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New Generic Leak Frequencies

for Process Equipment
John Spouge
DNV Consulting, London SE1 9DE, United Kingdom; john.spouge@dnv.com (for correspondence)
Published online 13 October 2005 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.10100
The likelihood of leaks from process equipment is a
key input to any quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of
process plant. This paper describes a new source of
generic leak frequencies and reviews the challenges in
using it for QRA.
Established leak frequencies for onshore process
equipment are poor in quality because they are based
on old data sources of unknown provenance, judgmentally modified. Recent data from offshore process
activities provide a high-quality data set, which appears to show that the established frequencies are much
too low. Much of this discrepancy arises from the QRA
practice of modeling only the most hazardous leak
scenarios. Recognizing the practical difficulty of
changing QRA practice to match new data, the present
paper therefore describes a method of analyzing the
new data to obtain leak frequencies for specific modeled scenarios.
Leaks are divided into three scenarios, allowing analysts to use frequencies for only those scenarios that
are compatible with their QRA outflow modeling. Standardized leak frequencies have been developed for different types of process equipment, using leak frequency
functions to ensure that consistent, nonzero frequencies are available for any equipment type and hole size.
The results are consistent with traditional onshore leak
frequencies, while also being traceable to specific incidents among the modern high-quality offshore leak
data. © 2005 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Process Saf Prog 24: 249 –257, 2005
Keywords: leaks, leak frequencies, process equipment, quantitative risk assessment
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Role of Leak Frequencies
Modern safety management practice commonly
makes use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) to
make informed decisions concerning the safety of process plants [1]. These decisions may concern the pro© 2005 American Institute of Chemical Engineers

Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

vision of safety features, the level of inspection and
maintenance, the permitted inventories of hazardous
materials, and the separation from nearby populations.
The overall risk management approach is beyond the
scope of this paper, whose focus is on one small but
highly significant input, that is, the frequencies of leaks
from different types of process equipment.
Leak frequencies, which represent the long-term average number of leaks per year of operation, may
differentiate between different sizes of leak, from small
to catastrophic. In their simplest form, they refer to
individual equipment items. “Generic” leak frequencies
apply to an average of all equipment of this type, as
opposed to specific frequencies for particular equipment manufacturers or operating circumstances. This
paper refers to the types of steel equipment used in the
process industry to contain liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons.
The role of leak frequencies in a process plant QRA
is illustrated in Figure 1. Multiplying the generic leak
frequencies by a plant’s numbers of equipment items
yields a simple estimate of the likelihood of leaks that
reflects the size and complexity of the plant. This can
be combined with estimates of leak consequences to
obtain the overall risk. The dominant sources of leaks
can then be identified and appropriate management
controls adopted.
The aim of QRA is to give guidance on managing the
risks of rare events, unlikely to be seen in the direct
experience of most engineers and individual plants.
Precisely because of their rarity, establishing the frequency of such events is difficult, requiring systematic
data collection, covering not only leaks but also the
exposed equipment population, over many plants for
many years. Such data collection is time-consuming
and thus unusual. Alternative methods such as fault
tree analysis are possible for plant-specific applications, but have not yet delivered generic leak frequencies suitable for routine use in QRA studies. Because
they require data for calibration, they are normally used
in combination with generic frequencies, rather than as
an independent alternative.
December 2005

