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CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 1-44

1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING
COMPANY OF ASIA, INC
October 6, 2010
Topic: Article 13 of the Civil Code as Amended by the Administrative
Code
DOCTRINE: Article 13 of the Civil Code is deemed superseded by Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, which thus
means a year is equivalent to 12 calendar months.
FACTS:
On September 30, 2004, Respondent Aichi Forging Company filed a claim
for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002 in the total amount of P3,891,123.82 with the petitioner CIR. The refund
is based on zero-rated sales made by respondent, for which the NIRC allows
a VAT entity (such as Aichi) to claim a refund credit. In denying the
application, petitioner argued that the claim was filed beyond the 2-year
prescription period provided by law. It posited that pursuant to Article 13 of
the Civil Code, since the year 2004 was a leap year (364 days instead of 365),
the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was
beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim for refund was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive
period or not
HELD:
YES, because the claim prescribed in September 30, 2004 and not September
29, 2004. The Court explained that both Article 13 of the Civil Code and
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with
the same subject matter – the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil

Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap
year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed
of 12 calendar months. In the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of
days is irrelevant. The Court further clarified that in this apparent
inconsistency, the Administrative Code must prevail, being the more recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods.
(The claim for refund was still denied. Respondent did not observe the NIRC
requirement of filing a judicial appeal after 120 days from CIR decision or
failure to render a decision. Hence, aside from the 2-year prescriptive period,
the 120-day administrative appeal period must also be observed. Not relevant
to our topic.)
2. WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner, vs. NEW PROSPERITY
PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY, Respondent. June
30, 2014
Topic: Article 13 of the Civil Code as Amended by the Administrative
Code
DOCTRINE: Article 13 of the Civil Code is deemed superseded by Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, which thus
means a year is equivalent to 12 calendar months.
FACTS:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy
filed a case against petitioner for the violation of B.P. 22. In the absence of Uy
and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9,
2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July 2,
2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.On July 2, 2004,
Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.The motion
was granted. After the case was reraffled (judge inhibited), Co then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases.

1 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
ARITCHETA, CELIS, ELUMBA, GAYADOS, IBANEZ, LAUS, PENAFLOR, SOLLER, VALDEZ, VALLEDOR

It was dismissed. MR and petition for reviewer on certiorari under rule 45
was likewise dismissed. However, before the cases were reraffled, a Motion
for Permanent Dismissal was filed by Co. Uy opposed the Motion. The new
judge granted the Motion. After Uy’s MR was denied, she filed a Petition for
Certiorari. The petition was filed. Thus, the RTC ordered that the proceeding
in the lower court proceed. Co filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The
CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for reviewer on certiorari
under Rule 45 with TPO/WPI.

DOCTRINE: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of
the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

Co claims that assuming that the dismissal on June 9, 2003 was provisional, it
became permanent after 1 year from its issuance (June 9) and not upon notice
to offended part and because 2004 (?) was a leap year, the total number of
days is not 365 days. Hence, the dismissal became permanent on June 8,
2004.

Atty. Luna, a lawyer in a big law firm, married Eugenia on September 10,
1947. They begot 7 children. After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY.
LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" whereby they agreed to
live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property. ATTY. LUNA likewise obtained a divorce decree in Dominican
Republic. On the same date, ATTY LUNA married Soledad. They bought a
condo unit in Makati which they paid through installments. Upon full
payment, the CCT was issued in their name as husband and wife. Atty Juan
died. His son Gregorio took over his law books, furniture and equipment
found inside the condo unit. This prompted Soledad to file a case against the
heirs of Atty Luna arguing that the properties in question was obtained
during the existence of their marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the total of number of days in a leap year should be used in
computing the 1-year period for the provisional dismissal to be considered
permanent
HELD:
NO. The fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine
the timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive the criminal cases. Granting for the
sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year
and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the
date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, the Court still
held that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed.
A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a
leap year.3 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a yearis
composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant.
3. SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA, Respondents.July 23, 2014
TOPIC: Nationality Principle

FACTS:

The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs thereby ordering the RD to change the
CCT in favor of Eugenia - from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna". The CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should recognize should recognize the
divorce decree from Dominican Republic.
HELD:
No, because the Nationality Rule applies in the case at bar. Our Family Code
does not recognize divorce. The only two types of defective marital unions

