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TEN ~uS,. ..AND" ,,,MOODS










Assistant Editor, Sanskrit Dictionary,
Deccan College, Pune








Code No.: M:-183

: : '.

First iEdition: 750 coPies: March 1978

-. c'.

All Rights Reserved

S. D .

Printed by M. S. Latkar at SMS LetterPr'iSs,' i29!A-2 Chiplunkar Road

Erandawana, Prine 411 004.
Published by Dr. A. M. Ghatage;: Dir.ector, Deccan College Postgraduatl'
and Research In~titute,
Pune 411 006.






lunkar Road


. Professor

S. D.





- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------------------------


Works on Sanskrit grammar deal with the mechanism of

linguistic expression ill. a synchronic manner with passing references
to historical and dialectal variations and also with the nature of the
semantic concepts associated with the linguistic elements, giving rise
to what is generally called the philosophy of grammar. The extreme
brevity of Pal)ini's Siitras makes it hard to know what views'he held
on the semantic problems involved in his analysis. But discussion
011 these are seen in ample ineasurein the Varttikasof K.atyayana, '
the Mahabha~ya of Pata:ftjaliand above all in' the Vakyapadiya of
Bhartrhari. This 'tradition, of' dealing witli both the aspects of
language is continued upto the very end but with varying emphasis
on one or the other aspect, which has 'given rise to 'two types of
grammatical works in Sanskrit. The VaiY'akaral).abhi1~a!.la of
KaUl).9abha~ta primarily devotes itseif to the semantie problems involved in the meanings of 'grammatical elements and categories. 'As'
a re.qult of it; 'it comes in contact with similar-views of other philosophical systems of India, resulting irito a lively polemic dialogue
with' them, leading to a further refinement of the coiicepts involved
to an extraordinary degree with the help of the terminology of the
" ,


~ ~;


Translating and explaining a work of thistype is no easy task.

It demands on the part of the translator not only a deep knowledge
of the subject in hand but an equally good knowledge of other systems '
of ihought with which the polemics is carried on. In addition, the
translator 'must. ,possess' ali unusual ability to sort out the various
ideas inextricably mixedilpin the dis~ussion and a facility to explain
them in, a manner so as to make it' understandable and digestible to a
modern reader. ,In translating and annotating the chapter on ,the
lakarartha of the Vaiy;akaraDabhii~aQ.a Dr. Jayashree A. Gune has
done this arduous work remarkably well and has thus produced a
book whkhis not onlysystetnatic and informative but also persuas\ve
and above all pleasant to read. This she has been able to do by
separating the problems of general interest in the form of an introduc"
tion from' the details and technicalities which are treated fully in the,

succeed and the s;

and krtisadhyatv

notes on the various sections of the book in which it has been intelligently divided afresh.
To a modern linguist what appeals most are the basic semantic
problems more than the clever use of a methodology current in earlier
days' and the arguments based on views then current. In'the field
of Sanskrit tenses and moods two such problems stand out clearly,
the concept of time or tense and the modality
of vidh'i ,or
. Iili, the exact
significance of which is as much relevant to the present_day thought
as it was. to the ancient grammarians and philosophers, More than
the systematic explanation of the grammatical forms in wl)ich they
excel, what IS more pertinent to us is their attitude towards language
and the daring they show in dealing. with the exact relation between
the lhlguistic expression and the. reality of experience as they. COIlceived. it. As such, no demarcation is made between linguistic meaning and' semantic level and the writers have boldly accepted the resulting problems and have attempted solutions some of which are acceptable even today. One cannot but come to the same conclusion as
the author, that time is not much different from our ideas of the
occurrence of events, a view which .coD;les close to the attitude of. a
modern philosopher like Bergson. Such an attitude alone is likely
. to explain satisfactorily the' usual gnimmatical categories of tense
based on cOnuTIon sense and daily usage. The analysis of the meaning of lin is remarkable in its subtility and its implications to such
philosophical and pragmatic systems as Nyliya and MimlitpSli. One
only wishes that the attempt to explain them - and the author has
done an excellent job in clarifying them-' should have gone a step
further by classifying and correlating them with the 'motives of
action', which are psychological like i$tasiidhanatva, circumstantial
like krtisiidltyatva or pragmatic like blalavadani$tiinanubandhitva and
their role in action. The difficulty which is felt by all the schools in
this regard is probably due to their insistance on having only ac,ingle
motive of one type or the other. Some new light can be thrown on
it by bringing in consideration of the historical development of the'
meanings of the lin forms of'Sanskrit and Greek. Of the. three uses
to which they .are put, optativus, potentiaJls arid prescription, the
hist one is of later' origin and has probably developed' from either
ofnie two,which are independent or each other $rid of.equal antiquity. Air attempt to derive one from: the other is not likely to


The reading
ing and pleasant
studies on the 01
material is avail a
of explanation, if
to compress the
limitations put 0
the reader of sorr
to be printedha!
indulgence of tht

- - - - _ . _ .. -

succeed and the same holds good for the two notions of i$tasiidhan.atva
and krtisiidhyatva.

las been intellibasic semantic

lIrrent in earlier
.t. In the field
md out clearly,
or Iili, the exact
:nt-day thought
:rs. More than
; in w!).ich they
wards language
'elation between
:e as they COlllinguistic meanepted the resulthieh are aeeeptie conclusion as
ur ideas of the
le attitude of a
! alone is likely
~gories .of tense
sis of the meanications to such
Mimarpsa. One
I the author has
ave gone a st~p
the 'motives of
I, circumstantial
lubandhitva and
tllthe schools in
ing only a single
III be thrown on
relopment of the
)f the. three uses
prescription, the
)pedfrom either
ld of. equal antiis not likely to

The reading of this monograph, besides being a thought-provoking and pleasant experience, only whets one's desire to expect similar
studies on the other aspects of, Sanskrit semantics for which ample
material is available. I should like to conclude with two more points
of explanation, if not of justification. At my request the author had
to compress the explanations to the maximum extent because of the
limitations put on the number of pages, which may have deprived
the reader of some nicer points and the hurry in which the work had
to be printed has caused some insignificant misprints for which the
indulgence of the reader is solicited .




This book d
the ten sets of ,
Here I must em)
distinction betw{
which was not dl
Grammarians an
New (navya) G
Ritualists etc. ar
works are appea
work has been de
successors who a
Nyaya and Mimi
sian and therefon
who have not stu
wiII be of some 1
nin).aya, which di:
Mimaqlsa, and {
opinions of some
suffixes, is very i
I am thankf1

authorities of th
of this work
I wish to e:

the Department
has been very ge
word of an earli{
I am also ~
of Sanskrit, Unb
field and has gil





This book discusses the meanings of the lakiiras (I-members),
the ten sets of verbal endings representing the tenses and moods.
Here I must emphasize that R1Wihi and his followers make a ~c1ear
distinction between forms - even abstract lakiira - and meanings
which was not done in the West. Semantic theories of the Indian
Grammarians and their development in the later schools of the
New (navya) Grammarians, as well as the Neologicians arid the
Ritualists etc. are therefore of tremendous interest to the modern
Considerable work has been done on Ral.lini and many new
works are appearing on Patafijali and Bhartrhari. But not much
work has been done on the theories of meaning propounded by their
successors who as a help in their interaction with the schools of
Nyaya and Mimaqlsa have adopted thenavyanyiiya style of expression and therefore have remained inaccessible to students of grammar
who have not studied Nyaya. The present monograph, it is hoped,
.will be of some help in tbis direction. Kaun.(l<ibha~~a's Lakar,arthanirl.laya, which discusses the semantic theories of the schools of Nyaya,
Mimaqlsa, and of course Vyakaral)a, while also bringing in the
opinions of some Vedanta writers, concerning the tense and mood
suffixes, is very important from this standpoint.



I am thankful to the Director, Prof. A, M. Ghatage and to the

authorities of the Deccan College for undertaking the publication
of this work.
I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. George Cardona of
the Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania, who
has been very generous with his help and has gone through every
word of an earlier draft and made many valuable and constructive
I am also grateful to Prof. S. D. Joshi, of the D~partment
of Sanskrit, University of Poona, who first introduced me to this
field and has given me constant help and encouragement.






I would also like to thank : Prof. Ludo Rocher of the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Pennsylvania, who has .alwaysbeen encouraging;
Prof. C. G. Kashikar and Pandit Shrinivasasastri whom I consulted on various maitters concerning Srauta and. Nyaya. res~ctively
with great profit;
. ..
My colleague, Shri. D. B. Polkam, who was a great help in
proof-reading and preparing the index;
Dr.. Vijayendra Pratap, Dr. V. W. Paranjape, Pandit. N. M.
Chirputkar and many other coJIeagues and friends who also helped
. me in various ways;
Shri. M. S. Latkar of SMS Letter Press, who has been very
co-operaitve throughout in spite of the very short time available
for printing.


Page Line













26 .





















Studies, U niver:ing';
ri whom I coniya respectively

great help in

Pandit N. M.
Iho also helped
has been very
time available

Page Line

. For,

* **ji1iinabhava






srT~IW!<iT~"'l \UJ<i:cr


38 .



. anekathakatva



prgtiyogita .. '.




'PT>{,;;t .'

. this
pratiyogita ...
















1fIt<! ~c<rTartt

1fI,~~~ijT~rtt:; ., . .










be specifically be



iij '"







specifically be

'1q;ii:q 1'.(

























Table of Contents





















29 .










. 160

. 13







mw-r.'lJfT~ll:I1S[ I




mgl1~m .






Is 'timE
Two pr
The M
The Ny
The Bh


The Pr~
The vie'
r 1] Refutati
ilft,Gsii .
. [J J Some p:
[K] Analysis

nasti G
The aut!


[M] The Lak


Text, Translation ar




. -L.. :


L ..








Table of Contents


lakiirfilJ, '[-members'

- [D)

. [J J'


Is 'time' a denoted meaning of I-members? ..

Two problems about vartamiinatvta
The Meaning of lIN
The. Nyaya view
The Bhana view
The PrabMkara view
The view of KaUQcc;labhatta
Refutation of the opponents of the
. i!i(!Gsiidhanatva view
_Some problems in -accepting the
i:j(asiidhanatva view
Analysis of the sentences kambugriviidimiin
nas'ti and svargakiimo jyotiiomena yajeta ..
The authors
-The Lakarnrthanil.1l)aya


. 51,-203' .

Text, Translation and Notes

.. .
. .. ".,:, .... '
". ,.,. -""
SeCtion. I. lAT.

. \
~II IUT aridl1!-T
'78' .
. .
. IV lET (lIiir)
VI lAiv, lIN, IUN.and 11!-N
" VII General


lakariil; 'I-members'

[A-I] According to the Grammarians, it is the sentence that

is the basic indivisible lingui~tic unit and that alone has real
existence. Individual words and their meanings are extracted
(apoddhrta) from the sentence and the sentence meaning, and nave
only a relative reality. As opposed. to the sentence meaning, which
is fixed in character (sthitalak'$aiJa), the extracted meaning is not
definite, and thus can change according to the way the sentence is
analysed, Grammatical. analysis can always. be different
ways. Thus the famous example is thefQrm asti which has been
+ 'Ii, whereas other'
analysed by Pa1).ini into the component parts
grammarians divided it as follows: a + s
ii. The method used
for thus extracting individual word meanings, and at a further level,
from these, the meanings of the bases and the affixes, is called
iiviipodviipa 'insertion and extraction', or anvaya 'concurrent occurrence' and. vyati"eka 'concurrent non-occurrence'. The way this
method works has been explained by Patafijali in his Bhli.$ya on
Vt. 9 ad P. 1.2.45. (M.B. vol. 1, p. 219). He takes the example
1)rksal; 'a tree', and Vrk$au 'two trees'. In this pair, we find one
agreement in meaning, and one contrast: singularity and duality.
In the utterence itself also there is agreement in the expression Vrk$a
and contrast in the expressions l; and au. The principle to be followed in this case according to Patafijali is that common meaning
is connected with the common part in the utterence, whereas the
difference' in meaning is connected with the difference in expression.
Thus the meaning 'tree' should be connected with the partvrk$fl,
and the meaning difference singularity and duality is to be connected
with the different expressions l; and au. For grammatical analysis,
the reality of these units has to be assumed, though they have .no
place in actual communication level.
The Mlm~sakas and the Naiyayikas however, do accept the
reality of individual words. The Ritualists, for interpreting the Vedic
sentences, and the Logicians, because precise and exact expression
is important for them, also felt the need for discussing the meaning
of the sentence, and the inflected' words (padas) that form a part




of it, and the bases and suffixes that fonn the inflected words. According to the particular bias of the..oe different schools, their theories
differed, and thus there is a great deal of controversy about the meaning of all these parts of a sentence. Kaui,JJc;iabhatta's Lakiiriirthanir,I,laya, translated here, is devoted to a detailed analysis of these
theories of meaning concerning the I-members, i.e., the ten sets of
verbal endings representing tenses and modalities.
[A-2]lakiiralJ 'I-members' are the ten Pa:Q.inian symbols:
IAT, lIT, IUT, llq, lET, lOT, lAN, lIN, IUN, and IJ]N, used in
grammar. These endings do not occur in actual utterances. They
belong to Par;tini's metalanguage. The endings actually used are
ti (third person singular present), t (third person sinl1;ttlar imperfect) etc. But, for grammatical purposes, these are considered to be
the replacements (iideStis) of the I-members. Thus all the verbal
endings are subsumed under the single symbol I, to which J""al).ini
assigns the general meanings kartr 'agent', karnzan 'object', and
bhiiva 'action', by P. III.4.69 lalJ karma1ji ca bhiive ciikarmukebhyal}
[Z- (members are introduced after a verbai root, when) karman
'object', (or kart! 'agent' is to be denoted); and if (the verb is)
intransitive, (when) bhiiva 'action' (is to be denoted)] .
[A-3] Ten separate members aredistiriguished by the use of '
markers. The function of I is to group toget.her all' these, different
'endings. 'The markers T and N distinguish primary endings from
secondary endings.
[A-4] We now consider the particular meanings of these
,suffixes. I-members denote not only kartT, karman and bhiiva, but
,also are used with reference to time and modalities. The function
of the vowel markers following l's is to disting-uish affixes introduced
for particular tenses or modalities. Six I-members an; used when
actions are re.ferred to particular times: IAT (present); lIT (past
beyond the "ken of the speaker); IAN (past exclusive of today);
IUN (past in general) ; IUT ,(future exclusive of today) ; IJ]T (future
in general). The other four I-members have no reference to time,
They are: liN (optative or potential + precative); lOT (imperative); IJ]N (conditional) and lET (subjimctive).
[A--5] As explained in [A...:2] , the meanings assigned to these
l~members are really expressed by the actual endings' ti, t etc. But
. does not need to say specifically that these meanings belong
to the replacements (iidesas) , because of, the assumption that a re,


placement has tt
Just the introdt
Thus KaUlJ~abl:

>!~ 'Q;~

denotative funct
of conveying a
(prrakalp- ) to ,
(k,aipita, assum

I-members are ir
(karman),' and:
Thus it is (
to denote a mean
assumed to exist
Grammarians. 1
such as P. IlIA
having the deno
taking recour~e
ments on it" sur
The early L
ingto them, the
placements like .
mind the Z-meml
brevity. Assumi
replacements lea<
the 1-IIl"JI1ber COl
This cannot
uttered C3n be s
it is the non-ul;ter
The Grammarian
mount. Their al
grammar. Thus
~.<D" s"ht'f['f'I'i:

that expresses m
(This seems to '
R~"'l~ ~~

is uttered', in tl
P. I.1.68 (M.B.'
Moreover, if



edwords. Ac;, their theories

bout the meanI'S Lakararthalalysis of these
the ten sets of

placement has the same meaning as that which it replaces (sthiininl.

Just the introduction of the I-members as the prototype is enough.
Thus KaUJ).c;!abhatta says- "ill:l'f.Ql~qi fcr<n~o:rf'<f; Q~lfrr~., 'f.i~qa
05'fiR: >!~ 05'1ilU: '!iBfUr ~R '<n~" fr4t'-!"a I (V.B.S. p. 23). 'The
denotative function (sakti) of endings tiP etc., which is the property
of conveying a meaning (bodlv,akdtlirupii),- is theoretically assumed
(pr[akalp-) to exist in a I-member, itself a theoretical construct
(kalpita, assumed to be) the one replaced by it (tiP etc.). Then
I-members are introduced by this (P. III.4.69), to denote an object
(karman) , and an agent (kart!).'
Thus it is clear that, according to KaUl).9abhat't;a, the capacity
to denote a meaning actually resides in the endings tiP etc. It is only
assumed to exist in the I-members.. This represents the v.iew of all
Grammarians. How can one then account for the rules of Pill).ini
such as P .. III.4.69 etc., that introduce the I-members as the ones
having the denotative power? Nagea answers this difficulty by
taking recour",e to superimposition of the meaning of the replacements on its supposed prototype (see P.L.M., p. 138).
The early Logicians however, have attacked this theory. Accord.jng to them, the significatory power resides in the prototype I. Replacements like 'tiP etc., can denote meanings only by bringing to
mind the 1-members that they replace. This serves the purpose of
brevity. Assuming significative functions as existing in the many
replacements leads to prolixity, whereas assuming it as existing. in
the l-member concerned, is much simpler.
This cannot be accepted. Only that word which is actually
uttered can be said to denote a meaning. One cannot assume that
it is the non-u1;tered grammatical prototype that denotes the meaning.
The Grammarians always have held the spoken language as paramount. Their' analysis of it has reality only within the confines of
grammar. Thus Nagesa quotes the Bha~ya as saying ~[RQ Il;'l
'It is only the actually uttered word
that expresses meaning, not the non-uttered one' (P.L.M., p. 138).
(This seems to be based very loosely on the sentence ~~'!
Ra;jl~ 1Tnfcr' 'it is the meaning that is understood when a word
is uttered', in the Bha~ya on svarj'l raparj'l sabdasyiMabdasalnjfiii/
P. L1.68 (M.B. vol. I, p. 175).
Moreover, if I-members alone have the denotative function, and

nian symbols:
:l llJ.J.iT, used in
:erances. They
:ually used are
sing"'l!lar imper:onsidered to be
l ali the verbal
:> whiCh PaJ).ini
n 'object', and
when) karman
f (the verb is)
;.:1) 1.'

:l by the use of
I these different
"y endings from

mings of these
and bhiiva, but
. Tlfe function
are used when
:ent); lIT (past
lsive of today);
lY) ; IlJ.T (futur,e
=ference to time.
I; lOT (imperalssigned to the&e
(s ti, t etc. But
meanings belong
lPtion that a re-


-.-~-------~~- ~-




the replacements can convey meaning only by bringing them to mind,

how can a person who is not educated in grammar and thus has no
knowledge of these hypothetical prototypes, still cognise their meaning? Even a person educated in grammar might not remember the
prototype every time. The Logicians' answer that the cognition of
meaning from the replacements when the prototype is not remembered is produced by delusion (bhrama) , and that the replacements
do not have the denotative function by themselves, is not at all
convincing.. ' In addition, even though brevity can be achievecl in
so far as only l. wiII have the denotative function instead of all the
replacements, there is procedural simplicity in assuming that the
replacements denote meaning immediately upon being heard, rather
than assuming that they first bring the I-member concerned to mind,
and then that I-member: denotes the meaning.
. [A-6]
3!T'>[il 1I iff'S': ~llcn: (V.B. kCirikii 2)
The general meaning of the I-members (i.e., of their replacements) , is discussed in kfirikii 2 of the Dh:Uvarthanil1l).aya. Thus
according to the Grammarians, while a verbal root denotes an activity (vyiipiina) and its result (phala), a verbal affix den9tes the
locus or substratum of these two. .The agent is the iocus of activity, .
and the object is the locus of the fruit or the result of the action.
This confor:ms to. the wording of P. II1.4.69, which introduces the
I-members to denote the agent and the object. Thus anabhihite/
P. II.3.l, would mean: 'when the agent or the object etc., is not
denoted'. Therefore, the instrumental case would be used after a
nominal base, when the agent is not denoted by anything else, (i.e.,
by another element in the sentence, such as verbal affixes etc.), and
the accusative case wiII be used when the object is not denoted,
(P. 11.3.18 and P. 11.3,2). When the agent or the object is denoted
by l-members, the nominal base concerned would take the nominative
case (P. 11.3.46) .
The Logicians, while still accepting Pa1).ini as authoritative, inter- .
prete his rule P. II1.4.69, to fit their theories. According to them,
the words karman andkartr in P. II1.4.69 do not mean an object
and an agent. What is really meant is kartitva1f1 'agentness', which
is considered to be the same as krti 'effort', and karmatva1f1 'objectness'~ The meaning 'locus' is understood by the use of number,
which qualifies either the agent (locus of activity), or the object .
(locus of the result of activity), in active and passive sentence res-


pectively. As
meaning 'locus'
case suffix.
The Gramr
the Ritualists.
sthiininyapi ma,

suffixes when a
'you'. If, inste:
vity, it cannot 1
the system of n
will not operatl
Moreover, .
sentences: '.


base devadatta
mental proper
that meaning, s<
mental case calli
saka view is ace
'agent.' Since,
P. 11.3.18 wiII :
the undesirable
(b) The s
also. If object
then the namim
case by P. 11.3



To avoid tl
considered as th
About bhiit
verb is intransiti'
schools. For a
see Joshi 1960,
[BJ Is 'time' ~
[&-1] In
another meanin~
discussing the n
raised: is this


:hem to mind,
f. thus has no
;e their meanremember the
e cognition of
s not remem, replacements
is not at all
e achievecl in
ead of all the
ning that the
heard, rather
!rned to mind,

their replaceiI1l).aya. Thus

!notes an actix denotes the
eus of activity,
of the action.
introduces, the
us anabhihite/
!ct etc., is not
e used after a
hing else, (i.e.,
iixes etc;~" and
; not denoted,
)ject is denoted
the nominative
Loritative, inter)rding to them,
nean an object
;entness', which
~atva1'f1 'objectlise of number,
, or the object
v-e sentence res-


pectively. As an alternative, the Mlmfupsakas suggest that the

meaning 'locus' is available from the form ending in the nominative
case suffix.
The Grammarians reject these arguments of the Logicians and
the Ritualists. P. 1.4.105 y~madyupapade samiinad.hikara1Je
sthiininyapi madhyamalJ has laid down the use of the second person
suffixes when a I-member is coreferential with the pronoUn yu~mad
'you'. If, instead of denoting the agent, the I-member denotes activity, it cannot be coreferential with the meaning of y~mad. Thus,
the system of rules describing the use of the various personal suffixes
will not operate (V.B. p. 5).
' .
Moreover, there will be difficulties in explaining the following
sentences :
(a) ~'f~'q: q"<ffq 'Devadatta is cooking'. Here the nominal'
base devadatta takes the nominative case, instead of the instrumental proper for the agent, because, ,the verbal suffix ti denotes
that meaning, so that, according to the heading P. 11.3.1, the instrumental case cannot be used. But, if the Naiy'ayika and the Mimarpsaka view is accepted, then the affix ti does not denote the meaning
'agent.' Since agent is not denoted by anything else, P. II.3.1 and
P. 11.3.18 will' allow the use of the instruinental case. Therefore,
tb.e undesirable sentence *d.evad.r.Pttena paCiat'i will result.
(b) The same. will happen in the case of the meaning 'object'
also. If object is not considered to be denoted by the verbal suffix, '
then the naminal base ta1J4ula 'rice' will have to take the accusative
case by P. II.3.2, instead of the nominative case, in the sentence
~a q~:
'the rice is being cooked'.
To avoid these undesirable usages, agent and object must be
considered as the denoted meanings of I-members.
About bhiiva 'action' being the meaning of I-members when the
verb is intransitive, there is no difference of opinion among the various
schools. For a detailed discussion of what the term bhtiva means,
see Joshi 1960, p. XXXIX.
[B] Is 'time' a denoted meaning of I-members?
In addition to the general meanings discussed above,
another meaning common to six of the I-members, is 'time'. While
discussing the meaning of lAT, the following important question is
raised: is this 'time' denoted or co-signified by IA T ? The dis-


cussion of'. this question concerns all the six I-members that have
reference to time.
The theory of the co-significative function is controversial. The
grammarians use it in various degrees in their meaning analysis of
particles (nipiittas) , and nominal, verbal and feminine endings. According to this theory, particles and these suffixes do not denote an
independent meaning of their own. Where does the additional meaning come from then? For example, in the sentence, \l+r.a:r ~1l:'1"U].a:r
'Rfuna and Lak$matl).a', the particle ca 'and' brings in the additional
meaning of collocation. This is explained by saying that the meaning
collocation also belongs to the words 'Rllima and Laki!mm;Ja', but
these worns are not capable of expressing it unless they are accom. panied by the particle ca. The function of the particle .ca is then
to help the words 'Rama' and 'Lak$mmJa' to express their particular
meaning, i.e., collocation.' In other words, collocation is not the denoted (vacya) but co-signified (dyotya) meaning of the particle CiIl_
The example involving feminine ending and a particle used as a
verbal prefix are as follows: deva can denote a god or a goddess.
In the latter case, the. feminine suffix i is used as a co-signifier.
Similarly, the root bhu 'become,. be' can also be used transitively in'
the meaning 'experience'; in this case the particle siikt is used as a
co-signifier. Thus a co-signifier can be likened to light, that while
, not creating things, only indicates those things that already are in a
room_ A co-signifier just brings to mind the meaning denoted by
the word that accompanies it, while not possessing any meaning of
its own. (Co-signifier~ness has been'defined as ~U+nlrc<rr~f.rWl
in P.L.M., p.1l3). The same theory has been used
to explain the meaning of the nomin81 endings. Depending on which
of the five or six different views about the meaning of the nominal
base was adopted, one or more of the following five meanings would
be considered to be belonging to the base, and the rest would be
denoted by the nominal ending. These five meanings are Hili 'generic
property', vyakti 'individual', li1iga 'gender', sa1JZkhya 'number', and
kiiraka 'participant in activity'. In the last view, where all five are
considered to belong to the base, the suffix is still not meaningless,
because it co-sIgnifies these meanings. Now the question under Onsideration is whether to apply .the same prinCiple to the meaning
'time' in a verbal form. Thus it is asked, is this 'time' co-signified


or dene
According to
the meaning 'timE
however, this me;
I-members (as il
praises', ek., whe
sary to help brinf
of I-members. T
noted meaning 0
meaning of the I
can be said to be
ing is not create(
to be the denoted
'needs the use of
can be said to bE
the accompanyin!
[B-2] Mea
The meaninB
varthaniI1l).aya 'I
According to Ka\
(v yapiira) , and i
separate denotati1
are 'not two sepe
single combined
combined in such
active sentence, a
ordinate' qualifieI
result is predomi
according to the
have to be consi
according to the
sentence meaninf
meaning 'time',
.also denotes 'tin
its result.
[B-3] I{m
namely, that l-rr.
'time', separatel:




:rs that have

>versial. The
19 analysis of
endings. Aclot denote an
litional mean:Tll~


;he additional
,t the meaning
k~mar:J.3', but
:y are accom:le ,ca is then
ieir particular
is not the dele particle w.
Ie used as a
or a goddess.
a cosignifier.
ransitively in
t is used as a
Lt, that while'
eady are in a
g d.enoted by
y meaning of
'rc<nt>;d~;;:Pr~ lasb'een used
ling on which
the nominal
,anings would
est would be
e jati 'generic
number', and
:e all' five are
III under Onthe meaning
e' cosignified





(dyOtya) or denoted (viicya) ,by/AT?

According to this theory as applied to the I-members in question,

the meaning 'time' is not the denoted meaning of these suffixes. Since
however, this meaning is not cognised without the presence of the
I-members (as in forms such as stuti 'praise', sUivaka 'one who
praises', ek., where I-members are not present), I-members are necessary to help bring this meaning out, i.e., it is the co-signified meaning
of I-members. The two alternatives, namely, (a) 'time' is the denoted meaning of the I-members, and (b) 'time' is the co-signified
meaning of the I-members, hinge upon the question whether 'time'
can be said to be the meaning of the verbal root. Co-signified meaning is not created out of nothing by the suffix in question. It has
to be the denoted meaning of the accompanying word, which however,
needs the use of the suffix to bring out this meaning. Thus 'time'
can be said to be the co-signified meaning of the I-members, only if
the accompanying word, Le., the verbal root, can denote it.
'[B-2] Meaning of a verbal root
The meaning of a verbal root has been discussed in theDhatvarthaniI1l).aya 'Decision regarding the meaning of a verbal root'.
According to KalJlQl9.abhat.ta, a root denotes two things: an activity
, (vyiipiira) , and its result (phi1la); In this case, the'verbal'root has
separate denotative functions (Pithak StIktil}) for both these meanings.
, Nagesabhat1;a does not accept this. 'According to him, there'
are not two separate denotations-activity and its result-but a
single combined denotation; In this, activity and its result are
combined in such a way, that one is subordinate to the other. In an
active sentence, activity predominates, whereas, the result is the subordinate qualifier. On the other hand, in a passive -sentence, the
result is predominant (P.L.M., p. 85) .' As a result, we can see t:\lat '
according to the theory of Nagea, active and passive sentences will
have to be considered as having different sentence meanings, while
, according to the theory of Kaup'~abha!tta, they will have the same
sentence meaning. Now, to decide whether l-members cO-,signify the
meaning 'time', it is to be considered 'as to whether a verbal root
also denotes 'time' in addition to its usual meanings activity and
its result.
[B-3] HaU1)Qabhatta has first stated bOth, the alternatives,
namely, that I-members denote .'time' and that I~members co-signifY
'time', separately, trying to establish one and 'to refute the other:


Thus dyotakdtva 'co-signifier-ness' can either be defined as (a)

saktylidhiiyakatva 'the property of being that which brings out the
capacity (of the denotative function proper to the signifier), or as
(b) tiitparyagrahakatva 'the property of being the conveyer of intention (of the speaker) .
According to this theory, (a) the root itself denotes all aspects
of an action,including time in general. <fil?:mm;:,f en<Ef~: lAT etc.,
help to specify which particular aspect of time is in question. Cosignifier-ness is defined here at the at;tributor of capacity (saktyadhiiyaka). We can illustrate this by taking the example of the word
ghata 'jar'. In the sentence <Ii 9lURr,
'he makes a jar', the jar
has the qualities of objectness (karmatva) and the property of being
produced (utPadyatva). In the sentence E{~ ;;fOll1H'fRr 'he brings
water with a jar', the jar has instrumentality (karal1Jatva) , whereas
in the sentence <fl' ~~
'water in the jar', the jar has the quality
. of locus-ness (iidhliratva). The same jar has all these different
capacities, but different particular suffixes have to be used to bring
out the particular aspect of capacity already existing in it. The
same principle is to be applied to tile verbal root and lAT etc. or (b)
the root has only one, denoted .meaning, i.e., action. But it also
has an indicated meaning, i.e., presentness. The basis of the
indicative flmction is the intention of the speaker and lAT is the
conveyer of this intention ofthe speaker. (tiitpd1y,agriikaka). Both
of these views are essentially similar. As a matter of fact, (b)
is just a 'modified version of (a); the difference being that according
to Ca), a verbal root signifies time by denotative function, whereas,
according to (b), the verbal root signifies time by the aid of indicative function. . From the way, particular emphasis is given, in
connection with the indicative function (lak~a:lJii), to the intention
of the speaker (tiitp,arya) , rather than to the syntactic connection
.(anvaya) , in. (b), it seems to belong to the Neologicians (see note Z
on . [1.5]!). According to both views, either by denotative function
or by indicative function, it is the verbal root that signifies the meaning 'time'. However, this meaning cannot be cognised without the
presence of one of the six l-members .that have reference to time.
Thus the l-member helps the verbal root to signify time by being
(a) that which brings out the ,power of the denotative function already residing 'in the root; or (b) by being the conveyer of the intention of the speaker that the verbal root has time as a secondary





meaning. In eit
verbal root signif
ficative function,
I-member can be
I t does not deno
[B-4] Agai
establish that th,
signify it. The j
to be the denote(
function will hay
for this one mea
by the suffix alon
tative function. '
ment is based 0:
I-members to del
lA T to denote
P. II1.2.123 are
denote specific n
There should be
. preted.' AS,we h
to mean that 1-ri1.
'agent' etc. Thel
interpreted to m.
Thus it is the I-I
not a verbal roo1
mean that lAT (
who maintain th
P.III.4.69 wouk
meaning agent (,
would also be co
signified by the ,
these two faults 1
of I-members.

meaning of the 1the meanings wb

agent, the object,
.the expectancy :
reason'why lAT

. _ - - _--....

,S AND ",'I00DS


lefined as (a)
brings out the
ignifier), or as
:onveyer of in-

meaning. In either case, since, all a I-member does is to help the

verbal root signify a meaning for which the root does have.a significative function, and not bringing in a meaning of its own, the
I-member can be said to be the co-signifier of the meaning 'time'.
It does not denote this meaning.
[B--4] Against this, two arguments have been put forward to
establish that the I-members do denote time, and not merely cosignify it. The first of these arguments is that if 'time' is accepted
to be the denoted meaning of the verbal root, a separate denotative
function will have to be assumed as existing in every verbal root
for this one meaning, when it is possible to denote it much simply
by the suffix alone. In that case, only the suffix need have the denotative function. This serves the cause of brevity. The second argument is based on Pfu;inian rules laying down the use of specific
I-members to denote specific times. Thus P. IlI.2.123 introduces
lAT to denote the present time. Now, both P. III.4.69 and
P. IlI.2.123 are rules that lay down the use of specific suffixes to
denote specific meanings. They are both worded the same way.
There should be no difference in the way these -two rules are interpreted. As we have already seen. in [A-2] , P. IIl.4.59 is interpreted
to mean that I-members are introduced to express the meanings kartr
'agent' etc. Therefore, in the same way, P. III.2.123 should also be
interpreted to meari that IA T is introduced to express the present.
Thus it is the I-member that should denote the meaning 'time', and
not a verbal root. If in spite of this,P. III.2.123 is interpreted to
mean that lAT co-signifies the present time, to accommodate those
who maintain that time is only co-signified by the I-members, then
P. IlI.4.69 would also have to be interpreted in the same way. The.
meaning agent (kartr) etc., then would no longer be denoted. They
would also be co-signified, by imagining them somehow to have been
signified by the verbal root. This is undesirable. . In order to avoid
these two faults then, time must be accepted as the denoted meaning
of I-members.
[B~5]! But the second alternative, namely, time isa denoted
meaning of the l-memoers cannot be accepted either. IAT etc. denote
the meanings which belong generally to all the I-members (i.e., the
agent, the object, and action if the verbal root is intransitive). Thus
the expectancy for a meaning is fulfilled. There is therefore no
reason why LAT should apply itself to any additional meaning like

otes all aspects

[<Of~: lA T etc.,
question. Co)acity (saktyiipie of the word
s ajar', the jar
operty of being
l'fro 'he brings
!atva) , whereas
has the quality
these different
! used to bring
ng in it. The
lAT etc. or (b)
. I. But it also
basis of the
. md lAT is the
rahaka). Both
,r of fact, (b)
: that according
Iction; 'whereas,
;he aid' of indilis is given, in
o the intention
ctic connection
ans (see note 2
tative function
lifies the meaned without the
erence to time;
time by being
lve function al'eyer of the inas a secondary





"---"--~- ..".-----.,.-~.--


.. -..


-_ ..... - --- -_..






-time. And, if, in spite of this, it does so apply itself to this meaning,
then since 'time' is a specific meaning of that particular I-member,
as opposed to the meanings 'agent" and 'object', which belong to all
the I-members the general meaning will be set aside to make room
for the specific meaning. In sUpport of this, the 't.akrakauIJrJinyanyiiya is brought in. (This has been explained in detail in my notes
on [1.7] also see note 2 on [I.17] for comments). Thus, if time is
accepted to be the denoted meaning of the I-members that have reference to it, then the general meanings agent etc., will not be denoted
by them. To avoid this undesirable eventuality, the view saying
that time is denoted by l-members has to be set aside.
[B-6] , After thus first discussing both the alternatives, and
. showing how _there are difficulties in accepting either of these,
.Katll.l9-abhaHa shows how both of these alternatives have support
in the Bha~ya. The same passage (M.B. vol. 2: p. 123) has been
utilised to givesuppon to both the views. This has been made clear
in the text, and need: not be repeated here.
In order to avoid the fault that all the roots will have to have
an additional denotative function to denote 'time,' if 'time' is accepted
as a meaning of the verbal root, it is suggested that 'time' is hothing
but the series of activities. "IiT<'5I ~ C<f[(rrH!;:(jT~Tfufhn) - kala 'time'. is
generally considered to be the measurer of action fs!;<n<[Ko~G;'fi: "lire:
.But at the same time, it can also be -said that time is measured by
action, since division of time cannot be made without the help of some
action. Time cannot be the measurer of action without having divisions, and it cannot be divided without being associaied with some
action. Thus the more basic notion of time is that it has action as a
determinant. ~N"Ii: 'liT<5: Thus just as a crystal looks red when
it IS in the proximity of a red hibiscus flower, time evep though it is one
and undivided, seems to have divisions when associated with action.
_ According to grmnmarians, this is still on a popular level and has
D_O reference to actuality. According to them, time and action are
one and the same because time has no reference to anything outside
the domain of action. Order in time. is the order of the different
moments of action or activities. There is an activity for every stage
of time, and thus kala itself may be called vyapara. ( 'liT<5 Q;'l' ~ f'l'''''T<<!T
o'lT<[T~ '{Rf 'li~'la
V.P., II1.9.12). Kaiyata also says that action


itself is called time



vol. 3, p. 281) .


. I

That vyapiira
already been diSCl
Thus since time h
activities (Le. acti
meaning of the vel
by the verbal root
signifier of the me
tative function for
Thus prolixity
the root and then
can be accepted.
But the other
ing 'time' can alsc
bhatta takes recour
lAT to denote the
has gone- against .t
by Bhattoji DIk~itl
a root when the 2
present. Thus lA
present, but merel)
the meaning of the
grammarian who
Another argument
and thus not deno1
ment that describl
111.9.2.) . This ca:
same. Thus time
be prolix to attrit
since an additiona:
root to denote it.
What of the (
taken to denote thE
such as the agEmt
This objection has
of that which sets a

__ ....oil



o this meaning,
:ular I-member,
:h belong to all
to make room
akrakaw:ujinya:ail in my notes
rhus, if time is
s that have re. not be denoted
he vie", saying
ternatives, and
ither of these,
s have support
123) has been
been made clear

n have

to have
ime' is accepted
time' is nothing .
kala 'time' is "
i<!TqR~~: 'fire:

is measured by
the help of some
)ut having diviated with'i some
has actiori as a
I looks red when
though it is one
ted with action.
.r level and has
and action are
mythirig outside
of the different
. for every stage
'fil<il' 11:'1 ~ f'l'flT.+n

says that action




itself is called time when it measures other actions. (il~qR:mUf[ 1;pl!'l

m;'!T;:m:'1R~"R'fiT<il' 1(~'ffiR I
Pradipa on vt. 5, ad P. III.2.123,

vol. 3, p. 281).
That vyaparasantiina is the meaning of the verbal root has
already been discussed and justified in the DhatvarthanirI).aya II.
Thus since time is considered to be nothing more than a series of
activities (i.e. action), and action has already been accepted as the
meaning of the verbal root, it naturally follows that time is denoted
by the verbal root. Thus the objection that IAT cannot be the cosignifier of the meaning time, unless the verbal root has the denotative function for it, is removed.
Thus prolixity is avoided, and the view that time is denoted by
the root and therefore only co-signified by the I-members concerned
can be accepted.
But the other alternative, i.e., that l ..members denote the meaning 'time' can also be shown to be justifiable. For this, KaUl!~a
bhana takes recourse to the wording of P. III.2.123, which introduces
lAT to denote the meaning present. In doing this, KaUiI).Q.abhatta
has gone against the traditional interpretation of this rule accepted
by Bhattoji Dik~ita etc., accordingto whidi, IAT isintroduceo. after.
a root when the action that is the meaning of that root is in the
present. Thus lAT seems' to' be used not to denote the meaning
present, but merely introduced when that meaning already exists in
the meaning of the root. As far as I know, Kam.t;labhtta is the only
grammarian who went. against this traditional. interpretation.
Another argument in favour of taking time as separate from action
and thus not denoted by the verbal root, is the V'akyaparuya statement that describes time as being the measurer of action (V.P.,
111.9.2.) . This cannot be true if time and action are one and the
same. Thus time must be separate from action. Therefore, it will
be prolix to attribute this additional meaning to the verbal root,
since an additional denotative function will be necessary in every
root to denote it.
What of the objection mentioned in [B-5]? If tAT etc. are
taken to denote these specific meanings, then their general meanings
such as the agent etc. will not be denoted. This is undesirable.
This objection has been answered by saying that there is no relation
of that which sets aside and that which is set aside (biidhyabiidhaka-

. _ - - - _..




b.hiiva) between these two meanings, since both can exist together.
Thus 'time' can be the denoted meaning of the I-members.
[B-7] , After showing that both. the alternatives that time is
denoted by the I-members and that time is cosignified by them can
be justified, and can be shown to have support in the Bha~ya,
KaUil).Qabhatta finally states his own view, which combines the features from both of these views as stated so far. Thus time is accepted
by him as being one and the same as action. The general notion of
time is thus denoted by the verbal root, when it denotes action.
But the specific aspect of time such as presentness etc., are denoted
by the I-member concerned. Thus while accepting that action and
time are one and the same, KaUIQ.Qabhat;!:a still manages to follow the
strict wording of the rule P. III.2.l23, which introduces IAT to ex. press the meaning present. . 'The traditional interpretation of this
.ule does not strictly follow the wording of the rule, though it; is
accepted by all the commentators. The doubt raised in the Bha~ya
about the usages (!+[ 31Hr1tJ:
etc. is also set to rest if this view is
[C] Two problems about vlartamiinatva
[C-l] Katyayana has discussed the meaning of vartamiinatva
in five viirttikas on P. nt2.123. Two problems are niised. In the .
text (see [UOJ etc.), reference is made to the discussion of one of
them, namely, how to account for the use of present suffixes when
an action goes on continuously without stopping (nityapravrtta) ,
so that it is difficult to characterise it as either past, present, or
'future. This pmblem actually concerns all the six I-members referring to time. Thus IDityayana says f.wlll"~ 'q 'liTO!n~'lWlltJ: vt. 2 ad
P. III.2.123. lAT is to be used to express presentness which has
been explained as the time characterised by an action which has begun
but not ended. (see [1.2] note 1). In that case, how can we justify
the use of lAT in sentences such as 'the mountains stand', or 'the
self exists'? The action in question here has no conceivable beginning or end. The existence of the self is eternal without beginning
or end. How can we then speak of it as having' existed, existing
now, or about ;to take place? The use of present, . past, and .of
future will be equally hard to explain in this case. It is with this
background that the Bha~ya raises the question regarding the justification.of the use of IAT in these sentences.
Kaiyata goes even further. In the Pradipa on Vt. 2 (vol. 3,




p. 280), it has been

be associated with th
action either. An ac
is about to be brougl
tains and the exister
be brought about
i.e., it has to have ex
Bath of these are 111
mountains' or the ex
the counterpositive 0
possible either. Sin
associated with the s1
because an action is
three divisions.
Uddyota on Vt. 2 a








there are divisions c

The Bha~ya explail
qualification to the
of the actions of thE
of the kings are co
mountains: The st
i.e., the actions of '
have kiilavibhiigiilJ
Now, since the
(the existence of th
of time, it can be ca
Uddyota on Vt. 5 ,
[C-2J The 01
in our text) is the
breaks in the actiOl
studying', l(i{ <!1
famous one is l(
sacrifice' (Le., we ;
mitra) . All these
While they are g(
ended, various br(



. can exist together.

latives that time is
:nified by them can
Jrt in the Bha~ya,
1 combines the feahus time is accepted
le general notion of
. it denotes action.
ss etc., are denoted that action and
mages to follow the
;roduces lA to exerpretation of this
rule, though it is
lised in the Bha~ya
) rest if this view is


19 of iJ'artamiinatva
. are raised. In the'
liscussion of one of
esent suffixes when
g (nftyapravftta) ,

r past, present, or

ix l-mem.bers refer~TfiliTlrl'l. Vt. 2 ad

entness which has
m which has be!Wn
how canwe justify
lins stand', or 'the
conceivable begin'without beginning
Ig existed, existing
sent, . past, and of
:e. It is with this
'egarding the justion Vt. 2 (vol. 3,

p. 280), it has been explained that since the eternal action cannot
be associated with the three divisions of time, it cannot really be an
action either. An action is supposed to be siidhya 'an entity which
is about to be brought about', and since the standing of the mountains and the existence of the self are eternal, they are not siidhya
'to be brought about'. Whatever is siidhya has to come into being,
i.e., it has to have existence in future, and after destruction, In past.
Both of these are not possible in the case of the standing of the
mountains' or the existence of the self. Since presentness is merely
the counterpositive of the past and the future, it (presentness) is not
possible either. Since all three' divisions of time cannot thus be
associated with the standing of the mountains, it cannot be an action,
.because an aGtion is invariably an object of usage in terms of these
three divisions. . (~lifi~<{~11T<JC<{'1~l.:]qq'1<'l~'1111'11~~<{T: ~fu liTO:Uddyota on Vt. 2 ad P. III.2.123, vol. 3, pp. 279-280).
"'RI :q '!il<'l']q111'n: Vt. 5 answers this objection by asserting that
there are divisions of time even in 'these actions that go on eternally.
The B~ya explains the existence of these divisions by adding a
qualification to the eternal action in the form of the limiting factor
of the actions onhe kings belonging to different times. The actions
of the kings are cOllsidered' to be the locus of the standing of the
mountains.. The standing of the mountain:s as limited by its locus,
i.e., the actions of different kings belonging to different times does
have kiilavibJUigii/;L 'division/, in time'.
Now, since the standing of the mountains as limited by its locus,
(the existence of the kings) can be associated with the three divisions
of time, it can be called an action. (<fQ: '!il~~r.r: 5!C!: f'li~'l'<'lfli",'.l:
Uddyota on Vt. 5 ad P. III.2.123, vol. 3, p. 282).
. [C-2] The other problem raised in the Bha~ya (not mentioned
in our text) is the use of the present tense in cases where there are
breaks in the action. The examples are:. ~ s!"l111~ 'here we are
studying', ~l!: '1~11: 'here we are living', and the last but very
famous one is . ~l!: :J;0'!l'l:f,r '!lw:!l+!: 'here we make Pu~yamitra
sacrifice' (i.e., we act as sacrificers at sacrifices initiated by Pu~ya
mitra). All these actions 'go on for an extended amowt of time.
While they lire going on, that is, when they have begun but not
ended, various breaks occur, a~, for example, taking a meal etc.



We are not actually studying while taking a meal. But the action
of studying has not ended and the sacrifice is not finished. The
I-member lAT cannot be introduced by P. III.2.123 to derive adhimahe etc., since studying does not actually occur when one is eating, etc., and III.2.123 introduces lAT with reference to an action actually
taking place (vartamiina).
This objection is met in two viirttikas :
(1) t~'1P:"lT <9T<:+l1Ff,!911f<J.:
(The present endings [bhavantil
are) justified, since (an action) has begun and has not ended.

There is a break even in such clear

and undoubted instances of the use of the present tense as
'Devadatta is eating'. The action-.of eating here is. not.
constant, because, while eating, Devadatta also may laugh, talk
a little, drink etc., and while these minor actions are going on, there
is a stop in the action of eating. But these actions are not considered to cause a break in the main action, because, they are merely
necessary accompaniments to the main action. (OiFCI<:l'1'1i<9T'C1I<:IT ~
I{Jasi. p. 344). They cannot be called obstacles
or interveners in ea:ting. Usages .like ~~ ~9<l:'tf: are accepted as
being correct instances of the use of the present tense suffix, although
. it .can be shown that even here, the action is not constant, hence,
usages like ~f[ 31~(h:r~ etc., also should be accepted. In this case
also, it can be said that the action of taking a meal does not cause a
break in the action of studying, because of niintariyakatva. Kaiyata
even goes to the length of saying that since it is impossible to go on
studying without a meal, the action of taking a meal can be said tobe forming a part of the action of studyjng ( W-T91~<r~9T9'19fl1;"lrn
Pradipa on Vt . .4 ad P. III.2.123; vol. 3, p. 280). These
two. views are given by Bhar'Grhari in the Kalasamuddesa. He notes
that (a) all actions are always found as if combined with something
else ~Ef9 ~ flI;'1l~rr ~:s:;T.tifr<!rw.<r('r v.P. III.9.83) and (b) The actions
which occur during the process of the main action, should be tal,en
to be forming constituent parts of the main action, if they contribute
to the realisation of the latter. Such a constituent action, even if it
is a completely different action, should be taken as a part of the
main action, since it occurs right in the middle of it. ((lG:~CR:I<'5~T g


I1'fClWIT't Fl<:T+r:









~Ef919'19f.t;'f[ I ~l~<n<

the example given i

of eating.
[C-3] To aVI
describes a fourfol
following four divi,


denote an activity
has now abandoned
of ~~\a '1<:lilifiUr ;:
spots of others now'
sa1'flPraii, but reall
activity denoted b3


the Bha~ya. It wa
in [C-2] was stan
(3) nityapro
This explains usag
where the action i
been discussed in [
(4) Siil'nipye
past are covered b:
for example,_
from the town'?
KriyaRaSa p. 2).
-[C-4] In th
out giving any de!
explanation is att,
time is that by wb
is indicated. ~ 1
P. II.2.5, M.B. vo:
that when associa
called by various t
of the time into d
ciation of action w
or longer duratior



ll. But the action

not finished. The
123 to derive adhiwhen one is eating,
) an action actually

'-'!~'fI'f'l"'fffi<IT I '-'!l~l1lttfRr ~ l!~<it;:r 'li;la II V.P. III.9.84). Hete also.

ndings [bhavantiJ
IS not ended.
: even in such clear
tense as
_eating here is not
may laugh, talk
lre going on, there
tions are not conle, they are merely

( ,,1"CI;:l'l"'li<'91'<111JT;:r

called obstacles
are accepted as
se suffix, although
t constant, hence,
)ted'. In this case
I does not cause a
~akrtt'l!(l. Kaiyata
Ipossiple to go on
eal cail be said to

, p. 280). These
lddesa. He notes
d with something
:I (b) The actions
, should be taken
;f they contribute
action, even if it
as a part of the
t. (<I'\"CR:l<"n!l l!


the example given is the combination of activities forming the action

of eating.
[C--3] To avoid the rising of these problems, GUl),aratnasiiri
describes a fourfold present. Thus varaf!amana for him has thefollowing four divisions:
(1) pravrUoparata: the present suffix is here employed to
denote an activity in which the agent was previously engaged, but.
has now abandoned, e.g., ,-,!+J:!f<l ;,ft'f'l1<f ., 'liUTcr 'he does not kill now' ,
of '-'!-nTm- G\lHlflUi ., ;;f<;q"Rr 'he does not babble about the vulnerable
spots of others now'. This distinction depends on the use of the adverb
sa,lf'tPrati, but really has nothing to do with the presentness of the'
activity denoted by -the verb:
(2) v?,Uavimta: This is the same -as pravrttasyiiviriima(1 of
_the Bha$ya. It was concerning this usage of IAT, that the discussion
in [C--2] was started.
(3) nityapravrttrt: again this is the same as in the Bha$ya.
This explains usages such as Q,lcrnf<j2'Rr
'the mountains stand',
where the action is going on eternally without stopping. This has
been discussed in [C--I] and text [1.2] etc.
(4) siimipye vartamanaJ;: immediate future and imm~diate
past are covered by this. This is the same as stated in P. IlL3.131,_
for example,
'lim <'i .,l1UG,:Fmlsre
'when did you come back.
from the town'? answer:
'here I come' . (see,
KriyaRaSa p. 2).
[C--4] In this whole discussion, the nature of t.ime is very_
important. Pa:J:rini has used the word kiila 'time' Several times with-,
out giving any definition of the word. It is in the Bhli$ya that an_
explanation is attempted for the first time. There it is said that
time is that by which the development and decay of material objects
is indicated. ~., l=l'<1f<!11lq"'iPP>ll'f9'l"&l <"a;'la ci 'iiF;!Ji'i<'l"JS: (Bha$ya on.
P. II.2.5, M.B. vol. 1, p. 409; also see V.P. II1.9.13) . Patafijali says
that -when associated with action, time -appears in different forms
called by various names such as day and night etc. _Thus the division_
of the time into day and night indicates some sort of intimate association of action with time. What is meant is that the idea of shor.ter'
or longer duration which is associated with time belongs in reality-




to actions and it is because of this association with action, that time

is regarded as a measurer of development and decay of phenomenal
objects. Since these divisions are made only due to the association
with action, time should be considered as essentially indivisible, and
only artificially conceived of as present, past and future.
Bhartrhari, the philosopher of language has .recorded several
theories about the nature of time, devoting the whole of the ninth
section of the third k~c;la of his Vakyapadlya to this. Time to him, is a power of the sabdabrahman (V.P. 1.3). (For a
recent discussion of time according to Bhartrhari, see Peri Sarvesvara
Sharma, the Kalasamuddesa ... , pp. 29-39). Kau.."?c;labhatta has put
forward the accepted view of the Grammarians that time is one and
the same with a series of activities, i.e., with action. This has been
discussed already. Since time is' thus identified with action, it is
clear that it is denoted by the verbal root, a fact used by others to
support the view that time is co-signified by I-members.
KaUl):c;labhat1;a however, while still accepting that time and
action are one and the same, holds that it is only a general notion of
time that is thus denoted by the verbal root. In order to denote
specific aspects of time s11ch .as presentness, pastness; etc., the use of
. the specific I-member is necessary. Thus in a sense, the meaning of
time is both co-signified and denoted by the I-members, according to
Kain;lQabhatta. The general notion of. time, while being denoted by
the verbal root, can be considered to be co-signified by I-members,
since in the absence of I-members, as in the forms stuti 'praise' etc.
this general notion of time even is not present. The specific aspects
of time such as presentness etc., are however not to be considered as
being denoted by the verbal root, and are thus denoted by the specific
I-members like lATetc.
[C-5] I cannot here go into details concerning all the lakiiras
due to limitations of space. For a detailed discussion of the problem
of Parok$atva 'imperceptibility' concerning
, lIT see my notes on
Section II.
ID1 The meaning of 1IIir
[D-1] Parr;ini has introduced the. I-member IIIir in P. II1.3.
161. (vidhinimantra~matitra1Jiidh~taSa1!lprasnapriirthane$U lin).
Here six meanings are given as conditions for introducing lIN.
These are as follows :

(a) vidhi' 'injunc1

subordinate p
. :you should !
(b) nimantra-(/a ':
(c) iimantrarpa 'p

(d) adhi$[a 'respl

teach (my)
( e)

sar(tprasna 'iT
'should I stue

(f) priirthana're







According to 1'.
four' of these' mear
According to NageS
. pravartalla. This n
stead of saying just
he does in P. III.3.:
(a) in order to ;

(b) in order to e:
of the. suffix
:po 160, Laghl
p. 33), also I
that lIIir shOD
tcmii, and tha
sake of expar
Once one has d
question follows: '
[D-2] pravaro
pravartana 'ills1
which leads to anot
by X of an optative
0'111f[~: );{gc\9if;!ir ~
thus the person who
him: X is a pra
(pravartakatva) is
perty of uttering ar


h action, that time

cay of phenomenal
, to the association
.Ily indivisible, and
LS .recorded several
whole of the ninth
this. Time accord(.P. 1.3). (For a
lee. Peri Sarvesvara
lJ).!jabhat(:a has put
Lat time is one and
)n. This has been
with action, it' is
used by others to
19 that time and
a general notion of
in order to denote
~s, etc:, the use of
se, the meaning of
lbers, according to
~ being denoted by
tied by l-members,
l stuti 'praise' etc.
'he spedfic aspects
:0 be considered as
)ted by the specific
ing all the lakaras
ion of the problem
see my notes on



. lIN in P. I1I.3.

lin) .

r introducing lIN.


(a) vidhi 'injunction'. This means inducing or commandil1g a

subordinate person to do something.' Thus.i 'l<Ti' 'l~: .
:you should go to the town' .
(0) rdmantra1Ja 'invitation'.
~l[ ~lcr '191~ 'please eat here'.
(c) iimantra1}a 'permission'. ~il: amrlcr 'you may sit here'.
(d) adhi$ta 'respectful command'.
3."!l1<l:{]q'li~il..' (please)
teach (my) son'.
(e) sa'J}1tyrasna 'inquiry' or 'delibei:ation'. i'ii '11 ~1'["lll:!1l:{ ;aQ <t~'l
'should I study the Veda or logic' ?
(f) pr/irthana 'request'. '1! m'>!;l "'~l:{ 'may I get a meal' ?
According to KaUI.1(iabhat(:a, it is possible to reduce the first
four of these' meanings to one, namely, pravartana 'instigation'.
According to Nagesa, a fifth meaning can also l;>e included under
pravartanii. This meaning is tyriirthana (LaghuMafi., p. 984). Instead of saying just Q'9C!'l1l:!T ~~ then, why does Pii1'Qini say what
he does in P. IlL3.161? Two reasons are offered :
(a) in order to allow a clear grasping of the detailed meaning
.. (nyiiyavyutpiidaniirthal1~) or
(b) in order to expatiate on the basic meaning (prapanciirtha'J}1)
of the suffix (see the karikii quoted,in [IV.A.2]; V.B.S.,
p. 160, LaghuMafi, p. 983, P.L.M., p.144 etc.). S.K. (voL 3,
p. 33), also has accepted that it is better to say (suvaca'J}1).
that lIN should be introduced to express the meaning pravar-'
tana, and that the seperate mention of the four is just for the
sake. of expansion.
Once one has decided that this is the basic meaning of UN, the
question follows: what precisely is apravariJ,anii ?
. '. '..
.pravartana 'illstigation' .is. a,n W:.tivity on tl;Le,part o(:a"per.sonX, .
. which leads to another person Y'.s doihg soriwihii:lg,nam,ly, thy u~e

by X of an optative form. Thus,"Nageasays <t'3[Q''KI<n Q',['(~:.J;iiJI

c>.fTtfl{: Q''fcf.!if<ml f0s'lfu:l;[R:cr'U~mwr: (LaghuMafi.. p.958). X is
thus the person who causes Y to do something by commanding (etc.)
him: X is a pravartaka. The property of being a praViartaka
(pmvartakatva) is defined as follows: pravaiiJ,akatva is the pro- .
perty of uttering an optative (etc.), with the provision that one be

-.-.-_ .. -- - -------,..... _-


-------_. - - - -




indePendent. Thus says Nagesa again: . :qem'fi~ "f~'lIQ"4 <lfu

~l~lirtrr<~ (LaghuMan. p. 958).
However, Y does not act imm~iately. Other conditions are
necessary. The sequence of events is then as follows:
(1) instigation (pravdrtanii) is uttered by the person X, who is
considered to be an iipta (see below).
(2) further, there is no inhibitory thing present as qualifying the
(3) from (1) and (2), Y infers that the action he is being askecI
to do is: a means of reaching something he desires, and that
it can be performed by him.
(4) it is (3) which then leads Y to do what he has been instigated to do.
'la;'{+rl1Jf~cft'fcrn 'Cf ern ( ~'S"~,!Q~'l'll ) llRr'fr '<j'fil111'lfFIfuE"'ll ~
M'!it ~E"<lI'<l'li'lRTI~q: (an~'ll ~fu<ll~'{1 'Rl~'lAa ) ClCl: l/'{fu: I

LaghuMafi. p. 959.
(a) an iif1b,a is a person qualified as follows: he is devoid of
confusion, anger, etc., he does not indulge in certain actions
which would lead 'to undesiredresuits, or preclude one's reach- .
ing desired results. (LaghuMa:n. pp. 959-960).
(b) as n9ted in (2) above, a prava'rtana is to be. qualified by an
absence of any inhibitory factor.
On account of the conditions described above by (a) and (b),
a person Y does not perform the act he is commanded to do in the
following instances :
(1) If an enemy of Y says, 'eat poison', Y does not do this.
1'he enemy is not iipta. Hence, Y infers that his eating will lead
to no desired results, nor does he consequently eat.
(2) even if an ,apba says, 'eat poison, but do not eat in this
person's house'-, Ydoesrtot immediately proceed to eat poison.. For,
':h~re there is an inhibitory faCtor : . Y knows that eating poison isa
means to an undesired result, namely, his death. This conclusion
produces an aversion (dvle~a), which is an inhibitory factor (p7atib,andhaka). In effect, the sentence uttered is intended to convey
that Y should not eat in this person's house, because it would lead
to undesired result~.
[D..:31 The inference mentioned above (3), that leads to Y


doing what he is inst

. (a) general: :
(b) particular
cular desired thing, E
(b) is necessar
and effort are involv
me to something goo<
not suffice in cases '
are necessary, as in ;
[IV.'B.24 etc] , it is ~
knowlecIge that the I
..sired. On the other
that object of desire
that a person becoill<
iipta, even when spec
cause is not present.
apta is commanding
cause something goo
object. of desire. is nl
something which cau
an activity, specific I
through this action 1
[D-4J All this
tions of everyday Ii
,,<ftRlit~'l ~qir'lil+rT




of as the statement 0:
of Indian philosoph
'not composed by .rr

, Therefore, for t
pravartanii isa state:
perty of the words ,
~~ lTemrrl fu~qR;Qi'l~q
[D-5] We ha\
I. As regards]
(a) lIN denot

- ._-........


ther conditlons are

~ person X, who is
It as qualifying the

] he is being asked
Ie desires, and that
he has been instiJ"frl;{'f,Tl:r19for~<rr ~

fa ) (fer: ll"'lRr: I

" he is devoid of
in certain actions
'eclude one's reachc960) .
be qualified by an
, by (a) and (b),
mded to do in the
. does'!'not do this.
:s. eating will lead


not eat in .this

eat poison.. For,
eating .poison is a
This conclusion
:ory factor (prati
.tended to convey
use it would lead

. that leads. to y



doing what he is instigated for, can be of two kinds:

(a) general: i.e., one infers that an action leads to something
(b). particular: Le., that a particular action leads (0 a particular desired thing, e~g. S'varga 'heaven'.
(b) is necessary for Y to be inclined to act when great expense
and effort are involved. Mere general inference that this will lead
me to something good, since an apta has instigated me to do it, will
not suffioe in cases where a great deal of trouble and expenditure
are necessary, as in a big sacrifice, for example. Thus in our text,
[IV.13.24 etc] , it is stated that lIN does not convey just the vague
knowledge that the prescribed action is the means of something desired. On the other hand, lIN denotes specific knowledge of what
that object of desire is. In our day to day experience, we do see
that a person becomes inclined to activity, when commanded by an
apta, even when specific knowledge as to what good this activity will
cause is not present. This happens due to the general faith that this
dpta is commanding one to do this because he knows that this will
cau&e something good for oneself. Thus specific knowledge of the
object of desire is not neoessary. This however, does not apply to
. something which causes a lot of effort. To be inclined towards such
an activity, specific knowledge of the object of desire to be achieved
through this action has to be known (also see LaghuMafi, p; (60).
[D-4] All this preceding discussion applies to normal injunctions of everyday life. There are also Vedic injunctions, such as
'ii'fliW-lii<r ~'li1l'[I <riit(f 'one desirous of heaven should perform the
Jyoti~toma sacrifice'. Now, such injunctions cannot be conceived
of as the statement of anyone person or iipta. By the iistika systems"
of Indian philosophy, the Vedas are considered to be lapaurW}eya
'not composed by man'. Hence, the definlti~ns oL.pravartanii-and
pravartaka given in [D-:-2lca!1.1:J()iial?plyt.o;th~fVeda.
Therefore, for the Veda, a particular situation exists. Here a
pravartana is a statement the Veda: '. And pravartakiiva is a pro
perty of the words which occur in the Veda. Thus NageSasays :
't~ ll"'Ta;rl fo>~"lR:c!~"'l1 lT9a9i<'i 'q OJOG.:[;rgWi (LaghuMan. p. 959).
[D-5] We have then, the following:
1. As regards normal usage in the real world situation :
(a) lIN denotes instigation or command in general: this is



. . ----.. '-----~---.--.-----,... --





variousiy called vidlzz, pravartana, prermJii.

. (b) This is.definedas a pr<ipertywhich leads to someone else's
doing something. ,q'['t<j~r lOjB:. ,see also text [IV.B.l]. The
command consists in uttering
opta,ttive form, and the speaker is
the locus of the property prqvartakatva.
(c) When a person Y spoken to hears the command of X, he
performs that activity under the following conditions. He infers
from the injunction that the activity in question is such that it can
be accomplished by him (krtisiidhya) , it will lead to results which he
desires (i~tasadhana), and if there is no inhibitory factor involved
(pratibandhakabhava) , and finally, if the person who utters the
injunction is authoritative and trustworthy (apta).
II. As regards the Vedic injunctions, of course, since the Vedas.
are ,apauruljeya, no speaker is necessary. The words in the Vedic
'injunctions themselves do the instigating.
[D'-6] In sum, according to Nageabhatta, a vidhi is connected with the following properties of an action, which one is insti
gated to perform.
(a) iljtasiidhanatva 'the property of being a means to some.thing desired.
. (b) krtisadh yatva 'feasibility'
(c) pratibqndhakabhiiv.a 'the absence of an inhibitory factor'.
In addition, instead of (c), one may consider also (d) balavada1~iljtananuband.hitva 'the property of not being associated with a
greatly undesired result'. These will be explained later when the
views of the different schools are being discussed. The discussion S0
far has been general, though it has followed NageabhaHa in the
main. It will make the differences among the various schools easier
to understand, since I will have to be brief in discussing them.
In addition .to these features,remember that Nagea says that
these' are inferred from: an injunc'tivesiatement. Consider now the
epistemological "side . of' the . question. One hears an injunction,'
cognises it, then infers certain properties, and then finally acts. Tbus
there is an instigation (pravartana), knowledge of it (jnana) , and
an action (pravftti). Further, there is a result (plla!a) involved and
a means (sadhana, upaya) to it, namely, the action one is to perform.
Hence, one has the foHowing sequence in cognition : .
(1) an instigation is cognised (vidhiji'iiin,a) ,





one know
one kno~
There is desire
cause of desiring th(
absence of misery) ,
desiring to perform
knowledge that the
can be performed,
leads to excessivel~
14648) .
[D-7] In ace
are held regarding
of which leads to :
(1) It is pra:
factor. From this i
desired; and feasib
activity. This is th
[D-2 to D'-6J.
(2) It is a c
y,atva, and .( c)ba,
the Naiyayikas, an
(3) It is b.ha
and has been acce]
(4) It is kiir
(5) and fina'
believe that the or
means to a desired
Xnandatirtha and
In the followil
[E] The Nyaya .
[E-IJ This
meaning of lIN ac
vidhi is then defir
desire to do, which
precisely, that pro!
to do (p. 142). T
'feasibility' , (b) ~
something desired'





sto someone else's

Kt [IV.B.I]. The
(nd the speaker is
:ommand of X, he
itions. He infers
s such that it can
o results which he
:y factor involved
n who utters the


e, since the Vedas

)rds in the Vedic
a vidhi is coni'hich one is instimeans to somelnhibitory. factor' ..
'so (d) balavadassociated with a
i later when the
[he di$Cussion Sl)
esabhq~\a in the
}US schools easier
ssing them.
~agea says that
~6nsider "il0W the.
ian injunction,
ially acts. Thus
it (jiUina), and
~a) involved and
,ne is to perform.




one knows the result (phalajfiiina)

(3) one knows a means to this result (upiiyajfilina).
There is desire (icchii) relative to each of (2) and (3). The
cause of desiring the result (phala, viz., in general, happiness and the
absence of misery), is the knowledge of it, Le., (2). The cause of
desiring to perform the action which is a means to this result, is the
knowledge that the action is a means to the end desired, and that it
can be performed. On the other hand, the knowledge that an action
leads to excessively undesired results is an inhibitor (Mukta. on
146-48) .
[D-7] In accord with the above, the following possible views
are held regarding what is vidhi as the meaning of lIN, a cognition
of which leads to activity.
(1) It is pravlartanii qualified by the absence of an inhibitory
factor. From this then, the properties of being a means to something
desired, and feasibility are inferred. This inference then leads t)
activity. This is the view of Nagea, which has been discu&-<ed so far
[D-2 to D-6].
(2) It is a combination of (a) itasiidJu:matv.a, (b) krtisadhyatva; and (c) balavadan4.tiinanubandhitva. This view belongs to
the Naiy;ayikas,' and will be discussed in the next section.
_ (3) It is bhiivanii. This is the view of the Bh2.tlamimarpsakas,
and has been accepted for Veda by Nagesa.
(4) It is kiirya according to the Prabhakaras.
(5) . and finally both Ma:t;lt;lanamisra and KaUl).\labhatta firmly
believe that the only meaning of vidhi is the property of' being the
means to a desired end (itasadhanatva). This is also the view of
Anandatirtha and Nrsilp.hasrama.
In the following sections, these views ,vill be discussed in order.
[El The Ny.ya view
[E-l] This is the most straight forward view. Vidizi is the
meaning of lIN according to the sabdasaPra. (kiirikii 101). This
vi:dhi is then defined as the object of a cognition, which causes a
desire to do, which in turn instigates one to perform an action. More
precisely, that property qualified by which, a cognition causes a desire
to do (p. 142). There are three such properties: (a) kiUsiidhyatva
'feasibility', (b) it,asiidhaY/iCltva 'the property of being a means to
something desired', and (c). balavadil1ni~lananubandhitva 'the pro-




_ , _





(by swimming) '. Th<

which in this case, wi
being a means to a de,
the sea might fulfill tIl
be a means to a desir
here be taken as nega
to swim across the 51
feasibility as one of tc

perty of not entailing a greatly undesired result.' The dharmin of

these properties is an object action such as paka, yaga etc., for example, the meaning cognised from the verbal form ending in lIN,
- such as yajeta 'he should sacrifice', is "1FT: 'lifOOT~'1: W:!!<:!T"l;'f 'i!<'l'lG:-.
Fr2T~.\;j1 'Cf
'the sacrifice is feasible, a means to something
desired (i.e., heaven), and it does not entail a greatly undesired
result'. Thus injunction has a threefold meaning according to the
Naiyayikas, involving the three properties mentioned above. To
cause volitional activity in the person who is being instigated, the
presence of all these three properties is individually necessary. None
of them may remain absent. Thus ]agacli:sa states that all three of
these individually (pratyekameva) are to be considered as causes
__ for the desir:e to do (sabdaSclPra. p. 142) .



The Naiyayikas argue that the agent does not become inclined
to act unless he knows that the action concerned can be accomplished
by him with effort. He does not proceed to perform such impossible
tasks as bringing the peak of the golden mountain Meru, or to produce rain (vr~tikara1Ja), or to create or bring the moon, even thougJ:!
these actions might be able to-produce some-desired resultS for him.
It is only when it is-known that the activity in question can be performed, that the agent becomes inclined towards it.
An objection has been raised, that, this property of being
feasible, may have once existed in some particular activity, and tow'ards which then there would be inclination to act, even though, the
action is not possible now. Thus creating the moon was possible
once, when the moon was first created. It has been proven to be
not impossible to do, and thus feasible. Therefore, there will be
inclination towards thIS activity, if feasibility is considered to be a
meaning of lIN, and thus an instigator (see [IV.B.13]). This objection has been met by adding the qualification idiinim 'now' to
feasibility. The action in question has to be feasible 'n~w' for this
property to be the instigator. Since the creating of the moon is not
possible 'now', there will no inclination towards this act. Thus there
is no fault.
Further, another argument used in favour of accepting feasibility
as a meaning of lIN, is as follows: There are negative injunctions such as ~: ~ ;or a'tl:. 'a cripple should not cross the sea



The other proper

is i~tasiidhanatva 'the
Mere knowledge of a
after he has ascertail
unless he knows thal
It is because lIN has
as its denotatum, th~
If an action is of no 1
is not inclined iowan:
It is necessary te
account for the follow
'one' desirous of sat
the water'.' Here th
will not make sense,
action in question is :
satisfaction of his h1:
no desired result. 1
desired end, that is t
of this property that
A problem has
feasibility and the pr
cognised at the samt
(siidlzana) has to be:
_ means something wt
thus contradictory.
stating that the cogr
natva) and the prop!
are not both cogniw
diction. What is cc




:: The dharmin of
Z, yiiga etc., for ex)rm ending in lIN,

(by swimming) '. The negative particle here negates the injunction,
which in this case, will not make any sense, if only the property of
being a means to a desired end is accepted as the instigator. Crossing
the sea might fulfill the fondest wish of the cripple, and thus definitely
be a means to a desired end. Therefore, the negative particle must
here be taken as negating feasibility. It is not possible for a cripple
to swim across the sea. It is necessary for this reason,to accept
feasibility as one of the three meanings of lIN (sabdasaPra. p. 143).


W:!ml;J;of <!<"'1q:-

aeans to something
i greatly undesired
Ig according to the
tioned above. To
~ing instigated, the
y necessary; None
es that all three of
nsidered as causes
ot become inclined
be accomplished
rm such impossible
n Meru, or to promoon, even though
oed results for him.
lestion can be perit.
;>roperty of being
:1' activity, and to~, even though, the
noon was possible
Jeen pr6ven to be
'ore, there will be .
~onsidered to be a
B.13] ). This ob- idiinim 'now' to
ible 'now' for this
)f the moon is not s act. Thus there


;cepting feasibility
, negative injuncnot cross the sea



The other property necessary for causing an inclination to actis i~t,asiidhanatva 'the property of being a means to something desired' .
Mere knowledge of an injunction will not make a person act, even
after he has ascertained the feasibility of the activity in question,
unless he knows that this will achieve something that he desires.
It is because lIN has the property of being a means to a desired end
as its denotatum, that an injunction Can instigate the agent
to act.
If an action is of no use in producing a desired result, then the agent
is not inclined towards performing it.
It is necessary to accept 4tasiidhanatva as a meaning of lIN, to
account for the following negative injunction. Q:1WJ;Tii'r 'Jf~ 'rclT:S'l _
'one desirous of satisfaction (from hunger), should not thrash
the water'. Here. the negative particle -negates the injunction. It
will not make sense, if, the injunction meant feasibility only. The
action in question is perfectly feasible. But for a person who desires
satisfaction of his hunger and thirst, this useless activity will bring
no desired result. Thus it is the property of being a means to a
desired end, that is being negated here. It is because of the absence
of this property that there is no inclination to act.
A problem has been raised as to how two properties such as
feasibility and the property of being a means to a desired end, can be
cognised at the same time as existing in the same thing. -A means
(sfidhana) has to be a finished thing (siddhadharma) , whereas sfidhya
meanS something which is to be accomplished yet. These two are
thus contradictory. A solution to this problem has been found by
stating that the cognition of the property of being a means (sfiiihanatva) and the property of being possible to accomplish "(sadhyatva) ,
are not both cognised in the same instant. Thus there is no contradiction. What is cognised is that this thing which will be a means




(a) the desire fc

ledge of the fruit conci
(b) the desire fo
this, the knowledge of .
sired, is the cause (on
from this iccha, which:
the knowledge of feas
something desired. I
general Naiyayika vie'

to something desired after being accomplished, is feasible now.

fu 'li:'4 '1.q~ tfT~T"!T'''!~~<::Fllrq'1~fcrm>.'fi'll'!'l 5:r:rii'r",fcr~\;jT't.MaI)iDa. p. 54)


The property of not entailing a greatly undesired result is the

third part comprising :the meaning of the suffix IIfI. The Naiyayikas
argue that if the property of being the means to a desired result were
the only meaning of lIfI, then there would also be inclination towards
eating food mixed with honey and poison. It wiII accomplish satisfaction of hunger (trpti) , and the honey gives it a desirable taste.
Thus it can be said to be the means to something desired, i.e., trpti.
But this food is also deadly. It will certainly cause death due to the
poison mixed in it. That there is no inclination towards the eating
of such food goes to .prove that the property of not entailing a greatly
undesired result, is necessary for instigation. Thus there is no volition where the bad effects outweigh the good ones. Since this property
. is thus necessary for instigation, it must be considered to be the
meaning of lIfi.
Acceptance of this property as a meaning of lIfi is also necessary
for such negative injunctions as '1'1i<"r EOOcr 'one should not
eat kala:Tija' (for the ineaning
kalai"ija,see note 1 on section
[IV.I.l] ) . Now, the eating of kalafi}(l does satisfy hunger, and is.
thus a means to a desired end .. But it is also a means to hell. Thus
the undesired result i.e., hell, outweighs the desired result of sati.sfaction. It is .this property of not entailing a greatly undesired result,
that is being negated by the negative particle.
There is a little bit of difference of opinion aoout what balavadan4tananubandhitvf{l exactly means. .It is normally taken to be the
knowledge of the absence of evil (balavadani~tiijanakatvajnana or
ani$tasiidhandtvabhiivajnana). But some take it to mean the absence
of the knowledge that the aqtivity in question will cause
undesired (an4'Jajanakatvajfi..iibhliva). It is thus a negative condition according to them. (Ma:I).iDa. p. 56).
The author of the Mukta. agrees with most of what has been
said so far about the Nyaya view. But he does not accept the third
property baktvadf{lni$tanamtbandhitva as one of the causes of volitional activity. When a person wishes to gain some fruit, he has
two types of desire :




L ..

desired result', as one

is the inclination to ea
. It is certainly feasible
. also a means to soril(
insiead of accepting l
inclination to do, Vis'
activity, namely, boa
property of being a ca
148). Knowing that
for which the agent
Altert1.atively, the del
dv,esah) itself (Mukr
[FJ' :The Bhatia Mi
[F-1] The Bhl
'a person
<:'ltff\+r :
In this sentence, saCI
goal. The fonn endi
verbal root yaj 'to sa,
properties: suffixn(
(lhitvl a). The prop
common to all the tel
of these aspects' expr
defined as follows :
is the activity on .the
bringing about of wh
in the case of a simpl,
is cooking rice', riCE
nasya) . The activit

- - ------ --- -- -- --~-- --- -----



i, is feasible now..
'<rr~Mal).iDa. p. 54)
iesired result is the
iT. The Naiyayikas
, desired result were
inclination towards
;11 accomplish satist a desirable taste.
: desired, i.e., trpti.
se death due to the
towards the eating
.: entailing a greatly
us there is nQ voHSince this property
lsidered to be the
'N is also necessary
'one'should not
note 1 .on section
sfy hunge!;", and is
eans to hell. Thus
fed result of satisly undesired result,
lut what balavada~
.y taken to be the

;anakatvajnana or
) mean the absence
,I cause something
a negative condiof what has been
t accept the third
he causes of voH)me fruit, he has







(a) the desire for the fruit (phaleccha). For this, the knowledge of the fruit concerned is the cause.
(b) the desire for a means to gain this fruit (upayeccha). For
this, the knowledge of the property of being a means to something desired, is the cause (on kiirika 146). The desire to do (cikira) results
from this icc.ha, which according to Mukta. on kiirika 147, comes from
the knowledge of feasibility and the property of being a means to
something desired. In this, Visvaniatha's view is the same as the
general Naiyayika view. However, Visvanatha does not accept balavadan4tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a greatly undesired result', as one of the causes of volitional activity. How then
is the inclination to eat food mixed with honey and poison avoided?
It is certainly feasible, and being capable of satisfying hunger, it is
. also a means to something desired. To get out of this difficulty,
. instead of accepting bahavadani$tananubandhitva as a cause of the
inclination to do, Visvanatha has a pratibandhaka 'deterrent' to this
activity, namely, balavaddvitasiidhantitiijiiiina 'cognition of the
property of being a cause to something very much undesired' (kiirikii
148). Knowing that the activity in question will result in som~thing
for which the agent has great aversion prevents the desire to do.
Alternatively; the deterrent is'said to be 'great avtrsion' (balavaddv,ealJ) itself (Muk!a. p. 508).
[F] The Bhati;a view '
[F-l] The Bhat1;a Mim~sakas analyse the 'sentence ~Q
'a person desirous of heaven should sacrifice', as follows:
In this sentence, sacrifice is prescribed for a man with heaven as a
goal. The form ending in lIN, namely, yajeba, has two parts: the
verbal root yaj 'to sacrifice', and the suffix. This suffix also has two
properties: suffiimess in general, and the property of being lIiV
(lintvla) . The property of being a verbal ending (iikhyiitatva) is
common to all the ten I-members. li1itva is proper only to lIN. Both
of these aspects express bhavanii 'bringing about'. bhiiVlanii has been
defined as follows: <=rf;!gir'l<lr::i'fi<'lT m'lf<lgei:{fq]'~~lq: ['bhavanii]
is the activity on the part of the instigator, which is conducive to the
bringing about of what is being produced' (ArthaSaip.. p. 18). Thus
in the case of a simple sentence such as 3l1~ q'ilfu ~'<!; 'Devadatta
is cooking rice', rice is being produced (bhavitub = 'utpadYamiinasya). The activity on the part of Devadatta, which is conducive




to the production of rice is bhavana. When a teacher orders his

student to bring a cow, the inclination to bring this cow in the mind
of the student Devadatta is caused by that activity on the part of his
teacher. This activity on the part of the teacher, conducive to
Devadatta's action of bringing the cow, is bhiivana:.
This bhiivana: is of two kinds: (a) siibdi and (b)
iirthi. It is siibdi bhiivanii that is proper to lIN. :A:rthi bhiivana
-is expressed by all the I-members. (a) is a sabc!Javyiipiira, or rather,
.sabdasamavetiavyiipiiralJ, 'an activity invariably related with the word
(i.e., lIN)', as Kumarilabha1!ta puts it, and is considered to be the
'same asabidhii. (also see Tantrav:a. p. 114; NyayMan. p. 246; P.L.M.
p. 158; MaJ)iD~. p. 44 f.; M.K. p. 3554 etc. for general discussion).
Mal)iDa. (p. 44) identifies sabdabhiivanii with abhidhii and: pravartanii. It is 'the activity on the part of:the instigator, which is condudve to another person's getting inclined to act. . CI'f ,:p;qq~~'1:1'lio;r
+rT9fl:rgc'ffqT\~q: ~TT~l lil'RT (ArthaSarp. p. 27). This applies in the
worldly situations to the intention of a particular person who instigates the agent. In the case of the Vedic injunction, of course, it is a
.property of the word itself. llN itself is the instigator (prayojaka)
.in this case. It is because. this property .thus .belongs to the Vedic
word itself, that it is called siibdi bhiiiJimii.
[F-3] This bhiivifJnii has expectancy (iiklink$ii) for three things:
(a) siidhya 'the goal', (b) siidhana 'the means'and (c) itikarwvyata
"the way to go about it'. Out of these three expectancies, (a) is
satisfied by the second kind of bhiivanii, namely, iiithi bhiivanii.
"Both the bhiivaniis are closely related, since both are denoted by
,different aspects of the same suffix. This iJithi bhiivanii is defined as
follows : ~~;;~I;;Jf.rafs!i'1If.lq'1O<jTrn\: an~'l1T9;:rT (ArthaSam. p. 42) .
aTthi bhiivanii is' the activity regarding an action, caused by
the desire for a fruit. Since activity is the meaning of suffix in general
(according to the Mimfupsakas, as opposed to the. Grammarians,
who accept the agent as the denoted meaning of the suffix, [see A-6] ) ,
. mthi bhiivanii is expressed by the iikhyiitatva aspect of lIN. This
is the general suffix meaning that lIN has in common with the other
[-members. Thus what it amounts to is that the "verbal effort on the
'part of the instigator is Siibdi bhiivanii, whereas, the actual effort put
forward by the agent, is the iiithi bhiivanii. The injunction instigates
;an agent towards a particular activity, stating that this activity will


produce a desired resulthere is inclination to a

Thus Kumarilabhatta :
~~Th"11'lil'fT ~E:lfG?JG:l
f<1',I1R'Il'fi1 liFHI ffi~<~"

. (b) is satisfied h.
What is meant by thi!
tion of lIN cannot rn
explaining this. (1)'
f;fibdi bhiivanii. It doe
but not known to the:
of llN. lIN so to say 1
we see a blue pot, and
011 it, that does not me
of the eye and the p<
know it only when ou
of the eye and the pot
ledge of the blue COI01
does not create the col
the cognition of llN
iibdi b.hfivanii.



the other
iibdi bhiivanii is not (
However the goal of
no prior existence. 1'1
(c) is satisfied
of the activity concel
In this way, thi
[i.e., (a), (b), and
inclined to act. iiitl
and they are satisfi~
(a) the goal:
(b) the means
(c) how to :
prayaja etc.
Thus the. wholE



a teacher orders his

this cow in the mind
ity on the part of his
acher, conducive to

produce a desired result. , If the agent has a desire for such a result,
there is inclination to act. sabdi bhiivanii causes this iirthi bhiivanii.
Thus KUJ:Illirilabhat\a says :
CfSfT~hfW!iI1:ft f<'s6'IfG:~~l"li <r: ~q Q"fcr ,Fil;;'[9iC<fl'lI1:: ~ W:Cl1'l": ~Q,,'i!ms
ii'r<!n~!l"lil <=fl'l;:rl f~f~I~<~~'1~ \ (TantraVilL p. 378) .