249

resting on a data set of eight leaks in U. Offshore Leak Frequencies Until the 1990s. In almost no case can it be determined what equipment population and hole sizes underlie the leak frequency. reanalysis of the leaks and equipment population in the WASH-1400 study yields a frequency of 4. a key element of most process plants. or earlier collections whose size and origin are now unknown. For each leak underlying the frequency values. Validation of the frequencies is surprisingly difficult. Existing Onshore Leak Frequencies What data collections underpin the generic leak frequencies in current process QRA? Although there are numerous sources available that cite generic leak frequencies [2]. In part this is because they are so low that most available data are inconclusive. In some cases. The Netherlands “Purple Book” [7] gives values based on the COVO study.3. at which time the database contained 2071 leaks. which greatly exceeds the COVO values that are supposedly based on it. mainly the USNRC’s WASH-1400 [4]. and many other parameters. while acknowledging that subsequent reviews indicate a tendency for higher frequencies. A widely used loss prevention textbook [6] quotes a range of leak frequency data. but it begs the question of why the process industry has not obtained any data of its own during this period. In the future. particularly compared to the existing onshore frequencies. mainly drawn from WASH-1400. Furthermore. and provide it to operators to support QRA. it is possible to establish the hole diameter. few reveal what data underlie them. For example. Comparison of Offshore and Onshore Leak Frequencies What are the differences between the established onshore and the new offshore frequencies? Figure 3 shows the ratios of the offshore frequencies as analyzed by DNV in 2004 compared to the onshore frequencies Process Safety Progress (Vol. Even validation against the original data. four breaks and four minor leaks from pipes in U. Many have been judgmentally modified to apply to different hole sizes. the hydrocarbon type and pressure. HCRD is now the primary source of process leak frequencies for offshore QRA [11]. An authoritative IChemE monograph [5] makes a judgmental synthesis of various sources from 1971–1985. In addition. Most can be traced back to first publication in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus it appears that the judgmental modifications for pipe and leak diameter dominate over the data content in the generic frequency. the system and equipment type. which were based on synthesis of earlier studies. Other sources use values of similar quality and age. relatively straight section of the plot indicates comprehensive reporting. This is consistent with an earlier review [8].4. The inquiry into the Piper Alpha accident in the North Sea [9] recommended that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should collect a database of hydrocarbon leaks from offshore installations in the UK Sector. In this case. This may be preferable to the use of unmodified 30-year-old data from a different industry. consider what data underlie the frequency of leaks from steel pipes. The COVO report gave six separate values for different pipe diameters and leak scenarios. However. its frequencies were blended with earlier sources. The current edition refers to a previous review of sources published in 1989 [2].4) . Role of leak frequencies in QRA. That source is the first in this historical trail to acknowledge some real data: that is. These frequencies were first published in 1997. the long. which tends to be greater for smaller holes. and whether they are based on data or expert judgment. the same generic leak frequencies were used for process QRAs in both offshore and onshore industries. Investigation of other 250 December 2005 types of process equipment yields similar conclusions. which concluded that most frequency sources either quoted from other sources or assumed the values. the estimated quantity released. Convexity for small holes in this type of plot would suggest underreporting. the offshore industry will have access to the data through the World Wide Web. there is no clear definition of what sizes of leaks have been included in the data.24.Figure 1. whose origins in the nuclear industry of the 1960s and 1970s are now practically untraceable. For example. nuclear plants during 1972. The quality of the HSE offshore data set is exceptionally high. it is concluded that the most widely accepted leak frequencies are in reality judgments. A typical modern QRA might start with the AIChE/CCPS guide to QRA [1]. No. the HSE has estimated the exposed population of equipment items. where obtained.S.3 ⫻ 10⫺5 per meter year [8]. is problematic. The resulting hydrocarbon release database (HCRD) has collected all significant releases in the UK Sector since October 1992. nuclear plants in 1972. Figure 2 shows the leak size distribution for all the leaks in the database up to 2001. as shown in Table 1. 1. 1. Convexity in the plot for large hole sizes results from the limited capacity of small-diameter equipment to create large holes. 1. it is not even clear what industry the values came from.S. but no complete update is yet available. known by its Dutch acronym COVO. Its example of a distillation column used generic frequencies for pipes and vessels from a study of process plants in The Netherlands published in 1982 [3]. In the case of pipes.2. and most recently updated in 2002 [10]. and from these has determined leak frequencies and size breakdowns for each equipment type.

8 ⫻ 10⫺6 ⫺10 3 ⫻ 10 2. Figure 3.6 ⫻ 10⫺7 ⫺9 6 ⫻ 10 5.6 ⫻ 10⫺6 Figure 2. The overall frequency is similar for both data sets.3 ⫻ 10⫺6 ⫺10 1 ⫻ 10 8. Ratios between offshore and onshore generic leak frequencies. The overall frequency refers to a minimum hole size of 1 mm December 2005 251 . that were current in 1993 before the offshore data became available.8 ⫻ 10⫺7 ⫺8 1 ⫻ 10 8. Leak size distribution for HSE offshore data. but most are increased.4) hole size.Table 1. The most frequent holes are smaller. but the slopes of the distributions show two key differences produced by the new offshore values: 1.8 ⫻ 10⫺8 ⫺9 3 ⫻ 10 2. at about one leak per year. No. showing the total leak frequency on a base of Process Safety Progress (Vol. Pipe leak frequencies from COVO study [3]. Figure 4 compares results for an example installation. The overall effects depend on the equipment types in the study and on the hole sizes used for the comparison. Some are reduced. sometimes by more than an order of magnitude.24. Pipe Diameter ⱕ50 mm ⬎50 ⱕ 150 mm ⬎150 mm Mode of Failure Catastrophic rupture Significant leakage Catastrophic rupture Significant leakage Catastrophic rupture Significant leakage Leak Frequency (per Section Hour) (per Meter Year) ⫺9 1 ⫻ 10 8.