2 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
ARITCHETA, CELIS, ELUMBA, GAYADOS, IBANEZ, LAUS, PENAFLOR, SOLLER, VALDEZ, VALLEDOR

under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.The
non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can
ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
(The Court further ruled on the issue of the validity of the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement and the property relations during the
cohabitation of Soledad and Atty Luna. But as this case was assigned under
Articles 1 to 44 of the Civil Code, I did not include such ruling in this digest.)
4. MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT
November 7, 2008
TOPIC: Nationality Principle; Decree of divorce obtained abroad
DOCTRINE: An absolute divorce secured by an American married to a
Filipino can be recognized in the Philippines despite the former’s eventual
recognition as a Filipino citizen.
FACTS:
Rebecca (an American citizen born in Guam) and Vicente were married on
April 20, 1979. After having their only child Alix, Rebecca initiated divorce
proceeding in Dominican Republic. The Dominican Court ordered the
dissolution of their marriage. After a year, the same Dominican Court issued
a decree settling their property relations pursuant to an Agreement they
executed. Within less than a month from the issuance of the divorce decree,
Rebecca filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The
petition was however later withdrawn with the approval of the court.

Rebecca then executed an Affidavit declaring that she is an American citizen,
that she and Vicente had been living separately, and that she is carrying a
child not of Vicente. She then filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s psychological incapacity.
Aside from such petition, Vicente and Rebecca filed various criminal cases
against each other (bigamy, perjury, concubinage). Vicente’s Motion to
Dismiss and subsequent MR was denied by the RTC, which thus forced
Vicente to file a petition on certiorari to the CA. The CA ruled in favor of
Vicente, reversing the RTC’s decision stating that Rebecca no longer had the
right to have her marriage declared void as she already obtained a divorce
decree as an American citizen. It must be noted that Rebecca was eventually
recognized as Filipino citizen as evidenced by her Philippine passport and ID
Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse can be
recognized in the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes, a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
When the divorce was granted, Rebecca was yet to be recognized as a
Filipino citizen. As an American citizen whose national law recognizes
divorce, she obtained the divorce decree. The Supreme Court emphasized
the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted
by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce
court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the
opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of
partition of their conjugal property. The two elements in Article 26 were
present in the case, and thus, there is no reason to not recognize the divorce
decree.
5. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO ONG,

3 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
ARITCHETA, CELIS, ELUMBA, GAYADOS, IBANEZ, LAUS, PENAFLOR, SOLLER, VALDEZ, VALLEDOR

November 24, 2010

FACTS: HELD: Spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from LBP Legazpi City in the amount of P16 million. had paid with interest at 12% per annum computed from the filing of the complaint. In ruling in favor of the respondent. J. LIBERTY D. They failed to pay the loan. Land Bank is still liable for the return of the P750. IBANEZ. A receipt was issued for his payment.TOPIC: Unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation. (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss. VALDEZ. No.Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank because of a credit investigation about them. He was promised that the P750. As it was not returned. petitioner Alfredo Ong. GAYADOS. Additionally. But while Land Bank is not bound to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage. or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice.000 would cause Land Bank to approve his assumption of the loan of the Spouses Sy and the transfer of the mortgaged properties in his and his wife’s name. VALLEDOR . crime. ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the assumption of mortgage amounted to unjust enrichment. He also submitted the other documents required by Land Bank. and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. Accion in rem verso DOCTRINE: The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay. LBP then foreclosed the mortgage. ALBIOS G. 2013 MENDOZA. Hingco (Branch Head). 198780. or quasi-delict. Land Bank misled Alfredo to believe that he had for all intents and purposes stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Sy. Alfredo was told that there was nothing wrong with the agreement with the Spouses Sy but he was provided with requirements for the assumption of mortgage.000 and to update due or accrued interests on the promissory notes so that LBP could easily approve the assumption of mortgage. ELUMBA. such as financial statements for 1994 and 1995. FAMILY CODE: ARTICLE 1-73 1. Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against LBP claiming that he was lured into believing that his payment of P750.000 would be returned to them. later went to Land Bank to inform it about the sale and assumption of mortgage. the RTC explained that although the Assumption of Mortgage was not perfected. They executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Evangeline’s mother. it is estopped by its action of accepting Alfredo’s payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize Alfredo as the new debtor. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. The CA affirmed the decision. equity and good conscience. unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. under the principle of equity and justice. the following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant has been enriched.000 and personally gave it to Atty.Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another. Alfredo then issued a check for P750. the bank should return the amount Alfredo Yes.By accepting Alfredo’s payment and keeping silent on the status of Alfredo’s application. and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract. Evangeline’s father. SOLLER. No notice of transfer was sent to him. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CELIS. Alfredo only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the subject mortgage properties included in a Notice of Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale. Atty. (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground. October 16.R.000 based on the principle of unjust enrichment.: FACTS: 4 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. quasi-contract. PENAFLOR. LAUS. Hingco then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title of the Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but this never materialized. He was also told that Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed at P750. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper.