. (a) Yibdi and (b)

v. rA'rthi bhiivana
~avYiipiira, or rather
elated with the word
:onsidered to be the
Man. p. 246; P.L.M.
general discussion) .
fbhidhii and pravartor, which is" conduq'f. ~~"l"Q"'l'~"'r

. ThIS applies in the

Ir person who instion, of course, it is a
;igator (prayojaka)
olongs to t.b.e Vedic

,a) for three things:

::I (c) itikartavyatii
cpectancies, (a) is
ly, iiithi bhiivanil.
;h are denoted by
iivar.iiHs defined as
ArthaSam. p. 42).
ldion, caused by
of suffix in general
the, Grammarians,
suffix, [see A-6J) ,
>ect of lIN. This
Ion with the other
erbal effort on the
e actual effort put
junction, instigates
this activity will





(b) is satisfied by the cognition of lIN etc. (ArthaSarp., p. 34) .

What is meant by this? siibdi bhiivana already exists. The cognition of lIN cannot be said tD create it. There are two ways of
explaining this. (1) The cognition of lIN causes the knowledge of
siibdi bhiivana. It does not create it. siibdi bhfivanii already existing,
but not known to the agent, is made known to him, by the cognition
of lIN. lIN so to say brings siibdi bhiivanil to light (prakiisayati). If
we see a blue po~, and get the knowledge that the pot has blue colour
- on it, that does not mean that this colour is created by the conjunction
of the eye and the pot. The pot already has blue colour. Btu we
know it only when our eye lights on the blue pot. The conjunction
of the eye and the pot is here the main means (kara'IJa) of the knowledge of the blue colour as existing in the pot. But this main means
does not create the colour, it only brings it to light., In the .same way,
the cognition of lIN is the main means of the knowledge' of the
Siibdi bhiivanii. It does not create it, it only makes it known to theagent.
(2) the other way of course is as follows': it is true that
siibdi bhiivanii is not created by the cognition of lIN. It already exists.
However the goal of that siibdi bhiivanii, i.e., the iirthi bhiivlanii has
no prior existence. And the cognition of lIN helps to bring this about.
(c) is satisfied by the knowledge of lIN accompanied by praise,
of the activity concerned through a-rthaviida (Arthasarp.. p. 34) .
In this way, this siib4i bhiivanii along with these three things,
[i.e., (a), (b), and (c) mentioned above] , instigates the agent to be
inclined to act. iiithi bhiivanii also has the same three expectancies
and they are satisfied by the following :
(a) the goal: a fruit such as heaven etc.
(b) the means: sacrifice etc.
(c) how to go about it?: by performing rites such as
prayiija etc.
Thus the whole thing can be shown as follows :



yajeta svargak{ima~!







fdbdi bhavana

'firlhi bh?ivana







karmaprasastyaviSi~ta li,i(idijfiana




~wn >!<R!'1i,ir 'if '>J~R~i!

The Prabhakara



[F-4) Some vari

According to Mima
instead of having a S
pr.ava"rtanii, let this pr,
conducive to bringing th
According to Gaga!
holds the following :
f<>;s; '>JfiFf:
The pro.
_are available through J
tanii, which is the me~
entity: it is with resp
Note now, that Nagesa
to a desired end etc.,
However, he holds tha






to the prabhakaras.
It ceases to' exist the :
supposed to result f:on
'of the sacrifice, until a
position of the sacri!iI
as the means of achle'
cannot be the means
inclination to perforn
of being a means to a
Well, in that cas(
direct cause to heave!
generates apurva ar:(
Through this, connect!
to achieve the desired
The Prabhi.ikaras
according to them, for
means either, since
1:f<:+q~1<rt'il'1'9~fq il;1
word dviira is here u
(for definition of vyi






arlhi bhav7ina









[F-4] Some variations of the Bhlitta view:

According to MimaKau. (p. 22) , p,arthasarathimisra claims that,. .
instead of having a separate property resident in llN,. which is
pwvattanii, let this pravarta'!iii be ,considered merely as .. the.power '
conducive to bringing thearthi bhavdnaabout.( grl>li+ilq;:n~~0T1ilf9:cR<t}
, According to Gagabhatta, (BhattaCin. p. 88), the Bhatta school
holds the following: ~!2<:!N;:r,ql~1<rl111~qm <i51+i1<I. qG:l>lf;C!~ ,Fl!;jT (l'S[
:i0:s: 'OlWcr:
The property of being a means to a desired result etc.,
are available through inferenoe. Therefore, they cannot be pravartana, which is the meaning of lIN. pravartana then is a separate
entity: it is with respect to this, that lIN has a denotative function.
Note now, that Nagesa also holds that the property of being a means
to a desired end etc., are to be found by inference (see [D-2J).
However, he holds that pravartana is llN itself. (~,lt >'<,~,;jl f<,.~,p':(l
~'l~qj );(q\'!lf'i 'if 'Ol~f<T.oi'tq LaghuMaii. p. 959) .
[G) The Prabhlikara view
~G-ll i(as"tidhanatva cannot be the meaning of lIN according
to the Prabhakaras. A sacrifice has but a momentary existence.
, It ceases to exist the moment it is finished. The heaven which. is
supposed to result from it, does not come into beIng for the performer '
of the sacrifice, until after his death. Since there is no direct juxtaposition of the sacrifice and heaven, how can sacrifice be cognised '
as the means of achieving the desired heaven? And, since sacrifice
cannot be the means of getting heaven, lIN cannot then cause an,
inclination to perform it, by denoting its (nonexistent) property
of being a means to a desired end.
, Well, in that case, it can be said that a sacrifice may not be a
direct cause to heaven. But it is still an indirect cause. Sacrifice
generates apurva and this ajniwa then directly causes heaven.
meahs" ", '

"'i-:" ':' -.
.:... -.: "
" ': - ,;- .
.,-., .: "-"
toachleve the deSIred heaven.: . , ..,,,,' ,"';(<:,';:
','it" ': ,'C '~"i'
The Prabhakaras deny this
. ;. . ' . . . ...,
according to them, for lIN, to den9te the property of being'an irirlirect
means either;' since the interconnecting link is not :present.,'
[IV:C.2] The
word dvara is here used in the technical sense.' It means vyiipara
(for definition of vyapara, see note 2 on section [IV.C.2]).. The
''',.~ ,.~_.,

.~. ~_






link apiirva is vyiipiira, because, it is caused by the sacrifice, and is

the cause of the heaven, which is also caused by the sacrifice. Without this connecting linl. being present in the sentence meaning (in.
the form <nli'1' s:r~c1&;rlJ ~em 'ffi'/'li'C) 'the property of being an
indirect cause cannot be denoted by lIN. One of the essential factors
in the cognition of the sentence meaning is semantic compatibility,
and the Ptiibhii.kara definition of this semantic compatibility is that,
it causes semantic relation (mwlaya). Without the presence of apurva
as the interconnecting link, sacrifice and heaven cannot be connected.
And since this link is not present in the cognition of the sentence
meaning, there is no semantic compatibility to denote the property
of being an "indirect cause.
[G-2J The final view of the Prabhakaras is then that it is
this apurva itself that i~ the meaning of lIN. lIN accordinv: to them,
denotes kiirya 'the thing to be done', or k!ttyuddesya 'that towards
which activity is directed'. This, according to them, is, the same as
apiirva. As a matter of fact, the words kiirya and lapurva are considered to be practically synonymous by them. Thus: apiirva =
kiirya = niyoga etc. Thus Ramanujacarya says: ~'f 'I>li'f +!FIF<l<:T<1t"lT.<'fT<;:,{eIT'i'rRll;'fr<+!R 3;<i1Sr REfr-n R'1ll'T J{R <[1"1(1 (sastraPraPa. p. 59).
It must'be stressed here that, the Bhatta apftrva is not the same as
the Prabhakara notion of apiirva. For the Bhattas, sacrifice is the
'kiirya, and apiirva results from this. For Prabhakaras, however;.
apiirva itself is kilr)lla. Thus 3T'{~q- 'lirif ro:s:rfu:lf<"1'19r'Ol:fl{ (TantraRa.
p. 42),
The Prabhii.karas do not deny that verb ending denotes krti
'activity' or 'effort'. How then can they say that lIN denotes kiirJi!l;
or krttyuddeSya and not krti? The answer is that the Pri'ibhakaras
do not accept krti as the only meaning of all the I-members. Thus
lIN has the additional meaning kiirya also (see TantraRa. p. 426).
But this briiigsup the fault of anekiirthakdtii 'having more than one
meaning'. No, say the Prabhakaras. : kiirya is a meaning, which:
if is not possible to denote without denoting "krti also, since both are
related to each other. Thus lIN denotes krti as being subordinate
to kiirya. kiirya means that towards which all activity is directed.
Activity (krti) is thus a qualifier. Its object is the sacrifice and the
locus is the person who is desirous of heaven.
T4'li<'i."l' W~~"1'9ll. .(f5f mIquft~<l~rWl"f<ilSf<n'!il:S:ll:Tr<rt ~q"1<l"1J "1Jit


a:!T9.>T1:{<:r<{T ~+!: ~+O('<<ri;t

Thus the cognitior

the Prlabhakaras goes
'one desirous of heave
(1 )


its object and with tll

whom this duty is int~

~1'?l~ <il<

sacrifice as its object, v

(particular person) fOl


for a person desirous (

"desirous of heaven.




who is the performer (

al~ l;~r
. Therefore, this (sacrif

Prabhakaras insis
visis,tatii). This has :
oth~~ view. (The ste!
ings of lIN above, are
in the P.L.M. pp. 15'
[G-3] This stiIl
kiirya has to be conne:
of heaven. The worc
nominative .case. Tht
svargakama~l kiiryal!!'
and the goal of. actiol

The. Prabhiikaras
connection is ..possible
. nominative case. Tc
form svargakiimalJ, to
ending with the geniti
in connecting svargak


{ the sacrifice, and is

T the sacrifice.
Withentence meaning (in
property of being an
f the essential factors
nal1tic compatibility,
:ompatibility is that,
Ie presence of apurva
:al1l1ot be connected.
~ion of the sentence
denote the property
; is then that it is
, according to them
rlesya 'that toward~
.em, is, the same as
nd lapurva are conThus: apurva ,=

m'l 9>1;.r +Il<lT"([U-

istraPraPa. p'. 59) _

is not the same as
tas, .sacrifice is the
hakaras, however
, T'lr'"'1~ (TantraRa.

lding, denotes krti

(IN d~notes kiir~a
~, the Prabhakaras
I-members. Thus
,mtraRa. p. 426);
ng more than one
, meaning, which.
so, since both are
>eing subordinate
;ivity is directed.
sacrifice and the .


SlI'>f'-m'1T ~'l"r9>1+r: ~+'I~'1i;1l'


[see IV. C.5] .

Thus the cognition of the sentence meaning. (siibdabodha) for

the Priabhakaras. goes through the following stages: ~'1it'liTm ~cr
'one desirous of heaven should sacrifice' ..
(1) ~T+rf.r:j'r">:p.f, <ll1TfojQ'1'-ii 9>1<ll1. I kiirya with sacrifice as
its object and with the person desirous of heaven as the one for
whom this duty is intended.
Wrr'11"'19i '1TlTf<im ~nf':!~l'c!;'r 9iliil1.1 goal of action with
sacrifice as its object, which is the means of heaven, and which has a
(particular person) for whom it is prescribed.
~'liT+rml"''1'liT ,<lIlT: ~9it'lil+T9i14; I The sacrifice prescri1:w<!
for a person desirous of heaven, should be performed by the person
desirous of heaven .

~'lil+T[ '1TlT'licrf
It is the person desirous of heaven
who is the performer of the sacrifice.
ait ~9ir9il+Tlscl'r +Ti'[.m"l~'!: I I am desirous of heaven.
be accomplished by my effort.
is to
. .
Prabhakaras insist on the element of self reference (mada1J1.savisi$,tatii). This has not. been given that much importance in any,
other view. (The. steps in the process of the cognition of the meanings of lIN above, are based of the summary of the Prabhakara view
in the P.L.M. pp. 159-160).
[G-3J This still leaves the problem as to how this meaning
kiirya has to be connected with its locus, namely, the person desirous .
of heaven. The word svargakiimalJ expressing this locus is in the
nominative case. Thus it cannot be connected with the word kiirya,
svargakiimail kiirYI{[1.n makes no sense. The peisoiidesirous of hea,Yen .
and the goal of action cannot'be c6ref~i~ntiat;:~itheach oth~l"; .
The Prabhakar<)s gelaut of. this difficultjby admitting that no "
connection is possible as ,long as the word svargakiim-dlJstays in the
nominative case. To help the cons'truction then, they change the
form svargakiima{z to svargakii.m!fJsya, thus replacing the nominative
ending with ti'1e genitive one. Once this is done, there is no difficulty
in connecting svargakiimasya with the meaning kiir)liam.






But how can this be done? The Prabhakaras here take recourse
to a device called the upadana pramaIJa, with the help o{which, lIN
itself provides this chi!ngeotcase ending in order to help the ton-.
struction of the sentence: (For a discussion of the upiidana pramii7pa,
see note 2 on [IV.C.6] and the sections following it).
[G-4] Another argument brought forth by the PrabhIikaras in
support of apiirva being the instigator, and not the property of being
the means to a desired result, is as follows. There are certain obligatory rites prescribed by the Veda. The performance of these rites
does not bring any specific fruit. However, the nonperformance of
them brings in demerit. Now, the Prabhakaras argue, these rites
cannot be said to be performed in order to gain any desired fruit,
since they do not produce any fruit. If the property of being. a means
to a desired result were the only instigator, there would be no inclination towards these rites. But we do see people perform them.
How is this inclination to perform these fruitless rites to be explained
then? However, they point out that if apiiTva is said to be the
meaning of lIN, there is no such difficulty. Every Vedic rite yields
apiirva. And it is with this lapurva in view, that people perform
these rites.. Even in the case of the optional rites,. which do yield
specific fruits, say the Piabhftlmras; the inclination to a~t is not really
with this fruit in view, though of course, secondarily, the fruit is also
. achieved. Generally everyone believes that in the case of optional
rites, gaining the object of desire is the main thing. According to the
Prabhakaras, however, the inclination there also is due to apiirva
the fruit being a sort of fringe benefit and entirely by the way. In
the case of the obligatory rites of course, there is no other fruit. Thus
the .inclination to act is only for the sake of apiirva. Therefore, it
is apiirva, towards which all activities are directed, that is the meaning of liN. .. ~ml,~,~~q'1l'!~9 9iT"il1.[IV .C.121 .
[HJ The view 6fKaill!\fabhatta[H--I] KilUl,lQabhatta mostly follows Mal)!<;lrinamisra arid his
view agrees with those of AnandauIrtha (Madhv3.oarya) and
Nrsirphararila. According to these scholars, there is only one meaning
of lIN, and that is the property of being the means to a desired result
(4tasiidhanatvla or hitasiidhanatva). No one performs an action
unless there is some beneficial result for him. Therefore, the cause
of performing such aJ;l action is the knowledge that this is arrieans


to something desired
agreed upon is the IT
is conducive to voliti
siidhanatva. Furthel
result is the cause for
to activity without i
property of being thE
the suffix lIN. One c
involved in this proc
the injunc
should sacrifice', is 11
(2). from this ~
to heaven, which is d~
, (3) the Inclina
The object of tll
the contentness of thi
to a desired result.
A slight variati(
. which, the goal of 3
(i~lasiidhanlfJ), it it:
[IV.B.7]. Of course,
and the desired mean

~l-er<rr1rnBf +!rr<nf;'r!?!~q~
[H-2J Now til

to know specifically
scribed act. In day
respected and autho
Nothing. specific is k:
the persOn concerned.
said this, knowing tl
without knowing wh~
ever, says Nrsirphasl
Veda, since theY de~
world, and need a 10
the fruit specifically.
to act. Thus in the (
is not the vague pr<



'as here take recourse

le help oiwhich, lIN
del' to heip theton-,
le upiidana pramii'ipa,
'ing it).
, the Prabh..lmras in
he property of being
lere are certain obli
:mance of these rites
~ nonperformance of
lS argue, these rites
n any desired fruit,
rty of being a means
:re would be no in;ople perform them.
rites to be explained
a is said to be the
:ry Vedic rite yields
:hat people perform
ltes, ~liich do yield
1 to act is not really
:ily, the fruit IS also
:he case of optiopal
;. According to the
) is due to apurva
:ly by the way. In
o other fruit. Thus
~rva. "'~fherefore, it
d, thai is the mean:"?,

~a.ilamisra and his

1adhvacarya) and
lS only one meaning
s to a desired result
lerforms an action
herefore, the cause
!at this is a means



to something desired. pravartana 'instigation', which it has been

agreed upon is the meaning of lIN, is a property (dharma), which
is conducive to volitional activity (pravrttyanukUZa). This is i~ta
sadhanatva. Further this property of being a means to a desired
result is the cause for adion in general. There can be no inclination
. to activity without i~tasiidhanatv.a being known. Hence; it is this
property of being the means to a desired end that is the meaning of
the suffix lIN. One cognises it, and that leads to activity. The stages
involved in this process are as follows :
'one desirous of'heaven
(1) the injunction ~9<Tif,Tm '1~cr
should sacrifice', is heard.
(2) '.from this sentence, one cognise~ that a sacrifice is a means
to heaven, which is desired by me. It is this cognition that produces.
. (3) the inclination to act.
The object of the cognition in (2) is sacrifice. The limitor of
the contentness of this knowledge is the property of being the means
to a desired result.
A slight variation is proposed by Anandaortha, according to
which, ,the goal' of action is nat only a means to the desired' end
(i~tasiid.hanla), it itself is a desired means (i~ta1Ji sadhana~ft)
[IV.B.7J. Of course, the desired end in that context is the liberation,
and the desired means to it, the desired Godhead (i~tadevata). 'liP\:
lJ1"I<rr~t'!B! 1if['11Rli!~'1crT (AnuVya. v. 46).
[B-2] , Now the question comes as to whether it is necessary
to know specifically the desired fruit to be achieved from the prescribed act. In day to day experience, we see that an older man,
respected and authoritative, may command one to do something.
Nothing specific is known as to what good this act is going to do to
the person concerned. But one thinks that this respected person has
said this, knowing that this must do something good. Thus, even
without knowing what that good is, one is still inclined to act. However, says NrsiIphasrama, in the case of the acts prescribed in the
Veda, since they deal with fruit that is to be gained in the other
world, and need a lot of effort and expense, it is necessary to know
the fruit specifically. Without such knowledge, there is no inclin!.tion
to act. Thus in the case of the sentence ~'liT.i'r '1~cr the instigator
is not the vague property of being a means to something desired,






but the specific property of being a means to heaven; this is to be

considered the instigator. (see [IV.B.24J). ,KaUJ}.9abhatta agrees
[IV.G.3]. But this position creates the following problem: this
will mean that in every instance of the injunction, lIN will have a
different meaning. Thus in 1:'!<1'll1,'-i <~Q lIN means the proPerty
of being a means to heaven. But in other instances of the use of
lIN, it would come to mean the property of being a means to getting
a son, or all wishes etc., as the case may be. One suffix will have
too many meanings, and as a result, significative association (sa1JZketagraka) would be impossible. No one will be able to knQw all
the different meanings of lIN.
It is in order to avoid this fault of aneklithakritva, that it has
been suggested that desire here should be taken as a consecutive
character (anugamikli or anugata dharma) of all these different
limitors of the property of being the denoted meaning of lIN. (For
a detailed discussion about sakyatlivacchedaka 'the limitor of the
property of being the denoted meaning', see note 1 on [IV.B.25]).
The use of this idea of a consecutive character can be illustrated
with the case of the pronoun (third person) tad. The same fault
of having too many meanings existR in this case also. In differ-ent ,
instances 6f the use of the pronoun 'tad, the !)roperty of being its
, may pervade .such widely different properties as
studentness, mountainness, mouseness, tigerness ",tc. If all these
pervaded properties are accepted as the denoted meanings 0. the
pronoun 'tad, it will only result in there being innumerable denoted
meanings for tad. This is not desirable. To avoid this fault then,
one must find a property which will be pervasive (vylipaka) enough
to pervade all the innumerable individual meanings which are all
vyapyaor pervaded properties. This property; being common to all
the possible individual meanings, is cailed the consecutive character.
In the case of tad, such consecutive character is vakt!buddhivi~ayatva
'the property of being the object of the speaker's intellect~ This property is common to all the different meanings of tad encountered in
different instances of its use. This results in -there being only one dehated meaning, and thus the fault of anekiirthakatva is avoided. In the
case of lIN also, it can be shown that there is a consecutive character
present in all the individual meanings of lIN. This common property is that they are all objects of -desire (~ta). Thus it is that,
the property of being a means to a desired end, common to all these

. .- ..- -


different meanings, is (
and the fault is avoid,
of the use of lIN, the
the object of desire. '
of the property of beiJ
since this cannot be ob
property that must be '
<'<<'110:. '>:FP':{1'l:. \ [IV.B.t
[B-3] The Pra
sadhaliatvla as a mean
- not be an instigator i
means to an unspecifi.
meaning of lIN . . It i
specified desired end
fault of having too r
answer provided for t
The case of lIN is not
case of tad, the use c
there is a l;mitor to 1
character. . This limi
cognition. If in the
there is a lit:nitor, at
arises. Those who b
of the limitor, be a
istasiidhanatva cann
.. This objection 1
out that both in th
the knowledge of tb
the area of denotati
'knowledge of the ,
saktigraha 'signific;
for that which is Ii
speaker's thought,
to that which is lim'
thing. In the case
the words such a,
sp~cify, the object
In a way, thi




this is to. be
:tUI;Ir;iabhatta agrees
ng problem: this
111, liN will have a
neans the property
mces Df the use of
a means to. getting
'ne suffix will have
: association (same able to. know ~ll

Ikdtva, that it has

as a consecutive
all these different
ning of liN. (For
the limitor of the
1 on [IV.B.25]).
can be illustrated
. The same fault
also. .- In- different
perty of being its
rent properties as
etc. If all these
meanings of the
lUmerable denoted
id this fault then,
(vyiiP7ika) enough
Jgs which are all
ing common to. all
,ecutive character.
!tellect' .This proad encountered in
}eing only one de: is avoided. In the
secutive character
'his common proThus it is that,
nmon to all these



different meanings, is considered to. be the denoted meaning of liN,

and the fault is avoided. However, in all ~he individual instances
of the use of liN, the cognition o.f meaning must be specific about
the object of desire. Since thus volitional activity needs cognition
of the property Df being a means to. a specific object of desire, and
since this cannot be obtained from anything o.ther than lIN, it is this
property that must be the meaning of lIN. Il:.ei '"f <.<!'lf~"l<T<'ll1;r;:<[05+<[<qi<1:. 1lJ'f'lB:,\ [IV.B.26]).
[H-3] The Prabhlikaras object to. this. They say that i$tasiidhanatvla as a meaning o.f lIN is hard to justify. It certainly can- not be an instigator if it is taken to. be just the property of being a
means to an unspecified desired end. Therefore, it cannot then be the
meaning of lIN. It is true that the property Df being a means to. a
specified desired end does instigate one to act. But this creates the
fault of having too many meanings as explained above. As to. :he
answer provided for this fault of anikiirthakatii, it cannot be accepted.
The case of lIN is not the same as the case of the pronoun tad. In the
case of tad, the use of the idea of a co.nsecutive character works, but
the,e is a limito.r to this property that is being used as a consecutive
. character. This limitor is bodhyabuddhi 'knowledge of. the object of
cognition. If in the same way, it is said that in the case of lIN also,
there is a Ihpitor, and this limitor is desire, then the foHowing fault
- arises. Those who have renounced all desires, will not, in the absence
of the limitor, be able to cognise the meaning of lIN. Therefore,
i~tasiidhanatva cannot be accepted as a meaning of lIN.
This objection has been answered by KauDr;iabhatta by pointing
out that both in the case of tad and in the case of lIN respectively,
the knowledge of the object o.f cognition and of desire does not enter
the area of denotation, i.e., one does not have to have bodhJl1abuddhi
'knowledge of the object of cognition' or ic.cha 'desire' to have the
saktigraha 'significative association'. tad has a denotative functio.n
for that which is limited by the pro.perty of being the object of the
speaker's thought, and lIN has a denotative function with respect
to that which is limited by the property of being the means to a desired
thing. In the case of tad, the context helps. In the case of lIN also,
the words mch as 'heaven' etc., that are uttered along with lIN,.
specify the object of desire. (see [IV.D.ll]).
In away, this represents a slight shift in the view of Kaul).4a-


--,--~ -~~,,--




bhatta. Previously (in [IV.B.24J), he had insisted that UN itself

denoted the property of being the means to a specified object of
desire. Now, however, it seems that, in order to get out of the difficulty raised by the Prabhakaras, he is suggesting that liN itself
denotes only the property of being a means to a desired result. The
desired result is not at this point specified. But it is specified by
means of the words such as 'heaven' etc., that accompany the use
of liN.
[IJ Refutation of the opponents of the i$tsiidhanatva view.
[I-I] kjtisiidhyatva cannot be a meaning of liN.
The 'Naiyayikas accept krtisiidhyatva 'feasibility' as one of the
instigators and thus as one of the meanings of lIN. The arguments
in favour of this have already been stated (see [E-2]). KaUJ.l~a
bhatta has leaned on Anandatirtha, his commentator ]ayatirtha; and
Nrsirphi'israma, for the refutation of this view.
krtisiidhyatva means anything which can be accomplished by
action. If this is accepted as an instigator, there will be inclination
for prohibited things such as killing a brI'ihmaI)a etc. For, the killing
of a brahmaI)a is also something which can be accomplished with
action, and is thus feasible. In order to avoid this fault, it is nece~
sary that krtisiidhyatv.a not- be accepted as the instivator. If only
, i!ftasiidhanatv;a is an instigator, then such fault would not arise, since
the killing Of a brahm'aI)a does not produce anything desired. On the
other hand, it produces demerit, which will surely lead to hell
krtisiidhydtvaviidi shows that this objection is irrelevant, since
it also applies to the view that the goal of action is the means to a
desired end, and also because it cannot really be called a fault at all,
since the inclination to do prohibited things is well known and thus
if the instigatot applied in the case of a prohibited action like adultery,
it is just what is to be expected. Since adultery also has the property
of being a means to a desired end, namely, sensual pleasure, inclination to commit aduLtery is there even if the property of being a means
to a desired result were the only instigator. This objection therefore,
cannot refute krtisiidhYlatva as being the. instigator, since both the
sides are equally at fault [IV.B.I6].
. Another objection against the krt'isiidhyatva view is that if that
is accepted as a meaning of liN, there will be difficulty in connecting
it with the negative particle in the. ordinary negation (prasajyaprati-

sedha, see note 2 on

to signify niVl(lrtanii
done)'. To do this,
the verb form. How
normally connected v
verb and the negative
as compared to the s'
ticle because of the ir:
is that the verb mean
of the suffix, i.e., b.hii, .
ber which is subordil
further connected wil
pound riij,a[Juru$G 'J
connected with the
ZFi!3;1i""ll'!j'f'l' 'bring
connected with the
brought. It is conne
man is brought. In
of a verbal suffix is tJ
is subordinate to th,
not normally conne(
the suffix. This is '
such as the paryud
Thus in the exampl,
the meaning of the \
root, I.e., b.hak$a1Ja '.
produced by action';
particle should be co
brings about the sec
duced by action'. . V:
this would mean "!iii
produced by action'.
The krf;isiidhya
same objection is tn
meaning of lIN. B
thing desired, nam,
Four different
difficulty. For a dis



ted that UN itself

specified object of
set out of the diffing that UN itself
esired result. The
it is specified by
ccompany the use

edha, see note 2 on [IV.B.17]) Negative sentences are considered

to signify nivartana 'turning away (from that which is not to be
done) '. To do this, the negative particle has to be connected with
the verb form. How is that done? The negative particle cannot be
normally connected with the meaning of the verb, even though the
verb and the negative particle are closer and without any intervention
as compared to the suffix which is farther off from the negative particle because of the intervening verb in between. The reason for this
is that the verb meaning is subordinately connected with the meaning
of the suffix, i.e., bhavana 'bringing about, causing (to be)'. A member which is subordinately connected with something cannot then be
further connected with some other thing. For example, in the compound rajapurU$a 'king's man', the word 'king' is subordinately
connected 'with the second member 'man'. Thus in the sentence
~l<i'rli'q'+!H'! 'bring the king's man', the verb 'bring' cannot he
connected with the subordinate member' 'king'. . The king is not
brought. It is connected with the main member 'man', and thus the
man is brought. In the same way, since in a verb form, the meaning
of a verbal suffix is the qualificand and the meaning of the verbal root
is .subordinate to the meaning of the suffix, the negative. particle is
not normally connected with the subordinate verbal root, but with
the suffix. This is the general rule. It does have some exceptions
such as the paryudasa, which however does not concern us here.
Thus in the example ;:{ '!i<'5:;>;;i -g:;>'"Ilcr 'one should not eat kalanja',
the meaning of the verb form is the meaning of the verbal
root, i.e., bhaka1Ja 'eating' + the meaning of UN (in this case 'being
produced by action'). This being the ordinary negation, the negative
particle should be connected with the meaning of the suffix llN, which
brings about the sequence na kriyajanJlia1J! or kfi;isadhya1J! 'not produced by action'. When it is connected with the rest of the sentence,
this would mean '!i<'l~[l::ra:loi ;:{ %:;n""'1l1: 'the eating of kalafija is not
produced by action'. This makes no sense.
The krtisiidhyatvaviidi answers this objection by saying that the
same objection is true even if 4tasiidhanatva alone is accepted as the
meaning of llN. Because eating of the kalafij,a does produce something desired, namely satisfaction of hunger (trpti) etc. [IV.I.I].
Four different explanations have been offered to get out of. thin
difficulty. For a discussion of these, see sections [IV.I.4] to [IV.I.8].

:atva view.
f lIN.
lity' as one of the .
'. The arguments
E--2] ) . Kaundaor Jayatirtha; 'a'nd

accomplished by
viII be inclination
. For, the killing
ccomplished with
fault; it is neces-
3tivator.. If only'
ld not arise, since
: desired. Ori the
ely lead to hell
, irrelevant, since
3 the means to a
led a "fimlt at all ,
known and thus
ion like adultery,
has the property
pleasure, inclinaof being a means
jection therefore,
, since both the
w is that if that
ty in connecting










.. ----- .... -----------------.- ..


Thus finally it is established that the fault of not being able to

connect the negative particle with liN in the ordinary negation does
not exist in the 4tasiidhanatva view.
Nrsirp.hasrama argues hat since krtisiidhyatva can be gotten
from another source, namely, from the relation of the verbal root'
and its suffix, it cannot be the meaning of lIN. This is based on the
wellknown maxim anany.alabhya~sabdartha~. Only that meaning
which cannot be obtained by any other means (i.e., from another
element in the sentence), is accepted as the meaning of the word in
question.. (Vedantatattvaviveka, p. 67). Even if, just the meaning
feasibility is available from liN, that cannot be the instigator by
itself. It needs to be qualified by the element of selfrefepence
(mada~av'iS4.{atva). This cannot be got from the Veda. Further,
the meaning feasibility is not even an instigator. The noninclination
to acts which are not feasible, can be explained by the aversion
created by the fact that the efforts wasted on it produce nothing
[IV.B.22]. Therefore kitisadhyatva cannot be a meaning of lIN.
[I-2] balavadan4tananuhandhitva is not a meaning of lIN.
The arguments in favor of accepting balavadanistan,anubandhitva
'the property of not entailing a greatiy undesired ~~sult', have been '
-discussed 'already in [E--4]. KaUlJ9abha~ta'does not accept this property as an instigator, and therefore, it cannot be a meaning of lIN
according to him either. 'He points out that'there is no way to
determine how much suffering will be, a deterrent factor in the case of
different activities and in the case of different individuals faced with
the choice to undertake the same activity. There will be no inclina
tion to act when the action involv~d needs a great deal of effort. And
sometimes, depending on the person concerned, even a little trouble
will be enough to obstruct the inclination to act. Therefore, rather
than attributing the absence of inclination to act to the absence of an
instigator, (i.e., balavadani$tananubandlzitva), it would be better
to say that, the noninclination to act is caused by the aversion (dve$a)
that the person concerned has for that particular undesirable tlling.
That the personal element is very much operative can be seen by the
fact that a sacrifice such as Jyoti~toma, which involves a great deal
of effort arid expenditure, does not appeal to some people. In these
people, therefore, there is no inclination to perform such a sacrifice.
The trouble involved is for them, an effective deterrent (pratibandhaka). However, somebody else might be very much iriclined to



perform such a Eacrifi

is explained very well
is considered to be the
Here it should bE
aversion (dve~a) as ar
ing balavadani$trmm~
greatly undesired,resu:
hand, (f:ee [IV.B.28]
p:orty of entailing a gr
activity. However, h
as an instigator. Th
consider the absence
result, i.e., balavadim
activity, it is easier at
a strong undesired re
there is no inclinatio
Ka~9abhatta 1
property of being tr
.:onsidered to be th~
aversion, even with f1
something undesired;
known. But when 1
Therefore, it is aver
Once this is accepte
is not necessary.
As I mentioned
, does not accept the p
:as one of the instiga
ledge of the propert
there is strong aver
tively, a strong aver.
a deterrent to activi
For the discuss:
which all activities: ,
thus the meaning 0
According to him,
means to heaven the




of not being able to

iinary negation does

perform such a sacrifice, in spite of all the trouble involved. This

is explained very well if personal aversion about a particular action
is considered to be the deterrent for the individual concerned.
Here it should be pointed out that KaUl)ic;iabhatta has accepted
aversion (.dve$a) as an independent deterrent in order to avoid accepting balavadani~tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a
greatly undesired.result' as an instigator. NrsirphMrama ort the other
hand, (~ee [IV.B.2S]), with the same objective, considers the property of entailing a greatly undesired result itself as a deterrent to all
activity. However, he does not accept the absence of this property
as an instigator. This avoids prolixity. For, instead of having to
consider the absence 6f the property of entailing a greatly undesired
result, i.e.. balavadlrln4tiinanubandhitva in every case of volitional
activity, it is easier and less prolix to assume the propertY of causing
a strong undesired result (balaoodan4tas,(idha1'llatva) in cases where
there is no inclination to act.
Karn:rc;iabhatta however rejects NrsirphMrania's view that the
property of being the cause of greatly undesired result should be
considered to be the deterrent. As long as there is no personal
.aversion, even with full knowledge that this activity is going to cause
something undesired; inclination to such acts as' adultery is well
Imown. But when there is aversion there is no inclination to act.
Therefore, it is aversion that should be .accepted as the deterrent.
Once this is accepted, balavadanitananubandhitva as an instgator
is not necessary.
A~ I mentioned earlier, even among the NaiYlayikas. Visvanatha
does not accept the property of not entailinng a strong undesired result
as one of the instigators. He also has proposed to accept the knowledge of the property of being a means to something towards which
there is 3trong ayersion (balavaddv4tasadha1'llatiijnana) or alternatively, a strong aversion itself (balavad dve~a~ - Mukta. p. 50S), as
a deterrent to activity instead (see [E--5]).
[1-3] krttyuddesya apiirva is not a meaning of lIIir.
For the discussionof the Prabhakara view that apiirva, towards
which all activities are directed (krttyuddesya) is the instigator, and
thus the meaning of lIIir, see JIG]. Kau~J.(;labhatta rejects this view;
According to him, it is the'-cognition of the property of being the
meaI)S to heaven that is the instigator. And that can be justified even

1tva can be gotten

of the verbal root

fhis is based on the
Only that meaning
( I.e., "rom another
ning of the word in
if, just the meaning
, the .instigator by
'nt of self-reference
the Veda. Further,
The noninclination
d by the aversion
it produce nothing
a meaning of UIir.
a meaning of IIIir.


[ result', haye been

Jot accept this pro~
~ a meaning of UN
here is no way to
'actor in the case of
ividuals faced with
will be noinclina:leal of effo'Ft. And
ven a little"trouble
Therefore, rather
, the absence of an
; would be better
e aversion (dvesa)
undesirable thi~g.
:an be seen by the
'olves a great deal
people. In these
n such a sacrifice.
[;errent (pratibanr
much inclined to





without apurva. What of the objections mentioned in [G-1] then?

KaUl,lqabhatta challenges the basic position of the Pr~bhlikaras
that it is not possible to denote the property of being a means without the interconnecting link apurva being present. He does not deny
that the sacrifice is impermanent, and thus it is not possible to denote
it as a direct means to heaven. But, according to him, this does not
preclude the possibility of its being cognised as a means in a general
way. In this kind of general cognition, it is not nece~"llry that the
linking factor be present.
Then KaUI):c;labhatta uses the same device of the upad-iina pra,ma1}a that the Prabhakaras had used to help their own theory (see
[G--3] ). As the Prabhakaras have said [G-1] , the linking factor
is necessary in order to have semantic compatibility (yogyaw)., It is thus the limitor of compatibility (yogyatavacchedaka).
Kaul)<;labhatta suggests that the same device of aupiidanika pramii1}a
that the Prabhakaras have used to change the case ending from
nominative to genitive, can be used to say that apurva, the connecting
link, i.s also here available on the strength .of lIN's denoting the
property of being a means to a desired end. apurva is thus available
in this way, and therefore, it is not necessary to consider it as ,a
denot,ed meaning.
The basic position of the Prll.bhakaras is that a/furva is the
cause directly preceding the desired result. The sacrifice, however,
does not directly precede heaven. And the agent cognises only the
immediately preceding cause, as the thing to be done [IV.C.4J.
Therefore, since apurva is the immediately preceding cam,e, it is
cognised as the thing to be done, and being thus karya, as the meaning of lIN.
This position is met in the following way. It is less prolix to
say that the cognition of the property of being the means to a desired
result is the instigator, rather than (0 accept what the Prabhakaras
say, namely, that the instigator is the cognition of being the means
immediately preceding to the desired result. There is no evidence
that the part 'immediately preceding' is in any way necessary for
instigation. Further, this immediately preceding cause can either be
(1) the main means, or ,(2) the subordinate means. In (1) also,
there can be two alternatives: (a) the cognition is in the form that
this is the main means, and (b) that this is apurva (svarupata~l
'of itself'). All of these alternatives have been shown to be unaccept-


able in [IV.D.7J.
The Prabhakan
that the knowledge'
gator. And, accordil
(see [G-2J). Sino
that the knowledge'
be the instigator, ar
'produced by effort'.
KaUl)Qabhatta, is al
Thus for example, 1
action of eating (bh
it is this action of e;
thus karya. In the
root in 'question is
to be done' is the sa
Prabhakaras have
The refutation
as a meaning of IIi
of having too man)
Other arguments ~
detail in my notes'
here. Thus a/fUrva
is made clear for tl
[J] Some problen
[J-1J If it~a
desired result' is a(
culty in explaining
obligatory rites, sil
used by the Pr;abh .
that lapurva is the
produce apurva (s<
view of course do I
it is with that end
according to these
. apurva is accepted
the desired result.
something fruitless

..-.. ----~ _. _.- . ~.............I



"d in [G--;lJ then?

the Prabhakaras
~ing a means withHe does not deny
: possible to denote
him, this does not
neans in a general
necessary that the
the upiidiina pm. own theory (see
;he linking factor
Ipatibility (yo g_
yatavocchedaka) _
iidanika prama1Ja
:ase ending from
'a, the connecting
'iT's denoting the
is thus available
consider it as a
t apurv,a is the
ognises only the
done [IV.CAL
ng came, it is
;0, as the mean-

is less prolix to
ans to a desired
fIe Prabhakaras
eing the means
is no evidence
, necessary for
e can either be
In (1) also,
I the form that
a (svarupatah
o be unaccej)t~





able in [IV.D.7].
The Pr;abhakaras have said. that in common experience, we see
that the knowledge 'this is to be done' ~<i: "'l~ll:. acts as an instigator. And, according to them, apiirva is kiirYla 'the thing to be done'
(see [G--2J). Since apurva is kiirya, and since experience shows
that the knowledge 'this is to be done' leads to activity, apurva must
be the instigator, and thus the meaning of lIIV.
KaUl).~abha1;ta refutes this by pointing out that karya means
'produced by effort'. The property of being prodw;ed by effort, says
KaUl).~abhat1;a, is always located in the meaning of the verbal root_
Thus for example, bhok~ 'to eat' is a verbal root. It expresses the
action of eating (bJv.ak:W1Ja), which is produced by effort. Therefore,
it is this action of eating (bhai?$d!./Ja) that is the result of effort, and
thus karyo. In the case of the sentence ~lr'lill1[ 'filer the verbal
root in 'question is ya; 'to sacrifice', and therefore, the karya 'thing
to be done' is the sacrifice as explained above, and not ajYarva, as the
Prabhlikaras have claimed [IV.D.8].
The refutation of the Prlibhakara objection that i$tasiidhanatva
as a meaning of lIIV is hard to justify, since there .will be the fault
, of having too many meanings, has already been discussed in. [H-3J.
Other arguments against the Prabhakaras have been explained in
detail in my notes on section [IV.D.1-12], and need not be repeated
here,. Thus apiirva as the meaning of lIIV is also refuted and the path
is made clear for the i$tasadhanatva view.
[JJ Some problems in accepting the i~tasiidhanatva view.
[J-l] If it$asadJv.anatva 'the property of being a means to a
desired result' is accepted as the only meaning of lIIV, there is difficulty in explaining the inclination towards performing the fruitless
obligatory rites, since, no desired fruit is involved. This has been
used by the Pr;abhakaras as an argument in support of their view
that lapurva is the meaning of lIIV, because after all, these rites do
produce apurva (see [G-4]). The opponents of the i~tasadhana'tva
view of course do not admit that .apiirva results from these rites, and
it is with that end in view that these acts are performed. These acts,
according to these people, are completely and utterly fruitless. If
apiirva is accepted as resulting from them, even that will suffice as
the desired result. Even an ignorant man does not feel inclined to do
something fruitless. How then is the performance of these rites to be

- - - _ . ----_..



Kaul,lc;labhatta, in support of his view, brings in several smfti
verses (BhagGi. 18.5,6 etc.) , which do attribute some sort of fruit to
these rites. Thus these rites cause purity according to the Gila verses
mentioned above. They are the basis of briihmatJa-ness etc., according
to several floating s;lnrti verses [IV.E.5]. This justifies the inclination towards the performance of these rites. Otl(erwise, i.e., if the
obligatory rites are considered to be fruitless, Veda would end up
being unauthoritative [lV.E.9].
Strangely enough, in all this discussion, KaUl):c;labhatta argues
in a way that makes it look as if he considers these various smrti
verses on par with Vedic injunctions. The whole argument that the
Veda would not be worthy of belief (.asraddheya) , if we do not accept
that these verses state the fruit for the obligatory rites, is astounding.
I t utterly loses its force when we consider that in fact, these are not
Vedic sentences. Orthodox pundits such as Vasudevasastn Abhyan.kar have spoken out against this tendency of considering smrti
statements as arthaviidas etc. to a Vedic prescriptive sentence (see
PrabM on i\.padevi, p. 200).
. '
. [J.,2] The second problem to be raised is. also indicative of this
same tendency on the part of the later writers to put smrti verses on
par with Vedic injunctions. Thus it is said that the Vedic injunction
"3l1;fltitl=it;t Qa!m.,1:ta- prescribes the sacrificing of an animal for the
-deities Agni and Soma. Since there is an injunction for this act of
sacrifice, it must be a means to something desired. However, there
is a prohibition;r ~<:lfr'( 'one should not kill'. This is in direct
,contradiction to the injunction mentioned above, and creates the
problem of reconniling the two. Now, this prohibition';r ~<:lfr'(
occurs in the Mahabha. santi parva, 269.5. It is not found anywhere
directly in the Vedic literature itself. Thus it is surprising that a
smrti verse should be brought forward as contradictory to the Vedic
sentences and treated as if it were itself a Vedic sentence. This shows
the later bias against the killing of animals in a sacrifice, and can
'always be justified by the device of taking recourse to some lost sruti
as a base for the smrti statement's authority. This is not at all unusual, and as a matter of fact, is quite typical of the later writers of
all the schools.




At least three
meet this objection
(a) the verb
meaning for this ,
brought in the sta
not mean 'to kill'
(b) The pre
prescribed. Any I.
Various smyti and
this positi.on.
(c) It is hi1?1
the sacrifice, the d,
.involved, is slight,
Since in the (1
blem, and I have !
valved in my not<
account of all the;
[J-3] Anoth
islaslidhanatva vie'
kite! P. II.3.1. 1
expressed [elsewhe
fore, the rule <P~
strumental case is
[when these mean
in the sentence] .
'the persc
Jyoti 9\oma' (i.e., I
the Jyoti~oma is .
mental case is uSt'
objected that, if i
something desired'
jyot4tomena will :
karm]a 'the main
therefore, instrum
meaning. The we
have to take on th
used where the mE


-- ---- ---





:s in several smfti
me sort of fruit to
: to the 'GIta verses
Jess etc., according .
.stifies the inclinaerwise, i.e., if the
da would end up



l'l.lQabhatta argues
lese various smr ti
lrgurnent that the
f we do not accept
tes, is astounding.
'act, these are not
;vasastn Abhyanconsidering smrti
;ive sentence (see
) indicative of this
lt smrti verses on
! Vedic injunction
m animal for the
on for this act of
However, there
This '.1s in direct
and 'creates the
ilibition ;r ~~1FI:.
t found anywhere
surprising that a
tory to the Vedic
mee. This shows
;acrifice, and can
to some lost sruti
is not at all un.. Ie later writers of





At least three different kinds of answers have been offered to

meet this objection :
(a) .the verb a + /ab.h does not here mean 'to kill'. The Vedic
meaning for this verb is 'to touch' instead. In support of this is
brought in the statement
where it undoubtedly does
not mean 'to kill' in context.
(b) The prohibition applies only to that hir}lSa which is not
prescribed. Any prescribed hirJzsa does not count as hirrzsa at all.
Various smrti and pura'IJa verses have been brought in to support
this position.
(c) I t is hil!ISii. But compared to. the great fruit resulting from
the sacrifice, the demerit and the resultant suffering from the hirrzsa
involved, is slight, and therefore, is borne in order to gain the greater
Since in the text, a whole section [IV.l] is devoted to this problem, and I have given exhaustive explanation of the arguments involved in my notes, I shall not repeat myself by giving a detailed
account of all these arguments here.
[J-3] Another ~ and rather technical - objection against the
islasadhanatva view, is as follows. Consider the Paninian rule anabhi
kite! P. li.3:i~ This rule, (~vhen lth~ meaning concerned] IS not
expressed [elsewhere]), is understood in all the karaka rules. Therefore, the rule -9i~'f,~lJP-i1~Q:cTtql I P. II.3.1S, would mean that the instrumental case is used to express the agent and the main means
[when these meanings are not already expressed by another element
Gl:ilfcHDi'i<r ,'liT;;;11'l--'r
in the sentence]. The sentence in question is :
'the person desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the
Jyoti~toma' (i.e., he should perfonn the lyoti$toma sacrifice). Here'
the 1yoti$1:oma is the kara'IJa 'main means', and therefore, the instrumental case is used in accordance with P. II.3.IS. Now, it can be
objected that, if Uitasiidhanatvla 'the property of being a means to
something desired' is accepted as the meaning of UN, then this usage
jyotUitomena will have to be considered as unjustified. The meaning
karmJa 'the main means' is already expressed by the. suffix lIN, and
therefore, instrumental case ending cannot by used to express that
meaning. The word jyot4toma, thus deprived of its case ending, will
have to take on the nominative case ending. For, nominative case is
used where the meaning concerned is already expressed by something



else, and only the meaning of the nominal base in question is to be

denoted. There would thus result the .undesirable sentence *jyoti$.{oma1.z svarglakiimo yajetal
Three different schools have offered four different explanations .
to get out of this difficulty. These are as follow:
(a) Kaury9abhatta, as a Grammarian, explains this away by
saying that even if lIN does express the property of being a means,
it does not express its locus, and thus the use of the instrumental
case in the form jyoti$(olme11la can be justified by saying that it expressed the locus. In support is brought in kiirikii 24 of the V.B.
(b) . Madhav,acarya, the author of the ]aiNyaMa. explains the
use of the instrumental, by saying that, the means expressed by lIN
is the yiiga 'sacrifice', the meaning of the verbal root yaj. jyoti$!oma
is a separate nominal base, denoting a specific' sacrifice, -and is thus
not denoted by lIN. KaU1).9abhai;ta rejects this explanation, (see'
[IV.F.3] ), because after all, the relation of nondifference exists
between jyot4toma and the yiiga denoted by the verbal root.
(c) This view belongs to the Naiyayikas, according to whom,
the verbal affix denotes agentness etc., rather than the meaning agent
accepted by the Grammarians (see [A-6]). Thus anabhihitel
. P. 11.3.1 would mean 'when agentness-. etc. are- not expressed'.
P. II.3.18 then introduces the instrumental case to express agentness
and the property of being the main means (kara1Jatva): Even if
. liN does denote the property of being a means (siidhanatva) , it does
not denote the property of being the main means (kara~zatva), and
thus the use of the instrumental case to express this meaning is
(d) The fourth view definitely does not belong to the Grammarians. It seems to belong to some authors in the Nyaya school,
since the basis of it, i.e., that P. II.3,1 is interpreted to mean 'when
number is not expressed', is found in some Nyaya texts (see
MaryiDa. p. 120;. TattvaCin. vol. IV., part 2, pp. 843-4). In the
present case, the number is expressed. But it is syntactically
connected with the agent. The meaning 'agent' also can thus be
considered to have been expressed. The meaning kara1J1a however, .
is not expressed, and thus to express the main means, the use of the
instrumental ending is justified. This view has also been rejected by
KauryQabhatta (see [IV.F.6]).
Thus all the main arguments against the i$taslidhanatva view


are answered, oppos

refuted, and it is est;
ing of lIN.
IK] 9i.~9rfG:Hl;;n~ .
[K-l] In my
IIV.G.4] to the prob
the acceptance of Val
sentences in the intI
In the beginninl
(S1) 9i.~T91f<t

object with a shell-Ii

(S,) . eri'r ~TI~a
. (S 3) *o:eri'r ~1f.

All of these sen

That which is abser
absence. For examp
absence in that sent
posse~ed of the pro
speaks of the .absenc"
what is spoken of as
(avacchedaka). .In
question is one whie
(i.e., counterpositivi
limitor of counterpo
the property comme
(gha(atva) .
In tS,\ one s
relatum: it is absl
absence. Here agai
Further, again, then
vacchedaka 'limitor
vacc.hedaka, see not!
Now, as conce
speaking about a pc
[K.-,2] Consirl<
particular kind of p


;e in question is to be
irable sentence *jyotdifferent explanations


~plaius this away by

rty of being a means
~ of the instrumental
by saying that it exiirikii 24 of the V.B.
, NyaMa. explains the
aus expressed by lIN
root yaj. jyoti~tom;a
sacrifice, and is thus
tis explanation, (see
nondifference exists
~ verbal root.
according to whom ,
n the meaning agent
Thus anabhihitel
ire 'not expressed'.
to express agentness
l~a1Jatva). Even it"
;adhanatva) , it does
IS (kara~zatva), and
~s this meaning is

elong';'to the GramI the Nyaya school,

eted to mean 'when
Nyaya texts (see
)p. 843-4). In the
it is syntactically
, also can thus be
,g karaf/la however,
!ans, the use of the
so been rejected by

:faslidhanatva view



are answered, opposing views belonging to the other schools are

refuted, and it is established that 4f,asiidhanatva alone is the meaning of liN.
IK] 91+~'nfG:H1mR<l I <:'l'T911111 ;:;l{nm!IB<r <[~cr
[K-l] In my notes on Ramakr~a Bhattaaarya's solution
[IV.G.4J to the problem of discrepancy [IV.G.l] and, to avoid that,
the acceptance of vaijiitya, [IV.G.3] I promised to discuss these two
sentences in the introduction (see [IVJG.4]).
In the beginning, let us take the following three sentences :
(S1) '!i~>n'1l1~l11mR<l (~~)
'there is on the ground, no
object with a shell-like neck etc.'.
(S,) '9~1 ;:rTI~cr ~~ 'there is no pot on the ground'.
(S3) <r103'9i\ <rlftcr ~cr~ 'there is no blue pot on the ground'.
All of these sentences denote absence (abhava) of something.
That which is absent is termed pratiyogin 'counterpositive' of an
absence. For example, the pot of (S,) is a counterpositive of the
absence in that sentence. The pot is thereby also spoken of as
posses.sed of the property pratiyo gita 'counterpositiveness'.
speaks of the absence of a thing -'a pot. In such cas,es, ,one delimits
what is spoken of as absent, by means of a property which is it limitor
(avacchedaka) . In ,the pres~nt instance of (S,) the limitor in ,
.question is one which delimits the pr~perty of being what is absent
(i.e., counterpositiveness). This is a pnatiyogitiivacchedaka 'the
limitor of counterpositiveness'. Here, the pratiyogitavacchedaka is
the property common to all pots and only pots, namely, potness
(gkatatva) .
In tS" one speaks of a pot not merely as such, but also as a'
relatum: 'it is absent somewhere. It is thus related (anvita) to
absence. Here again, one has a property relatedness (anvayita).
Further, again, there is a limiting property. This is the anvayitiivacchedaka 'limitor of relatedness' (for a discussion of anvayitavacchedaka; see note 1 on [IV.C.S]).
Now, as concerns (S,)
the pratt yo gitiivacchedaiui and the
anvayitavacchedaka are the same: ghatatva 'potness'. For, one is
speaking about a pot pure and simple.
, [K-2] Consider now
(S3) In the latter, one is speaking of a
particular kind of pot - a blue one. Further, consider the follow-




ing. Given that there is a blue pot on the ground; one should not be
able to say of this situation: . (SJ (-.::r) erzr ;:rJmr 'there is no
pot here'. For this is false in the situation.
Now consider the following paraphrases of (S.)
and (Sa)
(S.) erz<'1T'Ifi;w;r!fR'rltfrraJ'IlT1'lJ'I'I'r.- ~<i>B:. [this is a paraphrase of
(S,)] The ground is qualified by an absence which has its counterpositiveness limited by potness.
;:fi<i>"iZi9J'Ifi;9;;r!fRr'-!rfirCiT'liT1iT'I'i'r. 'LQ(i)+!.

[this is a paraphrase of (Sa)]. The ground _is qualified by an absence which

has its counterpositiveness delimited by blue-pot-ness.
If, now, instead of (S,,) we say that . (S.) is a paraphrase of
also, we commit the fault noted above. To avoid this, we
say that absence has as its counterpositive that which belongs to the
class delimited by the avayiUivacchedlaka 'limitor of the class of related things'.' Thus it is said in our text: a:F'II'lClT'I"~C::9il'lfi;9;;r!ffu
>frfiraT'Il<'1c~,qRI : ( 3l1'lT'I~'1) [IV:G.4].
[K-3] Consider now (S,)
Here the anvayiUivacchedaka is
ka1Jlbugriviidi.11Jdttva 'the property of having a shell-like neck etc.'.
But this composite of properties (gurudharma. 'prolix property') ,
is not really necessary here. For, the only things which have all
these properties are indeed pots (ghata) . .For the sake of brevity
then, we may reject this prolix property in favor of glwt,atva 'potness'
in one way (gurudharmiinavachhEdakapak~e [IV.G.4]).

(SI) and (S,)

are distinguished in terms of their connotations, by means of different anvayitaVlacchedakas: (S) - km'(lbugrlvltdimattva, (S,) - ghatatva. However, (S,) and (S,) both
denote an absence which has as its counterpositive a pot. Hence,
the pnatiyogiUivacchedaka of both the sentenoes would be the same,
i.e., ghatatva 'potness'.
Therefore, the principle is accepted: whenever possible, the pratiyogiUivacchedaka should not be a prolix property (gurudharma).
- Alternatively, one can, on account of sentences such as (S,) and
(S.l) insist that, an absence always has as its counterpositive, what
is limited by the anvayitiivacchedaka. In short, in these cases, the
following is true : anvayitiivacchedaka =' prati yo gitiivacchedaka.


[K-4] Analysis
Assume that lIN


being the limitQr of

with heaven', and (b
In effect, the al
this property does TIC
are absent in the san:
'Further, through
is predicated of the 's
same locus as heavel
.Now, to get an
[IV.G.1] ), without ~
again (S,) The pc
conjunction (sa1J1yog
on the ground'. H
'subjunct of a relati<
Similarly, (a) :
particular relation. t1

positiveness delimitec
imitor of counterpc
distinct heaven : (s
reading ).
The meaning UI
property of being the
as h ea ven <;'1~+!FlT
the relation of the pr'
im ited by the state <
lhedaka of absolute:
Simply put, jYOtiStOII'
i n the same locus as
being absent when tl
In (S. ) etc.. th
'the proprty of be
Bhattadirya does TIC
daka. vaijiitya thus
lIN according him.



I, one should not be

'there is no

[K-4] Analysis of (S,) ~' "'ilRnni=l;:; ~Cl

Assume that lIN has a composite meaning consist;ng of :

and (S,)
; is a paraphrase of
!(;h has its counter-

[this is a paraan absence which

is.a paraphrase of
To avoid this, we
hich belongs to the
: of the class of re~Cl'9'O~G;9i19f''19mrRr~ayitavacchedaka

,hell-like neck etc.'.
'prolix property'),
ngs which have ali
the sake of brevity
'f ghatatva 'potness'

V.GAl) .
of their connota: (S,r' - kalJlbuS,) and (S.)
:ive a pot. Hence,
would be the same ,

pratirty (gurudharma).

r possible, the

s such as (S.) and

,unterpositive, what
in these cases, the



'the property of
being the limitor of counterpositiveness of an absence coreferentiaI
with heaven', and (b) 31+119:
In effect, the absence of (a) is conveyed for jy(Jti~t(Jmatva :
this property does not delimit a class of things (sa{;rifices), which
are absent in the same locus as an absence of svar gao
Further, through the intermediary of jyoti$tomatva, this absence
is predicated of the sacrifice, which is then said to be absent in the
same locus as heaven.
.Now, to get around vyabhicara 'discrepancy' (see note 2 on
[IV.G.1]), without admitting vaijiitya as denoted by lIN, consider
again (8.) The pot is related to the ground through the relation
conjunction (sa1!1yoga) , e.g., (S,) bhutale ghrtta~ 'there is a pot
on the ground'. Hence, for (S.) the ground is the anuyogin
'subjunct of a relation', of absence of a pot through conjunction.
Similarly, (a) and (b) denoted by UN are related through a
particular relation. this is (c) feI;;jl~frt!m'l1f'C{9i~UJ1<!lralm"J;J:Rr~mCl19:-
'O~G;9i"'''''9R'3;;{J;JRr1'lmCll'li'''l{ 'the property of having the counterpositiveness delimited by .the state of being the property of being the
imitor of counterpositiveness of absolute absence coreferential with a
distinct heaven : (see note 3 on [IV. G. 4] for a discussion of this.
readillg ).
The meaning understood from (S, ) is then: the absence of the
property of being the prgtiyogitavccchedaka of absence in the same locus
as heaven "'lir~+lFnN'f.~UJ1Bi"Cll'119>rI<1<llmal<j"'~'f.<"1'i\s+lI'l: , through
the relation of the property ofhavillg the counterpositiveness of absenee.
lim ited by the state of being the property of being the pratiyogitiivacchedaka of absolute absence in the same locus as a particular heaven.
Simply put, jyotistomaiva does not delimit a class of that which is absent
in the same locus asheaven; this through the relation of Jyoj~toma not
b eillg absent when there is a partioular heaven.
In (S, ) etc.. the anvayitlivacched~aka pas to be vijiitiyasvargatva
'the property of being a particular heaven'. However, RIil.makr~a
Bhattaoarya does not wish to accept vaijiitya as a pratiyogitiiva.cchedaka. vaijiitya thus does not form a- part of the denoted meaning of
lIN according him. If the alternative mentioned in [K--3l, i.e. that


. - ..

. .

- ,----



even a prolix property has to be taken as a limitor of counterpositiveness ~~\Of+T~'l" ~ra'l"ltmrl'l~(9qaj is .a~cepted, t.hen .~he. absence i?
question must have as a counterposItrve what IS dehlll1ted by thIS
anvlayiti'ivacchedaka, namely, vijiitiy,asvargatva. Therefore the alternative, according to Rarnakr~a Bhattacarya, is to be accepted only
when a negative particle (naii) is actually used. That is not the case
in the sentence ;;1flmmi'r., ~9lr'fll+!1 <!~q Thus there is no difficulty.
[L] The authors
[L-1] Bhattoji mk~ita, the author of the ki'iriki'is, and.his nephew
.. , the author of the Vaiyakaral)abhu$aJ;la, belonged to a
very illustrious family, wellknown for its scholarship in various
fields of sastric learning. Bhattoji Dik~ita's commentary on Pal)ini's
AstadhyaYl, with the rules arranged in different sedions according'
to' their use in various derivations, supplanted all previous works of
that nature, and is used in traditional schools in India to this day.
His other two works on grammar (the sabdakaustubha and his autommmentary on the Vaiyakaral)asiddhantakaumudii, called the
Praudhamanorama) are also very much respected. But it is with
his f~urth work on grammar that we are concerned with now. This
work is variously referred to by. the following two names: Vaiyaka;'amimato~majjana and Vaiyakaraa;tasicldhantakarika. It is the
latte; name that is more common. The ki'iriki'is of Bhattoji DIkliita .
summerise in a very condensed form, the views of the Grammarians
concerning the problems of philosophical and semanic doctrines. Not
all of these karikas are Bhattoji's own. Out of the total number of
seventy-six ki'irikiis, at least twelve can be traced directly to the
Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. As S. D. Joshi has shown, there are
other kiirikas that can also be traced to various different sources (see
Joshi 1960, p. X). The Vaiyakaral)asiddhantakiirika is thus a colJection of verses taken from various sources. Bhattoji put this collection together, adding some karikas of his own to it.
Katmdabhatta was the son of Bhattoji's brother RaIi.goji, who
himself ~~s a w'~ll known Vedanta writ~r. KallIJ.Qabhatta refers to
two of his works in this text: the Advaitasaroddhara (see [IV.G.18]),
and a Vrtti on the Brahmasiitra (see. [IV.J.17]). RaIi.gojibhatta
enjoyed the patronage of a kelasIi ruler of Ikkeri in the present Mysore
state. This king's name was VeIi.katappa, and he ruled from 1560
to 1630 A.D. KaUl)r;labhatta, in his Tarkapnidipa has ref~rred to
. another ke!aQl king, called Virabhadra. He ruled froin 1629 to 1645


Thus KaUljr;lab:
seventeenth century.
A.D. (see Code 1954).
[L--3] Kau9:r.lal
all of them dealing wi
shown his mastery
the views of other si'is
KallJ)Qabhatta, as we
taries on the Vaiyaka
bhiisail).a. The bigge
published twice: fil
then in the Bombay:
edition ralso includes
unfortunately are. ain
is no commentary a
abridged version has
they are. of liinited 1
and abstruse argumel
have been omitted it
of the Grammarians
to interprete this te~
As stated aboVE
condensed form. E
semantic concepts iJ
marians'. views agair
of the Naiy1lyikas, :
sakas etc.
[M] The Lakiarar1
[Moo'!] Thep
Lakarathanir]l}.aya .
version) . This sec
theories about the
verbai endings repn
. the arguments of tho
some Ve&.nta writl
views are defended:
cular section was t
of the lakaras so fal






Ir of counterpositive_
hen .the absence in
is delimited by this
Therefore the alterto be accepted only
That is not the case
ere is no diffkulty.

Thus Katll!~abhatta's date is fixed in the early part of the

seventeenth century. P. K. Gode puts him between 1610 and 1660
A.D. (see Gode 1954) ..
[L-3] KauJ).abhatta is known to have. written seven works,
all of them dealing with Nyaya and VyakaraJ).a. He also has clearly.
shown his mastery over and. Vedanta in his discussions of
the views of other sastras in his works. The Vaiyakariu).abhii~ajI).a of
Katll!~abhat1;a, as well as his VaiyakaraJ).abhu~aJ).asara are commentaries on the VaiyakaraJ).asiddhantaldirika of his uncle Bhattoji. The
VaiyakaraJ).abhii~a!l)asara is an abridged version of the VaiyakaraJ).ahhiis3iJ).a. The bigger work, i.e., the VaiyakaraJ).abhu~aI).a has been
published twice: first in the lBenares Sanslq't Series in 1900, and
then in the Bombay Sanskrt and PrakrtSeries in 1915. The second
edition 'alsO includes some 'notes on the text.. However, these notes
unfortunately are almost always silent Qnanydifficult pOint. . There
is no commentary available on the Bhu~al}.a either. "Though .. the
abridged version has been published with a immber of commentaries,
they are of limited use, since iri the abridged version, many major
and abstruse arguments from the rival schools of Nyaya'and M'imaqlsa
have been omitted in order to furnish just a straightforward account
of the Gramrriarians' point of view. All this makes it very diffictiIt
to interprete this text.
As stated above, the kiiriki'is of Bhattoji Dik~ita are ina very
condensed form. KaUl}.~abhatta discusses these philosophical and
semantic concepts in greater detail, and tries to defend the Grammarians' views against the attacks made by the old and new schools
of the Naiyayikas, BMtta and Prabhakara schools of the MilIlil:q1sakas etc;
[MJ The Lakararthanil1l).aya
[M--I] The present work is an explanatory translation of the
Lakarathanil1l).aya of the VaiyakaraJ).abhU~3iJ).a (the unabridged
version). This section is devoted to the detailed analysis of the
theories .about the meaning of the I-members, i.e., the ten sets of
verbai endings representing tenses and modalities (see [A--2]). All
the arguments of the rival schools of Nyaya and Mimaqlsa as well as
some Vedanta writers have been brought in, and the Grammarians'
views are defended against them. The reason for choosing tl;tis particular section was that, little work has been done on the meaning
of the lakliras so far, and I felt that a beginning had to be made; ,

"kas, and his nephew

i~aJ).a, belonged to a
)larship in various
nentary on !'anini's
; sections acco~ding
I previous works of
India to this day.
tubha and his autol1llUdii, called the
,d. But it is with
~d with now. This
'0 names:
Vaiyakarika. It is the
)f Bhattoji Diksita
f the Grammari~ns
,nic doctrines. Not
he total number of
ed directly to the
; shown, there are
'ferent Sources (see
.rika is thus a coltoji put this collecther RaIi.goji, who
Qabhatta refers to
~ (see [IV.G.18]),
) . RaIi.gojibh<itia
he present Mys~~e
~ ruled from 1560
a has referred to
'roin 1629 to 1645



. - --.---



.. - .. _"----.




I have divided the text of the LakaCarthanim.aya in seven major

sections. These divisions marked with Roman numerals are as
lUT and lll-T



IAN, lIN, !UN and lJ!N

the question as to whether the meanings of these
I-members are limited to those mentioned in' the
These sections are further divided into smaller text passages, marked
with Arabic numerals, to make the sequence of argumeiJtsclear. Thus
text passages are normally numbered,as for example; [Ul, [VII.2]
etc .. Thei fourth section dealing with the meaning of lET (i.e., of
lIN, since lET is introduced under the same meaning' conditions as
Ill'l) is very, large and practically takes up two thirds of the entire
text. Hence, this section has been subdivided into eleven subsections,
each dealing with a specific argument. These then are again further
divided into smaller text passages. The subsectwns here are'marked
with a letter of the alphabet. Thus the text passages of the fourth
section are marked as for example: [IV.A.I] to finally [IV.J.34].
Each indivisual numbered text-passage is followed by translation
and this translation is then folIowed by exhaustive explanatory notes
(indent~d and nUmbered for easy cross-reference) in which these
difficult arguments have been made clear and discussed in detail.
Therefore, a detailed account of these arguments is not necessary in
the introduction, "and to avoid repitition, it has not been attempted
KaUJ:lQabhatta's analysis of the meaning of the I-members takes
into account all the contemporary thought of its time as well as
the earlier work done on the subject in various schools. Thus a
study of it is very important for thorough understanding of the contribution of the Neogrammarians, as well as the semantic theories,
arguments and counterarguments put. forward by the schools of
Nyaya, Vyakara;I).a and Mim.ftqwii. It was with this goal in view
that I have attempted to explain the text and the various theories
and arguments involved.





Q<~ c::~
q<\l11;'t qD~




[The author1
by one as follows :
"lAT etc., are to b
pre~ent; [past1 no
going to happen tc
reque3t etc." //22/
1. dasalakiirii1}iin
, symbols: . lA
llY-N. For a c
2. pratyeka1!!:
I-memberS [ka
in the first cha
cular meaning
the marker T
3. vidhyiidaU:
UN (fol;s:if ~
'trana 'summa
so~ething wh
sam pr.asna 'ir
Se~ P. III.3.1
As KaUl)
to elaborate 1:


laya in seven major

numerals are as



meanings of these
mentioned in the
t passages, marked


pIe; [I.ll, [VII.2]
19 of lET (i.e., of
ning conditions as'
hirds of the entire
eleven s\1bsections,
I are again further
15 here are marked
ages of. the fourth
finally [IV.J.34].
v-ed by translation
explanatory notes
) in which these
scussedin detail.
3 not necessary in
,t been attempted
~ l-members talces
; time as well as
schools. Thus a
nding of the con;emantic theories,
T the schools of
this goal in view
! various theories


~<i 5l<lfi; <::OJ<?9il~lUfl1i~ ~fu

CIcll1T~ 'i{1~


':nf9;:<{~ <1f'i~<!fu


f9~l:{T~T 5ll>.l<l1~ CIT 'lim~ ~l:{l oo:Sl<l:<!: \\ 'I. 'I. 1\ ( ~ )


[The. author] describes the meaning of the ten [members one

by one as follows :
-'. .
"lAT etc., are to be understood respectively' in the following senses:
present; [past]. not witnessed [by the speaker) ; something that is'
going to happen tomorrow; future lin general] ; injunction etc., and
request etc." //2211 (1)
1. daSatakarii1}iim': Imembers llakiirii~] are the ten Pfu:tinian
symbols: IAT, lIT, lUT, lJ!.T, lET, . lOT, lAN, lIN, lUN and
IJ!.N. For a dIscussion of these, see the introduction [A]. - .
2. pratyeka:J!l: 'of each, one by one'. The general meaning of the
I-members [kartr, karman, and b.hiiva] has already been discussed
in the first chapter [Dhatvarthanil1).ayaj of V.B. Now the particular meanings of each of the ten I-members are to be explained
individually. In this kiirikii, meanings of the six I-members with
the marker T are given.
3. vidhyiidau: lET is introduced to express the same meanings as
UN (f<l;S:>T ~~ P. III.4.7). Other meanings of lIN are niman"tra1}a 'summons'; iimantra1}a 'permission, asking someone to do
something which is not obligatory; adhi$tla 'respectful command';
sa1}'lpr,asna 'inquiry' or 'deliberation'; and priirthana 'request'.
See P. III.3.161 and Introduction [D-IJ.
As Ka~9-abhatta will be giving more detailed and precise
explanations while commenting on this kiirikii, it is not necessary
to elaborate here.

-_. ,- - ..




[ I.2 ]

q"i 'I~ll"l;'jS ~ "E~ 'I<\ll"[;'j wf;gfq- <!."i1<J:, I 'I<\ll"H<<i' 'q ~l~~'if]q'I1ll"Tff

r.t:q:J1:lOll%CI<~ ~Cllirer.'{~;;r'!llw<ei '11 w{q;5[ffi:&:~ I CI"'I "q'qRr"
If(l:!l~'IM'W-\lTfT?.T'if:>-1,{lTf1''W!ll<rR.s~fu all"TG;l'{ m~>r1rn: I

lAT is [to be understood] to refer to the present, on the strength

of the rule vartamiine lett (P. III.2.123). Presentness is defined as
either (a) being characterised by an action which has begun but
not ended; or (b) the property of being a time other than past and
future. [The latter is the definition] commonly understood in normal
usage. This is present in the activity beginning with putting a pot
on the stove and ending in taking it down [when one uses forms like]
pacati 'he cooks' etc. It is with reference to that [activity] that
fAT is used.
1. vaitamiinatvaf!l: 'presentness~ is here defined as
'being characterised by an action which is
begun but not ended'.- What is really meant is
'being a time which is characterised by an
action that is begun but not ended.' The phrase given above
is omitted by KalJll:lQabhatta because it is well known that
vartamana is a Mia 'time'; . So commentators say: - !in:~'<lTi:rR-~!imf,j;'1)r:r"'MCI'!lTw<'fm(l:!'~: I 'f<1ll"F!<ql;" <fiTwnq,~;:c ~qf:J;~:r<lffi:&:''f1<J:, I
(sailka. p. 146; Kiisi,. p. 344). - priirabdha 'begun' has been
explained as follows: prarabdha is that which is the object of
effort conducive to the realization of the result x, while not
coexisting with the posterior absence of the activities conducive
to the same result x. Presentness is priirabdha as weI! as
aparisamiiPJ;a. This second property has been explained as being
that which resides in a time which does have for its locus
the prior absence of the destruction of the last activity conducive
to the result x. (Kasi. p. 344) .
Klityiiyana has discussed the meaning of vaitamiinatva in
five vlirttikas on P. III.2.123. For a discussion of these, see
the introduction [C] ..


<fiTw: fj;<IT '11'0'{) 'IT I ;:C1?T: I Cfl;'{ "IT<q~<'I1l1191<J:, I

?f)a<fi<ei 'q ~(I:!l"<lT,{'!li, ;:c :il-aq; "11m: ;a'f(l:!li1~ ~+liqm I
Now, is this time [present] cO-Signified or denoted [by ZArl?

[1.3 1


The first alternative is not [acceptable], because it [time] _is not


the meaning of
.that which brin
to the signifier]
root does not (
1. 'For a discu
of a verbal
2. dhiitvartha

were the ill

whenever tl
stiivaka 'or
does not C'
denoted by
verbal afib
3: ~aktilJ: 1by Bhartrl

refers to th
cepted by ~
4. For lAT to
verbal root
root does I
it is not pc
[I.4 ]

;:c 'q " 1

<fiarfr.t '11

Nor [can[of the meaning

time, prolixity,
lAT alone shOll
denotative fun(
statement tha,t
present, then e\
the other hand]
[in the two ca~
1. All Indian
dure is pr'



~ ml:&<iT'1~m(f

. I CI"I "'1'OfRr"
:r<!ln: I

- Il

on the strength
is defined as
has begun but
r than past and
stood in normal
1 putting a pot
uses fonns like]
.[activity] that


action which is
ml:&IiI['fR"HlT(f ,

lcterised by an
se given above
~ll known that
i' :


''If:'!l'f'l~~''ll<r. I
gun' has been
3 the object of
; x, while not
ities conducive
ia as well as
[ained' as being
for its locus
vity conducive

itamiinatva in
, of these, see
~''l1l'f1'll<r. I
l'f'lm I
xl [by tAT]? .
[time] is not


the meaning of a root. Co-signifier-ness [is the property ofl being

'that which brings out the power [of the denotative func,tion proper
to the signifier]. This is not present [in the case of IAT] if the
root does not denote [time].
1. 'For a discussion of the co-significative function and the meaning
of a verbal root, see introduction. [B-1].
2, dhiitvarthatvabhiiviit. But time is not a meaning of a verb. If it
were the meaning of a root rather than of IAT, it would appear
whenever the root is used. But this is not the case; in forms like
stiivaka 'one who praises', stuti 'praise',. etc., the meaning time
does not come to mind .. Since time is thus not the meaning
denoted by the root, it cannot be said to be co-signified by the
verbal affix lAT.
3, saktil}: The 'word sakti in its 'general mea:ning has been used
by Bhartrhari to denote the power or potentialities of the
sabdabrahman. (V.P., 1.2). In its more particular use, sakti
refers to the denotative function, i.e., power to denote a certain
.meaning. sakti is the only significative function (vrtti) accepted by all schools.
4. For IAT to co-signify ,the meaning time, it is necessary that the
verbalroot"should have the denotative function for it. Since the
root does not have sakti for the denotation of that meaning,
it is not possible for IAT to co-signify it.

[1.4 J ;or 'Of

;;:m; U:'l I 'iI<!T '<ll<J:.<!T CI"f ~'ffi,~ <TI1:'llCJ:. I u:<fl~<[

or1'Of'li<~lRrl1~ I l~ 'Of 'l<i+n~ 05f:sfu fqfut<[ fq'ill~sfit <>,~'3([~'q,~
'limfit 'l1"'~ ;or ~'ll<r. I 1;<[1'" ;;ir,<[1l;'! I 8lfq~lS[1<r. I


Nor [can it be said that] it [verbal root] is the denotator

[of the meaning time]. If many roots were considered to be denoting
time, prolixity would result. It is also [more] appropriate that only
TAT alone should denote [time]. Further, if LAT does. not have the
denotative function for that. [presentness] even after the specific
statement that IAT [should be introduced to denote the meaning]:
present, then even the agen,t will not be the denoted meaning. [On
the other hand] ; it will also be co-signified, as there is no difference
[in the two cases] .
1. All Indian slj~ras use the principle of brevity; a simple procedure is preferred to a prolix and complex one. lAT and its
replacements are less in number than the total number of roots,



all of which will have to be considered as having separate deno

tative fUn<;tions to denQte the single meaning 'time.' On the
other hand, if IAT is considered to be the denotator, only one
denotative fun<;tion will be enough to account for that meaning.
It is therefore more appropriate (ucita) that fAT should be the
denotator, and not the roots.
2. "li(ffiG" 'Il'"'lT ;r <:'-!Ti\ .,. S11<r~1S[1i\ The word laviSe~at'because of
nondifference (in the two cases)' refers to an argument which
has been explained in the Introduction [Br-4].
[ 1.5 ]

S1q Q;er 'CfTCI1oMp.T;r'~ ooa~IJTT (fT,q,hn~<g 00<:" qT,q~~"li(er~er 'Cf

?l"Tq'J;,erm(,-!{q- ffi<:crB:. I

That is why [the following view] is set aside [refuted] : Verbal

root has the indicative function for the meaning presentness, while
IAT is but the conveyer of the intention [of the speaker]. .This
[property of] being the cQnveyer of the intention [of the speaker]
itself is co-signifier-ness.
1. laksana: Indicative function, by which the indicated or secondary meaning is cognised.
2. Q[<q:1tm~'fi<g"0<: In this' sentence, we find a modified version
of the first view. According to the first view, presentness is the
denoted meaning of the verb root, and. IAT is the attributor of
capacity to denote a meaning (saktyiidhayaka). So in this view,
the root has two meanings: action and time. In the second view,
the root has only one denoted meaning: action. Time however
is its indicated meaning.
In the first view, co-signifier-ness is being the attrIbutor of
capacity to denote a meaning,. whereas in the second view, it
means being the conveyer of the intention of the speaker. Since,
in connection with the indicative function, the intention of the
speaker (tatParya) has been taken into account rather than the
syntactic relation (anv.aya) , this view seems to belong to the
[1. 6] . ;r ~1'-!: I OR::,-!W WPHl~;:r RU'!il~'-!1 (f~q<,-!l5I~: I
The second [alternative] is no;t [acceptable]. IAT is without

expectancy [for any add~tional meaning] due to [its posse..<sion]

of the general meaning of the I-members. Therefore it [IAT] cannot
be applied there [to denote time].


1. The alternative

co-signified but
2. The general ffiI
and in the case
peeled to have
tancy (iiklink~a
Since lAT is .
additional mea:
ing time. The
IAT must be I


(f~Tlq ~~'QT


,erT;:rl'i~f\fu '

If there is apl
general meaning by
milk and Kaundin'
agent will not be d
Both of these alter
and can also be pr
~. tnllmkaWJ:ufiny
Katl1)!~inya. '
(Bh~ya on P.
his Uddyota or
course has use(
exoeptions (a
nyaya exempl:
even after the
of anav,akasat
to operate on
applied in the
rules can appl
rule permittin
2. 9i;'!Mfl<fTtRr
whereas if fA1
3. ~sf1:rftcr,<n;
M.B. vo!' 2, r,
intepreted in t






1. The alternative in question here is that the meaning time is not

cosignified but denoted by lAT.
2. The general meaning of the Imembers is the agent, the object
and in the case of intransitive roots, action. Every word is expected to have some meaning. In the case of IAT, this expectancy (iikarlkii) is fulfilled by the general meanings given above.
Since IA T is thus without expectancy (niriikii1ika) for any
additional meaning, it will not apply itself to denote the meaning time. Therefore verbal root must be the denotator, and
IAT must be considered to be the co-signifier.

ng separate deno
~ 'time.' On the
nqtator, only one
for that meaning.
AT should be the
ieiit 'because of

argument which

Clnq<lm~'li<c!~c! 'C!

efuted] : Verbal
Iresentness, while
speaker]. This
[of the speaker]
dicated or secon
modified version
.resentness is the
.the attributor of
So in this view,
the second view,
. Time however
;he attiibutor of
&econd view, it
speaker. Since,
intention of the
rather than the
o belong. to the
fqB!l11~: I

IAT is without
[its possession]
.t [IAT] cannot




[I.7 1 CI~:nfq >!~~T ;or fel~is[lJT ml'!F'1~'1 <l'fi'!iifiJ:S;'1r<n'11<l; <r!'<l1<f, 'f.~9f;;'1

<c!Fnq~f'Rl 9;~'l+I. I qa:l~B!T'!i'tsf1:!~CI<'l1~f9:cIre;&:<ql"ll

If there is application in spite of this [the possession of the

general meaning by IAT] , then, since by the principle of the butter-

mille and Kai.Jl)!t;linya, the general is set aside by the particular, the
agent will not be denoted [by lAT]. It cannot be argued like this.
Both of these alternative views have been mentioned in the Bha~ya,
and can also be proven by reasoning.
1.. . tallr.akau1J4iny,anyiiyiit: 'By the principle of the buttermilk and
Kai.Jl)!t;linya. This maxim' first appears in the MahabliiCi~ya
(Bh:?ya on. P. 1.1.47, M.B. vol. 1, p. 115). Nagesa refers to it in
his Uddyota on the sivasutra hayavarat (vol. I, pp. 96-97) and of
course has used it in the Paribha~endusekhara while dealIng with
exoeptions (apavada). (P.S., p. 136). The takrakau1J4inyanyiiya exemplifies' the kind of exception which can take place
even after the general rule is applied. Thus the usual maxim
of anavlakiisatva (where the exception does not have any scope
to operate once the general rule has been applied) cannot be I
applied in these cases. Since both the general and particular
rules can apply t.his rule prevents the application of the general
rule permitting only the exception to take place.
2. 'lil!<IT,",,<C!1<r1<ffi: kart! 'agent' etc. is the general meaning .of IAT
. whereas if lAT is applied to denote time, that will be the specific
meamng ..
3. ~Sf~ff~:CI<'l1<f, iikara here means the Bha~ya. (on P. III.2.l23,
M.B. vol. 2, p. 123). The same passage in the Bha~ya has been
intepreted in two different ways to get support for both the views.

. . -....... _-,",


----- --

,_. - -

... _....," .- .






