that the
conduct may be called willful or wanton,
66200. [Link] of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death’ damages under applicable law,
including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual,
moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of s
, grief, funeral expenses and
all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
201. Asa result of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction,
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION.
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE.
THERMOCOAX DEFENDANTS BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
202. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 201 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
203. Upon information and belief, the Thermocoax Defendants placed, among other
things, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system into the stream of commerce by selling and/or providing them to the
Liebherr Defendants.
67204, Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector in Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were in substantially the
same condition as when they left the control of the Thermocoax Defendants
205. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aireraft’s cabin
pressurization system, including its inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, was
being operated as intended, and was being used in the manner for which it and its inlet temperature
sensor and/or bleed air leak detector were designed, manufactured, selected, assembled, tested,
distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to the Thermocoax Defendants
as designer and manufacturer of, among other things, the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air
leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system.
206. Atall relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system, among other things,
were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design,
manufacture, selection, assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of the failure to warn
of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other things, that:
a. the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were
defectively designed in a manner that allowed a dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a
result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off,
b. the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were
defectively manufactured in a manner that departed from
their intended design such that they allowed for dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a
result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were
designed in a manner that departed from the standards used
68in the aviation industry in that they failed to adequately
protect against dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut off;
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked
other alternate designs capable of preventing dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin that were
technologically and economically feasible at the time the
inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the
Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were sold,
and the costs of adopting them were low compared to the
risk of harm;
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in.
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were
designed in a manner that allowed for dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin under normal or
reasonably expected conditions;
the component parts of the inlet temperature sensor and/or
bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin
pressurization system were designed in a manner that
allowed for dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aireraft cabin under normal or reasonably expected
conditions;
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system deviated
in construction and composition at the time the products left
the manufacturer's control in a material way from the
manufacturer's specifications or performance standards,
‘minimum design standards, industry design standards and/or
from otherwise identical model cabin pressurization
systems;
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system were
designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, marketed and
distributed such that they did not provide adequate warnings
of the risk of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
aircraft cabin including as a result of the cabin “bleed air”
being shut off;
6pressurization system.
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircrafi’s cabin pressurization system lacked
adequate warnings to users of the likelihood of dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a
result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked
adequate warnings about the dangerous characteristics of the
product that presented a risk of harm, including dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin including as a
result of the cabin “bleed air” being shut off;
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in
the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system lacked
adequate warnings to users of the likelihood of dangerously
unsafe depressurization of the aircraft cabin given its design
after the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak
detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system
were placed into the stream of commerce, even after the
‘Thermocoax Defendants learned of the risks of such
condition; and
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector, or
some other Thermocoax product in the Subject Aircrait’s
cabin pressurization system suffered from some other defect
in design, manufacture and/or warning that rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended
use to be proven through discovery or at the trial of this
matter.
LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the
aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of, among other things,
the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin’s
Upon information and belief, the Thermocoax Defendants’ design, manufacture,
and failure to provide adequate warnings for, among other things, the dangerously unsafe inlet
temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s cabin pressurization
system and its component parts with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of serious injury or
70death due to a dangerous cabin depressurization exhibited a conscious and deliberate disregard of
the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.
209. Asa result of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law,
including but not limited to their lost monetary support, oss of inheritance, loss of intellectual,
moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and
all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
210. As aresult of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’ fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE
‘THERMOCOAX DEFENDANTS BASED ON BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
211. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 210 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
212. Prior to September 5, 2014, the Themocoax Defendants implicitly warranted and
represented that the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject Aircraft’s
cabin pressurization system and other component parts were airworthy, of merchantable quality,
nfit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, tested,
serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and that the instructions, manuals and warnings which
had been issued were adequate and safe, and further that the component parts of Subject Aircraft’s
cabin pressurization system were free from defects.
213. The Thermocoax Defendants breached said implied warranties in that on
September 5, 2014 the inlet temperature sensor and/or bleed air leak detector in the Subject
Aircraft’s cabin pressurization system and other component parts were not airworthy, of
merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which they were designed, manufactured,
assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the instructions, manuals and
‘warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were defective.
214. As a proximate cause of the Thermocoax Defendants’ breach of their implied
warranty, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed.
215. Asaresult of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintif'and
all lawful beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law,
including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual,
moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and
all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as,
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest.