Consent Consent must also be conscious or intelligent. and for Fringer. legal in form but entered into as a joke. it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.26 Based on the above.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. 182438. but for a complete absence of consent. Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer alleging that they never had any intention of entering into a marriage to comply their essential marital obligations. stating that the essential requisite of consent was lacking and that their marriage was similar to a marriage in jest.Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer. opining that when marriage was entered into for purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life. for Albios to obtain American citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not a marriage be declared void for lack of consent if it is contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship HELD: No. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective. drugs. CELIS. clearly present.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity. defective. the consideration of $2. and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. VALDEZ. such was farce and should not be recognized from its inception. 2. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.R. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose. VALLEDOR .: FACTS: 5 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal. hence.000. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage. Marriages in jest are void ab initio. Upon appeal of the Office of the Solicitor General. In fact. There was. IBANEZ. After some time. J. as nothing impaired their ability to do so. and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. 2 July 2014. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage void ab initio.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever. RONULO vs. contracted marriage for personal gain. ELUMBA. LAUS. The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. that is. with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status. there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie. the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling. BRION. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage. considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. not for vitiated. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. No. albeit for a limited purpose. Under Article 2 of the Family Code. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. or unintelligent consent.00. SOLLER. the absence of any genuine consent. or hypnotism. GAYADOS. thus. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. PENAFLOR. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of. an American citizen. consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. for consent to be valid. therefore. Genuine consent was. Consent must be REAL in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. intoxication.

without securing the required marriage license. and 2. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized. herein petitioner Ronulo. However. arranged their wedding before a certain priest. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. 2007 FACTS: Petitioner Restituto M. ALCANTARA G. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer. SOLLER. 3. which states that: The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita. or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities. they headed to an Aglipayan Church. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. the church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license. ALCANTARA vs. and 2. IBANEZ. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. through the testimony of its witnesses.Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. they parted ways and lived separate 6 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. in the discretion of the court. Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage ceremony. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. No. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary: As such. for a fee. 167746. Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty. The elements of this crime are: 1. shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month. ELUMBA. The Aglipayan priest. The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA. specifically Article 44. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. LAUS. RULING: Yes. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage. conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. VALLEDOR . Section 44. authority of the solemnizing officer. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A. They met a person who. But on the day of the wedding. August 28. They got married on the same day. There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. Manila. The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. GAYADOS. or both. The second requirement is likewise present since the prosecution. PENAFLOR. on 26 March 1983. In 1988. CELIS. The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. proved that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.R. VALDEZ. With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo. 1.

Cavite. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was celebrated. Cavite. Cavite. the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA G. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona. was issued to them. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly. Hence. there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number. Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his 7 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. represented by GREGORIO Z. VALLEDOR . cannot be given weight because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. SOLLER. PENAFLOR. In her Answer. namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario. No. neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. the court held that it is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. He and Rosita did not go to Carmona. GAYADOS. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. VALDEZ. Restituto appealed. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise. petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Cavite. Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the marriage. or at the very least. After hearing. LAUS. and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement” whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property.R. the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. The CA affirmed the decision. to apply for a marriage license. the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.lives. In this case. LAVADIA vs. ELUMBA. IBANEZ. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA. 4. Luna married Eugenia in 1947. Cavite. J. 2014 BERSAMIN. As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number. 171914. further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Atty. the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. SOLEDAD L. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license. knowingly and voluntarily. CELIS. criminally and administratively liable. supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. July 23. went through a marriage ceremony. Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands. Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage. petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.: FACTS: Atty. ISSUE: Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio? HELD: No. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband and wife. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.