1. kriya = vyiipi

The reasoning involved has been explained in the text itself

later 011. Thus it is claimed that bdth the views do have the
sanction of the Bha~ya, and can also be proved by reasoning.
[1.8 ]

entity, but a c
activities (v yii.
words kriyii aJ
basically there
- v yiipiira refers
many such ac1
activities 1 + :
idea that actio
uses the word
(who does use
. It has to be in
Action as a w]
only the indivi
this. In a pro
sequence in til
ception also t2
next activity i
perished. HOl
we perceive ar
idea of superin
to a circle of fI

Clq,~ I '1cl+n<f'li'To5T "s,"-fft1l": I '1clm<f'f.T"~ \;\F'I~1'11<J:. CI~"1 .,l

f.t<fT "I"[lfcrl~: 'IT'fi1lT\;\T"1'll1r'l '11"'1lJ:, I

To explain [the above statement more meaningfully] : present

tense is cosignified by lAT. It should be said that the property of
being the attributor of capacity [is the co-s;gnifier-ness in IAT],
because present tense is the meaning of the verbal root, and because
it cannot be cognised without lAT.
1. According to the first view stated here, presentness is co-signified
by LAT. This is the same view already mentioned and refuted
with the objection that co-signifier-ne.."S is the property of being
_ the attributor of capacity, and that is not possible for lA T unless
the root has the significative function for the meaning time.
[see 1.3]. Now the same view is taken up again and in support,
the position is taken that presentness is the meaning of a verbal
root. Once that is accepted, since this meaning is not cognised
without lAT, IAT becomes the attributor of capacity, i-.e., it
becomes the cosignifier~
2.. The words dyotakatvamiti have to. be understood in this sen'TI'ft1l"TI;j"j"1'f.<r'f
tence. Thus the whole sentence becomes :

( SWilC1"1"~q

eye really pen

circle which d
entity, is perc
temporal orde
siders them a
different and
single purpose
a1l subordina-

( .mcr~~) 'lRlJ:, I

[ 1.9 ]

.;or "I" CI~1:f \;\Ti!'fG<f<% ~G)q: ~/Gftr '1Tm:. I o;qT'1T~<RlT;:rTR!R~

'li'T"~<f'l-~<flT+fl<J:. CI~ "I" \;\1iI9l'"'1<9~fq'1Tfu:<I''fI'El I CI.n~ I ~;or
o;qT'iR~~crT;:nf~: +fHl<=rl'll<J:. I 3lR!R'ffi~ "I" CI~'ffi''f~fq'll<;q;:f[t:{'efl 'TR:9Tq~lIl I

Nor can it be said that there will be the fault stated above
[in 1.4] , if it [time] is denoted by the verbal root. For time different
from a series of activLties [Le., action] is not accepted, and that
[series of activ~ties] .has been explained as the meaning of averbal .
root. Thus, time is not distinct from a series of activities, as there
is no proof ~to accept it as being separate from a series of activities].
If it is to be theorized as separate, then it will lead to the assumption
[that the verbal root has] a significative function for that [time]
also, and this results in prolixity.


:r1T[~~'f'f'l: ~

(V.P., III.8A
pravrttiinli 1[t

to the parts 1
Bhartrhari la
concept in th
the distinctio

l'ni"l'~R1CC CI~'l <'Ii

ingfully] : present
It the propert.y of
fier-ness in lA Tl ,
root, and because
:ness is co-signified
:ioned and refuted
property of being
ible for TAT unless
he meani~g time.
lin and in support,
eaning of a verbal
ng is not cognised
f capacity, i.e:, it
stood in t.his, sen~Ff\'1l"Ten'-f-!i~9


I CI'-<l~ I 'limr "f



mIt stated above

For time different
:repted, and that
aning of a verbal
lctivities, as there
Ties of activities] .
10 the assumption
l for that [t.ime]

An action (kriyii) is not a single

entity, but a complex one. It is really a process consisting of
activities (vyapariilJ)'. Though it is true that sometimes the
words kriya and vyiipiira are used as one and the same thing,
basically there is a distinction in the meaning of these two words.
"vyiipiJra refers to a single activity, whereas kriyii is formed by
many such activit.ies taking place one after another. Thus:
activities 1 + 2 !+ 3 + 4 + 5 and so on = action (kriyii). The
idea that action is a process is found even in Y.ska, though he
uses the word bhiiva. (Nirukta I.1). According to Patafijali
(who does use the word kriyii) , this action cannot be perceived.
It has to be inferred. (Bhli!9ya on P. 1.3.1, M.B. vol. 1, p. 254) .
Action as a whole cannot be perceived because we can perceive'
only the individual parts. Bhartrhari goes in more details about.
this. In a process, individual parts occur one after anot.her in a
sequence in time, and cannot thus be perceived together. Perception also t.akes place in the same sequence. By the time the
next activity is taking place, the previous activity has already
perished. How can we then talk about a single action when aU
,we pera,ive are parts that are not even co-existent? Here the
, idea of superimposition comes in. The nature of action is likened' ,
to a circle of flame formed by moving a burning wand in a circ!f.
(sro1Cl'C[~'ilt.q f>ti'-f!!JfT qR~'!~ V.P., II1.S.S). Eventhough the'
eye really perceives the burning wand at different points of the
circle which do not coexist, one thinks that the circle, a single
entity, is perceived. The conglomoration of parts t.hat have a
temporal order, is itself called an action when the intellect considers them as unified. These parts are cons;dered to be nOlldifferent and unified in a single whole, because they all have a
single purpose: the ultimate result of the act.ion to which they are
all subordinate. Thus Bharlrhari says :

1. kriya = vyiipiiras.antii1lia:

in the text itself

,iews do have the
>ved by reasoning.





~ITp~r<:9'!~: ulil[: 'fill"Fll"fT~ I ~'ll1 J;('f.~qcrT~<\:

ffii'-tRi, ;;,!Gl~~,!~ II

(V.P., IILS.4.) and Helamja adds t.he part ekaphaloddesena

prav'(ttiinii1'}'t 'begun with the same end in view', as a qualification
to the parts born in a temporal order. (vol. CXVI, p. 21-2).
Bhartrhari later on goes into further elaboration of the same
concept in the course of which it seems that according to him,
the distinction between an activity (vyiipiira) and an action




.. -


"---- ...


.---_.-.- - _ . - - - - -





(kriya) is subjective rather than objective, that of a degree rather

than that of the basic nature. Thus he points out that it is not
only an action such as cooking that can be analysed into constituent parts, for example, to put the pot on a stove, to pour
water in it etc. An activity forming a part of this action of
cooking, such as putting the pot on a stove, can also be shown
to have further parts like picking the pot up, carrying it to the
stove, etc. (V.P., IlLS.9). Thus when one is to be called an
action (kriya) and when one is to be called an activity (vyapara) very much depends on the subjective element, i.e., the
desire of the speaker. Thus if the speaker views the activity of
putting the pot on a stove as a part of the bigger process of cooking, it will be considered to be an activity, whereas if the same
putting the put on a stove is viewed as a whole consisting of
different parts, jt will be considered to be an action. Of course
here Kau:t:lgabhatta does not go into all these details. But it is
clear that he considers action to be a series of activities which
form constituent parts of it. Thus he has used the word vyaparasantana 'a series of activities' to denote action, which is the
meaning of the verbal root.
2. kiila= vyapamsantana see introduction [B:"()].
3. gauravat: see note 1 on [1-4].
[1.10 1


'<IT~ft'fC!'fiTi'O<?h 'fT'Ol.[,"!t " 8l],l'nrer " ~<l.fT<tl c!'i;[<9>T~~"!f<{l.,t

fii;'-fT"!T R\T<i1<!l'i;[Tl'fl~TZr<rl'1'1'<fr 'fi~ "q~qT~~Rr", "sn,mR<!" ~<l.fl~'

Olmfq:t["!m ~r'~~111'l.[l'f~~

B!l~ Q'i;[<'fiT~'f.U~t ~.
l'fr<::T"!lmR~ re~F'i;[+!T'l.[l'ffit q~T I qT'I'~;ci ~ "l19'1l~qq~: I

"'1'<1:. I

In addition, if time separate [from action]. is [considered to be]

the denotatum [of ,the root], then since in [the case of the examples]
'the Self exists' etc., the action of the Sun etc., is not set aside, and
a justification [of the usage in question ill possible] taking that
[action of the Sun etc., into consideration] ; the Bh~ya bringing up
the doubt as to how :the use of lAT etc. can be justified in [sentences
like] 'the mountains stand', 'the Self exists' etc., will be meaningless.
The BM~ya giving the final answer that Lthe use of lAT etc. in such
cases] can be justified by :taking into consideration the actions of
the kings belonging to differen,t times, will also be the same [meaningless]. There is no justification for running so far [afield],.

1. The passage in (
(M.B. vo!' 2, p.
2. sii.ryiidina1!t kriy
amples: 'the Sel
is the meaning c
or the standing
or an end, and (
sent or future.
which the divisi,
and it can be ta!
ment of the Su
If the meaning
(i.e. the meanin
need be no cont
the existence of
time with refen
longing to diffe
from the meani
diction between
and the eternal
Thus, sinc~
cases can be ex:
the SlID, the B
. and if the quest
by referring to
will be meanin!
find an explam
divisions of tim





nm fii;'11l'flG:

.. In our view, n
fied since the actio
does not have a bel
being that which i1
answer [of the Bhi
sideration the begi


of a degree rather
out that it is not
nalysed into cona stove, to pour
of this action of
an also be shown
:arrying it to the
.s to be called an
m activity (vyaelement, i.e., the
liS the activity of
r process of cookereas if the same
lole consisting of
ction. Of course
letails. But it is
: activities which
he word vyapiiraon, which is the

'," gnmr~" iti<!l<l:l
"l'~'-liU~t f.!;'{l.
~ 1ol1'l;:n~qq%: I

:onsidered to be]
of the examples]
at set aside, and
)lej taking that
i<)ya bringing up
ied in [sentences
. be meaningless.
lAT etc. in such
1 the actions of
;he same [meanr [afield].



1. The passage in question occurs in the Bhii:~ya on P. IIl.2.123.

(M.B. vol. 2, p. 123). See introduction [C--l].
2. siiryiidin(hp, kriyiiya niriibiidhat: In the case of the two ex-

amples : 'the Self exists', 'the mountains stand' the action that
is the meaning of ,the verbal root, i.e., the existence of the soul
or the standing of the mountains does not have any beginning
or an end, arid cannot thus be distinguished as being past, present or future. But the action belonging to the Sun etc., on
which the divisions in time are based, is going on all the time
and it can be tagged as past, present, or future, since each movement of the Sun does have a perceptible beginning and end.
If the meaning 'time' is considered to be different from action
(i.e. the meaning of the root) and thus separately denoted,there
need be no contradiction. The meaning of the verbal root, i.e.,
the existence of the Self etc., can be said to have divisions in
time with reference to this action [movemen~l of the Sun belonging to different times. Since time is something different
from the meaning of the verbal root, there would be no contradiction between i:ts divisions based on the action of the Sun,
and the eternal existence of the Self.
Thus, since the question regarding the use of lAT in: these
cases can be. explain~d away by taking reco.urse to the action of
the Sun, the Bha~ya raising this question will be meaningless,
. and if the question is raised, the Bhii~ya answering this question
by referring to the action of kings belonging to different times
will be meaningless, since there is no need to run so far afield to
find an explanation. It can easily be done by referri.'1g to the
divisions of time made by the moving of the Sun.


:;:rl<+!IolRlT[l~~G<f1rfR<?:r m<':GIol('lllll'lio:. ~HGlollqRBll1H-

~am"<'l<?:rllj+ll'llGJ~~lj~: I



nm fii;'{lmG;1'11<+!~<':lT[1~~'I1<':<?:rlN ~l!r(qRrmG;l'1 ~qqf~{'l I

In our view, moreover, the doubt [in the Bha~yal can be justified since the action conducive to the continued existence of the Self
does not have a beginning, and presentness, which is 'the property of
being that which is begun but not ended,' is not possible. The final
. answer [of the Bh~yal also has a good justification taking into consideration the beginning etc .. even of the activity conducive to the.



continued existence of the Self, when it is qualified by taking the

actions of the kings belonging to different times [into account] .
1. lasma.tpak'fe: 'our view' here means the alternative already
stated in [I-9J. According to it, time and action (i.e. the
meaning of the verbal root) are one and the same.
2. Since, according to this view, the meaning of the verbal root,
which in this case is the existence of the Self, is the same as time,
and that does not have a beginning due to the eternal character
ot" the Self; presentness which has been defined as being characterised by an action which has a beginning and an end is not
posSible. Thus the doubt in the Bha:;;ya about the use of lAT
in this case is justified.
3. The final answer of the Bha~ya is also well justified. Though
the existence of the Self does not have a beginning taken by
itself, it does have a beginning and an end, when it is qualified
by the actions of the kings belonging to different times. Thus
the Self is eternal, but its existence as limited by a particular
king's term of reign does have a beginning and an end. Thus
the definition of presentness [that which is begun but not
ended] would. apply, and the. use of .lAT will be justified.

u:<l~" fu~Fal1l~ 'li'R:! sf'[ c<[l~ I "~~ ~cll:rfet6<rrlIlFl.Trrt ~l:ut

<[T: f>i;,{llSTrRug::t~N'Il{ITf>t'
~C!l'1lm'D<r "CTOT ~m fu1Fcf{CT1~i:'t~;:r
fu;;n 'f<fC!Tfu:~.r\<!r~~~'l;ra- f,j;,{l~'ff 'li1<?W!<[r'IT~:i'r'f'f"a ~~p~: I"
CT'RI1ti~ni[i:'tG:+!T'Di(" liI6<[B:.1


Kaiyata has also explained the Bha;;ya giving the final answer
in the same way. Taking [~he Bhii:$ya passage] 'here the actions
belonging to the Icings past, future, and present, are the locus of the
[action of] standing [of the mountains] as a heading [Kaiyata says]
that the conclusion [from this passage] is that the existence of the
kings is divided [qualified] by the divisions past etc., and divides
[qualifiesJ the standing of the mountains etc. Thus its [the standing
of the mountains] being an action, and association with the three
times is justified. Thus, the Boo;;ya [pas~age is written] taking into
consideration the division [of time] only in a qualified [action].
. 1. The reference to Kaiyata is of course to the Pradipa explaining
the Bha9ya on Vt. 5 ad P. III.2.123. (vol. 3, pp. 281-282).
See Introduction [C-I] for an explanation.


2. viSi'ftabhedamiidiiy

accepted the divis

qualified, i.e., limih
periods, it is clear
action (which is t
the Bha;;ya. If til
from action, quali
the kings would I

I U 3 J ~ci fu Cfl'f<['f'i{
~<;5Rl"l1:q. ~ql!!B:. I

.+r1G:I~oj\'f'fRlifiaIt is alsiysaid in
{distingUished} in rel~
[or substance]_ itself i
standing of the 'mount,
something else." It i~
the distinction here is
That is why in sabda
[cases] such as 'the 0
taking into account tl
1. The verse quated
2. The reference to I
(vol. CXVI, p. 8
3. KaUi!):Q.abhaV;a i~
P. III.2.I23. '<:
~f<lcrf~1<r.1 ~abd~

<WCT'!if Wl~ai't
,,'t<'-l <;5'5IG;<[ ~R

Hence, the presel

of the presentness ret
concurrent occurrence
production of the S~
pastness. When that
co-signified, TAT etc.,
in all the [appropriatt


Iified by taking the

; [into account] .
alternative already
nd action (Le. the
e same.
of the verbal root,
is the same as time,
he eternal character
ined as being charg and an end is not
lout the use of lAT

,justified. Though
beginning taken by
when it is qualified
:erent times. Thus
ted by a particular
and an end. Thus
is begun but not
be justified.
rl1r.r~<lrlm<{l;TI <:l:(lT


fill ~q'r:r<.!C! ~tlP~: I".

19 the ifinal answer
J 'here':'the actions

Ire the locus of the

ing [Kaiya1a says]
he existence of the
t etc., and divides
1S its [the standing
ion with the three
'ritten] taking into
,lified [action].
Pradipa explaining
. 3, pp. 281-282).




2. viSif,tab.hedamadiiyaiva bhii$YaJ!I: Since the Bha~ya has clearly

accepted the divisions of time only when the eternal action is
qualified, i.e., limited by actions of the kings belonging to various
periods, it is clear that the view taking time to be the same as
action (which is the meaning of the root), has the sanction of
the Bha~ya. If time had been considered to have been separate
from action, qualifying the eternal action with the actions of
the kings would not have been necessary.

I L13]

;a<fci ~ '!1'f'1qGJi:t I "r:r<:cIT fli<.!a

~<fl'ml'fl i! <! r.r'li<it<:fa I q<fcrTfa:-

fuffu'ffil11,r:r<:~qlTf l~a" ~fu II foifu1?!i'l<::l~"

~<m:l;;ft'1l ~1?!lI.1 SlC! <1:9 "Q;'lil ;;: ~ <{R"T'flTf SlH:n(,('~i'l.n<U foiro1?!i'r,,-

m"l>{ejtqr:rfultfu ~OC;:9iT<i!i'r sr.~'f(jlI.1

It is also."said in the Wikyapadiy1l. :"eyerythingiS qualified
[distingUished} iil relation to. something else. [A. thimg's] nature
[or substance] itself is hot li1!ble to differentiation. . Therefore the
standing of the-mountains etc. is .differentiated by taking into account
something else." It is clear in Helaraja's commentary on this that
the distinction here is due to differentiation between the qualificands.
That is why in sabdakaustubha also it is said, that justification in
[cases] such as 'the one Nlirliy<l!l).a existed', [can be given] only by
taking into aq:ount the distinction of the qualified [entities].
1. The verse quated here is V.P.,III.9;80:
2. The reference to HeJaraja is to his commentary on V.P. III.9.80.
(vol. CXVI, p. 81).
3. KatJil!r;jabhatta is here referring to the sabdakaustubha on
P. III.2.123. Q;'li12l1r.<:fl'~'<!1'1Rcr;;{f;mlqf;;:crl<:fT afjqrN<5 i'r<t 3;<:<~i;1i
~f<M~C( I sabdakau. vol. II pp. 465-6.


C!~~m"l9il~ o<:f!ql<:Tcl'f'/i" Q;9 I C!f~{lJcrclm<{'912l 'CfF'1<:fO<:ff~'lip<rt

<mC!9i~ ~wa~9 I ~ C\<#.i'!@c'l1~t'1~'I.1 C!fu:l<I:.

<mci:t <":Sf,,'1 ~Icr C!"l QSl19~'1'I. I c!<l'fl'l; <;[1c!'liC9~~fu f.r~: q'''l!: I

Hence,. the present time is activity itself. The co"signified-ness

of the presentness residing in it is well justified by [the process of]
concurrent occurrence and non-occurence. Thus, the [previous] nonproduction of the same [action] is futureness and completion is
pastness. When that [presentness, futureness, and pastness] is to be
co-signified, lAT etc., [are introduced]. This should be understood
in all the [appropriate] places [Le., also in the discussion of the other



temporal suffixes]. Thus, cosignifier-ness [of IAT] is the established

way '[i.e., view].
1. This is the final statement of ;the view that time and action
[meaning of the verbal root] are one and the same thing. Thus
presentness also is the denoted meaning of the verbal root, cosignified by the suffix lAT. The meaning of the verbal root, i.e.,
action is time. The presentness aspect of it is co-signified
by IAT,
2. anvayavyatirekiibhyii:m: The method of anvaya 'concurrent
occurence or agreement' and vyatireka 'concurrent non-occurence
or contrast' has been explained in the introduction [A-I]. The
meaning 'time' is denoted by the root, but to express different
a,spects of it, such as presentness, pastness and futureness, the
. , root hast<> be accompanied:by different sUffixes such as IAT, or
IUT.' Therefore, by the principle'of anvaya and vyatireka, these
suffixes should be considered as being the co-signifiers of these
different aspects of the meaning 'time', which is the denoted
meaning of the verbal root.

1<:<i '!T'i.f'liWsf<t <n3;QQfu: I cPur.: I qa111;:f.f,W-I <'l~r''':r 1<:'1 qa111~

. <'Jre-R'r 'l."fl1:<:lICJ:, I "fs!i<ni'lG:1'l 'lilmg ~1 wt<!-r lTI~" ~fa
q"F'l~'-l., 'Pl<'J"-I &ii'l1t:fl~~a:fi''f1i1':f\''1'l1~ I
l;9~6t, I

.,~ ~QR:'O~<::'Ii<'f

In this way, the denotator-ness [of IATJ is also not unjustified.

Thus: the present time is denoted by lAT, in accordance with the
rule "IAT [should be introduced. to express] the present [time] ,"
and since time is the measurer of action according to the Vakyapadiya, [which says] , "time serves to distinguish action [s], whereas
number is the distinguisher of all". It cannot be justified that a
thing can be its own measurer.
1. This is the final statemen,t of the view that time and action are
not one and same. They are different, time being the measurer
of action. Measurer and the thing to be measured cannot be one
and the same. Since time is not the same as action, it is not
the denoted meaning of ;the verbal root, and thus needs another
denotator, namely, lAT. This is in accordance with P. III.2.123,
which in,troduces IAT when the meaning present tense is to be
expressed. Here, it is clear that Katm)lc;1abhatta does not accept


the traditional
by Bhattoji Dil
traditional intel
root, when the
present. As fat
who went agai
2. In sUPIX>rt of 1
is quoted V.P.,

according to :t"
Bha~ya. (M.B
[I.l 6]
i'Ii 'i.f I J;i;'11
. 'cr<::rq "'lWi9'~
m:) <Rilf["~
f;i;'l1'l1~ ~fu

Moreover, sine
the presentness resil
also will have to Ix
of thus theoreticall)
, roots, why not say
sentness. [In that
you have to say tha
is the re?-son for t
'Since it amounts t
1. lA T is not nel
Even 'when IA
or lIT is the 0:
action is cogn:
out the meani:
[1 17J 8iitoi cr"'f q
~qlI. I s!~i
'i.f 13"1191 <r~
[If it is objecu
meaning of IATJ,
general will be sei


1 is the established

the traditiQnal interpretation of the rule P. III:2.123 accepted

by Bhattoji Dik~ita and other cDmmentators. AccDrding to' this
traditional interpretation, IAT is to be introduced after a verbal
rDot, when the actiDn forming the meaning of it resides in the
present. As far as 1knDW KaUll).Qabhatta is the only grammarian
who went against this traditiDnal interpretation.
2. In support of the view that time and action are nDt the same
is qUDted V.P., Il1.9.2. This kiiriki'i is based Dn a:r~9T '1FCI~1ll
fit<ri<!"[<l+!l'1n <fil'01: ~~a
(Bha~ya Dn P. 1.3.1),
according to' Nagea in his Uddyota on that passage in the
Bha~ya. (M.B. vol. 1, p. 258).

It time and action

same thing. Thus
:he verbal root, co;he verbal root, i.e.,
f it is cosigni fied

mvaya 'concurrent

Tent non-occurence
lction [A-I]. The
;0 express different
md futureness, the
res such as IAT, or
nd vyatireka, these
)-signifiers of these
ich is the denoted


Il:'l 'l(h:n~
T wtBr 1'rfG:'lil" ~fcr
\ '1'i'f ~'I':rR;;~~'lii:

;ime and action are

being the mea~urer
lured cannQt be Qne
as action, it is not
thus needs ahother
e with P_ II1.2.123,
~sent tense is to' be
tta does not accept

m: .

(if, 'i'f \ f.ii<!1<!1

p.j'nN mfta<:Clffilk 'lr+!F'I<'l~'1 ?ili!l"l \ am 'i'f
~~R "Ilsr-u<P{ '11;;~l{ I am 'i'f ~'1t "Il~ cr;{ ~f*Ff,,,q'1ll1:q~'f.~'1
OlZT. 9C'i+!T<{~~l'rcrR~;;<l([l"ll:. \ .... ~"!'1T<J:. \ aTN "i'f '1~+1H<'lffiful!""
f;i;'!l'!l~ ~fcr '0~+!~<!1m:~~Ill~fu Own '11'Oir CI~l 'i'f GJ'!!ll%Zl

[1.1 6J

:r Ol~~

(. .Iso not unjustified.

ccordance with the
i e present [time] ,"
" ing to the Viikya_c,
action [5] , whereas
be justified that a



MDreDver, since action can be cognised even withDut IAT, only

the presentness residing in it is to' be co-signified [by IAT] . Then that
also will have to be said to be denQted by the verbal rODt. Instead
Df thus theoretically cDnceiving denDtative functions for many verbal
. rODts, why not say IA T alone .has the denotative function for pre~
sentness. [In that way, there will be] simplicity of procedure. Also,
YDU have to say that the utterence [of the root] accDmpanied by IAT
is the relIson for the cognition of action qualified by presentness:
-Since it amoun:cs to the same thing, why nDt say that IAT is the
1. fA T is Dot necessary for the cDgnition Df. the meaning action.
Even when IAT is not used, and some other suffix such as IVT
or lIT is the one that accO'mpanies the verbal rDDt, the meaning
action is cognised. Therefore, lAT is necessary only to bring
out the meaning presentness.
a:r~ CI~ 'llClf '11'0<11 <{ <?-l1<J:. \ m,ii1ur <:fl+11~<?-T 'l1"11~fu ~<J:. \
ir'll{ \ a:r~"[<l~ <:f.l=fcI~ <rT~<!<rT"I'li+!l'll>trm<J:. I CI~'Rll'l \ "
'i'f W+!'II ~~1'P-l <?-T1\'f." ~fcr ,
[If it is objected that] in that case, [if presentness is the denoted
meaning of IATJ, the agent will not be denO'ted[by 1AT] as the
general will be set aside by the particular, that is nDt so. The
[I 17]






- - - - - - -- - - -





relation of that which is set aside and that which sets it aside does
not exist here, since both the meanings are possible. Thus it is said,
'it is possible that both should apply'.
1. See Introduction [B~5J.
2. vie:j.ena samanyasya biidhiit: This is the same objection
brought in iri [1-7]; This basis of this objection there was the
"takrakaUr(.l4inyanya)1a (see [1-7]; note 1). But the whole
argument bringing in takrakau,1J4inyanyiiya is false and does not
apply here, The arguments involved are clear in the Uddyota
on Vt. 7 ad P. III.1.22, where the two rules concerned are
P. III.1.21, and P. III.1.23. (vo!. 3, p. 78-9) .

f'i; '"f I 0:<[ ~ <'>: ~lJjtrcr f<!~9'1lT,ftj'l <!-Tlq: I ~<9FQ~Sjq- foi~'lT?!>:t<rf"ilI~: I Q~I '"fFl'~'f'!trRrO:QI;:ri foiqtffi <rel<reff1fu "'fp:TT~'1fu

' .'
. ' ",
Also: in ~hat case [if agent etc. is not denoted] , the rule that
1- [members should be introduced after averhal root] when object
[agent, and in the case of intrasitive roots, action] is to be expressed,
will be without scope, as in other places also it will be set aside by
the meanings such as injunction etc. Thus the general rule also
takes .place by the maxim ,that the relative strength and' weakness'
of tllOse rules threatened by uselessness is reversed.
1. P. IIIA.69 is a general rule. If every time a specific meaning
is.taught the general rule is set aside, it will have no scope left.
In this case, it is ,to be superceded by P. III,2.128.. In other
places, it will be then superceded by o.ther rules giving specific
meanings such as P. IIL2.115, III.3.13, 15, 162, 173 and
III.4.7, etc. Thus P. III.4.69 will be useless. This cannot be
allowed. Any rule which is threatened by this sort of uselessness
automatically becomes stronger according to the popular maxim,
since every rule must have its own sphere where it can apply.
To provide scope for P. III.4.69, as weI! as the specific rules,
it is necessary that EAT should denote both the general meaning
of the I-members as well as its own specific meaning, i.e., prEsentness.
II.19] apnfcrR'fC!'lilOOBr 'IT"'l,'q ~!F!J&:<i m1;<ll1<9~'t\ BTTfijij ~;;[ 1
ITCflir'la:rl1TG:T<l qc::~"ilFITq: 1 ~~g 'lil<'-<?'1Ifcrf~cRErSjq- q~l1F1T
QS[ m~;;;"ilT'1RlJ.m=rIsi;'llq'<9Mcrrll. 1 Q~H111m1TT<il f'li<ll<rr: J:TI .... "il<'flm'fl;;[ ~fl:l1ifQlfcr 'Il~ 9c111T<!rmrcr ~T~<r: 1 W:!T'l1 Sl~"il<'it sjq-



I '!> ~rn:T>J\


[If you obje

[by IATJ, then .

sense; [that is] :

by accepting the
time is seperate
perty of being ,
. not ended, and t
of the absence of
be presentness?
It should be und
presentness etc. c
does not have a .
being characteris
action] does haVE
1. bhl4yamaZag.
mentioned in

q~: 'liT<

'"f " SlT,lll
" g;'O~<!T+9

In reality, til
etc., of the form (
belonging to it, is
presentness is ind
exists', 'the moun
'that which come
NarayaI;ta alone 1
1. This is the f
denotator or I
considered tl
of the root.
verbal root,
denoted mear


~ -,~



sets it aside does

. Thus it is said,
same objection
;ion there was the
But the whole
false and does not
r in the Uddyota
es concerned are
<?[;:Q~slit f<t<-'m:r~

n<reflifu ;:'11'11""EiRr

~d], the rule that

oot] when object
lS to be expressed,
11 be set aside by
general rule also
~th and weakness

specific meaning
ave no scope left.
:.2.128. ' In other
i les giving specific
l ), 162, 173 and
This cannot be "'_
sort of uselessness
e popular maxim,
lere it can apply.
the specific rules,
~ general meaning
neaning,i.e., pre~'!\

~lfu:fu ii(~

rft9:cr~slit Cjchn~<'i
~l f'li'1I'1T: ~m:;;;"i

It'!1'11 snm:o"i~ slit


f'l;fo:'<!fu:~lTI'1]: !lRo"i''!lo:. cr~q'('5faJcr''!Bl" ~>!91~fcr .mm~C91~fi'rfu

f~i;:crlOJ'1 ~a

<'l<flI. I

[Hyou object that] if time separate from [action] is denoted

[by lAT], then the Bhli~ya passage already quoted will not make
sense; [that is] not [acceptable]. It [Bha:~ya statement] is made
by accepting the a~ternative of co-signifier-ness. Actually, even if
time is seperate [from action], presentness is [still] the property of being characterised by an action which is begun but
not ended, and that is not possible in 'the Self exists' etc., because
of the absence of a beginning of -[that] action. Thus, how can there
be presentness? This is the meaning of the doubt [in the Bm~ya].
It should be understood that the meaning of the final answer is :
-preSentness etc. are [justified] since even though the action [hereJ.
does not have a beginning, it is possible to -[have the property of]
being characterised by that [Le. that which is begun] becau.e [the
action] does have a beginning when it is qualified by something.
1. bhii~yamaZag.naka1Jz syat : This refers to the objection already
mentioned in (I.1D).
[L20] - '1'Gcr: <01<7.1 ~lfuR'fcr: V-f; g fs!;i{'1 I Cli!:Ci !ll~.'<11'IR~+lH1<'11~q
'1cf+ll~'~l\<;:'li <7.:S'~ ~fu q"+ll~: I cr;lilfJ;~lil~<'i Cjl~l'I'I I, ~<,q
'<! "811<l1n~ ", "'1~Cllf~'g]~cr" ~<'11<nijlit -'Icf+ll;r,ei !' Cll1 smHo:.",
" g;;%9~P:'Ifqf~ '1<:;l~o:. ", "q:9il ll: ~ ;rH::T'1UT 3TI~<r." ~~ ~cr<'1+11it

In reality, time is not separate but is action itself. Presentness

etc., of the form of the property of having begun but not ended etc.,
belonging to it, is the meaning of lAT. This is the final view. Thus
presentness is indeed denoted. In this way,- presentness in 'the Self
exists', 'the mountains stand' and pastness in 'there was darkness',
'that which comes into being [abhu] was covered by void', 'the
NaraYaJ:la alone was there', etc.; also is justified.
1. This is the final view of the author as to whether IAT is the
denotator or co-signifier of presentness, and whether time is to be
considered the sarrie or different from action. According to
Kau~H;labhatta, time is the same as action which is the meaning
of the root. General notion of time is thus denoted by the
verbal root, but its particular aspect, i.e., presentness is the
denoted meaning of lAT. Thus KaUilfc;!abhatta is adhering to a




literal interpretation of P. 111.2.12'3, which goes against the

traditional' explanation accepted by other commentators, but
which does not follow the original phrasing of the rule. See
Introduction [B~71.
'2. The Use of present tense in the sentences about which the Bha$ya
had raised a doubt are also shown to be justified if this view is
,accepted. In addition to the previously quoted 'the Self exists'
and 'the mountains stand', three other sentences have been quoted
in, which the use of past tense needs justifying. The sentence
tarna iisU is taken from R.V. X.129.3a. The word varna in this
sentence means according to the commentators avidya 'ignor
ance'. It is this avidya that causes the perception of the universe even though it does not really exist. This avidya is eternal
and thus cannot be limited to anyone Hme. tuccheniibhva
pihita1!l yadiisit is taken from R.V. X.129.3c. KaU'l).~abhatta
justifies the distribution of the tenses here py superimposition
of the ideas of past, present and future on the existence of the
highest reality with the aid of the contextual actions of kings
belonging to different times.


~:g~hn~ I (

rn:~'i1: I it
~<lR!C!;'j '!.~

[The author '

the words], 'beyo:
the rule parok~e 11
today, and exclusi'
and future. [Qui
today, which is n
not used to expn
today, or even pa~


Any definiti,
, Kau:ndabhai
.. . '
about the 1:
cannot be u
ditions givel
usage. Thu
today, whle.
dition, I.e., 1
apply to fu'
be exclusive





:oes against the

llIllentators, but
f the rule. See
'hich the Bha$ya
XI if this view is
I 'the Self exists'
lave been quoted
;. The sentence
)fd tama in this
s avidya 'ignor}tion of the uniavidya is eternal
. tucchenabhvaKaU't}Qabhat(:a
existence of the
actions of kings

~:s'.h:n~ I ({"{raj ~fu I q{'raj ~fsm ~,;{l<r. I 'f.l<'ml19<::;;qc!~1~~~i:!~~



ffi:f9-4t slit

"%!~fei.~q: I cr,;{H;;Qcr;') '!.~ q{raj


'119: I

~.n;;QC!;') '!.~s~;;Qa;') ~fei.'1fu '!.~sr.l:fq{rij '" ~ l~llT: I

[The author of the karikiis] stated the meaning of lAT [with

the words], 'beyond the ken [of the speaker]', in accordance with
the rule parok$e lit [Po III.2.115]. Time is twofold: pertaining to
today, and exclusive of ;today. [This] twofold [time] is [both] past
and future. [Out of these], lIT expresses the past exclusive of
today, which is not witnessed 1by the speaker]. Therefore, lIT is
not used to express the past happening today, future exclusive of
today, or even past which is witnessed [by the speaker].


exclusive of today






not witnessed


Any definition has to avoid the fault of overapplication. Here

KaUiIJ<;labhatta has shown tha,t because of the conditions given
about the usage of lIT ,to express a particular meaning, lIT
cannot be used in any other possible cases. Each of the conditions given is necessary. An absence of it will lead to wrong
usage. Thus lIT is to be used only to express past, exclusive of
today, which is not witnessed 'by the speaker. If the first condition, Le., that it should express past, is taken out, it will also'
apply to future exclusive of today. If the second that it could
be exclusive of today is taken out, then it would also apply to




past pertaining today. If the third condition, Le., that it should

concern something not witnessed by the speaker is taken out.
then it would apply to past witnessed by the speaker also. Thu8
all the three meaning conditions are necessary to give the precise
usage of liT.
2. adyatana: day accompanied by (a) 112 of the night that is
past + 1/2 of the night yet to come. (b) 113 of the night
that is past + 1/3 of the night yet to come. or (c) from sunrise
to sunrise.
3. parok$a: (a) one hundred years ago, (b) one housand years
ago, (c) two or three days ago, (d) even hidden bya wall etc.
is acceptable. (BhJ!~ya on P. lII.2.115, M.B. vol. 2, p. 120).
Not being witnessed by the speaker is the common factor among
all these different alternatives.
[II,2 J 'lUa:!cFl Wi)'f1'lRrffia:!lc'f.u+rlc~cnnlfeiISp.jCllBlf0~l~lfc!,:pn'll1: I
ImperceptiJ?ility [not being witnessed by the speaker] is the
property of not being the object of the knowledge with content such
as '1 perceive', that resides in the speaker.
1. KaUll)9abha1ta's phr.asing of this (Le., ...
m~lc''OJi~,,!<[CllOJlf0~F1Tf9"l<[c'll1: is awkward,because actually, the phrase
siik$iitkaromi 'I perceive', does not refer to the fOlm of the
. content (vi~ayaliikiir.a), but to the form of the knowledge (vi~ayi
tiikiira). Therefore, the commentary sailkari on the V.B.S. replaces it with ~l~lC'f.D+!lc~l~OJOJ.'nr'i<lt<[+rT~fciISp.jClroT~ <[~~T<i clT~OJ~r~fci,,!<[c'll'ilq'lc'l+L I Sailka. p. 151) : the absence of the property
of being the object of the knowledge endowed by the contentnens
de;:cribed by the phrase 'I perceive'. The commentary Parik93
of the V.B.S. interpretes the phrase 'I perceive' as referring to
the anuvy.avasiiya 'consciousness of knowledge', i.e., knowledge
of knowledge. (Pari. p. 123). Thus the phrase comes to mean

'the property of not being the object of the kriowledge that has
its contentness defined (or conditioned) by the consciousness
. of knowledge such as '1 perceive' ..
.'. 2. vi~ayatii: According to the Neologicians, the property of having
an object (savi$ay,Gtv'a) belongs only to knowledge, and that
property thought of as belonging to anything other than cogni. tion, i.e.,' desire etc:, is merely like borrowed finery (yiicita-

The term vi~a
from vi~aya.
stracts. vi~ay,
cognition. It
cognition whic

~:1 qUa:!ci! c



But impercep'
action is unperceiv,
is very much not ~
temporal order. ]
If [this is your 0 b
1. The objection
is that the tel
eluded in the
and lIT shou
But all actio]
carinot . serve
(rdivyiipti) iE
2. kriyii niimeym
the word an
oncurs. Kau:r:
poral order'.
whole. Ever)
the action of
the .fire, putti
Because these
co-exist and t
as a whole.
that time, th>
the following


[The objectic


e., that it should

~er is taken out.
~aker also. Thu~
) give the precise
;he night that is
1/3 of the night
(c) from sunrise
Ie housand years
en by a wall etc.
vol. 2, p. 120).
Ion factor among,
olfc!q'-l'C1+I. I '

speakerJ is the
lith content such
, :rr~IC'f.~l'!1<i'\Cll~

ually, the phrase

the form of the
10wledge (v4ayi>ll the V.B.S. re'-lClroTr.s '-l~T<i ClT-

:e of the property


mentary Parlksa
e' as referring to
" i.e., knowledge
ie comes to mean
Dwledge that has
he consciousness
roperty of having
~Iedge, and that
)ther than cogni1 finery (yiicita-



rna1Jq.ananyiiya). Thus every cognition has an object (vi~aya).

The term vi$tayatii is a 'relational abstract' (Ingalls) derived
from vi~aya. Navyanyaya is very fond of such relational abstracts. vi~ayatii or contentness has for its locus the object of
cognition. It is always said to be described (niriipit,a) by the
cognition which is the vi~ayi.

<T~ q-aJ~ <C!Cl:fl<rc'i'f.+I.. B~~'-lT Olfri f;i;'-fI'-lI: q~aJ<C!rq: I Cl~'fCi +:r1 1ii'\ I
"iiii'-li <Tl~'-l!i<'-l.alqRE:!'!l
R~~[i:ri'!+(' 1<:fQ ~?! I


<T ilFf'-ll

fq o:s1'iclT

But imperceptibility [cannot serve as an] excluder, since all

action is unperceived. Thus it is sa1d in the BhaWa that this action
is very much not seen, [Le., not perceived], and has its parts in a
temporal order.' It is not possible to be pointed out as a whole.
If [this is your objection], it is not [acceptable]. _
1. Theobjection in the :Boo.~ya on P. III.2.115 (M.B. vol. 2, p. 120)
is that the term parok~a 'unperceived' has been supposedly included in the rule so that all perceived action can be excluded,
and lIT should apply only when the action is not perceived.
,But all action is imperceptible, and so this term (Parok~a)
cannot serve- as 'an excluder.' The fault of overapplication
(ativyiipti) is still there.
2. kriyii niirneyamatyantiiparidHlii: In the Bha~ya passage itself;
the word anwn'l<lna~arnyii 'cognised only through inference'
oncurs. Katn:J.~abhatta has here substituted in its place the word
purviiparibhiitiivayavii 'the parts of which take place in a temporal order'. This just explains why action is not perceived as a
whole. Every action is a conglomoration of activities. Thus,
the action of cooking consists of several parts such as lighting ,
the fire, putting the pot on it, etc., all occuring in a sequence.
Because these parts take place in a temporal order, they cannot
co-exist and thus cannot be pointed out or perceived as action
as a whole. Only one part at a time can be perceived, and at
that time, the preceding part has already ceased to exist and
the following part has not yet come into being.

ClG'!'ioo>Jf'i:Cl!iClT c'-ll<m:Tfei!'!I<TT BN<T1<TT qTi\8:'!~i'\l[ mf~ClC91<l:.1 a<T

~'-fI<Tlfei!;!m>~<Tlil"lq<'-lajsfq ~<:~ +:r'l<l.\q I '-l"-fl" Ol<i qqrq" 1<:~ I

[The objection stated in [II.'9] is not acceptable], because, the



irnperceptibility of the means [to produce action], that have the

power conducive to it [actionJ; and which are engaged in activity,
is intended. Because of this, liT is applied even when the means
[to produce ac(ion] are perceived, if they are not engaged in activity..
For example, as in aya1'(t p,apaca 'this man cooked' etc.
1. The word siidhana has been used for the kiirakas by Pataiijali,
and following him, by Bhartrhari, and all the later grammarians.
Siidhana is the means to achieve action. According to the
Mahabha~ya, a substance has many attributes (gul,Za) , and
. each of these attributes can work separately to achieve some
action in one way or another. Thus the same substance through
. its various attributes can be different kiirakas. Thus it is the
attribute which really is the means and not the substance.
(Bhia~ya on P. II.3.1, vol. 1, p. 442). Bhartrhari does not differ
from Patafijali, though he uses the word power (sakti) instead
of attribute (gulJa). According to Bhartrhari, sadhana is the
power to achieve an action either in the same locus or in another,
(V.P., IIL7.I), which means that the locus of action is either
the agent or the object. HelJaraja explains that in the Bha~ya
also, the word attribute is rea.Jly used to mean power, since power
can be an attribute in so much as it also depends on its locus .
a.lJ!d qualifies it. (p. 230). Here, KaUil)cc;labhatt;a says that the
sadhanas are possessed of the power conducive to the action.
This means that he is going against Bhartrhari in differentiating
between siidhanas and the power (sakti) to bring the action
about. In the V.B.S., on the other hand, the phrase kriyanukiila
only' [of the means] that are conducive to action' has been used,
without bringing in the word Mkti 'power' at all (V.B.S. p. 153) .
2. aya1'(t papaca: The alternative under consideration is that the
term irnperceptibility does not mean imperceptibility of action,
but the imperceptibility of the means of action (siidhana) in
stead. Now, if we accept this meaning, the difficulty may arise
that the usage aya1'(t papaca 'this man cooked' would not prove.
to be correct, when the agent is perceived by the narrator after
the activity. of cooking has been completed.. The means of
action is not unperceived here. . To meet this difficulty, the
qualification vyaparav4tiinii1J'l '[the means of action that] are
engaged in activity', has to be inserted. Because of this added
qualification, lIT is applied even when the means of achieving


the action
engaged in ;
there is no
cooked'. E~
does perceiv
perceive the
ing. If he
cooking, the:
[II. 5]



'fi1'!1Tfl:]; fl:r<

f-ii<7.[~+t '

Thus lIT is
ceived by oneself
then is inferred :
babbled a lot bE
1. Since it has
the action 01
that action
that UT car
. one does. on
difficulty in
2. The sentenc
first person
see PLM. p
3. Not all sehe
the imperc<
people, the
the rule IJai
cause of thE
in the first :
rule can be'
ful, llT is u
view as bel<
'-1.:::l 'Ipn
'~ .
~l+!fq #>,

(P.L.M. p.


I, that have the

aged in activity,
when the means
~aged in activity.
\' etc.
ias by Patanjali,
ter grammarians.
ccording to the
:es (gu~a), and
to achieve some
.lbstance through
Thus it. is the
t the substance.
Ii does not differ
. (sakti) instead
, siidhana is the
:us or in another,
, action is either
It in the Bha~ya
)wer, since power
~nds on its locus
, ta says that the
e to the action.
in differentiating
:,ring the action
rase kriyiinukUla
n' has been used,
(V.B.S. p. 153) .
ation is that the
ibility of action,
n (siidhana) in
acuity may arise
would not prove
Ie narrator after
The means of
is difficulty, the
action that] are
Ise of this added
lUS of achieving



the action are perceived, as long as they are not actually

engaged in ac,tivity when the narrator perceives them.. Thus
there is no difficulty about the usage aya1[l papiica 'this man
cooked'. Even though the narrator while using this phrase
does perceive the agent of the action of cooking, he does not
perceive the agent while actually engaged in the action of cook
ing. If he does perceive the agent engaged in theaetion of
cooking, then the usage aya'f{l papiica is not desirable .
[II. 5]

~oi l;~o:q1<:f1~l;'fTr'f 'fdl1FICl1<r-m:qt c'fT~~1~1 l;,!:ql1!!fcre;:'<ll~sfq


'f,1'!UJr:l:fl:ral <'['!,ll'! Rl~ I l:[?:!1







~lq 'l~l"q

'>Ill" ;J;1:l;CI1G:. Cll;ll'

Thus lIT is applied when even one's own activity is not perceived by oneself due to one's being absorbed in something etc., and
then is inferred from its result. For example, people say, 'mad me
babbled a lot before him.'
1. Since it has been established that liT is to be used only when
the action or according to the other view, the means of achieving
that action is not perceived by the narrator, it becomes clear
that lIT cannot be used in the first person. Of course whatever
. one does oneself must be perceived and thus the condition of
imperceptibility is not fulfilled. . KaUil)!~abhatta answered thIS
difficulty in this passage.
2. The sentence quoted here as an instance of the use of iIT in
first person is taken from SisuVa. 11.39. For other examples
see PLM. p. 155.
3. Not all scholars agreed thus explaining away the difficulty about
the imperceptibility in ~he first person. . According t.o these
people, the usage in the first person can be justified by taking
the rule 1}aluttamo viii P. VII.1.91 as a jfiiipaka. Thus if be
cause of the abovementioned difficulty, there is no use of lIT
in the first person, then P.VII.1.91 will be useless. No Pfu;linian
rule can be without a purpose. Thus to malce this rule meaningful, lIT is used in the first person. Vyutpattivada mentions this
view as belonging to the Upayakara and his followers. Thus:
~R'2 '!'fi!B=r;;{li~li,'!l:r'! q'U'lIc'!l{ I 3lq ~'l





~!3~ UIl3~T '11 ~C'fT~~fq'f,C'llj<:f1l:["Ii1U'f<i ~~cr I

(VyutpaVaLaVi. p.141). NageSa does not agree with this view.

(P.L.M. p. 155).



.., .....






Mi<,:IT[T9~!!'<'l;r" ~Ri <'m'fClB9 I ~'fQ<.:1<<n <['If['f,ilRf{

qQe:r<9Tq'l1G:~ sr.'l<l':RI'1<~TCllCl<'i'iNsc!<':11" mfiJrerr.,trT~'lrul\m~f.iof <[~H~<::'i'f"T<l1'f.ll;;q for~CllU'fl<n<[Tl1tr~~;r ree:TS'lT'TlCC I

[The usage] "I Udayana, composed the KiraI,iivali" however

must [be considered] wrong. Even if imperceptibHity can be somehow or other justified in the abovementioned way, in the action of
expanding of the work which is accomplished with utmost contemplation and which is composed with well-arranged words giving the
[final] decision of the meaning of the siistra, there cannot be pastness
.and exclusiveness of today. For this reason lIT does not apply here.
1. The use of lIT in the first person in the sentence vyatene
kira1Jliv,alimudaYlana/:t, which occurs in the beginning of Kiral).avali (p. 2), is obviously wrong. Even if imperceptibHity can
somehow or other be justified, stilI according to Kau:Q.<;!abhaHa,
the usage is wrong. He means to say that at the beginning
of the text yet ,to be composed; while the author is engaged in
expanding it, the condition tha,t the action should be in the past,
exclusive of today is not fulfilled.
The saiJkari on V.B.S. however says that the usage v),litene
here can be justified by the superimposition of tlie pastness, imperceptibility, and exclusiveness of today, the basis of superimposition being. that the result is achjeved of communicating how
easy and quick the writing of this work was for Udayana. According to sankan, the Mafijii$1i supports this view. (saftka.
p. 155).

~ <'!'!~'l~ I f.ii'l1<n 1l:9 qlD~q rem-<'l'-TI <"1":r'ITf{1



fef.r.lH'l I'{I<'!>\' <"e:run'lT ~91'O'!i <.1+'!-I'{: trTI'{i'[<?a~IT[T<[T ~9T'O'!ml'{<ri

<.1+'11'{ ~Ri .n<':'fli. I
But the following should be taken into consideration. Because
of [the principle ofl brevity, the [final] view is [as follows] : lIT
is applied when the action is imperceptible. For, when the heading
'after a root' [is made to mean] 'the meaning of a root' by indicative
function, the relation [between the denoted and the indicated meanings] is that between the denotator and the denoted. But when
[the same rule is said to mean] 'the means of action' by indicative
function, the relation is that of the denotator and the means of the
denoted [meaning, i.e., action]. Thus ,there is proli){ity.


1. This is the staten

question whether
of the means of
use of lIT
In the rule j
. understood from "
connected with t
'when the root is
indicative functio
desired meaning .
meanings are to
action, and (2) t
these two, the. fin
whereas the secOl
son, the author 1
of the action wh
. 2. In the V.B.S. it
of action is inten
tators however,
scholars, whereas
i.e., that imperce
to sailkan (p. 15
be taken as the
action, is the viI
grammarians thiJ
we see that Kau;
Nagesa states th

<r 'i'f <.1'lf %'11

e:r<'lICC I aTCl 1<:'

'J:<T! I'{F~Ri "~"

But that is no]
[This objection is n
activities] is not per
is perceived. That j
cannot be pointed Ot
the action of runnin!
all, in the sentence '!





<[~R;;rr~f.ioT <[~I

.vall" however
, can be somethe action of
tmost con temrds giving the
lOt be pastness
lot apply here.
tence vyiitene
ing of Kirana:eptibility can
the beginning
is engaged in
be in the past,



usage ,vyiitene
~ pastness, im-.
iis of superimunicatihg how
Jdayana. Aciew. (sanka.



rT ~ororl~m'<l.,<'i
;ion. Because
follows] :. lIT
n the heading
. by indicative
dicated mean:1. But when
by indicative
means of the

1. This is the statement of the final view of Kau.1):Qabhatta on the

question whether it is the imperceptibility of the action or that
of the means of action that is concerned in determining the'
use of lIT .
In the rule parok$.e litl P. III.2.U5, the word dhiito~ is
understood from that heading (P. III.1.91). This word is then
connected with the word parok$e, and the meaning becomes
'when the root is not pEirceived'. In both the alternatives, the
indicative function has to be appealed to in offier to get the
desired meaning. Thus from the word 'root', two indicated
meanings are to be had: (1) the meaning of the rbot i.e.
action, and (2) the means of the meaning of the root. Between:
these two, the first alternative is clearly more directly connected,
whereas the second alternative leads to prolixity. For this rea'
son, the author accep~s the view that it is the imperceptibility
of the action which determines the use of lIT.
2. In the V.B.S. it is the view that imperceptibility of the means
of action is intended is stated last. According to the commentators however, this is just stating the view of some other
scholars, whereas fhe author's own view is the one stated before,
i.e., that imperceptlbility of the' action' is' intended: Aocording
to sailkan (p. 153), the view that the word 'unperceived' should
be taken as the qualification of the meaning of the root, i.e.,
action, is the view of the old grammarians, whereas the Neo-
grammarians think that it qualifies the means of action. Thus
we see that KauIYQabhatta has sided with the old grammarians ..
Nagesa states the view of the Neogrammarians. (P.L.M., p. 143) ..

.;or 'Cf 1J'lf f,j;=![l qU~,=![o<rT~

em:. I i3!!"l~ G'U"litsfq ~,'-l'li+iqU

a,:r''!1tJ:. I alC! 11;or fc[u;ltwrr ;or f.ia::~'r[ 'OJ9'ltR(m1Sltsfc[ I grcr 11;'1 " q<['
1I~ '<IT'!fu'' '<:,'f'[ '<IT,!.,f,j;=![l<rT 11;'1 qlt<=!f?[ 'li~Coi 1J~fu~?!'! I




. .Ji8J4-._.

But that is non-excluding, s;nce all action' is imperceptible.

[This objection is not acceptable). Even though the group [of
activities] is riot perceived [as a whole], each [activity by itself]
is perceived. That is why, in the Bhas;ya also [it is said] that it
cannot be pointed out as a whole. That is why, the objectness of
the action of running in the [imperative form] 'see' is accepted by'
all, in the sentence 'See the deer is. running'.



1. After stating his final view, KaUiJf9.abhatta wants to refute any

objections that may arise against it. Therefore the same objection already mentioned [II.3] is restated. As an answer to
this criticism, KaUl)it;labhatta says that even though action as
a whole cannot be perceived, each part of it is perceptible.
Every action is made of many small parts that take place in a
temporal order, and thus do not co-exist. That is why the
whole group of activities cannot be perceived together, because
it does not exist. But each of these activities that form a part
of the main action can be perceived, one at a time. That is why,
in the Bha~ya also when the imperceptibility of action is stated,
it is said, that it cannot be pointed out as a whole. The parts
can be perceived. Thus there is no difficulty in considering the
imperc('!ptibility of action as an excluding condition for the
use of lIT.
KaUl!t;labhatta has here stopped the process of having parts
at a level he wants to, in order to support his argument.
Bhartrhari goes further. According to him, these -parts also
have further parts. Thus the action of cooking is comprised of
putting the po,t on the fire, pouring water in it, taking it down
etc. Whereas the action of pouring wa;ter, which is a part of the
action of cooking, also has parts such as picking up the jar with
water, stre,tching the hand towards the pot on the stove etc.
According to Bhartrhari, a partless thing cannot be called action.
. (V.P., III.S.lO).
2. The sentence pasya mrgo dhiivati 'See the deer is running',
is often quoted. Nagesa has used this example in his refutation
of the view of the Naiyayikas, that in the cognition of the sentencemeaning, it is the meaning of the word in nominative case
that is the main quaIificand. If that view is accepted, in this sentence, the word mrgla will have to take the accusative case instead
of the nominative, which is undesirable. (P.LM., pp. 110-111).
According to the grammarians, the difficulty does not arise,
because in their view, it is not the deer, but its action of
running that is the object of the action of seeing. Since dhiivati
is not a nominal base, and case affixes can apply only after nominal bases, the question of applying the accusatice case termination does not arise. Kaut:lt;labhatta has here used this usage to
prove that action can be perceived. $ince the action of running


is here the obje

This lends sup:
can serve as an
[II. 9]

;r 'Of :q,~~'

+!T~'fij J;t'U'
Nor should om
[which is by defini'
impediment to [aci
ceptibility spoken (
action. It appears
1. rejects
q~ij,di sq'iq~iJ


-----,------------- - - -




lilts to refute any

are the same obAs an answer to
though actIon as
it is perceptible.
lt take place in a
That is why the
together, because
that form a part
me. That is why,
If action is stated,
Nhole. The parts
in considering the
:ondition for the
of having parts
rt his argument.
these -parts also
19 is comprised of
't, taking it down
~h is a part of the
19Up the jar with
on the stove etc.
t be called action.

is here the object of the action of seeing, it must be perceptible.

This lends support to his view that imperceptibility of action
can serve as anexc1uding condition for the use of lIT.
[II. 9) rr:q 5l,i:\<ii rr ljfi'f[;'lr.rrcr 'n~'I. I Cll'lmJQ 'ill<'l~<'llafct I 'Rre:r<'!ll]q
+rl~'f<i fit'lFTi <J'W~CI >;:rcr 5lfcn:mftrcr R'f I
Nor should one object as follows: each part is not an action
[which is by definition a dhiitvartl~aJ. For even then, there is no
impediment to [action being the] root-meaning. And the imperceptibility spoken of -in the Bha~ya is proper with respect to an
action. It appears that this is the thrust [of the present view].
1. NageSa rejects this in his Uddyota on P. III.2.115.
'l~arS'l'19~)sr.'151<'1a:r<'ll'l2j~'R'r >Tl<fi I (vol. 3, P. 272 )


deer is running',
in hIS refutation
nition."of the sen1 nominative case
epted, in this senative case instead
M., pp. 110-111).
, does not arise,
lutits action of
g. Since dhiivati
T only after nomi;ice case tenninased this usage to
action of running




S36,hlT\[ I 'ifl" lilf<i"'1>l" ~Rr I gr<l;;rC!~ +nler;'n<<[~: I gr<l;;rC!~ S3~fq
<L"!l<J:. I <[2:!T " 'ifl" lif<lcrl ~<'1T<tl I
[Now the author proceeds to] state the meaning of IU,!, [with

[ IlL I J

the words] 'something that is going to happen tomorrow'. Future

exclusive of today is meant, on the strength of the rule anadydtJane
lut (P. III.3.15). For example, 'it wiII happen tomorrow' etc.
1. In the rule anadyatane lut/ P. IIL3.15, the word bhavi$yati 'to
express the meaning future', is understood from P. III.3.3,
whereas the heading dhiito /:t 'after a root' comes in from
P. I1L1.91. The meaning .of the word anadyatana 'exclusive
of today' has been explained already. (see [ILl] note 2). The
meaning of the word bhavilffydt 'future' wiII be explained by the
author himself in the next passage.
2. The word sva/:t 'tomorrow' in the kiirikii is rather limiting. If
it is taken literally, IU,!, can be applied only when something
. is going to happen the very next day, and something happening
day after tomorrow wiII be excluded. That is why Kall,I).Q.abhatta
has paraphrased sva/:t. with allladydtane 'exclusive of today'.
According to the commentators, the wordsva/:t in the kiirikii
should be taken as an upalakW1}a for any future exclusive of
[III 2] (Qftt!+rT\[ I liler"'lC!1fq ! lifql;<[reT+rT"<f ~<<[~: I ~ iillil ~m <LOl1<J:. I <[!If[
""liT lifer"G'1Rr ~''11;;t, I CR~ 'i:f'f<hrF!qmlil'fqRr;'l''r~~lF1l"<'1Rrl1'i'f~ I

[Now the author] states the meaning of llf.'!', [with the words
'to express] future'. Future in general is meant, on the strength of
the rule ITt se$e ca [Po III.3.13) , as in the example 'the pot wiII corne
into existence' etc. That means having the property of corning
into existence in a time which is the counterpositive of the prior
absence [existing] in the present.
1. ITt se$e cal P. I1L3.13. dhiirto/:t comes in from that heading in
P. I1L1.91, whereas bhavi!jyaiti is taken from P. I1L3.3. The
'rule anadya~ane lull P. I1I.3.15 introduces the suffix IU,!, in the
sense of future action not taking place in the course. of the

current day.
after a verb wi
to express acti
The rule in qu
the sense of th
pure and simp:
taining to this
action for ithe
action for the ~
says that fu.tu
2. tattvaJrt refers
. of which the I
used in the te:
l3+1'1'f''f~ I ). i
though there
commentary F


in this contex1
since d/:tVlt1!ISa
with future. ,
. itself to def
(see [VI.4]).
action which CI
present. Non-:
to here as its :
ledge 'there is
action is the (
Thus the defin
action, of whi,
to the present
is that time w


19 of lUT [with

rule anadydtane
norrow' etc.
rd bhavi~yati 'to
'rom P. III.3.3,
'comes in from
~atana 'exclusiye
IJ note 2). The
explained by the

;her limiting. If
when ,,something
, ~thing happening
ly KaUl).Q.abhatta
usive of, today' .
I~ in the kiirikii
ture exclusive of

l'-t ~fcr~'l?llO: I >l~


[with the words

n the strength of

the pot will come

perty of coming
tive of the prior
that heading in
P. 111.3.3. The
suffix lUT in the
le course of the


current day. The suffixes tum UN and !,!vuL are introduced

after a verb when there is another verb in construction with it,
to express action for the sake of future action. (P. I11.3.1O).
The rule in question (P. 111.3.13) introduces the suffix If!.T in
the sense of ;the remaining cases of the future action, Le., future
pure and simple. Thus If!.T can be used to express future pertaining to this day, as well as to other day, and when there is
action for ithe sake of future action as well as when there is 'no
action for the sake of future action. That is why KaUlfgabhatta
says that future in general is meant.
2. tattvGJ.n refers to bhavi~yattvam 'futureness'" for the definition
of which the phrase 'Ic!l1HlTl<Tlil'llT1v-hTlrul1<i't,qRrl1'<'I'l. has been
used in the text. Another reading ('Ic\111"llT1<r1il'1lTR,~~,qfu"f.
'Nl',g't'l'l. I ), is suggested in Darp. p. 150. It is clearer,
though there is not, much difference in meaning. The
commentary Prabha which says 'lc!111.i'r "IT "<i<.1: ClOT{a"lllit >l
'2!W1: ClG.N"f.~I1f'lil<qful1ml''I'l.1
(Pra. p. 150) is meaningless
in this context. This definition would fit better for past:J.ess,
since dhv,an1sa 'posterior absence' connects with past and not
with future.' As a matter of fact, it ii; used later on' in V.B.
itself ,to define pastness. ,
(see [VI.4J). The definition simply means as. follows: the
action which comes into existence in futUre does not exist in the
present. Non-production of action at the present time is referred
to here as its prior absence (priigab,~iiva). Now, in the knowledge 'there is a prior absence of action at the present time',
action is the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of its prior absence.
Thus the definition means that future is that time iu which an
action, of which the prior absential counterpositive is limited
to the present, comes into existence. In other words, future
is that time when prior absence of an action comes to an. end.


[IVA.l] ~its~m~ I f<r~'11GJf<rm I foos>'r~~ <1,~m:: I 3!T~~T RWSlITfTl!;:~lTfl\;\rg:TG({T 'l~;.Fcr I f<rN~fli ~{ITfll. I +l''111tR~g:~ lFI<I~mrn
<[T'Iil: I Rl1;:~tJf R<!rl"FHITfll. I 3!wt<['t; '-'ll;&:l1r;;r;:cT<tl <Df~'n1t: ~'Ia-
;:rm!a <[T'Iil: I 3!lW;!!Jf 'lill1T"fFl:J;'!fT I. 3!\;{rg:: ~''-iiR~'-iiT O<flrn{: :
[Now the author] states the meaninK of lET, [with lhe words]
'injunction etc.', on the strength of the rule li'liart.he let [Po III.4.7].
By 'etc.', summons, permission, respectful command etc., are to be
taken. The word vidhi means injunction, i.e., inducing [or commanding]
subordinate person such as' a' servant etc. . The vi'Ord
nimantra1Ja means assigning a duty, i.e., direding a person like a
grandson etc., on the occasion of the necessary Sriiddha ceremonial
meal. The word iimantr,aIJa means permission to do as one likes.
The word adhi$ta means a respectful command.
. 1. liiwrthe let! P. IIL4.7 provides for the use of lET in the Veda
to express the same meanings as lIN. The meanings of lIN are
given in P. III.3.161.Seelntroduction [D-l].
[IVA21 ~'Ia;:n<li ~fu 1f R~'li~: I "fl.!uif 'l~~rnl;l ~~l'~ll. I ~n::Ts: I
"3!~Q ~'1r;:n~ql1:1'~ "f2~~fq I cr~ f<'>~ f<r\;\'R!c<:n i'lili",'1.'{ fcI'Ia;l'lT II
. ;:'11'1C~,q'''C::;:Cl~ 'IT ~~T'~l!'11f<t 'IT I f<r'<'11G:r;:rTl1rnG:l;l 'OfglTffm~:
l,Clll. II " ~Icr I 3!Q ~Qil: fu:&:Fcr~~l;'~!ll1r.~'q.ll. I
The conclusion is that lIN expresses instigation. The separate
mention of the four (meanings] is [just] for the sake of the expansion . [of the basic meaning]. Thus it is said, "[question]: In all
the four, the [common aspect of] instigation is closely connected.
[Therefore] lIN should be prescribed in that [general sense] alone.
Why then is the difference [in the four meanings] intended?
[answer]: The mention of the four [meanings]vidhi etc., was
made in the first place to make the details clear, or to expatiate
[the basic meaning]." That is why this is stated in tile Siddhiintakaumudi also..
1. The two verses quoted here sound like Vakyapadiya verses, and
and in LaghuMafi. (p. 983), one of them (asti pr,avaitaniirupartt . .. ) has been quoted with the introduction uktartt ca hari1Jii.

But neither of
The Siddhiinta
2. See introducti(
ml1T;:l'I ~g<<{T
Instigation is ;
means [to achieve]
perty of being the r
being the cause of
[the cognition that
should be the deno
1. pravartanii ha:
activity. In 1

of the conteni
activity.' The
thing desired i
contentness of
means of the d
of the suffix 11
knowledge of
knows' that th
he desires. In
is the propert)
Thus in the se
should sacrifice
means of the (
does not denoi
It denotes the

trates the fop

question. Th(
and the propel
in i$tasiidhanl
desired end'. ~
[IVB2l crm"f<frf4
~ <:9lTI~ 51
'll'1C!T ~ ~~



But neither of these verses can be found in the Vakyapadiya.

The Siddhantakaumudi reference is to S.K. vol. 3, p. 33.
2. See introduction [DC:l].
[IVBl] Cf'1l!efr;:u ~'[~~"'T 'ij~ ~t!T'il'l<'llI.\ ~!roT'ij'laTm'l<:<:[ >!'[fu~
<fll1T;:i.t ~i!''lT'I'ijRUR Q~'1 '11~c<IlRr!1<l:' \

a:n~;!T Rl1;:'11Jff-

~R'!5![~<:[ ~'1<'i.,fl'rru




Il'lCf'lil<':~'liT Ol:fl'll<':: :

[with the words]

,Ie! [Po III.4.7].
ld etc., are to be
Iducing [or comGetc. The ",-ord
~ a person like a
iiddha ceremonial
) do as one likes.
lET in the Veda
:anings "of ilN are

w:I:;;'n~+I. \ ~l~: \ .
1<:[: i'f;ilt::~ foI'laJ<n \I
aQTt::lo1 'i:@1Jff111~;

.on. 'Fhe separate

sake OHhe expanquestion]: In all
closely connected.
neral sense] alone.
mings] intended?
s]vidhi etc., was
ir, or to expatiate
I in the Siddhantaipadiya verses, and
(asti pravaitaniiru)n uktam
. ca harina.

Instigation is a property conducive to activity, i.e., being the

means [to achieve] the desired thing. Since cognition of the property of being the means of the desired thing has been determined as
being the cause of activity in general, it is appropriate that that
[the cognition-that this is the means to achieve something desired],
should be the denoted [meaning of lIN] .
1. pravar!;anii has here been defined as the property conducive to
activity. In the V.B.S. this property- has been specified a~
'property of being the limiter
of the contentness -of the cognition which produces" volitional
activity.' The cognition that this is the means to achieve something desired is the one ~hat produces volitional activity. The
contentness of this knowledge is in the property of being the
means of the desired thing. Therefore that must be the meaning
. of the suffix liN. What Katu:Jlgabhatta is saying is -that mere
knowledge of injunction would not make a man act unless he . knows that the ac;tion. -in question will achieve something that
he desires. liN instigates activity because its denoted meaning
is the property of being the means of achieving the desired end.
Thus in the sentence svargakiimo yaje.ta 'he who desires heaven
should sacrifice', lIN suffix tells the agent that sacrifice is the
means of the desired heaven. Here it should be noted that UN
does not denote the cognition that produces volitional activity.
It denotes the content of such cognition. The phrase yiiga
i$!asiidhanal?Z 'sacrifice is the means of the desired end' illustrates the form of the content (vi$aya) of the cognition in
question. The contentness (vi$ay,atii) resides in the content,
and the property of being the limitor (avacchedakdtva) resides
in i$tasiidhanatva 'the proper:i;y of being the means of -the
desired end'. Thus i!?!asMhanatva is the denoted meaning of liN.
[IV B 2] C!~'Cf ~fl'r;ft>{ I+I.\ "liJf;I~ l!<ITmK ~aJrJf<'ll<t." ~R'!I liJf;It!~
~ <:<m'l~ w{\'<'f.K 'li<'iR l!l:{~",m'il'la'R'la:t1!f,cnfu:~: \ <f,,fi'tarcrT'll'lCfT ~


"'fiCfi ~lffi'~'l''ll<t.'' ~''lf'ij'li<':ut m+ltt O<!l~l:jjCf+I. !

.. _.. ,'-.-.0.



addition, there is the aphorism of J aimini that fruit assodated with [acts prescribed in Vedic] injunction resides in the
[person] who carries it out, since it [the Vedic injunction] is characterised by that [agent]. This has been explained in BhamatI
.in the section, ' [the individual self] is the agent, since the [Vedic]
injunctions are meaningful', as follows: the fruit heaven etc.,
connected with [Vedic] injunction resides in the person who carries
it [the action prescribed by the injuction] out, i.e., in the agent,
since injunction means the property of being the means of achieving
what the agent expects.

<'14 wt~ ,:t{1<J: I M.S. IIL7.8.18

states the first of the two views which are later to be rejected
in M.S. III.7.8.20.
. 2. The aphorism karta sastrart'havattvat/ B.S. II.3.33 describes'
individl,lal self as being the agent.
Otherwise . (iI the
individual sel is not the agent), Vedic injunctions yajeta
'he should sacrifice', juhuy,at 'he should give oblations' etc.,
would be meaningless. While commenting on this section,
Bhamati brings in M.S. nL7.8.18 and explains it, (Bham.
p. 61'3) without mentioning that it is a. view. which is later
to be rejected.
3. The impor:tant thing here is the part (kartrapek~itopayata hi
vidhilJ) which supports KaUI,lQabhatta's view that injunction
means the property of being the means of achieving what the
agent desires. The compound krartrapek'iitopaydtii is to be
divided kartrape~ita :.+ upayata, arid not as kar'tarapek'iita +
upayatii which does not yield the desired meaning.
4. I have accepted the reading adhikaraIJe of the Bombay edition
instead of adhikara(zctrtt of the Benaresedition'. The explanation
in question is not that of the section kartii sastraithavattviit,
but that of M.S. III.7.8.18 which has been brought in in the
course of the discussion of that section.

~1~'fi0- >!'119'ClR q~a:r<1['91<J: q<l'!l<J:


[IV. B.3]


1l;'I +rcr:S<j~~<i<fq'I.


~!!!I<=gqp:r~'!l<J: f;n'11<,!rl:{: >!'1~'li: I

~,[~~IT "Iif:q ~,!c;-f.q ~cl<jl'I. II "

'?;Rr I

That is why it has been stated by MaI,lc;ianamiSra that there is
nothing other than the property of being the means to a desired end
that instigates men to [perform] actions. This property, [since it is]
the cause of volitional activity, is called instigation.


1. The verse quo

viveka .. '. (Vidl
brings forwar{
not the proper
i0<t'I~<=1{: ~'!r<i

answer, karik.
property of t
<fTC~'!r<jl):q f;n;
that KaUlJ.lQab:
2. any,al;: by tl
siidhyata) am
be discussed Ie



Now [if it is c1:

be denoted [by lI!v:
desired. end, [it] als.
1. The view of thE
rejected. Acco:
fold meaning a:
being the mean
feasi bili ty', all(
not entailing a
to cause volitio
q~qlru:q ~IC!

142) . For det,;iabhatta :
peities Which b
suffix 1Ifl.



"j\;f;:rqT J;t<j

f,j;'11 'lil~ ~


In this [matter]
chapter of the Anuv



li that fruit asso.on resides in the

ljunction] is charlained in Bhamatl
, since the [Vedic]
fruit heaven etc.,
person who carries
i.e., in the agent,
means of achieving

1. The verse quoted here is taken from Mlll}Ic;lanami:sra's Vidhiviveka .. ' (VidhiVi. kiirikii 27; MK, p. 3612): The purvapa~in
brings forward the objection that lIN denotes instigation,and
not the property of heing the means to a d'esired end
~IR.l:f: Q'<Rr'llql1l=l:fa [ ;or :O;'l: ~1S[1~'lTl:fm ] M.K. p. 3612). In
answer, kiirikii 27 says that instigation is the same as the
property of being the means of achieving the desired end.
~n(Q'q~'lI)T.f f;nl:[11lTT+!'tfu,il'ITl:fijq MK, p. 3612). This is the view
that KaUJJ;lr;iabhatta has followed.
2. any,a/J: by the word 'other', the property of feasibility (krtisiidhyatii) and the property of not entailing a stronger evil
(balavadani~tiinanubandhitva) are meant. Both of these will
be discussed later.
[IV.B.4] ":1 '(IHn'i!'l<q~'i.tq ~Rr<fl~l:f<~l:flfq Q"!#r'llCll:f1 'O]9'l:f<Ei ~Rfu ~<l:. I
Now [if it is claimed that] the properly of being feasible can also
be denoted [by lIN] ,since, like the property of being the means 10 a
desired end, [it] also [acts as an] instigator; [that is not acceptable] .
1. The view of the Nai)layikas has been brought in here, later to be
rejected. According to the Naiyayikas, inj1IDction has a threefold meaning and it consists of i~;<asiidhanatva 'the property of
being the means to a desired end, krtisiidhymtva .'the property of .
feasibility', and balavadani${iinanubandhitva 'the property of
not entailing a stronger evil'. All three of these are necessary
to cause volitional activity. Thus Jagadisa says in his sabdasaktiprakasika," foil~~g . 5[qij'f.f'<[9itlSff"t ",Q"llI~9im;or~ ~iF'i <r

'I: I M.S. III,7.8.18

.ater to be rejected

3. II.3:33 describes'
Otherwise (if the
tion!> yajeta
ive oblations' etc.,
5 all this section,
[plains it, (Bham.
'iew which is later

ew that injunction
achieving what the
itopaydta is to be
;8 kaTtarape~ita +
the Bombay edition
n. The explanation
:i siistrarthavattviit,
1 brought in in the


C1~ .C11~ '<[ ~fu<fI~l:f<qm!!:lOl'i!;:r<Ei <{<>q<::I~!!:T"@<{I~'i!<'i 'if Q'<'t'fiii q

142) . For details of this view see -Introduction' [E-2]. Here

KaUiI).~abhana is stating the first of these two additional pro~
perties 'Y'hich have, been prposed tb Qe the.rnea.ning of th.
. suffix 1II'i.
.."._. . ': " , ."

:o:r~c'! Q'~+!T'i'-fI>:[WF1'IT~StI~~ I " 9i1>faT 'l '<[ 9iiR,~fc::2lOl'i!'lClt foi'lT I. 9iii{;or

~ , ];f;'1lo
f.lm~" ~ll<<iCl:
. II ~ +!RG<!];f;<!l '9i1~ ~~l:fCl1liJ ~Rr mjq- I 'fili{ ~l~q ,<['f-f,~+!liJ<P:{ 'filirfll'rlra I

amiSra that there is

ans to a desired end
Iroperty, [since it is]



lOll=l:fI~'! Rfi?r~~" Qfc::g <f1'i!;1 C1~T II" ~Rr I

In this [matter] it has been said in the first section of the first
chapter of the Anuvyakhyana, "the property of being the goal of




action is none othE!r than the property of being the means to a desired
[end]. That whiGh~hould be. doneis hot invariably connected with
[covered 'by] action "(ingepenill, sinc~lhe prdhibited[action] will
alSo be':ihe'kme [Le.'action,' and so akllrya]. Neither is future
action then the goal of action; because that wiII apply to 'God will
create' also; nor can it be said that that which is' impossible not to
do [i.e., that which is possible to do, i.e., feasible], is the goal of
action, for [the same reason of its] similarity with that which ig
prohibited. Thus it [i.e., the goal of action] is the desired means."
1. The verses quoted are taken from the Anuvyakhyana of AnandatIrtha on B.S. 1.1.1 (Anuvya. 43cd, 44, and 45). Of course the
desired end in that context is the liberation and the means to
it the desired Godhead (4tade1 1ata). Thus verse 46 says "kiirya1JZ
siidhantami!ftasya bhagavan4tadevatii" Since Kaul!c;Iabhatta is
going to quote the commentary on these verses, it is not necessary to explain them here.
[IV .B.6]

fq~ij ~ '1:rF'f~'ijT<n+J:. I 'llp~''lfqfu!2'-i't'ij'f.~~9 'IT'f''f'1<!'1lJT;JT<r.

HO<l9~<':T<r. 'llT"fIRa t!:'l c::!,q~*f re~~{I;:rTlfih'ij'f.'91<r. 'lii< ~<n;fr.
~t ~ ~CfT'lQ ~""T~~T f;:r<':T'f.IT ClTij'l AI'lI~"ffQ I 'lili{ClT ~fu I

This-has_ also been explained in the Nyayasudha. "A sentence

always ends up _signifying [a meaning] qualified by the property of
being something to be- done. Also from the usage of elders, [it can
be seen that] one learns a meaning-relation only with respect
to what is associated with that which is to be done. From
this [it is clear that] anything which expresses the accomplished
thing, cannot be the signifier. How, then, do the [texts called]
Vedanta convey a pure Brahman? It is to refute this doubt that
[the authQrof the Anuvyakhyana] establishes what it [karya 'what
is to bect9Jle'] is, '[with the words]' 'kiiryatii9a'.'"
1; This passage is, based on NY~yaSu. p. 68;' lam translClting
the word kiirya as 'something to be done' or as 'goal of 'action',
'.jn accordance with the definition~ in the PtakaPaii which'SaYs;
~" '<T'$Qlr:lJQ~;;'-1a I
(p. 452). , Later on, I have thought
it best to leave it untranslated.
2. vrddhavyavahiira ': The usage of the elders is always considered
to be one of the main (and sometimes the only one) factor in
the complicated process of. smi-zketagraha 'the cognitiol,l of the


significatory ,
guageor the
involving the
action by a
These two elc
of the three, ;
i.e., older thai
the command
'bring a cow',
cow', aSvam :
so performed,
these sentenc{
'insertion anc
sentence aCCOl
the meaningi
Then when tl
by the action
meaning as a
the sentences
action of brin!
and each time
the indivi~ual
3. kiiryiinvlle ev,

meanings -of w
junctive sente:
after the sP-llte
in accordance
tence with tlie
stands'its mea
cow is an anirr
,would be .rn~a
general cqnGlq~
thing to be cior
and anything' t
any meaning.
4. Now the dout
not convey an]
cate pure Bra:
does not chanj

"'-----'----. - - -


leans to a desired
yconnected with
:ed[action] will
~either is future
.ply to 'God will
mpossible not to
J, is the goal of
;h that which is
, desired means."
lyana of Ananda). Of course the
nd the means to
46 says" karya1JZ
Kau'J!Qabhatta is
" it is not neces-

irr'l '1T'f<T'1"!'!<fTrrTi'(
.'il'll<'11i'( 'll>l 'len-a;

qfu I

9il~aT ~fu I

ha. "A sentence

, the property of
of elders, [it can
lly with respect
be done. From
:he accomplished
le [texts called]
~ this doubt that
G it [karya 'what
I am tra!Islating

'goal of 'ad ion' ,

ParL which sa);S;
, I have thought

llways considered
iy one) factor in
cognition of the



significatory. association', which is imperative in learning a languageor the mean{ng of .apew\vord. :it i\l always describd as
involviJ;ig the observation of it'c0l1v~rsation ,and the resulting
. action by .a biila'ac'nild' ," in, whith' two elders .are invoived.
These two elders are referred to as the i;,fJtortrUlvrddka, the eldest
of the three, and the madhyamavrd~ha, who is the middle one,
i.e., older than the child, but younger than the person who gives
the command. When a child hears ,the commands giimanaya
'bring a cow', asvamlinya 'bring a horse', gii1!l badhiina 'tie the
cow', asvarrz naya 'take the horse away'; and sees the actions
so performed, it learns the meaning of the individual words in
these sentences. In this procedure, the method of iivapodviipa
'insertio,n and extraction' is used. When ,the child hears the
sentence accomganied by the action of bringing a cow, at first,
the mea!ling is understood as belonging to the entire sentence.
Then when the second sentence 'bring the horse' accompanied
by the action of bringing a different animal is heard, and its
meaning as a whole is understood, ithe child sees that in both
the sentences the word .anaya 'bring' is common, and so is the
. action,of bringil).g; bu;t the words 'cow' and 'horse' are different,
and each time a different animal is brought. It is this way, 'that
the individual word-meanings are isolated.
3. karyiinvz!e eva vyutpaUe!J: According to the Prabhiikaras,
meanings of words are properly comprehended only through Injunctive sentences which involve some act to be done. Thus
after the sentence 'bring a cow' is uttered, and a cow is brought
in accordance with tha,t command, the child connects the sentence with tne visible action resulting from it, and thus under~
stands'its meaning. On the other hand, some fact such as 'a
cow is an animal', which does'not.involve,
,wo.uldbe !11~aningless tothe.~hild. ,FrplIl, this, -they draw the
general cqJ;J.(~\qsion th~t Ru,ly t~Q~~,seti~~\'!c~s, wh!Ghjnwlvesome- "
thing to be done, i.e.,mainlyinjuctiYe~ntences; are meaningful,
and anything tha.t expresses an acco~~lish~d fadcani'tot convey
any m e a n i n g . , . " .
4. Now the doubt arises'l;hat if'thus an accomplished fact does.
not convey any meaning, how is it that the Vedanta texts advocate pure Brahman ( The Brahman always' has existed and
does not change. It does not involve any action to be done:





[IV. R.IO] <a~:t[ql

To be meaningful, it has to be qualified by the property of being

the goal of action. This creates 11 difficulty for the Vedantins,
because ,they hold that anything which is kiirya could not have
existed before, and later, ~t necessarily gets destroyed, andBrahman exists eternally. How can it be called kiirya then? It is
in answer to this doubt that the Anuvyiakhyana verses define
what karyatii 'the property of being the goal of action' is, in
such a way that it does not contradict the eternal pure existence
of he Brahman.


[The state]
follows]: The
means that beca
absence of the I'
does have futui.
that future acti
claimed that] it
create'] is karya
kiiryatii] is the
1. This is the
gives the ree
karya. If f
of creating i
a kiirya. Bl
2. linviicyatiin&
since it is d
caita:t kiirya;
. However, th
before linva(
of creating .
kiirydtii has
sra~yalJi dOl

f<i~fcr ~lS[:

I ~'l~~ Cftllm'i{Hle( I
[In the verse], along with the property of being the means
to the desired [end], [the words] 'also except the property of being
the desired' are to be understood, since that is what is said in the
1. The commentator ]ayatlrtha is here referring to AnuVya. 43.
The verse itself just says 4tasiidha1'liatal!t vinii. But in the con. clusion, the adjective, 4ta 'desired' is also applied to the means
(AnuVya. 45). That is why it is being suggested that 4tatvarjz
ca vinii should also .be understood in AnuVya. 43).

1{!!<:IT'i{;rCfIf4<'l"l 1{!!<<l


'!iliirRfct I o'-1lr.>t "f;11~ I f<rli?!~~<l,,~;r"lllt: ~l"fi'i{~;r mr<91~'f"ff

Cfe( '!il'll",<l'.:r:


[The statement beginning with] 'kiiryam' [is explained as follows]: Invariably associated [with i.e.] produced [by]. [If
that invariably associated with action is considered to be kiirya] ,
killing a brahmin etc., which is prohibited, will also be the same
[i.e., kiirya] , as that also is produced by action. Hence, this [that
which is invariably associated with or in other words is produced by
action] isnbt the thing to be done ..
1. This. is the explanation of '!ili[;r W~'1io<lir.>t f.tfiiR;:l.O'l Ul'Itolcr: I
(AnuVya. 44). Thearg1,lIrient here is quite dear.



[IV.B.9] . ~ 11111 '[.a;r 91 ~a ff.rg'f,l>Wrfcr 0'f~'TG; lIfoi~:t[~:t[l

fit:t['l"lifoi~<rc<l91 m~'~CfP<r\R~ I ;r lI"~~:t[~fcr I


karya is future action or futurity in action. [This view is based

on] the following usage: [bne says] , "this has not been done by me,
nor is it being done, but has to be done." [Madhva] refutes this
. [view by 'saying] 'na bhavi~yat'.