Are generic leak frequencies higher offshore than onshore? It is a widely held belief in the onshore industry that the more harsh conditions offshore will result in higher leak frequencies. 2. Implications of the Different Frequencies The differences in leak frequencies between the onshore and offshore data sets could be interpreted in two entirely different ways: 1. being more recent and of higher quality. dropped objects. The offshore data set. Table 2.4) . with the difference arising from genuinely higher leak frequencies in the offshore industry. The largest holes are much more frequent. the new offshore values are more than an order of magnitude higher than the traditional onshore values. etc. 252 December 2005 Instances 321 277 920 76 89 267 495 36 237 81 231 323 34 Category Totals 321 1362 1116 588 2. Given that many installations are under common safety management systems onshore and offshore.24. appropriate management controls would be adopted.Figure 4. if the new frequencies are substituted directly into a QRA with no further modification. whereas the traditional onshore values refer to a minimum hole size of 5 mm (a judgment). 1. the causation factors in the offshore data do not provide support for this interpretation (Table 2). For hole diameters ⬎ 100 mm. However. This explains why analysts were content to use onshore data for offshore QRAs before offshore data were available. large changes in the risks can be expected. Causation factors in HSE offshore data [10]. Although the changes are sensitive to the equipment types and modeling techniques. No. it would be expected that where hazards were greater in one environment than another.5. Attempts to make detailed comparisons between Process Safety Progress (Vol. Category Design fault Equipment fault Operational fault Procedural fault Causation Factor — Corrosion/erosion Mechanical defect Material defect Other Incorrectly fitted Improper operation Dropped/impact Left open/opened Other Noncompliance Deficient procedure Other (based on the data in Figure 2). with the effect of minimizing any differences between them. could also be considered valid for the onshore industry. Failure mechanisms associated with the offshore environment (such as salt water corrosion. Thus. the results are dominated by these large hole sizes. In many QRAs. Comparison of overall installation leak frequencies. Both sets could be considered valid.) constitute relatively small proportions of the total and cannot account for the observed order of magnitude difference in frequencies. typically they involve increases of around an order of magnitude in calculated risk. produced sand erosion.