or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. both Filipinos. Who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code. however. 1947 until the present. even if voluntarily obtained abroad. and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12. Pursuant to the nationality rule. After Atty. The divorce between Atty. Atty. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code. 3/4 of the property became hers. 1976. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. ELUMBA. It is true that on January 12. Luna. Luna and her during their marriage. his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio. IBANEZ. 1/2 being her share in the net estate. 1997.marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. Luna’s death in 1997. SOLLER. SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married. the properties were acquired by Atty. which adopted the nationality rule. he married Soledad. to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties. As such. VALLEDOR . In 1977. Dela Cruz. even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse. This finding conforms to the Constitution. filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Luna on July 12. But this was not readily applicable 8 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. Luna and Eugenia. although living abroad. or under a marriage which was void ab initio. ISSUES: 1. The first marriage between Atty. LAUS. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists. 1947. and to the law books HELD: 1. Indeed. Whether or not the divorce decree between Atty. was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10. the divorce. the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. Luna and Eugenia was valid 2. On the same day. Luna. PENAFLOR. and the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code. No. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. or to the status. which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. Luna and Eugenia. the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage. CELIS. 1997 terminated their marriage. the rules on co-ownership would govern. condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines. Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Conformably with the nationality rule. Luna and Eugenia was void. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule. his son in the first marriage. his share in the condominium unit. VALDEZ. Soledad. The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. 2. GAYADOS. no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction. From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10. According to him. and because they had no children.

Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: 1. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. 7. The petitioner. IMBONG vs.) No. 8. 5. SOLLER. ELUMBA. No. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.R. 4. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. did not serve the purpose. 2012. given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. 2. proof of actual contribution was required. CELIS. As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions. as the party claiming the co-ownership. 10354. not being evidence. April 8. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. IBANEZ. Luna and Eugenia. for this presumption to arise. 2014 MENDOZA. GAYADOS. the presumption that Atty. Luna. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. Her mere allegations on her contributions. 204819. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution Petitioners question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. did not discharge her burden of proof. LAUS. J. 3. 6. the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide. was enacted by Congress on December 21. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. Consequently. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. VALDEZ. Luna in the condominium unit. 5. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. FACTS: Republic Act (R. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. OCHOA G.A. VALLEDOR . PENAFLOR. In contrast. However. otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law). support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must 9 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY.

It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. VALLEDOR . 628 SCRA 266. 4. Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 . he discovered that Sto. breastfeeding and infant nutrition. Canada. CELIS. As correctly noted by the OSG. 26 par. However. Two years later. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. despite the registration. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. IBANEZ.be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. A month later. LAUS. the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood. family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. TOMAS 10 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them. However. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Petitioner Gerbert R. DAISYLYN STO. Ontario. GAYADOS. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. series of 1982. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable. ISSUE: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. VALDEZ. Consequently. It was provided further that Sto. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement of attending a family planning seminar as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license violates the constitutional guarantee to freedom of religion HELD: No. PENAFLOR. When he returned to the Philippines. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. August 11. SOLLER. 2010 RE: Whether an alien spouse has a right under Art. 6. and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State. Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. the divorce decree took effect. the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. GERBERT CORPUZ vs. he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. 2 of FC FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. family planning. whether they be natural or artificial. Tomas. The requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. ELUMBA.

However. Remedy Available to Alien Spouse The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree The foreign divorce decree itself. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.M. Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. where he may be found in the Philippines. Without the first marriage being dissolved. CELIS. after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence. FACTS: Minoru Fujiki. Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City. Venue. and (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines. No. 4. VALDEZ.HELD: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. a Japanese national. being a naturalized Canadian citizen now. Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). RTC : Sec. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. 02-11-10-SC. 02-11-10-SC which provides that failure to comply 11 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. 2013 RE: A. On 14 January 2011. Marinay met another Japanese. The petitioner. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. x xxx Sec. that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. SOLLER. 2. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. PENAFLOR. Thus. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. 48. 7. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. MARIA PAZ MARINAY 700 SCRA 69. MINORU FUJIKI vs. married Maria Paz GalelaMarinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgment. Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. LAUS. petition to recognize foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law. serves as a presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse. In 2010. Philippines. at the election of the petitioner. who may file the declaration of nullity. x xx The RTC ruled. In 2008. Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC seeking. No. they lost contact with each other. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A. The marriage did not sit well with Fujiki‘s parents. without further explanation. – (a) Who may file.M. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. the (1) recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). VALLEDOR . pursuant to Sec. Eventually. ELUMBA. among others. IBANEZ. of Art 26 of the Family Code. June 26. or in the case of a non-resident respondent. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. GAYADOS. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par.