216. As arresult of the foregoing, the Thermocoax Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
nemotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION,
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES
AGAINST DEFENDANT GARMIN BASED ON NEGLIGEN
217. Plait
iff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 216 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
218. Atall relevant times, including on September 5, 2014, Defendant Garmin owed a
duty of reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, selecting, assembling, testing, marketing,
selling, distributing, and/or issuing instructions, procedures and/or warnings for the Subject
Aircraft’s G-1000 avionies system, including its CAS, so that it was safe for its foreseeable and
intended use by purchasers and users of the Subject Aircraft, including decedents LARRY and
JANE GLAZER.
219. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
Defendant Garmin was careless, negligent and/or reckless in its design of, manufacture of,
selection of, assembly of, testing of, sale of, distribution of, writing instructions for, and/or warning,
for the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS, in that, among other things,
they:
a, designed and/or manufactured the Subject Aireraft’s G-1000
avionics system, including its CAS, in a manner that
unreasonably and dangerously departed from a safe design
such that it allowed for an insidious depressurization of the
cabin without adequate warming of that depressurization to
the pilot;
b. selected and assembled component systems and parts of the
Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, in a manner that unreasonably and dangerously
Bdeparted from a safe design such that it allowed for an
insidious depressurization of the cabin without adequate
‘warning of that depressurization to the pilot;
tested and inspected the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics
system, including its CAS, in a manner that unreasonably
and dangerously failed to discover that it departed from a
safe design such that it allowed for a dangerous and insidious
depressurization of the cabin and failed to provide adequate
‘warning of that depressurization to the pilot;
designed the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system,
including its CAS, in a manner that unreasonably departed
from the standards used in the aviation industry in that it
failed to adequately protect against dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the cabin and failed to provide adequate
‘warning of the depressurization to the pilot;
otherwise designed, manufactured, assembled, tested,
marketed and distributed the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000
avionics system, including its CAS, such that it did not
provide adequate warnings of the danger of an insidious
depressurization of the cabin;
failed to incorporate available technology and/or art into the
Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, that would have prevented or provided adequate
warnings of dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
cabin of the Subject Aircraft;
failed to adequately address and/or remedy a known risk of
inadequate warning of a _— dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin by the G-1000 avionics
system, including its CA
failed to properly support the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000
avionics system, including its CAS, post-sale by remedying
the dangerous conditions posed by the design of the G-1000
avionics system, including its CAS, which allowed the
Subject Aircraft to experience a dangerously unsafe cabin
depressurization without adequate warning to the pilot
and/or by failing to supply adequate instructions or warnings
regarding the same;
4failed to select and/or use other component parts, capable of
sustaining normal and safe operating conditions of the
Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, under normal or reasonably expected conditions;
failed to adequately warn of the characteristics of the Subject
Aircrafi’s G-1000 avionies system, including its CAS, that
presented a risk of harm due to dangerously unsafe cabin
depressurization;
failed to warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000
avionics system, including its CAS, of the risk of
dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a
‘component part failure;
failed to adequately wam users of the Subject Aircraft’s G-
1000 avionics system, including its CAS, of the likelihood
of a dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization given its
design
failed to adequately warn users of the Subject Aircraft’s G-
1000 avionics system, including its CAS, of the likelihood
of dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization given the
Subject Aircraft’s design after the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000
avionics system was sold, even after the risks of such
condition came to Defendant Garmin’s attention;
failed to incorporate available technology and/or art into the
Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, that would have prevented dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the cabin of the Subject Aircraft or
provided adequate warning to the pilot of such condition;
failed to incorporate available technology and/or art into the
Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system that would have
safely and timely descended the Subject Aircraft to a safe
altitude and avoided the deadly consequences of the
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin of the
Subject Aircraft; and
took and/or failed to take any and all other actions to be
proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which
‘were in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and
reasonable prudence.
8220. As a proximate cause of Defendant Garmin's careless, negligent, and/or reckle:
breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed.
221. Upon information and belief, Defendant Garmin’s breach of its duity to design,
manufacture, select, assemble, test, market, sell, distribute and/or provide adequate warnings for
the Subject Aircrafi’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including,
its CAS, and its component parts, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks of injury due to
dangerous cabin depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights of
others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.
222. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful
beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but
not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as. well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.
223. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendants Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful
beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
16AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S SEVENTEENTH CAUSE,
OF ACTION FORWRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL
DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT GARMIN
BASED ON STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
224. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 223 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
225. Defendant Garmin placed the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system into the
stream of commerce.
226. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000
avionics system, including its CAS, was in substantially the same condition as when it left the
control of Defendant Garmin.
227. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000
avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, was being operated as
intended, and was being used in the manner for which it was designed, manufactured, selected,
assembled, tested, distributed, and intended to be used, and in a manner foreseeable to Defendant
Garmin as designer and manufacturer of the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system.
228. At all relevant times, and on September 5, 2014, the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000
avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, was defective and
unreasonably dangerous and unsafe by reason of its defective design, manufacture, selection,
assembly, inspection, testing, sale, and/or by reason of inadequate instructions and/or procedures
and/or by reason of the failure to warn of the same through warnings and cautions, in, among other
things, the
a, the Subject Aircraf’s G-1000 avionics system was
defectively designed in a manner that allowed a dangerously
unsafe cabin depressurization to occur as a result of the
1defective design and/or manufacture of, among other things,
the CAS which created or contributed to an insidious and
dangerous depressurization of the Subject Aircraft’s cabin ;
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionies system, including its
CAS, lacked other alternate designs capable of preventing
dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that were
technologically and economically feasible at the time the
Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been
adopted at a low cost when compared to the tisk of harm
posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft
cabin; i
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, lacked other altemate designs capable of alerting the
pilot to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that
were technologically and economically feasible at the time
the Subject Aircraft was sold, and which could have been
adopted at a low cost when compared to the risk of harm
posed by dangerously unsafe depressurization of the aircraft
cabin;
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system lacked other
alternate designs capable of safely descending the subject
aircraft to a safe altitude to avoid the dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the cabin that were technologically and
economically feasible at the time the Subject Aircraft was
sold, and which could have been adopted at a low cost when
compared to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aireraft cabin;
‘the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including the
CAS, lacked other alternate designs capable of alerting the
pilot to dangerously unsafe depressurization of the cabin that
were technologically and economically feasible at the time
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system was sold, and
which could have been adopted at a low cost when compared
to the risk of harm posed by dangerously unsafe
depressurization of the aircraft cabin;
the Subject Aireraft’s G-1000 avionics system’s component
parts, including those making up its CAS, were designed
and/or manufactured in a manner that allowed for an
insidious and dangerously unsafe depressurization of the
cabin of the Subject Aircraft under normal or reasonably
expected conditions;
Bthe Subject Aiteraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, was designed in a manner that departed from the
standards used in the aviation industry in that it failed to
adequately protect against an insidious and dangerously
unsafe cabin depressurization or adequately alert the pilot of
the same;
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, deviated in construction and composition at the time
the product left the manufacturer's control in a material way
from the manufacturer's specifications or performance
standards, minimum design standards or industry standards
and from otherwise identical model aircraft, including its
component parts;
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS was designed, manufactured, selected, assembled,
tested, marketed and distributed such that it did not provide
adequate warnings of the risks of dangerously unsafe cabin
depressurization without adequate alerting to the pilot;
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject
Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system of the likelihood of
dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization in the event of a
component part failure;
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, lacked adequate warnings to users of the Subject
Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system of the likelihood of
dangerously unsafe cabin depressurization without adequate
alerting to the pilot, given its design after the Subject
Aireraft’s G-1000 avionics system was sold, even after the
risks of such depressurization came to the attention of
Defendant Garmin; and
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system, including its
CAS, suffered from some other defect in design,
manufacture and/or warning that rendered the product
unreasonably dangerous for its normal or intended use to be
proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter.
9229, LARRY and JANE GLAZER’ injuries and deaths were proximately caused by the
aforementioned defective, unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the Subject Aircrafts
G-1000 avionics system, including its CAS.
230. Upon information and belief, Defendant Garmin’s design, manufacture, and failure
to provide adequate wamings for the dangerously unsafe G-1000 avionics system and its
component systems and/or parts, including its CAS, with knowledge of the likelihood of the risks
of injury due to a dangerously defective cabin depressurization exhibits a conscious and deliberate
‘egard of the rights of others such that the conduct may be called willful or wanton,
231. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful
beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law, including but
not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest.
232, Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful
beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
80AS AND FOR PLAINTIFE’S EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST
DEFENDANT GARMIN BASED ON BREACH OF I
233. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
‘through 232 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
234. Prior to September 5, 2014, Defendant Garmin implicitly warranted and
represented that the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or
parts, including its CAS, was airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for
which it was designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used,
and that the instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were adequate and safe,
and further that the Subject Aircrafts G-1000 avionics system and its component parts were free
from defects.
235. Defendant Garmin breached said implied warranties in that on September 5, 2014,
the Subject Aircraft’s G-1000 avionics system and its component systems and/or parts, including
its CAS, was not airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes for which it was
designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed, sold, intended, used, and the
instructions, manuals and warnings which had been issued were not adequate and safe, but were
defective.
236. As a proximate cause of Defendant Garmin’s breach of their implied warranty,
LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and killed.
237. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendants Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful
beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages inder applicable law, including but
not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual, moral, and
81physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and all other
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest.
238. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant Garmin is liable to Plaintiff and all lawful
beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not,
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
AS AND FOR PLAINTIFF'S NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES AGAINST
DEFENDANT NEW 51LG LLC BASED ON NEGLIGENCE
239. Plaintiff repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1
through 238 of this Complaint with the same full force and effect as if each were more fully set
forth herein at length.
240, Atall relevant times, Defendant NEW 51LG LLC, as owner and operator of the
Subject Aircraft, owed a duty of reasonable care in the conduct of its business to , among other
things, provide an airworthy aircraft to users and passengers of the Subject Aircraft, including
decedents LARRY and JANE GLAZER.
241. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, including on September 5, 2014,
Defendant NEW 51LG LLC breached its duties of care and was careless and/or negligent in that,
among other things, it:
provided an unairworthy aircraft to users and passengers of the
Subject Airor
82b. took and/or failed to take any and all other acts and omissions to be
proven through discovery or at the trial of this matter, which were
in the contravention of the exercise of due care, and reasonable
prudence:
242. As a proximate cause of Defendant NEW 51L.G LLC’s careless, negligent, and/or
reckless breach of their duties of care, LARRY and JANE GLAZER were seriously injured and
killed
243. Asa result of the foregoing, Defendant NEW SILG LLC is liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful: beneficiaries, for all compensatory wrongful death damages under applicable law,
including but not limited to their lost monetary support, loss of inheritance, loss of intellectual,
moral, and physical training, guidance and assistance, loss of society, grief, funeral expenses and
all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses incurred as a result of the subject incident, as well as
exemplary damages, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction, and pre- and post-judgment interest.
244, As a result of the foregoing, Defendant NEW 51LG LLC is liable to Plaintiff and
all lawful beneficiaries, including the Estates of LARRY GLAZER and JANE GLAZER, for all
compensatory survival damages and exemplary damages under applicable law, including but not
limited to LARRY and JANE GLAZER’s fear of impending death, and conscious physical and
emotion pain and suffering, which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
[Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank]
83WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, KENNETH GLAZER, Individually and as Administrator of the
Estates of his parents, LARRY and JANE GLAZER, deceased, and on behalf of all beneficiaries
entitled to recover under applicable law, including his siblings Melinda Glazer Maclaren and
Richard Glazer, demands judgment against defendants, individually and in aggregate, in a sum
exceeding the jurisdiction of all lower Courts, together with the costs and disbursements of this
action plus any and all further relief the Court may find just and proper.
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.
Dated: New York, New York
August 29, 2016
Daniel O. Rose
Steven R. Pounian
Evan Katin-Borland
750 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017
‘Tel: (212) 687-8181
Fax: (212) 972-9432
drose@[Link]
ekatinborland@[Link]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BE 32 Wd OF ony Di
84
@aisVERIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
STATE OF NEWYORK)
ys
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
DANIEL ROSE, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
Jam an attomey for the plaintiff in the within action; I have read the foregoing Verified
Complaint and know the contents thereof; the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to
the matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I
believe them to be true.
Plaintiff does not presently reside in New York Count
therefore, I am submitting the Verification for this Complaint\
Daniel O. Rose
Sworn to before me this
29" day of August 2016
Zenit R.
z
Notary Public
zone
ieee x
Comlanen Spr carieens 29 =
3
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2
2
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83114