by contrast. 75 ⬍ 100 mm. • The Statistics Report [10] gives hole size distributions for seven hole size groups (⬍10 mm. although in different ways. As a result of the small populations. In addition. involving contractors Scandpower and Safetec in the project. A more pragmatic solution is therefore required to enable this. Despite the HSE data being accepted as the standard for offshore leak frequencies. Project Origin The challenges described above are relevant for the offshore industry as well as the onshore industry. it is impossible to establish confidence limits on the frequency. Therefore. This requires adjustments if the QRA needs to model different hole size categories. such as ignition probabilities. 10 ⬍ 25 mm. Although logical. For example. • Risk estimates based on the offshore frequencies could be accepted as the best available estimates of onshore risks. ⱖ100 mm. and risers). Perhaps existing QRAs incorporated judgmental or fortuitous underestimates of other parameters. Nonzero frequencies are required to avoid bias in the risk results. but they do not want to change other modeling parameters or acceptance criteria and they do not want to see major changes to results that have been widely scrutinized and found credible. but changes might be needed in the acceptance criteria. pipelines. Challenges in Using Offshore Leak Frequencies The key requirement to enable the offshore leak frequencies to be used for onshore QRA is therefore to obtain frequencies that are compatible with current outflow.onshore and offshore leak frequencies for specific equipment types have revealed the poor quality of the onshore values. Up to 2003. 2. analysts and decision makers wish to use the new offshore data in onshore QRAs. 1. and “Not applicable”).1. with severe implications for plants that are to be updated and compared with fixed risk acceptance criteria. different analysts have processed the data in different ways. In reality. several further possibilities arise: • The offshore frequencies could be substituted into onshore QRA with no further modification. December 2005 253 . especially for the larger hole sizes that tend to dominate QRA results. To resolve this. the Norwegian operators Statoil and Norsk Hydro established a project to develop standardized leak frequencies. 50 ⬍ 75 mm. 1. the superior quality of the offshore data would seem to overwhelm concerns about its lack of applicability. so that the results of the QRA depend on the consultant carrying out the analysis. drilling equipment. No. However. These groups may need to be combined to avoid large changes in leak frequency as further data are added. DNV Consulting was commissioned to undertake the work. ignition. which assumes continuous flow from the full hole diameter at full system pressure until controlled by emergency shutdown (ESD). METHOD 2. faced with a simple choice between the two data sets.4) exhaustion. and released quantities indicate that they were quickly isolated. among the 89 process equipment groups. The many possibilities for adjustments of this type may result in a wide range of frequencies being derived from the same original data. It appears that this practice of modeling only the most severe leak scenarios accounts for much of the discrepancy between the new offshore data and the older onshore values. are based on a complete collection of all leak events.6. pressures. thus counterbalancing the underestimated generic frequencies. This would imply that the criteria for decision making should be reviewed to use the new data correctly. practical application of the HSE data has revealed the need for several types of adjustments: • Frequencies are available for 89 separate types and diameters of process equipment (excluding wellhead equipment. blowdown.7. The offshore data. This would imply that many existing onshore risks have been significantly underestimated. the frequency is zero for many hole size and equipment type combinations. given that these data are the latest and best available. These are not compatible with typical QRA outflow modeling.24. if the offshore data are adopted for onshore QRA. In effect. it is necessary to obtain a subset of leak frequencies of scenarios that are consistent with the way onshore QRA is performed in practice. but necessitating modifications to the way they are used in onshore QRA. These groups may need to be combined to match the QRA parts counts. 25 ⬍ 50 mm. • Many of these groups do not have sufficient exposure to show reliable leak frequencies and size distributions. as discussed above. Inspection of the HSE data shows that the leak events include many that occurred at zero pressure or whose recorded sizes. the older values had been adjusted downward to represent only the scenarios normally modeled in onshore QRA. This would imply that the whole QRA methodology should be revalidated to use the new data correctly. only 27 have more than 20 leaks and 18 have no leaks at all. and consequence modeling methodology. General Approach The project decided to make use of the HSE data from the UK Sector because all three contractors were already using these data. or inventory Process Safety Progress (Vol. • The offshore frequencies could be accepted as the best available estimates of onshore frequencies. where the size of the data set is unknown. The work was completed during 2004 [12] with significant involvement from Statoil and Norsk Hydro. all these interpretations are somewhat impractical. Perhaps strict acceptance criteria have evolved to give sensible decisions when combined with underestimated risks. In early 2004. For any new onshore QRA.