condition and legal capacity of its parties. Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. PENAFLOR. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. IBANEZ. No. Rule 108. Who may file petition. the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.M. VALLEDOR .with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition. Rañada. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties. can file the petition to declare their marriage void. this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits.M. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. YES." This is the rule of lexnationalii in private international law. over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen. this Court held that the rule in A. No." in this case either Maekara or Marinay. and not Fujiki. No. In Mijares v. A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. GAYADOS. Thus. the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife.M. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions. Moreover. 2. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto. Thus. ELUMBA. CELIS. ISSUES: 1. The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA.M. the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. No. (Emphasis supplied) 12 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status. even though living abroad. with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. in Juliano-Llave v. VALDEZ. 02-11-10SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. — Any person interested in any act. Republic. the Philippine State may require. HELD: 1. 2." Apparently. condition and legal capacity of such citizen. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. SOLLER. Petition granted. 3. 1. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status. event. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A. condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. for effectivity in the Philippines. or to the status. However. To hold that A. LAUS. which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. NO. order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register.

It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment. The procedure in A. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A. Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. CELIS.M. Circular No. 0211-10-SC. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. No.M. 02-11-10-SC.Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. 1-90 dated February 26. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. The City Civil Registrar of HimamaylanCity. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 2014 RE: MTC judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. VALLEDOR . VALDEZ. 1-90 allows 13 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. JUDGE ROJO 717 SCRA 236. but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. PENAFLOR. under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. February 24. 1990. 02-11-10-SC states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. REX TUPAL vs. as a ground for the nullity of marriage.M. LAUS. Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Moreover. No. He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties‘ marriage. Allegedly. "the term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago. Moreover. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. Negros Occidental. Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. No. Rojo solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. FACTS: Rex M. Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. GAYADOS. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage. IBANEZ. The rulingBraza v. bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. 3. Judge Remegio V. Section 2(a) of A. YES. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A. No. Thus." 8. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Herein petitioner contends that for notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized. notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code.M. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy. the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. ELUMBA. SOLLER. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. is not applicable where the RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.

Marriages.municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. 2008 RE: Civil Code is the governing law. Common-Law Cohabitation FACTS: Jose and FelisaDayot were married on November 24. He further argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. This is when Felisa fraudulently secured his signatures in the purported marriage contract by making him believe that he needed to sign three folded papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. In its report dated July 30. He 14 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. that he did not execute the sworn affidavit and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. he argued that the filing of the administrative case against him was only to delay Frialyn‘s case. ISSUE: Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law HELD: Judge Rojo was guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. VALLEDOR . Binan Laguna. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation. Thus. GAYADOS. Declaration of Nullity. as no marriage ceremony was celebrated. Felisa asked him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall to claim a package sent to Felisa by her brother from Saudi Arabia. 1–90. 1-90. As a solemnizing officer. which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. a judge‘s duty is to personally examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony. Jose insists that he was introduced Felisa only in 1986 and she thereafter became her landlady. VALDEZ. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge‘s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. JOSE DAYOT 550 SCRA 435. the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham. which has a pending perjury case before his sala. Under the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary. In his defense. 2013. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. the Office of the Court Administrator found that respondent judge violated Circular No. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized. 1-90. PENAFLOR. On July 7. In lieu of a marriage license. affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal trial court judges‘official functions and duties. The Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony. March 28. ELUMBA. Thus. Moreover. IBANEZ. 9. LAUS. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation. CELIS. 1993. One day. Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried. and of gross ignorance of the law. 1986 at the Pasay City Hall. SOLLER. Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. herein respondent judge argued that petitioner was only harassing him because he is the father of FrialynTupal. According to the OCA. there was no violation pursuant to Circular No. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA.