[IV.B.II] "'[i<l:fH
'!iFl-m ,'1

The krtya [1
[by the rule] krt
doubt that kiirya
must be done, the
words] kiirya1'JZ
cepted] , adultery
etc.] being impos:
has been expres:sel
1. The word kl.
lfyaT to the





'Operty 'Of being

the' Vedantins,
couldnqt have
,yed, and BrahIa then? It is
a verses define
,f actiDn' is, in
I pure existence

lili"lFI1<J: I
~ing the means
operty 'Of being
t is said in the

AnuVya. 43.
But in the CDnd to the means
d that 4tatva11!
43) :

n;;{<ij~", ~11<'11~-

Kplained as fol:ed [by]. [If

I tD be karya] ,
lO be'the same
ence,this [that
, is produced by
Im~ ~l1<'1<I:


cr, +!~"<!~l:fl 'Ii1~


lis view is based

~en d'One by me,
vaL refutes this

[IV.JUOj <a&:l:f<I1f<I 1 ~~$"T ~w 1 l:f<I: <all;<Ic!l<l:f''l ~~"'1:1~0f;fil:fll:fT

'l'lFot"<R~ sfri 'll1<{<'11+!1'I ll:fiI: 1 '" ~<I<'ll1<{l'r'l1 fol~'Il'Ol:f<IF~ifj'llR1<J: I

[The statement beginning with] 'sra~yatt' [is explained as

fDllDWS]: The wDrd hi is used with reference tD a cause. This
means that because in the [example, 'God] will create', there is an
absence of the prDperty 'Of being the goal 'Of actiDn, even though it
does have futurity 'Of the actiDn cDnducive to creati'On; [the view
that future actiDn is kiirYIG has to be rejected]. [N Dr can it be
claimed that] it [the action of creating in the example 'God will
create'] is kiirya, since [the property 'Of being the goal 'Of action, i.e.,
karyatii] is the accepted meaning of 'lIN.
1. This is the explanatiDn of the part sraksyatHa iti hyapi which
gives the reason for rejecting the view that futurity in action is
karya. ' If future action 'is accepted' as kiirya, even the action
'Of creating in the example 'God will create' will have to be called
a karya. But creating the world is nota duty fDr,God.
2. linvacyalangikarat: As it is this reading creates difficulties,
since it is difficult to connect with the preceding sentence na
caitat kiirya;meva, f'Or which it is supposed to provide a reas'On.
'~Dwever, this could be ,done by ~upplying the w'Ord kiiryatiiyiil}
before linviicyatiingikiirat. It w'Ouldthen mean that the acti'On
'Of creating residing in God cannot be called ,kiirya, because
kiirydta has been accepted as the meaning of lIN. The form
sra~yati does n'Ot end in lIN. ' The definition is aUvyiipta.
[IV.B.II] "'[.<l:fTW " ll:fl~'f'llTit '[.TT +!'IP<I 1 <I'"'C!1~~<rWrfcr <I~'1
'!il<{ifl<'l1~~'fl:f f.i<.t"lRr 1 'lil<lfl:rfu I' G<:;:nlJl1l1"'l~~'f~~1'fl:f<'ll<J:
'Ii1<l<'llQRi'ir<>m: 1 ~wn~~ 1

The krty,a [suffixes] are introduced in the meaning 'Of necessity

[by the rule] krtyiiSca [Po IlL3.I71] . [NDW first bringing up the]
doubt that kiirya is that which it is impossible not tD dD [i.e., which
must be done, the author 'Of the Anuvy;akhyana] rejects it, with [the
wDrds] kiiryarrt [etc.]. [Then he] says that [if this view is accepted] , adultery etc. will also be a kiirya, because 'Of its [adultery'
etc.] being impossible nDt to do [if 'One is in afit 'Of passiDn]. [This
has been expressed with the wDrds] siimyiideva.'
1. The word karya has been fDrmed by adding the krtya suffix
1!yaT tD the verbal rDDt kr. (rhalor~ydtl P. III.1.124). The






krtyiisca/ P. III.3.171 prescribes krtya suffixes when necessity . ~r obligation is to be expressed. (The word iivasy;aka
'necessary' or 'obligatory' has come from the preceding ,iivaoyakiidha.nw17;lyayor1Jini};J P. III.3.170). Thus the word kiirya should .
mean something which must be done, i.e., scmething which it is
impossible not to do. TIle argument here is the same as in
[IV. B.8] .

[IV.B.12J Clf'"Ri I Cl~1l1~<:q~: I ~!i Cl<m'cl<'r 'Ill'h'lfi:l~li[ I ~f+l<<n~ I Cl>lT

~!2'<'1~l:t!2'<:!l"FI''1~'1 'IT ~u'1<ll'Cjl <J:
;n~1l1<i1 1'Jf'rRRi +[T'I ~Rr I

'Ill4,,!fgf~12maqlO:'f.<'t s Pl

tad means 'hence'. [Madhva] says that the property or being

the goal of action is the desired means [to the desired end], [with
the words] 'i~la1fl' etc. Thus, since the properties of being the desired one or the means of the desired. [end] cannot be denied [as
existing1 in the Brahman, there is no difficulty for us even though
[the Brahman] is said to be qualified by kiiryatva.
1. This is the end of the Nyayasudha passage explaining the AnuvyakhYiana verses. This passage explains the last line, in which
the conclusion of ~he whole argument is stated. The original
objection aro'se from the Prabhlikara \:iew that only those sen-
tenoes in which kiirya 'something to be done' is expressed, are
meaningful. This created a difficulty for the -Vedantins (see
note 4 on [IV.B.6]) who advocate the pure Brahman. To
avoid this difficulty, Madhva proceeded to define the meaning
of the word kiirya in such a way, tha,t even though Brahman
is admitted to be kiirya it wiII not contradict its basic nature
of pure and eternal existence. Being desired or the means of
the desired liberation does nO,t in any way compromise the
character of the Brahman, and thus the word. kiirya can be
applied to it without any difficulty.
[IV. B.13J <[3; ~lEm'Cj~,'!~'1 '<f;:ll:+iU:S(?[~"31'CjRIJ[''il<J:: Cl'! 'l'[fu: <:'-!l~Ri ~;;r I
8lfflcr'f.T'i qiP?rcrT'11<:<'fo:':~"<rl'1l! ~'!1<J: Cl'll]q 5!<a'('lTq~: I
Now if [you claim that] since the property of being the means
to a desired [end] is common with the orb of the moon, there will be
inclination to activity about tha,t [if the view that i~tasiidhanatva is
the instigator is accepted], ;that is not so. Since the property of
being the goal of action as accepted by you something thai


is past, you also

Iconcerning the 0
1. I am taking
property of I
against whicll
were quoted
being the me,
gator. Now
another obie~
to a desired ,
saril y be an i;
activity is ne
being fulfillec
bility is the
2. vVhat is this
of the referenl
and not possi
by adding th
passage [IV']
might be the
Cardoria sug!
bringing of t
idiil'tirp 'now'
of the moon
would r,efer 1
mw.u!ala is' r
mentaries, th
3. The orb of tl
something de:
sired end is c
an inclinatiOl
of the moon.
faulty. Ther
4. i~tasiidhanatt
can be true e'
is taking reee
to both sides
moon was po:
and thus it d



fixes when necesword iivasYiaka

,ceding iiv,asyakii"Ord kiirya should
:thing which it is
the same as in

is past, you also will have this fau!,t of the inclination to activity
Iconoerning the orb of the moon].
1. I am taking this passage as connected to the view that the
property of being feasible is also to be taken as an instigator,
against which the AnuVya. verses and the commentary on them
were quoted in support of the view th<'\t only the property of
being the means to a desired end is to be considered as an instigator. Now the krtisiidhyataviid'i is making a comeback with
another objec~ion, i.e., that .since the property of being the means
to a desired end exists in the orb of the moon, there will necessarily be an inclination to an activity concerning it, and such an
activity is not possible. Thus the condition of feasibility not
being fulfilled, there wm be no such fault if the view that feasibility is the instigator is accepted.
2. vV11at is this a~tivity concerning the orb of the moon? Because
of the reference to its being sorriething which is past (atitakiirya) ,
and not possible now (since later on the fault has been removed
by adding the adjective idiini1'(t 'now' ~o feasibility ill the next
passage [IV.B.14]), it seems to me that the activity concerned
might be the creating of the moon (candrama1J.l/alanirmii~za).
Cardona suggests that it is also possible to think of it as the
bringing of the moon (candra;ma:IJl/aliinaYlana). In this case
idiiniiJ!z 'now' must be taken to refer to daytime when bringing
of the moon is not possible, whereas atita 'past' in this case
would refer to the night. Since the reference to the oandmma:~u!ala is'rather cryptic in the text, and there are no commentaries, there is rio clue to :the exact intention of the author.
3. The orb of the moon gives pleasure, and is thus the means of
something desired. If the property of being the means to a desired end is accepted as the only instigator, this would lead to
an inclination to activity (pravrttij.: i.e.; creating or bringing
of the moon. But this is not possible, and thus this view is
faulty. Therefore it cannot be accepted.
4. i${asiidhtmatvaviidi answers this objection by showing that .it
can be true even if feasibility is accepted as an instigator: This
is taking recourse to the maxjm thata fault which is common
to both sides cannot be held against either. Creating of the
moon was possible once (i.e., when the moon was first created) ,
and thus it did have the property of feasibility. Since that is

I ~f~<l:fl!G: I Q'-11
foIfu2!!TaQT<{'Ii<'t s fq

lroperty of being
;ired end], [with
of being the deot be denied [as
. us eVen though

'laining the Anu1st line, in which

d. The original
; only those senis expressed, are
,Vedantins (see
,Brahma11. To
fine the meaning
though Brahman
its basic nature
or the means of
compromise tbc
'd kiirya can be
!~Rr: ~'!T!G:fcr ~;;r

~lq~: I

being the means

lon, there will be
'~tasiidhanatva is
the property of
1 something that





is not removed.
moon [pleasure]
property now-ne<
being the means.
inclination to do
For us [krtisiidh;
. adjective of actio
1. The fault is
of desire. N
object of desi
injunction st
sacrifice' inst
fonn a sacrifi
But this hea'
the sacrifice ~
exist 'now', i
if now-ness c
additional dil
There will bE
avoided at al
2. In the caSe 0
being feasiblE
Now-ness is i:
Since creatin
feasible now,
does not ariSE
fruit of heave]
now, -the acti<
feasible now.
[IV.B,16] fiI; '<f 'P1

the instigator according to the krtisiidhyatiiviidi, the fault exists

even when this view is accepted, as it has not so far been specified
that to be an instigator, the property of being feasible cannot
be past.
[TV.B.l4] ~ '!iT~cn~!l;j <r~fu ~<r. I ~<::Fl1fuq'-1N<lC!l~!l;j <ritf<r '-1liT<ll{ I
<rli+rr~2'-1N<lCC!1"'l'!iTir''1li'1 R%r'fgli~;H<'Il<r. '11"'1<'1 liFl1111'11'<'q ;r
crq; fo\>:'1tr ~fu I Cl <r. g"~B: I
[If it is claimed that only] the knowledge of the [existence]

of the property of being the goal of action 'now' is like that [i.e.,
instigqtor], [we can] equally [say] that the knowledge of the property of being the means to a desired end 'now' is 'that way [the
instigator]. Therefore, since it is impossible to explain the property
of being the goal of action as other than the property of being the
means to a desired end, and since there is no evidence to [support
that anything else] is the de,noted meaning [of lIN] ; that [anything
other than the property of being the means to a desired end] is not
the meaning of injunction. [All this argument in favour of ~tasjjdha
natva as the only instigator] is inane.
1. The fault mentioned in [IV.B.13] is removed here.
2. The i$tasiidhanatvaviidi tries 'to imitate the s~metactics. The
reason for this being an empty argument will be explained in ,
the' next passage.
lIV.B,l5] ~liu:g<lTr;j ~~<nq~T 'liRrm>:'1<rT;ul<lli'1 ~'1r9i<'ll<r.1 ., ~<::1;:r1f~12'-1N<l<r1;u1;f ~'1rO!P <r~ <r?f ;:rr~fu 9l"'1l{ I ~a:Rf<R<'Im"~l'1H<r
rn:"f'lli'1 <iT fo\~"f11jl{ I an;q ";:~liu:S<l'fjiil ~"m'1T ~O:T<ll '-1~~91<r.
. tD"fIR'lffl: I 3!<r 1l:'1 ., \1T"li't '-11"l<l~ 'IT I 3!"'i\ '1FT1<D ~'lffi~
li9fJli1i<n;ffCf<l<9Tlil'l1<r. I 3!lili1'!i :9;<l: 'liCflfolGJ<lffi<l,et
fqffi~fu ;r ~"f: I

[The argument in favour of ~tlasiidhanatva in IV.B.14 is inane]

as the knowledge of feasibility is the instigator. [Otherwise] there
will be the fault of the inclination to an activity concerning the orb
of the moon. Nor can it be said that [only] the knowledge of the
property of being the means to a desired end 'now' is the instigator
and -that does not exist in that [the activity concerning the orb of
the moon]. The property now-ness can be adjective either (1) of
the desire, or (2) of its object. In :the . first alternative,

fq'o'1;'<2t ;




Moreover, the
the goa! of action
is [in the context
either (1) the ins
[alternative], that


the fault exists

ar been specified
feasible cannot

is not removed The desire relative to the fruit of the orb of the
moon [pleasure] now is evident for all. For the same reason [the
property now-ness cannot qualify] the means or the property of
being the means. In the last alternative [no. 2], there will be no
inclination to do sacrifices etc., since' heaven does not exist now_
For us [krtisiidhyatiivlidina~] however the property now-ness is the
adjective of actiori .. Hence there is no fault.
1. The fault is not removed by taking 'now-ness' as the adjective
of desire. Nor can now-ness be taken as the adjective of the
object of desire in order to ge;G out of this difficulty. The Vedic
injunction svargakiimo y,aj.eta 'one desirous of heaven should
sacrifice' instigates the person with a desire for heaven to perform a sacrifice. In this case, the object of desire is the heaven.
But this heaven is produced by the merit which results after
the sacrifice and as far as the sacrificer is concerned, does not
exist 'now', i.e., when he becomes inclined to sacrifice. Thus
if now-ness of the object of desire is insisted upon, it creates
additional difficu~ty, instead of removing the one in question.
There will be no inclination to sacrifice, a fault that must be
avoided at all costs.
In of those whoacceP[t. the view that the property of
being feasible is also an instigator, this fault does not arise.
Now-ness is in this case taken to be an adjective of the action.
SInce creating or bringing of the moon is not an action that. is
feasible now, the fault tha.t there will be inclination towards it
does not arise. In the case of the sacrifice that produces the
fruit of heaven, even thongh the heaven may not be in existence
now, the action leading to it, i.e., performing the sacrifice, is
feasible nj)w. Thus there will be no difficulty in that case either ..

~ C!~fC! <:!l1Fl+J:. 1
~~ l1HTl1l91~ ;or



the [existence]
, like that [Le.,
odge of the pro,that waY [the
iin the property
rty of being the
nce to [support
; that [anything
ired end] is not
our of 4tasiidha.ere.
ne tactics. The
be explained in
OJ ~o.l;:jlfli1'!





<l'Tm<i:1 ~'lRR

V.B.14 is inane]

)therwise] there
lcerning the orb
:nowledge of the
is the instigator
:ning the orb of
iTe either (1) of
lative, the fault


2: .

[IV.B.16] l"fi 'C[ 'Iil'li OJ f,\;'1I"';:'1<'i~'ifli'fG 1i~q@'~;t 'fiT'1c!l<U: Q'eRr'fi<El

fq<'1~<~ 'If 1 3ff?!' ~~<:!f'C{rri R<!l Q'~'1'1'rrml: Q<:'I1]q 'i\<::R<[+j.jf~T

<:!~~rr <H,'I' i1~'1''1f 1 >l'l~: 13'~fu~<l'l1 Q'eRr'li<:'1 (RffGQ'13'9'~\'tIi[II[<l'l1 C!G.;Ctli[lI[f<:!~~ ~ 1

Moreover, the refutation by Madhva that the property of being

the goal of action is not [just] being something produced by action, .
is [in the context of] the property of being the goal of action being
either (1) the instigator, or (2) the meaning of lIN. In the first
[alternative], that [the view that the instigator is i$(asiidhanatva]




$edha. The
between these

"is equal [in fault with the view that the instigator is anything pnr'
duced by action], [for ,the following reasons] : There is no inclination to activity without the property of being the means to a desired
end, and that [the property of being the means to a desired end]
also exists in [prohibited actions such as] adultery etc.. Since the
inclination to do prohibited things is well established, overapplication
of the instigator in that [direction] cannot be a fault. Therefore,
the objection [brought against the view that the goal of action is
anything produced by action] is irrelevant.
1. Here the opponent to the i~t,asiidhanatva view is referring back to
the objection stated in AnuVya. 44. See [IV.B.8].
S"F<lt RiSrliltfllilRu'1 Rq"i!l;:1l<\"r ;r ~~1l <rl~ 'fi~1l:.1 Cli[
'1!'1llllJf<;:lo1:[1 Cl'lTfiT '1"+!Hl+ro1:[oi" ~''1WCf'!;~''IGt;,fu ~'l'i I
In the last [alternative, i.e., if kiiryiitii (in this case, being anything that is produced by action) is taken to be the meaning of IDy] ,
the only' objection that results is that in ordinary negation, there
y;'ilIbeno connection [of UN] ,vith'the negative. But this [objection] is equally [true] for you also, as will be explained later.
111erefore, enough of [bringing up these] faults which are c()nfusing.
. [only] to a disciple. This is the [general} direction [thrust, of the
argument] .
1. ,If 'being produced by adion' . (kriyiijanydtva) is taken to be
the meaning of lIlv, there will be difficulty in connecting it with
the negative particle in the ordinary negation. By ordinary
negation, here prasajyaprati:!edha is meant, as prasajyapratisedha is generally considered to be the normal type of negation,
the other kind being the eXception. see Introduction [I-I].
2. prasajyaP7l!lti~edha: In P8!t).iniarr tradition, Patai'ijali was the
first who has shown the distincion between the two kinds of
negation, namely, prasajyaprat4edha and paryudiisa. (M.B.
vol. 1, p. 101 etc.). The I\tIimarp.sakas in their diEcussion of the
tli~edhavidh'i 'negative injunction' go in great detail about the
function and characteristics of these two kinds of negation.
Out of thes~ two prasajyapr:dti~edha is considered to be the
nOrn1al or ordinary negation, and only when it cannot be applied,
is the second kind of negation, namely, paryudiisa is accepted.
That is why, in our text, the word ni~.edhasiidhiira~~ye 'in the
case of the ordinary negation' is .used to refer to prasajyaprati-

~ I J;fRriStor: '1"
known as par:

with the firs

[whereas] th:
which the neg
ber [of the VI
4. The kriyajan)
same fault, i.E
with lIIv in t
for his oppon,
of being the m
in the view of
on [in IV.I] c
it is not,necess
[IV.B.I8] ~fi3v~11l




. lIN is only the pro'

meaning componer
not [an additional
- emmot be the word
eire. It can be (
ending with verbal
1. The passage ql
putting forwar,
natva and krtis
in this passage



Like lAT etc.,

by virtue of the ge
[kfti] further has aJ
which is the denot
ending; i.e., the vert


is anything pro
ere is no inclinaeans to a desired
a desired endJ
etc.. Since the
:, overapplication
ault. Therefore,
goal of act;on is
referring back to
r.B.8J .-


r;jfu ~'fi I

I C!~

case, being anymeaning of lIN] ,

- negation, there
But this [objeeexplained later.
teh are confusing
n [thrust, of the


is taken to be
)llllecting it with
n. By ordinary
_s prasajyaprati:-ype Of negation,
juction [I-IJ.
atafijaJi was the
he ,two kinds of
yudasa. (M.B.
discussion of the
detail about the
Ids of negation.
dered to be the
mnot be applied,
liisa is accepted.
ihara~~ye 'in the
:0 prasajyaprati-



$edha. - The following oftquoted verse states the difference

between these two kinds of negation: 'l~ro:" fg~>l\ 'l?f q~~
'" be
;P{ I J:ffuq"l: ~ ~<IT 'l?[j,<:!{<[~<[ <[Of II 'That [negationJ should
known as paryudJiSia in which the negative particle [is connectedJ
with the first member [in the verb form, i.e., the verb];
[whereas] that [negation] should be known as pratUjedha in
which the negative particle [is connected] with the second member [of the verb form, i.e., the suffix] '.
4. The kriyajanyatvavadi answers this objection by saying that the
same fault, i.e., that the negative particle cannot be connected
with lIllin the ordinary negation, can also shown to be true
for his opponent's view, i.e., the meaning of lIN is the property
of being the means to a desired end. As to how this filult exists'
in the view of i${asadhanatva is not discussed here. Since later
on [in IV.I] considerable space will be devoted to this problem,
it is not necessary to go into elaborations at this point.


;a~'>T'11~g ~'S"~~g ~e!lJl,<!<[,Fj~Fj I <[ 11 'lifulJl~'l,FJioJrsf<t I

C!~:qI''l''<[,1t;jI~o~Tir'FjI<r. T 3l1~'-T1e!FG'<!I11lITl=!"!I<r. e!RB~: I

Nrsi:qlhasrama however [holds -the following] : the meaning of

llzv"is only the property of ,being a means to what is beneficial. The
meaning component [a1]OlSa]..,..., the property of being feasible - is
not [an additional meaning]. That- [the property of being feasible]
c~rmot be the word-meaning since it can be obtained from something _
else. It can be established on the strength of the verbal- root
ending with verbal suffix.
1. The passage quoted here is found in VeTaVi. p. 67. After first
putting forward the alternative that lIN denotes both i$tastidhanatva and krtistidhydtva, Nrsi:qlhasrama comes to the view stated
in this passage, the argument involved will be clear in the next
~:S1~~ ~,FjlJlI1F'-T1'liitIJ[IRCI :srf"om:. ~ciT ~fij:e!: I ~l 'Of ~f9q'll
lIHfi'rot{lll;cP'llerr;{ f,j"p.n'f.~C!l~ 5[~Rrfoiq'l~'l~lJl~'l<'i "'Ie! ~9 I
Like lAT etc., UN -is possessed of the capacity to denote krti,


by virtue of the general feature of their being verb endings. That

[kfti] further has an object. lit makes its object that action [bhava]
which is the denoted meaning of the item uttered with [the lIN
ending; i.e., the verbal root]. In this way, one obtains the property




of being that which can be achieved [feasible] [as belonging tol

the objec;t of inclination to act [without attributing this meaning
to lIN].
1. The argument here is tha,t it is not necessary to say that lIN
denotes feasibility. Tha,t meaning is available otherwise. Only
that meaning which is not denoted by anything else can be said to
be the meaning of the word 'in question rananyalabhyal;
In support of this it has been explained as to how the meaning feasibility can be obtained without ascribing it to UN. The
verbal ending in a form such as yajeta has two properties :
(1) liiltva: the property of being lIN, and (2) iikhyiilcttvlJ:
the property of being a verbal ending which is common to all
the ten I-members, This property has been referred to as tiiltva
The purpose of the whole discw:sion is to determine the
meaning obtained from the liiltva aspect of the suffix. Here it
has been put forward that the liiltv,a aspect gives the meaning
i$tasiidhanatva. It has been admitted ~hat it is necessary to
know that the objec:t of activity is feasible. But the knowledge
of feasibility can be obtained with the help of the tiiltV!a aspect
of the verbal ending, which is common to all the :ten lakiiras.
This common meaning is action" and its object is provided
'by the meaning of the verb which is uttered along with the
suffix. Thus:



lintva + iikhyatatva( =tintva)



krti (action)

the object of action

yZiga (sacrifice)


Here by the cc
object, it is cogn
thing that' can 1


'" . lJ1'"

'iJT~;;~>li: <3

q~T 'if Rrof,t~

Nor should [om

desire to do cannot t
nised as qualifiers, bl
elsewhere that the
relationship when tl
as in pacati 'he cook
conducive to sacrifie<
cando Thus also des:
ment] is unjustifiablo
-denotative function
1. ' These are some
vious passage, a
'bility can be 0
endings. The fi:
two kinds: (a
meaning such a~
In a qualificativc
(b) sa1Jlsargatiii
denoted by lingt
the connection OJ
Hence it can be
bility cannot be (
. 'Thedefloi;ed me
(in'rtote 1, rV.E
that 'the meaniI:
been explained el
as a result of a cc
-have the same ql
jari that the caus,




[as belonging to]

ting this meaning
y to say that lIN
e otherwise. Only
: else can be said to


, to how the meanng it to UN. The

wo properties :
(2) akhyal,r.ttva:

is common to all
,ferred to as tiittva
to determine the
he suffix. Here it
gives the meaning
it is necessary to
But the knowledge
f the tifltv,a aspect
II the :ten lakaras.
)bject is provided
d along with the

!Iva (=tii1tva)



Here by the connection of the two meanings action and its

object, it is cognised that the object of action (sacrifice) is some- .
. thing that can be atcomplished by action, i.e.; it is feasible. .
[IV. I ,.20J 0{ ~<i l31"'!fllta:. <:ilJ~Q'11

'11'11"0{ . ~'Ill1:Q;ua f'if'lilJl:'j;'lqfu; I

;al~'"~'1T: <3l'll'1q'fiR'Il~ ~gt!l'l~I'l~'1 S!;:zr5{T'l'l1(Fn~1 1'1; 9"
'l9"a1<'1~'I15{lfq '-TFll:'j;'fi051 ~Fcrf{<'-Fq'1'1T'ilr' +r~;;r g '1111fqitt~'1'f.: I
Q~l 9" Rl'lllql:!'l'lRi{'I fqN~,<na:: ~<ill(l'f<'l+rl~o{l:!'l'l<a~Fcr 'Il'"'1ll:, I

Nor should [one object ,by] saying the following: In this way,
desire to do cannot be justified, since feasibility etc. are not now cognised as qualifiers, but as relational [vi~ayata]. It has been explained
elsewhere that the cognition and the desire have the cause-effect
relationship when they both have the same qualifier. In addition,
as in pacati 'he cooks', here also, the cognition will be that of ac:ion
conducive to sacrifice, and not that in which sacrifice is the qualificando Thus also desire to do cannot be justified. [The whole argument] is unjustifiable also because the vidhikrt etc., do not have the
denotative function for action.
L ,These are some objections to 'the, view put forward in the pre- _
vious passage, according to which, the meaning element feasi-_ bility can be obtained ~rom the tifltva aspect of the verbal
endings. The first objection is as follows : _ vi~ayata can be of
two kinds: (a) prakaratakhyavi~ayata: which is a denoted
meaning such as ghatatva 'potness', is of the word ghata 'pot'.
In a qualificative cognition, this occupies the place of a qualifier.
(b) sa'/flsargatakhylCl vi~ayata : which on the other hand, is not
denoted by linguistic elements directly, hut can he obtained by
the connection or the joining together of these linguistic dements.
Hence it can be called relatiohalvi~ayatg.The meaningieasihility cannot be cognised ftom ycijetl1- 'li_eshouldsacritice'dir~tly. , 'The' denoted meanings -ate';acrj.fice,+"acHon :iishown' above.
(iririote 1, IV.B:T9)'. It is-~fhroughjoining' these two together
. that the meanIng feasibliity is obtained. Thus the meaning
feasibility will not be a qualifier of :the cognition. Now it has
been explained elsewhere that in order for desire to be generated
as a result of a cognition, both the desire and the cognition must
have the same qualifier. Thus it has been said in the Nyayamanjari that the cause of the inclination to act is the desire which has



feasibility as a qulifier, and the cause .of that (desire) is ihe

cogni~ion. with fe;J.sibility <is, a q~alifieI: .. , ,[Nya.yMafi. p. 248].
Alsollee Ranl. p. 506 .. What ,w~.actllaliY find in, the example
yajeia, is tha:t the qualifiers are not the saine forthe desii-e and
the cognition which is to be its cause, siricethe mea~ing' feasibility
is not obtained as a qualifier of the 'cognition, but only as relational viiiayatii. In this case the relation of cause and effect
cannot exist between this cognition and the desire. Therefore
desire cannot be justified.
2. The second objection is that in order to get the meaning feasibility, the cognition must have sacrifice as the qualificand. The
form of the cognition should thus be yiiga~ matkrtisiidhya~1 'the
. sacrifice is feasible for me' .. But this is not possible. Just as
in pacati 'he cooks', the form of the cognition is piikiinukulii
krti~, in yajeta it will be yiigiinukUlii krti~ 'action or effort
conducive to the sacrifice, in which sacrifice is a subordinate
qualifier. Thus the meaning feasibility cannot be obtained, and
desire cannot be justified.
3. The third and the last objection challenges .the very base of the
view that the meaning feasibility can be obtained through the
general aspec;tof the verbai ending, .which is taken to mean
kiti. Suffixes such as :the ones. called v'iclhikrt do not have the
denotative func;tion for the meaning krti. The word krti is here
taken to mean effort (prayaf:1~a), in accordance with the Naiyiayika view. (kTti according to the Grammarians means kriyiisiimiinya 'action in general'). kit suffixes generally mean the
agent according to karMri krt/ P. IIL4.67. According to the
Naiyayika interpretation,. this can be. made to mean effort, since
agehtness (kartTtva). is the same ,a~ effort (krti). But the
1;IiiJhikrts. ilre art exception tothisgeI!eral. rule, and :me:j.n bhava
<)l;ld f?atman; (P,!IIIk70}.';.. Thlls;;they do not. del1ot~ikrti in
.. either the Grammarian Qf,tlw;;Naiy;ayika point9f.vJ~w. Thus,
since the meaning 'effort~js'J1btobtained -in the first place, the
question. of ,what its object is aJjld the connection between the
two supposed to yieldthe.meaning feasibility does not
arise; Therefore the. whole argument about obtaining the meaning feasibility from somewhere else and thus not attribute it
to lIN cannot be justified.
4. This whole argument takes the non-grammarian view about the


. general aspec'
NaiyG.yil$a in
rule lalJ, krm
been accepte(
denote the m
the other han
and thus obt
etc. It is ve
base in a gr:
as brought in
Incidentally, i
tattvaviveka :
buted to him
view that the
bility, since f
. verbal root en
The rest of tl
tions and ans'
srama by ou

is no trace of
are available .
[IV.B.21) IF,%'1 '1"

. .

. 'IT'f<f<'11""

[The aboverhl
afterwards to have
abtained. by .the in
[sacrifice] ispottl
of being flO?-sible fa
intention is as foIl
Veda, it by itself i
do sometb
qualified by the "p:




at (desire) is the
yayMaii. p. 248J.
ld_ in)he. exa.mple
for the desire -and
neaning feasibility
, but only as relaf cause and effect
desire. Therefore
-lIe meaning feasiqualificand. The
1t!qtisiidhyalJ 'the
possible. Just as_
on is piikanukulii
'action or effort
is a subordinate
; be obtained, and
e very base of the
~ined -'through" the

is taken to mean

t do not have the

! word krti is here :e with the Naiyiaians means kriyiimerally mean the
According to the
nleati' effort, since
(krti). But the
, and :meGln bhiiva
:lot. dl<note,krti in
It 9fy.i~w. Thus,
;he first place, the
ction between the
easibility does not
ltaining the meanl not attribute it

an view about the



_interpretation of pa1).iniarpules.for, granted. - The only way the'_

_general aspect of. the verqall"ndingscan Jlenot,e krti is .wboh the
. N aiyi).Yilsa interpretqtign.(see PLIyI. p."106)_ ,?f the Fai,linia,.n
rule lalJ karma1Ji ca bhiiva ciikamakebhya(ll P .. III.4.69, has
been aocepted.According to tl),e grammarians, -these suffixes
denote the meanings agent, object and bhiiva. Naiyaylkas on,
the other hand, interprete the rule by addiIlg tva to these words,
and thus obtain the meanings kartrtva (Le., kiti) , karmatva
etc. It is very strange to frod this Naiyayika view used as a
base in a grammar text, even though it has been attributed'
as brought in as a purvapak~a by the Vedantin Nrsil!lhlisrama.
Incidentally, in both of Nrslll1hasrama's books, Le. the Vedantatattvaviveka and the Advaitadlpika, this whole discussion attributed to him cannot be found. Only a bare statemen)t of his.
view that the meaning of lIN is hitasadhandtva and not feasibility, since feasibility can be obtained on the sltrength of the
'verbal root ending in a suffix is to be found in the VeTaVi. p. 67.
, The rest of the discussion which elaborates on this with objections and answers to them has also been atltributed to Nrslipha, srama by our author very clearly' with the .words beginning
nrsiJrihiisMmiistu and ending iti priihulJ [IV.B.21J '. But there'
is no trace of all )this in the texts written by Nrsliphasrama that
are available to 'us, as has already been pointed out.
[IV.B.21] +!<l%'1lf~I~'[~<Tr~.+1'1lo:. 1 <lll;1 <1FT! ll<'[.fuBI'<."1:[: ll<'[.fuBl'<<i<ormtN'llll<!N'll{1T[<'!I~!~lll<ll<J:. Cla;>!~ s:fu ms: 'I 'a'TIll"lll~"!: I'
'[.fu6l'<."1:[<'1+n~ ~<::omasfq- <! (Ir+n?i >:r'lT'f.~ 1 S'!~9'(I~I]rr
>:r~lf<a: 1 ff.11 li~ili~~I, CI~'i:[ 05'jf.l;'f.>[1'fl'Jt<llftt ul1'1C1lf(l <l
fq~a'3{ '5Jf<fa,"'1Oll'''!<fIlr( L .lJ<t~l'l[<ij+1I'-tIJj"" 'l~<l<!r'Cjilil111'". ~9'''!<orl..:i~lfu; 1 ,. " :': 'i.;'/'l~, .,'. , "
,', [The abovementioned-.objeetio;;ls
is ,pO$sible'
'. " .'
-, ,"'1-':. " ' ..
afterwards to have a cogniti(}J;l. ~ike tMtJbi:,tlie;m,i.~d,Atsel,f;,or itxan be" ,
abtained,bythe inference that the sacl:jfice is,reasibl~~ot me;. sin2e jt '
[sacrifice] i~~notthelocus,of a property contradict6ryto thepropeity ,
. of being f~flsible for me. This isvvhat [Nrsii!lbliSrama] haS said; His
intention is as folloWs': even if just feasibility' 'is 'known from"the'
veda, it by itself is not the instigator. Otherwise even a person not
able to do something will be inclined to do it. Thus [feasibility]
qualified by the part 'me' [is the instigator] ; and that it is possible,



[to get] by common sense also.. Thus lIN does not have the deno-

tative function with respect :to it, since it can be obtained otherwise,
and since it is impossible for the Veda to denote [feasibility] including the part 'me'.
1. in this passage, the objections mentioned in the previous passage
. are answered. Even if the cognition connecting action and its
object is as a relational vi~ayatii and not as a qualifier, and eve?
if the cognition resulting from yajeta would not have the sa;;nfice as the qualificand originally; the mind can make the connection and later a cognition in which sacrifice is the qualificand is
possible. But this does not remove objection no. 3,which points
out that the vidhikrt suffixes do not have the denota:tive function for krti. Thu~ an alternative answer to the problem has
been pro~sed in the form of ,the' inference that the sacrifice is
feasible for me because it is not a locus of any property contradictory of its being feasible for me. Here for the first time,
personal' elemenjl; has been introduced along with feasibility.
Thus the sacrifice should not only be feasible, which it can be
called even if only one person was capable of'performing it; but
it should be specifically. be feasible for me, the person who is
supposed to have the desire ~o Perform it: If :his. were not s.o,
even a person nqt able to perform it would be mclmed to do. It.
It will be like a cripple deciding to swim across the EnglIsh
Channel, because after all it has been proved to be feasible by
other people. The addition of personal eleme~t is a~o~~er
argument in favour of not attributing the meanmg feasIbIlIty
to lIN. After all the Veda cannot cause the cognition of the
element 'me'. It is intended for all, and not just for one person.
Thus we have to look elsewhere for the means to obtain this
meaning. KaUlJ"abhatta thinks that it 'is possible. ~o obtain
it even by common sense. ". Sirice it cah thus be obtamed elsewhere, lIN cannot'be said'to have -a denotative function ,for it;2 ... As has already' blien pOinted out, this whole argument cannot
be found in the works of Nrsirp.hasrama available to us. .
{IV.B.22] ~: ~Rrm<<rcl1m~ ;or' ~'1ci<i; ~''RIri~ ~~'f~'1~(!(! ~ml~;or
'pnwl'f"!;or'f.foj;or ~l('{. I ;orlcRCI";p:j'l:, I ;or "f R'I>'l'-ll~D~;or CI~;p:j'l:,1
~'liCl~"'1lTlil~'lftql"'i~'Il('{. I

Actually, the cognition of feasibility is not the instigator. The


non-inclination towe
by the aversion [to
anything desired;al
. Hence it [feasibilit:
[can itbe said ~hat]
with the desire to do
can be cognised by
1. Here KaUl.l~abl
alone is !the im
it cannot be th
agreed upon ~h
the instigator. '
is that even the
perty of being 1
the instigatorm
made to obtain
by resorting to
in [IV.B.21]. 4
passage, the in:
is it then that
something not I
. is from. aversiO! .
definitely does I
labour. The r
bhiiva) betweel
established by,
comitance', wh
tasmin sati tal
occurs, Y also (
'absent. Thus 1
. an averSion tCi
is an' absence I
[IV. B.23]

~ ~1'!m"F


;:'f1~;or' ~



Nor [should on


.. - . .




not have the denoobtained otherwise,

[feasibility] includ;he previous passage
:ting action and its
l qualifier, and even
not have the sa~ri
III make the connecis the qualificapd is
no. 3, which points
he denota:tive func:0 the problem has
~hat the sacrifice is
ny property contrafor the first, time,
19 with feasibility.
Ie, which it can be
[performing it; but
the Person who is ,
If this were not so,
)e inclined to do it.
across the English
d to be feasible by
:lement is another
meaning feasibility
le cognition of the
just f(Ji one person.
:ans to obtain this
possible to obtain
.s be obtained else;ive fundiun-:ior it.~
e 'argument cannot
lable to us.

aa ~1+Tl~
'Il1q]!!D1rr CI"v'P1+{ I
le instigator. The

non-inclination towards tha,t whim is not feasible, [can be explained]

by the aversion [toit] , which is caused because it does not [cauS"e,l
anythingdesired,and ~hus cteates[all that] tr-oub\e for . nothing.
Hence it [feasibility) isno;t the denoted meaning:. [oflliV}. Nor,
[can it be saId ~hat] it is the denoted mea:riing [oflIN]- inacc~r~~nce
with the desire to do [tha;t which is feasible]. Since that, [feasIbIlIty]
can be cognised by common [sense],. the desire to do is possible..
1. Here KaUl)9abhatta has given his own view that 4tasiidhanatva
alone is tthe instigator. Since feasibility is not the instigator,
it cannot be the denoted meaning of lIN. It has already been
agreed upon ~hat the meaning of lIN is the property.of be!ng
the instigator. The difference between this and the prevIous vIew
is that even though both contain that lIN denotes only the property of being the means to a desired end, in the previous view,
the instigatorness of feasibility was not questioned. Efforl was
made to obtain that meaning without taking recourse to lIN, i.e.,
by resorting to the relational vi~ayata or the inference explained
in [IV.B.21J. On 'the other hand, in the view set forth in this
passag,e, the instigatorriess of feasibility is not accepted. How
is it then that we find no inclination ~o activity in the case of
something not feasible? The answer suggested here is that the,
non-inclina;tion to activity in the case of something not feasible
is from aversion created by the fact the unfeasible. activity
definitely does not achieve anYithing desired, and thus is a useless
labour. The relationship of cause and effect (karyakiirmJa-,
bhiiva) between aversion and noninclination to activity can be
established by anvaya and vyartir.eka 'positive and negative concomitance', which is generally stated in the following form:
tasmin sati tadbhavati,'tasminnasati tadabhii1)a~. When X
occurs Y also occurs. When there is an absence of X, Y is also
'absent: Thus there is.noninclinatlon to activity \hen there is ,
an: aversiont6 that activity. ' 'YheI! tlietds. P? ~v~rsi?n, there
is an' absence of ''rt(;n~inc]jriatiori.,i'" " '"
.' ,., ';" "

~El31~rral;jr.=i~~ ~,,~~f<jrr<:!lln: IsifrrE~n"<f.l~<ml1~ ~ 'Ii-g,

. q;ijfu;:l:fl~ "l~~I!~~ "i;:"ll;:;f ~"lfuRfu <n'"'l+lI~l~<i'P 81RP~l~~il ~qp:n"~I'1111~;f<t:


~~reml:fl' 81~D1rr,a~'1 Wla'fi-

Nor [should one objectJ by saying the following:. The property


---.-- ....



of. being the means tp

a .desired ,end will also, not

be the. instigator.

,1;"0.).', thet:..e is,n0.jnclination to ac,tiv~ty .iJ.1.the, case of something whh;)1

,;!}.i;t)1ges"a~,.ungesi~ij.pleJ;.t;sult .or somt;thing, ,whi{;h IS;D,eutral; becau,qe
.. ofave\siQn pprn pU~lpf. it$ inv9lVil!g useltisslabour, as is exemp!lfie.d

:lin ,the expressionJ.'difficult work'. It)s necessary [to consider1 it

,[4tasiidhanatllt~] as an instigator, ~aking into account theunive,r-

, sally established non-inclination towards [activity] which may not

cause something desired and does involve effort, even when there
is an absence of aversion.
1. In this passage, the opponent has tried to use the same argument (taking recourse to aversion) that Kal1J.lQabhatta has used
to refute the instigatorness of feasibility, in order to object to
the instigatorness of iIitasiidhandtva also. Kal1J.lQabhatta answers
this by pointing out )that aversion cannot be the .cause of non-,
inclination in all the cases.
rv.B.24] lii ~!HrriF[Ir.r~9Tf~IS{'Hrr'<1<{'Ei Ci'f Wf'!<Ei ~'I<iifG:'Jl'<1<I<9lfG:'l1 ~
~1Jf ~H~'l !:['l!'lilliJ: I <{ fc'l~<{ I ~"~'tll;:n'lq1JlJniJ: I Cl~'!{1:
~'l~qCf 12:9 ~g'91iJ: I <f"-fiit <.?T'li 'f<'llG; :J<i!:[ijT"l'!!l Wl~~~ fj;~fG:i!
~m9T 11T !:[orT'l~fu mll !:[9!Cf 12:9 CI'!!llq 'lWl'<lC<f<fl<fRllJl t 1j snBfi+r'li
:q foIfu'Gt[ Cf'i'tlR fq'll <{ !:['[~Rfci f1fu t 1l9 RM'l1 <fT"l'l1<frnlCf fe!fiTt~
<l~ ;Uffil~l I 3lCf 1l:9 il'li q;<.?lJ"~H~~'Cl'[~r.1jcn~;u~~ Cllfu~'lT

s<;a;,! ~I
Moreover, the property of being the means of the desired end
is (the same as) being the means to the object o'f desire. It is
the denoted meaning through being )the means of achieving heaven
etc., since it is only in that form that the cognition [of the property
of being the means to a desired -end] is. the' instigator. [It is not
an instigator ,in )the form of being the means] of just something
"desired, since the .cognition of desire is: not ,necessary.. It is an
.' instiga~or \)Yo: its ver~J1.at11fe.' . .Even tho~g~ ~r.i comrpQ~ ex,\lerience,
[a man] does become mclmed. to.. act at it~e ,cpmmand,qfone res. p{;ted, knowing that [this perwri] is instigating me knowing some-thil!g which is good [for me] ; in the case of [activity] concerning
the' other world, which is to be accomplished at much expense and
trouble, there is no inclination to activity without the specific cognition of it [the object of desire]. So lIN must signify it specifically.
Therefore, the denotative function of that [lIN] should be accepted


lls being specific [r.

thoug\;l in' common
~~gardil(lg ,~4e jruit,
i~",necessary.,", ,

Cf'f' ~,,~

a'<'1l'L, I

In that, in or
desire is the consec
iug-ness; as in the c
1. ak)l1afavaccheG

.denoted meani

word to denot
denoted meanil
the denoted m
property. All
of being a den
of their indiviC
of a word. Th
both thedenoi
of the property
on the other h"
accepted as th
the property 0
Thus the word
individual pot,
denoted meanin
'one desirous oj
"the denoted mel
the means of, ac
2. in this case, tl
different meanin
befOte[in Iv.Ii
. is necessary. T
. being the mean~
heaven, will ari&

be able to know


t be the instigator.

3f something which
iS~I1,eutral; .becau,qe
lr, as is exen).pllfi~d
ry [to consider1 it
Iccount theuniver;y] which may not
:, even when there
lse the same argu(lec;Iabhatta has used
order to object to
lI,}c;Iabhatta answers
! the cause of non-',
:'l<iT~~"R"T1R<lT ~;:r
:T>JFn<lq~1J[lQ. I Ql;>:[l:

'l1 >r'l~>.T~ f.j;fu~ir

"'l<!T'lT~~'i~ 3l1ID"l'I'P

n 'll,,;:f1<Ifl:Ifufq~'~q
r.~clll':~~i'; cnfu"l'll-

of the desired end

~t of desire. It is
)f achieving heaven
)ll [of;the property
;igatoi~ [It is not
of just something
!cessary.', It is an
:omrpQn eXperience,
nmand," qfone res'me knowing some:tivity] concerning
much expense and
; the specific cogni(nify it specifically.
should be accepted



as being specific [regarding the object of desire]. is why, even',

though in' common experience" there i~ ~olition even if there is doubt
i!lgar~ig ,~he)ruit,:in.a<case'likethis; its [of the fr,uitJ, specifi~satiolf
:i~ ,fleceSsar~v "',,:


~'"9T ;jRl~,qqKo:Hl'l' cl'<:J<::Tfqq ~'f<IClTq~"'f.RFI:J;l1lH'tfu


In that, in order to avoid having many meanings [for lIN],

desire is the consecutive character for ~he limitors of denoted meaning-ness; as in the case of tad etc. This is the reality [of the matterJ.
1. sakYlatavacchedaka: 'the limitor of the property of being a
denoted meaning.' The N.K. (p. 580) identifies this with
pravrttinimitta, a property on which the usage of a particular
'word to denote a particular meaning is based. saky,a is the
denoted meaning 'of a word. saky.atii is the property of being
the denoted meaning. sakydtiivacchedaka is a limitor of this
property. All schools agree !that this limitor of the property
of being a denoted meaning is a generic property, irrespective
of their individual views as to what constitutes the denotatum
of a word. Thus the Logicians accept the generic property as
bOth the denoted 'meaning or rather part of it; and as the limitor
of the property of JJeing the deno,ted meaning. Kam:t9abhana
on the other hand, staltes that eVen if generic property is not
accepted as the denoted meaning, it still can be the limitor of
the property of being !the denoted meaning. (V.B. p. 119).
Thus the word g,ha{a might have as its denoted meaning an
individual pot, but the limitor of the property of being the
denoted meaning,i.s potness. In thesentence svargakiimo yajeta
!one desirous of heaven should sacrifice' , the property of being
th~ denoted meaning of lIN w9uld thus be the property of being,
, the means of achievinglleaVe:I\" "
' , '"" ;, ' ',' :'" ,
2. In this case, the problem would aril1~' 'thaFliN would haVe. '
different m~anings in every instance, slriceashasbeen explained '.
befcire[inIV.B.24j, speCific knowledge of the object of desire "
is necessary. Thus, different meanings such as the property of
, being the means of achieving a sori, or wealth, or any particular
heaven, will arise as the case may be, and significative association
(sa1J'lketagraha) would as a result, be impossible, as no one will
be able to know all the different meanings of lIN.

------------ - - - - - - - - -



3. It ii! in order to avoid this fauljt that it has been suggested that
desire should be taken as' the consecutive character of all the
-different -limitors- of the property' of being the denoted meaning
of lIN. The case of the third person pronoun tad has been'cited
as an illustration of the use of the idea of the consecutive
4. In the case of the pronoun tad, the same fault of having too
many meanings exists. It might pervade such properties as tigerness, heaven-ness, student-ness as the occasion may be. If all these
pervaded properties (vyapyadhar:ma) are accepted as the limitors
of denoted meaningness, it will result in tad having innumerable
denoted meanings, -which is undesirable. Thus it is that a
search is made for a consecutive character (anugam,aka dharma) ,
which will be common to all these different possible meanings of
tad. This property has to be a pervasive one (vyapaka dharma).
which will pervade all the limitors of individual meanings that
are the vyapyadharmas. In the case of tad, such consecutive
character is the property of being the object of the speaker's
intellect (vaktrbuddhivi$ayatva) , which is common to all the
individual' inst;mces such as tiger-ness or student-ness etc. Thus
there is only one denoted meaning, i.e., that which has the property of being the object of. the speaker's intellect, and the fault
of having too many meanings is avoided. In the same way,
in all the differel1;t individual meanings of lIN, such as the property of being the means of achieving a son, heaven etc., the
consecutive character is that all of those are objects of desire
(i$ta). Thus it is that the pervasive property of being the
means of achieving a desired end, will be considered the meaning
of lIN, in order to avoid the fault of having many meanings. In
spite of this, -in every individual instance of the use of lIN, the
_cognition of me,aning must be -specific regarding the' object of
desire. See Introdudion'[1I':'2j., \ _ '
[IV.B:26] Q;<T 'r.f ~'fnlfu:(11~;r''fl'!~'11<'3~11''flG:: 'OJ'F!~~ I ;r ~"'Hjq~ir'!iTmfu:
'I'<::(1Hf+To111ml~p~C! ~I'l1<'l~<!<'fll: I 'fiTllT"CI'I'<::1G:: <:'f<ii~I<?-@<!fit
mocr.:r''filTer'!iT+TT'IlG:: I for~~~ - <:'fir'liT+nfu:(1Hf'ic'11&:HBlJr.<!+lT'Il~m <'-1<!'l, I

Thus, since the property of being the means of a,rttaining heaven

ek, cannot be obtained from something else, it must be the denoted


meaning [ofllN]
also1 is obtainabl
together with [at
etc. [It cannot t
ing element] 'hea
_'desirous of', it st
it should also be
etc., there is even
svmgakama 'one
1. The argumer
the property
of desire, ane
than llN, it
2. Even though
ti:tined with 1
ment 'properl
of lIN. - AIs(
tences is the
Thus in the i
there is an ;
should sacrifi
6,7, and it I
it is not din
the property
which there'
meaning is J
since there i,
[1Y.B. ')7]

81~ +r~



~ "fC!<:



Now [if you

eating of food in
of not entailing ~
meaning due to





,n suggested that
racter of all the
zd has beeri' ci ted
the consecutive

meaning [of lIN] . Nor [can it be objected that] this [meaning

also] is obtainable from elsewhere, namely, from the items uttered
together with [an opta;tive form], such as 'one desirous of heaven'
etc. [It cannot thus be obtained] because, even though the [meaning element] 'heaven etc., is present from the word ending in kama
'desirous of', it still cannot denote the 'property of being a means'.
it should also be noted that in the case of the Visvajit [sacrifice]
etc., there is even an absence of the coutterence with [words such as]
wargakiima 'one desirous of heaven' etc.
1. The argwnent is that volitional activity needs the cognition of
the property of being the means of achieving a specific object
of desire, and since this cannot be obtained from anything other
than lIN, it m1,lst be the mellning of lIN.
2. Even though the meaning element svarg,a 'heaven' may be obtained with the help of the word'svargakama, the meaning ele. ment 'property of being a'means' is not available without the help
of lIN. Also it should be noted that not in all injunctive sentences is there a co-utterence of a word such as svargakiima .
Thus in the injunctive sentence prescribing the sacrifice Visvajit,
there is an absence of. any such word. viSvajitii ya;eta 'one
should sacrifice with Visvajit' has been discussed in M.S., IV.3.5,
6,7, and it has been decided, that the fruit here even though
it is not directly stated, is heaven. Thus lIN here does denote
the property of being the means of achieving heaven, without
which there will be no inclination to perform this sacrifice. This
meaning is not available from anything else in this sentence,
since there is an absence of any word like svarg,akiima etc.

It of having too
roperties as tigeray be. If all these
ed as the limitors
.ing innumerable
us it is that a
ramaka dharma),
lible meanings of
yiipaka dharma).
al meanings that
such consecutive
of the speaker's
.nmon to all the
It-ness etc. Thus
~ichhas the proect, and the fault
1 the same way,
such as the proheaven etc., the
objects of desire
rty o'f being the
.ered the meaning
my meanings. In
.e use of lIN, the
ing the'object of
. '


~<;"l'!fti ~iT'liTl'!TiG:
~<i:. <:q~l~q~~crTorfti

a:ttaining heaven
,8t be the denoted

[IV. B. 17j SF! lf~fqql..l+'l'Rfl;q+rl"l'11~1 - l<'l~qT~1J!l<[ <R?'fa:f<!21~~"!f<'il<'f~

~l'1<:"ll<'l'<<i'l'lf'1'1iCf"ll ~"l<'l <?n~iG ~;q I r.j~l"lRlBl'<~ l<'l~<r.llq~: I
~ "!SCf<:,!:~<:"lTfit "Il"ll1H<'llG: I 3'{<'iT:f:r:'2l<:"llfti ;.crf~~~qlG: I
3'{~w'f~<W-! ~~<'fl"" I cr~l'i'R!fu:q"l9il <['llil:. j;:q: ~Cf;:'~1J!
l<RJif"'il"li ~Rr <r Cf<~~ ~q:Cfl1.. I 3'{cr Q;'fT"Cf~T~'f.lJ1i'r <['l~ql;q
~RJml1Tc8 l<'R\~ 3'{""l<:g crztRJ <~<nr. I

Now [if you say that] in order to avoid inclination towards the
eating of food in which honey and poison are mixed, the property
of not entailing a greatly undesired result should also be the denoted
meaning due to its being a means of causing inclination; [that is]



not [so]. For [that way] there will not be any volition in the case
of anything to be accomplished with much effort, due to the generation of a lot of suffering in that. Even a little suffering [is considered
to be] intense for some reason. The quantity.of intensity [of suffering] is hard to determine. Therefore it is not right to assume that
[balavadan4!iinanubandhitva, is ~he denoted meaning of UN]. Strong
aversion about a particular [activity] is independently a deterent.
That is why someone who has great aversion to the effort involved
does not feel inclined [to perform] Jyoti,~toma etc., whereas someone
else does [feel inclined to perform it]. This should be kept in mind.
1. Here again as before [in IV.B.4] , the Naiyayika view has been
brought in, later to be rejected. According to the Naiyayikas,
injunction has threefold meaning consisting of i~tas,(jdhanatva;
krtisiidhydtva, which has already been rejected; and lastly balavadani~tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a great
evil', which has been brought into discussion now.
2. See Introduction [Ei--4] and [1-2] for a detailed discussion.

[IV. B.28]





~':I~llT: :J;~~ <!<o<!~Hi!!H~J;<fFi{<9 r<!""1~:



~m'f~ '<{"Iiipn crO:+{l'f<:'4'fTQa:mT<J:. 1 ~ g. crtt!T'<{~'<![l:rfq:ijFl<:'1Tr.'1QI;,1T 1

. 31~:r'1o'1RR'fiT+!ft ;;;-;i9ilfoil;Jz'li<:;:[TJq :ijl~~'1' ~fu~~'Cj9i,Ello:'l 31i <fin

'fiT1:lJfl+n<!I~q 'fiT<fI:1;O:'-t. cr<:'1 ~fu<!~,<{9i,qp;l'lm~Ts: 1

NrsirpbJasram~ however has said tha;t the property of not entailing
a great evil is not a meaning of lIN. fThe reason for this is the following] : since the knowledge of the property of being a means to a great
evil is a deterent, only its absence is expected [for the inclination to
activity]. Nor [shQuld it be claimed] :that the knowledge of the
absence of it [the property of en,rtaiiing great evil] , is expected' [as
an instigator] .. By the process of positive and negative concomitance,
even that cognition which does not destroy the cause can be a
deterent. Otherwise, [if it does destroy the cause] , it will not be a
deterent, [since in that case], the result will not arise only due to
the absence of the c a u s e . '
1. KaUl)!9abhatt;a considers aversion' as an independent deterent,
and thus avoids having to consider the property of not entailing
a great evil as an instigator. NrsiJp.hli:Srama on the other hand,
achieves the same result by saying :that the property of entailing
great evil should itself be considered as a deterent to all activity ..


Aversion need I
he does not acc
2. janakavighatlak
vighataka is to
which destroyer
means that whi
NiKa, p. 200-::
the absence wl
fire to burn, tl
Thus the coun
1nmji is the prai
in order for em.
the fire, it is no
i.e., the fire. 1
cause Um~akii~
hand, the jewel
of the result (t
and not becaw
3. In this w~y, th
sideration tlte c
ing great evil at
it is easier to a
deterent in the
4. The view attril
in his works a


~'r<!: ~<!T~:a:,i

5J'f'1B:, 1

That is doubtf
in such instances a
[this will] result in
aversion. Since tha
desired end is the [
reasons] : when th
This non-inc1inatiol
which has been acc<


ition in the case

e to the genera19 [is considered
nsity [of sufferto assume that
: of Ulir] Strong
ltly a deterent.
, effort involved
Ihereas someone
Je kept in mind.
:t view has been
the Naiyayikas,

and lastly balantailing a great


d discussion.
111'!~1<j~r:>wan I
""HEllO: I 81;:'l~

, of not entailing
lis is the followneans to a great
le inclination to
IOwledgeil of the
is expected' [as
, 'e concomitance,
:ause can be a
it will not be a
ise only due to

ndent deterent,
of not entailing
the other hand,
~rty of entailing
t to all activity..



Aversion need not be brought in at all. In spite of this however,

he does not accept the absence of this deterent as an instigator.
2. janakiivighatlaka: janaka 'generator', here means the cause.
vighataka is to be understood as vighatayanti vighatakalJ. 'that
which destroyes or dissolves'. Thus the word ;,anakiivighataka
means that which does not destroy the cause itself. a deterent
(pratibandhaka) has been defined as kiirmJibhfttabhiivapratiyogi
NiKa. p. 200-201). Thus a deterent is the counterpositive of
the absence which is the cause of the result in question. For
fire to burn, the absence of acandrakiirita mani is necessary.
Thus the counterpositive of this absence, i.e., the candrakiin~a
ma1Ji is the pratibandlwka 'deterent' of the burning by fire. ,Now
in order forcandrakiinta mm.1i to deter the burning property of
the fire, it is hot necessary for it to destroy the cause of burning,
i.e., the fire. Thus even something which does not 'destroy the
cause (janakiivighataka) can be a deterent. If on the other
hand, the jewel had destroyed the cause (fire), then the absence
of the result (burning) would be due to the absence of a cause,
and not because of a deterent.
3. In this way, there is less prolixity. Inste?d of taking into consideration the' cognition of an absence of the property of entailing great evil as an additional cause in every instance of activity,
it is easier to associate the property of entailing great evil as a
deterent in the places where there is no volition.
4. The view attributed here to Nrsil11haSrama cannot be found in
in his works available to us.
Q~;:''l1I.1 "f<'5'1c.:R2;;r;:['!imRt '1fT~sfit CP! ~111'1c.:OJP1t 'l1:c.:R'T+!;n1
~;f<r: tr~m~''1TO: I Q~~ trm ~ ~'lful!fijiJ;:"'IO: 5[fuiJ;:"l'!i~'11 ..~q-

[IV. B.29]

'ii:fT~'1m~qq~; ~1;w:r t[fui[;:"''!i~ +!FHl1l9l~fcTQl;!1n~I"CRWr,!

That is doubtful. It is well established that there is volition
in such instances as adultery, even when there is knowledge tha~
[this will] result in. great evil, provided that there is an absence of
aversion. Since that is so, only the property of being a means, to a
desired end is the [one] denoted meaning [of lIN, for the following
reasons] : when there is aversion, there is a deterent to volition.
This non-inclination can be explained only as due to the aversion
whkh has been accepted as the deterent. There is' no reason why



the knowledge [of the property of entailing great evil] should be

the deterent.
1., KaUJ:.1Qabhatta here rejects Nrsi:rphi'i..srama's view that the property of entailing a great evil should be considered as the deterent to the inclination to activity. See Introduction [1-2].
[IV. C. 1]

<I~ 5fT1'!l'flU: I ~lIm"l"'fot [q<<lll: <lIn a3JiJr'f.Cl<lT'llla (lB1'


~FP{<'lI<J: I
As to what :the Prabhlikaras [say] that the property of being
the means to a desired end is not lthe meaning of injunction. It is
not possible to, denote that [i$iasiidhanatva] , since the momentariness
of the sacrifice is known.
1. Here starts the discussion of the view belonging to the Prabhakara school of Mi! See' Introduction [G-l].


tfP'RT~T'l<!<'l12'nftt ll:1{1:rr~~Clr '11"l!'rl1+i~l'f'f<'fI<J: <D>'1C!l:(!R<:'f

~nll:'ll~ ~l1<EfI<l:. I SF'l<lw:f\"l'f,~t(EftEf,'l\Ef 'q 'l1><I(lI<'!l<J: !

It is not possible [for lIN] to denote the property of being the

indirect cause either, wiJthout the presence of the link. Knowledge
of semantic compatibility is a cause of a verbal cognition, and this
semantic compatibility is only.that which causes the connection.
1. The Prabhakaras have above shown :that no direct con~ection
.between the sacrifice and heaven is possible. [see IV.C.I].
Then how about lIN denoting an indirect connection? S:acrifice
generates apurva(which for various schools means either merit
or duty, see no:te I, IV.C.5), and this merit then directly causes
the heaven. Thus the sacrifice is a cause of heaven indirectly
through the connecting link 'merit'. The Prabhakaras deny
this alternative also. According to them, it is not possible for
1II'1 to denote the indirect cause-ness, without an interconnecting
link being present.
2. dvara 'door', thus 'an intermediery'. The word dviira has been
used in the sense of the technical term vyiipara which has been
defined as tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanako vyaparalJ. by the Logicians. Thus vyapiim with respect to Y, is that which is caused
by X, and is the cause of Y, which is the result of X. In this
case also, this definition can apply. The link in the present
case is apurva 'merit'. This apurva is caused by the sacrifice,
and is :the cause of the heaven, .which results from the sacrifice.
3. The Pr.bhakaras do not accept that lIN 'denotes the 'indirect


cause-ness (parl
link is not pre!

[IV. C.3l




Nor should it b
generally should be (
particular aspect ha
ricted to be somethil
1. Even though th
be present, why
of heaven in a
this also. To t
must be brougr.
gha(ena jalamiil
clear that a pot
compatibility tc
a pot with a hi
chidvetarlMJa gh
a hole'. The co
than the kind :
principle will h:
seen that the ~
compatibility ir
sacrifice cannot
hole cannot be
restrict the sacr
heaven, or heav
fice, just as thE
without a hole.
[IV. CAl 1'5 'q I <wr:
'lim') 9ifo'~ q:

Moreover, the ~
It has been decided
, stands as the thing
from the thing desir
desired end.
1. Here the very
sacrifice is chal



; evil] should be

cause-ness (pam1]1parasadhanatva) of the sacrifice, because thelink is not present. See Introduction [G-I] for explanation ..
[IV. C.3l rr ~'1lj"rq ~!<{;:r<~ ~l+rl~'fli\qlJf "iT~'f(jlmfcr 91"'ill:. I ll;'fif<!~r~

iew that the prolered as the deteiuction [I -2] .

l'lll~ (I~ --nl:@rg+r-

;>roperty of being
injunction. It is
he momentariness
19 to the Prabha[G-l].
"<'1I'l:. <fl''icn~r~'f
''f(lI<'ll'l:. I

>erty of being the

linle Knowledge
)gnition, and this
he connection.
direct connection
[see IV.C.I].
,ection? Sacrifice
leans either merit
.en directly causes
heaven indirectly
'riibhiikaras deny
s not possible for
~n interconnecting

:d dvMa has been

"a which has been
Jaralp by the Logi
It which is caused
ult of X. In this
lk in the present
i by the sacrifice,
from the sacrifice.
notes the indirect


w:rl~1.j~Fi~ ([R(I'l:'Ff.R~ fol'i<1<'91'l:. I

Nor should it be claimed that the property of being the cause,

generally should be cognised. [This is not possible] , since when one
particular aspect has been rejected, the general knowledge is rest
rieted to be something with another qualifier.
1. Even though the link between the sacrificer and heaven cannot
be present, why not the cognition that the sacrifice is the means
of heaven in a general way? The Prabhakaras do not accept
this also.. To understand the argument here, another example
must be brought in. Thus when /the meaning of the sentence .
ghafena jalamanaya 'bring water with the pot' is cognised, it is
clear that a pot with a hole iniit would not have the necessary
compatibility to bring water. When this one kind of pot (Le.,
a pot with a hole) is thus rejected, the sentence has to mean
tihidr.etare1J.a ghiatena jalamanaya 'bring water with a pot withouta hole' . The cognition here is restricted to the kind of pot other
than the kind already rejected as not .compatible. The same
prin.ciple will have to apply in this case also. We have already
seen that the sacrifice and heaven do not have the' necessary
compatibility in the absence of the connecting link. Thus the'
sacrifice cannot be the means of heaven even as a pot with a
hole cannot be the instrument of bringing water. This would
restrict the sacrifice as being the means of something other than
heaven, or heaven as resulting from something other than sacrifice, just as the bringing of walter has been restricted to a pot
without a hole. This is not desirable.
[IV. CAl 1'# 'if I <wr: 'flrC'f(l1.jl <rT1FT+<lq I "liT+>nG?1'l:. Cf.l+<l1e<l9~(f~<ffer;:ri't9
"liTli't Cf.ctc'-i(l1.jI~(f')<'H<lF1.j?f 'to?"'(f<'91'l:.1

Moreover, the sacrifice is not cognised as the thing to be done.

It has been decided elsewhere that the person who desires, under, stands as the thing to be done, only that which though different
from the thing desired, is the means which immediately precedes the
desired end.
1. Here the very applying of the word kiiry.a or kartavya to the
sacrifice is challenged as sacrifice is not the means that imme-








diately preceds heaVen.

. ,(IV. C.S]

. aOllT 'tf ll:H:l1i(~ 'filn{IOl{'1fo:a~~l:!T"1;q+!'i~ilq ~'P:f 'fil~"l~qur I 'filf{<ei

'tf 'l'~~~<ei a~

f'l~,lS[1J]l'i..a'fauwrf.lq'lI'fiI~;qt ~q"a<[T 'IFf

3iT~a'lT Flfr'!il+!: l:!l<['<'la I !!~~:~llil'll~~l'fil~.n~~lfq

~~<r 'l'<~,\~>:'l<'1;;il~lq: I 3i'11~i:t ~~S5f1+!TU'l~<[1 Sl"'lljl'l1ql<I:. I
Thus only the connecting link, i.e. the duty, which is the means

:immediately preceding the desired end, is the denoted meaning in

-the form of the thing to be done. The thing to be done is that
towards which the activity is directed. As regards the expectancy
about the object and locus of the activity which is the qualifier
lhere the sacrifice and the person desirous of heaven respectively
are connected with it as the object and the locus. Just as the absence
etc., of happiness and suffering [is known] from common [day to
day experience] , duty is also known ftom the Veda as the goal of
.action-. And no doubt regarding the absolute authority of the Veda
-is possible [due to the fact that the Veda is] not written by a human
1. Here the final view of the Prabhakaras is stated that it is the
apurva itself which should be considered to be the meaning, of
lIN. As a ma:tter of fact'the words kiirya and cipurva are considered practically synonymous by them. For the Prabhakaras
, apur1JJa= niyoga -= kiirya: This is clear from the following
statement by lliimiinujacarya: ~ilq 'IiFl mrn;m:T<Tt'i:f~<'I1"'i_
~;rl<+rf.r ~"r,f R~~fI<rT R'1I'l !<:m 'I1'1a I ~q <:'I5f'fi~~a~,q~l~'
-<:qf'l~'ffl<n '&1lR. mo:'fi ~m 'l~~ ~,qerir ~n~f+Jofl <:ena,ltur ell
ll:l~~1S[([:ql f.if;r~&l<rl f.if.!'1I'W-ll ~m;\:;r'fi ~la 'i:f I (sastraPraPa.

TantraRa. p. 59). N.K. (p.288) also says :



'fi1~~1r ITll1l'fi\1: I
[IV.C.6] ~>:'-i<ei 'i:f 1;[+!l~cr~l'rq Cf'~l 'tf 'fill! crR~<:~i[9il+!<:<! IPl+!Fa~I~<!'
Unrql~'1l"I<j}f+!lot;:r crfu:l~'.lJ~q i~'l'\~<!l <:qii'fil+!<:i:tm U~1;[: 9iliffi I

[This] property of being the goal ,[of action] is a different

property [from the effort itself]. Thus further [what is denoted by
the word] svargakiimalJ 'desirous of heaven', which ends in nominative 'cannot be connected [directly] with that karya. Therefore
by the expansion of the denotative function of lIN itself with the aid
'of the ttpadana pra,min:ia, the connection is made so that one understands svargakamas)ila [karya'?Z] 'of him who desires heaven'.


1. It has been asserte(

the goal of action (I
itself. The locus (
nominative case. 1
heaven cannot be
between the two a1
nominative. There
is changed to svarg.

2. The problem here j

given by the Prabh
construction can be
denoting its regula]
function itself is ut
the denoted meani
upadanapramii1}a, v
iiT'1I<tll~'fi: ~'1'1R1;
~l<i'I, I G<l:!l['l'CI~~~

upadiinapramii1pa t:
meaning elemt:nt~
[IV, C.7] G~'fCl'I, '1<!\q~

G1<'l'! G<:<!

G~ ~

This has been said i

raja: as the form svar
[though seperated by b
person for whom the a
tative ' function]; the '
have the main significa
for the meaning which
1. The Prabhakaras 1
view that it is the
the change of svar!
ing its own denote
only the primary n
be considered as d~
theory of the cogn


f'i 'lil~l~qur


I 'lilit,<i




31"'1'11=;:!'1](1:' I

vhich is the means

noted meaning in
o be done is that
'ds the expectancy
:h is the qualifier
eaven respectively
Just as the absence
common [day to
~a as the goal of
10rityof the Veda
ritten by a human

that it is the
the. meaning of
.d apitrva are conr the Prabhakaras
rom the following

~W-f.~Uf'1fu-a~ ~;;jl<i

l~~l <'ITa .~ur 'II

(sastraPraPa. of
ll'lBl 11'1l!l;:C!BlF'l'1i<ltfu Woi(r'<{: q;l~~ I

)n] is a different
,hat is denoted by
.ch ends in nomikiirya. Therefore
itself with the aid
,Q that one underires heaven'_



1. It has been asserted that the meaning of lIN is duty which is

the goal of action (kiirya). This kiirya is different from activity
itself. The locus of activity is svargakiima a word ending in
nominative case. The goal of action and the person desirous of
heaven cannot be coreferential. No connection is possible
between the two as long as the word svargakiimal} remains in
nominative. Therefore to help the construction svargakiima(l
is changed to svargakiimasya with a genitive ending.

2. The problem here is as to how this can be done. The answer

given by the PrabbJakaras is ~hat this change of case to help the
construction can be denoted by lIN a,t the same time when it is
denoting its regular meaning, Le., kiirya. Thus the denotative
function itself is utilised ;to effect changes that will help justify
the denoted meaning. This is what is meant by the word
upiidiinapramii~za, which can be explained as follows:
Blj'11GJR'li: ~'1qRl~1~6il:'!i.aT <!T'<I: I 8ls{ ~''1Rl: I <l'lT~l;{ 31~qqRl
m~~ I a,6i!~0J0~~ ;;jAaT "IT'<I: aTIql'Of~'li ~fu I (N.K., p. 196).

uplidiinapramiilpa thus is the assumption of all such syntactic

meaning elements
as will
be compatible
- with
. the


[IV.C.7] CI~'fa~ ~~'li'l~"u'>l1~ I "!!~'11~+rf+l"'C{G: 'UOG;Bl '1R+lYJ:. 31~

CIT<'1i:l a<1: CIS{ ~~'i 'lRl: '1~r <'I Q'lil+l<1: q;~FCI~A<l\"'1~<l[" ~fu I

This has been said in the commentary on Nayaviveka by Varadaraja: as the form svargakiimasya 'of the person desirous of heaven'
[though seperated by being] on a different level, [still] denotes the
person for whom the activity in question is meant, [by the denotative function]; the word signifying the primary meaning does
have the main significatory function [Le., the denotative function],
for the meaning which is intended [by the word] .
1. The PrabbJakaras here bring in Varadaraja in support of their
view that it is the denotative function of lIN itself that effects
the change of svargakiimal} into svargakiimasya, without affecting its own denoted meaning. Thus Varadamja says that not
,only the primary meaning, but also the intended meaning is to
be considered as denoted. To understand this, the Prabhakara
. theory of the cognition of sentence-meaning must be taken in-



to consideration. This theory is called the anvitabhidhanavada ..

According to the PIiabbakaras, individual words exist only as
parts of a sentence, and not independently. Thus the meaning
of individual words can be cognised only in their proper context,
in a sentence. [PrakaPaii. p. 377J. Thus in the process of the
cognition of the sentence-meaning, first the related meaning is.
cognised, and then in that context, the individual meaning of
the words in the sentence. Where does this related meaning
come from? The Ptabbakaras hold that the words in addition
to their individual meanings, also denote their relation with the
other words in the sentence 'by their denotative function. tiitparya is the intention of the speaker which relates the different
words in a sentence together. .
[IV. C. 8]

ci2li 'i:f lOqfr'f.l+!~'l mr 'IT'lf<Iq'lit Fr'lf<r ~fu <If''1: I 31''fT~.r~

<r[<rfeIq'l'!i<ro'liq~q <rFT~q'l''fB:. I
'l"T'flO'l if[~fufersr!~
g'lq~[~'l~ 'i1FqP1if[~G:'li+!~ff.~1Jj~ Cft'fl~,ci 'i:f I Cf~ 'i:f
W'1c!T I Cf'!T~;:r ;j[<;l"+n~"1 fffitCf~<'lB:.1 'l"lVffll'f<0G:'li'1':r~>.Tfu~ '!?~'<r[GJq*'lTmTor'l,~'CfIr.r[G:Tf.r'liQ'+!T1JjWT"~9 r

Thus, the person desirous of heaven has the cognition that thue is
duty for me which has the sacrifice as its object. The duty [apurva]
has as its object ~he sacrifice by virtue of being the goal of effort
[krtyuddeSya], which has the sacrifice as its object.. The sacrificial
act is the object of an activity and has as its locus a man. The
properties which delimit the relation of the sacrifice to these are:
the property of being a means for carrying out a duty [apurvakara1}atvaj, and the property of being the agent of the duty. That
itself is compatibility. Similarly, the property of not having a hole,
in the sentence 'bring water in a jar', [delimits the jar's being related
to the act of bringing water]. The limitor of compatibility is brought
in by taking that meaning for granted in [the sentence] 'bring water' .
etc., and in the .present case, [in the sentence sv;argakiimo yajetaj,
by the denotative function itself on the strength of the aupiidiinika
1. anvayitiivacchedaka is the same as compatibility.

It is the
justifier of syntactic relation. It is the factor that determines
that X is compatible with Y if certain conditions are assumed.
Since 'the property of the jar being without a hole. has to be'


assumed i.ri order I

bringing water; tl
called the limitor (
Since apurva is
(yiiga -7 apurva .:
. ,of heaven, the onl;
js by being the me
of gaining apurv.
the sacrifice to be
2. In general, in thi
been explained be'
{IV, C. 9] ;:r;:;r.u'f<f+!fq


" <f.T'r:+<lf
'f'f G:[q: 1

Nor can it be clair.

jf, in this way, even ~
word], can be broug:
we accept that what
.of the word '[with otl
[the word in questior.
.colony on the Gailga'
itpfidiina pmnWIJato
here convey a relatic
indicative function w1
in 'protect the curds f
where is the fault. U:
bility is aiso denotea
1. The Priibhakara

. 'ing of the word,

such things as In:
The opponent hI
the denotative f
meaning, there v
notative functioI



words exist only as,
Thus the meaning
their proper context.
n the process of the
, related meaning is,
iividual meaning of
lis related meaning
Ie words in addition
:ir relation with the
;ative function. tiitrelates the different
~Ic! <IT1ol: I


1'fl;1f Qf~fulW1fot

<r,'li~'~ :q I <r~ :q
8:. I '11nml~<f'lilq
'fi~11ll'l\Ul~9 r

gnition that ihEre is

The duty [apurva]
'~ the goal of effort
ect. The sacrificial
locus a man. The
rifke to these are ;
it a duty
[apurva.J.. .
of the duty. That
f not having a hole,
e jar's being related
patibility is brought
tence] 'bring water' ,
v,argakii"",o yajeta] ,
, of the aupiidiinika
ubility. It is the
tor that determines
itions are assumed.
t a hole has to be



assumed iIi order for the jar to be compatible with the action of
bringing water; the property of being without a hole, is 'to be
called the limitor of the syntactic relalion, ie.,anvayitiJvaccheka.
Since apurva is the link, between the .sacrifice and heaven
(yaga ---'> apurva' -"7 svarga), and ,apurva is the only direct means
,of heaven, the only way the sacrifice can be the object of activity
js by being the means of gaining apurva. Thus being the means
{)f gaining apurva is the limitor of the syntactic relation for
the sacrifice to be the object of activity.


2. In general, in this passage, the same theory which has already

been explained before [IV.C.6], is stated again.

c. 9]

;J;:ero'f'1lif'i <I~9 '>J'f''llq'~I<'l~ ,iq'Q~ f:.,11ll1"'~<::; <:'llfu:f<r ~'J I

<:9'>J'f'11.q'1;;j[1ol'f.<:~9 ,;;j[q'1l<::'li~'lio!l>'\;;j[lol'li<'ll~q'llll<1:. I " '1m'll
1ol11Sl:" ~''1l<tt <:9~f'f:ql<q;:!'i'N'li,qFn~;i'tql<::Fllf+!11Tfl<!9'lil'>Jl<1:. I
'. 'lilt,~"-!l <::M' ~~"-!<Il+I.," ~<'11;;q~"9]>fuf:..11ll1 g <!l<:<ifclR'r
'f9 <::N: 1

Nor can it be claimed that ,there will be no indicative function left,

'if, in'this way, even that which is' not the denoted [meaning of the'
word], can be brought in by the same denQi;ative function. For,
we accept that what conveys the relation of the denoted meaning
of the word [with others] signifies all meanings necessary to justify
[the word in question]. In [sentences such as] 'there is a cowherd
:colony on the Ganga'; on the other hand, there is no scope for the
itpadana pmmii1Ja to operate,since [tqe items ganga, gho~a] cannot
here coiwey a relation between their denotations. And since the
indicative function where the denoted meaning is not suppressed, as
in 'protect the curds from the crows', does not exist lip ouropin,ion] ,
where'is the fault [in our .-theory that, the limiton:bf the <:pmpati-;"
bility is also denote~ hytlieden{)tativefunctionl','[ ,',' ,
' :
1. The Prabhakarath~orY'i~ that in addition 10 the aenote,c:lmean~
ing of the word, it also signifies by the denotative function all'
such things as may be necessary to justify the syntactic relation.'
The opponent here brings in the objection that if in this way,
the denotative function' can denote what is not the primary
meaning, there, will be no, separate indicative function left. Denotative function will be doing the work of the indicative func-

.. ,.




. ti~J;l. 'rhus in tbe sen~nQe, gaiig{iYfllJt.gho$a!J,. the word glmiga

wIll be .able tosignify the b~mkoftlje river without the aid of
,- . ",the secondary iii.~ko;hjl'e!lJnction~,'" i . "':: ,.: '. '. ;,

2:' The Pmbh~karas r~j~ctmi~ hbjectibn by' pointini()ut the difference between' the' instances where' the indicative function will
have jurisdiction, and where the denotative function itself will
have an expanded power to denote something in addition to the
primary denoted meaning. The expanded power of the denotative function is accepted only in such cases where the additional meaning is necessary to justify the syntactic relation of
the denoted primary meaning. The primary meaning is never
rejected. It is on the other hand, justified with the aid of the
additional me.aning. On the other hand, in the examples of the
indicative function such as the sentence gmigayit1!Z gho~a!J, it is
not possible to justify the syntactic relation of the primary
meaning. A cowherd colony cannot be on the water of the river.
Thus the primary meaning 'the stream or the current of the
river Ganga' is utterly rejected, and the meaning 'the bank of
the river GangIi' is brought in by the indicative function. The
meaning brought in ,here by the in~icative function does not
justify the syntactic relation of the primary meaning of the .
word ganga with the meaning of the word glw$,a. .On the, ot),ier
hand, it brings in a connected but entirely different meaning.
Since thus it carr be shown that the jurisdictions of the indiCative
function and the expanded denotative function are entirely different, and that both have in their separate spheres, it cannot be
claimed that the expanded denotative function will take over
the functions of lakWIJit and thus destroy it.
3. Even though. this answer takes -care. of the instances of. the
.indicative function where,the primary meaning !is entirely abandoned, what about the other kind 6fdhdicative function; in which
the primary meaning is not rejected, but additional meaning is
brought in by the indicative fundion? This kind of 'indicative
function is called the ajahatsvitrthalak~.a1Jit. The stock example
cited here is 'protect the curds from tli,e crows'. Here the primary
meaning of the word 'crow' is not rejected, but in addition to it,
other animals or birds are also understood as things from which
the curds should be protected. The Prabhlikaras an~wer that


." they do not acce

there is no.diffic

'u;<i :~'1:'~

~<'1~ ,'31cr:
" ~~qlF~,fq<iq
~<'1'~: I

Thus [the follo\1

goal of action as his
the person who desir
of action as his own.
be instigated with re,
the volition of the I
is explained and the
stood from this [an
being the means to ,
1. This is just a su
ing of IIJil is dt
to a desired end


[IV C. 11]



Moreover, [if il
lIN, lIN] would ha'
i.e., it would denote
of achieving the objE
being the means of ,
acceptable, since the
object,of some unspe
ing.of vidhi is upiqu
produces' activity.. )
being the' means of
would undesiredly, 1
1. This in. essence
[IV.B.24], and
and [H-2] , ex(
, against the viev





.F:it4out the aid of



they do not accept this kind of indicative' function at .all. Thus.

there is n()difficulty,
,_ ':"
" ; . , ."

[IV.<:.1'O] 'll:'i ;!;:[''-ff'~>l ~~9ij<i'~~ ';~<:fa" <:1: ~'j\T'I: iit~itr~9ili[ 1;'f'l:1"1<~"I:

[lting out the differ:ative function will
function itself will
[ in addition to the
~ower of the denos where the addirntactic relation of
r meaning is never
.vith the aid of the
;he examples of- the
[iiyaf!! gho$alJ, it is.
)ll of the primary
~ water of the river.
the current of the
aning 'the bank of
tive function. The
. function does not
~ meaning of the
W$,a. On the other
different meaning.
ns of the indiCative
,n are entirely diffeheres;' it cannot be
take over


le instances of, the

l/tcis entirely aban~ function; in whic4
:iitional meaning is
; kiildof':indicative
The stock example
, Here the primary'
it in addition to it,
things from which
ikaras answer that

'. : ;~"1a":8!Q:' 'llT+'i!'1;' f.r:l\i;"1: 1 . ~ ~ ~<!TNC!+!~~ff0"1

. '. ~I;{Q<iRr~qq'lC! ~fu' . <;'l~.qRR:~f~qq',!.m ~ . ;'J'fflI'il.,ii
~~"1.~: .1

Thus [the folJowing results] : the person who understands the,

goal of action as his own, is the person ;to be instigated, and further'
the person who desires a result is the one who understands the goal
of action as his own. Therefore, the person desirous of heaven' is to
be instigated with regard to the activity depending on desire. . Thus
the volition of the person towards the duty known from the Veda.
is explained and the coming into existence of the heaven is understood from this [and not from liN]. Therefore, the property of
being the means to a desired end is not the meaning of UN.
I. This is just a summation of the Prabhiikara view that the meaning of liN is duty, and not the property of being the means.
to a desired end.
[IV C. 11] foi; "'. t~'<ml9"1"1<:f['o1"1<'it"l ~l'il"l<'it;r ~ Bl<fCl: 1 "IFa: I'
Cl;;m"l<;1:[T>!'RT'll<'1Tf( 1 >{'fa'!i;uFl~I;{'J:r'f ~~Io.'P~<'fl<i: 1 '11-<1:[: I'

Moreover, [if i$;aslidhanatva were accepted as the meaning of

lIN, liN] would have a denotative function [with respect to this, .
i.e.,.it would denote this] either as the property of being the means'
of achieving the object of desire [unspecified] or as the property of
being the means of a;ttaining heaven .. The first [alternative] is not
. acceptable, .since the cognition' for that (the property of' being the
object of some unspecitied desire], isnot anjnstigatQr; fodhe meaning .ofvi4hi. is u1?-iquely that whieh is ;~m::objec:tof<a,cognitiQh .which
produces activity. Nor is the last .[~lternative;,i.e;,the pro'pertyof
being the means of heaven] acceptable, since [in thatca:seJ, lIN
would undesirecily, have multiple meanings.
1. This in essence is a repetitiori of what has been -said before
[IV.B.24], and has been explained in the Introduction [D-3land [H-2] , except that here this argument has been turnea
against the view that 4tasiidhandtva is the meaning of UN.'