This includes: • ESD isolated leaks. 3. to obtain a smooth variation of leak frequency with equipment and hole size. 3. 2. Of the remaining 31% of leaks. Instead. it does not give generic frequencies per equipment item. Zero pressure leaks. The initial release rate from the hole is estimated using simplified equations [11]. valves. and fluid density recorded in HCRD. and thus the f (D) term has been defined for these types. RESULTS 3. Figure 5 shows the breakdown of all leaks in HCRD for the period 1992–2003.1. where the equipment is under pressure but the outflow is much less than that from a leak at the operating pressure controlled only by ESD and blowdown. resulting in a greater outflow. presumed to be controlled by ESD and blowdown of the leaking system.01 barg. QRA-Compatible Leak Scenarios To promote compatibility with different approaches to leak outflow modeling in the QRA. m is the slope parameter.4) . No. The method of allocating leak records in HCRD into the scenarios is as follows. The leak frequency functions and leak scenarios are described in more detail below. because of lack of equipment populations. The DNV leak frequency function has been chosen to meet the following general principles: • There should be a smooth variation of leak fre- quency with hole size and equipment size. and pig traps. This may be because the leak is isolated locally by human intervention (such as closing an inadvertently opened valve) or by a restriction in the flow from the system inventory (such as leaks of fluid accumulated between pump shaft seals). A range of plausible release quantities is estimated based on the system inventory recorded in HCRD and possible ESD and blowdown responses. DNV’s method of obtaining leak frequencies from HCRD has three main steps: 1. presumed to be cases where there is no effective ESD of the leaking system.2. HCRD provides data for different equipment size groups. • An additional element may be added to represent ruptures. Analysis of these showed significant variations of leak frequency with equipment size for pipes. Limited leaks. that is. these are defined as ESD isolated leaks. and manual valves. It may therefore be misleading to apply the constant probabilities above for each equipment type and hole size. This shows that nearly 10% of leaks are at zero pressure and 59% are limited leaks. • The probability of a given hole size should de- crease logarithmically up to equipment diameter. Steel Pipes The leak frequency functions obtained by applying the above method to the HCRD records for leaks from steel pipes during October 1992 to March 2003 (inclusive) are [12]: Process Safety Progress (Vol. Leak Frequency Functions A leak frequency function is an analytical representation of the variation of leak frequency with equipment and hole size. pressure. D is the equipment diameter (mm). but varies significantly between equipment types and also with hole size. Splitting the leak frequencies into different leak scenarios. This leads to the following general leak frequency function: F 共d兲 ⫽ f共D兲d m ⫹ F rup for d ⫽ 1 mm to D. This may be because the equipment has a normal operating pressure of zero (such as open drains) or because the equipment has been depressurized for maintenance. 3% are consistent with late isolation. The additional rupture frequency Frup and the slope parameter m are assumed to be constants. The breakdown of leaks in HCRD into the scenarios is largely independent of hydrocarbon type. Late-isolated and limited leaks are cases where the recorded release quantity is respectively above or below this range. 2. flanges.24. d is the hole diameter (mm). Grouping data for different types and sizes of equipment. based on the hole size. DNV allocates each leak in HCRD to a single scenario and then fits the leak frequency functions for each scenario and each equipment type. where the actual pressure inside the equipment is ⬍0. flanges. • Late isolated leaks. and Frup is the additional rupture frequency (per year). where F(d) is the frequency (per year) of holes exceeding size d. for any equipment type. 2. Fitting analytical leak frequency functions to the data. with a hole size equal to the equipment diameter. implying that on average ESD has been unavailable on 9% of occasions when it was needed. where the outflow is consistent with or greater than a leak at the operating pressure controlled by ESD and blowdown. not to be dependent on equipment size. Where the recorded release quantity in HCRD is within this range. 3. the DNV method divides the leaks in HCRD into three main scenarios: 254 December 2005 1.Available Norwegian data [13] are suitable for validating the approach but. f (D) is the function representing the variation of leak frequency with D.3. where there is insufficient experience to show significant differences between them. 2. As a simple indication of the relative importance of each leak scenario using the methods and criteria above. The Norwegian hydrocarbon leak and ignition probability (HCLIP) database is currently being constructed and will eventually provide suitable Norwegian data. For pipes. to promote compatibility with different approaches to outflow modeling in the QRA. Full leaks.

and d is the hole diameter (mm). Figure 6.01 barg: F zero ⫽ 9.5兲d⫺0. as included in HCRD: Table 3. Ffull is the frequency of full leaks (per meter year). causal factors. It is notable that the total leak frequency from these results is close to the pipe leak frequency based on the original WASH-1400 data [8].24. Table 3 gives the frequencies for selected leak size ranges. the frequency of full leaks above is based on 47 events with hole size ⱖ1 mm in pipes that are 3. thus allowing further analysis of unprecedented detail.0 ⫻ 10⫺6d⫺0.to 11-in.Figure 5. • Total leaks. suitable for modeling as outflow at the normal operating pressure. Leak frequencies for 150 mm diameter pipe.5 ⫹ 1 ⫻ 10⫺6 but not exceeding Ftotal ⫺ Ffull • Limited leaks. whereas the full leak frequencies are consistent with the more judgmental values quoted in the COVO study.74 ⫹ 3 ⫻ 10⫺6 • Full leaks.42 • Zero-pressure leaks. Fzero is the frequency of zero pressure leaks (per meter year). controlled by ESD and blowdown: F full ⫽ 8. controlled by ESD and blowdown: F limited ⫽ Ftotal ⫺ Ffull ⫺ Fzero where Ftotal is the frequency of total leaks (per meter year). Flimited is the frequency of limited leaks (per meter year). in diameter. Figure 6 illustrates the frequency functions for an Process Safety Progress (Vol. D is the pipe diameter (mm). Other Equipment Types Table 4 gives the frequencies of the full leak scenario for different types of process equipment. which as yet has barely started. For example.4) example 150 mm diameter pipe. Event tree presentation of leak scenarios. occurring with an actual pres- sure ⬍ 0. where the pressure is not zero but the outflow is much less than that from a leak at the normal operating pressure. F total ⫽ 3. Leak frequencies (per meter year) for selected hole sizes for 150 mm diameter pipe. The HSE database categorizes the circumstances. A unique feature of the new frequencies is the ability to access the underlying data set.0 ⫻ 10⫺6共1 ⫹ 1000D ⫺1. No. These are examples of the complete set of generic leak freDecember 2005 255 .3兲d⫺1.7 ⫻ 10⫺5共1 ⫹ 1000D ⫺1. and consequences of each of these leaks. 3.2.