Felisa sought reconsideration but to no avail.meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years .and continuity that is unbroken. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The OSG filed a separate petition praying for the reversal of the CA‘s decision which declared the marriage between Felisa and Jose void ab initio. GAYADOS. Jose‘s cause of action relating to fraud had already prescribed. The Civil Code. and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement. jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage. being unmarried. CELIS. and that. Jose even wrote Felisa‘s name as his wife in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12. one year after his alleged discovery of the purported marriage contract. VALLEDOR . this material fact cannot be dispensed with. TheCA accepted the argument that Jose and Felisa‘s case is one of exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil which allows the execution of affidavit in lieu of marriage license. Felisa declared. ELUMBA. action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible For the exception in Article 76 (old CC) to apply. VALDEZ. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement. effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. ISSUE: YES. the CA reversed itself and declared the marriage between Jose and Felisa void ab initio when it determined that the affidavit of marital cohabitation was false with respect to the five-year period prescribed by law. No other reading of the law can be had. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid. but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. According to him. places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. in no ambiguous terms. The CA initially affirmed the RTC‘s decision on the ground that the circumstances do not fall squarely with the grounds constituting fraud pursuant to the Civil Code. LAUS. The CA gave credence toJose‘s opposition which cited the legal condition that the man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. HELD: The RTC ruled in favor of Felisa stating among others that Jose‘s version is implausible because any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him sign a blank sheet of paper. it was only in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa when he saw the alleged marriage certificate on top of the sala table. that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife without the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980 but deferred to contract marriage on account of their age difference. A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. However. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage. Hence this petition. Falsity of Affidavit not a mere irregularity. Additionally. IBANEZ. Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. characterized by exclusivity . 15 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. PENAFLOR. SOLLER. it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. To settle all doubts. 1988. for her part. since the language of Article 76 is precise.reluctantly signed then immediately left. they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

Teresita Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. Bayadog: 16 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. PENAFLOR. executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license. VALDEZ. GAYADOS. is beyond question. Nevertheless. it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child. Yes. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar. ELUMBA. No. HELD: 1. and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. Perwel. The appellate court also cited Felisa‘s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. and that he was merelyprevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state. Whether the child is the daughter of petitioner. However. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made. VALLEDOR . their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. REINEL DE CASTRO vs. or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and was denied. They plannedto get married. and thus obliged to give her support. sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.R. 160172. LAUS. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. and that the official. in order to push through with the plan. respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. ANNABELLE DE CASTRO G. Respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. 2008 RE: The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked ISSUE: FACTS: 1. petitioner and respondent went back to 2. claiming that their marriage is voidab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit. priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. the marriage license had already expired. thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. In her complaint. after the ceremony. IBANEZ. Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994. 10. The couple got married on the same date. Thus. in lieu of a marriage license. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa‘s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor. Therefore. the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties' marriage. Trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. February 13. and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. CELIS. Citing Nial v. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986.It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. SOLLER.

Leonila G. Instead. LAUS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever. in fact. an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. testified for the prosecution. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty. No. 2. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. there was no cohabitation at all. IBANEZ. She alleged that she had met petitioner on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. PENAFLOR. LEONILA G. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation. *Article 34 – Marriage without a marriage license . because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes. such as but not limited to determination of heirship. SOLLER. July 15. SANTIAGO v. In the instant case. asked petitioner to marry him. there was no scandalous cohabitationǁ to protect. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.R.[27] Thus. Petitioner asserted that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy. In the instant case. one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only or after she had already married Santos. and therefore entitled to support. shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. Santiago and Nicanor F. GAYADOS.“However. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. settlement of estate. it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. VALLEDOR . 5 years cohabitation period Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. it is a mere scrap of paper. she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license. dissolution of property regime. who was a 43-yearold widow then. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. YES. VALDEZ. the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio." while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 2015 FACTS: The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos. married Santos. 200233. the first wife. Petitioner. whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. However. CELIS. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Under the Family Code. the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter. legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case. other than for purposes of remarriage. ELUMBA. or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws 11. or a criminal case for that matter. a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Estela Galang. When such need arises. his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution. who had been married to Estela Galang. or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four months after the solemnization of their marriage. but in this case. Petitioner moved for 17 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY.