_ . _ ' _ . _ _ _ _ .......--.~-------- - .


------- --

----~----------~---- ~---

-- --------





;[ IV.


c. 12]

a~T(UM~'m ~<P:[aT9~'liT<1T+G<rfi'I'liTftra ~'" la'l ;;it'<'<[~~~'l~%1<:'li<9T<J:. I Q'<Fc1sfq ,il'<'>:t;;~T q:;~c<[~qlli'l *,<iTfu;:n-

. .' .

';'lllflt: mll!);qfulC!~"~'fc<[>!il:1~ra
- I
. '

[If you claim that] as in the case of tad et!;.,desire'is the con:secutive character for the limitors of the property of being the denoted
meaning, that is not so. In the case [of tad], the limitor is the
intention [of the speaker] that is to be cognised. If in the present
case also the limitor is taken to be the desire to be cognised, then
ihere will be no cognition [of the meaning of lIN] for the renunciasts
who are devoid of desire. Also, there will be no significatory asso'dation since heaven etc., are not previously present.
1. For detailed explanations of sakyatiivaccheka, and the consecutive charaCter as illustrated in the use oJ the pronoun tad,
see my notes on [IV.B.25].
2. See Introduction [H~3].


ali'Ff Rc<[;rIi'rRr'li';>.Tiil "~lg:q~Ti) ';<11<11<1:."

~ra ~f.i:rfoi~CI"fiT<o~fcr;r~
lili ~Fll3'~"'nfoil3['l'!il R'lill ~fu <!1"l1"1 'li<'llq~l f"lf"l'l1'f~ 'li<"l1W"I!Jf1"l a'l 'li<'lFIT9: I ~~'li'li<lU~~'lc~" <itNCI+l~~l;i~~'l ~

Q'~;~ I a~'l 'if ~~ <;'lCl:" ~1i13[1~<il"l"1~ I CI ...1 'if 'li1l>:t

'li<"l1'llm1:1!);1S[!Wf.t I
~~'l1<J:. Q''[Rr: I _
a<;+l1C'Jic~~'1+r~i'l'l ~f+rfu


Moreover, in the case of necessary and conditional rites, [such

:as enjoined by the injunction] "one should bathe when there is an
.eclipse" [or "one should worship sandhyii daily"], what is conveyed
by the injunction is "I, who lead a pure life, and perform duties at
:appointed times, have a duty to bathe and worshipsandhyii." Therefore, no fruit is -looked for here. Nor is there any fruit, "sirice the
"sentence laYing down this rite does ndt'mention any. [People] are activated Wy such injurictlons] by' virttie of ~ori~idering [asg'oal] "only
the duty, which is conveyed as"the bbject 61 an aet :[enjoined by. a]
Vedic [injunction]. The Veda also refers to this [duty] alorie, as
ihe aim of man. " Thus in "the activities which are optional, the
getting of the fruit is [only] incidental. In the case of the obligatory
-rites also, the inclination to act is due to the presence of apurva.
Thus apiJrva, which is the goal of action, is the denoted meaning
[of lIN]. [This is what the Prabhakaras] say.

1. I have translat
out the contrast
the word svargG
expedient. WI
devoid of all n
2. One of the maje
and the others
[IV.D.l] _81~ f.i:r;

Here the follo"\\

not proper to consi<
there is no authorita
of being a means to
be justified even wit
is] known definitely
cognised as the me:
is nothing to- prevem
1. -Here Kaui.Wabt
by challenging
not possible to
heaven. EVen
of the sacrifice,
of heaven, that
as a means in a
(IV D. 2] 'Q;llflitlq;;n


Nor can one ar

perty] must necessal
cannot be qualified J
water with the pot',
holes, the [cognitio_
qualifier] 'with [a I
the present case als(
cannot p,e a means




~;;r la'l[ <!1~l1-

il1~'I'll't ~<rr

.;desire'is the conf being the denoted

the limitor is the
If in the present
be cognised, then
for the renunciasts
significatory asso~nt.

and the conse. the pronoun tad,


~Rrf<i~CI'IiT.,.nfqrr ~
i'illq~l f<lfl;{<II'f't 'f.i'ill-

<ftNCI<l~!;i~it'l ~

~rrI'f. I . CI'Ill 'G <ill't .


ll'!RI: I

itional rites, [such

e when there is an
, what;is conveyed
I perform duties at
,sandhya." Theremy fruit, 'since the
'. [People] are acti:ing [as. goal] only
lct[enjoinedby. a]
s .[duty] . alone, as
. are optional, the
se of the obligatory
tresence of apurva.
e denoted meaning



1. I have translated the word kamya as 'optional', only to bring

out the contrast with an obligatory rite. I have also translated
the word svarga as 'heaven' throughout only because it is more
expedient. What is actually meant is a state of happiness
devoid of all miseries.
2. One of the major differences of opinion between the Prabhakaras
and the others is set forth in this passage. See Introduction
[IV. D. 1] . 3l~~ Rf<<l1li. I 3l~~~l1 <II"'1i'l<l~Clli. I ll<lI1lTll1I<!1'f. I !l'[RI9iI<:1lTl'iCl~irl3l'<lrrClI~FI~ ~rr fcirrI~q<ffl: I ~filr'f.<'IR~'1I'BTI;{
rr<'l:(!lrrT<!+~ slit BlI;{<li'lI3F!l<l(<!I\:t <!ll;{'liTl1l<!1'f. I
Here the following should be taken into consideration: It is
not proper to consider apurva the denoted meaning [of lIN]. For

there is no authoritative justification. The cognition of the property

of being a means to heaven, which [cognition] is the instigator, can
be justified even without that [rapurva]. It is true that [a sacrifice
is] known definitely to be momentary; so that it cannot itself be
cognised as the means [of attaining heaven]. Nevertheless, there
is nothing to prevent its being cognised as a means in general. _.
1. Here Kaw:'li~abhat\a starts refuting the view of the Priabhakaras
by challenging their basic assertion that without apii,rva, it is
not possible to -denote the -sacrifice- as the means of achieving
heaven. Even if it is true that because of the impermanance
of the sacrifice, it is not possible to show it as the direct means
of heaven, that does not preclude the possibility of its cognition
as a means in a general way.
[IV D. 2]

ll;.Iif<i~Iif<!T\:t B"I<lFl1m<i a~CI<:ll'f.HClIRl1C1li.1 l1~ f~i:t ~rr .

'ili'ilm~~<l1'l[ I~<:iil;'jlcl ~'f. I rr I !!~a sfq Bl~<B"l'<lrr<'l;qT\:t

CI~CI<:ml;{rriilrr <!II;{<!+l1'1I'f. 1 ClI"[~<ft\:t '<f ~~Ier<:9iTrrq~1lTl'f. I

Nor can one argue as follows: a cognition of a general [property] must necessarily be qualified by something other than X if it
cannot be qualified by X itself. For example, in the sentence, 'bring _
water with the pot', when it has been excluded that the pot can have
hoies, the [cognition of the sentence meaning is restricted by the
qualifier] 'with [a pot] other than the one which has a hole'. [In
the present case also, once it has been established that the sacrifice
cannot be a means to heaven, in the cognition, it will have to be




something other than a means, i.e., it will not be a means of any

kindJ. For, in the present case also, once the property of being the
direct means is known to be impossible, there still is the possibility
of cognising [a sacrifice] as a different kind of means. In such a
cognition, the linking factor is not necessary.
1. Here the second argument of the Prabhakaras is rejected. This
argument was stated in [IV.C.3].
2. See Introduction [1-3].
[IV D 3]

Q;~T~;:r~l'iF[~ '"f 'i'rnrnl'f~<::<i> 'RlQUv.<i> ~'t[lo;l'fJ.ll. 1 ~~T:q

'"" ....
~rrnl';FF'f;:r'f"''f <'fl~~l'fT<::1I'i'f,ll+rlIJjT<::~;en'!1~~"Gl <J "Gll:l'<'1ll. 1
3T;:<:f~n ~~;lTfq 'i'r'<:f~l'f~<::'iiJ;<:f 'iT'<'li'flq~~1<J'f~;~fq 1

For being such a means [indirect means] , the. linking factor is

the limitor of compatibility. That [in the present case], is the
apurva, and that is not denoted meaning, since it can be brought
in by the aupiidiinika pram{t1;a that you [Prabhakaras] yourselves
have shown. Otherwise; there will be the undesirable consequence
that the limitor of compatibility will be the denoted meaning everywhere.
1. r-iow KaUl)l(iabhatta us!'s the same devise that the Prabhakaras .
had used (see notes on [IV.C.6]) against them (see Introduction [1-3].
2. If apurva is considered to be the denoted meaning here, then
at every place, it will be necessary to include the limitor of compatibility in the denoted meaning, and this is not desirable.
Thus the property of being without a hole, is not considered
to be the denoted meaning of the word 'pot', even though that
property is necessary as a limitor of compatibility in a sentence
such as 'bring water with a pot'. [see IV.C.S].
[IV- D. 4]

f'i;:q 1 ~~l"I<J"I<i1"i{T "Il<:flll;:r: qFqnm"i{;:r,~qijTTfq ~f~I~'1'1i

Q;'fl<ID ~~~aG:2l+r'i~ 'fl~ll. 1 ;:r :ql'i'lf5;qR~c'iT QF'!<;rnT"i{;:ri'f+!fit
~1"i{ll. I 'fl'<<:f"lqa:rsfit !lF15;qR~cil ;:r'f<'l"~"~O<::l<::":1qf~.:r(1T
'3l 1iiffil:. 1

Moreover, let the cognition of the property of being a means .

got from the Veda, be in the form of an indirect means. Why
should apurvla have to be considered as the denoted meaning in order
to understand this? Nor can it be claimed that, in the absence of
apurva, it is hard to understand [how the sacrifice can be] an in-


direct means. (Th

apurva is denoted [I
dation in the absen
cannot be got even
1. The Prabhakan
fice being an in
answer, KaUl)lQ:
fault present ir
considered to bE
grasp the relati
where else, and
place. salikan~




are grasped fin

without first 1m
the s' gnificatory
the views have
as objections ag
V.B.S. says:
. . Slr;,9f5;qR~m. 'I;
'f. ir ;:rf.i:q;:r~ ~<'-1

[IV. D.5] 'liTir<'f~qllT

f;:rqf~ '1<;"
R'fk ~'!l1

Alternatively, y
other, establish you
saying): it is im!
optative form as a
argmnentat'on, my I
denotes the propert)
became it is impossi"
form as a means of
1. tvaduktarityii:
taking advantal



direet means. (The same applies) if one adopts the view that:
aparva is denoted ,[by lIN], since there can be nQ significatory association in the absence of its previous appearance, and it [apurva}'
cannot be got even from a Vedic utterance, [as a direct m~ntionJ.

e a means of any
perty of being the
I is the possibility
neans. In such a

1. The Pnabhiikaras object that it is hard to understand the sacrifice being an indirect means without the link, i.e., aparva. In
answer, KaUl)lt;iabhatta points out that there is just as big a
fault present in the Prabhakara view also. Even if aparva is
considered to be the denoted meaning of lIN, how is one first to>
grasp the relation of aparVia and lIN? It does not occur anywhere else, and so the significatory association does not takeplace. salikanatha brings up the same point
'f.~ m~FCln~q

, is rejected. This

Cl'tlT'nwi+I. I Cl'TI:q
ifqRl:l#'1 <f Cl&:l"''1+I. I

~ ''1~FJ~~ fu I

Ie linking factor is
:sent case], is the
it can be brought
.karasj yourselves
,irable consequence
;ed meaning every-

iw'{j:!lsi~:sf<{'1: I __ . >:j'il
);P:!llJll;Cll,:J>:jll1i+I., Cl"Sf <:f+'FiillO:IJl+!~'f'1+I. I
,,[l:'1P911O:IJ]'i~'fi'91'<T~'! I (PraKaPafi. p~ 417). Unless both the relata

are grasped first, the relation cannot be grasped. Therefore>

without first knowing apurva independently, how can one grasp
the s;gnificatory association of apurva and lIN? Thus, since both
the views have faults of similar magnitude, they cannot be used
. as objections against each other. Thus the commentator of the
. V.B.-S. says: .

It the' Prabhiikaras
tern (see Introduc-

3!'lFJf:J;qRl:lrJ! qp'Rre1'<1;:r,FJ+!N '9iir ~~ ql'<1~~fu IT3':rqR~~$~~1

'!lir o:rfifClllil: ~,'1~;or W'1>fr<ra:r+!+I. I (Darp., p. 161).

neaning here, then

the limitor of com, is not desirable.
is not considered
, evert though that
)ility ill a sentence

[IV. D.5] 'lil>l-,~~qllf fu~'1<::o:ri'R.>!O:l;l:[l:lI:J;qq'111 'II l:[l:ll'f.~Rl<r. Cl~qf<?~?-fl

frr'lf~ q<:>q,l<:fl'<1<f,'!!<f a~Gl~l:l~: ''I~'fCl<:1<'11qR~?lT 'if m:flJiT

frr'lfo:: ~'H ~Rr ~'1'1+I. I

Alternatively, you [the Prabhakarasj might, in some way or

other, establish your position that apurva is conveyed by lIN ,by
saying): it is impossible otherwise to grasp the meaning of an
optative form as a thing to be done [kiiryaj. But, by the san1e:
argtunentat;on, my position is also easily established: The optative,
denotes the property of being a mediate means, [and this is conveyed'
became it is impossible otherwise to grasp the meaning of an optative:
form as a means of what is desired] .

~~,~qijTTfq- Cl~'fi

l:laT QFQU<:fl'<1<f<FJl'!N

of being a means
, reet means. Why
d meaning in order
, in the absence of
lice can be] an in-

1. tvaduktarityii: in the same way as you have stated, i.e., I'!y

taking advantage of the anupppatti. See Mru:tiDa. p. 69.






[IV D 6] o:~ 9iI P:f!<::;:qn:. 9irl''!lTo:q'lf..''Q'i~''I~er 9icTo<:lq<n~a't\11fit ;or :!'faB:.1

9iTl''I"TI01r[aT~FIl!-l WI'l"ermrercT'f.<erTn:. I ;or !OOf~a<ert~~,;:i a>.:fT
m~Of'<J:. 1 llHT11TOfT'<I I

Similarly, it is also not proper [to say that] only that which is
other than the desired object, but is a means directly preceding it is
understood as the thing to be done [by the agent]. Just the knowledge of being the means to the desired object is the instigator, since
it is more simple that way. Nor can it be claimed that the cognition
of the part 'that which immediately pr'ecedes it' is also like that [i.e.,
simple], because it is prolix. There is no support [for such ~state, ment either] .
1. The Prabhakaras had said that only the means which directly
precedes the desired object and is not the same as the desired .
object, can be the goal of action. [IV.C.4]. This was their
justification for saying that even though the sacrifice is a means
to heaven, it is not the direct means, and thus cannot be understood as the goal of action. Only apurva which is a means
directly preceding to heaven in the link of causation [i.e., sacrifice ---'> ~ apurva ---'> heaven], thus can be a goal of action, and
therefore, the meaning of lIN. Kam:t9abhat1;a here objects t6
this on the basis, .that there is more prolixity involved in this.
It is more simple to 'say thart just the knowledge of the
property of being a means to a desired end, is sufficient as an
instigator,instead of adding the additional qualifier: 'only that
means which directly precedes the desired object'.

'f.TP:nO<:fCJfoa~~m<R ~ R:wFHmlO1;j' nTlTJa<m'{;:rl!f'!a't Ofl I

8!lit:;-f[ a't't;or ~TT;j' ~er~qa 0:'1 </1 I <r1"l": I 3l'l<Wnfit >lT~
q~>.:[a~;or a't't;or ~HTljl''1erl''l 'f.T>laTer'fl!Hlq~: I ;or rn:a't: I
8!'t~Bl" 'f.T>faTOf'fllH;:a{llTtr ]l1, 9i1>lCl'1Ter'fll!' ;or ~:qq
. R~~ m~n<ljN;or<"T1:rTerTn:. I ;oF,:q: I <fT<H>!Cf "Te.1T<9iI~a<fTer'f1'[
"l'l1"T<::~~erT'O<:f<OfO:T<r1tj~: I

ri> "'f

Further, the. means to a desired end and which immediately

precedes that end is either (a) the principal means to that [desired
object] or (b) a subsidiary means to that [object]. And if (a),
also: the entity in question is understood (a,) to be the principal means or (a,) as itself. (a,) is unacceptable: the apurva
(supposedly conveyed by an optative ending) , is not present, [to the





mind] before [one h

upon hearing an inl
3tood as kiirya. (a
stood that an apurv,
stand that a sacrific
principal means] .
main object. (b) h
be understood direct]
being a denotatum 0
thing to be done, the
1. The last altem~
the result may .
accepted, then .
denoted meanin!
be the main me~
. as the thing to I
[IV. D. 8]

;or,fit ~~

Nor can it be cl:

cause it is a matter
ido be done' is the
(kiirya) is (by conee:
the property of being
meaning of a verbal I
be brought about] tI:
cannot even conceive
. of an effort is not a rr
stood from -worldly (
1. It is said that i
that the knowle
Apurva is the th:
kara view in wl
all synonymous.
2. KaUl)l9abhatta a
pointing out that
Being produced .
of the verbal rooi



:rn~cftil!f't ., ~CllI. I
O<f<frfl:Clm~'in<r CI'-11

Jnly that which is

:tly preceding it is
!. Just the knowile instigator, since
that the cognition
also like that [i.e.,
rt [for such stateans which directly
me as the desired
. This was their
;aciifice is a means
s cannot be underwhich is a means
usation [i.e., sacrioal of action, and
ta here 0 b jects to
y involved in this.
knowledge" of the
is sufficient as an
.lalifier : 'only that
iT1T[(I<w<!<rm'RI'l 'l"T I
I 8l'L<fBnf't 5[T~
;jTq~: I <r fu<ft'i: I
!CI'l"T'l"llllT ;or. l;'1TC(

" which immediately

ns to that [desired
ect]. And if (a),
to be the princitable: the apilrva
not present [to the



mind] before [one hears such a form], so that it cannot be cognised

upon hearing an injunction, as a means and thus cannot be under,tood as kiirya. (a,) is also unacceptable: after one has understood that an apiirva is to be brought about, one would not under- .
stand that a sacrifice is to be performed. For, [the ap,;;,rva is the
principal means] . [The sacrifice is] not the direct means for the
main object. (b) is unacceptable: now the sacrifice Mane could
be understood directly as the thing to be performed, so that apurva
being a denotatum of lIN would be done away with. [For, it is the
thing to be done, that is the meaning of lIN] .
1. The last alternative (b) is that the means directly preceding
the result may be a subordinate means. If this alternative Is
accepted, then there is no reason to consider apilrva as the
denoted meariing "of lIN. " Since in this case, the sacrifice would
be the main means, it is possible to "directly cognise the sacrifice
as the thing to be done.
[IV. D. 8]

;orrf't mfRfCl -:ur<f<?1 <.?T't; 5[9a'li(ero:~;:n,<!~'l" fq,.,,.~


~'fCllI. I

~lcr;;f"'i(9ww.r CI<?1 <!T(9'JRg~ ~9a'f.(91C( I ;or "'l'l<t~'-[ (1'-11(9-

<Fl'fT9<flf't I (ll~~ <.?T'Ii(l tJ:9 W"l91C( ~(,-[liJ'fCI~9 I

" Nor can it be claimed that [a~rva] is the meaning of lIN be- "

cause it is a matter of common experience that the knowledge 'this

is to be done' is the instigator, " For, what is to be brought" about
(kiirya) is (by concensus), the result of an effort (krtijanya). [And
the property of being the result of a conscious effort is] proper to the
meaning of a verbal root. It is this [property of being something to
be brought about] that serves to instigate one to activity. And one
cannot even conceive apilrva to be that. [Further, being the result
of an effort is not a meaning to be assigned to lIN] ; for, that is under- ".
stood from -worldly experience. This has already been said.
1. It is said that in the common day to day experience, we see
that the knowledge 'this is to be done', acts as the instigator.
Apilrva is the thing to be done. This is according to the PrabMkara view in which the words" ktirya, niyoga, and apilrva are
all synonymous. See TantraRa. p. 59.
2. Kati:Wabhatta" answers this argument of the Prabhakaras by
pointing out that ktirya means that which is produced by effort.
Being produced by effort is a property located in the meaning
of the verbal root. For example, the root yaj denotes a sacrificial



act (yiiga). Performing this act is preceded by effort, so that

the action is the result of an effort. Thus, the root meaning is
possessed of the property of being the result of an effort. This
is the property of being klirya. Thus the thing to be done is the
sacrifice. Apurva cannot be connected with the meaning of the
verbal root in any way.
3. KaUJ::l~abha1;ta also points out that even though it has been
accepted that the property of being produced by activity is an
instigator, it does not have to be the meaning of lIN. As has
already been pointed out (and explained in [IV.B.22J'), this
knowledge can be obtained from common experience.
[IV. D 9]

1l;'1m~'3I\'Fl"l1;'1 R~'fg!r~I'f'1<'1I\'( ;or Cl'OWf'1m<'lr.~'fCl+J:. 1

Similarly, it is also improper to argue [as follows] : the property

of being the means to a desired en9 can not be the denoted meaning
of lIN, because it cannot be explained ..
1. Here, reference is made to the arguments of the Prabhakaras, .
which have already been explained in [IV.C.ll].
{IV D.IO] ClG:la:~';<'!Rf;r~~'!IR<'1'1~.~'1I\'( 1 Cl~Ir.:1

. q'11;?-1C1"l,;<,!qZ"l1l~}J11('l~ ~i:&:i'l'l'l"Cll~o<::'f.'1rCl '.lJ'fCl CTG;l1~G:mill'! ClC:Ill:: '.lJffir>i~: 1 ~fu:fqq'l""I!!qft~Gl9!l,<[W!i111Sr ;or g
Cl~0 '.lJ~Cl:1
1l;'!l1''fllrr f<'o;S;I~~'Olf~q'l"Cll'l'O~1;'!ir"lI~'1clJl\;{;:rc~91'if'f, ~~ Cl"! \lJFfCl>i;a: 1 .


...... ,..."


For, it is possible [here to have a single property common to all

denotata] just as tad etc., [pronouns] denote things delimited by
the properties potness etc. Thus one grasps the word-meaning relation of tad etc., as follows: The words tad etc. denote things having
limitor of the property of being the objeCt of thought; things which,
while possessed of the properties potness, clothness, etc., are brought
up. as objects of thought ... And the property of being an object of
thought is merely a consecutive character, which accompanies each
instance of an object's being brought up. It is not made part of the
denotatum .. Similarly, here also,. the significatory association is
grasped as follows: lIN denotes the property of being the means
of the locus of heavenness etc., which is the limitor of the property
(If being the object of desire.
L The concept of the consecutive character and its use to explain
the meaning of tad has already been explained in [IV.B.25]


and in the Int:

that an anugan
tion. This will
represents the (
tion, according
pak$a, where, tl
not enter. In t
[IV. D. ! 1]

;:r 'ifl"! Cl




<:P:1i'I1\'( 1

Further, desire
denotatum [of lIN]
part of the denotat
association is possit
to be cognised, or (
denotation] , as folIc
which has the.limit(
[lIN] has the dena
the property of heir
particuJar meaning
context etc., there .
limitor of being th.
[in the case of IIJi
possible, on the str
1. This is in ans
that the knowl
the case of tad
of the limitors i
are devoid of d
has been explai
2. In answer, Kat
of cognition or "
How can the pi
bhat\a goes on
of the speaker'



by effort, so that
.e root meaning is
)f an effort. This
~ to be done is the
le meaning of the
)ugh it has been
by activity is an
g of lIN. As has
[IV.B.22j'), this
R(:qr.g'fCf+J:. I

the property
denoted meaning

iVS] :

the Pdibhakaras,


''1m '.lJ'fa <rGJ~q,,-:

ICflq~<1+iq;+ilSr ;or IT

rty common to all

ings delimited by
lord-meaning relaJote things having
ght; things which,
;, etc., are brought
>eing an object of
accompanies each
; made part of the
Iry association. is
f being the means
)r of the property
its use to explain
ned in {IV.B.25]





and in the Introduction [B-2]. The only new thing here is

that an ,anugamaka dharma does not enter the area of denotation. This will be specifically stated in the next passage. This
represents the difference between the notions of anugamaka and
pravrttinimitta. Pravrttinimitta does enter the area of denota
tion, according to all theories of meaning except in kevalavyaktipak~a, where, the pravrttinimitta, being a generic property, does
not enter. In that case, it also can be called anugamaka.
[IV. D. ! 1)

;or "fT'!" <r?:IcD 'II "I1~'13~~'<m '11 );from1 I ~;or foi;orlJct 3f;&J~
:qCfI'l~"W{m ~"~I~q:q<lT'l~({'f,'lm ~"if(ifirr1r ~f'f<fJ;f~Bnl'lla:

q"I~lqR'~Icr'f,l~sfq <r({lC::l );f'f,<:UJlf~~l'\ 'l'fQ3~firq:qCflq,,~G:'f.\

'lR~'>f.!I'4q<Blimo:ql~Cf~'l'lfRq"Ii~+;orl ~qir~T'4;:rfl:r(~<i '11'4BHl.'l1,\ I

Further, desire is not here part of that which is set up as the

denotatum [of lIN] ; nor is the cognition of what is' thought of made
part of the denotatum of tad etc. The grasp of the significatory
association is possible even without it [the knowledge of the object
to be cognised, or desire, as the case may be, entering the area of
denotation) , as follows: [tad] has the denota,tive function for that
which has the limitor .of the property of being the object of thought.
[lIN] has the denotative function for that which has the limitor of
the property of being the object of desire. Even at" the time when~
particular meaning presents itself, in the case of tad, by the help of
context etc., there is a cognition of tha;t which is limited by the
limitor of being the object of the thought of the speaker. Just so,
[in the case of lU.'] , the cognition 'means of attaining heaven' is
possible, on the strength of the co-uttered word 'heaven'.
1. This is in answer to the Prabhakara objection in [IV.C.12]
that the knowledge of the object to be cognised, is a limitor in
the case of tad. If, similarly, the desire is considered to be one
of the limitors of the denoted meaning, then the renunciasts who.
are devoid of desires, will not cognise the meaning of lIN. This
has been explained already.
2. In answer, KaUI)i9abhatta says that the knOWledge oft-he object
of cognition or desire, does not enter the area of-denotation at all.
How can the pot then be cognised from the word tad ,? Kauwabhatta goes on to explain that. We know what is the object
of the speaker's thoughts from the context. The actual togni-



tion is here expressed as buddhivi$ayaWvacchedakiivacchinna.

This applies to the pot in the following way: The property of
being the object of the speaker's thought, resides in the pot. The
limiting factor to this property is thus potness. (buddhivi$ciyatii
gha/e, tadavacchedaka1'[lghatatva1'[l). The limitor of buddhivi$ayaW thus resides in the pot which is the same as saying that the
pot is limited by the limitor of buddhivi!}ayatii. (buddhivi$ayatiivacchedakaviin ghafialJ = tadavacchedakiivacclzinllalJ ghat aM.
-3. In the case of tad, the context provides help. In the case of lIN
also, the object of desire is specified by means of the word
'heaven', which is uttered along with it. This in a way, represents a shift in the view of our author, because previously, he
had insisted, that lIN itself denoted the property of being the
means of a specified object of desire, in. order for it to be an
instigator. See [IV.B.24] and Introduction [D-3] and [H-3].
[IV D.12]






BfTfGfcr ~ "<! I ~ltffi~l!i<rl'll1lj<91q: I crlOmfullJT~crlm~<r

:q'R!'!i~~1~,{'!i'91q: cr~9 foi~'1't!T ;n~+J:. I oo!N.'f,l;:ri cr<:::i~mq: I
Nor can it be a.'l objection that, in that_case, since suffering is
also the object of desire of God, even the means 6f that [suffering],

will be the denoted meaning [of lIN]. This is a desirable result for
us,. as will be explained later. Therefore, since the cognition of the
property of being a means to something desired, is necessary as an
instigator, that alone is the meaning of injunction, and not a/ntrva.
For, in common everyday situations, that [apiirva] is not the goal.
1. In this passage, one basic difference between the Prabhakaras,
and their opponents, becomes evident. The others try to account
for the meaning of lIN, in both the common and the Vedic usage,
whereas, the Prabhakaras always assign priority to Vedic utterances in their analysis.

[IV. E. I]

'{'; f.r~~ 1J;:<'-Tl9"'<D foi<<r'~<[l'iflq~ir crft<<r..r s:fcr I cr;;[ I cr1!Tl

m~. q'3[ :q'[~<r.r]q'~f:f.r~'f.""91q: ~:~'!i'f.OO<'11~ I :q'[fum~
S:1!m\;f~qlm~BT ~g<EI1"1 I

As to [the previously stated objection) that it [i$tasiidhanatva]

is not the meaning of lIN because, in that case, in the instances of
fruitless rites, such as performing sandlzyii- etc., the meaning of lIN


[in this case, i$tasiidh

true. If [these rites]
inclination towards tl
only trouble. [We a:
in the case of any inl
an [activity] is the IT
1. This refers to the
stated in [IV.C.l
IV. E. 2]

~ 'q1':f~E(l~~;
C9rqq~: I i
., 'q



~~'1C9~<r :q~

Nor can it be ob.

with apiirva in view..
being the means to a
that very thing [aPl~r
the] result as being t:
goal] , \ which is an ot
qbject of v:olition. An
can that [the object
since there is no evidel
goal, will be quite m
1. Here the Prabhak
[see IV.C.I3].
2. But actually, Kal
goal at-all. It dOE
of being the goal (
Only that can be
activity in questio
an intermediate IiI
It just helps expl~
performed now.
[ IV .E.3]

~ 'q ~<::<TtRl


Nor [can one c1ai

will still be impelled t

----- -- "-.- -






[in this case, i$tasiidhanatva] , will have to be rejected: that is not

true. If [these rites] were like that, [fruitless] , there would be no,
inclination towards them, due to their being fruitless. and causing
only trouble. [We also reject this objection on general grounds] :
in the case of any inclination to activity, it is the knowledge that
an [activity] is the means to a desired end, that serves to instigate
1. This refers to the Priibhakara argument which has already been
stated in [IV.C.13].
IV. E. 2] ., '<fT'{ oi1~}I., J:I'lRl: I <IT'i<l1Vt <li::"I;n:nO:1~!'!m'il.,''l<!-f PF'l'>l[
,Ejt'i~: I 'l<:g;<I: J:!'lRIW!'l"1~'l~ "al'"mf,jq'l"~'l 'V0 '3'~'lr$


The property of
in the pot. Tl;J.e

, (buddhividyaUi
tor of buddhivia-

as saying that the

, (buddhiviayatfi'chinnalJ ghata~z).

In the case of lIN

of the word
a way, repreLIse previously, he
lerty of being the
!r for it to be an
:0-3] and [H-3].
3 in

:rm1'il.,mN ~'fir
J<:l1l]G;~ ,,1 'o{.,<l1$1 <:'l'

Ml'li1<ri GG~3Jr<1:_ I
, since suffering is
, f that [suffering],
lesirable result for
,e cognition of the
is necessary as an
I, and not ajn'trva.
1] is not the goal.
the Prabhakaras,
'lers try to account
td the Vedic usage,
tty to Vedic utter,~'l'>l ~fcr I <1;;[ I <I~T

W-<'l1"l I



., '<f <lO:~''l' <T '<fF'l'i::'l <If.~'l~ I, +THFfl'll<l, I 'iO:1~f-aH;<i't

t'i'l'<'l<:<r J:!'l"fl 'i!!'ilillTl"l I

Nor can it be objected that the inclination to activity here, is

with apftrva in view. In that case, we can justify the property of being the means to a desired end, as the meaning of lIN, by taking
that very thing [apftrva], as the desired end. Actually, [we define
the] result
as being the object [of effort] as follows: [that is the
goal], which is an object of desire, and is brought about by the
object of volition. And apttrvq does not have that [property]. Nor
dm that [the object of effort] be assumed to be something else,
since no evidence [to do so]. Further, any other thing as a
goal, will be quite useless as far as the inclination to activity is
1. Here the Priibhiikara argument has been turned against them.
[see IV.C.13] .
2. But actually, Kau:J:]\Iabhatta-states that aprtrva cannot be the
goal at all. It does not fit in with the definition of the property
of being the goal of activity, that is accepted by KaUl).<;\abhatta.
Only that can be a goal, whicli, while being produced by the'
activity in question, also is the object of desire. Apttrva is only
an intermediate link, and cannot be the object of desire in itself.
It just helps explain how heaven is produced from the sacrifice
performed now.

t [itasadhanatva]

:n the instances of
le meaning of lIN


., . '<f "IG.'.;/1N((<'lT<l, f;r"'li~sf?r J:!'lRl: ~o:,,~~~fq ;;ft~ f.r;'W--.

,'l~ I.,O:liJT'1i 'i1m:T~<:Q{J:!~: I

Nor [can one claim that] even if som"thing has no fruit, one'
will still be impelled to activity, merely by virtue of what a Vedic-




statement conveys. When there is cognition of fruitlessness, even a

.country hick will not feel inclined towards activity, though being
told by a thousand Vedas.
1. See Kumarilabhatta (slokavarttika, p. 653). wi);;r<!+!:!ft;<:[.,
+!'i.Uslit 5!'Jcfi!t I
Even a dullard does not feel impelled to

activity without a reason.

[ IV.E.4]

., "'f '3T'fO<'of'fiffiffi:r<1~r f?!M~ir <:[ ~'i<:[i!t I <mO<:fMfu +!<!:

13+!f'C[1<:[ 13 131R'J'fi:" ~ +T'l'Jf<"'f<!f9ul;l: I "<f~C:l<!Cl'r:'liii.,
<'ll~ 'fi1<{~9 Cl<J:: I <:fit C:l;t crq:'fiir t:[T9'1Tf.r +I:.,l/'iIljTll:. II ~dT;:'ilit
g 'f.+!lluT <:TW <<f'f<'lf 'fo<.OTR "'f I 'Ii<lo<fT.,lfa ~ t:[pt f.rr1rci
+I:Cl~"fI'll:. II" ~<'lgT<ctl "I'l'l~'J t:[T9~<'lI'fi!t: I cr~ "'fl:!f%;gl slit
![r'Jl"fWO:l~: 9i<.O~Fcr 'fo<'> <<f'f<'JTlit m.'i+!llJf~"i t:[f'!"<'i +T'ICllfu
'11'1: I 3TCl ~'l f.r<1f'iflfcrgllll<D ~'1l]h.[4lf::)}gl~ slit f.r<1f!['lll1
fuf'"f1'Fcr fu~FCl: I

Nor [can it. be claimed that] thi!, contradicts the following

statement of the Lord : 'tha;t sacrifice, performed by those who expect
no fruit, as prescribed by the Vedic injunction, keeping only the
. following in mind: I should sacrifice [as a dutyJ, isendciwedwith
the [quality] S1attva.' In the eighteenth [chapter], the Lord himself
11as spoken of Pllrity [asa result oUhese obligatory .rites] in [the
following verses]: 'Activity such as sacrifice, charity and penance,
should not be given up. It should definitely be performed. Activity
such as a sacrifice, charity and penance are purifying for the wise.
Even these actions should be performed without any attachment,
and without expecting any fruit. This 0 Partha, is my best and
:finalopinion.' In this way, the taking away of demerit, even though
not looked for, is the fruit. Therefore, purity results even for him
who is acting without any expectation of reward. This is the essence
[or thrust. of the argument]. That is why. the final conclusion in
the case of the routine J yot~toma is that the usage 'routipe is justified,
even when the performance is for the sake of attaining heaven.
1. The Bhagavadgita verses quoted are 17.11, 18.5, and 6.
2. For nityasomejya, see HiralJ).yasS. p. 278.
[IV. E. 5]

Fii "'f I W<<:[T'J"'''Tl.tiil1S'fO<'l~ " ~Cl~'~<:[T"f'i >n<m "fT&lu<i

<f<::Nrnall:. I <f~ .,T~<1fT(::nCl"f ., lJ ;n&llJf <f'O"ii!t" ~r~

" lJr'<"iI:rT

13 ;:r1Q<!ll:. "

Moreover, if ritt
sidered to be fruitless
ingless : 'these are th
ffi3lJ.l.a-ness [of a mar
no resped for these,
are praised, always p'
away, they go to the
1. Thege are fioatir
brahma.J:J.a-ness ir
next, to the sari<.
port of his view
[IV. E. 6]


" lJ~1''f: ~
lITlJl1''fT '"
'fo<'lT'ii~T f.r\

If [it is claime(
sandhyii] are just use
sentences will also [u
praise]: 'Darsa al1(
for all desires', 'the J
[the fulfilment of] al
the expectancy regar,
tences: 'One desirO!
and Piim.l.amasa [sacr
flee with the Jyotisto
[IV. E. 7J ., '<f' 13~~
" <Ii'>!] S9<i~

Nor can it be clai

form sarvebhya.(z, [th
fruit. The dative fa
arthaviid2, as in the ca
1. The sentence urjt
the Sabarabha$ya
slightly different



'uitlessness, even a

" 13r<'11~q113a V; Q 13ClCl oJTUCI'IClT: 1 fcI~Clql'nm l".fTPCI '1lll<"R;

<:f;rf<l~+r.." s.:i'1l;.l".f "if ~'f~'fhf''<I: 1

Tity, though being

wt1q~+l:J:fu:~l".f <!

t feel impelled to


"l".f:U<::T~CI'1:' <!
+I:~l,iSrijnB:. II 11: ClTrl".ffq

n~Tfci ~ ([p.r


1 <I~ "if1:J:fu:ID sfq

i'Jjl,l".f ([T'!<!i +1'!ClTfu
+I:i-g1~ sfq Rc'1;('11<1'

:licts the following

)y those who expect
, keeping only the
1, is endowed with
] , the Lord himself
tory rites] ; in [the.
,arity and penance,
erformed. Activity
ifying for the wise.
Lt any attachment,
la, is-;;;'my best and
;merit, ~ven though
esults even for him
This is the essence
final conclusion in
'routine is justified,
taining heaven.
18.5, and 6.



IlllUf ~'Ol".fa"




Moreover, if rites such as worshipping sandhya etc., are considered to be fruitless, then the following statements would be meaningless : 'these are the three sandhyas prescribed, on which the brahmllil)a-ness [of a man] is founded [Le., is dependent]. He who has
no respect for these, is not called a brahmal)a.' 'Those whose vows
are praised, always perform sandhya. Having their demerits washed
away, they go to the ancient brahmaloka.'
1. These are floating smrti verses' which attribute such fruits as in this life and an entry in the brah.malok;a in the
next, to the sandhya rite. KaUl)lQabhatta quotes them in support of his view that sandhya does have a fruit.
[IV. E. 6J

~['!'Iic't=n'1l".fm ~fu~<J:. Clil "<:f~""1': <f,l~."fl <::~,!aTli1ffi '"

" "~"'1: <f,T~~:'1r ~furu<l: " '~iV;CI'1r,fq <I'lI[('!1qN: I," o:B'1aT'"
<l1131"'fT <:'!ir'f.T<ll <:f~<I", " ;;>:ftmru~<! <:Efl'T'li1<il ~<I" ~c'1<1:
'm>['fi~1f.!vq<l'11':i'1'11rrl<J:. 1

If [it is claimed that these statements about tlJe fruits of

sandhyii] are' Just useful' for praising lthese rites] , then, the following
sentences will also [undesirably] have to be considered as that [just
praise]: 'Darsa and Purilamasa [sacrifices should be performed]
for all desires', 'the J yoti$1;oma [sacrifice should be performed] for
[the fulfilment of] all desires.' For, they now have no other use:
the expectancy regarding the fruit, has been satisfied by the sen
tences: 'One desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Darsa
and Pilr1I) [sacrifices].' 'One desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Jyoti~\oma.'
[IV. E. 7J <! "if' ~"'1: 's.:fc\ "if1F'1f: <:f~'!T<J:. q:;03<:ftl(['Ii<'!f?rfu 'IT""!'!. I
" <:!i:j'fls'!,,~~ " ~<<:f~~~'!l;;:<'!li1'S{c"1<! ::qg~'1'1~: 1
Nor can it be claimed that, because of the presence of the dative
form sarvebhya.~z, [these sentences' can be justified as] stating the
fruit. The dative form has been explained by merely being an
arthavad~, as in the case of the sentence 'for the obtainment of urjas'.
1. The sentence urjo'varuddhy,ai has been quoted in that form in
the sabarabhli~ya on M.S. (p. 114), but is found in a
slightly different form, in which there is no dative, in the





Taittirlya Sarp.hita, II.1.1.6. This sentence has been discussed

in four sutras (M.S.I.2.2. 19-22). The question is as to whether
this sentence should be considered as a p.halavid.hi or as an
arthaviida. P.haiavidhi is an independent prescriptive sentence
from the Veda, which lays down the fruit for the rites prescribed.
arthaviic],a has no prescriptive power. It JUSt serves either to
praise somethIng prescribed, or to censure something which is
prohibited. Since the dative means 'for that~, it has been put
forward, that this sentence has been used to give the fruit for
which the sacrificial stake should be made of udu1JZbara wood.
Kam;u;labhatta denies this by saying that the dative form in the
sentence urjo'varuddhyai can be explained by its just being an
arthaviid,a. Thus the dative form sarvBbhyalJ also should be explained-likewise, and not taken to mean that, on the strengh of
it, the sentence concerning the Dal1sa and PUIiI).amasa sacrifice
is also phalavidhi.
2. In this, KaU1)l9abhatta is going against the thesis of the MImarp.sakas (Prabhakara), who finally decide that though urjo'varuddhyai is not a phalavid.hi, neither is it an arthaviida. It has
finally been decided to be taken as an independently prescriptive
sentence prescribing the me of ur}u1JZb'ara wood for the sacrificial
stake. Others however, are of the opinion that this sentence is
just a praise of a stake ma:de of udutJibara wood. (Timtra. varttika, as quoted in the M.K., p. 1336). .
[IV. E. 8] f<j; 'Cf I ~Tq9i~;orlq>{l~sfi't ;;gfci~q '[iWr ~",~if ~qf<:'{ I ~'C(;rlii'
1;gRrK[a ~ I ;or I a<;<{1 81fi't c",~,qT<'l: I ~"qIl'[f'<ml''f.<'lm
~<'l: I ;or I 81~lG:lmj:fTu<i "ll'1a<.C!G::1qtj~: I 'l~1~ .11Rfu
qFP!Tmlll~ "ll'1a1;a1D'f"'l~fu I
Further, even if [these verses in question] are considered useful
as praise, [their] uselessness is .unavoidable, since praise itself is
useless here. Nor can it be claimed that this praise is just in order
to stimulate [people about these rites], because, even that is not
needed. [If you say tl)at] it serves the purpose of making people
inclined towards activity, that is not so. It cannot be justified in
the case of a person who knows that arthaviida has nopresctiptive
power, just as [the inclination of a person] who knows that the
sentence 'this cow gives a lot of milk', is not true, [cannot, be justi-


fled] , on the strengt

1. The uselessness
also been discUi
flV. E. 9J






~'l1~'Ta "

[And if you sa]

tative qua showing
attainment of heave:
praiseworthiness [of
for the generating of
ness has anywhere
worthiness [except t
an instigator. If e\
. -is ;;till to be consid
[the ~ruit, which in
like the statement of
Therefore, these ser
[I.e., they say, that
even though someth
prescriptive sentenCE
in questionJ are to
especial inclination,
different way, or by
1. Strangely enou~
way, which ma~
verses as Vedic
not accept this,
it" force, when
verses. The ten
arthaviida to a
orthodox pundit


laS been discussed

III is as to whether
zlavidhi or as an
oscriptive sentence
he rites prescribed.
It serves either to
lmething which is
;~, it has been put
give the fruit for
. f udu1J1bara wood.
dative form in the
r its just being an
also should be ex. on the strengh of
. iira).amasa sacrifice
~sis of the Mimarpthough urjo'varud!rthaviida. It has
dently prescriptive
d for the sacrificial
lat this sentence is
I wood.

~if ~h:+r. I ~u"l;nif


I 'l"i:G:'~ 'lllRRt

e considered useful
1ce praise itself is
lise is just in order
" even that is not
! of making people
mot be justified in
has no prescriptive
ho knows that the
e, [cannot be justi-



fled] , on the strength of that sentence.

1. The uselessness of the praise for the purpose of instigation has
also been discussed in the TantraWi. (p. 117).
[lV. E. 9J

~llf?l>l'lic!l<rF!~IFlTu'-lsfq m'OJ~c<!'lI'C!'f,''1e:H1 Ull~'li,'1fBC'll~tmas~ ~FlTU'll<!m ~'>! I

W1~<r ~t'l'li<iq;n<J:. I 'C!1=IfraUIl'OJ1:,'1;u1<t<:'1 ~'1c\<f,''1l+!l'l1'<'Of
Cl'<!i'fi<"l1'"l<!'li,'11]q- Clil'C!<!e:l,r ~1'CJ<:''11=11'l a31Tf1'1l ~ 'f. M'IFF1'fG:~;i~<rc!l "l ~G:<:'1 1:'1l<J:. I "1:111<1:'Iltr u:~qT ~11=l1u'IB:. I tr,ci """'11~t!l"IC!" ~''11<{T T<!NCl sJ!l'ln~s]q- G<:'Il'1F,,<:~qU] 'l1'C!<!e:Hl
''Qm'(llQ<re:H] el1 ~'[Rr[q~I'SI1l':r1=lirCfl<:: ~m ''l'lB:.1


[And if you say that] even if these statements are not authoritative qua showing that the rites iJ1 question are intended for the
attainment of heaven, they can still be meaningful as signifying the
praiseworthiness [of these rites]: That is not ac.:eptable. Except
for the generating of the specific fruit, no other kind of praiseworthilless has anywhere been assumed. And any other kind of praiseworthiness [except the one which generates the specified fruit] is not
an instigator. If even that which does not produce the said fruit, .
i.s still to be considered a:s praiseworthy, by way of signifying it
[the fruit, which in reality is not going to be generated] , then, just
like the statement of a bad poet, the Veda also would not be believed.
Therefore, these sentences are meaningful in their own meaning
[Le., they say, that sandhyii does produce brahmaloka etc.]. Thus
even though something desired [as a fruit] is understood from the
prescriptive sentence 'one should worship sandhyii', [the statements
in question] are to be considered as an arthavlida, for the sake of
especial inclination, through their signifying [the same thing] in a
different -way, or by implying that (these fruits] will be produced
1. Strangely enough, in this passage, KaUl~~labhatta argues in a
way, which makes it look as if he considers these floating Smrti
verses as Vedic oentences. The whole argument that, if we do
not accept this, Veda would not be worthy of belief, really loses
it", force, .when we consider the fact that these are not Vedic
verses. The tendency of considering the Smrti sentences as an
arthaviicf.a to a Vedic sentence, is not approved of lly some
orthodox pundits. (see PrabM on Apadevi, p. 200).



[IV. E. 10] 8"l(f q;oI "wkr'F(fllF[Rr: ~1{1'(fqT'!.(f1q~~ni'(" ll:fcr ~~~'FC'1N'fil.:rrr

'l~qa:l~ ~<i'1l'~~1{ 111C>l~:q111<:f~fq- ~~C<!Ii'(" ll:~'Fci m;:.e:r'tfTi'/: I
O'>fi'f<:fH:l 'tf " 'fiTP{ <:fqT 'f."'l:q1qfG:~ (fql Rc<:f+rqlfcr ~?jT;~:" ll:m I
Il;<i ~2ffi'iFF'IB9 fot>::q~ ~fq +r~ <rrt 0,1'1: I

For this reason, KuIlliirilabhatta, commenting on the sutTa,

'sarvaSaktau pravrttil; syiit tathtibhutopadesiit' [Let one be inclined
to perform an act, when one has the capacity to perform it in its
entirity], which represents the priliminary view in the Sarvasakti
section, has said: 'since the goal to be achieved is common in both
[the routine and optional rites]'. This has been explained as follows:
Just as the optional rites are prescribed in order to gain some fruit,
so are the routine ones. ThiS is the meaning of the aphorism. Thus
this is no fault. from the point of view that the property of being
the means to a desired end, is the meaning of injlmction.
1. ~OJ'Fcll ~(q; ~1<I: (f'.n~1~~1i'( M.S. VI.3.1.1, begins the discussion about the question as to whether, only he who can perfonn
every detail and minor rite, should be the one inclined to perform
the routine rites, or whether a person, who cannot perform the
minor rites, but can perform the main ones, should also
feel inclined to perform them. The opponent's view [later to
be rejected], is that only when there is ability to perform the
routine rites, with all their parts and minor rites, will there be
inclination to act in the matter. The reason given in support
of this statement is tathiibhutopadeat. This phrase has bet'n
explained in six different ways in the Tupt[ka by Kurnarilabhatia, of which the sixth and last way is the one.' with
which we are concerned here. Kau~c;labhatta has not given
an exact quotation, which is 8"l~ ~<;'i!TWitl1'i"f ~+1RC'(li'(
(TupT. on M.S. VI.3.1.1, p. 1417). Ka11l,lQabhatta give5 the
sentence as follows: ~~:q- (11T~:q-) ;::r<l'R (:atjq-) g~<:f<'lTi'(
where the words I have put in paranthesis are taken really from
the commentary Tantraratna by Hirthasarathirnisra, and
tulyatvltt is substituted for vidyamiinatvat. Later on, another
sentence from this same commentary has been quoted. tathiibhiitopadesiit thus is taken to mean that since the routine rites
are also said to be the same as the optional ones in so far as
having a fruit is concerned, the same rules which apply to the


optional rites, sh
the optional ritE
entirity, there h
to perform then
about the routin
in support of K
do have fruit, aJ
applies here witl
2. Kau:ryc;labhatta rVI.3.1.1. occurs,
in M.K. the sect
[IV. F. 1]


<r ~'ni'( I 9


Now [it can be I

of injunction, there cc
iyoti~tomena svargaki
. sacrifice by means c
denoting an instrume
expressed [by somethi
later in the verse [no.
the object is intended,
ings of the ~everal en
when the locus and :
there is no difficulty
case ending in the ser
property of being th(
property] is not expr.
1. This is another te
[]-.. 3]- (a) .
[IV. F. 2]



~crl'IT ;jT:l,q.

As to what Mad!


, ~Rr ~'OJ'f",Rl'fi1::!Jf
" ~"''fci l'fZ~'<flif:
'1+lqlRi 'l"l1~:" ~Ri 1

ing on the siUm, one be inclined
, perform it in its
in the Sarvasakti
s common in both
plained as follows:
:0 gain some fntit,
e aphorism. Thus
property of being
begins the discus, who can perfonn
nclined to perform
annot perform the
)nes, :-should <:Ilso
It'S view [later to_
.ty to perform the
rites, will there be
1 given in support
) phrase has beE'n
ilia by Kumarila
is the one with
;ta hils not given
'11l'f'f"f W;r+lF'I1CC
labhatta give& the
pi{ (:atflt) g~'1t91CC
! taken really from
sarathimisra, and
Later on, another
,n quoted. tathii:e the routine rites
ones in so far as
Ihich apply to the



optional rites, should apply to the routine rites also.' Thus; since:
the optional rites can be fruitful only when performed in their
entirity, there is inclination to act only when there is ability
to perform them with every detail. The same should be true:
about the routine rites also. This passage has been brought in,.
in support of KaUl)!gabhatta's view that the routine rites also
do have frtiit, and thus i$:asiidhanatva as the meaning of lIN
applies here without difficulty.
2. KaUl).Qabhatta refers to the section where this aphorism M.S.
VI.3.1.1. occurs, by the name sarv.a,aktyadhikara~za. However,
in M.K. the section referred to by that name, starts with M.S.
[IV. F. 1J 8T~Brer~<:r~'1 M~'1>l~ ",""IRrmi'l;r 1;Q"!'f.l+l1 'l~G"~iln<::1 iictl<rf
;r 1;'11<1:.1 <f,1::Ujl;rf+l"!1~ It'! Grn:"!l;rl~fG ~<I.. 1 s;-,n'<'l~ 1 "a<1~
<rlserN<i~'1: Bl'ir;:,,!: 'OJf'i:G~'! 'IT" ~fu 9~'1'llUj1::I<<rl 8T:~'11;'
'OJ'f~,m;rm'Cjl~ iicfi'11<;"'1 ~Ri R'-1~S"3nfrt Bl\Hc'!lf+l~l~Sfit
G<::;rf+l"!Fn<;[l~qfuqRrG I

Now [it can be claimed that] if 4.!asiidhanatva is the meaning:

of injunction, there cannot be any instrumehtal .form in the sentE'nce
jyoti$tomena svarg.akiimo yajeta 'the person desirous 'of heaven should,
sacrifice by ,means of Jyoti~toma'. That [the instrumental case'
denoting an instrument], is introduced only when the means is not
expressed [by something else]. On this, we say that, as will be stated,
later in the verse [no. 24] , 'locus, point of seperation, that for which
'the object is intended, relation, or potentiality alone, [are the mean,
ings of the ~everal endings]'; ipstrumental case etc., are to be used'
when the locus and potentiality are not expressed. In, that case,
there is no difficulty about justifying [the use of the instrumental
case ending in the sentence jyotitomena E1tc.] , because, even if, the'
property of being the means is expressed, that [the loclls of that
property] is not expressed.
1. This is another technical objection. For details, see Introduction'
[J-3]- (a) .
[IV. F, 2] <!~ +!l"!'!l:c[]<!f: 1 ~l~;rFar~!['[.fiFl~>l+!T"{i(~Jj!B1,,!;r,'tsf+l~~ sflt
'11'l~q-~q"'1lfuJ?tm~l!lRiqla:<f,1 >l'la1;'1T~fl:r"!l~;r
iial'1T ;rT:1q;:~fu ~m"!1;rms;: 1 Go;( 1
As to what Madhavacarya has given as an explanation, [which



. is as follows]
The use of the instrumental is not unjustified. For,
even though, llN expresses the property of being the means to a
desired end, located in the meaning of its own [verbal] base yaj,
which is immediately connected with it; it does. not express the
[same property in the] specific sacrifice, which is the meaning of
the nomUlal base 'jyoti~toma'. That is not acceptable.
1. Here Kaul}!;labhatta brings in another explanation of the use
of the instrumental in this sentence, given by Mli.dhavaciirya,
the author of JaiminiyanyayamaIa. See Introduction [J-3]-(b).
According to Miidha.vacatya, llN is closer to the verbal rooi yaj,
which is its own base, in the form yajeta. This it is natural
for liN to express the means located in the meaning of the verbal
root, i.e., yaga 'sacrifice in general', as the means, is denoted by
liN. But Jyoti~toma is a specific sacrifice, denoted by a seperate nominal base. lIN, denoting i~tasiidh(mdtva located in a
sacrifice in general, contained in the meaning of yaj, does not
express it as located in a specific sacrifice Jyotit~oma. Thus,
the instrumental use jyoti$tomena is justified, since the specific
means is not expressed elsewhere. Katu:l4abhatta does not accept
this explanation.
[IV. F. 3]

\rl:iTla'2T~'1;;'1~<j'r~il~~Tfl:!'i!FI~TqHUfT<J:: I 3F'1;.rr "~qG:'Cf: G'"fm"


"Tmr ,(a"RtI;s:[

9iif1:!'i!Ti:tSfG'fortq~qUfT~'i!H[<J:: <perf{

l>:nqirf{m I
[Madhavacarya's view is not correct], because [one can] not
avoid [considering. that] the meanings [of the items] yaj and
jYl!t4toma are [contextually] the same. Otherwise [if this identity
of reference were not accepted], instead of [the sentence]
'Devadatta is cooking' ,- [which contains the nominative
devadattalJ] ,- [one would desire *devadatt.ena. paeati, with the
instrumental devadattena]. For, although the ending [tiJ denotes
an agent in a general way, the specific agent is not denoted [by this
ending] , so that the instrumental would, undesirably, be introduced,
to express the agent [specifically].
1. In this passage Katu:l\labhatta rejects Madhav,acarya's view that
even if liN expresses the property of being the means, it is only
the sacrifice in general, as the meaning of the verbal root yaj.
Thus, in order to express the specific sacrifice Jyoti~t0ma, the

use of the instru

that there is the
yagla 'the sacrifil
specific sacrifice
of yaj, liN aut,
Jyoti~toma. Sin(
and the use of tb
has to be rejectec
2. In support, Kau
sentence dev,adat
agent is expresse
use the instrume.
the word devadia
same principle t
jy.ot4!omena SVG
highly undesirah
verbal suffix here
that, the specific,
instrumental cas
ag,ent. , The senh
able result. To,
noted by a verb
this sentence), c,
[IV. F. 4]



'Ii~ iEfI?;f;:rfl:!;

'RUf<EfI<im l

Others, who acce:

suffix, describe the rn
follows: when agen1
etc., should be used] .
of being a means is e}
property of being the:
is no difficulty [abou1
This is made clear in
1. According to the'
does express agen
accepted by the ~
the Naiyayikas.


,t unjustified. For,
19 the means to a
[verbal] base yaj,
~s not express the
is the meaning of
anation of the use
by Madhavacarya,
duction [J-3]- (b) .
the verbal root yaj,
This it is natural
;aning of the verbal
eans, is denoted by
denoted by a sepe:na'tv,a located in a
19 of yaj, does not
Jyotit~oma. Thus,
:1, since the specific
atta does not accept
ll;q~ "~'l~:


q~itun;n~"!FHa:. '!l<lR

lUse [one can] not

le items] yaj and
jse [il this identity
ins the nominative
a . paeati, with the
;nding [til denotes
,ot denoted [by, this
ably, be introduced,
, lVlacarya's view that
he means, it is only
he verbal root yaj'.
ace Jyoti~toma, the


use of the instrumental is justified. Katu;l!9abhatta points out

that there is the relation of non-difference or identity, between
yii~a 'the sacrifice in general' (the meaning of yaj), and the
specific sacrifice Jyoti~toma. Thus, by expressing the meaning
of yaj, lIN automatically also expresses the specific sacrifice
Jyoti~toma. Since, thus, the fault remains the same in this way,
and the use of the instrumental is not justified, this explanation
has to be rejected.
2. In support, Kau~9abhatta brings in another example. In the
sentence dev.adatta~ paeati 'Devadatta is cooking', the meaning
agent is expressed by the verbal suffix. It is not necessary to
use the instrumental case to express that meaning. Therefore,
the word devadJatJta takes the nominative ending. Now, if the
Eame principle that Madhavacarya has used for the sentence
jyoti~!omena svargakiimo yaj,eta, is applied to this sentence,
highly undesirable result will follow. Thus, even though the
verbal suffix here expresses the agent in general, it could be said
that, the specific agent Devadattta is not expressed. The use of the
instrumental case thus would be necessary to denote the specific
ag,ent. The sentence *devadattena paeati would be the undesirable result. To avoid this, one has to accept, 'that what is-de-_
noted by a verb ending, and another item (i.e. devadatta, in
this sentence), can be- identical.
[IV. F. 4J &.'-1 ~ '!l~<91R'!lm~':r1cr91">i "''tW~''CITS<[m-~cr ~~B!lN
'Ii~'91?!<[m-r.:a ~;qif 9tfi'-l"<i'tS?f llN<[<9m?flm-"!1~SN cr~q
'Ii~rrr<9l<[m'if[<[f';l G)q: I ~~+!'l<lT'liF() fq'l,U't sr.;'1cra:. ~l!!m-ils: I
Others, who accept that agency etc., are denoted by the verbal
suffix, describe the meaning of the rule anabhihite [Po IL3.1], as
follows: when agentness etc., it not expressed, [the third ending
etc., should be used]. Thus they say that, even though the property
of being a means is expressed, a particular property of that, i.e., the
property of being the main means, is not expressed. Therefore, there
is no difficulty [about justifying the use of the instrumental case1..
This is made clear in the VivaraJ).a at the end of the first VarQ.aka.
'1. According to the view described in this passage, the verbal suffix
does express agentness etc., rather than the meaning agent, as
accepted by the grammarians. This view apparently belong to
the Naiyayikas. See Introduction [A--61 [J-3]-(c)., In sup-




port reference is made to the Vivara:t:\aprameyasarpgraha. However the view of the author of the VivaraiI).a is not quite correctly
represented here. See ViPraSarp. p. 135.
[IV. F. 5]

'f~ 8l;orf1:r~iJ ~!<i'1r<!l'i:r~lj~'lT1p ,{!f: 'Ii?['e:~l~'!Tql'n'O'n'l1a:.1

iJ~l 'ifT?[ ~: 'll<li:i'll;:'1'!T'UaJ+rl;ll~sf.t <! 'f."{lJTTr+rI;lHfi'lfu I

[There is another claim] : In [the rule anabhihite] [Po 11.3.1] ,

the word anabhihite means 'when the number has not been expres~ed',
because, the verbal suffix does not denote agent etc. In the present
case, since the number is syntactically connected only with the agent,
that [agent] is expressed, but not the main means.
1. This view definitely does not belong to the grammarians, since
they do accept the agent as the meaning of the verbal affix.
The grammarians also use the word akhyiita to denote the form
ending in a verbal ending, as opposed to The l\1Imarp.sakas; who
use it to mean the verbal suffix. According to them (Mimarp.sakas) , iikhyiita is the element common to all the ten I-members.
iJ?fT~'fRl G:OJ05'lil~lJTl;ll~lJllI. (ArtlmSarp.. p. 16). This particular
view however, seems closer to Nyaya, and is also given in Nyaya
texts such as Ma!l).iDa. and TattvaCin. (see Mal).iDa. p'. 120,
TattvaCin. vol. IV, pt. 2, p. 844). See Introdudlon [J-3]-(d).
(IV. F. 6]

iJ~;;~lI. I "'f<[<!Tsrn;orl", "'1,,-!;:J! l.mO''fll'(' ~ni<::~.<::i~~RlJll,{

<Ji<:lJlqce~'11?;[;::wn'1T1:r1;jR s.fif <'111jil~S?[1fi:T ~~'!T<!illl;ll~sfq

'f."{lJllOJf1:rl;ll'1T<I: Q:W'fr'IT ~'1qrG:''1Ia:. I

That is inane [false]. [One should say pacano'gnil; 'fire with

which one cooks' , pacani sthiili 'pot with which one cooks']'
[Under the theory now proposed, one would, instead achieveJ.
*pacano'gninii, *pacan'i sthiilya.1JZ [with instrumental and locative
. endings, because a krt suffix does not denote number]. To avoid
this, [one has to] accept that [anabhihite provides for the introduction of endings] when either an instrument or its number has not
been otherwise expressed. Once this has been accepted, here also [in
<i1rcnn~;or <:'l'l'lil+!T 'f~q ] the instrumental ending is hard to justify.
1. kara1]iidhikar(ClJ{lyosca P. III.3.117 introduces the suffix LyuT

to express the main means and the locus. Thus a krt suffix such
as LyuT denotes the kara1Ja, but not its number.
2. Both the Benan;a and the Bombay editions have the reading

pac ani sthalya

argument woule
form. I hav,
paoan~ sthalya:
suffix denoting
(IV. F. 7J

;or 'if



QH'1'r q'

l1F!l<;f <f


Nor can the fo

expres..o.ed, since cog;
is not intended. T
principle: In order
suffixes], [it is to be
where the cognition
with the agent as c
would end up being 1
tion [of sentence me1
[belonging to (he vc
[known] from expe
specific desire, its de:
acter. That also thl
1. The intended COl
the action of coe
the agent is cons
and the norriinal
the instrumental I
way, in the senter
the lIN suffix d(
the qualifica.nd c
active sentence.
above, the agent
been expressed, a
of the difficulty
the form jyoti:;tor.
schools have diffe




yasarpgraha. Hows not quite correctly

: ;:r <f.':llTTf+r"lFl~rCl I

'bhihite] [Po II.3.1] ,

not been expreseed',
etc. In the present
only with the agent,
grammarians, since
of the verbal affix.
1 to denote the form
e Mimarp.sakas, who
~ to them (Mimarp.II the ten I-members.
. This particular
also given in Nyya
ee Mai).iDa. p. 120,
eduction [J-3]- (d) .






<i~<n~ f1'l "ll ~ Sfit

'fire wilh
one cooks']'
::I, instead achieve],
mental and locative
lUmber]. To avoid
des for the introducits number has not
cepted, here also [in
is hard to justify.



:es the suffix LyuT

'hus a krt suffix such
1S have the reading

paeani' sthalya which obviously cannot be correct. The whole

argument would not make sense, based as it 13 on this impo~sible
form. I have substituted the grammatically explainable
pa()an~ sthiilya1?l. Thus it would provide an instance of the
suffix denoting locus (adhikara1}!a).
[IV. F. 7] ;'[' "" 'li<l3Nr,u1{rif "I"! 9i(~J~~'1{9i1 '-II"l1 1{"! 'TT 'li~19~""I9i"lI~
<UNit Cl"! 'liCllf1'l~Cl ~<"I"~'1<r+lT~fq- 'Ii,lJ)fij~"'1'1i'-iTi;[ Cl1<'1':fl
+rT'lT'>! 'll,IJ)Tf1'l"lFlfl:rm 'IT''''Il1., I <i'T"l~1:[ C1~~<q'i1:[:J;"TR<~<r1R1:[C!(O( I<l:.
ClT<<rtr~'n "'iT19~ i;[~lW1 rn:i!<'lr.IP."(o( Ii '1 01:[9< ~ fl:rffi
!fRri:,:J;wn"'9"r:rr'1Cl(91~ei <:1m ..-r1\'iTlI!TIiTU1{!fl3'Wr~ fu:"Z I

Nor can the following be claimed: The main means is not

expressed, since cognition with the main means as the qualificand
is not intended. - This is based on the strength of the following
principle: In order to bring the krt suffixes on par [with the tiN
suffixes], [it is to be accepted that] , it is the agent that is expressed,
where the cognition has the agent as a qualificand, or if cognition
with the agent as a qualificand is the one intended. The sastra
would .endup being unaUlhoritative [if this is acc~pted]. The cognition [of sentence meaning] is different according to different theories
[belonging to the various schools]. It is -also wellknown and also
[known] from experience that the intention itself being only a
specific desire, its desiredness or undesiredness is not fixed in character. That also thus is uncertain.
1. The intended cognition in caitraJ! pakta 'Caitra is the agent of
the action of cooking', has the agent as its qualificand. Thus,
the agent is considered to have been expressed by the krt suffix,
and the nominal base caitra takes the nominative, il~sread of
the instrumental case' proper to expressing the agent. In the same
way, in the s~ntence jyotitomena svargakiimo yajeta even though
the lIN suffix does express the meaning karaIJa 'main means',
the qualificand of the cognition is the agent, since this is an
active sentence. Therefore, according to the principle stated
above, the agent should be the one that is considered to have
been expressed, and not the main means. This would take care
of the difficulty regarding the use of the instrumental case in
the form jyoti$tomena. Kaul).Qabhatta rejects this, since different
schools have different theories about the cognition of the sen-

. . .,--.--.. .-., --.,.

~~.-,. >~- ~-~




tence meaning, accepting this principle would create chaos, and

the siistra would end up being unauthoritative.
[IV. G. I]


1Ilt(;r<ir G'i'lfuitii "IT'i.l'i1<i rr:q


I 'n;;jq~lC::Jq


and the difficu

[IV. C. 3]

~Tff I


,q~oi! 8:i'<rT~1<J: I



Now, the property of being a means is to be signified as being

located in the Jyoti~\oma. But that is not possible. There is discrepancy, because heaven is produced from Vajapeya also.
1. vyabhiciira: the fault of discrepancy, in the relation of cause
and effect. (Kiiryakiira1Jabhavabhanga!J N.K., p. 824) . This discrepany is of two kinds: (a) anvayavyabhiciir,a: nonproduction
of the effect, even when the cause exists. (b) vyatirekavyabhicala : production of the effect, even when the stated (;aUSe is not
present.. It is this second kind of discrepancy, with which we
:are concerned here. Thus, the opponent points out, that the
;effect heaven can be produced even without the performance of
the sacrifice J yoti~toma, which is the stated cause of heaven in
this sentence. Heaven can be produced also from the Vajapeya
'or the Agnihotra, etc.

On this we sa
being the means to
perties. There cam
exist here. This e[,
the denoted meanir
been accepted that
denotative function
means to particular
1. See [IV.B.24].
2. Inthis way, the
has been accep,
previous objecti
is also put asid

[ tV: G. 2J rr =.r fol~TC!I~Cl 'tn'i.lrr,~ 'IT'i.l;rl<!l{ 1 ~1~W'lll~ 'Il<iqrrl1:[,'IT~fu ~('(, I

Nor can it be claimed that it is the property of Delng the means
. -to a distinct [heaven], that is to be signified, since this [distinct]
.class is assumed later [than the cognition of the meaning of Ilk].
1. The opponent to the i$!asiidhanatva view, says that this discrepancy that has been pointed out in [IV. G.l] , cannot be
removed by saying that the heaven which is produced by the
]yoti$toma, is distinct from the heaven produced by the Vajapeya. What' is at issue is vaijiitya (itself a gener~l prope:ty
here). Hence one gets vdijiityavacchinna svmga; that IS there IS a
-distinct svarga. But there are not several properties, one for each
heaven. This view apparently belongs to the Mim..qlsakas, who
'consider that there is only one generic property distinct-heaven-ness residing in all the individual heavens achieved from the
'performances of a particular sacrifice, and th~ ?bject of t~e
'sacrifice is to achieve a particular heaven lmuted by thIS
-generic property. The opponents put forward the objection
that this whole concept has been thought of only after the mean. 'jng of the prescriptive sentence with liN has been cognised,


[IV. G.4]


t!;~Rr rr Q

According to tl
is not a limitor [of ~
terpositiveness limit
cognition which aris
ject] possessed of a
[from a sentence sue
understood : an abse
positiveness of abse:
component meaning~
terpositiveness of ab
are coimected] by
limited by the stat
positiveness of absoll
Further, the princi]



. create chaos, and


'a I

'Il"lQ<rr<::Jcr <:'!:rT\-

~ signified as being
:ble. There is dislpeya also.
e relation of cause
., p. 824) . This disir,a: nonproduction
) vyaUrekavyabhistated <::ause is not
.cy, with which we
)ints out, that the
the performance of
cause of heaven in
from the Vajapeya

~ <!i"Cfl<r<'!TfG:fu ~<r. I
. of ~ing the means
ince this [distinct]
e meaning of Il]'i].
says that this disV. G.I], cannot be
is prpduced by the
duced'by the Vajaa general property
rga; that is there is a
perties, one for each
~ Mimfup.sakas, who
~rty distinct-heavenachieved from the
:I the object of the
~n limited by this
ward the objection
only after the meanhas been cognised,




and the difficulty of discrepancy understood .

[IV. C. 3] 8l;;{t'O!f('t I f?!;;mrl<r([<lIT'CRi ~N~T ;sf, q('t I '1 '" (1?[ G~T~
~Tft I (1"1" ~;;rr<'l R~l;([~ 1iJf9:(1l;'11"!iH:r~CfR~+l: I q:q",WI'I
(f"l,m\:f"l<~ fe!N1iJf9:QR:fcr ~HToit"'T~fcr I
On this we say the following: lIN denotes the property of
being the means to [the objects of desire] with distinct generic properties. There cannot be even a suspicion that the discrepancy may
exist here. This element of distinct generic properties appears [in
the denoted meaning] because, the denotative function for lIN has
been accepted that way. That is why we have sa;d before that the
denotative function of lIN is [to denote] the property of being a
means to particular ends.
1. See [IV.B.24].
2. In this way, the fault of discrepancy disappears and since vaijiitya
has been accepted as a part of the denoted meaning of lIN the
previous objection that the distinctness was imagined afterwards
is also put aside.
[IV. G.4 1 9i~1119TfG:m;;rRq.'!{<[:i:T ~<;'if+!f'1q-;;%,,'f.''!Cf~ 'if<::<'!T,!p.~;;r~ra-<rlm(1T<rT q:9 '3lo/'if<'!~lfit fe!mcr1'.fl,.mlIln"lTf'if-f.'.:1lfT{<[rc!TtrT'!m~flicrT'!~'f.'9<'!T'!P.w-;rl!Rrn flim'f. <91;P:<r'~ l;'I.m+!T'1Tf\:f'f.<.:Uflm,!qfcrWTcrler~"if,<91'11 S"l1for:l!W'I(f ~fcr. "Il:J.QQfu: I
8l''!P-icrT~<::'f.1er~~;;rl!fcr>nflicrT'f.<er~<'ifu~ . ;:r~+!f+lil:fl~H:,0:r5
q:~fcr '1(f~U\:f ~fcr ~+!1<::f,,* <':l+!'J5~Uf"l1"l~l:;nl:{f: I
According to the view that [an unnecessarily] prolix property
is not a limitor [of a relation], [it is thus accepted that] only COUllterpositiveness limited by potness [is] the relation posited for the
cognition which arises from sentences such as] 'there is not [an object] possessed of a shell-like neck [on the ground]' etc. Similarly,.
[from a sentence such as svargakiimo jyoti~tomena yajeta] , there is,
understood: an absence of the property of being a limitor of cQunter-
positiveness of absence in the same locus as svarga; [further, the
component meanings, viz., the property of. being the limitor of counterpositiveness of absence in the same locus as sv,arga, and absence.
are connected] by the relation of having the counterpositivenesslimited by the state of being the property which limits counterpositiveness of absolute absence in the same locus as a distinct svargu.
Further, the principle that [absence] has its counterpositiveness



delimited by the property which delimits the class of things

as related, holds only in such places where [an absence] is
directly denoted by the item nan used with other items. Hence,
there is no conflict [between this principle and the view presented
here]. This is the solution offered by RiamaJq-wa Bhattactirya.
1. For detailed discussion, see Introduction [K].
2. If, in the view given above, UN denotes absence, then thi3 absence
should have as counterpositive an entity, which belongs to the
class of things delimited by the property which delimits relatedness (anvayitiivacch,edaka). In other words, the thing absent
here should be delimited by the property of being a particular
svarga. But this is not Ramak)'wa's view. Hence, the restriction that this principle applies only where nan is used.
3. Both the Benaras and Bombay editions accept the If'.a'ding

The Bombay edition also mentions another

reading as given by MSS. T. and D. TJJis reading is fei;;nCfT'!
0!111'l~>{rmCll'l'O~G;'li''lI'l~~'il .. <:j'+i{"iir;:r.
However both of these
readings are not proper in the context. The absence or abh"!iva
in question is that of ;I, property .. This property (~q<T~+!T;:rTRI'f,<:Ufl-'
m'lqf~:qTmql'l'O~?:'Ii''l) is the counterpositive or pratiyogi~ of that
abseIice. CO,unter-positiveness or 'pratiyogifa re~ides in this
property. TilUS thi, abh?<va is the nirfip.1k:t of...avacchedakatvani~!hapratiyogitj and the limitor of that coullterpositiveness or
prati),ogitdvacchedaka has to be <:9h<fllHlfl;j'HUfl'1Tq>TRi'i!mCfi'l~'5
"Il<'l-<q. I have amended the reading accordingly to fei'J!lcfi"!<:'lir<f<lR1N'li\UfI"'1;:al111'l>[m>{rflTqI9'O~<::'li''l''ll9f.<~lim:qTflTCIl'li'9<:fMpiir~1

[IV. G. 5J

'!~ ~'lip.p111 1<,'!Ifu:;:rr <! <:9*'l19"~~;:r ;;"1Tfa2'Tl1<fl~'l~ -.n~,!('r I

0!'l"~'f,''!i'.5J'ill;j;:rl<f1l1~'li~+'191~ I <:'Ff,ql.;,,! Cf<::"''''!'[R!<EfI<::mliWfCfcgl<J:. I

Now as to [another view, which maintains the following] :

[A sentence such as jyotilftomena] svargakiimaij. etc., does not convey that [heaven] as delimited by the property heavenness, is what
is attainable through the Jyoti~toma .. For, this is incapable of
conveying the meaning component consisting of the delimitor
[heavenness] , and this is also impossible: the property heavenness


also occurs in that wh:

so that this property :
1. Now starts the '
2. Heaven is not pro
[IV. G 6J fll"IT ~'l<T' ~

51 'liT <: 'fiTo"ITl:r'



. Instead ,[of the rn

sentence signifies only
ness and of the pro~
can the cognition of (
of discrepancy which 1
nondiscrepant knowle(
crepancy if [a sacrifice
heavenl through the (
to any heaven] , let tht
by] occurring. immed
through this de1imitat
one's accepting that [.
property-possessor, whi
1. This samiinfidhika
2. This view (svar gat
belongs to the I
clearly in the Vy
In order to avoid d
carefully. Accordil
to heaven consists
limitor of the pro]
relation to the pre
Thus it is that X t
of the property whi
preoede [in effect,



class of things
an absence] is
. items. Hence,
~ view presented
;hen this absence
belongs to the
delimi ts related;he thing absent
,ing a parti cular
ence, the restricis used ..
ept the widing
~;;r~Rr:il Fral""'1:ntions another
in g is fei;;na1<r
er both of these
bsence or abh'iva
:l;9ir<:!m.nM~1T[1ratiyogin of that
. re~ides in this
... avacchedakatv:rpositiveness or

il'[l'l~R!<rl f<Rri'l~~

19lyto fei;;rra1<rl'i'rmC!l'li<'l<:!l'i[rt.,1
ml1<:!l~;q<'t 'i[l''''~ I


the following] :
:., doeB not C011venness, is what
is incapable of
the delimitor
~rty. heavenness



also occurs in that which is not produced by means of the Jyoti$toma,

so that this property has an overly broad extension [for the present
1. Now starts the view of the Neologicians.
2. Heaven is not produced exclusively by Jyoti~toma. 'See [IV.G.1].
[IV. G 6J

f'iirg l;'lir'~["JB'I;;{r<r<'l<:!Tm"lR<'li1:mrlll'3{ ~<lj'T ;;f\'<:<ra I., 'C{f?{

o:qfl'f"'lrnn<i ~re'i[r'l'li+1:, I <:!llT;orWI'[<':* ~o:qf+!'C{H;al;'r <:!llH51'1il<':'lilo:qf+!"'ll~m.,feiuR< I <I't!l 'C{ l;'l<i<'ll'l~~" o:qf<'fin<':'n~J'<TG;
'I;;~?:;or R:qa'I;h:RI'~ llTl1Ifo: I <lG;T~~ '1lmar ~l!<I1"~ 'q. rr
<[1'1'0+1:, I

Instead [of the meaning refuted in the last passage] , the Vedic
sentence signifies only the co-occurrence in the same locus of heavenness and of the property of being produced byhSvamedl1a. Nor
can the cognition of discrepancy refute this. Only that cognition
of discrepancy which has the same qualifier can be contradictory to
nondiscrepant knowledge. Thus, since one sees that there is discrepancy if [a sacrifice such as Jyoti~toma is considered the cause of
heaven]. ~hrqugh the delimitation of heavenness [Le.. with respect
to any heaven] , let the [Jyoti~tomas' etc.]. property [of being cause
by] occurring immediately hefore [its effect)., not be accepted
through this delimitation. . [Nevertheless], there is nothing to bar
one's accepting that l.Jyoti~toma etc.] is a cause with respect to a
propertypossessor, which is the locus of that [property heavenness] .
1. This silmardidhikarmJya view is also quoted in VyutpaVaLaVi.
2. This view (svargatvavacchedena niyatapurvavrtfitvagraha) also
belongs to the Naiyayikas. It has. been presented more
dearly in the Vyutpattiviada. [see VyutpaVaLaVi. p. 165].
In order to avoid discrepancy, it is necessary to choose the Iimitor
carefully. According to this view, the property of being a means
to heaven consists of having the property (PI) that i~ the
limitor of the property (p,) of being invariably preceding in
relation to the property (P3) which has heaven for its locus.
Thus it is that X that is the cause of heaven, which is possessed
of the property which limits the class of all X which immediately.
precede [in effect, a cause] .