Standardized leak frequencies have been developed for different types of process equipment. in particular Stine Musæus.0E-03 6.0E⫹00 1.3. Brian Bain.0E-04 1. it has rarely been used in onshore QRAs because it would tend to give much higher risks than the established but largely judgmental onshore leak frequencies. No.7E-02 1. 1 m length Steel pipes (18 in. The overall results of using these new frequencies for an example installation are included in Figure 4.2E-04 2.) Manual valves (18 in.) Manual valves (2 in. The approach de256 December 2005 Frequency of Full Leaks (ⱖ50 mm Diameter) 0. The author acknowledges their kind support. The author also thanks Art Dowell of Rohm & Haas and John Covan of Sandia National Laboratories. and so the importance of this parameter should be noted in any future data collection.9E-04 quency results that now form the standardized leak frequencies for offshore projects. Frequencies of full leaks (per equipment item year) for process equipment. 3. This is adopted only because of the poor quality of available onshore frequency sources.6E-04 6.5 in. while also being traceable to specific incidents among the modern high-quality offshore leak data. and Jan Pappas.2E-05 4.) (nonpipeline) Instrument (0. using leak frequency functions to ensure that consistent.4E-05 5. Views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of DNV. allowing analysts to use frequencies for only those scenarios that are compatible with their QRA outflow modeling.0E⫹00 3. Sensitivity Tests Sensitivity tests have been conducted to identify the main sources of uncertainty in the generic frequencies.) Flanged joints (18 in.0E⫹00 7.7E-05 2. Although becoming the standard for offshore industry. Guidelines for chemical process quantitative risk analysis Process Safety Progress (Vol. and was funded by Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Despite the arguments for similarity in this paper.6E-07 1.0E⫹00 4.3E-04 5.6E-04 2. and more realistic modeling of these aspects would be desirable in future work.8E-05 2.2E-04 1.3E-04 4. A key longterm aim for the onshore industry should therefore be to gather leak frequency data of a quality comparable to the HSE offshore data.0E-05 1.7E-03 2.1E-04 2. Jens Michael Brandstorp.9E-07 2.2E-03 8. Equipment Type Steel pipes (2 in. Statoil and Norsk Hydro.3E-06 1.0E-03 1. The results are consistent with traditional onshore leak frequencies.) Actuated valves (6 in.).).2E-04 2. The results are very sensitive to the assumed ranges of isolation and blowdown times.3E-05 1. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The work reported in this paper is based on data collected by the Health and Safety Executive.) Process vessel Centrifugal pump Reciprocating pump Centrifugal compressor Reciprocating compressor Heat exchanger (h/c in shell) Heat exchanger (h/c in tube) Heat exchanger (plate) Heat exchanger (air cooled) Filter Frequency of Full Leaks (ⱖ1 mm Diameter) 5. who reviewed the paper and provided helpful comments.4E-05 4.7E-08 4.8E-03 3.Table 4. This shows that the full leaks are roughly an order of magnitude less likely than the unmodified total leaks and are consistent with the traditional onshore values for large hole sizes.1E-06 0. nonzero frequencies are available for any equipment type and hole size.4E-06 scribed here solves this problem by dividing leaks into three scenarios.24. 1 m length Steel pipes (6 in.0E-06 1.). Although there is no evidence of systematic underestimation of the release quantities in HCRD. focusing in particular on the full leak scenario.9E-05 6. Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS).4E-03 1. it is an unavoidable limitation of the approach that the results would be very sensitive to any such bias.1E-05 1.9E-06 0. it remains undesirable to use offshore data for onshore QRA.) Flanged joints (6 in.1E-05 3. LITERATURE CITED 1.0E-03 2.9E-05 3. CONCLUSIONS The hydrocarbon release database collected by the HSE in the UK offshore industry contains data of a quality and quantity that far surpasses any previous leak data in the process industry.4) .2E-08 0. The results are also sensitive to the treatment of cases where the system inventory was not recorded. 1 m length Flanged joints (2 in. and are also considered suitable for onshore QRA studies.) Manual valves (6 in.

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