which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. the heirs of the 18 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. reflected the exact opposite of this fact. ELUMBA. and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. In violation of our law against illegal marriages. Enrico. MEDINACELI GR NO. CELIS. RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. petitioner said that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife for 21 years openly and publicly. which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. signed by Santos and Santiago. On October 11 2005. as an inviolable social institution. which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. SEPTEMBER 28. hence. VALDEZ. On appeal." It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. It is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy. 2007 *Article 34 . PENAFLOR. EULOGIO B. GAYADOS. IBANEZ. which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license. they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. Cagayan. LOLITA D. petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. HEIRS OF SPS. The Certificate of Marriage. Consequently. 12. was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. 02-11-10-SC that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. ISSUE: Is the second marriage of Santiago valid. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage. however. In her Answer. Petitioner now seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law. it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. It will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction. They had 2 children who carried the surname of Eulogio. Respondents averred that the marriage between Eulogio and the petitioner was entered into without the requisite marriage license. Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code. this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy. petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. for there to be a conviction for bigamy? HELD: YES. VALLEDOR . contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. ENRICO v. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code. SOLLER. 173614.reconsideration which was denied. Respondents contend that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli was dissolved only upon the latter's death on May 1 2004. Respondents likewise raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible. the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. LAUS. is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio Medinaceli (deceased) and petitioner Lolita D. and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract. Santiago and Santos. She contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo. Therefore. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage. Who file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage FACTS: Respondents filed with the RTC. It cited section 2 par (a) of Administrative Matter No.

However. this petition. petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. 1992.M. and (e) sum of money and damages. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.M. 02-11-10-SC which provides that petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. VALLEDOR . 02-11-20-SC only applies where both parties to a void marriage are still living. ELUMBA.M. on 1 June 2006. Hence. docketed as Civil Case No. HELD: A. the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. No. No. he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. what should be resorted in this case in esolving such issue is A. No. Teofilo died intestate. (d) reconveyance. In 1994. 2008 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. The marriage of petitioner and Eulogio took effect after the effectivity of the Family Code. Scope. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies in the case at bar. In August 1995. CELIS. 16. Upon Teofilos death. It said Section 2(a) of A. which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 02-11-10-SC applies to the case. SOLLER. the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition. Eventually.M. petitioner commenced an action. 1994. 02-11-10-SC . On May 13.R. RTC reversed its ruling on October 11 2005 and reinstated the complaint saying that it ignored the ruling in Niñal vs. In his complaint. Teofilo. Parcel No. petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City. LAUS. VALDEZ. CARLOS vs. compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent. Thus. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs. 179922 Dec. against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage. No.M. 13. in turn.M. dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them. He was survived by respondents: Felicidad and their son Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). No. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. No. petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. IBANEZ. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the marriage during that time is the Civil Code. The Niñal ruling cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. (c) recovery of property. Where one or both parties are deceased. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In the said case. undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir. SANDOVAL G. upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. ISSUE: Whether the Niñal ruling or A. the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. A.deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void. not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages FACTS: Spouses Felix B. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos. 95-135. No. On September 17. GAYADOS. 19 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. Bayadong which is the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. but *Who may file . PENAFLOR. (b) status of a child. to wit: Section 1. Teofilo II. Parcel Nos. However.

hence. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. SOLLER. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages. not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. IBANEZ. VALDEZ. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage. it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. in Niñal v. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. 2. for. and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses. No. It is emphasized. CELIS. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest and must be based on a cause of action.ISSUES: 1. Whether or not any person can question the validity of marriage. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. VALLEDOR . GAYADOS. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14. however. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. Petitioner is misguided. the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage. HELD: 1. 0211-10-SC. the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage.M. like any other actions. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Whether or not judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment is allowed in a proceeding for nullity of marriage. the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to 20 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. Thus. 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment. ELUMBA. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.M. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. 2. however. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. and. While A. Badayog. This is so. 1962. or even in the Family Code. 1988. that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15. 2003 is prospective in its application. as the new Rule which became effective on March 15. They can still protect their successional right. can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. NO. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3. On the other hand. LAUS. PENAFLOR. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor. No.