2. tadiiSraye dharmit;ti is in the translation above, a niTupaka saptami. Thus the result is: sVlargalviisrayanirupitii hetutii

[IV. G. 7]

sr~ err O<[t1'r<il~~~;iI S'f i1 ~fa<rr"l'li: I"f; l! ;q['l{c!I~wrt:[~'1~iJ'~

tS'fT~'fi'" 11;'! I c!N'>J;;rlfcrer~~<r. C!q;o;qRI~'f.f.'lW1-!1{ ;:n~,'l<! I

Alternatively, the doubt about discrepancy does not prevent

this [knowledge that heaven tesults from the performance of the
Jyoti~toma etc.]. On the contrary, this [doubt] is actually conducive to this [knowledge], since it is limited only to doubt about the
fitness [of heaven qua heaven being that which is caused by aparticular sacrifice]. Further, there is no definite knowledge that heaven
is not capable of being preceded by a particular sacrifice as a result
of the doubt about such a generic property [heavenness delimiting
the class of that which isproduced by Jyoti~toma etc.]'
1. This is fairly clear. As to how the fault of discrepancy arises,

this has already been explained before. Here, the opponent says
that the doubt about whether the fault of discrepancy may not
be found here,- if we say that heaver) is produced by Jyoti$toma
(since heaven is also produced by other 'sacrifices), is not really
, a deterent at all. The doubt here is only as 'follows: Since heaven
is produced by more than one cause, it will be discrepant to
delimit the heaven being produced by Jyotl$toma by heaven.
ness. This kind of doubt should be no deterent to volition however since, even with the doubt, it is taken for granted that JyotiI?toma does produce heaven. Though other sacrifices may produce
it also, there is no definite knowledge that Jyoti$toma does not
. produce it. And only such a definite knowledge can be a deterent
to volition. By doubting about the discrepancy,. as a matter
of fact; you are accepting the fad that Jyoti$toma does produce
heaven, since otherwise the discrepancy will not arise. Thus
the doubt regarding the discrepancy is a help rather than a
[IV. G. 8] C!~fq 'lil<iQl'l'<~"9il>f~ 9i~ 9iH:lJfClT

>!1l[irffi ~<r. I

i1 I ~1l!HT

f~u<[mi1f:'fln~sfi.t '>J~lq; o<[Tfi:cfl:rll:qc'li"'~i1 C!~ ~f.!;lU<r. I

srci 11;'1 C!~>nll:'liW(~ ~,<[~~~~s]q ~Rw::.~q<[i:'r I C!~ Q:lJfl<:filrl!fTr<;~ I SiC! ll;'I ol{Tqc!I'I~9iT'i~sfq 'Ii<""!<'ll", cl:f[l<n:r;il



q~fu I
Nevertheless [t:

property of being a
perty which delimit
[In the case of a par
smoke by fire], fro
actually have a dire(
[of smoke and fire] .
of a fire or that J yo
of results [a fire, he1
reason, in some case
vasion of an effect b]
makes causation knc
of grass, rubbing sti<
caused by each of tl:
have grasped the lirr
grasp, on the streng
etC.]. This' gnispir
occurs and is seen iJ
the above reasoning]
a cognition of petv
,knowledge of the lirr
the absence of result
of the Jyoti$toma e
[IV. G. 9J




This is to be c(
perty of being pro(
limits it [the proper
without grasping the
it, when there is th
of discrepancy.
1.' From here on,
view stated in
statement is tha'



l'{+!lon'li1r;qF1:f~~Tq~~~ ~T"I ~~;g:: "~"9~ I

i'e, a nirupaka sapryanirupiiil hetuUi

:'f.f.'r~~ <n~~ I

does not prevent

performance of the
I is actually conduto doubt about the
s caused by a parti)wledge that heaven
sacrifice as a result
,avenness delimiting
:t etc.] ,

f discrepancy arises,
~, the opponent says
.iscrepl:lncy may not
.11ced by Jyoti 9toma'
'ifices), is not really
)llows: Since heaven
ill be discrepant to
>ti~toma by heaven.
ent to'volition how~ granted that Jyoticrifices may produce
Jyoti~toma does not
.ge can be a deterent
pancy, as a matter
i~toma does produce
ill not arise. Thus
help rather than a

~<r. I ~ I <:TI+!l~l
;.,~~ crm ~1'1i1<::1<r. I
~~~~ I cr~l Q:<Jfl<::fur-


s]q 'fm"lm<l:, c<nfu>r~



~o'-:nfu'Ofi<:rT+!mffi'~ cr~o1:fRl~'t<Jf 9iI<1:c;qfcI~~,fr<ll<r. I cr~T~~q

qfflRRl I
Nevertheless [the following objection is raised]: how can the
property of being a cause be grasped if one does not grasp the property which delimits what is caused? This objection is not valid.
[In the case of a pararthiinumana] , one grasps the pervasion [of e.g.,
smoke by fire], from a verbal statement, although one may not
actually have a direct knowledge of the co-occurrence in a given locus
[of smoke and fire]. Similarly, one accepts [that grass is the cause
of a fire or that Jyoti~toma is the cause of heaven] on the strength
of results [a fire, heaven as. conveyed by Vedic statement]. For this
reason, in some cases of direct perception also, one accepts 'the [pervasion of an effect by a cause] , given that the element [result] which
makes causation known is available. Thus, for example, in the case
of grass, rubbing sticks, or a fire jewel [where fire is considered to be
caused by each of these]. Hence it is that, although one might not
have grasped the limitor of the property of being pervaded, one does
grasp, on the strength of the result, a pervasion [of smoke by fire
etc.']. This grasping of pervasion with respect to smoke which
occurs and is seen in different ways, is established and correct [by
the above reasoning]. For, given the necessary elements to'produce
a cognition of pervasion, namely, co-occurrence etc., even if the
Iknowledge of the limitor of the property of being pervaded] is absent,
the absence of result is not observed. Hence, the [above knowledge
of the Jyoti~toma etc., as the cause of heaven] is not unjustified.
[IV. G. 91

~ ~'1"'i9?0i'C[l'i'Roi 9i"+!'l"'~~ foRT

>riQ.1l'!. I c;qf1:ri:fH~lT~~qfer<::TM~: <:T'<3; crG.>r~re.l'1'Il"'l I

Sf!<:: Rrr<1:f+l1 ;;fr'!f

This is to be considered concerning this argument: The property of being produced is being possessed of the property that
limits it [the property of being produced]. How can it be grasped
without grasping the limiting property and it is impossible to grasp
it, when there is the deterent present in the form of the cognition
of discrepancy.
1.' From here on, KaUl).~abhatta starts to refute the opponent's
view stated in [IV.G.8]. The whole point of the opponent's
statement is that it is possible to grasp the relation of cauSe and



being caused, without having to grasp the limitor of the property of being caused or produced. Thus even without grasping ,
heavenness as the kliryattiVlacchedaka (= janyatavacchedaka
'limitor of the property oJ being produced), it is still possible
to grasp the causation between lyoti~toma and heaven. Now
KaUl,lJQabhana points out that janyatva (= kiiryatva 'the property of being caused or produced) cannot possibly be grasped
without also grasping its limitor, because janyatva is the same
as janyatavachhedakadharmavattvam 'having the property that
limits the property of being produced'. And grasping this limitor
is not possible in the present case due to the discrepancy already explained.
'[IV. G. 10J ';or "i ~l;;~ ;or tf ;;)1;[: Igl'n'<!G1R~'l~q~


81':!fii:a1:r"nf9CR'lTQ'.1 ;or "i Gfua:rlf <r1~,li'l U~'l~ ;or. ~<fl~'fa~fcr

'IT'"'ll'{ I 5[~ir ;;<i'rfcrnfl'f fqrrl1:'l~~"J{T<~'lir>..T'Iot G~~'1Tl1T'I~'lT
tf i l1'lTQ'. I G'I 1I(t ~;;rl<'1~'1TqTGaf sfcr '{<1l1:!q~~,qTQ'. I

Nor [can it be claimed] that this fauLt is not valid in the case of
the Vedic statement. It is impossible to say that the doubt regarding
.fitness. is not deterent. Nor should one say that there is no definite
:knowledge, just a doubt, imd a doubt is not a deterent. It is impossible not to have definite knowledge [that lyoti9toma is not the
-cause of heaven qua heaven] , after first hearing [a Vedic statement]
about heaven caused by Agnihotra, even without lyoti 9toma. For,
in. your view [the concept of] the property of being a distinct
[heaven}' does not come in first even superficially.
[IV- G. II] 1<lJP,:'T<r1<!rq ~~<>ilq~~ciT fq;jflGl'11.'1'lo'lfu~'lil~:'li 'IT (j\~: I
'1fi'1(t "i 'rfITfT.a<:+!qr''ll~ ~'-l'1+r, I

Even in the case of the grass etc., the grasp of that [causation]
takes place, when the property of being a distinct [fire] is taken into
consideration, or by the positive and negative concomitance of the
"distinct [Le. grass and the distinc:t fire resulting from it]. It should
-also be borne in mind that another fault is also going 1;0 be stated.
1. In this passage, Kauwabhana also shows that the example of
the, fire resulting from different causes such as grass, rubbing
wood, etc., does not really help the opponent. Fire is produced
by grass, as well as by the fire jewel, or the ritual rubbing, wood.


Here ,if the limito

to be fireness, then
grasp of causatior
course to the conI
resulting from gra!
from the ritual ruJ:
of discrepancy is ,
This does not help
in the concept of v
[IV. G. I2J ;;'1'rfcrrfti'li:tc<Pl


In the sentence jyc

as follows: heaven [:(:
anyone other than the
can that be grasped, S1
heaven] delimited by h
to cognize also that the
perty jyoti~tomavaiian)
Otherwise, usages such
be possible.
1. Here svarga is the J
other than the pe
vrttitva) . Thus t]
resides in svar ga an
Now the ,adhikara
of being a locus' is
one other than the j
the limitor in a limi
dena) or (b) by tI
yen.a). It is in th
reasoning arises. 11
heavenness, all and
heaven is not the I.
anyone other than t
also from the perfOl



ltor of the pro-

;vithout grasping

is still possible
:I heaven. Now
'ryatva 'the piosibly be grasped
rtva is the same
1e property that
tping this limitor
discrepancy al(j <'n);ri~<r'~'f. Cll<!'

q 'lAA"n~CI~ra

[Q<'Il<I: I

.id in the case of

doubt regarding
!re is no definite
~rent. It is lm(:oIDa .is not the
Tedic statement]
Y'oti~toma. For,
>eing 'a distinct

;hat [causation]
reJ is taken into
omitance of the
1 it]. It should
ng to be stated.
the example of
l graSS, rubbing
Pire is produced
tl rubbing wood.



Hereif the limitor of the property of being produced is taken

to be fireness, then the same doubt of discrepancy arises and the
grasp of causation detered. To avoid this, one must have recourse to the concept of vlaijatya 'distinctness', Thus the fire
resulting from grass, is of a different type from the fire resulting
from the ritual rubbing wood, and so on. In this way, the fault
of discrepancy is avoided, and the causation is clearly grasped.
This does not help the opponent's view, since he does not bring
in the concept of vaijatya.
[IV. G. 12J '>'1.''rfcn!Ii:l~'<R '>4'rmmll'fG:!'l'lRr: <'Ill ~,ilq <rl~'l'ij I 'I '" cre:1N
<qir<'llq~~;or "flNClfur1r "Il~llq<FClc"l~ I 31M'f.<::1J[<ilq~~<<!,
mm'lrf"l"ll1:oi.'\'ll""l.q<!'<f\'e[l3'+'1'i1<I: I :a:r'''l'n''' llW1<!'T 'I Il~: "
~<1.lT~1<rT foIo>'!l!<J'W1<I: I
In the sentence jyoti.tomena etc., the verbal import can only be
as follows: heaven [produced by ]yoti~tomaJ does not reside in
anyone other than the performer of ]yoti~oma. Objection: How
can that be grasped, since even that is contradicted if [the result is
heaven] delimited by heavenness? Answer: Because, it is possible
to cognize also that the delimitor of locus-ness is related [to the property jjotitom4vadanyavrttitvaj by co-occurence in the same locus,
Otherwise, usages, such as 'there is no fish in the Ganga' will not
be. possible.
1. Here svarga is the locus of the property of not residing in anyone
other than the performer of ]yoti9toma (jyotitomavadanyavrttitva). Thus the property of being a locus (adhikaralJala)
resides in svarga and this property is then delimited by svargatva.
Now the ,adlzikaralJatavacchedaka 'the limitor of the property
of being a locus' is thus svargatva. This svargatva is related to
jyoti'itomavadanyavrttitva 'the property of not residing in anyone other than the performer of ]yoti~toma;either (a) by being
the limitor in a limiting relation (adhikara1Jatiivacchedakiivacclzedena) or (b) by the relation of co-occurence (samanadhikara~l
yena). It is in the former case that the problem of discrepant
reasoning 'arises. If heaven the locus is taken to be delimited by
heavenness, all and any individual heavens are understood and
heaven is not the locus of only the property of not. residing in
anyone other than the performer of ]yoti~toma. Svax,ga can result
also from the performance of Vajapeya. Thus heaven being pro- .



ven to be the locus of jyoti$(omavadanya (i.e. vajapeyavad)vrttitva also, the problem of discrepant reasoning arises if jyou.
$(omavad,anyiivrtflitva is said to be the vyapaka of svargatva. In
order to get around this fault, it has been suggested that there
should not be a limiting relation here with the limitor of the
property of being a locus. Merely the co-occurence of heavenness
with jyoti$tom[lVadanyavrttitva is' sufficient for the syntactic
relation. In order to prove that such cooccurence is sufficient
for the grasp of the syntactic relation, the following example is
given. The sentence 'there is no fish in the', will be false,
if it is taken to apply to the whole river, and it would apply to
the whole river, if there is a limiting relationship between not
having fish, and the Gailganess, which is the limitor of the property of being a iocus. The statement can be Perfectly true,
however, if taken to mean that, in a part of the river, there is no
fish. This .can be done by saying that Gailg,aness and the property of not having fish co-occur.
2.. I am translating the word svarga as 'heaven' only for expediency.
What is actually meant is a state of bliss devoid of misery.
[IV. G 13J q:<i:q. "n~i'I'i!<'!i=l'l f<l<:'1><:, <:11<'1,<1 :q 'l~l'I~ <:I<'lme:rut 'l('3'i~
. 'l~'lRr~ :ql'3'i'!f+r'~~~lIJ 3T<1 11:'1 'ib:l:~rr:!<qF:1f~l m'lP-ll'<f1C:-l
Jf'[l%: ~~~ I '31""11 ~:Ff'lf+rfu i!~ :q Qon'f<iiT<,,~~I'l<'iwr
'3Nrr,'!'illrr1'3l ,,'ll'Q'i{ ~'[r'<f;:f ~'l1G:. I ."I :q '31"rrf'll'ill<r1~'[I;;r;{
~'ll~fq 'l1"'ll{ I '3+1Fre~~~?':[Q'lT Clmm~fu l1 ~'11f':!'f.<lc'n: I

Thus, the meaning of injunction is the property of being a result

which is desired. And Y is the result of X if the following holds:
if X exists, in the next instance, Y exists; and if X is not present,
Y also does not occur. That is why the inclination to perform exc
piatory rites is explained, since they are [performed] so that pain
should not be produced. If the view that. the property of being a
means is the denoted meaning [of lIN, is accepted], there will be
no inclination [towards these rites], since the knowledge of the pro- .
pertyof being a means, in the form of existing prior to it [the nonproducing of pain], is not possible. Nor can it be objected that
[in this view] , there will be no inclination because of the absence of
knowledge of the property of being a means. For, that is obtained
due to its being cognised by the same cognition.. This is [tpe opinion]


of the Neologicians.
1. This view is fo'
as follows: Cl~
Ql;'l :q "l<'li[s
~'!<:I1<i'I'i!'l1Rfci <["\I

2. p. 257).

2. If the property
of lIN, there wi
As has been spe
be the property
prior to somethi.
prior absence of
the expiatory Tit
prior absence .
absence? Thw
there will be no \
pt. 2, pp. 256-2,
3. I have amende
accepted by bo
otherwise it mal
4. 1 have accepted
rather than <11'
closer to the W(
See note 1.
[IV. G. 14J 31~B'l~

'Ilfu'C;; W
for<'1 olen I

, Here the followi

case of smoke, once c
cerning the donkey, '
cular smoke not resi
donkey, the absenc.
established. Thus, ~




(i.e. viijapeyavad)ming arises if jyoti

1M of svargatva. In

iuggested that there

the limitor of the
lrence of heavenness
t for the syntactic
:curence is sufficient
'ollowing example is
;aitga', will be false,
d it would apply to
onship between not
~ lirnitor of the pron be perfectly true,
the river, there is no
gjaness and the pro-

. R~

<:I,l{iWreJut' l{'<:1"~
:!<ql<nf~crn m<[~,"l~
, . Q<m'f'llrel;mFl<9~q'~

'0[ <:Il'i!~<91't!l~l,);I'[lW'

~fu Q~l{lf<rif.<iCliT: I

rty of, being a result

he foNowing holds :
if X is not present,
ltion to perform ex,rmed] so that pain
property of being a
pted], there will be
10wledge of the pro- .
prior to it [the nonit be objected that
[se of the absence of
?or, that is obtained
rhis is [the opinion]



of the Neologicians.
1. This view is found in a commentary of the Tattvacintamal)i,
as follows: (ll;1l1<J:. <:I11l1;:l{(I: <:'1<:11<'12 );[,'I'Ii l;'1<:11~'1<;'l<rl~9i '11 i'i"<'1>l:
(IFf '0[ l;jl''1'lS;:1jl{: I <:~ <:Il1m&fT&;ci ;;''lllcrffi111R I ...31mffil1"1llT:
l;'1<:11"<'tl!!'11F!lcr <hl;j: I
(TattvaCinRa. (;la) vol. 4, pt

only for expediency.

s devoid of misery.


2. p. 257).

2. If the property of being a means is accepted to be the meaning

of 1IN, there will be no inclination towards the expiatory rites.
As has been specified above, the property of being means has to
be the property of existing prior [to the result]. Now, existing
prior to something means in a time (hat is limited by the
prior'absence of that something. Now the result intended with
the expiatory rites is the prior absence of suffering. How can a
prior absence be said to be existing before another. prior
absence? Thus the causation cannot be grasped. And thus
there will be no volition. [see Aloka on Tattvacintamani, vol. IV,
pt. 2, pp. 256-257] .

. 3. -1 have amended the reading .;or 'if <:Il'iFI''1=ilFI1<J:.. which is

accepted by both the editions to ~ 'if <:ITIO!;or''I1=ilFl1<J:. because
otherwise it makes no sense.
4. I have accepted the reading


of the Bombay edition

rather than 'Jl~'Il!!'ll''1ll. of the Benares edition because it is
closer to the wording of the original view in the Nyaya texts.
See note 1.

[IV. G. 14] 3l~11'1~l{ll. \ ~ 'Hf'lic<rPi"l,l-\i[~ll{T U6l1'lG:;:1fI'[Rr:

'll~q; ~11 ~lcr 't!T~sfq );['[~'1l'{T'I~<! <:fo\fu~,~~a<;"1l);['1c'i'!i<91;;r
fq~ll~c!1 I

. Here the following should be taken into consideration: In the

case of smoke, once one grasps that there is discrepant reasoning concerning the donkey, even if there is a cognition that there is a particular smoke not residing in anything other than :that which has a
. donkey, the absence of inclination [towards a donkey] is well
. established. Thus, since this [meaning accepted in the view of the



N aiYlilyikas that the sentence jyoti$Iomena etc., denotes this meaning :

a heaven (is caused by Jyotil?toma) which does not reside in anyone
olher than the performer of Jyoti~tomaJ cannot be the instigator, it is
not the meaning of lIN.

l~ ~<i" 13,"1~sfi'r ~:;jT<"1"l."q;t ;r ~G:. !l~H!Q ~'I !l'lcN.~T;rre;g;T


l1Hl11T'I1G:. I

In addition, in this case, even later on, the concept of the property of being a distinct [heaven] need not be conceived of. There
is no basis for it [for the concept of vaijiitya] , since instigating knowledge is already first established.
1. The concept of vaijatya will not be needed. Vaijiitya is to be
thought of only in order to justify the inclination to act, by
removing the discrepancy created by the heaven being produced
by causes other than the Jyoti$toma. But in this view, the inc
clination to act is already explained, by the knowledge that
Jyo%toma produces the desired result heaven. Thus vaijatya is
not necessary in order to justify that.
[IV. G.1]

'l:.~ 'l~cl'r.RllTcnfii'll~if aC'f.<i"R"I. I 'jl1T~ ~~lfit ,'I<TBr

<!T1l;;r;:<[,~ '11'elij;P:lT'I1G:. I 'f.HllTal''1~q
815;~ie<;<'IiG:. I <liN
aG;J:t~ a~q<ftl1: I 31~1l'fl'llG:. I 'f.l'UiaT'I'' 131'1~~~ro
o1.{Trn&:[TWh~'f;l I '



Nor can [it be said thatvaijiitya] has to be conceived of in order

to justify the causation already grasped, since there is no difficulty
about the heaven being produced by the sacrifice even without a
generic property. It [generic property] is not necessary to the
property of being a cause. Nor is it useful for grasping it [kara~Jatii],
because of [its, i.e., of vaijatya] absence here ratihe time of grasping
the causation]. The pervasive relation that like the property of
being a cause, the property of being a result is also delimi.ted, is
without purpose.
1. The property of being a cause (Kara'IJatii) is always delimited.
Thus ya y,a kam'IJata sa sa avacchinna. But to say, that like
that, the property of being a result should also be grasped as
being limited, does not serve any purpOse.

~<i" "fer ~fuID111"~'el;;r'''1: ,'1<1: I'J; ;r ,'l'I~ ~~ I 'lif<itf(fS1tr

~c\ \'iilf~l!lr111'CH1"",,>i'lfuIDm~1<{,a'llltf i~ ., '1:[.G:. I 1;'Il'fl'l1G:.



Asvamedha not ,
This objection is :
. should even you r
~toma come into
that an individual
Objection: In t
the use of the lim
1. The view ta1
an individual
by another ir

the limitor of
[IV.G .18]



Therefore on"
a goal [kiiryat~]'
But ;that is hard .
Alternatively, let I
extended limitor c,
father in the Adv,
1. karyatva = kG
explained in r:
words, i.e., jan,
this limitor he
wide. It limit
medha etc. C
a. limi tor can h
limitor. His j







;notes thiS meaning :

not reside in anyone
Ie the instigator, it is

concept of the pro:onceived of. There

Ice instigating know. Vaijiitya is

to be

clination to act, by
lven being produced
in this view, the inthe knowledge that
n. Thus vaijatya is

l1. I '>Ir!{i f<r.nilt <:E!ilBf

<:'l' a:;:1~1C1i<9Hl:' I ::J1N
. f'lf.l.cllf'1. ~lE!R:g~fu.

;onceived of in order
here is no difficulty
ice even without a
,t necessary to the
.sping it [kiiral.1atii] ,
,the time of grasping
ke the property of
is also delimlted, is
is always delimited.
lt to say, that like
also be grasped as

Cf"l:E!<TC<fffir ~Rr CI'<lG;o<['f~~iF'I1C;; ~fu ~<\.I Clf~ WF1Cf 11:'1

~1:rfu<[Cft l~ 'J!1<<[l'l'~'f,<[T I

Objection: In [that case, why should the heaven produced by

Asvamedha not come into existence from Jyoti~toma? Answer:
This objection is not valid. Even if vaijiitya has been assumed, whyshould even you not have the heaven produced by a parti.cular Jyoti~toma come into existence from another Jyoti~toma? or It is natural
that an individual [Jyoti~toma] is the cause of an individual heaven.
Objection: In that case, follow that in the first place. What is:
the use of the limiting generic property?
1. The view taken here, is that every individual sacrifice creates_
an individual heaven, which is distinct from -the heaven caused
by another individual sacrifice. This view has been rejected by
Kaut:lt;iabhatta, who accepts the generic property svargatvaas'
the limitor of the property of being a goal see [IV.G.18].
[IV.G .I8J

Therefore only the following is to be said : the property of being.

a goal [kiiryatii] is having the property that limit':> it [karyatiiJ.
But ,that is hard to grasp if the limiting property is not grasped.
Alternatively, . let heavenness be the limitor. As to how an overextended limitor can be correc;t, this has been shown by my revered:
father in the Advaitasaroddhara.
1. kiiryoatva = kiiryatiivacchedakad.harmavattvalJz: This has been
explained in [IV.G.9]; where the same thing was stated in other
words, i.e., janyatva= janyatiivacchedakadharmavattvalJZ. But
this limitor heavenness, which must thus be brought in, is too
wide. It limits the goal of Jyoti~toma as well as that of Asva-
medha etc. On this, Kau:i:Ji;labhatta answers that his father,
Railgojibhatta, has shown in the treatise Advaita:aroddhara, how
a limitor can have an overly wide domain, and still be a proper
limitor. His father's argument is given in the next passage.

'il~ ~'J I 'lif<iq~ slit

f?fi <r <:<[,<\. I <:'Il'!l'll<\.

Cf<:l'lT<'f.1~<lTq"W<::'Ii'e1+l9~9~q 'li14<'I1+r<l'l'i 'IT"<['1:. I Cf'<!19"~'lin:r~

~~ii;;r I gr<:g 'IT <:9fr<9l11f"~<::'Ii'1:. I <[~T 'i'fTf~~'fG<:'!l'1'~'liCoi
~l~ Cf~I'fCfl11;liR<q'i'f(~<:~G<:nD;g:I~ I .

<r.ij[C1t1ID;g:T~ l(O'!<'I'J!TRr<i'!U:S~ 'f;phn?[~+!il1I'r'f.T<:1T[([I'I'~'Ii,'J<r

~o'l<9imi::i:rlliJ~'f'! \1~;;r CfG;'I'~~ I <r ~ ~1T[""'I;q- WiRfl'll"l!

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------



Now this is what is said in theAdvaitasaroddhara in the section -where the property substanceness is rejected: After first proposing
[as a priliminary view] tha(t sUbstanceness can be established as the
limitor of the property of being a material cause in respect to all the
effects, [this view has been rejected in favour of the view that] Being
[satta] alone is the limitor. Nor can it be objected that, in that case,
-colour etc., could be [allowed to be] produced in a quality etc.,
[instead of in a substance]. For a particular colour a particular substance is necessary as the material cause. Thus it is due to the
absence of its special ingredients itself, ;that there is the absence of
the production of the result [i.e., the production of colour in a
quality]. 1. dravy,atva: 'substanceness'. The accepted rule is that '-H 'IT
'fiRlTfcrr UT 13r'l~;J>!r Thus the property of being a cause always has
to have a Iimitor. Thus to take the usually cited example threads
are the material cause- [or more correctly, the cause related _by
the inseperable relation of samavay;a] of "the cloth. The property
of being a cause would];>e here limited by the_property threadness.
But in the case of the result pot, the material cause is the earth
or clay, and the property of being cause would then be limited
by the property c1ayness. Now there is another maxim which
'f,~+!l~ ~Ic! s::c<i 13li<iTT'l"fiT,lTfB: 'substance is the
says that
inseperably related cause for all results.' When we think of the
karaIJata in this connection, there would be discrepancy if either
threadness or c1ayness were taken as the Iimitor. The conse,cutive proper-ty for both of them is substanceness, which is a
broader concept. Taking this as the limitar of the property of
being a cause, will avoid the discrepancy. This is the general
argument given in favour of the acceptance of substanceness as
a jati 'generic property'.
2. KaulJ't;Jabhatta's father Railgojibhatta does not accept substanceness as a generic property. How then can the discrepancy be
avoided? Threadness or clayness are narrow concepts, and we


need something
crepancy. Ran
an additional jf
cited above, he 1
substances as th
to be taken as a
ina concept itt
stanceness. ACI
in all substance~
be the karaIJatt
the discrepancy.
3. The objection a
property of beir
resides not only
would lead to di
cause of the col,
the kiirm:zatavac
in quality (guIJ
which limits the
-cause. There WI
be considered p:
herence. It is
_accept substance
of the property ,
4. Rangojibhatta d
satta alone is su
-cause. For him
stanceness. The
for every partk
necessary as the
condition is not:
or colour in it is
a Iimitor that is



131c! ~<1<'!T

~Ic! ~ I



oora in the section

fter first proposing
. established as the
n respect to all the
.e view that] Being
d that, in that case,
in a qu;;tlity etc.,
lr a particular subIS it is due to the
e is the absence of
on of colour in a
rule is that "iT "iT
: a cause always has
ted example threads
le cause related by
cloth. The property
property thr,eadness.
11 cause is the earth
uld then be limited
other'~maxim which
'subStance is the
hen W'e think of the
discrepancy if either
imitor. The conse'
nceness, which is a
: of the property of
This is the general
of substanceness as


need something broader such as substanceness, to avoid the discrepancy. Rangojibhatta does not think it necessary to posit
an additional jati substanceness. In the case of the examples
cited aPove,. he ",ould take into consideration only the individual
substances as the material cause. When the broader concept has
to be taken as a limitor of the property of being a cause, he brings'
ina concept that is even more wide than the supposed substanceness. According' to him, satta, the 'Being' which resides
in all substances, qualities, and actions, should be considered to
be the kiiral}atvavacchedaka here, and that would take care of
the discrepancy.
3. The objection against this, argument is that the limitor of the
property of being a cause \V'ould then, be' too wide, since ,satta
resides not only in substances, but also in' qualities etc. This
would lead to difficulties. Thus cloth is -the inseperably related
cause of the colour residing in it.' According to Railgojibhatta,
the kar~atavacchedaka would be satta. But satta also resides
in quality (gul}a). Since, thus quality also has the limitor
which limits the property of being a cause, it would also be a
cause. There would 1h.en be the difficulty that colour could also ,
be considered' produced as in a' quality, by the relati~n of inherence. It is to avoid this difficulty that it is necessary to
accept sUbstanceness as a generic property and thus the limitor
of the property of being a cause.
4. Railgojibhatta does not accept this objection to his theory that
satta alone is sufficient as the limitor of the property of being a
cause. For him there is no need for the generic property substanceness. The difficulty noted' is removed by pointing out that
for every particUlar form or colour, a particular substance is
necessary as the inseperably connected cause .. Since this special
condition is not fulfilled by a quality, the non-occurance of form
or colour in it is perfectly justified. ,Thus the objection against
a limitor that is too wide, has been removed.

lot accept substancethe discrepancy be

)w concepts, and we


~;:;"icrTl{ 1 I'lT IT '!iliicrlq~?<:91l=TRllf\,!'RT~'RTl{ 1 CI~q:2'Rm. 1 CltlT

\,!R1 <:qiTlTqf';~;;rBl'n::M;n;:;;:;<i'lRnTI+R,;q'f.HUJTmql<::~<'f"<lTq~RRll
Cltllr.'l<'f"" 'if 'W~ U\'!"!q" 011fl:r:qHl<::fii~;n~~911~UJ,q~<r'W




Let' that be proper. You, on the other hand, have stated a

. limitor of being an effect, which [limitor] has an overly wide domain.
This is however, not proper. FOf, if this were [accepted as] so, it
would, undesiredly, result in the following: [the result i.e. heaven]
delimited by heavenness would not be produced from the Agnihotra
because its cause, the J yoti~toma, is absent. If, in spite of the absence
of the cause, the result so delimited does come about, then the fault
of discrepancy arises. Consequently, just as a donkey [who carries
the clay to. make a pot is not the cause] in the case of a pot etc. so
also wouid the Agnihotra etc. now n~ be the cause of heaven. This
is undesirable.
1. For a discussion of anyathiisiddha and .ananyat,hiisiddha, see
pp. 194-96 of the notes on T.S.

[IV.G.2 'J

3l'i'r'O,,~" .r1f~iB>.{~<r",""~~<r" ~Rr ,,~~dj<lHni:~,"l lerfua'lT


'1<: ~er{o"fcR 't>s fer J;[~<j;

'ti<;! "I"l'f, ,'II <J:. qH'Rfer,~

'f,rii<Cf'<flerQ{Oll~Her"ll"'lfq a~"g I

Concerning this we say the .following: The injunctions

'one should sacrifice [with] rice', and
'one should sacrifice .[with] barley' provide that the rice and barley
are to be offered at !the Darsapaul'l,lamasa;'even if one or the other is
absent, each one produces the [same] result and thel'e is no discrepancy even though the result is produced in each other's absence.
The same [principle] should apply here.
1. Mvamedlia and Jyoti;~toma are two seperate causes of heaven.
In the previous passage, the question has been raised about the
possibility of discrepancy and in that case, the possibility that,
as in the case of the donkey and the pot, Agnihotra then would
not be called a cause. In answer to this, KaUl).9abhatta brings
in another example. The two sentences vrikibkiryajeba and
yavairyajeta both lay down the use of different grains for use
as oblations in the Darsapiirl).amasa sacrifice, fOf. the same fruit.
(cf. ApasS. VI.31.13). Even though they are contradictory to
each other, it is accepted ithat .they are both individually able to
produce the fruit, and thus ~here is no discrepancy in the result
being produced with one of them as the cause in the absence of
the another. The same principle should be followed in the present case also. Thus both the Jyoti~\oma and the .Agruhotra


being individ
of the other,

[IV. G.22 J "l '<f Q'

~ "CGi'

Nor [can it b
the property of bei
and by [thus] bei
thus [accepted, 1
mantras used to a
offering cakes [pl
in them, the acts
mantras are: 'I
worthy of your s.
[0 Puroqiisa) , Y01
firmly and happily
contain the phrase
the ritual act only,
is the final, accept
contradicted under
two faults: (a) [5
identical capacity,
the offering of barl
not now come abol
(b) [If, on the ot)
bringing about thi!
1. In this passage
and rice is diff,
and rice can b<
and have the s:
perty of being
the same singl
each other.
2. This objection
etc., (ApaSS. :

- - . - -..


nd, have stated a

verly wide domain.
accepted as] so, it
result i.e. heaven]
rom the Agnihotra
,pite of the absence
lout, then the fault
mkey [who carries
lse of a pot etc. so
it of heaven. This


~~IJj+nU\~~,;or f9~a>!T

:"';pf,'91~ OR ,m:f<:,~

The injunctions
,', and'
;he rice arid barley
one or the other is
there is no discre~h other's absence.
causes of heaven.
!n raised about the
he pO%ibility that,
nihotra then would
1UJ.l9abhatta brings
'rihibhiryajeta and
rent grains for use
for the same fruit.
re contradictory to
ndividually able to
pancy in the result
e in the absence of
ollowed in the preand the Agnihotra



- - - - - - - - .-.---


being individually capable to producing heaven in the absence

of the other, there is no discrepancy.
[IV. G .22]

;or 'C[ Q~'f,~fiRr+!~;orl."a"91R<l1 'C[T1'["il~lr<fl I Q,9+!fq "~T;:i

u~ '1in~ '2,W[ "11,'11 li1~~ 'f,;;'!'llm I CIl~r<:!l<::l~ij '1fu[ijB"

mt)urt l'l"l li1+!<lBl+!F! I" ~Rr ~~l~<:!,,;:r<:!l""'1'f,lm.+!~'1T:

";:Hl[1urT l'l"l " ~fQ +!~f0~1G; li!l~ll'1m Q,91~'ot ;or 'l'll1'lTil ~fcr
fu~lrQ~;'llq%: I Q~91~'lf~"I'f,l'lf:J:,'!fuO'lJ1::r'CfRl;:'!Q<:l~: I

Nor [can it be claimed that] there, both [rice and barley] have
the property of being a cause due to having the same single capacity,
and by [thus]' being alternates [of each other] . [If this claim is]
thus [accepted, the" following fault] also [results]. There are
mantras used to accompany the preparation of the vessel in which
offering cakes [PUroasa] are set, and the Setting of. the cakes
in them, the acts themselves being stated in the mantras. These
mantras are: 'I make a comfortable seat for you. I make it
1V0rthy of your si1ting in it by this pouring of ghee. Sit in it
[0 Puro<J,iia] , you, who are the essence of the rice, seat yourself
firmly and happily in this place free of death'. Since these mantras
contain the phrase 'you who are the es~ence of rice', they accompany
the ritual act only when the cake is made of rice, not of barley. This
is the final, accepted conclusion. .This established conclusion is now
contradiCted under the present claim. For, this results in either of
two faults: (a)' [Since both offerings now are supposed to have an
identical capacity, they should both produce the same aparva. But
the offering of barley, not accompanied by the mantras noted,] will
not now come about qua act which is to result in this one ajnirva;
(b) [If, on the other hand, this offering is considered to apply as
bringing about this apurva] , then there is discrepancy.
1. In this passage, first it has been suggested that the case of barley

and rice is different from the case of the two sacrifices. Barley
and rice can both be used alternatively in the DarnapUD)arnaSa
and have the same capacity. Thus they can each have. the property of being a caus,e. The sacrifices in question do not have
the same single capacity, and therefore, are not alternates of
each other.
2. This objection is then rejected. The ritual formulae syona1JZte
etc., (ApaSS. II.IO.6 and II.ILl) are to be used only when




rice is used in the purotfJiSa, since the words 'essence of rice'

occur in the formulae. Thus, these verses are not used with
a barley puroqiiSa. Now, if both barley and the rice are to have
the same capacity, the same formulae should be used for both
. of them. This would go against the accepted ruling explained
3. If both rice and barley have the same power, and this formulae
are not used with the barley puro,qiiSa, then the resulting apurva
will not be produced. If it is produced even without the formulae
being used, then there will be discrepancy. One fault or the
other is inevitable. Thus it cannot be said that rice and barley
have the property of being a cause because of having the dame.
capacity, unless the established conclusion regarding the use of
the mantras noted, is rejected.
[IV. G.2 1 J

3l'L~ Ei"fl<'1'fi<;q~ f9'f.<;ql'!r?{C'I,!~~qql~ 'q lft~~l1l!J)t <R-<mlm~F'IW: I >f~'ij+!f!1lt

13+l'!l<lh(l<rt 'q+rBi''!'! I ~~<TT~13T'ij;r<,!

<"'tIIJf1'1T: ffim~mG:T'I 'ql'!<:Hn\QHu<{T~ I S!91~U~~~ >!~qG:l<;
;:,HW<T!11 o;fhi'rq~~~a:{l'!13T13~>f~ 'q >!1~T<;iit 111f~l3T>:'1T~f9~!Sfl
q~'.R'1T <r~ );i'r~'l[1;;qmfff~qf{T I <T~1J'1~lC!1'1T~ Il;Cf &g<TT I 1l;'1
<"r% g!J)l\"filTl'!!J)["lr '!~T'!N i{lj!o'l"L. 1

If, [to avoid the faults noted, thus] justifying the Mantras,

which provide an option, one assumes that there are distinct apurvas
[produced by the rice and barley offerings, then the following results] :
the properties which apply to the rice, do not apply to the barley,
just as the wip'ng etc., which apply to the graha [vessel], do not
apply to the camasa [vessel]. For, [once one has distinguished the
two cases by] taking into consideration the apurva of the soma
offering, the present [case, where the injunctions do not merely have
their primary significations, but have the] secondary signification
[of conveying that an offering is] a means [for bringing about] an
apurva is exactly parallel to [the case of] the camasa [ves~el].
Given, then that intermediate apurva [produced by the wiped graha
vessels] is understood immediately from [the mention of] the word
graha so that camasa is not included, it is difficult to avoid [concluding that] sprinkling etc. do not apply to barley. For, from [the
menti(')ll of] the word vrihi alone, one understands a particular ap17rva
produced through the rice [alone]. Therefore, with the [barley and


rice] , the property

apurva with a sin
so that grass, rit!
property of being;
1. The problem
applies to the
karmJa. (M.

[IV.B.24] ;or 'qiFT<

'11'Olj"L. I
4T'!'1la ~
~'<{~li\ ij


Nor can it be (
[considered] the cc
pancy, then that [d
grass etc. also. Bec
its being a cause thl
barley etc. by Vedi.
an absence of the ri
of being a cause is
. and negative corico:
there is fire; if ther
and vJ"titiuka] are
of fact, there is St
which are neces~al
of there being the I
1. The argument
has here been
things too. TI
is not really n
Thus, the don
pot is not a c
which are abso
to indicate tha
tion to the abc
the generic pI





essence of rice'
not used with
rice are to have
~ used for both
uling explained

rice] , the property of being a cause reside~ [ir, them] with respect to
apurva with a single generic property. In common experience, it is
so that grass, ritual rubbing sticks, and the fire jewel have [the
property of being a cause] with respect to [a single type of] fire.
1. The problem as to whether the wiping etc., of graha vessel also
applies to the camasa vessel has been discussed in the camasiidhikara'(la. (M.S., IIL1.8.16-17).

ld this formulae
:esulting apurva
mt the formulae
'ne ,fault or the
rice and barley
laving the "arne
'ding the use of
~'<'imrrrt <r~t'lmfu~'[.c!T~'I.1T\o1'l''1-

Rn~~<'1 J:[~q<::1~
'l'!.~ Tl:'I ~l!<ll I 1l;9

distinct apurvas
llowing results) :
y to the barley,
[vessel]'; do not
:iistingU'i.'Shed the
v,a of the soma
not merely have
ary signification
nging about] an
:amasa [ves.<el].
the wiped graha
.on of] the word
t to avoid [conFor, from [the
)articular aparva
the [barley and
19 the



~ei ~l'l.1l1li'-11fq ep.:~1!ajql%: o<l'l+Rnu~r''11i'l Q.rrrl~fq GG;Tqfuftfu

'11'O1:{'l:, I C!"{ ~g;al'1t +iT'lll1191il. I "'11~: ~{'Il ,!rrrl~~<:jil1Hm:r
'+!l'l'lRr ~lli q:rrrm~ '1~'I.1~~ C!"m~s:];<'lf~~''';:'1''G'lfu~'f.'I.1~'[.c!l
>'''Ia:l1il. Gfl'l.1~: I ~T'I.1i't g; ;:f\+r1+l:,1 i'ii ''1'1l\'''f.<;r.''''O:sT~8:T~;:'1~n
ful?i;:~Rr 'l ilgl'l'l.1+m'l'llft I

Nor can it be objected th3lt in this case, even the donkey would be
[considered] the cause of a pot, and if it is put aside because of discrepancy, then that [discrepancy and thus not being a-cause) would befall
grass etc. also. Because there is no [authoritative] reason to suppose
its being a cause there. The property of being a cause is justified for the
barley etc. by Vedic injunction, and in the case of grass, when there is
an absence of the ritual rubbing wood and the fire jewel,' [the' property ,
, of being a cause is justified] by perception accompanied by positive
and negative concomitance of the following kind: when there is grass,
there is fire; if there is no grass, there is no fire. These two [anvaya
and vydtheka] are not seen in the case of the donkey. As a matter
of fact, there is superfluity [in the donkey) due to the stick etc.,
which are necessary [for making the pot]. There is no question
of there being the property of being a cause [in the donkey].
1. The arguments here are fairly clear. The word anyathiisiddhi
has here been translated as suPerfluity. But it can mean other
things too. The word has been used to indicate a cause which
is not really necessary, and thus should not be called a cause.
Thus, the donkey which 'is not neoessary to the making of the
pot is not a cause. The pot is made with causes like a stick
which are absolutely necessary. But the word has also been used
to indicate that which accompanies the necessary cause in addition to the abovementioned meaning of the unnecessary. Thus
. the generic property da'(lif.atva 'stickness' also is considered
anyathiisiddha, and slickness classified as unnecessary ,




2. Will this then

rice or barley
there has beer
one performar
produced from
final apurvaf
why the alten
that sacrificer.

to the production of the pot.


c[~Tfq '-liT1:uf R<!l 9il'1f6HT'Il<J:. "1~111~ 9i~ <[~P1: 9il~mfu

~'6"'B:. I 'il~f1:t18:"'f ~Ri ~<;r.[1'l~~l'I'16+"f'"ij~'1 "l~9il~c!l'l~'f.6+'iF"ij,~;:n"lql<J:. I ~Fl 6l<[.~;orrn'11~~ '1~,3;<q~: I

q:'1!!'fCll'!'Sl~'WJ3;U"ijl<J:. CI~'1 ~g<'ll;;r o1:ff<RrJ,: I 6~~ 'i:[
'fi0T'I'llmi ;or2fin1r l!'lll'TFCI~ '1'11<::I<iT!!'1lGJ;'j ;:rl:1qq?l~
Q:'Tf1~,fq Q.1J[,ql'lR9;;r~'11<j6t'l.~;:r q~lqP;9;;f


I q:<i


~1J[<~;or ~ga'1:flR ~2o'1~ I




Objection: Since the result is not possible without the cause,

how can the result be achieved by [the use of] barley in the absence
of rice? Answer: This is true. But there is no fault because only
that relation of the time which is limited by .the inten~ion 'I will
sacrifioe with rice' is the relation which limits the property of being
the goal of activity concerning rice. Barley cannot produce tlie ,nerit
of sacrifice through that relation. Thus there is no discrepancy,
since the property of being a cause will be there in ,accordance with
the ritual formula spoken: Since the merit resulting from the determination is destroyed when the resulting apurva is produced, using
barley in another sacrifice is, not unjustified. Similarly, [in the case ,
'of fruit produced b)' dIfferent causes, one should vi~w this as following in order to avoid discrepancy]: Grass is itself a cause relative
to [a fire] delimited by fireness through the relation of conjunc~:ion
, . which relation is itself limited by the property grassness.
1. KaUlJ!r;labhatta defends his position by saying that the fault of
discrepancy does not arise inspite of the fact being concedt.'(]
that the result is thus produced with one of the two causes in the
absence of the other. He accomplishes this by bringing in a
relation by which this result is produced by barley iri the absence
of rice and vice versa. Thus the relation limiting the kiiryatavacchedaka in the case where rice is used is of the time when the
intention has been made that the sacrifice will be made with rice.
The result though finally the same with the use of barley, is not
then produced with this same relation which is limited by the
intention previously made that the sacrifice is to be performed'
with rice. This difference of relation by whieh the result comes
into being, does away with the fault of discrepancy, since in the
absence of rice, the result produced by the barley is not produced
with the same limiting relation to the goal of action.



In the case 0
heavenness by the
duced by Agnihotr;
the same generic pro
said [thus] in the
with Agnihbtra, at
Agn~~loma; he wh(
as much as he [Cal
the amaviasya [sac
Atir1itra.' The wi,
1. TaiSa."
[IV. G.27] aTCi



That is why tl
The property of ha
the property of be:
the smoke [as inv
mountain]. There
of inference..
[IV. R.l] ~IT Ril'l<
p:rrq~r aT<
~q I<\"q~~'l

~Ri Cl~t

." ,u',


Of. ~

<{Ct +'l:


(I ......


'fil'lF:h C!

[Wn~B1 '1~-::!(q%:1
n-:: I lj~~~ 'Cf

Do'j '11:!qq;;j~ I t:!;<i

~;;;[ >1m cllG:Tc.ll<f

vithout the cause,

ley in the absence
fault becau&e only
, intention 'I will
property of being
produce the merit
I . no discrepancy,
1 accordance with
Ig from the deters produced, using
.arly, .'[in the c.ase .
lew this as followIf a cause relative
.on of conjunc':ion
that the fault of
X being concedt.'<l
two causes in the
by bringing in a
'ley iri the absence
ting the karyatathe time when the
Je made with rice.
e of barley, is not
is limited by the
; to be performed
1 the result comes
,ancy, since in the
~y is not produced



2. Will this then limit the performer of the sacrifice to the use of
rice or barley exclusively in all instances of the sacrifice, once
there has been the intention to use rice or barley in it during
one performance? No, says Kaurygabhatta. Since, the apurva
produced from that rite with the intention is destroyed once the
final apurva from the sacrifice is produced, there is no reason
why the alternate grain cannot be used in another instance of
that sacrificer.
[IV.0.26] armiT"fIil:: ""iT g arm~"f,"Hn~~folfugljlFW:[lj.'1;:~~,,'!lT,,!+!'1~G:9i+!C!: U1il'1"J"1Ql'1 t:!;'1 "~<rlsf>liT"f1ra:..i'l i'!l-: t:!;llfcr I ~<[a 'Cf
ri%(i'1~<ll1 "'1 t:!;<i fol"[Hm~ ~iTfcr '11'IG:~lqJ1:<fTI~
c!"I~(W;TIlcT 'l t:!;<i l~"[l'l:. QllJf+!1W '1'iTa '11q~;t,.TIqJl\fu
Cf1'l~qJr..m~ 'l t:!;<i f<i"[l'l:. 3T+!1'11BTT '1~a '1l'lGfQ\1~\qJ"<ilfcr
'(fl'l~qJr.;TIfcr I" 1i:Rr ~f"C!"i'r folm~rg ,
In the case of the heaven from Agnihotra etc. the limitor is
heavenness by the relation of inherence qualified by the. apurva produced by Agnihotra etc. Therefore', it is unavoidable that heaven \vith
the same generic property [is produced] by Agnihotra etc. It has been
said [thus] in the Taittirlya sruti, "He who knowing. this, sacrifices
w'ith Agnihotra, attains as much as he attains by performing the
Agni~toma; he who knowing this, sacrifices with Paurl).arnasi, gains
as much' as he [can] gain by Uktha; he who knowing this, performs
. the arna~asya [sacrifice], achieves as much as he [can] gain by
Atiratra.' The wise should take note of this.
1. TaiSa.
[IV.0.27 J arC! t:!;'1 "l+!q-:l+!~ff~'fil:qc!lq~G:<t "l+!~,qlra:Of.i'rq <f g
C!"fl:!fi'rcll ~'ilT''1'1i.~cf.lC'1fi'r~'R!I;ffi fflr"a ,
That is why the following statement of the scholars is justified:
The property of having. smoke as a mark etC., alone is the limitor of
the property Of being the goal [in the case of] the consideration of
the smoke [as invariably related with fire, and as residing on the
mountain]. There is no [reason] to bring in vaijiitya in the process
of inference..
[IV. H.l) '1<;g. folP::{w~'1l'-Tf~~H'!il~ ~1"'I<:'11'f.T~ '"'1llc!ilm\:m"f'-fll w<:n.'1M~l ar~qfol,<!o'1'1T'fIB"ffT~Il<fTmil~1Jf 13lft~~1 ~+!+!Rn?l'lN'fi:r.r
~Q"'l"1!lr.('<l1 '"'11R1itm",i'r'ilrn:fo!\il1<!l+!'1:!m<i<"~IJf+!>!T+!lU'1mQiSR[

1i:lcT c!ffiq<{fi'rfc! l'f111TW-f.TPl:fi'r: qfhfooC!: Q;:!<]: I





Sl>Tl"lfa I

-"------_. __

-------'-~'.~-.-.-.-- -.--.-----.-.~-.





As to the following way [of thinking] cherished by the MImti.qlsakas etc. If,at the time one considers the meaning got from
lIN, vaijiitya is not accepted, then the fruit from Jyori~toma and
Agnihotra, will be the same. In that case, since the Agnihotra, which
. can be performed with less expenditure of money and less trouble, ..
can produce the desired end, there will be no inclination to perform
Jyot~$toma and Asvamedha due to the aver;;;ion created by their being
richer only in extra 'trouble. Thus there will be no performances of
these rites; on account of this, [the Vedic statements enjoining these
rites] will be unauthoritative. [To avoid this] that [vaijatya] has to
be accepted. Concerning this view, we say as follows:
[IV. H. 2]

~<'IT<l;:rcrr'iTFl<:'T Wl<l<f,~'T ;;;>ilfai\+n<8C!fq <'I'<C/1<;f IF[~'l:fitfR!: I

_~Tsfq rr <'Iof~>.tfcr 'T~l{'l ;:r a<:~'1 31:rgl;:r<'l.~i9: I 31?<!'iT a'lTfq
,""Tfcrmi'! S''l;:a+rI<'51;!T'lar'~~'i<fl <:)'llq~:

Inclination is not unjustified since the knowledge of the property

of being the means to the desired end, \vhich [knowledge] is the
.instigator, exists also with respect to the Jyoti$toma etc. Aversion
. also [is not felt] by all. Thus only he who does not feel that [aversion] wi)! perform [these sacrifices]. Otherwise, even for yOU, [who
accep:t vaijatya] , there will be a fault; since a very lazy person will
not be inclined to perform this Jyot~toma.
L The Bombay edition has the following additional sentences after
this : 'I~gcr: 'Ii~ ~;;(li<ll+rl~Sfq <1<::.... I=Il<::fq ~~:Iqq~;:rf~l+rluir ;, 'Cf
R~+rlut'\;;(;~'l ;U-I;f 'Ii<?'lar~~~'l<fm1fcr ~c!T~":n>il s'i>.tac'T~<'T<:'l1f1:fI'n;:r'liI<?

1l;C!If1:r'CfFllG:. 'Ii'ii'!afu:fcr 'l1'O<1+!. 1 'ifl'1Bf ilJ~,;;f;:'l~;:r a;:+fl?[;;f''''l'ifl~I~Rl~: I

<I;:+rl"l~ mUT;;(;'Ti 'Cfl"llr.<:[llJal'{ 1 ~<::;;"'T'ifH 1l;'l ;i:)"l'lmiill <'T+rl;:r]G:. I


Actually, since
is able does not pe
[sacrifice] in order t
additional fruit of
in the GYtii, worldly
saying: 'People will
respectable person il
duty and reputation
of Yudhi$thira etc. 11
[men] born of [the
the kingdom [altho
instiga.tor to activati
wish to be qualified. b
Thus the fault !:j1;ate.
1. The verses quol

[IV. H.4]

31a 1l;c!T~f;
'T1<'ItiT>:>.t >r
rr ~I;{: I

Hence it is that
rites] accomplished v
of worldly eminence,
selves' authorised to r
the extreme passion :
[such] great expense
thus even when there
. 1.

31Cf t<:'lf)3Q'fiTrrt

<b~'T 'Cfl~+nUT<'l1G:.

I' I have followed the. Benares edition in

dropping these sentences as they appear to be corrupt and as the
sequence of argument is clear without them.
flV: H. 3]


ilJ'!Cl<:'lH:!~l~S'lilij~qWdlWl'i'Tif <51fii;'li>mnfl<"'lTl<l'li-

'li<?lil '11 +ri[Cf1 Q~Rlrr'i:!'lq;;rl I . 31a 1l;C! <furl'll+!. " 310filrn 'Cflfq

<r..CfIR 'Ii'iFit'TFcr ~ Sc'l<nl'{ I <'I.+rl~Cl<:'T 'Cf1'lillcrm:UTI<::fuf0'l~ I

aa: ~'l"''if -'li1Ri 'Cf " ~<'T"l "fl~'Ii~fcrgrfu:'li :q'lc\'Ii~<lr'lCll'{ I 31<1
tJ:'l WIi<?~I~feJ~ ?:l;Nrn,1;.::1<lt ~''f.<'-'Ii<:IG<fl~ .jl"l;;r.{llffUTT~~~ ~Rl: <'I~~9~ I a<:+rlarfcr)gl:Iqjf<l9OJI:;;rr<l+rHrf.Z"~'I
:q'[<!l :q>i\~'l;fcr_.n'fCl;,::l"l: 1

[IV.H. 5] 'I~a~[ "

q'1uT1l1'.'1"1T: ;

:l[!TT'l,'T f;'j"
"F'i~rr Q?:l;f

Actually, since [ii

be performed for [att
1).amasa would be. per:
it will be difficult to a
Putre~ti are useless.




oed by the Mima,tp.meaning got from

'ill Jyoti~oma and
le Agnihotra, which
y and less trouble, lination to perform
!ated by their being
no performances of
!!Its enjoining these
It [vaijatya] has to
,llows :

Actually, since a bad reputation is created when someone who,

is able does not perform [a sacrifice], inclination towards a big_
[sacrifice] in order to avoid that [bad name] , or in order to get the,
additional fruit of worldly respect, is not unjustified. That is why
in the Glta, worldly eminence etc., is mentioned as an instigator by
saying: 'People will tell of your imperishable ill-fame, _and for a,
respectable person ill-fame is worse than death. Therefore, your
duty and reputation .. .'. This explains the inclination on the part
of Yudhi$thira etc. who knew all the sastras, towards the slaying of
[men] born of [the same] lineage, Brahmal).as etc. for the sake of
the' kingdom [although that] yields -little fruit. Therefore, - theinstigator to activation is the intense desire which arises from the
wish to be qualified- by eminence etc., and this [intense desire] alone. _
Thus the 'fault Itated above, does not [arise].
1. The verses quoted are, taken from BhagGL 2. 33-34.

",Of)?! :Q'l''l~qt!Rr: I
n:rEf: I or"'!"T C!OfTN

!CIge of the property

-[knowledge] is the
oma etc. Aversion
not feel that [avereven for you, [who
!ry lazy person wm
mal sentences after
,~qq~~fml1Tu'-T <[ 'if


(lr~n%>r"'!m~T!ffu~: I
<Dq'l,,;r(~ "II <'l'1'[T<rTFJ:. I
Benares edition in
: corru pt and as the


"GFlTB:. "or9itffl '<fJN

'<fJ911Rfm:UJ1C\W.0'l~ I

t !fEf<l91~;i't'lc!B:. 1 orC!
'li'{l"<l'l~ ,j\,,"fm\!lUJT-

lfcrq"81;;;ll'F1Fi't<'f. ~ "WI

[IV. H.4 1 orC! ll;EfT!glrr'liT<rf 'fiHf<m\'<~ "f['lC!THN oS'If-:r.'li>rRr'llif '1::foi'Qii'l''lT<l'RHn~~ ;['[RI&>:'l'aSN I >rfci'l1<D ,mt<91(;'l:[lFJ:. 'lSfil'QO'J"lT<l'l"l<D-<[ itq: 1 orc!~c!'F:R SN <[ R'[R!: I

Hence it is that one sees modern men inclined to [performing,

, rites] accomplishect with great expense and effort, this' for the sake"
of worldly eminence, though they know [!that they are] not [themselves' authorised to perform sacrifices] with 'the ancillaries. Due' tothe extreme passion for eminence etc., [they have] no avers;on to[such] great expense and effort involved. They are not turned away
thus even when there is knowledge [of the trouble involved].

orC! ll;Ef[!g~'!lFli 'liHftllWi'i "fFlc!T+r~N'lilRUJ1HN I


[ IV. H . 5 1 ~c!~g;


~ ~

[LaghuMafi. p. 334.]

",p:!!: 'liT+i"'ll ~ql'lT~R:ll - ~<:q-C!: "~'f''''~ ~-ti'I!JfIlTW'lT: mr.~~C!'1TN ~:;'ql!!"nG:1<[lHFF~'f'-T ~~lW 1 -a:oiqibTHlt!;[<:rT'1('l lrr<'l'C!'lT orl'l"<'l"H<l' ~'fl~'iiTH.p.jEfT~"61~ ~<ITil~<'lfuf;l;:-
"-'1'[4<[ ~~f9:c!<"T"l~.Tl<r. ~~2'll1~1 ;r'[~'1{!~l1Ofl<r.1

Actually, since [it has been said that] Darsapaurl).amasa should:

be performed for [attaining] all desires, it follows that Darsapaur-l).amasa would be performed for
the fruits. Thus even for you
it will be difficult to avoid [concluding] that [sacrifices] such as the'
Putr~ti are useless. The Darnapaul1).amasa rites are obligatory,.


J 54


hence must be performed [under penalty of incurring sin] '. One can,
[now] , perform these in the desire of attaining a son. Once this has
been done, . [the Damapaul'l).amasa] inCidentally meet [the requirement of being performed] obligatorily. Therefore, by virtue of one's
wishing to perform as few rites as possible one is not possibly inclined to perform [also] the Putre~ti etc.
1. For the performance of Darsapaurl).amasa to fulfil all wishes,
ct. ApasS. III.l4.9_ Also See JaiNy,aVi. IV.3.U (p. 246-47).
{IV. K 6] ;:r;:~C!<l:'.fii'l ~Srf!~Tfu:'Ii~ ~~


</'.<'<'1a I ;:r 'i'.i\'~lj!Brlfq

G1.:'1 "~~.'1: 'f,m~[ "'ITfciitll":" ~fu Cfl'Fflil.". cTBnfq ~"'r?i:if
f!!'iil~ CT~T~'1 ~+11'11il.". ~;:r{ll"T<'1T 8iH'~'fli ~~f~!i'Ifci '11'O<!B:. I
~ ~foI>:~ >['f,<,"'1 ll">:'1fo1'il<f.<'lT'.fwn CT"! >[~~qq~;1

[Objection by the vaijiityaviidin]: But it is for this very reason

that [we] assume that the son which is the fruit [attained by performing] the Putre~ti is superior [to that which results from others] .
Nor [should you, in turn, object as follows]:. Although [such] a
[son] be superior, it is still difficult to avoid [concluding that the
Putre~ti is] useless. For, from the statement sarv.ebhyah kiimebhyo
. jyotifo'mal} [orie knows] that. this [Jyoti~toma]. enjoined for
the purpose of [obtaining] a son. Hence, [a son] can [be obtained]
through it also. Therefore, [one will not] be inclined [to perform a
sacrifice] anew [for the same purpose]. [Answer] : One assumes that
three kinds of fruits exist, a.l1d that [the Jyo:ti~toma] is for the fruit
,of the medium quality. Thus inclination [towards the Putre$ti]
'can be justified.
1. Jyoti~toma is a Soma sacrifice and so presumably gives a higher
fruit (i.e., a better son in this case) than Jthe usual Darsapaurl).amasa. Putr~ti gives the best possible kind of son. For the
sarvakiimatva of Jyot~toma, see JaiNyaVi. IV:3.U (p. 247).
'[IV.H.7] m I Wr'lllllCfT'fli ~qio!m~r: 'f,1+'1~~~ll1"'~ ,,>lIfcil2Tl1B!
'Cf 'liTRRITl1'1TlT'Ii<? Q;'1 ",f.r;itir foI'il~ .~fCJ ;:r ~Srlj!~lfu:'Ii<?~ "'IT1cmTm~]1:r~+1i'ITsfil ;:r CfT 'f,"'~~'<.<!'li<,q;:llrftfu ~ I 'f,CTl'ilH1.:'1 TllTfu:m~q1.:'1
~q(uf+m:rTCq]lTfil ~~~l~T<l~nl1!j;:rFl'ii'f'1qR:i[!~
'Ii<?~'O!TC'I'f,<,q<lT<n 12:Cf <ii,1!j1ljT~nICflil.".1 ;:r 'Cf "<::~qio'i+!T~l~T:lr~
~T~;:r '1~CT"s,fcJ CfFf'1i~ll~ <::~i'G'tGICfR:-~;:m<:>'1 G>.:rm +!T;:rl'TRcr I

'Or [one might claim that] the Vedic sentence about [these sacd-


fices yielding] all de

the fruit of only all
i$\fna for the fruit c
not be even possibh
Jyott~toma. Nor wil
This [view] is not a
up a [ritual] fire, al
Putre$ti etc. is pos~
uselessness [of Putn
the fruit itself is not
Nor [can one claim
after Darsapaul'l).ami
form a sacrifice witt
other sacrifices [wid:
after Darsapau.l'l).am
1. Both the editiOI
should be '~[11<
2. Soma sacrifices l
masa is first pe
ct KatyasS. VI
[IV.R 7a1 o/'1<,~iii'FI


Then let it be so
own .counterobjectio
answered. [If you sc
have started perforn
the inclination towar,
1. The Mimfup.saka
lessness of the Sl
the third explam
have nothing aga
harm to their pt
provide an answ
[IV.H.5] that tl
accepting vaijiit>



ingsinl '. One can,

on. Once this has
neet [the require
, by 'virtue of one's
is not possibly in-

fiees yielding] all desires lays down the use of Darsapaun:J.amasa for
the fruit of only all the op,tional 4tis [without soma], and of Jyoti~trna for the fruit of all the optional soma sacrifices; hence it will
not be even possible to gain the fruit of Putre~ti etc. by means of
Jyoti~toma. Nor will the concept of three kinds of fruit be necessary.
This [vi,ew] is not acceptable. In the case of a person who has set
up a [ritual] fire, and is desirous of a son etc., the performance of
Putre$ti etc. is possible even before Darsapaul1).amasa. Sinoe the
uselessness [of Putre$ti] is thus avoided, the concept of v.aijatya in
the fruit itself is not IJOssible, because [it would result in] prolixity.
Nor [can one claim that] , as soma sacrifices are [to be performed]
after Darsapaurl}amasa, because of the statement 'one should perform a sacrifice with soma after performing the Darsapaul1).amasa',
other sacrifices [without soma] are also like that [to be performed
after Darsapau,rl}amasa]. There is no authority for this [view].

) fulfil all wi shes,

.3.11 (p. 246-47).

' 1a I

;j 'qlc'f.l!~lfq
f'l"l<r. C!B11N :g '3{liU if
'f"r ~'!n::mRr '!1~+I. I

or this very reason
[attained by persuits from others] .
\1 though [such] a
)ncluding that the
'ebhyah' kiimebhyo
tlso is enjoined for
can [be obtained]
.ned [to perform a
One assumes .that
la] is for the fruit
Irds the Putmiti]

1. . Both the editions read '~~'l" <::iii~~ aT'!,!:' which obviously

should be 'ml1B1 <::"j'f'mCll'!<J:' to make sense.
2. Soma sacrifices are to be performed only after the Darsapaul1).amiisa is first performed. A specific order has to be followed,
d. Katyi1isS. VIII. 1. 1. '
[IV.H 7aJ

l'Il'3{%> ,",j)-R!2t11~
fl!.,>{Tre;'fmB1 'ii>{lfu2'"Cf1;j~'1 ~r

FlU++i~;n<l ,q'f'l"qfto:i~


RH a~T~ 111"fl1Tm I

about [these sacri-

;j<'!~c"'lii,!;j;j; f-!i~'C[< 'It r{ a~'l ~3r~jiUl;j~'f'15iR!'f;:;;:'l .

ooo'<lT'<i{R! ~<r. CI~lfq ul1Ho"Cf<::Mliir111Uj;jT 'fil+'qfR~ffi~l<fr

~h: ~ <1<::111: I

Ibly giV'es a higher

~ usual Darsapaur:l of son. For the
IV:3.11 (p. 247).


155 .


Then let it be so. It is in no way undesirable for us. But your

own counterobjection about the uselessness of Putr~ti etc., is
answered. [If you say this] , we say that, nevertheless, for those who
have started performing the; Danapaurl}amasa, the elimination of
the inclination towards the optional sacrifices is unavoidable.
1. The Mimarpsakas, after their two explanations to avoid the uselessness of. the special sacrifices have been rejected in favour of
the third explanation supplied by KaUJ.1t;iabhatta, say that they
have nothing against this third explanation. It does not do any
harm to their position. On the other hand, all it does is to
provide an answer to the objection Kau;ryt;iabhatta had raised
[IV.H.5] that the special sacrifices will be usc1esseven after.
accepting vaijatya.



2. In answer to this, KaUl).Qabhatta points out that even though

his explanation does justify the inlinalion to perform these special
sacrifices before the performance of Darsapaul1}.amasa, their uselessness for anybody who has started performing DarsapauIl,lamasa is still unavoidable.
[IV. H. 8]

'1~g([~g ~"lR"ll~<li !!JfoT9i([Hn""~lo'1'1\;fl;'j., ~lir <:l'~ '"f

R'f';tq:j<':<l1l'r9i~'11mq;m.fol., 9ill'1~'11<'11'if[<l~., 9il('>~([1!!JT <lTN

([G:l1t ~1+T'11i1 G:~ttloTl1l~I"l<.:al~al8jRr "~li'l., '1!,('ll1lUJlspn:n,,"lla

.,~ 'l~ <l~~" ~<'!Tf<t~f~mllllum.:rnmi't ~~lRTa~ I

Actually, however, one who has not set up a fire, having perceived the momentariness of possessions and thoughts, wishes to bring
about [a] soma [sacrifice] and its fruit, without delay, need not wait
for a [certain] time to set up the optional [sacrifice] fire; nor need
he wait to perform the soma offering until after he has performed
the Darnapaul1l).amasa first. For, with respect to the Agni$toma,
the established view is that one need not do this. This view is held
on the authority of the following Vedic utterance: "Let one who is
to offer a SO:l1va offering, set up a fire; he should inquire neither about
the season, nor about the constellation [which is in conjunction with.
the moon] . " .
1. For the text quoted,. cf. AsvasS. 11.1.14. (p. 140).

[IV.H 9] a~ '"f 1l1<f<fl'<:'!G:oJtf[l]hfl~l: ~q'll''l1Z'O~l'1G~([l'l,9il('>R''+<rmr, ~tllTll1rf.'!9iH (["'1nNi'l~ UrllT!!t61<[,,!~qq~n"'~'f:qqml<':1~ ,,~

QloTllT<fTttrli't >;'l<JQ;"'i.ll1'li<''f<i 9iol ~~1ta: I 'limTf<tR"~<[ <:9"QR"lo'!'1r'!Rl1f<t01''!<:'!1r.'!'~<:'!I<9i~1'l0Tit'''~T'!T
~rf<tm: <.1 QrG:<['!-T "1'P ~1'1~; <.1'1f:J:ll'lfu~"!1<J:. I

The Darsapaul1} takes a month to perform. For a rich

man intensely desiring heaven, who cannot tolerate that long await,
the performance of a soma sacrifice for the same heaven, is justified.
Thereby the uselessness [of bigger sacrifices] is avoided. How then
could one justify positing that )the heaven relative to the soma sacrifice
is greater than the one for \the Darsapaurl,lam~sa? For, it is weliknown
in the general experience that something is achieved with much effort
and expenditure, when there is an intense desire of getting it quickly,
even though the same thing can be achieved with little expenditure
and trouble, but with a delay in time etc.



1. KaUll,lQabhatta is a
is no difference bet
sacrifice such as
performing a spec
opinion, the conce
sakas cannot be St
time it takes to Pt

H. 10] "<.1~~T"'<ll;o

orfit '"f I "

~([ "~Rr R,
f.'!(l:{W~Ii't<[ ~


One should also ob:

a sacrificial fire will be
elude that such a per:
intervention of it fire'ri
need not be preceded b
that the Agnihotra, D~
gatorily; hence must p
'Let him who is desirou:
fruit of the obligatory
perform the Agnihotra
Darsapaul1}.amasa sacri
contiguity. The desire
prompts one to perforr
simpler concept than I
the positing of the abs
obligatory rite, the OCC1
fleer] , the aversion to t
this [aversion]. [Sec(
of the principle 'Let thE
stated] be heaven, sinCE
which all deSire] .'

<:'1 ii'liT111



ut that even though

perform these special
luO}.amasa, their userming DarSapauO}.al\;jl~" ~lir




Kau~Qabhat1;a is again trying to support his own view that there

is no difference between the fruit gained by performing a routine
sacrifice such as DarsapauO}.amasa, and the fruit gained by
performing a special soma. sacrifice like J yoti~toma. In his
opinion, the concept of vaijatya, put forward by the M"unfup..
sakas cannot be supported. The only difference, he says, is the
time it takes to perform these sacrifices in order to achieve the


H. 10] "<:I~l>l"IG,"'~l'1: <:It?!., '-T!{'-T+llurr ~9<i.l9" ~Rr 311'i'tfll~'-T'Ii+l'lc'-T9'Cfl~.,


'11 ., 'lil<om\1 ll:fT .,lft

i'l., <{!\<{+nUJ1Sm+llG,",,1C1


fu~lRlQB:, I

) a fire, having perghts, wishes to bring

delay, need not wait
rifice] fire; nor need
!r he has performed
to the Agni:;;toma,
t. This view is held
!: "Let one who is
nquire neither about
in conjunction with






'Q,H'~'f'Ffl'il:Rl<t G,"'.lJ~

'lil<Ol~fl,,~ "9~-

,<91<1:, I


erform. For a rich

lte that long await,
: heaven, is justified.
avoide<1. How then
to the soma sacrifiCe
For, it is_ weliknown
'ed with much effort
)f getting it quickly,
th little expenditure


'-T/!{'-T+I1UJ<'1"lm"i~!~1"5jH;Q>{+ljq: Q<Ul't m?! 'n~1<'-TIq l(2C'IB:, I

3lIq '<{ I "<{I'l,"'>l1~l1r.rir-l ~itRr"," <{!9,"~~ ;':-;UIflQf+llfll+'-Ti

~([" ~R! fl~([Ri'lll'lrlj~~'I 'f.(>,fI11.:f4; flF.:r'Cfl.,ltt9fr'lil+1'11'f'imTr

f<r<'-Tll'lrit;:[ Qi'1'1f'-T!l1['I: 'f.~ 'Ii,,'-,!: 5!wn'lrr:r~~fcr([q;~'ffl<rr:rR!
Q<::11[9"!il+l~Hi 'Ii"q.,I+lQ/!{'f "'Ii['O~['-T11l;9 <ol"f~;:r "<:I ~<T:- ~'-T1<1:,
fI'lf;q<'-Tflfuf'Il<l:," ~fq ;'-Tl<{l"'l 'Ii~'FilRri'-Tl<l:, I

One should also obEerve that the statement "Anyone who sets up
a sacrificial fire will be offering a soma sacrifice" allows one to conclude that such a person will make such an offering without the
intervention of a fire rite, so that _such a person's soma offering also
n-eed not be p~eceded -by the Agnihotra. Further, [one cannot claim
that .the Agnihotra, Darsapaurl).arnasa etc., must be performed obligatorily; hence must precede the soma offering, for,] the statement
'Let him who is desirous of heaven [perform etc.] , serves to provide the
fruit of the obligatory rites enjoined by the statements 'One [is to]
perform the Agnihotra as long as one lives, let one perform the
DarsapauO}.amasa sacrifice as long as one lives.' This by contextual
contiguity. The desire for heaven is correctly assumed [as that which
prompts one to perform such rites] on two counts: [first], it is a
simpler concept than [the avoidance of demerit, which involves] :
the positing of the absence of demerit as the fruit because it is an
obligatory rite, the occurrence of demerit, [in the mind of the sacri- .
ficer] , the aversion to this, and the desire for its absence, brought by
this [aversion]. [Secondly, this is correctly assumed] on account
of the principle 'Let the [fruit of a sacrifice whose fruit is not directly
stated] be heaven, since this is the fruit common to all [persons, i.e.,
which all desire] .'
Hii"!i1m G,".hi~lHm ApasS. IIIA.14.8 m+!{T <{l"\;~~ <{~-



III.4.14.10: This supplies the s,annidhana mentioned aoove.

2. The principle that heaven should be assumed to be the fruit ror
all sacrifices for whom a specific fruit is not mentioned directly,
is stated in M.S., IV.3.7.1S.
[IV. H. 11]

<!l;g;q~g; ~~["lFll~.sfcr 'i1:fl;<l'jl~q<'!l"1:fri'!'l ;;~fu!!1irrF<ril~,{T'

f'f~iSftq'nil J:[~mt!+ln[~'f.<:1:fl1:1:fmljlu>.:i 9i21lj;:1:f>.JT ,,~,,<i't <::~

QloTljlt!"t" ~'1:fcr: t!~'fiil9: ~'ioTljlt!l:[T: mHl'lA ~Fl~'Plll:.'

Actually, even in the absence of vaijiitya, the difference in the

fruits of Jyoti~toma and Agnihotra, can be justified by the greatneES
and smallness [of the same fruit]. Since the inclination [to perform
these sacrifices] is thus possible, not one of [the injunctions enjoining] them is unauthoritative. Otherwise, how could there be no uselessness given the eventuality of Dal1Sapaul1J.amasa for all .fruits on
the strength of the statement "Darsapaul1J.amasa should be performed
for all [the desires] ?"
1. The argument already mentioned in [IV.H.6] has been brought
forward again here. Tl><.1s even though Jyot~toma and Agni
hotra give the same fruit, there is a difference in quantity. Before
it was said that the difference was: qualitative ...
[I V' H. 12]

<!l;g;q>;:g; 'fi<OTf'Cff1:f1 R6f."''f~lifi't ~ ~'fcf. m~p:lT'l[C;; ifl<:'lT'"f t

T'ih g; t!fll~'fmT~lljf<t ~UJt~'fCllm=ai'lit<l o1:f'l~~R-,n' s:r~'
Q;'l "t!Q:~m%;~ W ~q~fu;~Jq '<f I <::?IT<::'f~ '{: ~'f,irT ~
g;<i~'fmT: . ~c!l: "~Fct l1i~FrT<:cf t!W~~" "f9~6'i ~ 'I>1<?:l<J:."
~,~ Q'<IG:i'lQWH')I':fi~)q'l1'f"\1:"f:
.~!!I;:"!'flq'M 1'!1:ffc;:r t!~l<n'lt I
<r ~~ 13\111N'liTRUJT G;Bq]oTI1Tt!,{T'Q<::M9ilRUJTlim~Sr '<fTJ:[~~1:fl
qf~: I 1:fll'joiftl'lf9f-cr'fml'i:l ~~~q'f~R<1:f~ qS3f95~ !

Actually, the concept of quantitative difference in the fruit is

also not justified. There is no proof [of such a difference] , and prolixity [results from such an assumption]. On the other hand, it is
fitting to differentiate among rites with the same fruit according to
capacity. Thus the following Mahabharata verse is justified: 'A man
with the capability of a thousand, [should give] a hundred, and he
with the capability of a hundred [should give] ten. [These] and
the man who according to [his] capability, gives JUSt water, are all
[entitled] to an equal fruit.' On the strength of sentences such as


'There should be no '

different vows also, tll
also for everybody. 1
be no inclination of 1
DarSapautll).antasa, ar
the Agnihotra. The
. is justified in order to
with the injunction y
1. Instead of differ!.
either on a qual
suggests that the:
for the bigger or
. of the performer
form the costly :
. expenditure is no
ing of the Agnil:
[IV.H. 13]

a:rfq '<f '


1% g; Cl'<l

. ~'li'l"C!TR'"
f9f-cr<rT c
~fu ~ f.lif

Further, let then

it does aide inclinatio
precisely the way YOt
that [a given sacrifice
is not [a Slh'ficient] il
ledge that a sacrifice i:
cient instigator]. On
sacrifice] is the mean1
to particular activitie\
Cl1ssed earlier, unaCCI
grasped that heaven i\
tion of co-occurrence:
perty of being the re
also has grasped that



mentioned aDove.
d to be the fruit for
mentioned directly,

tr'F'1trT "<f<ll'>n- <::;J:rfRl'ljq <il<i~'f'1lI.1

he difference in the
.ed by the greatne~s
ination [to perform
injunctions enjoinllld there be no use[sa for all fruits on
;hould be performed
i] has been brought

)ti!?toma and Agniin quantity. Before


. m<nliT'llc; ifh:'!1"l I.
<i 'o'1'[~~Ri(jT I 8lci

G:?!T<::r:r~ '1: ~q:''1T <f<l

I "~mn6ir ~ '!>1"ij<!:,'
n<ft<t ll'1f<n 13ifqTIlf<t I
ftul111m~'!\ "lTWF'1Tq~~~<i

~ce in the fruit is
ifference] , and prole other hand, it is
. fruit according to
is justified: 'A man
a hundred, and he
ten. [These] and
; just water, are all
f sentences such as



'There should be no deception regarding money', in the sections on

different vows also, this same arrangement is desirable in other cases
also for everybody. Nor can it [be said] that in this case, there will
be no inclination of those entitled to perform soma sacrifice for the
Darsapaul1l,lamasa, and of those who are able to perform that, for
the Agnihotra. The inclination [for the smaller routine sacrifices]
, is justified in order to gain the fruit of [performing] them, in accord
with the injunction yavajfiva 'as long as one lives'. Enough of this
1. Instead of differentiating in the fruits of sacrifices in question,
either on a qualitative or a quantitatIve basis,' KaUJ;lt;labha\:\a
suggests that they all do give the same fruit. But the inclination
for the bigger or the smaller rite is dependent on the capability
of the performer of the sacrifice. Thus those who can,
perform the costly soma sacrifices whereas others, for whom such
expenditure is not possible, will gain the same fruit by performing of the Agnihotra etc. This is similar to the argument in

w'ill .

[IV.H. 13]

arJq "i'f 8l1:i'! ~,<w:!~~ ~:jflc<t C!~[q ,~'f(jtl~C!,<f,~ct

<T~!i!<rN<i<'l1:i'l'l <rT!11"'1C!:' ~~llm\;]<i''1~T<illfq <[ >!'1(['f.lI. I
1''1; i'! c!'<Ii9i<?13N<i(jT'ilT<iB~fu I <l21'T "i'f ~ijll,~<r1l1H1N'ii~ui{<iT
,\'m\;{j~:jf''1Wf~sf'r 8l'>:'1B'~ore.;:1.n'[Rr''!>r~srq "l ~ >!'[RrRR!
foif~<iT c!TI':OJ'ill<i'5r.:Fmr.'1~ >!~'f.'iI'i<ifqq<Wr'l fo!'<:'1~i91q:
~fu <i f'f.i5="lil;<lq: I

Further, let there be [for the sake of argument] vaijatya, since

it does aide inclination [to perform the sacrifice]. Nevertheless, L'1
precisely the way you [have argued] , it results that the knowledge
that [a given sacrifice] is a means [for attaining] heaven in general,
is not [a sllliicient] instigator [to performance], just as the [knowledge that a sacrifice is] a means to something desired [is not a sufficient instigator]. On the contrary, only the knowledge that [a given
sacrifice] is the means ;to a particular result [desired is an in~tigator
to particular activities] .. Thus also [is the Naiyayika position,' dis
cltssed earlier, .unacceptable, as follows]: Even if someone has
grasped that heaven is produced by an Asvamedha, this by the relation of co-occurrence in the same locus [of heavenness and the property of being the result of an Asvamedha]; and even' if someone
also has grasped !that [heaven] does not occur in anyone other than


-the performer of Asvamedha, still [one sees that this person] is Hot
[thereby necessarily] inclined [to perform this rite]. Therefore, [une
concludes that] the production of such a knowledge by means of the
[verb affix denoting] vidhi is fruitless. For, the meaning of vidhi
[should be] only an object of that cognition which is an instigator
[to action]. Therefore, this [view given by the Naiyayikas] amounts
-to nothing.
1. I have accepted the reading q'q<'fiOHll"'!<rffi:i.!TrrI1Ef of the Bombay
edition instead of the q''fiOlm"'!<rQl~I<r'l:. of the Benares edition
in this passage..
2. The Naiyayika views mentioned here have already been explained in my notes on [IV,G,6] and [IV.G.12].

'1~" <r ~I~1fu:N;;r;:<t :i.!1~ ~fE[('i<ii flf; S ClOl'-'I'j'i'1+!'lW I SiCi IJ;Ef

~NOl;:'!m<r;;r;:lT~;f :qEf~9i'l:."

'{fu .


CI~~l1, I 'lili'1<rl'11 ~<rl <!T"'!<ii, mf;ffiqql~9if<i"l'1'E[f<r1~<r

~If;ff<:q9<'i9imf<iq'1 ll;Ef f<ifeT'iI'f~: <:f,<[ClcCTI<J:. I

As for the [view] stated by .lGaiJ.geSa] the author of the

Tattva-] cintamal}i [as follows]: That which incites one to action
is not" a knowledge produced directly-by injunction.. It is, ratl{er,
.another [knowledge] brought about by this [earlier knowledge].
Hence, [the formulation is] : A knowledge produced by a knowledge
which itself arises from injunction is the instigator to action. That
[proposal of GailgeSa] is empty. [When there is a question of .
setting up entities to account for facts, one operates with] the restriction that, unless there is some circumstance to the contrary, a construct [is to be such that] its object directly produces [the results in
-question]. Thereby the only proper meaning [to assign to the affix
denoting] .injunction is the object of tha;t cognition which direcltly
propels one to action.
1. ~~;:'1:i.!Trr;;rr>:i ~r;f :qCT<'i9il1, I This view of GailgeSa has been
quoted from Ta1J!;vaCin. (sabdakh3l}qa) vol. IV. pt. 268. Ac-.
cording to GaiJ.geSa, the cognition C, directly rising from lIN
is not the instigator. It is the cognition C. which is produced
by this cognition C, that is the instigator. This has been explained by Mathuranatha, the commentator on Gailgea, as
follows: lIN produces the cognition that sacrifice is the means
to achieve the desirable end heaven. From this cognition of the


sentence mean
indeed the mea
that prompts (
2. According to 1
. properly be oni
is rejected'
[lV.H.l) 1 aT;:>:(~J





. Otherwise, it v
a speaker is the de:
in the way stated 1
.by lIN etc., is the
[on the part of ane
to what the agent
[this assumption w
obtains as timitor (
general property \
being a means to ;


of Udayanacal
the property 0
directly expres
noted by lIN.
[IV. H.16 J




. If, on the othe

object of the know
denoted meaning
prQperty of .achievii
the inclination to a
liN. There is ther
cess [which the Na




this person] is lIOt

e] . Therefore, l,me
ge by means of the
~ meaning of vidhi
.ch is an instigator
'liyayikas] amounts

sentence meaning, the mental knowledge arises that sacrifice is

indeed the means to achieve heaven. It is this mental conviction
that prompts one to action.
2.-According to l(au:J)lQabhatta, however, the meaning of lIN can
. properly be only the direct instigator. Thus the view of Gailgesa
. is rejected.

of the Bombay
b.e Benares edition

[IV.H.I.:> 1 . 8l;:"!"'! " f~f'C!~'fg<:f'1>t:l1:{: ~'[~<{Io:j fQ!G-l~f1:r: L 8lfl1~1:{TS~B1:{l

g 'Ii~R:l'!ll'~gl<{ClT \I" ~<~O:1:{<{T'if[,n'fCl~IC1:{l 9'f"1f1:rlTl~ 12;9 '"
fejNoJfu;: Rr~~<1:. I ~;;~T<Ef;;rI~: OJ'f1:{Cll'!;;~O:'Ii<Ef<'>li:r<{ <illEl91<1:. I


already been exG.12] .

Q;q.'i;;1:{l1 'f{~ I 8lCl 12;Ef


the author of the

ncites one to' action
tion. It is, rather,
:arlier knowledge].
ced bi a knowledge
)r to action. That
! is a question of
:s with] the restricIe contrary, ':a:iconClces [the resurts in
, assign to the affix
ion which direcltly
GailgeSa has been
. IV. pt. 268. Ac;ly rising from lIN
which is produced
This has been exr on Gailgea, as
:rifice is the means .
his cognition of the

CI?Tl '" l1C1f~!I'!~l 'C{<{<EfOJ'fC1:{1 I

Otherwise, it would' be possible to [posit that] the intention o(

a speaker is the denoted meaning of [the affix denoting] . injunction,
in the way stated by Udayanacarya : . "vidhi, the meaning denoted
by lIN etc., is the intention of a speaker with respect to activation
[on the part of another]. That [the action in question] is a means
to what the agent wishes is, on the other hand, inferable." For
[this assumption would have the advantage of] brevity: One now
obtains as limitor of the property of being the denoted meaning, the
general property' wish-ness. Thus the meaning -'the property of
being a means to a desired. end' is eliminated [qwameaning to be
denoted] . . ,I. feifer:!i'fg<:f~lTl<{:
etc. has been quoted from the Kusum~.iijali
of Udayanacarya. [Kusuma. p. 567J. The actual instigator,
the property of being the means to a desired end, is not here
directly expressed. by lIN; it is inferred from the meaning denoted by lIN.
[IV H.16 J

~11..11<Wlc'i'!i'iJHf'lq~'l :;:Ff<{<'l~<"!l>!~ '" fei;;rlcftl1~"irl:!I'C!l1<Ef

12;9 OJI'fCl<iRClI I 8l~+EftC1:{1 feiM;;r;:l1'iJl'll1tEf
. ClT~'C!Hl'li;;g;'r +!lrrr~lEfI<l; ;fj<:Efl~<1:{1~ ~~fl'r~~<nJ:" -

.'. If, on the other hand, one insists that only that which is the
object of the knowledge whiCh is directly the insigaior, can be the
denoted meaning rof lIN], then the only proper meaning is the
property ofachievinga.distinct svarga. In the way ad.opted by me,
the inclination to activity is [causedJ by- the cognition produced by
liN. .There is there'fore, no'support -for conceiving that kind of process [which the Naiyayikas accept]. For,[this view] has no autho



ritative support and involves prolixity. This should be taken into

consideration by the intelligent [who therefore should accept my
[IV.I.I] .a:t~q+rfq ";:l'fi(;lt:<;flI," ~fcr frjilr"ll!!c[t[fu: 'fi~1'f1JlJfl~~t'<!Tta:~qq'OF!'fi~;:r CJG:1'fTOJBf "fTfirn<qlC. i ll;a;:r ~~m"l;:r,qT1'fl'llqq~
T"ClUR!ffll<!;:r,;;i 'fi<;r.'-iCl ~fcr qn~ClT 'f,<;C[cr0li1<:T'i!ffi!: I

.Now; even if this is so, the prohibition' [One should] not [eat]
kalafij.a' cannot be justified. For, the eating of kalafija does produce
something desired such as satisfaction [of hunger], the absence of it
. [of something desired] is refuted. By the same token, the following
statement of the author of the Kalpataru is rejected: In order tc
justify the absence of the property of being the means to a desired
end stated in the Vedic sentence, the property of being the mt;ans
of something extremely undesired is assumed. .
1. kalafija: The whole sentence is fAa kalafijam bhak~ayet. na
lattna1?l na grfijana.1!l, of which, however, only the first part is
usually the subject of discussion. About the meaning of the
word kalafija, there is controversy. The following oftquoted
floating verse describes it to mean the meat from those animals
or birds that have .been killed with a poisoned arrow:
ferq~+'l'fCl'!Tut;:r ~


',Plqfa:tuIT 1C!'Il+r"lli 'fi<'l:;:~ ~<!1C. ::J;'!'1'lf. 'Cfl~T'-iaf 'Cf~rr. I

It has also been translated as red garlic, which in view of the

fact that garlic (launa) has been seperately mentioned in the

same sentence, does not seem likely. It has also been translated
as fermented food.
2. The relevant passage similar to the one quoted here can be
found in. the VeKaTa. on B.S. 1.1.4 [po 146-147). Katu;l\fabhatta
rejects the view of the Kalpatarukara that in order to justify the
ahsence of the property of being the means of something desired,
one should assume that the eating of ka/afija causes greater
evil. This is not true. Even if the eating of ka/afija does cause
greater evil, that does not refute the presence of the desired
satisfaction which can be had by eating it.
[ IV. 1. 2 1

'-i:;:J" q~+r~. ~<;ClnR2m"l"1~ 'fi~rfcI cr'tlfcr~;:"ijTij ~j'!;rg'li

'f.<'lTffici"aC! I Qfu%~ 'Cf Q~~;i .,T~fcr ~~T<!;:r<cn1'fT'IBl"
."., ~i'<j~' 1l\CJG:~Rn;rt., 'fifa:{~);r ilftr l1'C[~lI. I :


It is true that,
this as follows: (
the property of be
[all is in order] .
such results, one's
Once desire turns:
Hence, there isiJ.o I
[such prohibitive i:
the absence of [an
1. This has been 1
[IV. I. 3 1

cr~ a:tli




However, that I
parimalal himself,
\vho :does believe i1
there is certainty ,
fruit at the time de
tion [supposed to1
means to a desired
proper that the Ve
both authoritative
sons in question.
tional meaning: t
which is] greatly 1
negative [particle]
[as not entailing a
the qualifier. Th
described before.
1 . ~~ISfIJfT1'fT'!lq<;]':
rally taken inl


by itself,
as qualifil


lid be taken into

lould accept my
n..fifq: I

houldJ not [eat]

iijadoes produce
the absence of it
:en, the following
d: In order tc
~ans to a desired
beIng the means

'n bhakayet. na
, the first part is
meaning of the
lowing qftquoted
Jm those --animals
JOisoned arrow:
''IT 'Gl'1tT"1ui 'Cf~<J:: I

h in view of the
nentioned in the
:J been translated
ted here""can be
. Kaul:lI;labhatta
der to justify the
)mething desired,
a causes greater
zlaiija does cause
~ of the desired
lfRr<:!""11it <:!i<rrn-'f.ff ~<:!l"l"'c'lTo:rT~




It is true that, in the Parimala,[Appayya Dil,,~itaJ expands on

this as follows: Once one has conceived of [an action having].
the property of being the means to an extremely undesirable end,
[all is in order]. Upon one's considering that [an action leads to
such restilts, one's desire] for the evident. fruit i~ then ,suppressed.
Once de.sire turns away, the [result] is not [apy . longer] desired.
Hence, there is no fault in considering that the meaning [of lIN] in
[such prohibitive injunctions as] 'one should not kill' is [indeed]
the absence of [an action's] being the means to a desired end.
1. This has been taken from the KaTaPa. p. 148.
Cl:sf 3ilRCl'f.'lil!!'l>~"1 <:FTF"1~"1 ~cl{fq lilfiT"'~'f.~:@l'l~l{+o:rl'll'l<rB
Cllc'l>l~'f.9W;;;~T ;orl~cftfu ci J:!Rr ~~T"l"'C'llo:rl'l"lT"1'li~ f;jq"l-

[IV. I. 3 1

'IFf"1~<!TJ:!Fnu:qTqfu: I ~'If<r. J:!Rr i!+1TQj'~Cl~l{ 'G ~a:~l{ s:"q~",

J:!1+11Ul{lJ:!1.lTU~ '" ~<RI ~fu l;'Il{l'i'l f;j~l.;l{ "l<?'la:f;l21"'~"1C'1+1f't
~,~: I Cl~ 'G fiT~i';rQj'l+rT'IT'l?!T f.jj~mFn'lT;or"n J:!RI':rfficr l(Rr

;or <::Tq ~c~'fct crClllg<RH1C<!T q<:Rcri'l'l I

However, that has been rejected by [the author of the Kalpataruparimala] himself, as follows: In the case of a desirous person,
who does believe in the' Veda, but is blinded by lust, even, though
there is certainty about future suffering in, hell, the desire for the
fruit at the time does not goaway. Thus for him,a negative injun
Hon [supposed to] signify the absence of the property of being the
means to a desired end, would not be authoritative. And it is not
proper that the Veda, which is accepted as authoritative for ali, be
both authoritative and not authoritative, according' to different per
sons in question. Hence, [says Appayya], lIN has an additional meaning: the property of not being followed by a [result
which is] greatly undesired. Thus [in a negative injunction], the
negative [particle] nafi conveys the absence [of an action] qualified
[as not entailing a greatly undesired result], due to the absence of
the qualifier. This [view of Appayya] is refuted in the way
described before.
1 .. f;i~qUjT111'llq'>[: fiT~mt+rT'f: Three ki~lCis 'of visilitiibhli1,)as are gene
rally taken into consideration.
(a) fiT~qQj'lo:rl~'Rl: fiTfu21o:rT'I:
the qualificand is present
by itself, but the qualifier is absent. Thus the qualificand
as qualified by the qualifier can be said to be absent. For


.~, . . . . . . . . . . . . _

_ . . . . . . _ _ --.~,.,..."....... _ _ _







example, if one asks, is fancily dressed up John there?

and John is there, but he is not fancily dressed, there is a
. fciiUq-lJfTllT'IW,i'fCf: lei Ri211lTO!: I
(b) 'fci1Ut'l"1111'l!:!~Cf: fciRiTl'!lllT'I: the qualifier is present by itself,
.. but the qualificand is not present. Thus if the saine ques
tion ,vas: asked again, and there was a fancily dressed per
son present, but he is not John, then it is fcii:l'11l111'l!:!~'fCl:
fciRiTl2TllT'I: I


:;r11'l"T111'l!:!~'fCl: fciroHll1l'1:

both the qualifier and the qualifi

cand .are absent. Thus if the same question were asked,
and there were neither John nor any other fancily dressed
person present, then there. would be :;rl1l1l111'l!:!lf'fCf: f.lfuHl111'l:
In the present case, since the qualificand, i.e., the property 01
being the means to a desired end is present even in a prohibited
action, but there is the absence of the property of not entailing
a stronger evil, which is the qualifier, the meaning of the nega'ive
particle is said to be the fciiUqIlJ1111'1!:!~Cl: fcifu12T111'1: I
2. Kal1l].9abhatta points out that this view that the property of not
entailing a stronger evil is also a meaning if lIN, has already
been refuted. (see [IV.B.29]).

[IV. I 4)

Cl<:.IWli~qfu:rcr ~ I 3l?f <!;;:~ I 'l"HT1<::If;niJlJl'er~''

,5i0Wl<TCf<:'l" '!<'5Ef<,'I<:1.f ooI:JIJf'll '11"!:.~q<:'l" '11;:,'l] 'IT

!:!lJ'fCl<:q'l li'{qer l(f<r I m:~e.=rIJf'l"l~<:lf9"ll~;;:?flr.1.ff.T~1!~'1 'IT

~Cf 'l:<'l";:1l I <T ~'1+!~U 8lf9~<'l"~'1 <:nnlJjt[fu: I ~lffi<T
Cl<:'l" ~'-!i~'1'1i''1T<I:. I 8lq l!;'1 "<Tl~~9:" 'l:fcT q-ft;;:l~ <T <r 'l:f<r
~'fCllI. I

If [one now asks] how, therefore, this [negative injunction is

explained, I point out that), with respect to this, [those who have
expressed opinions] say [as follows]: In regard to sacrifices [and
other] such [acceptable acts] , one understands that [the acts], by
virtue of being connected with the property of being the means to
desired ends, are [also] not associated with greatly undesirable results. [This property of not entailing greatly undesirable results],
either reiterated by the indicative function, or mistakenly understood,
is what is negated. [This is the opinion of some]. [According to)
others, [the negative particle nan conveys], by indicative function,


a contrary, so that
[that the act in qu
Ithe words] asura,
namely, a demon, ;
dom]. Nor [in th
a compound [must
asu'l"a, avidyii. Fo
statement [vibhii$ii

a compound] optio
the paryudiisa niin,
1. niinuyiije$u:

. 'Ii~f<r <Tl~'l"l~9:
command yaja

first says the '

mantras are 1"1
TaiSa. I.6.11.
the Bhia~ya on
that the senter
y,a jiimahe are t
this is a case of .
that instead of
been a.compoU!
rejected on the
according to w
2. This discussion
though in a nt
exact opposite (
that there shot
asura and avid:
[IV. I. 5]


Others [hold th
that lIN denotes the
vidual ends, then on
svarga [do not then
denoted by lIN, but]
. [Similarly, in negat



up John there?
ressed, there is a

a contrary, so that, [from a negative injunction], one understands

[that the act in question] 'is the means to an undesired end, just as
[thewords] asura, avidya [signify the contrary of a god and wisdom,
namely, a demon, and ignorance, not the absence of a god, or wis
dom]. Nor [in this second position] does it undesiredly result that
a compound [must be formed], as in the case of [the compounds]
aSUTa, avidyii. For, [the compound] is optional by virtue of the
statement [vibhii~ii], that [nan and a syntactically related item form
a compound] optionally. Hence is it that, as [I] stated earlier, in
the paryudiisa niinuyiije~u it fa compound] does not [occur] .
1. ,iiinuyiije~u: The complete sentence is ,as follows'f;;JRI3; 'l~1+!~
'liDm ill?1'fl~9: In all instances where the adhvaryu gives the
command yaja, other than in the case of the anuyij;jas" the hotT
first says the words ye y,ajamahe, and then the proper yiijyii
mantras are recited. This process has been described in the
TaiSa. I.6.11. This particular sentence has been discussed in
the Blla~ya on M.S. X.8.1.4. After a refutation of the view
that the sentence gives an option as to whether the words ye
y,ajiimahe are to be recited or not, it has been established that
,this is a case of paryudiisa'exception': Now an' objection is raised
that instead of the 'two words na anuyiije~u, there should have
been a compound such as ananuyilje~u. This objection has been
rejected on the strength of the Pal,linian rule vibhli.$,iil P. I I.1. 11 ,
according to which the formation of a compound is optional.
2. This discussion is used here to support the statement that, even
though in a negative injunction, the meaning denoted is the
exact opposite of the normal meaning of lIN, it is not necessary
that there should be a compound as ,there is in the case of
asura and avidyii. "

;>tesent by itself,
f the same quescily dressed per; foii\l'i'fTl:rT'i'-m'fo:

. and the qualifi:ion were asked,

r fancily dressed
'is!~'fo: fqiiiltw:n'f: '

the property oj
in a prohibited
of not entailing
g of the negative

I'n'f: I

: property of Hot
IN, has already ,
~~o~ ''iI"F<':r! 'II

01"'-If.l~~g<'iH'f 'II
rfu: I foil'!Nlffi"l
q~il:I~ ';:f'-," ll:m

ve injunction is
:those who have
sacrifices ,[and
; [the acts], by
19 the means to
, undesirable reo
~sirable results],
~nly understood,
[According to]
'cative function,


<<mf~q<i:' (l"l<'fio;(lT<.~'mm
IT'fiI,'il"l<i[ ~:g:~t ;{3{, ol<~>ll\'!'Ii ll:<'F'l I
Others [hold the following opinion]. If the view [is accepted]

[IV. I. 5)

(l"lttlTCI"l<;i fei"<1~ ~ q~

that lIN denotes the property of being a means to particular individual ends, then one accepts also that [co,occurdng] itemssuchas
svarga [do not themselves convey the result in question, thus, bdng
denoted by lIN, but] serve to convey the intention [of the utterance] .
, [Similarly, in nega:tive injunctions], lIN [itself] has .as a, meaning



the property of being a means to an undesired end, and the negative

partic1~ [nafi] serves to convey the intention [of the injunction].
1. CRI<~<:INi'{,'f
is the last view adopted in the text before
this. (see [IV.H.13]).

r. 6]

{f'Q:fflH,oi f<t'<"p~ ~Ri q~ "i'{ ,"",":;n:r:''{<'!'S[ ~''1'IT'1q(1~1<:<:Ir'CIi'{,~

f<t~'1'~: I

<:IjI~i'{~ '"fl';f . ~'<:I"if R'1l'm: 5[<'1'fT'1111T'f<;~~liT2t

f.'r<P.I~: 5[,'1'11'1 '{'1.f"'!"!0'1Rl~'li'l"'!B:, I ~''1'fT'1r sfit "i'{ iSnm:;

~'1T~,"fJ~ f<tNil<::lrn:~e:f'Trr >n~'l1': I ~et '"' for~'!t'CI U;'! i'{SfT

f,p'1a I
u;oi ,",1':rf'Q~~'I!T<D <:1m Q'<'!'f1'1: re-,;"!Ri I ~ffl1?l
'li1Rlqqqf~R''1q~ I'

StilI others [maintain the following]. Under the position that

the meaning ofvidhi is the property' of being a means to particular
ends, its meaning in [the sentence] na kalafijam. ,. is. the property
of being a means of avoiding demerit. And being a means here consists [in being related to demerit] by concurrent occurrence and nonoccurrence as follows: if X occurs, there is necessarily the abstnce
of demerit; if X is absent, there is necessarily the presence of demerit.
Moreover, the demerit itself is to be considered distinct [in different
cases] i in accord with the'seperate injunctions [accorded for this and
cases such as] 'One should not slay a briihmalJa'. Thus, [in the
present view], n,an serves merely to deny thenieaning of vidhi
[denoted by lIN]. [That is, n,a kaiafija1!1 bhak$ayet denotes: "the
eating of kalanja is not a means of avoiding demerit"]. Thus, by
implication, it is established that the eating of kalanj,a leads to demerit. Therefore, there is no [grammatical or logical] difiiculty.
(IV. I. 7J

'liO!:;:;;rl1~'I!r+rl'!: ~'''!'!T'1q~l<:<:IT'CIi'{fiJ~'! '1r'<'1a Ii'{,", ~<'!'1Ti'{t



8'1+rl'fiT<:'lil1';:'1"!+'TiG:T<ilm: I

'{2<:1Ni'{,'!r;:'f'1' '{Ri



'li<;qi'{T[! I

, , Some also [maintain the following] . [The negative injunction

na kalai'ija1!l bhak$ayet] conveys precisely that the absence of ,he
eating of ka/anja [Le., not eating kal{l1ija] , is a means to avoiding
demerit. [That is, now ~he meaning of nan is related to the meaning
of .the, root, bhak$, so that one understands an' absence of eating,
Which is then related'to the meaning of the affix lIN]. Nor should


one object [to thi:

ings are construe:
the afiixes are atta
of lLN should be
How, then, can tt
a,means to a desh
ing of the base [j
as follows] . [Til.
[the meaning of ,
base] through til.
lIN and nan are
absence of eating
natively, [this int,
noted] : a differen
1. The semantic
as follows:
2. The meaning
desired end '
--? eating (th<
that the mean
root is satisfie.
as a link in th
(IV. I. 8] ~oi '"' "8'1
l1'~ot ~n
~"f 'liO!~

Thus ,it is tha

ron:sfu;t ~TRr 'He
not take up the $(
that both takinguI
ends. And because
there is no fault. I
the injunction na k,
absence of eating ~

1. 8tRTU'S[
sa,/!!sthtis of J y
VII.4.10. In'



and the negative

the injunction].
the text before
''1'lT'{q~ ~l ~"r!<1'~
5!rqr,{ll'fT'I~CI<l: l'fT~
~,{l slit "<I


[~'{'-lf.!q! 11;'1 <I"lT

re<,{Rr I


;he position that

ans to particular
is the property
means here conLlrrence and nonlrily the abs<:nce
,sence of demerit.
inct [in different
rded for this and
Thus, [in the
leaning of vidhi
et denotes: "the
rit"]. Thus, by
Inj,a leads to de:al] diffictllty.
:<i~ I <I 'Cf rr<'!<!FIT
'l!!ffi!;:r,'1r~'1,{ - ~Rr

<: <i <" J1:r?!o'{,Q['<f"


gative injunction
e absence of ;he
eans to avoiding
d to the meaning
)sence of eating,
N]. Nor should



one object [to this] as follows. There is a principle that affix meanings are construed [first] with the meanings of the bases [to which
the affixes are attached]. [Therefore, in the present case, the meaning
of lIN should be related first to the meaning of the root bhizk].
How, then, can the [meaning of UN, namely] the property of being
a means to a desired end be related to absence, which is not a meaning of the base [to which lIN is attached]? [This objection is met
as follows]. [The interpretation given] is justified by accepting that
[the meaning of lIN is] indeed connected [with the meaning of its
base] through the intermediary of absence. [i.e. the meaning~ of
lIN and nafi are not themselves related merely as such; it is the
absence of eating which is related to the meaning of lIN]. Alternatively, [this interpretation is justified by abandoning the principle
noted] : a different principle is set up in cases where nan isused.
1. The semantic rule involved in this argument is normally stated
as follows: rr,'l',{l<lT );['!i<'!'lff.'1C1~l~I;f"li''1ll:. I
2. The meaning of lIN, i.e., the property of being the means to a
desired end -. absence (the meaning of the negative particle)
~ eating (the meaning of the verbal root). Thus the condition
'that the meaning of a suffix must be connected with' that of the,
root is satisfied by acceping the meaning of ,the negative particle
as a lirik in the relation.
[IV. I. 8J 11;ci 'Cf "srf<rust "I):s~<i 'li!..llflRl", "<!TRrU~ rn'SfoJrj 'lir....lJfTfu" ~<'!'frfit ,
>r~ut >!l;:llfl'l'fT't 'iill!ffi"l<l<ci <!\"~ I ~~u,{l'" <I <D"I: I' 8i'CI
11;'1 'W-&l'f!':TIlfTl'fl'lf<i"l<fi; <fiTi{mfu ~~" ~,1:[i?r "tiRm. I

Thus it is that in [the sentences] sr~l?r ..n'S~ ~~lJfTfu, <lTRm-sr

rn'S~<i 'nl'llflRr 'He. takes the ~o4aSin at the Atiratra', 'He does
not take up the ~o4asin at the Atinatra', the meaning conveyed is
that both taking up [the cup] and not taking it are means to desired
ends. And because [there are] distinct results [associated with them] ,
there is no fault. Hence is it [also] tha:t the Prabhakaras [interprete
the injunction na kalaiija1J! etc. to convey] 11 duty whose object is the
absence of eating kaiafija.
1. 8iRr~T~
Agni~toi:na, Ukthya, $o9asi, and Atiratra arethe four
sa1J!s'thiis of Jyoti$f;oma, as laid down in the TaittiriyaS8.l11hita,
VII.4.10. In the same context,
both the




bitive sentences mentioned above occur. The question as to .how

these sentences are to be interpreted is discussed in sabarabha~ya
on M.S.; X.8.3.6 (p. 2063-64) .. There it has been decided that,
in spite of having to accept the optionalness of the action, there
can be :no. question of accepting the negative in the sentence
: rnRi~m . t;j'):sfuri l1il'lIflRi as a paryudiisa. It must be accepted
as a negative injunction. Therefore, since, the taking of the
$oqasin is prescribed by one sentence and prohibited by another,
and paryudiisa has been ruled out, there is an option. Both 1he
action of taking a $oqasin and the absence of such an action are
means to a desired end. Since the fruits gained by the taking
and by its absence are different, there is no difficulty.
2. Now what is this slifference in fruit? It . is nowhere stated.
KhaQ.Qadeva in his Bhattadlpika tries to find a way out by
saying that, since there is no incompleteness [deficiency) even if .
the $oq,asin is iiot used, it must mean that there is greater fruit
if it is used. (sn:rl[lTr sftT rl[rrc1T+rrc/lG; '1;rit 'fio;'i+!T BhattaDi. p. 797) .


[IV. J. I] 81~<i 1J<;q111ISirnl<f!1l("Tti5nr~ qlqrqffi: I " rr f~~r<r." ~Rt!l'erl<r. I

. ~ 'Cf a<1J~'fil~lla.l<r.1 a~i~ "zr.:ftt;j')+!I'H(~c<1rr~rrl lillO!lii[rr- .
~~~9;~cml'1~1 "rr~'Il<r." ~<'1i'trr 'CfTf.!~~gci\~1 I rr 'Cfrrr<inlRi'er:
l!~~"-Rll'l'RI1?{m'STi't q~'I>'t'1~;~'<.1i[+!r[1~'1 'Cf 1J+!1~~~~;:1l<r. I .

