ISABELITA LAHOM vs.

JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

G.R. No. 153989 JULY 14, 2003

FACTS:
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption in
which she averred, that despite the proceedings and pleadings of the petitioner
and her husband, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to
Lahom, to the frustration of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died. Even before his death, he had made known his desire to revoke
respondents adoption but was prevented by petitioners supplication, however
with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties
on interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption, decree on May 5, 1972, still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.

RULING:
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the
new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A.
No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the
Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person
has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It
is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem
to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action
given by statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

SLOBODAN BOBANOVIC and DIANNE ELIZABETH

CUNNINGHAM-BOBANOVIC vs. HON. SYLVIA P. MONTES
G.R. No. 71370

FACTS:
A petition to adopt the minor Adam Christopher Sales was filed by
spouses Slobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic,
both Australian citizen with established residence at Melbourne, Victoria,
Australia but who then were temporarily residing at No. 8 Aries, Bel-Air,
Makati. They are childless since their marriage due to primary infertility on the
part of the wife. Adam Christopher Sales was given to Dianne by Lulu, the
childs biological mother as shown by Deed of Surrender and Waiver and gave
her written consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry of Social Services and Development can grant
and issue travel clearance to the petitioners adopted child.

RULING:
It is a logical effect of the decree of adoption that the adopted minor
should be allowed to travel and join his adoptive parents. Only aliens whose
government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations
which are the ones disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code.
In such a matter, petitioners were advised to accept and submit
themselves to a family case study which should not be at all a difficult thing for
them to do. In the same way that the Court took to task the Ministry of Social
Services and Development for being, paradoxically, overly concerned over its
claimed exclusive prerogative to conduct the case study work. Upon furnishing
herein respondent Minister of Social Services and Development with the
corresponding official report on said Family Case Study and if such is favorable
to the petitioners herein, then the requisite travel clearance certificate for the
adopted child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic, should thus be issued by the
office of the public respondent Minister as previously decreed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES
G.R. No. 92326 JANUARY 24, 1992

FACTS:
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida Bobiles
on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603,
the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may
be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial
court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the
Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on
August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on February 20, 1990 which affirmed in toto the decision of
Branch 2 of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of herein private
respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal
thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption as the law, relating
Article 185 of the Family Code, cannot be applied retroactive effect.

RULING:
Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Article 246 of the
Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions

thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws. On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the
petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by
private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of
the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat, by
mere filing of her petition for adoption. Under the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself,
without joining her husband therein.
The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings
involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another. The Trial
Court and respondent Court acted correctly in granting the petition for
adoption and had found no reason to disturb he same. The jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby denied.