Now, this being oso [it follows that] the sacrificing of an animal
to Agni and Soma results in sin .. For, [the injunction] na hi1!lsyat
'one should not kill' prohibits [such sacrificing]. Nor is there any
[authority for] restricting [the prohibition, so that it be inapplicable]
in the present case. [The situation is] thus: [From the injunction]
agni$omiYiaill. .. one understands that the sacrificing [of an animal]
is a means to a desired end. And [the injunction] na hi'1zsyiit states
[that such killing] is the means to an undesired end. Nor is there
any confliflct between the two [in which case, the particular Vedic
. injunction to sacrifice would cancel tbe general negative injunction] .
. [For a single act can be a means to both] , since it is observed that
both the properties [of being a means to desired and undesirable
ends] occur together in )the eating of food mixed with honey and
PoiSon, ,and in approaching someone else's beautiful wife.
:1.: -The- sacrifice of an animaf for the deities Agni and Soma, is


prescribed b)
the three kine
two are refe:
All the prirr.
TaiSa. 1.3.7.
2. The prohibiti
269.5. This i
literature itse
should be bro
and treated a
later bias aga
of taking res(
smrti sentenc3. For the ut:>ar

[IV. J. 2]


Actually, ho,~
$omiYalll] pasumi
cause this particui
the object here oj
the animal offered
1. The argumer
enjoins a saer
with theproh
tion, it will b
The whole thi
[IV. J. 3J.


Or, let the wo

section visaye pr&
that on the strengt
Agnihotra, it will f
ceiling this] , the f
touching. only; ,



lestion as to how
in Sabarabhii~ya
!en decided that,
the action, there
in the senterice
nust be accepted
le taki ng of the
)ited by another,
ption. Both lhe
leh an action 8re
:d by the taking
nowhere stated. "
I a way out by
~fidencyJ even if
'e is greater fruit
lattaDL p. 797) .

'll' ~ra Rq'Cfl<1: \

~'~F'1n'il:<1T llllm<r"l-

al I "I '<fl,=rlltl'iffN:
R~F:::~"ll<1: I

ing of an animal
tion] na hilJlsyat
~or is :here any
be inappli'Cable]
!1 the injunction]
~ [of an animal]
1a hinzsyiit states
ld. Nor is there
particular Vedic
3.tive injunction] .
is observed that
and undesirable
with honey and
I wife.
;ni and Soma, is



prescribed by the sentence 3nnql~1~ q~~T<?i'tQ This is cne of

the three kinds of animals involved in the Jyoti~toma. The other
two are referred to as savan'iYia paU and anubandhya poasu.
All the primary rites involving these pasus are described in
TaiSa. 1.3.7.
2. The prohibition "I Rl2-Tl<J:." occurs in the MahaBha.. (santi.)
269.5. This sentence is not found anywhere directly in the Vedic
literature itself. Thus it is rather surprising that a smrti sentence
should be"brought forward as contradictory to the Veda sentence
and treated as if it wer,e itself a Vedic sentence. This shows the
later bias against the killing of animals in sacrifices. The device
"of taking resort to some lost sruti as a base of authority for a
" smrti sentence is not unusual.
3. For the utsarga-apaviidq question involved cf. SaTaKau. p. 42ff.
[IV. J. 2]

'f~galig:" q~111<?i\Q" ~<'1'fli;l+11fu'1flT<'l~Ofl'T( I S1ml'H>;;'l ali'1T'f

"eif~allJ"F<11~12~'l~ iit'l''ll<J:.1

Actually, however, the verbiilabh used in the [injunction, agniThis because this particular act, which has not been enjoined otherwise, is
the object here of an injunction, and connectep with a thing [i.e.,
the animal offered], and a d~ity [Agni, Soma]. ."
$omiya.J?lJ paurnfilabheta, has the meaning of sacrificing.

1. The argument is that the injunction. 3UftF.h+l1'-i

enjoins a sacrificial act, a particular act. There is then conflict
with the prohibition. And due to its nature as a special injunction, it wiII be an exception to the. general prohibition to kill.
The whole thing is discussed in SarBo. p. 42ff.
[IV. J. 3].

en S1f0+11"l~'f ~q~~l'f+( I
" '


5[l~~"lm, "

" 'fffl~T<?i'tQ " ~F'1~~UTqloaefFf'1Tl,,"f~l~'i!l"l\q~f{f\1 ~q~ ~q~~l"S( a<l:~~ ~fu re;awaa<'lTF( I

Or, let the word iilaJlzbhana here [mean] touching only. In the
section visaye priiy,adarsaniit [M.S.,]; the opponent ,"ays
that on the strength <if. the sentence vatsamiilabheta in the section 011
Agnihotra, it wiII follow that the"k:iIIing of a calf is prescribed. [Cancelling this] , the final decision is that the word [ala1J1bhanaj means
touching. only; ,



l. This problem has been discussed in M.S. II.3.6.16. The injUllc'

tive sentence under discussion is <f<lJ+!reit<!
This is taken
from MaiSa. 1.5.9. . Now does this mean that a calf should
actually be killed or does it mean that the calf should only be
touched ritually? In this case. of doubt, the decision is made
that the calf should only be ritually touched. The grounds for
this final' decision are that alabh is often seen to be used in
contexts where the meaning 'kill' is not possible. Thus in contexts
such as in the sentence 'f'ff 3lT<'I<=<!I'fT;:fr mlH<fT'f'lRr the verb
a!abh is used in the context of milking a cow.
2. I have amended the' reading vi$.ay,e [accepted by both the
editions), which is obviously wrong, to visaye, which is the
correct reading in the M.S. vi$ay.e in this context makes no sense.
[IV. J. 4]

3lC! 1l.'1 ." '1,\ i'[!Il[l'JaTI ~~C!: 13,f'1!~C!tlr '1liJI\1<'1'Fi <f ~lJr" ~Rr

'llrreffi lJ'W~~~ I
That is why the following verse in the Bhagavata is justified:
"since [it is] the smelling of the wine that is prescribed. and similarly,
the iilabhana of an animal, not its killing."
1. . This sentence is omitted in the Benares edition. 1. am here
accepting th'e reacting' of the Bombay edition of the text.
'2. The half verse quoted here is taken from the Bhagavata Purii.lf3,
3. The only way in which iilaMana cannot be killing is if it is
accepted to mean only touching, and not actually sacrificing.
[ IV. J. 5] C!~r 'q ~'l'<!~~ifi,Il[;:'lT~<f lJ~~ ~'l1iJN'!if ffl-7.fRr I C!~ ~
"~,[G;'-f~t'1'fm.,B:" ~,~'f''fr ttiM1'lr.,'T'!i~'1 ~ S:j;Slil;:<!''11''l~'fr>f: J
<'IIi!; "~'[";;~:"~fuwil'rn:. 'i{~tP.f, 'q~~~'1 05111; 1;'lT05T, ~il: ll:
" 3lrR,'1~: "l[~'f''fr "3lRfu+!Itf,'t;:r ') l[~'f<!C'fRtt;;:;:frs>t l[Rr
RoT~ sfit '1~ 'fl~I .,Tffii ~ ".~'Rmg:::fmh+!: ", " Tit 'q~
Rolq<J:" l[;!lT~' . <l~rfm:<l;l=f<i" mmli, I 'fl;f'l~"f'l<'lfq- (q'!i;;:q<f
'1"r ~'i(r"''!i<'liB05r'f.~G:'1r,MR''lT~ (q~i':r'f.'1T<p:fa'lT 'i(05'1,'1T'
,[FP:ro~ C!:<l;'fc! 1l.'1T>.if '!frm: I 3l"l"f1fq ~f<:::'f.<'IT~Gj6~ 1l.'fr~i
m;:;:'l:f l[fcr "liJi'l 'fft7.f<l l[~'f<l+r. I .1<:'f+!"f1fq' ~T'lc::oi<fT<J: 1;Qm>.f''fR!)hri<;:'l~Tfit lJ 1<:'1 >!Tll:'l:f l[fu fu'qfcr I

[The verb iilabh] also correctly


the meaning 'touch'every-


where [it occurs it

principle [set fortI:
Tantravar1Mka] .
following. [The w(
the bahi$pav.amiina
bahi$pavamiin a'l!1 i:
by the nine verses c
trivrt denotes] 'bei
as] trivrd rajju~l '
usage denotes 'a pc
on the basis of [VI
cated to Aditi', '[
lthese meanings]
. ~tatements in ques1
with which they at
mentary statement,
understood. For t:
For example : trivi
[Moreover], in ['
[both the normal
word are to be U!1l
mentary sentences
particular ways] , "
what particular we
[Kumarila answen
stood, [in a state!
Vedic] ,since,' c;:onte
a meaning of a .we
in other cases also
that meaning whic!
stood. This will 1
this view of Kuma!
on the basis of rna
means 'touch', it is
stood elsewhere aI:

1. trivrccarvadhi!

stated in the
'11m"f~ 'i(~<R


16. The injul1CThis is taken

it a calf should
f should only be
decision is made
The grounds for
:1 to be Ilsed ill
Thus in contexts
ncFfRr (he verb
~ by both the
'e, which is the
; makes no sense.

1;;;+1;:i ;:r ~<l1" ~Fci

lata is justifted:
:d, and similarly.
..on, I am here
f the text.
idlling is if it is
Illy sacrificing.
fu~'1fcr I qi;, ~
S3}!i1rcr<'n~1t~r'~: I
~'I; ~~roft, "lit IT
'RI''1T<O-~S'~ ~Fci


[gIl'[: ",

".nil' 'q~


fi'jT'f'1C1<n <;;'f'i'qT'
'li<'1TtG:fu:&: ~Ttif
'1G:rJ;:rTil:, ~qOJN' -

19 'touch' every-



where [it occurs in a Vedic injunction, and this is possible] by the

principle [set forth by Kurnarila] in the trivre-earu section [of .the
In that [section, Kumarilabhattaj has said the
following. [The word trivrt] denotes only the [nine verses comprising
the bahi~pavmniina stotra]. 'For, in the Veda, [the statement] trivrd
bahi~pavamiin,a1J'! is made, and this is followed [in the ritual order]
by the nine verses comprising the stotra. In normal usage,' [the word
trivrt denotes] 'being threefold', since [it also occurs in such usages
as] trivrd rajju(! 'a triple strand rope'. The word oaru in normal
usage denotes 'a pot'. In the Veda, however, it denotes rice. Thus
on the basis of [Vedic statements such as] "the earu which is dedicated to Aditi', '[let one offer] rice to Aditi'. [Now], although
[these meanings] are determined [in' the above cases, where the
statements in question have complements i.e. other Vedic statements
with which they are understood] , in cases. where there is no complementary statement, both [the normal and Vedis meanings] are to be
understood. . For there is no distinction [required by context here] .
For example: triverdagni~!udagni$tomalJ, sauryal!! Caru1?7 nirvapet.
[Moreover], in [Vedic statements] which have complements also
[both the normal. meaning and the particular Vedic meaning of a
. woi-d are to be understood]' optionally. . For [although the .complementary sentences may require given seritences to be interpreted in
particular ways] , Vedic and normal usage are the same in respect to
what particular words denote [by themselves]. To this objection
[Kumarila answers as follows] : Only that meaning is to be understood, [in a statement with a complement, which is particularly
Vedic], since, contextual complementation supercedes [in determining
a meaning of a .word] because it becomes one sentence. [Further]
in other cases also, since the utterances in question are Vedic, only
that meaning which is established in Vedic utterances is to be understood. This will be stated in the tenth [book]. [In accord with
this view of Kumarila] , in the present case also, since it is concluded
on the basis of majority usage [in Vedic injunctions] that [iilabh]
means 'touch', it is established thaUhis meaning alone is to be under;
.stood elsewhere also:'
1. trivreearvadhikar{f}}Janyaya: The import of this nyiiya has been
stated in the BM.ttaDI. on X.l.10 as follows: ol'r'llfu:&:lQa.'!'11
qT'f~q1?1 <r;;;'1~'1+I,
Thus the meaning provided by putting to-



gether the understood portion of the sentence is stronger than

the meaning wellknown among people.
2. The complete name of the section is trivrccarvasvavaliidhikar:a1Ja,
since along with the two instances trivrt and earu mentioned
here, a third one asvaviila is also discussed in the commentary
on the relevant st7tra. (M.S., I.3.4.9). See Tantra Va. p. 221.


20.1.1 states l~'l;;;:~r,'1q+!r;,B:.. The term bahi~pa

vamiina1Jl denotes the nine verses [rks] contained in three triplets of verses [t[.ca] , the three giiyatra siiman-s together forming
a stotra. These verses complete a stotra called bahi~pavamana,
because this stotra is chanted outside [bahis] of the sadas near the
cat1Jaia [the pit which stands to the northeast of the mahiivedil
during the first soma-pressing rpriita~. sa/Jana]. See Taryc;lyaBra.
6.7.9: <rW>'1q+!l~ laqfrq sayarya ad. loc.:
'-! 81~q~trff@1: <!~6'1q1iFn;f laG,::WfilB1<J: '"11<ql~
laqf.q I Also see ]aiNyaVi. 1.4.3.
TaJ)c;lyaBl1a. 20.1.1 [see above] states that the bahi~pavamana
is to be trivrt. That is, the stotra of nine verses is to be chanted
in such a way tha(t the group of verses is a stoma called trivrt.
The tr.ivit stoma contains nine verses chanted as follows: in each
of these ~ounds [Paryaya] ,three of the'rks are cha~ted after the
sound hi1Jl [hilJlkara] has been made. Depending on the precise
order of the individual verses, the triv?'t has modifications. These
are stated in TaI!c;lyaBra. 2.1.1, 2.2.( 2.3.l.


4. iidityascarulJ: Kumarila. [TantraVii. p. 222] quotes:

gnfG:r: lIl<!ufi<!: '1'1Rr '"1": 'the initial caru is dedicated to AdIti,
in milk: and then
(bne should worship) Aditi
[with an offering of] rice'. I cannot trace the~e exact statements
to a Brahmarya or Srautasiitra.. However, compare . ~;f'1Of9ili!ls
fG:<lt tf'1Rr '"1": trl'1Off'1: ApaSS. X.21.4.
5. 13!'lq; ( 81mgq; ) 81m!!!+!: This statement is made in;lyaBra.
17.6.1. The Agni$tut is a one day soma sacrifice, which is a
modification of the Agni$toma. The question arises here whether
trivrt is to be interpreted as denoting (a) threefold or (b) a stoma
which consists of nine verses. Further, there is not here, as in
the cases noted in note 3, a compliment to show that
trivTt has its _particular Vedic meaning. Hence; . cine: might


consider inter:
(a), in which
for carrying 0
accepted view
Vedic meariing
Agni$tut is. ch;
t'rivrt way .. S,
6. TaiSa.
'let (the adhv(
him [the sacri
splendour of BI
.affix [lal~ ~
cated to.,:' (
should be a tn '
means 'rice', aj
X.l.l0.34-44 aJ
sidered here.
7. dasame: The
tenth section oc
M.S., 'X.l.l0.3'
"l\Rq;;fla9il+!: Hen
in favour of th
8. All this discussi<
rather than the
Since in one pi
'to kill', but has
ale frequent, ijlt
Vedic instance.
. contradiction wi
[IV. J 5] 1l:'i '"1~fe
Thus, since tlie
the same thing, ho"
[the. injunction] ? .
l. "It has been sho
'one should not

1omiya111 pasu1n'
to this prohibiti<



is stronger than

caru mentioned
the commentary
antraVi'i. p. 221.
.e term bahilipaled in three trip
together forming

he sadas near the
)f the mahiivedi]
See Ti'it;lc;lyaBrii.
'I~lffl~T: ;qfo: 6 q-'I-

iNyaVi. 1.4.3.

; is to be chanted
ma called trivrt.
; follows: 11l ea,ch
:hanted after the
19 on .the precise
lifications. These
luotes :
,dicated to Aditi,
I worship) 'Aditi
exact statements
>are . R;fq-u['liT~S-

.e in Ti'it;lc;lyaBra.
'ifice,which is a .
ises here whether
d or (b) a stoma
s not here, as in
ent to show that
. ~nce, . cine' might



consider interpreting this term as denoting also the meaning

. (a), in which case, the statement provides that all the means
for carrying out the sacrifice are tripled.' However, the finally
accepted view is that trivrt has here, as elsewhere, its particular
Vedic meariing, so that TIiI):9yaBra. 17.6.1 prescribes that the
Agnt~tut is characterised, by the chanting. of each 'Stotra in the
t'1'ivrt way .. See M.S., X.6.7.22-'23and the Bhi'i'!ya thereon .
6. TaiSa. states 'll ~\llerT.!~'lil+r:. ~ <IHI1 ~ <iFf ""<> f;WI~
'let (the adhvaryu) offer a cam 'dedicated to siirya [Sun] for
him [the sacrificer] who. is desirous of attaining the brilliant ..
splendour of Brahman.' Now, the item saurYia contains a taddhita
affix [~T~l:f it'l<IT P. IV.2.24], so that the item means'dedicated to ... ' . (literally, 'whose .god is .. .'). - Hence, the Daru
should be a type of oblation. The final decision is .that cam here
means 'rice', and not a pot as in common usage. See M.S.,
X.1.10.34-44 and the Bha9ya thereon. Details carinot be considered here.
7. dasame: The discussion alluded to here as occuring in the
tenth section occurs in the Bha~ya on the section beginning with
M.S., Xl.lO.34.
The sentence discussed is <llif ~ R~i.)<r
~\ll'lT.!~'IlTl1: Here also, the common meaning 'a pot' is rejected
in favour of the Vedic meaning 'rice'.
8. All this discussion is in support of taking iilabh to mean 'touching'
rather than the usual meaning 'to sacrifice', and thus 'to kill'.
Since in one place it has been shown thatiilabh cannot mean
'to kill', but has to be taken to mean 'to touch', and such usages
are frequent, iilabh should be taken to mean 'to touch' in every
Vedic instance. This effectively gets rid of the difficulty of
. contradiction with the prohibitive sentence 'one should not kill'.

[IV. J 5]' 1<.'i ",,~Nf.!T;r1;f'l'I: lJ+!T;:n~9i<"~'Il+rT~ 'Ii ;qT~l:f'-l11;f'li+rl'1: I

Thus, since the inju~ction and the prohibition do not refer to
the same thing, how can one '[the prohibition] set aside the other
[the. injunction] ? .
1. It has been shown previously that the prohibition na hil!~syiit
'one should not kill', prohibits killing. But the injurictios agni$oniiyal11 pasuiniilabheta, which has .been claimed to go contrary
to this prohibitioti, is not abOut killing at all. It just prescribes

.. -~--~~----~---.~-~-----------"~.-" .. ----~. . . .



that part of the sacrificial animal should be touched ritually.

Thus, the injunction and the prohibition do not have anything
in common,and therefore cami.ot contradict each other.
[IV. J. 6J

~BTt'l'W'1FTf'"ll~q",.'IT 'I . ~

. 'Cf

qf.fifi'1J~<[r ~>.f.rt'l~;:<{cT:

~1~9 '11'lf~:'11'q~ <.11<[ ""<{C!. {fa 'l1'"'1~ 1 I[1'Cf1<iq~

,'i1;'!ilUJrr 'l1<{q~ijJl.:T <[F11fJtqf~91~1'1r'l'>.f1Cllf<l.'1G:;:c!l.:~Bl<i~nr'11'f.
8T.<{:qml~1'1c'lfu~'<[.rr91q.~'-'f 1

The [actual] harming [of the animal], on the other hand, is

inferred from the rites ancillary [to the offering, that is, from the
, preparation of the animal offering by cutting out its parts]. Nor
should [the following objection} be stated. In .this case, one does
not get a harming within the [sacrifice]. For the offering is effected
with parts got elsewhere. [The situation is now] a~; in' the offering
of the tail [of an animal slain elsewhere] during the pdtnisa}!zyaja
rite. [This objection i!\ refuted as follows]: The preparation performed on the animal earlier can be (considered to be) performed
within the actual rite, jus,t as the husking etc. [of rice to make the
purocJasa] is considered part of this rite [although it takes place befere
the actual rite]. This so that, through the iBtermediary of the [parts
of the] sacrificial animal [the preparation on the orie killed earlier]
be properly part of the sacrificial act. For, otherwise; [the animal
offering] would not be [properly considered] dedicated to Agni
and Soma.
1. The above translation assumes that priicinapasusaljlskarii:l}iiJ!1
refers to the preparations - actually killing etc. - of the animal;
thus in yajffiyapasudviirii, pasu refers, by lak~a1Jii, to the parts
of the animal (lqdaya vapa etc.) actually offered. There is room
for interpretive disagreement.
2. patnisal1lyiija are rites of offering oblations io the wives of gods.
For this rite, the use of a jf}.ghani, the tail of an animal, is
prescribed by the injunction ~>.f;:<{l qc<[l: U'11;;rlfRr
IILS.5.60 etc.). Now the problem arises as to where this tail
of an animal is to come from .. ' If there is no sacrificial animal
involved in the rite itself, a tai! of an a:nimal kiIIed elsewhere,
either in ahoth~r sacrifice or ,ev~n. atai! bought especially for the
occasion from a butcher shop, may be. used. [See JaiNyaVi.
IlL3.16 (p. 149) ]. Since thus actual harm to life is not done
in the body of the sacrifice, 'and yet the patni:>atfZyiija tites are


considered to
actual harm t(
of the prescrir:
3. This objection
killihg does n
animal, and in
perty of belo~~
being offered, t
longing' to the
that it occurs :
[IV. J. 7J


. 1;:r,['\1it 'Cf'

Objection: [}
sentences that lay d<
formed]. Otherwis(
, killing wi th a weapc
is that the [prescri])(
complete limbs and
sound, and thus car
1. Previously it ha
scribing iila1!'lbh(
killing is to be <>
ing rites. Here 1
have been prescI
in which the aniI
considered as in
killing with a w;
way the animal
acceptable for a :
way to kiII a sacr:
injuhctions to kil
2. Kaundabhatta re

thes~ 'sente~~es' i
animill is killed, j


touched ritually.
)t have anything
:h, other. . . ;

Ht ;;]T"l<lt"<l<\:;:'la;
<ll,",!l{ , m~'t<iq~

eother hand, is
;hat is, from the
its parts]. Nor
is case, one does
ffering is effected
~s in'the offering
he patnisalf/yaja
preparation pero be) performed
rice to make the
takes place before
iary 'of the lparts,ne killed earlier]
I'ise, [the animal
~dicated to Agni

-of the animal;

;anii, to the~parfs






;he wives of gods,

of an animal, is
to where this tail
sa~rificial animal
1 killed elsewhere,
especially for the
[See JaiNyaVi.
:0 life is not done
i sa1flyaja rites are



considered to be complete, it can be said that one cannot infer

actual harm to life occuring within a sacrifice on the strength
of the prescriptions in the accompanying rites,
3. This objection has been rejected by noting that, even if the actual
killing does not happen within the course of a sacrifice, the
accompanying rites can be performed by proxy on the sacrificial
animal, and in order for the oblation to have the necessary pro-,
pertyof belonging to the deities Agni and Soma, to whom it is
being offered, the actual killing also has to be considered as belonging to the sacrifice and thus cannot" be escaped by saying
that it occurs somewhere else.
[IV: J. 7]

f~~Hj<rWf,T<;feI"fl'l'f.'ll'f'llrn:~l.1<i "'~'l{~ I 3'FPH OJ&T~l ~<r~sfq

'lFTfu:&:'<:fl'fRrRfa ~;;r I 8l~rfUsaa'Cf(FW"'T+lGU~<r l1T~'H1JfTfu:<\:rq,

T;:r~'Cfl:t "'f l'i!OJl3'<rJ:f'llH<:'1n't WlllT"a~<r 1~~'1<rqf;,'f'9TT~fa a'i'll{ -

Objection: [A prescription of], killing is obtained from the

sentences that lay down the way in which the killing [should be performed], Otherwise, 'sacrifice will be considered complete even by
killing with a weapon, [This objectionJ is not [valid], 1:he truth
is that the [prescribed] way -of killing fuifills a purpose in preser~il)g
complete limbs and by avoiding the fault of the animal making' a
sound, and 'thus cannot be expected [further] to be an injunction
[also]. L Previously it has been stated that the injunctive sentence prescribing alaJJ'lbhana does not actually prescribe killing. Actual

killing is to be obtained only by inference from the accompanying rites, Here the opponent says that the killing can be said to
have been prescribed by the sentences that lay down the way
in which the animal should be killed, If these sentences are not
considered as injunctions for killing, says -the opponent, even
killing with a weapon [which is in direct contradiction of the
way the animal is said to be killed for sacrifice], will also be
acceptable for a. sacrifice. Thus these sentences prescribing the
way to kill a sacrificial animal must be~ccepted as authoritative
injunctions to kill an animal. .
2. Kaul):gabhatta rejects this by pointing out that the purpose of
these sentences that lay down the way in which a sacrificial
animal is killed, is to obtain whole limbs without any cuts on




them, and also to avoid the fault which will occur if the animal
. makes a sound while being killed. Thus an additional purpose
of prescribing killing cannot be imposed on these sentences. An
additional purpose not actually stated in a prescriptive sentence,
can be thus assigned only to th?se seritences that have 119 apparent purpose.

2. Any injunction acc(

there is provision IX
to be leading to sor
so accompanied, th
commentary Sarabc
Sfu'lkhyakarika :


~~<lW[Ril'iq'l '<ll<,!>i

[TV. J. 8J


<rl~li!''lo'llOCT<lr q~Cj""'I~'o<l~" <fir ~<Jli!I;;r i<{i;['C[Wlf"<rRRr <Jfu;

"1<'11 _I
qi{q~<:[I~<<I'i{., <f~ f<!u~

~r<lCT~<;>:fI!:!T+!lU'1<=1t'<l1 <f\f.R-Ffi~q"l I
'i'[ ., ~~Tl11+!lU<lfuT% 1j~\'<i'f,P:rlql<l:. 1

Nor is it right to' go about it in the following way: Since anything which is laid down in an injunction not accompanied by derogatory statements or the teaching of an expiatory rite, is invariably
associated with the property of not entailing evil [anything undesired] ; and since there is contradiction with the resulting meaning
of the injunction, the prohibition [against killing] should not operate.
[This is not accepted for the following reason]: When there is
[direct] contradiction between a Vedic statement and the meaning of
[another Vedic statement], the question of restricting [the scope]
arises out of fear tha;t, otherwise, one of them would be unauthoritalive. But when the contradiCtion' is .with the resultrng meaning
[inferred from an injunction], there is no [fear of the calamity of
nonauthoritativeness] for the Veda [itself]. Thus there is no reason
to restrict the scope [of the prohibition] .
1. As has already been explained, according to Kau~J.(;labhatta,
there is no direct injunction in the Veda which prescribes the
killing of the sacrificial animal. This is obtained only by inference, since there are Vedic statements that provide for the rites
to be performed on that animal. But this conclusion is only
inferred from the Veda, and not stated directly there. Thus,
since there is no contradiction between an actual injunction anq
the prohibition to kill, the..contradictionbeing only between the
prohibition and what is merelyipferred, from other injunctions,
there is no fear of nonauthoritativeness descending on the Veda.
Thus there is no reason \vhy the scope of the prohibition should
. be restricted in order io accommodate the killing in sacrifice.

[IV. J. 9]

"!ftt,, s:r~;jlJ
ql'R!+l1ql<l:. ~
<II 1); Q<:[Ff~
9i~liR"~fq l:!

+!qf<'~ ilJ~~
!:!'11;;j'f,B:, I 'f<!i......

,. -'::"'r-!',-...;


~~fW'o'r '<il~

- . Nor is Madhva's [c(

[one objects that sacrifi,
is] not [so], since [sucb
lMadhva comments as f
harm to life]., because of
causes,demerit. That i~
k;illing of the sacrificial ,
the Veda wiil cause greir
from .killing prescril:>ed i
'not pure', he [the auth
even killing prescribed b
will cause detnefit.' Tht
ingj. But the property
[by its very nature] the
prohibited [that can m::
property of being prohibi
it is prescribed by -V-edic
cated to Vayu [the-'W~
stated by the w~rdl 'Ved:
out that this inference vi.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --


lccur H the animal

additional purpose
lese sentences. An
'escriptive sentence,
;hat have n9 appa





.... _-.--...

_- ..... -_.

_ .._.. _ . _ - , - - -


2. Any injunction accompanied by a derogatory statement, or when

there is provision made for an expiation, is generally considered
to be leading to something undesired. When however, it is not
so accompanied, that is not the case. Thus it is' said in the
commentary Sarabodhini on the Siailkhyatattvakaumudi on the
Sfui.khyaklirika :
~flq<l5i"lRT\oiq'i\ 'C!T<or'llJT1lF;:RiTs;q .m~'i'li<or+!. I SarBo. p,49

t<iisterW[I'<!RRr J;lm;
;'4t<<lT Blf.[~'li.r.r;qT I
m% ~\''liTl'lT'Il<J:, 1

way: Since any

ompanied by dero
o rile, is invariably
vii [anything un
resulting meaning
should not operate.
When there is
md the meaning of
'icting [the scope]
. , tId be unauthorita
, resulting meaning
of the calamity of
; there is no 'reason

to Ka~QaJJhatta,
hich prescribes the
ined only by infer
trovide for the rites
conclusion is only
ectly there. Thus,
lual injunction and
g only between the
1 other injunctions,
nding on the Veda.
prohibition should
!ling in sacrifice.

[IV. J. 9]

;ql]q" 8!~~fi:rRr ~;;r ~.<n<J:," ~1cr<i.'f'j<!T " ~~~m<J:,

q)qB'l'l'll<J:, ~;~ ~'1Rr ~ I ~f~<l<'11<J:, I 1&'fll ''1~~'f.'j
<11 l! Q<lr.r~l SloT 1'fc/<J:, I
~13:ql l! ~~FI'.T:
. 'li~~"~fu l'fl "";'1 ]%'131,'.['1 ~~'1i'f~<f1<!T 8!f<t qlq~l!<Fjl<J:, ~;@
l'f'!R'orTti ~~ I ~mRr I Of ~ 1~I<1T;ql~l!'~' ~1<<i
wl\;;f'1i'+!. I f'i; l!<or+!. I <l~T'f OfIR<l1 :~r<~<l" 'fT<lc<i"'ii!<l+r."
~i'Illf<l:",i$~r4~<l<'fTf<l:<<lTll: I ~~fu,1 <31r.rlN~0f ~<l1~111;q~
l.:lJ11rfo!Dlir 'Ill: I 1&'Mtfu I <l'f'<lil9il~1 ' 1'!1<'1'j lJl''l'j I

. 'Nor is Madh:va's [commentary] on aSuddh,arniti cenna s.abdat 'if

[one objects that sacrificial kHiing is] impure, [we answer that this
. is] not .[so] , since [such an act is prescribed] by the Veda'; correct ..
[Madhva comments as follows] : Let there be suffering [caused by
harm to life]., because of its [very nature] of being harm to life that
causes,demerit. That is not ,so, since the Veda prescribes [it, i.e.,
killing of the sacrificial animal]. 'killing which is not ,prescribed by
the Veda will cause great calamity, but there is never any bad result
from .killing prescribed in the Veda.' [commentary] : by the words
'not pure', he [the author of the sittra], brings up the doubt that
even killing prescribed by the Veda is after all killing, and as such
will' cause demerit.' Thus $uffering will r'esult [ftoin sacrificial kill
ingj. But the property . of being harm: to .life [M1J1satvalh] is not
[by its very nature] the cauSe 6faemedC It is the property of being
prohibited [that can make it the cause of (iemerit] ,.and t4at . [the '
property of being prohibited]' does not exist here. Oii.the'other hand,
it is prescribed by Vedic injunctIons such as.'awhite[animal] dedi
cated to Vayu [the 'Wind, .should 'be.sacrificed],., [This has been
stated by the w9rd] 'Veda' [in the satra].He then l'lroeeeds to point,
out that this' inference which is faulty due to having a [hetu] with a



limiting condition, also goes against the smrti, [by quoting the versel
'killing' etc.
1. Here Kaw;rc;labhatta brings in the Madhva commentary on

B.S., III.1.25 [III.1.27, according to the numbering in the edition

with the Madhva commentary]. Madhva answers to the oppo
nent who brings in the doubt that sacrificial killing might lead
to suffering due to its being hi1rzsii after all, and thus a cause of
demerit. According to the Madhva way, the opponent is here
indulging in an inference with a fallacious cause. Thus it seems
that according to him, the opponent's inference may be stated
as follows: ~1Jr 'il'1&1Flil ~l~ This, he goes on to say, is
fallacious, since the hetu (hi1'flsii) is faulty due to the existence
, of a IilllJting condition., This cause with a limiting condition
has been defined generally as follows: m"<rc<nr.:![C11~~9i<:~cIT &g:
T.S. (notes)' p. 307, which in short nieans that this hetu is true
only conditionally. Thus, in the present" case,'even though harm
to life in general does cauSe demerit, and thus suffering, that is
not true in every instance of killing. Thus killing prescribed by
the Veda is not a cause of demerit and the resulting suffering. is quoted a smrti verse taken from the Variihci Pural).a;
which says that sacrificial killing prescribed by the Veda doe.~
not create any bad result.
2. The text in both editions reads s-utriyiihi1'flsiirnpaltviit and later
b.hii$yasthiihi1'flsiitvena. However sutriyii and bhii$yasthii are
adjectives of miidhvi which occurs at the end of the passage and
EO must be separated. Also ahimsiirupatviJ;t; or ahimsiitvena
would make no sense in the context. Thus I have taken the
himsiitext to be sutriyii + himsiirnpatviit and bhii$yasthii

3. The Bombay edition also unnecessarily has na at the end instead

of .ca. Actually na at the beginning of the passage is connected
here. Thus niipi. .. miidhtfi siidhvi.


[Madhva's argum
standing the basis of
not [claim that hhrzsii
but because it is prohi
thatthe property of bofl, injunction. And
merely assumed [as
authoritative] stateme
teachers such as Kam;
1. The smrti quote!
authoritative. F(
as authoritative, ,
[IV;]. 11] ~ '<C' '-loft!

w:<rr 'IT ~~
[Given this. ther
snqtisl such as conu
have to be discarded
demerit ca,used by dri
also'- Thus it has hi
pural)ai, 'Just as [it
mud, or the result 0:
possible to wipe away
1. The verse quotec
[IV. J. 12J aloft'"'18 '
~~'1 110:1'

<:CIT SH i
~~~CTT f
" GfGtITIIf>!!

[IV. J. 10] ~~r~l{F1'1.iit'i!T'?ri!;:I'!"'<orm:: I ",fu ~ITfuuTI ~m~ lT1ITm'ila:<! 'I l'iii g Rf~ 1 ' ~q~ll'!"'i ~NR!~~'1Tfit
~ ~l{Te/m: 1 ~fc!<:r.:!f<i;:crifi+l6r~~fct<!;<;tf9i+!~'1ifi~<fcfetfc! <r

"ilW I



d~+lro~liI q



On this [wel c


quoting the verse]

a commentary 011
ering in the edition
Iswers to the oppokilling might lead
.nd thus a cause of
e opponent is here
1se. Thus it seems
nce may be stated
goes 011 to say, is
ue to the existence
limiting condition
. nt<lcnCl~~"'Ii~~CfI ~g:

at this hetu is true

even though harm
IS suffering, that is
illing prescribed by
resulting suffering.
. the Vadiha Pural).a,
by the Veda does

'rupaltviit and later

nd bhii$yasthii are
of the passage and
'it or ahimsiitvena
; I have takeiFthe
'i$yastkii+ himsiiat the end instead
assage is connected


1&'mfo!;r tflq+f[tfT-

fqNRr~ 'i!~Cfq (Iti

'Ii~.CI'lir.;qWjfcr or



[Madhva's argument is not acceptable] , due to [his] misunderstanding the basis of the opponents' objection. The opponents do
not [claim that hilrtsii produces] demerit [just] because it is hil!ISii,
but because it is prohibited. It is the same even for you who accept
that the property of being the means to a desired end is [the meaning
of] injunction. And one should consider that the smrti quoted is
merely' assumed [as authoritative] by Madhva, who assumes [as
authoritative] statements in endless array on the authority of endless
teachers such as Kamatha etc., so that this smrti is not authoritative.
1. The smrti quoted by Madhva has been rejected here as nonauthoritative. For a list of those cited by Madlwa and assumed
as authoritative, see MaTaMuMa. p. 3, note 4.
[IV. J. III Il;'i "". Etul1q~~iFf+l;rIfu:~~fii<ilr:fl'rr~: I q:oi '1HIQi'\sfr.i W1!f~
;;f;:l{q'[q'[qfutClf~q I Cf'iT ;'1:1'fa IT'i+l~'f.;:i':r I "'-l'iT qi;;r ![\bTUl:
~'IT CIT !!U'[.CfB: I '!.Cfl['1:'-IT Cf~~'1ii ;r '-l~<Ifg+l~fCf" ~fu ~<J:. I
[Given this. then, one might say that] all rites [prescribed in
smrtis] such as commiting ritual suicide. at Prayaga and sati will
have to be discarded [as not being authoritative] ; and, in this way,
demerit caused by' drinking wine will be unavoidable in the Viijapeya
also. Thus it has been said in the first book [of the BhlgavatapuraI.J.a], 'Just as [it is not possible to cleanse] muddy water with
mud, or the result of [drinking] wine with [more] wine; it is not
possible to wipe away [even] the killing one animal with [several]
1. The verse quoted here is BhagP. 1.8. 52.


[IV. J. 12] l?{\~a ";P;~",{T;:q~~T'f.. 1&'m;jqt

"1im: I ~'<ll'rllf ""

~~'! +ll[T'Ii<iIlf'IT ~+lT"~fu 'liiliG:'!1q'[~!~~'.:fClTfum<J:.1 "e.~'<l+'l

~ffi'sfi'l ~ "l~ ~m 'fR('!j;;f"m- <!m"'RI~~'i~[qitmi( I" 'IT

~~CfT 1&'~1 m "i 1fcr

~fcr ~'<l~+E~Cf'fT~ I
. "<qmllf' f<r~Cf: W:T'-I1l;Cf~ WK!<.'!l1-l ;r 1&'61" i\.fu ml1<lCfT<J:. I
"'-Imif tf~'!: ~121: ~w:r'! ~'-l+wrT I 1RI1 S~'-I ~~ lJ'i~
~~ CI~$CI'<l:" ~fu" '-IT ~f<r~cn ~m f.T'-lcnR+r.J:, 'C(tffi I


l~,! Cfi fq;qT~~rn:+ll F.: J~,qm "

.'iT'f'IT~irt 'C( tfTtfTmqf~~ <Dq: I

~fu t:p.q.m.'-Im?:{+1'1-

On this [we] can say that, on the strength of the following'



statements, the absence of demerit is established, so that there is no

fault:.on the strength of the following passage' fro~ the subs~ory of
karka(i in the [Yoga} vasi~tha : (a) 'You wiII carry. away other
propie \vho a:ie worthyqtbeingkilI~, .' There is no hann. to .these
according to dhqrma. Killing when it is in accordance with dharma
however is. equal' to great mercy'; on the strength. of the' advice of
B~bha in the Brahmottara;la: (b) 'even while following the
duty of a katriya, avoid purposeless harm to life'; from the [following] statement quoted by srldharasvarni: (c) 'killing prescribed by
the Veda is not counted;as killing at all'.; from the. [followirig] slatemel1t in the Bhagavata: (d) 'the prescribed consuming [by only]
smelling [it] of wine and the [prescribed] sacrificing of the animal
is not killing'; and also from the following verses from the fifth sedion
of Manu.: (e) 'the creator himself created the animals for the sake
of sacrifice. Sacrifice is for everyone's prosperity. Therefore the
killiiIg iri sacrifice is not killing'; and (f) 'the killing prescribed by
.the Veda' in this \vorld should be known as not killing. For from
the Veda the dharma was born'.
L The quotatibns here are taken from the following places:
(a) YogVa. III.82:46.
(b) SkandP. III.n.25.
. (c) not traced.
(d) BhagP. XI.5.13.
(e) Manu. V.39..
(f) Manu. V.44.
2. All these statements go to establiSh that killing of sacrificial
animals prescribed 'by the Veda is not to be counted as harm
to life, and thus cannot be the cause of demerit and the resulting
3. It is rather strange,' though typical, that the smrti statement
quoted by Madhva shouid be rejected as non-authoritative,
.. while other sinrCi statements saying more or less the same thing
Should beacc~pted as authoritative enough to support the
author's view.
[IV}13] .. arS[ f~lJI ., f~J.1 S!w.+11~ ., ~m I "if~S"if\Ol'Z3'l~mlif~'l\Ol
~~<IT ql'rn<!'fil~'f.~l'RfW~: I
[The reC:>01 for this, the conclusion stated in the last passage is]
that the .sentences "Killing isnot killing", "Sacrifice is not killing",



and "Slaughter is n,
furthermost words, i.
. 1. .Just saying that
must mean
elsewhere, which
killing prescribed
was born, does n
[IV.; J. 14) ~ ~'<l)lm<
mi<il ~l~Rf


As .to [the opinil

follows]: There isa .
[by authoritative stat
which is conveyed b)
these statements now]
statements] do not Sf:
answer as follows] :
view], there is no.way
and puiposeless 'hami
Moreover [it is not 'Pl
.as saying that ritualI)
nary killing], since it
meaning of naii] h
property which delirr
construed [with nan]
ofharming qua harmi
which is somehow dif
[such a sentence] wil
1. I have accepted tl
-edition instead ,C
2. .Tne opponent su
na hil}'lsii is const
that ritual killing
K'aul.l4abhaWi re
The particle




o tha t there is no
n the subSt;OlY of
carry_ away other
no harm to ..these
anCe with dharma
_ of the advice of
-hile following the
from the [ prescribed by
[following] stateuming [by only]
ing of the animal
m the fifth section
mals for the- sake
1. Therefore the
ing prescribed by
jlling. .For from

and "Slaughter is not slaughter", cannot make sense, unless the

furthermost words, i.e., himsa and vadha mean that which causes
_ ' . ' -" . ' . - ' .
- 1.


J ~st saying that kiiling is not kl1!irigdoes not make s~nse. It

must mean that killing in. this case is nqi; the. same as killing
elsewhere, which is the cau~e of demedt. Th~s the sacrificial
killing prescribed by the Vedas, from which after all the dharma
was born, does not entail demerit. and the resulting suffering.

[IV.' J. 14]

~ ~"1J~T<rt <{~?liill:'<!~~~ m'<!'limfui a;;r I c.j~<rl

m~l:&:l~rmRt:i 3{""f<f<'llq~'Iil~~;;r!ffcr'lWrar'li<q~ ~<qfu

~1'<l.1 3{",,~'!n:q~l<{l+!i'i Cl~~q~: I
As to [the opinion that the above argument is .not proper, as
follows]: There isa difference between-harming .which is enjoined
[by authoritative statement] and just any harming. [And it is this
which is conveyed by statements such as hi'IJZsii na hi'IJZSii,' so that
these statements now] make sense [thus interpreted]. Hence [these
statements] do not serve to prove [the view above]. [To this we
answer as follows]: That is not -[acceptable]. For, [under this
viewL there is no way of eliminating -the equality _of [ritual harming]
and PUfposless harming [since they are' now both merely hil!'lsii].
Moreover [it is not -proper to Claim that na hi'IJZsa is to be interpreted
as -saying that -ritually enjoined killing is merely different from ordinary killing], since it is an established principle that [absence, the
meanil1g of naii] has its counterpositiveness' delimited by the
property which delimits the class of things [denoted by]' the item
hi~nsii must denote an absense
construed [with nan]. [That is,
of harming qua harming]. Otherwise [if na hi'IJZsii denoted 'a killing
which is somehow different from others] one could; improperly, use
[such a sentence] with reference to killingwhich is not ritual.

7Ving places -:.

ing of sacrificial
counted as hafm
and the resultil-i!:


sm'fli statement
is the same thing
.to support the

1. I have accepted the reading &""m<!'!f~l<{l+!i'i of the Bombay

-edition instead ,of the .3{""~1 <{m'1~I:qI+!fit of -the Benares
2. Tlie opponent suggests that tlie negative particle nan in hi1!ISii
na hi'IJZSii is construed with hi1J'lsii, so that the statement conveys
that ritual killing [vaidhaht1!isii] is distinct from ordinary killing.
Kaul).QabhaWi refuses this as follows:
The particle nan denotes absence (abhiiva). .That which is

e last passage is]

e is not killing",






absent is called the abhiiViapratiyogin. This must be delimited

by a property. Sitnilarly, the thing absent, denoted by' hilJlsii,
is related with absence, just as the items nan and hil'fZsft are
syntactically related. There is also a property which delimits
the property of being related, the anvayitavacchedaka.. Now,
there is an accepted principle which applies in interpreting
sentences with the negative particle nan. Absence has its praHyogitft delimited by the property which is !anv,ayitiivacchedaka.
For example, if one says nilagha{o na 'there is not a blue pot',
the anv!ayitftvacc,hedaka is the property blue-pate ness; and
the pratiyogitii is delimited by this property. Otherwise, false
statements are possible; The sentence na ghaJo'tra 'there is not
a pot here', denotes the absence of a pot. Hence the property
delimiting the pratiyogiUi of the absence' here is potness. Now,
if this same property delimited what was absent when one said
. nilaghd{Ona, the following would result: one could say na
ghatalJ, even if there were indeed a blue pot present.
In the present case, the anv,ayin in na hitllSii ishil!!sli.
Hence, as in <[ <{'!:: (where the anv,ayitiivacch-edaka ispotness)
the, anvayitiivacchedaka must be a. general property, not a property such as particular~harming-ness. Arid it is this property
which has to delimit the abhavapra.t!iyogitii. (See Introduction
[K...:2] ), Put simply, na hi1f1Sii must convey the absence of halming qua harming. 'To make sense of a statement such as hifflsa na
hilpsii, one says that the second item hil'fZsiidenotes harming
which does not produce s i n . '
[IV. J. 15]

I u'-iT (:l@I2!IR2r1'('l';;rf;'r't;~
q<f<reT~ ~v:rf~; I fliMR'tI'l'lT'FfI'l'l\T uID''iJli'( I siu~

<[ 'if

~:&::'fTq;;fR'IlT ~ 'R'>~:


;;iI-'lu '{<~Hi:l+J:. I

Nor [can it be saJd that] all it means is that [hitl/sii] does not
cause unmitigated d~merit. If it is taken that way, [these statements]
will be futile as the resulting meaning will be that [hinlSii] produces
hath desired and undesired results .. This is [already]. understood
from the injunctive and prohibitive sentences. For the same reason,
the view that it is the absence of the. property of being the cattse of
something desired that is to be:signified is also toberej'ected.
1. Sirice sac'rificialhinzsii is prescribed by an injUnction"it follows


that it must be c
since the prohib
obvious that hi1
fore, if the stater
sa~rificial ki!lin~

but also does p

that meaning is
[IV. J. 16] ;or ~QI~1f:1'
gF'l~i u<

Nor can it be Ci
repeating [the same
bition]. It is not I
purpose [of {heir 0'
[in the M.S.] woul,
1., An anuviida c
~vailable from .
claiming that it j
,quoted .above ir
that the sacrifici
claimed in the i:
mat sacrificial
create demerit; 1
been said that 1
the injunction I
all killing. It i,
that this difficU:
as repititions of
prohibition. TJ
2. Kal1J}.Qabhatta:
calling somethir
not possible to
If another purp<
meaning to be ;
possible. Thus,
showing that s
cannot be callI,
gathered 'from j
3. The tatprakhyi



must be delimited
denoted by' /ziJ!Zsii,
wi/, and hi'lJ'lsii are
,rty which delimits
~acchedaka, Now,
.es in interpreting
sence has its 'praa-
is not a blue pot',
olue'pot'ness; and
'. Otherwise, false
I!o'tra 'there is not
lence the property
~ is potness. Now,
;ent when one said
one could say na
I hi1?zsii ishi1!zsii.
'hedaka is potness)
:opcrty, not a pm
it is this property
(See Introduction
ie absence of halm- .
It such
as himsii
i denotes harming

~"ll<t. I oi~ ~i!-

[hi1?zsii] does not

[these statements]
[hi1?lSii] produces
ready] understood
.r the same reason,
being the cattse of
,be .rejected.
;.unction, it follows



that it must be a means to something desired. At the same time,

since the prohibition na hitflSyiit does prohibit hi'lJ'lsii, it is also
obvious that hi'lJ'lsii must cause something undesirable: There~
fore~ if the statements quoted before are interpreted to mean that
sacrificial killing does not just create demerit pure and simple,
but also does produce some merit, they will be u.seless, since
that meaning' is already available in the way explained above.

[IV. J. 16) ., ~~1~!f:!"1"'liTri:r" ~r",,,rcr '!l'"'P'l:. I ~rcr m~'fi~ ~~~~1<I:. I

3F'!~i ~,~~~uT\,"%"sre~<I:. I
Nor can it 'be Claimed that these [statements] may be taken as
repeating [the same thing signified by the injunction and the probibition]. It is not possible to do so when they can have ariother
purpos'e [of their own]. Otherwise the section called tatprakhya
[in the M.S.] would be meaningless.
'1. An,anuviida isa statement which just repeats wmething already
available from other sources. In this case, the opponent is
claiITling that it is not necessary to interprete the smrti statements
quoted such a way that we would get the conclusion
that the sacrificial killing does not cause demerit. As has been
Claimed in the last passage, they can be interpreted just to mean
fuatsacrificial killing, unlike ordinary killing, does not only
create demerit, but alsO can cause merit. But against this it has
been said that this information is already available to us from
the injunction prescribing it and the prohibition that prohibits
all killing. It is in answer to this that the opponent now says
that this difficulty can be solved by accepting these statements
as repititions of the information got from the injunction and the
prohibition. Thus they can come under the heading anuviida.
2. KaUQ.Qabhatta rejects this by pointing out that the device of
calling something an anuviida can be resorted to only when it is
not possible to find any purpose of its own for the statement.
If another purpose can be shown as being served then that is the
meaning to be accepted, and calling it an anuviida. is no longer
possible. Thus, since these statements can serve the purpose of
showiI)g that. sacrificial killing does not cause demerit, they
cannot be called mere repitions .of the information already
gathered from the injunctiQn and the prohibition.
3. The tatprakhyiidhikar.atza section is on




The sentence discussed in this section is

arfl1it;t ~fu'
Now the problem arises as to whether the
word agnihotnri here should be taken t6give the name of the
sacrifice concerned. Otherwise it should be considered a gUlJa, v:idhi, in which case, gIving the name of the deity to whom the
sacrifiCe is 'to be offered. The opponent's view is' that this' sentence gives the name of the deity. The Bmil 'deCision however
is that it cannot be taken as the name, of theqeity, because.there
is another sentence which does furnish the name of the deity to
whom, this particular sacrifioe is to he offered. This sent~nce is
, '"arm~fcr~i:!lrc!1:m: <:'11~
Since, there" is tliis other sentence
which has already given the, name of the deity; the wor'dagm, hotr;a is to be taken, as the ,name of the sacrifice concerned, and
: ,',
, ' , - , ',,not of the deity. "
4. Now .this whole reasoning would be meaningless' if ,,the oppo-nent's view iii this 'present case is tei be adopted by calling the
smrti staternerHs, mere repitions. In that case,agniliotra' does
not have to he taken as the name of the sacrifice, but, Can be
taken asa repititionof the infonnationabout the deity, which
'is already obtained fr()m the sentence agnirjyotilj etc.
, ,, '
[ly. J. 17] c!<:+!I~Fff.r'll q: t(1':IT1'[I'I: ' ![fcr1~nfcr ., a.C! .~'1 <:'-liI~ -~.n'WT
~I:qj "~HL ~'!If.l'CTI"!c!:" "'if<l'Cfi~if' ~'1 'llt(;;r;:p.fl~rrnr I
arC! q:'11=!1l'lC!1 0l11Bif ~BrCllI.I"3T~mRr~ $tI:I ~fcrl 3TCI
q:'1 'CTtr<'1l'C!ii<'1<!t: <iI.hi[l:ir''1m:<t~Hl>fI' :,,-rnJj<t<i1<Fc!~ m'CTir
,..... -,
.~" '~
~C! ~?T"-l" ~<>f<:+!I,t('l5[{Uf'[<l1 0<l~'l'IC!B:. I
, "Therefore the, absence ~f demerit a;~~rs
be as conveyed by
denotation. alone. That is 'why, while ,counting ,the tendemeriis in
the Skandapurana, it is only the, unprescribed kilLing that' IS -mentioned as causing demerit, in the' foliowing sentehce: "and Idlling
which is not prescribed"., That is \Vhy bhagavan Vy~sa has composed theaph9l'ism asuddhamiti oenna, sabdiJ,f;. ; That is why my
revered father 'has explained [this ap)loris'flll, iIi' his, Vitti as follows :
The only way. of finding out what ill dharma arid what is qrJhar'/nja is
,Vedic injun~tion, a,?-d the ?resc~ibed IdlFrig i1'.n:eriti~ne~ ~s r%h,arma ,
[Ill the Veda]. Therefore, It [tile. presenbed kIllmgj IS l)ot adharma.
This is the meaning 'of the aphorism. ,
. ': ',.' " ' 1 ', ._~,1. ",". ' ".. , , ' ,
1. The part of the verse quoted here as coinirig from the SkaridP.
r '.
" is also fouridin Manu. XII.7.
" ,'c:,',




. . _,"




'. '



',"! .. '



\ \



," ., _f







2. The aphorism' h~



father Railgojibha1
able to me.

[IV. J, 18 J

u:<i "~(::T;g:+i1

c!T<'l'i1'-l" '"f


Thus in statement:
etc., it is the property ,
as the criterion for deci(
with ,adharma. Thus
statements, there is ll(
sacrifice when it is pn
1. The part of the '
The verse only me
about taking win.
of the 'general im
understand the m
by the Veda is per
,Veda including th
wise be a cause 01
2. I have accepted th

sense than 'C!1l,~ 'CT.

edition. '
[IV; 1.19]



fq'C!l~;i c!~'1,


. 'l'Sf"W1N <rI


Or let it [causing
taking wine. The ISh:
taking through [smelli
cOrisideratibn'the fact t
tiohof a verysmalleXp



in this section is
, as to whether the
ve the name of the
considered a gu~a
deity to whom the
iew is' that this sen'deCision however
qeity, because ,there
lame of the deity to
d. This sentence
.' .
this other sentence
~ity; the ~Ol'dagni
ifice concerned, and


2. The aphorism has already been explained in my notes on


ngless 'if ,the oppolpted by, calling the

ase, 'agnifiotra' lloes
acrifice, butcilll be
.ut the, deity, which
~otilJ etc.

~9, <::o:r'1l'ilTUfiiI'! tflq'~<f-I1~T'fC[T I

~ ~l' ~fct I aTe!
.. .
-be as conv~yed. by
the tendemefits in
kllUng that i~ inen;ehce: "and killing
in Vy~sa has com. ',That is why my
isvrtti as follows :
Wh~t is adharma is
.ehtionedas dharma

~gj i~ !).Otf r:ulh~rma.


3. KaUl)'Qabhatl;a here mentions a, vrtti on the,Brahrnasutra by his'

father'Railgojibhatta. This vrtti however has not been availc
able to me.



[IV. J. 18]

o;oi "il<::I~~1 &: f;or~l'iT" ~''11~ il<:;fel&:a,'!?!'! "lll~SI;j+lfu'i<'5~

(mq'1l'~ 'C( ogR:'~I'fa
'll+!1;:'la: O;'la <:;:q 'li'R!;or'!i "q;orlO;{
l;ll.:ll-l~l<:;l'li'r !.T"foF'CT: I



Thus in statements such as "dharma was born from the Veda"

etc., it is the property of being prescribed by the Veda that is given
as ,he criterion for deciding the import as to what is dharma or mi'xed
, with ,adharma. Thus taking this as the general meaning of these
statements, there is no impending demerit in taking wine [in the
sacrifice when if is prescribed].
L The part of the verse quoted here is from Manusrorti V.44,
The verse only mentions hi'l!lsii, and' does not mention anything
about taking wine in sacrifices. That is why, consideration
of the 'general import' of the verse is to be .taken in order to
, understand, the meaning that not only just killing prescribed
by the Veda is permissible, but also that anything prescribed by'
Veda including the taking of wine in. the sacrifice cannot like, wise be a cause' of demerit.

2. I have accepted the readings "lir~s"!+fI~'1<o;'t and u:a<::>-f'Ii'l'C(<{'f,'ii'1;:rwr. _.~CI: of the Bombay edition as they make better
sense than .m'ill;jl-TI~~ an d U:'CT<::ii'fi'l'C(<{'fi"q'll"l' of the Benares
', ,
[IV. J.l9]
., .

aT~g ~Cl1:'lmHI~i;o.W;~glqfu~oi:;I" CloT\q:a+ill1'l'CTI~<mcirir~~ ,

foNI~~'CT~<ti;ij'i""~:rcf ~mi'<[ ';~'11lr~;ori1q' :;i-li-=ilfu.
. '[F.f<il'<:lll'i!

~;:i'11 . ~'qcfiRtcll~

~fu~~ l!<ftl~h:flo<!~ I


Or let it ,[causing demerit] be a desired result in the case of

taidng wine . The Bh~gavata verse quoted', aireai:ly prescribes this '
taking through [smelling with] nose and the wise should take into'
consideration' the fact that on the strength of the following prescriptioh of a verY smailexplatoIy rite; there is no difficulty': " [the routine


, - - - - -,




rite of] sondhya performed outside purifies [the demerits caused by

the following prohibited things); a lie, runeln)f wine, experiencing
sex during the day, and [partaking of] the food of an untouChable;' .
1. The verse quoted here is taken from BrParnS[Jl. 6.146.
[IV. J. 20]

q,'~ ;r'iH~9

'I~~1jI~f+r<lf<rl~19N Wlf91lf: I Cl~l '<1 +:rl19CII




RlJfl~B: I 9'9<i

"~H~o/i'l: ~H~'IR~n~: ~!!t<l9li~: ~'<f<o~


'1IQ'fjQl<:fI<5B: I

'fj~lu:. I ~w ~9 'f&<'f~fuI" l[t<llR I

Others, however, [maintain that] there is indeed some .demerit

in killing animals even in a sacrifice. Thus bhagaviin Vyasa has decided by quoting the statement of Pancasikhacarya in the Patafijala
Bhli~ya. This statement is as follows: "Let there be very slight
mixture [of demerit], which however can easily be got rid of, and is
thus to be forgiven. It is not capable of removing the merit [of the
sacrifice]. Why not? Because there is a lot more merit," etc.
1. The quotation taken is from the YogBhli. on the Y.S. II.I3
(CaIcujtta ed., p. 75; Bombay ed., p. 73). This statement is
going to be discussed in the next passage, so that no elaboration
is necessary here, also ct. SaTaKau.p,. 39.
2. The reading .;:n'l,};lS[J;!1<"l{ of the Benares edition is obviously
[IV J.21)

I ~o/iq': <J'f.~: 'lEJ11l:l3'I;;r<'f: llt<l91'f: ~1",'f<9<:f: I 'i:J:

+!~ql3'+'l'fCl1;;Jm~ l[91'l'!!'!Riol ~1~R'r ~;;J I ~Cl'(!!~~
~~'fT ~:<3~'f
WTI~W1I;;r'li<9Tf<tt<lfl:Iii\"flil: I ~~ - 'ifcr I
~q<'i '<1 "CR:!lT?l:tr ~\3!1 S9'i!:" l[fcr ~u:. "~W,'li;l[l"l[fu


' .


Cj~ S~'l'T2T'fj<91u:. I

'1, '<1" 81~:" , l[fcr'f~11l9T'~~T1'f1~liRt9:.

'1" 3l'<d91<r . it~CjT"'fCl1iiIfu-': 'lJt-:f'f1J:1

3F[fflf;jq'i!~ m'fT iiCl'1 'l3'~~i uir'<11~i+:r~io:. I .

The meaning of this [statemen't] is'~s follows :(ft is to be]

construed: 'Let there be a very small mixture -"a demerit resulting
from the killing of: an animal.' Objectiol).:, 48 [there is no inclination] to eating food mixed wtth honey ~nd poison, so there would
[now] be no inclination to [performing] it [an act which results
in sin]. Answer: The suffering [which results from] that [act] ~is
permeated by a larger happiness, so that, like the exertion etc.


------- -_._- - - - - - - -


[involved in any saCI

the act] . It is with '
svalpo,lJ 'very little.'
such acts is known]
is not killing". For
as in anudarii kanya
one, by way of doubl
be stated, on the basi
no sin [is involved] i
[to have] the meani
impossible to restricl
possible [in such w;
1. For a discussior
honey, see [IVJ
Z. For a discussion
a sacrifice, see [
3. The part of the'
[IV, J. 22) 81Cl 1:;91:


r.: lif[<'li<'l

I '1',
,It is for this vel
[by which he means
expiatory rite. [Anc
is not performed, nev
.. 'worthy of
that persons desirous
whicq ne~essaJj,ly: cc; eki[l)~J J:
[Pcmcaikh;;t} . ans,~et
11' <t Sal,'aKau. I?'

[rv.J :23]"

'1'<1 ~~




Nor should one


]erits caused by
le, experiencing
n untouchable".
t . 6.146.

"'1 'l1'1'I([T

Jj]~B: I O(;:r;:i


d some demerit
z Vyasa has den the Rataftjala
be very slight
)t rid of, and is
te merit [of the
erit," etc.
the Y.S. ILl3
lis statement is
; no elaboration

on is obviously

i ;<[1re:,;q;:O(;q: I '13
1 <IS([~~~T3-


:rr~ 1 ~ej~ ~ 1

~~T 31i;:m' ',<i~t\



fTo(T'~'n"r;ql<:Hjlto( ~.

!fB: 1


' .



is to be]
:merit resulting .
'e is no inc! inaso there would
t which results
1] that [act] is
e exertion etc.



[involved in any sacrifice] , it. does not cause [one to turn away from
the act]. It is with tjlis in mind thllt [thetea,cherPaiicaikhasaysj
svalpa1.i'very little.' And the slightness [of the sin I:esultipg from
such acts is known] from the teaching, "Hence, killing at a sacrifice
is not killing". For [l&.ere] the [particle] nan has the meaning 'slight',
as in anudma kanya 'a girl with no (i.e. a small) belly'. Nor should
one, by way of doubting [this view1loint, say the following] : Let it
be stated, on the basis of the same reason [- the same teaching] , that
no sin [is involved] in that [sacrificial killing]; [this] by taking nan
[to have] the meaning 'absence' as in agha~(/IZz 'no pot' .. For it is
impossible to restrict a general prohibition [against killing] if it is
possible [in such way to maintain its effectiveness].
1. For a discussion of the, ellting of food mixed with poison and
honey, see [IV.B.27].
2. For a discussion on how exertion is not a deterent to performing
a sacrifice, see [IV.B.27], Introduction [1-2].
3. The part of the verse quoted is from Manu. '5.39.

[IV J. 22]

80m U;<'!l~ 1 ~qR~~: 1 ~q1'1m m;qf~W! q

'iT'!';q: 1
3!~ ~llr<::([: mm;:r'<i "IRR(i ([.:nft mlmWl: ~l!l1i: 1 ~~

f~ ~~,'f,i!s 9iTir'111T~T<:([.:*l'i<fTfG:i{~:<?fl'f. 1 3!([ 'Il;'lr~ ~~

<:i:tfu 1 ~"'9tff I 9i<:+!I~fu I ~'<R;qfu I ~.05 @,<rTfG: I, ,
,It is for this very reason that [Paficasikhi'l] says suparihara~z
[by which he means] 'capable of being overcome' through a slight
expiatory rite. [And] even if, through oversight, the expiatory rite
is not performed, nevertheless, [says Paficaikha, the sin is] sapratyavamarsd!h 'worthy of .being countenanced'. For it is indeed the case'
that p~r~ns desirous of a: gre~t :result tplerate a small unpleasantness
which necessarily; cccom~anies it,l:Ience[dqes Paiicai~] ,say
kJda{qsy,q ~etc,.:'I~t!) ~i,20J;~' ': [To;';therq1}estion;;Jfo~)y~a;t;[r~?on?', >
W;W~ikhal:an$w,et.t,~Ua:la:1JZ,N~ ~tc. .. ' . ',i;',;I:'',;;
I;. cf.. sa-:ra..Kau.p, 4} . ':,;',:.::" . '~ , . ,,:;:,J": '.. ,;

,(t, . . . . ....

[IV. J. 23f "I"f iW~"''11q'jq~ifi <i~~iT<:irT(<t~ ~~' ~ffi'!!<tl ~q

fl'; llT~fufci 'O(ro<1+I.. 'I ~;;d'i'<T""~I<J:. I ~~."qT'i'm;q~<:'1
~.mO(l:J; HFfl'<l 1
;ql'f<:'1 "'1


([~~l;o(<fu:r <IS<Of9i;;Q"lT<J:. I

Nor should one [object by] saying [the following]:

This is






acceptable if indeed the heaven is greater than the sin which results
from killing [in a sacrifice]. .But. what is the authority for this?
[This objection IS not to be made], since the answer has already been
given [namely, that the statement ~asmiid yajiie vadho'vadhaf;, provides this]. Moreover, from the fact that the expiatory rite for the
sin resulting from the killing of an animal [at a sacrifice] is accomplished with an extremely small expenditure of money and effort,
one infers that the sin to be eliminated by it is also very slight. And,
since the ~acrifice itself is accomplished with great expenditure of
money and effort, one assumes that the heaven which results from
it is [also] great.
flV.J.24 1 3FT \l:'iT:a-i:t"f~Cf,"'fi<'ll'l'-m",,1't s<ft;:itTit~~'Il?J1 n'fIJf1iffl:qT~~lfu:':"!1


~fcrT-:lIJf1R~q'll'ii\cn I

r-. ,......


I a:rCf \l:'f



:--. ...


qf6Cfl{ I ,,'fifSr.'1q,"~l1 <i'fl'!?!1'll'it "!<flfcr I

[In accord with Paficasikha, then the sacrificial killing of animals

does result in sin and suffering]. Hence is justified the stream of
suffering described in the Veda and the Pufifu).as as befalling Indra
etc. anhe hands of Raval!a;' Mahisasura etc., even wheri they were
enjoying the fruits of a hundred Asvamedha sacrifices. The coming
into being. of the fruit of sin produced by' killing etc. in the sacrificf'!,
right in the middle of the enjoyment of the fruit of the sacrifice is
established by [this]. justification, that is why it is said in the remaining part of Paficasikhacarya's Statement that even in heaven,
[he1 will be experiencing a little misfortune.
1. . Becoming Indra, i.e., the king of gods is a fruit to be won by
performing it hundred Asvamedha sacrifices. There are; in the
PUl'8.'I).as, examples of many kings such. as Nahu~a etc. who got
thi~ high position on. thestrehgthof'rfotminga hundred
ASvamedha sacrifices. But' eveIi.,enjoYing" the fruit ofc;these
sacrifices by becoming Indra, did not utterly free thes~ p:Oople
from all troubles.' There were several times when they were
troubled, defeated and even captured by demons such as
and Mahi~sura. According to PaficaSikhaaatya, this trouble
taking place in the midst of the fruit of the sacrifices is to be
explained by the little demerit that they incurred by killir!g
animals Jp. these sacrifices.


[IV J. 2513i<:PTT ~

Alternately, let
pectively from the Sl
Nevertheless, the inc
[that person's] desi
just as [a person] h
.cause he sees a desi
desirable results] .
]. Previously it w:
sacrifice must bi
the demerit prot
. Now it is said 1
ment that, the
still no difficult
particular result
. is desired, there
by the killing a
actions are brol
though he know
because of his d .
deed (d.' f;rfil
there will be su
instigated to pe:
can be obtained
[IV J. 26]

3i<f \l:'f

\l:'1 c"!q

fq~: I

It is for this re
[act involving actm
in the eleventh [bot
on their desires] do
the drinking of liqw



[IV J. 25]

sin which results

uthority for this ?
!r has already been
vadho'vadhal;, proliatory rite for the
acrifice] is accommoney and effort,
very slight. . And, .
~at expenditure of
vhich results from




[Cf1 \[tl1l'<;;;"'1ql'r'f,"'~
. q~fu@:q1~:q;:r~q

I killing of animals
tied the stream of
as befalling Indra
n wheri they were
ices. The coming
:c. in the sacrifice,
of the sacrifice is
is said in the re~ even in heaven,

'uit to be wori*by
There are; in the
b.u~a etc.
otminga hundred'
lii fruit of'; these.
free thes~ p~bpl;
when. they were
IS such as RiivaQ.a
itya, this trouble
, sacrifices i5 to be
curred by killing

Sl1:[. <n ~@(!;:'8"111;[ii'l(n


I cr~:nf[ cr1ctt~10r0ICI:. ~'lf'Wll:J;qq;;rT


Alternately, let the happiness and suffering [which result respectively from the sacrifices and the killing involved in it] be equal.
Nevertheless, the inclination [to perform] is justified on account of .
[that person's] desire for such [fruit which results from'the act] ,
just as [a person] is inclined [to perform] a prohibited [action, be:
.cause he sees a desirable result arising from it in addition to undesirable results] .
]. Previously it was stated that the happiness resulting from' the
sacrifice must be so great that the small suffering resulting from
the demerit produced by sacrificial killing cannot be a deterent.
Now it IS said that, even if it is supposed for the sake of argument that, the happiness and the suffering are equal, there is
still no difficulty in justifying the inclination to act. If that
particular result which could be got from that particular sacrifice
. is desired, there will be inclination in spite of the suffering caused
by the killing of animals involved in that sacrifice. Prohibited
actions are brought in as an example. lust as a person, even
. though he knows that adultery leads to hell, is still .inclined to it
because of his desire for the kind of happiness derived from thiil
deed (cf. f<\f';r~ ~'l~: ~RI~<!T
[IV.B.16] ) knowing that
there will be suffering caused by sacrificial killing, will still be
instigated to perform a saqifice by his desire for heaven which
can be obtained with the aid of a sacrifice.
[IV J. 26]

3TcI q:9 fq~<i[Gf:Wr ~Bl1~'oi ~R~: I grcr 1I:91'fClH'Iil,,)

'1F19~ "<!<r l'!11Jfl1m ~"CI: ~n<n,Cl<n ~1'{T<'!+r.i;:r ~tIT I .

e<!<n<!: ~WIT ;:r ,~ ~ fq~;:r f.!~: .~<!~B." 1[fc! I

3lIml'lo:rH9 ~T~cr~1<'11 <!Fr 1;q<J;:j 91 ~ ;:r g ~fu 1;9~ ;:r

fq~: I i'i;rg ~'1 fq~~~i'l'l ~: I S1Q q:11* 1;9"llmfr fu!%:

<1 ~: I ~:~;;p.f.'<nfc:fu 1119: I SlCl q:~G:;;n;:rm f<\ro:1 I

It is for this reason that the discerning do not accept that thi~
[act involving actual harm] is of the highest kind. Hence it is said
in the eleventh [book] of the Bhiigavata: '[The foolish men bent
on their desires] do not know that their own duty is pure, since [not
the drinking of liquor, but] the smelling of liquor is enjoined; [that]




so also, the iilm.nbhana of an animal [enjoined by scripture] is not

harming; [and that] similarly, cohabitation [is enjoined] for progeny,
not for [mere] pleasure. [The meaning at the base of as
follows] . [These fools] do not know that what is enjoined is
iila71~bhana,' that is, as shown before, either' a sacrificial giving or
mere touching of an animal, not its harming, [and they do not
recognise this as] their dharma.. On the contrary, they believe that
actual harm is enjoined. Hence they do not recognise that their
dharma is a pure one, because [they think it is halming, hence] a
cause of suffering. Thereby, this [verse] is a censure of the ignorant.

belongs to him] , 11;

formed as instigatel
1. If hilllSa is thu
will cause a fal
is given that tI
the sacrifice, an
be considered (
2. The section cal

[IV. J. 27J "~,q~@!q)Sl.1"(!: l;qo'eT[: ~f'B.nR"I: I q~ ~mf.q m'>loerr:

~''1 <m"j;'q ~ '" qI<t.". ~"'~S" jq . UW'<~~ I ~qll~:i f~(r I
3lU'CIT Bmlll,!~qT: I 3jQ 0:'1 %:Wf{T~ "qTli~q'Rl~ff~T:" ~<l
'i1\"'fm, I lol'>lo"lT: I af.!"1 li;:f)~..n +rR!r,:q"f@ lol'iffi!T ~"lA s:m "~'".ll". I



Later on also [the following statement] is justified; those igno

.rant of this, evil [improperly] obstinate, thinking [what they are
doing is] right confidently betray the animals, are eaten by them after
death." Thus [they] do not know [tha,t v,That they are doing] is
impure. [The.word] as,anta/:l [means] engrossed only in enjoying'
[the sense objects]: That is why, [Camasai in answer to the king] I
. ,will say' in. the summation of this, that [these people art!] turned
away from Viasudeva. visrabdhiiZz, it should be noted means con
fident ~hat their desire will be fulfilled by this:
.1. The verse quoted is BhagP. XI.5.14. It immediately follows
yad ghrii'IJabhak~o etc. (XI.5.13).
2. viisudevapariinmukha(/. occurs in. BhagP. XI.5.1S.
[Iv. J. 28J

mei UT~FTT;j~13"r;:i ~'lT~fq I

<l~ q'f(jc>\", 1:nQ"l :'!<;q: J:!,<;~g I

'1FT~, U1W~ 'fiT mI-cr I (j~T 'q 'Ii~N'f.<:.Jr +rzJ<i'fq+i, I

i''-lf ;rFf 'fil:!+!~'l~~: 'Ii<"$lBR ~a:i~<i:. I "I ;PQ1~'! ~!);U~ '1>"'1'q1fu:qRrf~:' I ~fu I

As to [the objection that, in this case] , the sacrifice wili not be

complete, there is this to be said; Let demerit plague the man.
Where is the contradiction to the sacrifice's being complete? Thus
in the kartradhikara1Ja [section1, [Kumarilal bhatta has said,
"whoever, in the midst of a sacrifice, "eats kalanja etc., the [demerit

[IV. J. 29]

l:Ri %,,:

lol~: 'U

Ql;<iT"'f' "

As to [the follo
viidas convey the p
require these [in ore
worthiness] consist~
great.iy undesired re,
worthiness]. There
ot.her way, it is not j
also this" [praisew(
simultaneous applic~
in effect, a person is
able]. It has alreal
of not entailing sO!
by lIN] because [it
act which produces g
for through [the he:
will produce bad r
quite well denote t
without any accoml
act]. Thus the folle
[IV. J. 30]


..... _ . -




'( scripture] is not

lined] for progeny,
base of this is as
lat is enjoined is
acrificial giving or
[and they do not
" they believe that
:cognise that their
halming, hence] a
lre of the ignorant.


belongs to him] , there is no lack in the sacrifice. It has been perfonned as instigated."
1. If hilJZsa is thus. said to cause demerit even in the sacrifice, this
will cause a fault in the sacrifice. To this objection, the answer
is given that the fault lies with the man, Le., the performer of
the sacrifice, and not with the sacrifice. The sacrifice thus should
be considered complete and fulfilLed.
2. The section calledkantmdhikara1}G is on M.S. III.4.4.12-13.
[IV. J. 29]

fcli':r: lITf'i:aol

i't<lll~:i f'f~: I

q1q;:r ~<;q: >!<<;~g I
IN'f,~ot 'l1Z,;!~C!+J:. I
Sf,<l\>;Cl'f ~!1u;q 'l?TT-

icrifice will not be

: plague the man.
complete? Thus
bhatta has said,
etc., the [demerit

CfT ferfClf<rl1Cl'l"I:



<31~tlffi"r I C!?! I <r<,,~Uf


WRI<'Ir"~ lJi~'l"qm"~T:1>:!TPl;:r: I

r~ ~<'l"'~ ~fu ~~:q+r, I

amediately fcHows

3F'l"~RH'l1'11<J:: I

cr;'l"T;:<:j?TT~m(F~Hr: I

r~~'!'Rl'~!l:~lT:" ~Ci

;tified : those ignotg [what they are

:aten by them after
;hey are doing] is
I only in enjoying
lswer to the kingJ_t.
)eople are] turned
noted means con

~ foi~'lqfa:la'fTlIT~<'l"'!ICl'll<<lll>\qTa:l;ri "e[~~+J:. I a"'T.f '1<"'1,,f;'[I2H~frCliqi'i'f I

q~ ~~f.<I f<I~o"lT:

;a I


As to [the following claim]. It is established for all that arthamidas convey the praiseworthiness of sacrificial injunctions, which
require these [in order to instigate one to action]. And. that [praiseworthiness] consists in [the sacrificial act] not being followed by
greatiy undesired results, since nothing else can. [constitute this praiseworthiness]. Therefore; since [that praiseworthines] is got in some.
other way, it is not [assumed] that [iIN which denotes] vidhi denotes
also this' [praiseworthiness). Nor, [consequently], is there any
simultaneous application of an injunction and a prohibition [so that,
in effect, a person is not subject to sin]. That [view is] riot [acceptable) '. It has already been noted [see IV.B.27] that [the property
of not entailing something greatly undesired need not be denoted
by liN] because [its effect namely, the instigation of a person to an
act which produces good results, not bad ones] , is' otherwise accounted
for through [the hearer's] great aversion [to perfonn an act which
wil! produce bad results for him]. Moreover [the affix lIN] can
quite well denote that [an action) quickly produces results, this
without any accompanying praiseworthiness [as a qualifier of the
act}. Thus the followers of Sailkhya and Yoga.
[IV. J. 30]

cr~;:i<!l'{ I ~'lT.f;'j"'l'1 FNClT~~'R!i"HJ:: I ;:r 'if aa: ~

~'f<iq<'l'f.<;q;:i ~+J:. I ~~<!r: ~0(5tfu "CfT1l;:r FNIEf-

'fi"''''lqI4~<! ~ll<mt ll:'li ,,~'f,<'iT'lll1<f1<J::

<IT 'cli'fl<J:: I

I "~'if~t~



This [whole argument about the sin which befalls a person

who performs a sacrifice] is dubious. For, it has been noted that,
from the statements [vadho'vadhaJ). etc., one lmows that] the prohibition [against killing] does not apply [with respect to sacrifices].
Nor is it [really] proper to assume from those [state!l1ents] that
[sin does indeed result from such acts, but that] sin is smalL [Once
one accepts that] , by virtue of the prohibition [such as na hiiJ1syat] ,
sacrificial killing does [result in] sin, [so that such killing is like any
other] , it is impossible to restrict [the prohibition] in respect to that
[sin which is] the same [for any killing]. This by the principle
that, once a. woman has gone out unveiled, it is useless for her to
wear a veil later. For, [now] the restriction [on the prohibition
serves only to mitigate the sin which results from killing, not to.
eliminate it, so that the restriction is itself] partly [subject to]
being invalid.
1, The statements quoted previously say, according to KaUl)Qabhatta, that the prohibition does not operate in the case of the
sacrificial killing prescribed by the Veda. Now the opponents
say that these same statements can be construed to mean that
the demerit incurred by sacrificial killing is relatively smaller
than the killing not prescribed by .the Veda.. KaUJ:.l9.abhatta
rejects this by taking recourse to one of the principles drawn
from day to day life.. A woman, once ;;he has gone out in a
public place without adequately covering herself, need not trouble
covering herself the next time she goes out.. Thus what is the
use of restricting ~he scope of the prohibition only in so far as
the quantity of the demerit incurred from the sanctioned and
unsanctioned killing is concerned? One might as well go all the
way and say that the prohibition does not operate in the case
of the sacrificial killing.
[IV. J. 3 J]



If'4OJ'l'a: ~!fflT"i:['i<<i ~futll~'l<'If+Iit<'f'<ih,n~<i

m''lm<'l"l!i: I (1'4T 'if f.riSt"i:[P-li!>
~f.r!i!;;J'i9i<'l~ I
MN<.IT 'if ClT~Tf.rm;;J'i9i~1rfu feRTm;;[ MfW~ f.riSt"i:[: I['f<RrS:fu
;:r ,,1j'rful!!1tc ~.,.o:r;'r '1T'f;;J;:r'f;lHfu I o;:>t.,,,t1i!> 'il!i!ffi"i:['1<Ef~fcr
~l~'li<lT{'lTrorn.., Mq$n"i:[ ~a- Ef?:Rr I

Some, taking recourse to this same explanation, the


denotation of an injun
along with the propert
absolutely unavoidable.
denoted [by IIIV] : the r
feasibility, and the actl
along with the propert
unavoidable]. Thus, il
of generating an undesi
properties n1entioned al
junction, the property
undesired goal [is signi
does not operate in the
the sacrifice of an anim
In the case of the sye
being means to a desir
rehited to [the act, not
without causing stifferi
meaning of the injunct
1. syena is a sacrifi(
is to achieve the
. sacrifice does ach
former is hell. ~
causing undue sui

2. I have accepted t:
rather than grrr'!'1

3. I have accepted t
of the Bombay (
of the Benares ec
[IV. J. 32]



<'!lq~: I
'>\111 ij:{r.'l'i

1l;<TBf ~'I~



befalls a person
noted that,
liS that] the prohi;pect to sacrifices].
[statePlents] that
in is small. [Once
,ch as na hit}'lsyiit] ,
1 killing is like any
in respect to that
s by the principle
useless for her to
)n the prohibition
Dm killing, not to
Irtly [subject to]


'rding to Kaundain the case of' the

Jow the opponents
rued to mean that
relatively smaller
a. Kalmdabhatta

las gone out in a

If, need not trouble
Thus what is the
I only in so far as
le sanctioned and
t as well go alf'~he
perate in the case


~frr1?!'5Irf'-li<'!~a t
iWa f.ii!l'<i: Wlacr ~Rr

denotation of an injunction, llie production of the desired results

along with the property of not generating more suffering than is
absolutely unavoidable. Thus they say that the following three are
denoted [by lIN] : the property of being the means to a desired thing,
feasibility, and the actual generation of the desired object etc. [Le.,
along with the property of not generating more suffering than is
unavoidable]. Thus, in the case of a prohibition, it is the property
of generating an undesired thing like that [accompanied by the two
properties mentioned above], that is signified, and in the case of injunction, the property of not being the producer of that kind of
undesired goal [is signified]. Because of this conflict, a prohibition
does not operate in the case of a positively enjoined act. That is why
the sacrifice of an animal in the Jyoti~oma is not a cause of demerit.
In the case of the syena [sacrifice, however] , . only the property. of .
being means to a desired end and the property of being feasible are
rel1tted to [the act, not the property of producing the desired object
without causing suffering].1'hus there is no contradiction of the
meaning of the injunction.
1. syena is a sacrifice to be performed in one day. The object
. is to achieve the death of orie's enemy. Even though syena
sacrifice dOes achieve this desired fiuit, its resuit for the per~
former is hell. Thus it does not fulfill the condition of not
causing undue suffering.

principie~ dra~n




2. I have accepted the reading 5[~qq~<rT of the Bombay edition

rather than 8f<{;q;;n:,!qq~'IT of the Benares edition.
3. I have accepted the reading
of the Bombay edition. The reading
<{F(!{t<r9i~:'.~{lM;v.<,!~ .
of the Benares edition is meaningless in the context.



Il;tl~ ~lR!ll;jrf<'!t,Rt-

)n, include in the

[IV. J. 32]

8f~, RF<'-<'ll rfl"(R'i;v.,C/l.O'I ~cf"'<'Il<J:. 9ioi (!;;v'f'-!~I ~~<{9i.

'5I"'l<'1 (!"[l;;<r~fQ ~;;rl .n;:r~~'11~f!9i";;(;:<r~l.O,-! <IF<lD<r9i. ,qiq~: I ~Q'Ilr.<r<r (!~Rt ~;;r I ~ 9ilfW-ti<i~f;:<l'lf<;le;'i

~+!llt,r.'-!<lF'Q<l'-l"9i<'!T'l~r;l~>-1'!l1;j 11: I '1~ ~~, (!;D'f(!<::N: I

~~'{'lf<l~ (!~Rr ~ I 11:<11;'1 ~'l~q~'R!'~<{ f<I~'I't<'!I<lt'll<J:. ,
11:CIB1" 5!C/<l9i~ :q'-!~fil,<!c<r'll'llf!f!l~~ F'fjr,,'il~'5I<{~ !:I'l'il:f]qffi: I
d<::l;\f(!<I<[OlC/~f<Iq'l~: <m'5l<l9i <'!fl1lTI<q'<i1<'-!<:'!l>-1
~. ~;;r ,






"f.<'i'r~ sfrt
tf'i'l1'( fEi,:q~fi';qlil<n~inq~: I B'IiOl~qflq'1'f;~:~n"l~<i "'f ;:r
'<'1Tmmi:l sqlrq for<,,'<l<nlil: ,,'11'( I ~"I1~1'1~?~n"lit'lli ~I~i'i'li'i'i_

~ftr ~;;r I '<'1fr1m[+niq:l3<;'11fit ~<l~~"I1<l1'1,~;:r f<1"".~

"fTIiITq~: I <Tl;'IlT"I<T'Ili eI'i'lmm - ~~ I " '<'!ReI[ ;:r '!'t(f '"
"~ui'l <T ~?[<r~l;it'!T'l:."~<"IR~"-1"'Ilo:rr,,?[mRqIilTTfqfum&:
'1~~lfl'(l "<T 'Il0l'rl=(' ~'1.f[~~ ;:r\'lil"l~'Ii''1jl'[I'I'I'r liI'lic'ltf.l'[~ sfq (fl'[~~ ~~ph;it~ (f~l'[j<rftf.l'[~<T '~rNQT~'liQltN: I

Concerning this view, -the following is to be considered. It is

difficult to explain what constitutes being unavoidable. How, then,
can this [be consideredJa 'denoted [meaning of lIf,r]? [The idIow_ ing suggestions are -made to explain precisely what constitutes being
unavoidable; (a) [That hardship] is said to be unavoidable which
results from- [the same action as] produces what is desired. [if one
wishes to kill a btiihmr11t}a, his death is a desired result. It follows,
then that] the hell which results from killing a briihmmJa is, [though
not desirably] an unavoidable [hardship] . [Hence] this is unacceptable. (b) [That hardship is unavoidable] which oCCUl:S only where
or :when a desired result occUrs (lit. which is pervaded by the desired
result). This is [also unacceptable]. If [that hardship is unavoidable which occurs only] at the time [that the desired results are got] ;
then it follows that then even those exertions necessary to perform a
sacrifice are not to be considered unavoidable. Hence the meaning
of an injunction [namely instigating one to perform such sacrificial
acts] is contradicted. [And if that hardship is unavoidable which
occurs only] on the place [where the -desired resul ts are achieved],
the same fault [applies, for, the place of the ultimate desired result is
heaven] . (c) [That hardship is unavoidable] which precedes the
desired results, this [too] is unacceptable. [The knowledge which
directly prompts one to activity is the knowledge that the act is a
means to a desired result]. The present [actions which lead to un'lvoidable hardships are not so, hence] serve no purpose in one's
volition. Hence, this is not properly a meaning of an injunction.
And [if one assumes that] this does prompt one to action, it will
follow that a person will be prompted to perform an act which can be
'lccomplished only with a great expenditure of money and effort but
which yields only a minute desired result. - -[And this is not accept-


able]. (d) [When'

we mean [that the ;0
not produce a hards]
at the time [it is pel
eating of kalanja al1
some man or other SI
the object of intense
junction [lIa kaZafijaJ
over, even the Jyoti~
a hardship, which is
meaning of the injU!
refuted. (e) [When
hardship] the essenti
a -distinct kind of ha
ship produced by [s;
way or other, distinc
futation of the mean
unavoidable] which (
[Consider] prohibitio
not eat if one has fev,

has an eye dlsease-.
unjustified. In a pn
sure, possible [to say
of not producing hel
immediately discernil
tions, as are stated in
purpose, so that it is I
{of- the property of
view] ; the meaning {
1. for (f), d. sabc
fIV. J. 33[


s:fcr Wi.!",



Actually, even i



'ii<O~l1a:r1t SJq

F1'f;~:@I;;{~<<i '<f <r

i"!~:@T;;j<r'fl,<i (T~"'fllii



" ;;<!Rei'r <r ':!~'T<f '"

',"Ilmf;tlifr:r<q R1ct I~_

'1il;;j., 'jii''11111 '1ifl C['f,i''1:r~ "~rN<ll~'f.(Tl~: I

considered. It is
dable. How, then,
fN] ? [The IvllowIt constitutes' being
unavoidable ",hich
is desired. [if one
result. It follows,
ihmmJa is, [though
e] this is unacceptoccurs only where
.lded by the desired
llxlship is unavoided results ar~' "O'ot] ,
,sary to perform a
rence the meaning
! rm such sacrificial
f., mavoidable which
,; Iits are achieved] ,;~k
tle desired result is
'hichprecedes the
knowledge which
that the act is a
which lead to unpurpose in one's
of an injunction.
to action, it will
act which can be
ley and effort but
;his is not accept!



able]. (d) [When we speak of] the production of desired resUlt,

we mean [that the act' produces what is desired and. that] it does
not produce a hardship which is the object of an intense aversion
at the time [it is performed]. This too is unacceptable. For, the
eating of kalafija also possesses the property of not producing in
some man or other such [a temporally specified] hardship which is
the object of intense aversion, so that the meaning of a negative injnnction [na kaMfijattl bhak~ayet] wou1d be [here] refuted, Moreover, even the Jyoti~toma sacrifice. is not such as does not produce
a hardship, which is the object of any aversion at all, so that the
meaning of the injunction [jyotifomena yajeta] would [here] he
refuted. (e) [When we spea.1( of an act which produces unavoidable
hardship] the essential meaning is [that the act] does not produce
a distinct kind of hardship. This too is unCl-cceptable. The hard- .
ship produced by ,[sacrifices] such as the Jyoti;;toma are, in some
way or other, distinct ,ones, so that [this view] results in the reo
futation of the meaning of an injunction, (f) [That hardship is
unavoidable] which does not lead to helL This too is unacceptable.
[Consider] prohibition [stated in] medical texts, such as "One should
not eat if one has fever", "One should not approach a woman, if one
has an eye disease." In the present view, these prohibitions are
unjustified, In a prohibition such -as na kalanja1l1 etc., it is, to be
sure, possible [to say] that nan conveys the absence of the property
of not producing hell [i.e., it does lead to hell] . [For there is no
immediately discernible purpose herel. (However], such [prohibitions, as are stated in medical texts] do have immediately discernible
purpose, so that it is not possible [here for nan to convey] the absence
[of'the property of not leading to hell]. Hence, [in the present
view] , the meaning of (these prohibitions] will be refuted,
1. for (f), cf, sabdasaPra, p, 147.

nV. J. 33(

Cf~g;>;(Tg; ~i.t;r (T"T >:i'r\f.lS'Jq "IFf ;r cr~l ~tSf: <! Q;'I ll'laa;rp:r
~fct f<!~wn~f'i:<f'll~q<i f.p;1:f,i7.+( I ;:r ~<i ;;;'-llfctffillF:ft <mi~{1I
;;j;:'lQl'n'l''lT fu!!l;:rltlll~'l'lq'~mT1D<:Ilfl'l' ~it,q'<il<1fT~T o:rf'i:<I:
'Il~r."I(T ~fct 'IT'Oll+( I mIlfT~~(p1i[Tr.mmlif~sfcr m[<T+l<fetoftlliro-





ll~~qq~~~lifTqq(rii(T''1m: I

Actually, even if the Vedic [utterances] signify that, only he



who does not have such an aversion is inclined to act, .not any other.
Thus it is fruitless to imagine that kind of denotative function for
injunction. [Objection]: Since there is the difficulty that there will
be the demerit caused by killing animals in Jy~toma etc., the leaders
of wciety would not be inclined to perform it. It is in order to
avoid this difficulty that we assuine a denotative function for the
generation of the desired goal etc. [without causing any suffering
that is not absolutely unavoidable]. [Answer]: This should not
be said. It has been described many times that even the inclination
of the great is justified in actions such as satz, committing ritual suicide
in the confluence of the three rivers, and in the Sarvasvara sacrifice,
of which giving the oblation of oneself is one of the parts~ Although
[these] cause such a tremendously undesired thing as death, [there
is inclination] because of- the intense desire for the fruit.
1. tatha bodhane'pi. If ;:r..a~:>.:f.!;~:~:;nN'f,~?~IHi;:r'f,'9~
is denoted by a Vedic injunction.
2. This is the same argument as was PUt forward in [IV.B.29j.
3. .On Sarvasvarayajiia, see M.S., X.2.23.
[IV. J. 34]

[V. I]

05Ts~hlli'[ I ITT
"05T~ 'q" ~i

[Now the author

[with the words], 'rec
wish are included, or
as4i liiz!otau 'lIN and
wish [is to be denoted.
after a verbal root whe
are to be denoted] .;
1. The PalJ.iriian rule

1~ :if</lifq';:r f.1'~I;j~mp:r: I ~it.n~ffiq~~;m"JI'Fl<9-

. ~mlJl'':'1i'llll-srorT'i!il;nftt .f<iNWl~~fl':!'~: I ~'i!~t ~l(~'f,

~'1T'i!~g f.Iit"l~'1 ".;{~'I1J!'[~'Il"llomN'f,
f~l1Iol{~ I

~?11~ ~11:r~

What is more, even in this way, one cannot obtain the relaxation
of the prohibition. As in the case of the syena sacrifice, it is possible
to justify the operating of the injunction by means of [the assump
tion that here the optative ending] denotes merely the property of
being the means to a desired end, and feasibility; This in accord with
the prohibition .. The contradiction of a part of the [negative] in
junction in the case of the prescribed killing is not much compared
to the contradiction by which the prohibition would not take effect
at all. These things should be taken into consideration by the
1. This is the final refutation of the view put forward in [IV.J,31].

~-- .. ~


act, ,not any other.

)tative function for
:ulty that there will
Ima etc., the leaders
It is in order to
Te function for the
Ising any suffering
: This should not
,ven the inclination
litting ritual suicide
;arvasvara sacrifice,
le parts. Although
n.g as death, [there
, the fruit".

(V. 1 1

oli~~+n([ I Q"pf;')fu I s:nfG:<!l fij"'1T'alf.iT1Sf1 'llll"~ "3ilf~1fr" ~<'lril"

"olic; 'i:{" ~ffi ~?{l"'1t ~qf[1=!1('( I

[Now the author of the klirikiis] states the meaning of lOr,
[with the words], 'request' etc. By the word 'etc: injunction and
wish are included, on the strength of the two [Pal).inian] rules.
iiS4i li1i!o!au 'lIN and lOr [are introduced after a verbal root when]
wish [is to be denoted]', and lot ca 'lOT [is] also [to be introduced
aft'er a verbal root when the meanings vidhi etc. given in P. III.3.161
are to be denoted]:
1. The Pfu;liriian rules concerned are P. III.3.173 and P. III.3.162.

lrd in [IV.B.29].
ffi~ "efl3f'r~;pz1iIT~;rCcf- '"

~~~<!t ~~<!~if.
lR!if. ~rlfG: ~~-

btain the relaxation

crifice, it is possible
ns of [the assump
,ly the property of
This in accord with
the [negative] in
lot much compared
,uld not take effect
lsideration by the
rward in [IV.J.31].'





. .




_._._._._._ ..- .._ - - - - - - - - -





[VI. 3]

<!:1~'f.i':1lf fucn+!~+nil: I il:'l:fT 'I..a Q-<':fJTl<::l =q W1+n~ <!'S'1<::<!: I

f;fi<!TRrq'Ql =q 'I..~ .nfqf.l W;~ l;'lCI: \I 'I ~ II



[Now the author] states the meaning of [the I-members] marked

with N, in the order-IAN etc. :
iAN etc., have been taught respectively in the following senses:
[when an action is referred toJ past [starting with] yesterday; [when].
an instigation etc., [is to be denoted]; [when an action is referred to]
past in general. Il).N [is introduced] in the case where [two actions
are related as cause and effect, butJ an action does not [actually]
come about; both when [the actions are referred to] past and [to the]
future. II 23 / / (2) .
1. la1iiidaya~z: IAN, IFN, and IUN are meant. Thus IAN denotes
the past that happened yesteday. lIN means instigation, and
-IUJiJ expresses past in general. ll.'l:fT 'llCl

[VI. 2]

m- I 3Fr?jc!~ 'llCl ;<!~: I "3T;rocr~ ~"~ ~o:. I

The meaning of past yesterday is: the past not inclusive of

today, [Le., the day previous to the one in which the user of the form
is situated]. This on the strength of the rule anadywtane Ian.
1. anadyatane Zan. P. III.2.111.


Exclusive of today





[Now the atith6r]

'in the sense of instig,
rule vidhinimantrana
taught by [the rul~J,
1. vidhinimantraniim
P. III.3.161 a~d I
2. Since a whole lor
heading lET, to d
to elaborate here. .
[VI. 4]

~'-T!jlil: I ~
"31~" ~~T

R'ilf'iffm'ff fq"
[Now the author]
'in the sense of past in ,
occurs under the head
'became, happened'. R
being the counterpositi'
And this is in no way
so that, even when a I
pot came into being'.
1. The property of 1
absence existing nc
which is the locus '



by anac.ti6n whit
ab~end~ existiI1gin

, .I


~~:$tt< t:.'-~

]VI. 1]

r-, .

. l",;S;oq;:nil: I


Thus the definition avoids the fault of overapplication;

~ts~o:.' c(jJilbe
which is the (ocus (
It is the action of!
[VI. 51


~~: L <!'
w;f%i'! '1l"l:



[V 1. 3]

~~ II (~)

members] marked
following senses :
yesterday; [when].
tion is referred' to]
/{here [two actions
oes not [actually]
past and [to the]
Thus IAN denotes
1S instigation, and
.lit ~"~ ~'I1<J:. I

not inclusive' of
he user of the form'
ldytAtane Zan.

live of today



'. f:le~ /lTl[ I iRUfIG:lf,jfuIRlf'fl~lP'I&tfa ~1<J:. I anfG:<lT "snfuN

re~iiil "~fa ferr1<r 8lT~n~'l1 'll['l.l'a I

. [Now the auth~i'] states the meaning of lIN, [with the words]'
'in the sense of instigation etC:, on the strength of the [Pa1,linian]
rule vidhinimantra:::za . .. etc. By the word 'etc.', the meaning 'wish'
taught by [the rule]' aS4z [inlotau is also included.
1. vidhinimantra~ziimantraniidhi~aSa1!lpras.napriithamu liM
P. III.3.161 and P. III.3.173.
2. Since a whole long section has already been spent, under the
heading lET, to discuss the meaning of lIIV, it is not necessary
to elaborate here.
[VI. 4]

~'~!1Tl[ I ~l~ "fa I "~.' "i<iN'lil"t "~" ~ ~'fl<I:. I 'l'll

""l~" ~i1lT~ I 8l'f fer'-f!H~'~1Tfu<i'rm,<t 'li,q<'1+!. I Q~ jij;'lTl1T.
R"1f~mfa f<Rr!1Titsfi't ~ ""IZTS1i<I:." ~fu IT'lT'IT: I

[Now the author] states the meaning of IUd'\[, [with the words]
'in the sense of past in general', on the strength of the rule lwi, which
occurs under the heading bhute. For example, [the form] abhut
. 'became, happened'. Here. [by] pastneBs' [is meant] the property of
being the counterpositive of consequent absence at the present time.
And. this is in no way incOJ;npatible. with the action .lin question],
so that, even when a pot actually exists, one says [correctly] 'the
pot came into being'.
1. The property of being the counterpositive of the consequent
absence existing now, has to belong. to action, and not to that
which is the locus of that action. Thus what is really meant is'
qr111~~.re1Tfci';i'rm~<mfflImir ~''f+!.1 Pastness is characterised'
by an action which is the countetpOsitive of the' conseq)rent .'
. ab2ence existing in the present. '){i$' due <to.t~is thaI Uie usage ....
can he calIedcorrect,eyen.whenthepot in; Cjllest ion,
which is the locus of'the action of becoining'kstill
existence. .
It is the action of becoming which is past.... '


[VI. 5 1

W;:&"{l1'Tl[ I <f,1:llf4"'n~~T I ."La +nf<j~lfu I ~ll:~ll:l1<p:rT'ITre:~~<? .

~~: I <r~ "i all:~iF1?J1t ~'1T 8lRt~1 'l+'llilr!T'lT
I?:f#ff +nCf: I



. [Now the author] states the meaning of llJ!=l, [with the words]
'when there is' etc. [The words] 'in the past and also in the future'
are to be understood qS 'in the instances where there is the relationship of cause and effect etc: Thus, the import is that in the instances
where there is the relationship of cause and effect and it is understood that the action does not take place, llJN is to be [introduced].
1. The Pal).inian rules in question are as follow: ~~f;rrn'if ~
P. IlL3.I3S, and ~Q;~Q;+!(llffl~,
P. IlL3.I56.

[VII. I]

<!;:~oi ~>.Ti'i~
CItfu ~'${ I '

Now, why so mll,

meanings are also see!
[can it be claimed] : tl
ings. We can reverse
cative function] ,as wi
1. A new topic starts
It has been point
we can see that tl
.etc., only in the
For example, P.T
6f past not witnes
this text, this ,
such example is
as a)1 exception .
is asked, why thE
. presentness etc., '
2. ' A tentative anSWl
the meanings gi'
suffixes, whereas
by the use of inc
as just the rever




[VII. 2 I

~~ oo~f
<l Q; OJ"fu;qR



fu211'f I Ii<'[The objection's'

that all '[words denot
their correctness in. c
not ,limit the .denota
Thus [for :whatever!1


(J~, [with the words]
.nd also in the future'
: there is the relations that in the instances
ffect and it is underis to be [introduced].
.ow: f<o~'Rrn~


[VII. 1]

;r"~oi 9i~l'rG'~"!l ~ l~m-: I . grilT"aUlTfl"fq <.\~;rl<r. l05aJlTfl

~ ~" I . ~qn<>;(l~: I q~>;("I"Ri<iir<ll;>;(1S11:11111'l1~fij ~ 1

Now, why so much insistence on these meanings only? Other'

meanings are also seen [to have been hlid down in grammar]. Nor
[can it be claimed] that there is indicative function for these meanings. We can reverse this argument. There will also be no [indicative function] .as will be expiained later. [This argument IS]. not
. [acceptable].
1. . A new topic starts here concerning the meanings of all the lakaras .
. It has been pointed out that if we. look at the rules in grammar,
we can see that they do not limit themselves to introducing lAT
etc., only in the meanings specified so far, [Rresentness etc.].
For example, P.III.2.llS /at sme prescribes IAT in the meaning'
6f past not witnessed by the speaker.. AcCording to the discussion
.in this text, this ,vill be exclusively the. domain of lIT. Another
such example is sme lot P. 111.3.165, which. intr~duces 101'
as an exception to) the domain of lff.T etc. 'Thus the question
is asked, why then so much' insistence on the specific meanings _
. presentness etc., so far discussed in this text? .
2.. A tentative answer has been offered. Perhaps it can be said that
the meanings given so far are the denoted meanings of these
suffixes, whereas the meanings ether than these can be obtained
.. by the
of indicative function. This is immediately rejected,
as just the reverse could also be claimed.


[VII. 2]

<:f~ <:f'lM ~<1:[~~'fl1trl<r. I . <l'<!<::ii!l <:f1~<91~>;(llfIi o1:[l~un:r. I

;r 11 OJfuiqR'O~'!irnfij 'l'!;<fc\ I <lill 'Cfl'41"<l't lj'~?!OJllj'~ m~<'l
m!!l'r'l I ~ ~~>R:U;r;:rl"1+!. I

[The objection stated above. is not acceptable] because we accept

that all [words denoteJallthe inem;lings.Grammar on,lyJells about
their correctness in certain meanings...As will be said later,. it does
not limit the. denotative function . [alreadyexisti,ng in the wot;dsl .
Thus [for :whatever rother .meaning] a grammatical statelllent"exists,




it is desirable that that other meaning be correct. [The meanings

given in] the text here are just to point out the general direction.
1. The maxim same sarviirtkaviicakiilJ 'All words denote all the
meanings', occurs in Vacaspatimisra's commentary on the Yogasutra. (y.s. 1.27, p. 33). It has also been quoted by NageSa
while rejecting the existence. or necessity of the indicative function; . (P.L.M., p. 62):
2. The view that grammar just points out the correctness of a word
in a particular meaning,' but does not create a word to denote a
specific meaning, is also found in the first iihnika ofthe BhiiWa.
There it is said that people go to a potmaker, and ask him to
make a pot for them to use, but nobody ever goes to a grammarian and asks him to make a word to be used in language.
(M.B. vol. I, p. 7). Words and the meanings in which they
are used are known from the usage of the people .. All that
grammar does is to present the correct usage.
[ VII. 3 1 ..,~ 1fiIf~f 1<r"'~!!'l'lT?! '9 ",~1'iTq I Jtfu~lTf..,~'!t <I~'1l<J: I
qi: ''1TTtfij~m ~f'I'f.+[111t<Flil~fl:r<;'RIT <I"3[ <I"Sf "'e:rIlTT '"
"'1!3<q<Jllll~Rr <I"Sf <I"3[ l;~7.1~.+f: I </1?;<Jij '9lM'li ~<!~f<Tuj~
.. ~r"'lm[lnf;fq~fu I .

If [the maXim] 'An [words denote] all the meanings' is not

accepted, then there will have to be [recourse to] the indicative.

function. The decision [as to which one is the denoted and which one
is the indicated meaning] will be based on whether the meaning is
wellknown or not so we1lknown. However, the indicative function
used by the Naiyayikas and the Mima:rpsakas does not lend correctness [to a meaning] as it goes against the grammatical rules. We
will make this clear in everyplace where that [use of the indicative
function by the Naiyayikas and the MimaI!1sakas] occurs. More
[about this] will be said in the section on the meanings of the sUP
endings. So enough of too much elaboration here.
1. In the absence of the maxim that all words denote all the meanings, resourse has to be taken to the indicative function. The
previous objection that this argument can be reversed, and what
you say are the denoted meanings can be called to be the indicated meanings, and vice versa, is here answered by saying that
the decision as to which is the denoted and which is the indi-

cated meaning will

particular meaning
[VII. 4 ]




The determinant 0
discussed) is the order
sakas refer to lET alon
1. If the I-members I
Fan.ini gives them
follows: UT . (F
(P. III.3.l3), IU'!
justified on the ba~
the I-members witl:
order has been dete
I (lIT), U (IUT),
accepted order. Tl
'the fifth l-membeI
there is no confus
II ~>.

Here ends the con

in the Vaiyakara1).abh\i


The text. at the I

taking into considerat
as well as the variant:



ct. [The meanings

general direction.
ords denote all the
mtary on the YogaI quoted by NageSa
the indicative funcxrectness of a word
a word to denote a
nika of the Bha;;ya.
:er, and ask him to
rer goes to a grame used in language.
lingS in which they
~ people. All that

:'li>rf~~<IT qr~<I:. I
1 q"{ q;r 05fSuTT OJ
i'!~ '"l1N'li ~<[~RuTi't




cated meaning will depend on the relative wellknownness of that

particular meaning.
[VII. 4]

t;(\G{T Sfi+!R'l'+!"'Ii~:1<[;:'il'fi+! t;'1.1

sm u:'I "q-s:qti) 05'1iH::"

~~OJ .

l'l1+!T~~1W~ t;'1 Q<{'1fu;<:[~ I(fcr I

The determinant of the order [in whichJthese [l'members are

discussed] is the order of their markers. That is why the Mirriliirp.'
sakas refer to lET alone with the words 'the fifth I-member'.
1. If the I-members had been taken in the same order in which
Pan,ini gives them, the order would have been something as
follows: aT (P. III.2.115) , [AT (P. 111.2.123), llJT.
(P. III.3.13), IUT (P. I1I.3.15) etc. The order used here is
justified on. the basis .of the order of the markers. Thus first all
the I-members with the marker T are given. Among them, the
order has been determined by the vowel marker. Thus A (lATJ,
. I (lIT), U (IUT), lJ (llJT), E (lET) etc. This is the generally
accepted order. That is why the Mimfup.sakas also use the words
'the fifth I-member', and it is always taken to mean lET, and
there is no confusion.
. II '1(fcr~"t~<:[T'f,~U['LG(1it 059iH'~uT<r: II

.e meanings' is not

i. toJ the indicative

Here ends the conclusion about the meanings of the .l-members

in the Vaiyakar:otI}abh'i1~a.

loted and which one

:her the meaning is
indicative function'"
i. es not lend correct ..;~,
.I!llatica! rules. We .
:se of the indicative
:asl occurs. More
eanings of the sUP

ienote all the mean

live function. The
reversed, and what
lied to be the indi!red by saying that
which is the indi-

The text. at the Lakararthanil1).aya printed here is' constituted

taking into consideration both the Benares and Bombay editions
as well as the variant readings given therein.



Advaitadipik,a - by Nrsimhasrama, with a commentQry by Naraya\1asrama, ed; Madanmohan Pathak andG. S. Nene, Reprint
from Pandit, Varanasi, 1919.
A.loka - by ]ayadevamisra, see TattcaCin.
Anuvyakhyana - by A.nandatirtha on B.S., ed. not indicated,
M. V. Shingare, Poona, no date. [AnuVya.]
A.pastamba Dharmasiitra - ed. Umesa Candra Pandeya, Kashi
Sanskrit Series 93, Varanasi, 1969. [A.paDhS.]
A.pastamba Srautasiltra - ed. Chinnasvami Shastri, Gaekwad's
Oriental Series 121, Baroda, 1955. [ApaSS.J
Arthasarp.graha -' by Laug;ak~ibhaskara, ed. Shivaram Mahadeo
Paranjape, with translation and commentary in Marathi,
Nirnayasagar Press; Bombay, 1927. [ArthaSaJl1.j',
A$tadhyaylsiitrapatha - by P2l).ini, ed. Narayana Rama Acarya,
Nirnayasagar Press, 'Bombay, 1954.' [P.]
AvaLayana Srautasiitra - ed. Mangaladeva Sastri, 'The Princess of
Wales Sarasvatibhavan Text Series 74, Varanasi, 193855.
Balamanorama -'by Vasudeva DIk9ita on S.K., edd. Giridharasarma
Caturveda and Paramesvarananda Sarma, Motilal Benarsidas,
4 vols., Delhi, 1958. [BalMa.]
BmgavatapureI;ta - ed. not indicated, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay,
1950. [BMgP.]
BhagavadgIta - [BhagGL]
BMmati - ' by Vacaspatimlsra on S.B., ed. Artantakrsna Sastri
Nlrnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1938. [BMm.]
Bhskarodaya -.' by Laiq;nii:ilrsirnha Siistri onT.S,ed. MukUndJha
- Nirnayasagar Pniss, Bombiry, 1933. tBha~k.Y "'.',




. ' .,','

. . -,


Bhattacintlim1m).i - by
khamba Sanskri'
,Bmttad[pika - byKJ
and Vasudeo
Ll-lII.3], Nirm
Bhlittadipika - by I
Sastri, 4 vols:; l\t
1952-57. [Bhatt:
Brahmasiitra - by I
Bhiimati. lB.S.]
. -'
, Tattvadipikaby
Bharata Madhv:
Brhatparasarasmr. ti

- by Hariva
, and the commen
, Adarsa GranthaJ
Didhiti - by Raghiih;
skrit Seri es 197(
Gadiidhari - by Gad(
Sanskrit Series",
Hiranyak~~i Satya~\lh

aiJd Shankarsast:
190732. [HiraJ;l:
J agadisi - ori Didhiti,
. [Jag.]
JaiininiyanyayamaIa '~
Sanskrit Series 1

Kalpatamparimala -'
see ,Bhamati. II
Kiirikavali with MukU



mmentClry by,NaraG. S. Nene, Reprint

ed. not indicated,


ra Pandeya, Kashi
Shastri, Gaekwad's

;hivaram Mahadeo
in Marathi,
'ana Rama, Acarya,

tri, The Princess of

Varahasi, 1938-55, - by Giagabhatta, ed.' Suryanarayan Sukla, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, reprint 25 ,and 27, Varanasi, 1933.
, Bhl:it~ad'ipika - by Kh~9.adeva on M.S., edd. Anantakrsna Sai;tri
and' Vasudeo Laksmanshastri Panshikar, [from M.S.,
I.l-lII.31, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1921. [BhattaDi.]
Bhiittadipikii - by Kh~9adeva on MS., ed. S" Subrahmanya
Sastri, 4 vols., Madras University Sanskrit Series 19, Madras,
1952-57. [BhiittaD'i.j
Brahmasutra - by 'BadarayaI).a, with four commentaries, see
Bhiimat'i. [B.S.]
Brahmasiitrabhii9ya - by Aanandatirtha, ,with the commentary
, Tattvaliipikaby Trivikrama Pmy;lifa, ed. not indicated, Akhiia
Bharata Madhva Hahamandala, Udupi, 1958.
Bombay Sanskrit' Series 1893-1919
DarpaI)a - by Harivallabha Siistri on V.B.S., with text of V.B.S.,
, and the cominentary Prabhii by Balkrsna Pancoli on V.B.S.,
, Adarsa Granthamala 2, Varanasi, 1947. [Darp.]
Dldhiti - by Raghtinatha siroma1).i on TattvaCin, Chowkha Sanskrit Series 1970.
Gadadhari - by Gaddhara Bha\taciirya on DIdhiti, Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series, Benares 1970 [Gada.].
Hiranyak~i Satyii~9.ha srautasutra -

,dd. Giridharasarma
MotHal Benarsidas,
sar Press, Bombay,

.nantakrsna Sastri,
.,~d. MukUnd Jha,
iskj' , , , ,_

edd. Kashinatsastri Agashe'

and Shankarsastri Marulkar, Anandasrama Sanskrit Series 53,
1907-32. [Hira1).yaSS.]

]agadlsi - on Didhiti, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares 1908.

. [Jag.]
]aiminiyaily,ayamiila ' - by Madhavacarya,ed. not indicated, Kashi
Sanskrit Series 126, Varanasi. [JaiNyaMii.]
Jaiminiyanyayamalavistara [JaiNyaVi]
Kalpatamparimala - by Appayya Dik$ita on Vedantakalpataru,
, see .BhiimatL [KaTaPa.]
K~rikava!i with Muktavali -, by Visvanatha Tarkapaficanana, ed.



Harirama Sukla, Kashi Sanskrit Series 6, Varanasi, 1951.


Kiasikll - by Harirama Kale on V.B.S., with the text of V.B. and

V.B.S., ed. K. P. Trivedi, with notes, Bombay Sanskrit and
Prakrit Series 70, Bombay, 1915. [KaSi.]
Kasilw.vrtti - by Vamana and Jayiiditya on P., ed. Pandit Sobhitamisra, Kashi Sanskrit Series 37, 3rd en., Varanasi, 1952.
Katyayana Srautasiitra - ed. Weber, Berlin, 1859. [KatyasS.]
Katyayana Srautasiitra with Devayajfiika Paddhati - ed. Vidyadhara Sarma, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 415, Varanasi,
Kavyaprakasa - by Mammata, with the commeniary Sasikaia, in
Hindi, by Dr. Satyavrata Simha, Vidyabhavan Sanskrit
Series 15, Varanasi, 1955.
KiralJavali - by Udayanaoarya, ed. Jitendra S. Jetly, Gaekwad's
Oriental Series 154, Baroda, 1971.
Kriyaratnasamuccaya - by GUJ:)aratnasiiri, ed. not indicatea, Jain
Yasovijaya Granthamala 10, Varanasi, 1908. [KriyaRaSa.j
Kusumaiijal! - by Udayanacarya, edd.:t;>admapraBad Upadhyaya
and Dhundhiraja Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series 30, Varanasi,
. 1957. [Kusuma.]
LaghuSabdenduSekhara - by Nagesabhatta, with sfx commentaries,
Rajasthan Sanskrit Series 14, Varanasi, 1936.
Mahabharata - by Kr$l:ladvaipayana Vyasa, critical dition, vols. 13
and 14, ed. S. K. Belvalkar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute, Poona, 195461. [MahiaBha.]
Maitrayal)l Samhiua - Leipzig 18811886. [MaiSa.]
Mavidarp1U}a - by Rajacii~amakhin, ed. T. Ganapati Sastri,
Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 34, Trivandrum, 1913. [M~iDa.J
Manusrorti - ed. Narayana Rama Acarya, Nirnayasagar Press,
Bombay, 1946. [Manu.]
Madhvatantramukhamardana - ed. Chinnaswami Sastri, Kashi,
1941. [MaTaMuMa.]
Mima'q1sakaustubha ~ by KhaI)cQadeva,. Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series 58, Varanasi, 1924-33. [MimiiKau.J

Mima'q1sakoSa -. ed. I
sastri Abhyanb
Government Or
Oriental Resear'
Sastri, Kashi Sl
Mima.'P-sasiitra - by .
varttika and Tu
Sastri, Anandai
Nllakal)c1;hi - by Nilal
daya. [NiKa.]
Nirukta - by Yaska
and Prakrit Seri
Nyllyakosa - by Bhi
sastri Abhyank;
Bhandarkar Ori,
Nyayamaiijarl - by .
106, second edil
Nyayaratnamala - b:
Nyayasudha - by JaJ
Khuperkar Sast

Kalikaprasad S
Series 7, Barod:


Vasudevasastri .
darkar Oriental
Pariksa [Bhairavi] .. Series 133, Var;


. 207

6, Varanasi, 1951.

MimIi111sakosa -. ed. Kevalananda Sarasvatji, 7 vols., Vai, 1960,63.

;he text of V.B.and

ontbay Sanskrit and

Mima111sanyayaprakiasa -. [1\padeviJ - by 1\padeva, ed. Vasudeva

sastri Abhyankar, with commentary Prabhii by the editor,
Government' Oriental Series, Class A, no. 3, Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1949.

, ed. Pandit Sobhita

Varanasi, 1952.
:159. [KatyasS.]
dhati - ed. Vidyaeries 415, Varanasi,
neniary Sasikaia, in
iyabhavan Sanskrit

5. Jetly, Gaekwad's
not indicatea, Jain
1908. [KriyaRaSa.]
. aprasad Upadhyay"a
Series 30, Varanasi,
;h six commentaries,
i" 936.
t~ tical


dition, vols. 13';

r Oriental Research'"'

'. Ganapati Sastri,
m, 1913. [Mart;liDa.]
Nirnayasagar Press,
'ami Sastri, Kashi,
Iwkhamba Sanskrit,


Mimfup.sanyiayaprakiiSa [1\padevi] - by Apadeva, ed. Chinnasvami

Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series 25, Varanasi, 1949.
Mimfup.saslltra - by Jaimini, with Bha'iya bysabara, and Tantrawritika and Tuptikia by Kumarilabhatta, 6,vols., ed. Subba
Sastri, Anandasrama Sanskrit Series 97, Poona, 1929-34.

Nilaka1).thi -' by NilakaJQ.thabhatta on Bhaskarodaya, see Bhii,skarodaya. [NiKa.]

Nirukta - by Yaska, with Bha$ya by Durga, !Bombay Sanskrit
and Prakrit Series 73 and 85, Bombay, 1919, 1942.
Nyayakosa - by Bhimacarya Ja!kiikar, '3rd revised ed. Vasudevasastri Abhyankar, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 49,
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1928. [N.K.]
NyiiyamafijarI - by Jayantabhatta, 2 vols., Kashi Sanskrit Series
106, second edition, Varanasi, 1969. [NyayMafi.]
Nyayaratnamala - by RarthasarathimiSra, with Nyayakaratna by
Riimanujiidirya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 75, Baroda, 1937.
Nyayasudhii - by Jayatirtha on Anuvyakhyana, pothi provided by
Khuperkar Sastri, Kolhapur. [NyaySu.]
Paramalaghumafijii$ii - by Nagesabhatta, with Jyotsna by Pandit
Kalikaprasad Sukla, M.S. University of Baroda Research
Series 7, Baroda, 1961. [PLM.]
Paribha$endusekhara - by Nageabhatta, with Tattvadarsa by
Vasudevasastri Abhyankar, 2nd ed. K. V. Abhyankar, Bhan,
darkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1962. [P.s.f
Pank$a [Bhairavi] -- by Bhairavamisra on V.B.S., Kashi Sanskrit
Series 133, Varanasi, 1939. [ParL]



Pi-abha _. by Vasudevasastri Abhyankar on 1\.padevi, .see Mimaq1sanyayapraka~a.

PrabM _. by Balalq'$l].a Pancoli on V.B.S., see Darpana. [Pra.]

Pradipa _. by Kaiyata on M.B;, ed. Vedavrata, 5 vols., Harayana
Sanskrit Samsthanam. Gurukul ]hajjar, Rohatak, 1962-63.
Prakaral).apaiicika - by slilikanatha. [PrakaPafi.]
Prak'irn;mkapraklisa - by Helanaja on V.P., [III.1-7] i ed. KA.
Subrahmania Ayer, Deccan College Monograph Series 21,
vol. I, Poona, 1963.
Prak'iri}akapnikasa - by Helaraja on V.P., [UL7-I3], ed. K. Samba siva Sastri, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 116, Trivandrum,
Prakir;mkaprakasa -by Heliiraja on V.P., [III.14], ed. L. A. Ravi-
varma, University of Ti"avankorSandkrit Series 148, trivundrum, 1942.
PrauQhamanora.nm ~ by !BhaJt1;oji Diki)ita on S.K., ed. Sitram Sastri,
Hindu Visvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series 8, Vara nasi, 1964.
. Ramarudd _. on Mukta, see KJarikavall. [Rfun.]
I~gvedasan.Jhita - .. [R.V.]
sabdakaustubha - by Bhattoji Dikiiita, ed. Gopal Sastri Nene;
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, reprint nos. 3,4,5, and 6, Varanasi, 1933. [sabdaKau.]
sabdasaktiprakiuika - by JagadISa Bhattacarya, with two :ommentaries, ed. Dhundhiraja Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series 109,
Varanasi, 1934. [sabdas<iPra.]
sabdasaktiprakasikli - by Jagadisa Bhattacarya, ed. Jibananda Vidyasagar Bhattacarya, 2nd ed., Calcutta, 1904. [sabdasaPra.]
sankarabhaswa - by sankaracarya on B.S., see Bhlimati. [S.B.]
Sailkarl - by sankarsastri Marulkar on V.B.S., Anandasrama San. skrit Series 135, Poona, 1957. [sailka.]
Siiilkh}7atattvakaumudi - by ViacaspatimiSra ed. Sivanarayana
Sastri, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1940. [SaTaKau.]
satabodhini -" by sivanataYa!l)asastrion Sankhyaklirika, ed. Sivanarayana Sastri. Nirnayasagar Press. Bombay. 1940. [SarBo.]

Sarala -" by Gopalsastl

mala 4, Varanasi
siistradipika - by Ban
. Dharmadattasast
satapathaBrahmal].a sisuplilavadha - Nirm
Skandapural).a - ed. N
1959. [SkandP.]
Slokavarttika - by KUl
Sanskrit Series 1
Taittiliyasaq1hlta - E
. Kashinathasastri
Series 42, Poomi

Sanskrit Series 1
Tailtrarahasya - by :
Gaekwad's Oriell
T'antraratna - by Pal
Tantra\~rttika .
Tarkasamgraha - by
Y. V. Athalye, ;
tion and transl~
Prakrit Series 5!
Tattvacintamani _. b:
nath Tarkavagi:
908, 91-, 918,!
sabdakh81).Qa, v

Tup\ika - by KumaI
Uddyota -

by Nages



Jadevi, .see l\fimamsa

Sarala - by Gopalsastri Nene onV.B.S., sri Harikrsna Nibandhamala 4, Varanasi, 1952. .

sastradipikii - by Rirthasarathimusra, with two commentaries, ed.
. Dharmadattasastri, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1915.

"Darpana. [Pra.)
la, 5 vols., Harayana
:, Rohatak, 196263.

[IILl7] jed. KA.
onograph Series 21,
.713), ed. K. Samba
.s 116; Trivancirum,
l.14) , ed. L. A. Ravi
:rit Series 148, Tri

r.;:., ed. Sitram Sastri,

skrit Series 8, Vara

';; Gopal Sastri Nene,

.1: 3, 4, 5, and 6, Vara
,'.' 'ya, with two com':
10t Sanskrit Series 109,i;l~,'
, ed. Jibananda Vid904. [sabdasaPra.)
Bhamati. [S.B.)
Anandasrama SaneeL Sivanarayana
J. [SaTaKau.)
tyakarika, ed. Sivabay. 1940. [SarBo.)


satapathaBrahma1).a - ed. Weber, Chowkhamba, 1964. [satBra.]

sisupiilavadha - Nirnayasagar 1957. [sisuVa.]
Skandapuria1)a - ed. Not indicated, Gurumandal Series 20, Calcutta,
1959. [SkandP.]
SJokavarttika - by Kutnarilabhat1;a, ed. Not indicated, Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series 11, 12, and 15, Varanasi, no date.
TaitthiyasarPhita - ed. NaraharisastriTalekar [vols. 141, and
. Kashinathasastri Agashe [vols. 4.8], Anandasrama Sanskrit
Series 42, Poonaj 1959. [TaiSa.]
Tai1).\lyamahabrahmaJl).a - ed. Chinnasvarnisastri, 2 vols., Kashi
Sanskrit Series 105, Varanasi, 193536. [Ta1)QyaBra.]
Taritrarahasya - by R,ilmanujacarya, 2nd ed. Ramasvami Sastri,
. Gaekwad'sOriental Series 24, Baroda, 1956: [TantraRa.j
Tantraratna -. by parthasarthimiSra. [TantraRat.]
.. by Kumarilabhatta, see MimaqJ.sasiltra.
Tarkasamgraha - by Annambhatta, with two commentaries, ed.
Y. V. Athalye, with critical and explanatory notes, introduc
tion and translation by M .. R. Bodas, Bombay Sanskrit and
Prakrit Series 55, 2nd edition, Poona, 1963. [T.S.]
Tattvacintiimani .- by GaiJgeSa Bhattacarya, with Rahasya by
Mathuranatha, and Aloka by Jayadevamisra, ed. Kamakhya
nath Tarkavagisa,Bibliotheca Indica, New Sedes nos. 900,
908, 91, 918, 921, 927, 135, 943, 955, 960, 975, and 977,
Sabdakha1f9a, vol. IV, part 2, Calcutta, 1901. [TattvaCin.]
Tattvacintamal,lirahasya - by Mathuratiilrtha, see Tattvacintamal)i.
Tuptika - by Kumarilabhatta, see M.S .. [Tupti] or [TupT]
Uddyota -

by Nagesabhatta on Pradipa, see Pradipa ..

- ----.---_ ..


.. -'

.... -

.-- ..






- by Katlji,Jic;!abhatta, withPadarthadipikia, cd.

Pandit Ramakrishna Sastri, Benares Sanskrit Series 51, 53,
and 54, Varanasi, 1900.
Vaiyakarall}abhU~aIl}a - by KaUi!]J,c;!abhatta, with V:B.s., and Kasikai
see Kasilcti. [V.B.]
Vaiyakar<lil;labhii~al)asara - by Kaul)lc;!abhatta, for various editions
see: Darpal)a, Kashima, ParIlc~a, Prabha, Sarala and sankari.
[sara or V.B.S.]
Vaiyakara1).asiddhantakaumudi - by Bhattoji Dik~ita; with two
commentaries, see Balamanorama. [S.K.]
Vaiyakaral)asiddhantalaghuma:fiju~ by Nagesabhatta, with two
commentaries, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 44" Varanasi.
,1925. [LaghuMaii.]
VakyapadiYil- - by Bhartrhari, edd. K. V. Abhyankar and V. P.
Limaye, University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 2,
Poona, 1965. [V.P.]
Varttikapatha - by Katyayana, see M.B. [Vt.]
Vedantakalpataru - by Anandasarasvati on B.S., see Bhamati.
Vedantatatfviveka - by Nrsimhasrama:, 'ed. Ramasastri Telang,
reprint from Pandit, Varanasi, 1912. [VeTaVi.]
Vidhiviveka - by Ma,l)\IanamiSra, MImii.:rpsakosa pp. 3597-3631, see
Mirnarpsakosa. [VidhiVI.J
VivaraJ.laprameyasarpgraha - by Bharauitirtha, ed. Suryanarayana
Sastri and Saileswar Sen, AUS. 25, 1941. [ViPraSam.]
, Vyakaral).amahabha~ya - by Pataiijali, ed. F. Kielhorn, 2nd revised
edition, 3 vols., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 18-20,
Bombay, 1892-1909. [:Bha~yaor M.B.]
-Vyutpattivada - by Gadadhara Bhattacarya, with Jay., ed. Umesa
Misra, 3rd edn., Allahabad, 1953. [VyutpaWi.]
Vyutpattivada-Lakararthavicii.ra - by Gadadhara Bhattacarya, ed.
V. Subrahmanya Sastri, with the commentary Vivarana,
Annamalai University Sanskrit Series 10. Annamalainagar,
1948. '[Vyutpa VaLaVi.]
Yogasiltra - by Pataftjali, ed. Vasudevasastri Abhyankar, Bombay
Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 46, Bombay, 1917. [Y.S.J "

Yogasutra - by Pataiijal
harananda Ayany~
Yogavasi~tha - ed. W ~
Nirnayasagar Pres
Yuktisnehaprapiira:l).l -'
dipik., seeS8.stra(


Abhyankar. K. V. - A I
Oriental Series 13
Alston, W. P. - Philoso
, Series, Priceton-l:
Edition, 1965.
Cardona, George - Ne!
Anvaya and Vy2
Bulletin, vol. '31 c
Gode, P. K. - The CI
nephew of BhaW
Adyar LibraryBl
Ingalls, D. H. H. - Ma
Harvard Oriental
Iyer , K. A. Su~ramania
in the Light of 0'
Poona, 1969.
Joshi, S. D. - Kaw.i9.~l
Ph.D. dissertatlO
sphota-nirl).aya ,
notes, and introc
Matilal Bimal Krishr
Harvard Orienb



,ith PadarthadipiM, ed.

Sanskrit Series 51, 53,
ith V.B.S., and Kasika ,
la, for various editions
la, Sarala and Sankari.

Yogaslitra - by Pataiijali, with Bha~ya by Vy'asa, ed. Swami Hadharananda Ayanya; University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1963.
Yogavasi~tha ed. Wasudeva Laxmanasastri Pansikar, 2 vols.,
Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1918. [YogVa.]
Yuktisnehaprapiir~Q.i _. by lliimakr~Q.a Bhattacarya, on Sastradipika, see sastradipika. [YSP.]

oji Dik~ita; with two


age.sabhatta, with two

Series 44, Varanasi,
'\bhyankar and V. P.
and Prakrit Series 2,

B.S., see BMmatI.

Ramasastri Teiang,
~"" 'sa pp. 3597-3631 see

I, ed. Suryanarayana
; l. [ViPraSam.]
~: {ielhorn, 2nd revised~,.
, . ?rakrit Series 18-20,



Abhyankar. K. V. - A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, Gaekwad's

Oriental Series 134, Baroda, 1961.
Alston, W. P. -. Philosophy of Language, Foundation of Philosophy
Series, Pdceton-Hall Inc., Engelwood Cliffs, N.]., Second
Edition, 1965.
Cardona, George - Negation in P,8Jl).ini's Rules, Language, vol. 43,
Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian Grammar, Adyar Library
Bulletin,. vol. '31 c2, Madras, 1967.
Gode, P. K. - The Chronology. of the works of KOI).r;labhatta (a
nephew of Bhattoji Dlk~ita). Between A.D. 1910 and 1660,
Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. 18, Madras, 1954.

'ith laya, ed. Umesa


Ingalls, D. H. H. - Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic,

Harvard Oriental Series 40, 1951.
Iyer, K. A. Subramania - Bharq-hari, A study of the Vakyapadiya
in the Light of of the Ancient Commentaries, Deccan College,
Poona, 1969.

Ira Bhattacarya, ed.

lmentary Vivarana,
O. AnnamaJainagar.

Joshi, S. D. - KaUI).~abhaHa on the Meaning of Sanskrit Verb-roots,

PhD. dissertation,. Harvard University, 1960.
sphota-nirl).aya of Kau!)Jr;iabhatta, edited with Translation,
notes, and introduction, University of Poona, 1967.

.bhyankar, Bombay

Matilal, Bimal Krishna - Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation,

Harvard Oriental Series 46, 1968.

917. [Y.S.l




Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical

Analysis, Mouton, The HagUe, 1971.
Raja, Kunjunni -- Indian Theories of- Meaning, The Adyar Library
Series 91, Madras, 1963.
Rao, Veluri Stibba - The Philosophy of a Sentence and its Parts,
Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1969.
Renou, Louis - La Theorie des Temps du Verbs d'apres les Gramlnairiens Sanskrits, Journal Asiatique, C.C.x.V.III,' fase. 3,
Sarma, Peri Sarvesvara - The KalasamuddeSa of Bhartrhari's
Vakyapadiya with HeIaraja's Commentary, translated from
the Sanskrit for the first time, Motilal Benarsidas, Delhi,
Varma, S. - Analysis of Meaning in Indian Semantics, Journal of
the Dept. of Letters, University of Calcutta, vol. 13, 1926.



abhava 45, 47, 134, 1661

186, 194
- -_- --- --~
abhidha 26, 27' -----_------ -- - --1
adeSa 2 - j
aclhliratva 8
adhikat(1).a 120, 131. - -_'
adhikaranata/tva 130, 13~
adhikara;;Qatiivacchedaka 1
adhlsta 17, 51, -78
adyat"ana 67, 68
lak~a1).a) 1,09, 110
iikii.ilksii 26, 55
__ __
akhyaia 91,)30 - - _- _- - _-.
akhyatatva 25,: 2~, 28, 9,
alambhana 168, 169, In
- 189 , 192 -amantra;I).a 17; 51-,78
anadyatana67, 7.6, ~98
ananY<tthiisiddha 146
anavakasatva 55 - anekarti-iakatii/tva 30, ::
111 --anistasadhanatva 24, 16~
anugamaka dharma _100,
anugamika '34, 99" 112 _
anupapatti _115
anuvii.da 183
anuvyavasaya 68
anuyogin 47
anvaya 1,8, 30, 54, 62, ~
109, .138; 149, 166
anvayita- 46
anvayiti.vacthedaka' 45-:
109, 131, 134, 181,
anvitabhidhanavada 108
_anyathasiddha 146/1'49-anyathasiddhi 149, 191


.Indian Philosophical
Ig, The Adyar Library
,ntence and its Parts,
,rbs d'apres les GramC.C.X.V.III, fasc. 3,
leSa of Bhartrhari's
:ary, translated from
11 Benarsidas, Delhi,
)emantics,' Journal of
icutta, vol. 13; 1926.


abhava 45, 47, 134, 166, 181,
186, 194
abhidha 26, 27 '.
MeSa 2'
adhiaratva 8
adhikaral)a 120, 131
adhikaral)ata/tva 130, 139 .
adhikaranatavacchedaka 139
adhi~ta. i7, 51,.78"
adyatana 67, 68
lakijal)a) Hi9, 110
akailk~ 26, 55
akhyata ~1, 130 .
akhyatatva '25,: 26, 28,92
alambhana 168, 169, 175, 180,'
IS9, 192 '
amantral}a 17, 5L78
anadYatana67, 76, 198
ananyathasiddha 146
anavakasatva 55.
anekarthakata/tva30, 34,' 35,



ani~tasadhanatva 24, 162, 165

anugairiaka dharma 100, 119
anugarnika '34, 99, 112
anupapatti .115' .
anuvada 183
anuvyavasaya 68
anuyogin 47
anvaya 1,.8, 30, 54, 62, 97, '102,
109, 138; 149, 166 .
anvayita 46 .
ativayiw:vacthedaka 45-8,108,
109, 131, 134, 181, 182
anvitabhidhiinavada 108 :
anyathasiddha 14B/149'; , .
anyathiisiddhi 149, 191

aparisamapta 52, 59, 64, 65

apauru~eya 19, 20, 106
apavada 55 .
apoddhrta 1
apiirva 29, 30, 32, 39-42, 104,
106, 108, 109, 112-8, 120,
121, 147-51
arthavada.27, 42, 123-5, 191
arthi: bhlivana 26-9
iiSis 197, 19.9'
aritakarya 86, 87
ativyapti 69
atyantabhava 47, 133, 134
aupadanikapramfu:).a 40, 108,.
avacchedak~45, 1()s,1l8, 136,
. 11'37,' 139, 143
avacchedakatva 48,' 79, :112,
.. 134;143
avapodviapa 1, 3
avidya 66;- :165'
badhyabadhakabhava. 11, 63,
bandhitva20, 21, 24, 25,
38, 39, 81; 100, 102, 164,
191 :.

(tva) 25, 39, 102

bhava 2, 5, 51, 57, 91, 94, .95
bhavana."21,.25, 26,37
bha\d~yat 13, .52, 76, 84
bhrama 4 '
bhata 13,. 52, 198, 199 .
bodhakata 3 ,
bodliyabuddhi :35, '112,lW
buddhivi~aya1ia 120
. .





93, 96
dharmin 22
dhatu 29
dhlitvartha 52, 75, 117, 141
dhva;qlsa 77, 199
dravyatva 143, 144
dvara 29, 104
dvesa 18, 38, 39, 101, 103, 191,
193, 195
dyotakatva 8, 52, 54, 56, 63, 64
dyotya 6, 7, 52, 53, 56, 63
gurudharma 46, 48, 133 43, 169, 170, 174, 177-189
hitasadhanatva 32. 95
icchia 21, 25, 93, 98,99, 111, 112,
119-21, 131, 189
icchatva 161
i~ta 33, 34, 100
istadevata 33, 82
istasadhana 20, 33, 77
istasadhanatva 20, 21, 23, 29,
.. 32, 33, 35-8, 41, ~-5, 79,
81, 86, 88-92, 97,' 98, 102,
i~otpatti 192, 193, 195
itikartaryata 26, 28
janaka 103
janakiivighataka 102, 103
janyatiivacchedaka 138
janyatva 138, 143
jati 6, 132, 136, 142-4
jmna 20, 68, 93, 98, 111, 121,


jffiipaka 71
kala 10, 15, 52, 60, 64,65, 67 .
kaiaiija 24, 37, 162,' 165, 167,
190, 194, 195
kalavibhaga 13
karaka 6, 43, 70
131 .
. 27, 43, 44,.130,

kar<\I)ata/tva 8, 44, 142, 144

llliranatvavacchedaka 145
karman 2-4, 29, 51, 64, 94
karmatva4, 8, 95 .
kartr 2-4, 9, 43, 51, 55
kartradhikar<\I)a 190, 191
kartrtvam 4, 94
karya 21, 30-3, 40, 41, 82, 84-6,
105-7, 115, 117, .118, 137,
143, 150, 167
karyakaraI).abhiava 97, 132
karyata (tva) 30, 84-6, 90, 106,
138, 143, 145, 150
llliryatavacchedaka 138, 143,
145, 150
kriya 10, 11, 13, 26, 52, 57, 58,
64, 65, 69, 72
kriyajanya 37
kriyajanyatva_84, 89-91
kriyavyapya 81, 84
krJ; 94, 130, 131
krJ;i 4, 30, '31,91-6 ..
Iq-tisadhya 20, 22, 37, 56
Iq-tisadhyatva 18, 20-2, 36-8, 81,
87-9, 91, 102, 192, 196
Iq-tyuddeya 30, 32, 39, 108, 112
lakiara 1, 2, 16. 49, 51, 92, 130,
lak~aI).ii 8, 54, 109, 110, 148, 164
IAN 2, 50, 51, 198
IAT 2, 5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14-6,50-6,
58-66, 91, 201, 203
lET 2,50, 51, 78, 199, 203
II:r'< 2, 16, 17, 19, 21-7, 29-41,
43-5, 47, 50, 51; 78-79, 81,
85, 88-92, 94-104, 105, 107,
111-3, 115-21, 127-9; 131-4,
140-2, 152, 160, 193, 194,
198-200 6
, lintva 25, 28, 92

lIT 2, 16, 50, 51, 63, 67-7

lOT 2, 50, 51, 197, 200
W:r'< 2, 50, 51, 198
2, 50, 51, 76, 77, 20
lU:r'< 2, 50, 51, 198, 199
lUT 2, .so, 51, 62, 76, 2(
LyuT 130
mukhyartha 107
nan 48, 134, 164, 165, 16(
186, 194, 195
nantanyakatva 14, 192, 1
nimantraI).a 16, 17, 51, 7
nipata 6
Ii.i~edJ-tavidhi 90
nityapraVf1;ta 12, 15
nivartana 37
niyoga 30, 106, 108, 112
~vuL 77
~yaT 85
nyayavyutpadana 17
. pada 1, 6, 100, 119
paramarsa 151
paramparnsadhanatva 29,
114 137
parok~a 51, 67-9
parok~atva 16, 68, 69, 7:
parok~ya 72
paryudasa '37, 90, 91, 164
patnisa!11yaja 174
phala 4, 7, 20, 21, 25, 11:
phaleccha 124
pmgabhava 77
prakaratiikhya vi~ayata 9:
prarabdha 52, 59, 64, 65 .
prarthana 17, 51 .
prasajyaprati~edha 36, 90
pratibandhaka 18, 20, 2E
103, 135, 136



va 8, 44, 142, 144

racchedaka 145
4, 29, 51, 64, 94
4, 8, 95
9, 43, 51, 5'5
arajQa 190, 191
30-3,40,41, 82, 84-6,
115, 117, J18, 137,
.50, 167
rlabhava 97, 132.
ia) 30, 84-6, 90, 106,
.43, 145, 150
:chedaka 138, 143,
n, 13, 26, 52, 57, 58,
5, 69, 72
ltva.84, 89-91
ya 81, 84
0, 131
, 31, 916
;! l 20, 22, 37, 56
'f ltva 18, 20~2, 36-8, 81,
!'I: 91, 102, 192, 196
i' ya 30, 32, 39, 108, 112
,; 2, 16. 49, 51, 92, 130,

54, 109, 110, 148, 164

l, 51, 1 9 8 ' "
i 7-9, 11, 12, 14-6, 50-6,
,91, 201, 203
l, 51, 78, 199, 203
i, 17, 19, 21-7, 29-41,
47, 50, 51, 78-79, 81,
8-92, 94-104, 105, 107,
;, 115-21, 127-9, 131-4,
:, 152, 160, 193, 194,



lIT 2, 16, 50, 51, 63, 67-75, 200,

lOT 2, 50, 51, 197, 200
lRN 2, 50, 51, 198
lB.T 2, 50; 51, 76, 77, 200, 203
lUN 2, 50, 51, 198, 199
lUT 2,50, 51, 62, 76, 203
LyuT 130 .
mukhyartha 107
naii 48, 134, 164, 165, 166, 181,
186, 194, 195
nantariyakatva 14, 192, 193
nimantral).a 16, 17, 51, 78
nipata 6
ni~edhavidhi 90
nityapravrJ;ta 12, 15
nivartana 37
niyoga 30, 106, 108, 112
~vuL 77
~yaT 85
nyayavyutpadana 17
padal, 6, 100, 119
paramarsa 151
paramparas~dhanatva .29, 105,
pararthlinumana 137
parok~a 51, 67-9
parok~atva 16, 68, 69, 72, 73,
parok~ya 72
paryudasa 37, 90, 91, 164, 165,
patnisa71lyaja 174
phala 4, 7, 20, 21, 25, 112.
phalecchli 124
pregabhliva 77
prakaratakhya vi~ayata 93
prarabdha 52, 59, 64, 65
prarthana 17, 51
prasajyaprati~edha 36, 90
pratibandhaka 18, 20, 25, 38
103, 135, 136

pratiyogin 45, 77, 134, 182

pratiyogita 45, 134, 182
pratiyogitacacchediika 45-8, 134
pratyavaya 122, 166,. 186
pravartaka 17, 19, 80, 89, 142,
152, 160, 161
pravartakata (tva) 217"~0, 81.
97, 116, 117, 120, 125, 193
pravartana 17-21, 26, 28, 29,.33,
prawttinimitta 99; 119
pravrttoparata 15
pliayadarSana 169, 170
preral).a 20
sabdabrahman 16, 53
sabdi bhavana 26-8
sadhana 20, 23, 26, 28, 68-70,
sadhanata (tva) 24, 44, 72, 88,
100, 105, 113, 116, 129, 148,
sadhya 13; 23, 26,'28
sadhy~tatva 140
sak~t 6, 161
saktigraha '35'
sakti 3, 7, 53, 70, 95, 106, 109..
161, 191. 195
saktigraha 35
saktyiidhliyaka 8, 54
saktyadhliyakatva 8, 52, 56
sakya 99, 103, 192, 193
sakyata (tva) 81, 99
sakyatavacchedaka 34, 99, 112
samarndhikarat)ya 135, 136,
samavaya 144
samavayikara.IJ.a 14;3, 144
sa:rpketagraha 34, 82, 99
. saI!1prasna 17, 51
sarpsargatakhya vr~ayata 93 .
. satta 144, 145




. savi~ayatva: 68
siddhadhartna 23
sthanin 3
sthitalaksana 1
sUP 202' '.
taddhita 173
takrakClUJ;lc;iinyanyaya 10, 55, 64 .
tatparya 8, 54, 107, 108, 131
tatparyagrahaka 8, 54, 165
tatparyagrahakatva 8, 54
tatprakhyadhikaraJ).a 183
tiD. 4, 128, 129
tiiltva 92,93
tiP 3
Triv[ccarvadhikarat,lanyaya 179, 171
tumUN 77
upadana pramal,la 32, 40, 107,
109 .
upalak~al).a: 76
upaya 20, 21
upayeccha 25
utpadyatva 8
. va<;akatva 53, 62, 63
v;acya 6, 7, 52~4, 56, 63, 64, 129 .
v;acyatva55,56, 58,64,79,113,
114, 116
vaijatya 45, 47, 48, 132, 133,
138, 142, 143,148,151, 152,
154, i55, 157-9
vaktrabhipraya 161
vaktrbuddhivi~ayatva '34, 100,'
vakyase~a 170, 171

.. '

vattamana 13-5, 51, 52, 56, 60, i

vartamanatva 12, 52, 54, 59. .
vidhi 17, 20, 21, 27, 51,64, 78, ;
111, 133, 160, 161, 166! [
173, 191-6
vidhilqt'93, 94, 96
vighataka 1 0 3 "
visaya 169
vi9aya 69, 79; 161
. I
vi1)ayata 30, 68, 69, 79, 93, 94, I
96, 9 7 .
vi9ayatakJara 68
vi~ayitakara 68
vi'sistabh'ava 163
vrddhavyavahara' 82 . :
vrttavirata 15
vrtti 53, 107
vyabhiaara 47, 132, 133, 1'35-7, I'
141, 145, 147, 149

vyakti 6
. vyapaka 34, 100, 140
. ~.
vyapa:ra4, 7, 1.0' 17, 20, 25, 26,
28-30,57-61,.69,71,79, 104 I
vyaparasantana 10, 11, 56!8
vY1apti 136, 137, 142
vya~ya 34, 84, 100
vyatrreka 1:, 62, 97, 102, 137,
138, 140, 146, 149, 166
vyatirekavyabhicara 132
yacitama'l;lc;iananyaya 68
yogyata 40, ~36
yogyatavacchedaka 40, 108~ 114