too. August 11. ISIDRO ABLAZA VS. Nevertheless. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26. IBANEZ. LAUS. 158298 . He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to onehalf of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death.R. CELIS. According to Carlos v. However. PENAFLOR. 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest. 2003. No. 02-1110-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code. 14. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. thereby making him a real party in interest. or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. SOLLER. Hence. No. 0211-10-SC. No.M. who. as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife. then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. GAYADOS. only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action.M. the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan. 1988.M. that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. VALLEDOR . No. Here. 1949. Specifically. for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. 1950. 2003. ELUMBA. those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15. Thus. but. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation. 2010 * A. of A. No. which took effect on August 3. could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time. on October 18. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be. and that any person. due to such license being issued only on January 9. 2000. the RTC. VALDEZ.M. HELD: YES. due to the marriage being void ab initio. that the petitioner and Leonila 21 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. being a procedural rule that is prospective in application. Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26. we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila. as affirmed by the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner is not a party to marriage. or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case. even after the death of Cresenciano. the applicable law was the old Civil Code. Hence. himself included. However. the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM 02-1110-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. the effectivity date of A. 2000. as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit. to wit: 1) Those commenced before March 15. A. the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. and 2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and. Based on Carlos v. is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) FACTS: On October 17. We take note. 2003. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Sandoval. this petition. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Section 2 (a).declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest.

186400 . and. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. No.were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza. CELIS. Leonila and Leila. Section 1 of the Rule. 2003.Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law on July 10. an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. 2006. the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage. 2010 HELD: No.R.” Applying the rule verba legis. No. ELUMBA. VALLEDOR . reads: *Am-02-11-10-SC . Also. if the Family Code covers the case then a motion of ISSUE: Whether or not A. VALDEZ. Respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and hereby granted. The said court procedure required a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal cases on declaration of absolute nullity on void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages. since the respondent refused to comply with the precondition of filing a motion for reconsideration. Scope – This rule shall govern petitions for declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. Petitioner filed her manifestation and a motion for partial reconsideration but was denied by the appellate court as the 15-day reglementary period to file is not extendable. 16. 1988. “Section 1. ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE v. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability. and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Petitioner filed this said petition to the Supreme Court contending that the appellate court erred in ruling that their case is not covered by the Family Code. were the wife and daughter. the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages. no 02-11-10 SC “Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of void marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” is applicable to the case. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15. IBANEZ. the Court finds itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA." In the case at bench. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A. No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3. BOLOS vs. is explicit in its scope. the categorical language of this section leaves no room for doubt. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila. respectively. October 20. The decision as declared final after a motion to reconsider denial of appeal was denied.M. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 22 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. BOLOS G. GAYADOS. The appellate court ruled that AM no 02-11-10-SC did not apply to the case at bar as their marriage was solemnized Feb 14 1980 before the Family Code took effect. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza. reconsideration is a precondition for an appeal. SOLLER. As a defendant in that action. namely: Leonila G. No. 15. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration after respondent received the decision of the lower court. of the late Cresenciano. DANILO T. PENAFLOR. 2003.M. As such. in fact. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. LAUS. Ablaza. CYNTHIA S.M. that AM no 02-11-10-SC covers/pertains to the word “petitions” instead of “marriages”. Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. a relaxation on the rules of appeal is not proper. The RTC granted her petition on August 2.

and raffled to RTC Branch 109. No. No. Estrellita’s argument is that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. Adib. No. in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. 183896 January 30. under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. ELUMBA. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31. his widow. 1993. except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34. which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. PENAFLOR. as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir. 17. in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights.M. In their marriage contracts. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ZORAYDA AND ADIB HAVE THE LEGAL STANDING TO HAVE ESTRELLITA’S MARRIAGE DECLARE VOID AB INITIO? COURT’S RULING Zorayda and Adib. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27. filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights. A. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A. 1993 in Cotabato City and. VALDEZ. SOLLER. is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Both the RTC and the CA declared such marriage bigamous and as such. 1994. 03-0382CFM. On November 23. 1958 under civil rites.R. The complaint alleged that Sen. it has been held that in a void marriage. No. Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen.R. Tamano s wife. Since then. 169766. and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. subsequently. 02-11-10-SC. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage 23 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. 02-11-10-SC. Tamano for being bigamous. Tamano (Adib). which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda. IBANEZ. Since A. LAUS. No. GAYADOS. Title I of the same Code FACTS: The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City.M. CELIS. as the injured parties.G. any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription. have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. 2011 Del Castillo. March 30. Lanao del Sur on June 2. void ab initio. which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. FACTS: Around 11 months before his death. 2013 A marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning. private respondents HajaPutriZorayda A. Sen. docketed as Civil Case No. J. SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs GLORIA GOO ABBAS G. Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. VALLEDOR .: In a void marriage.M. and upon his death. Chapter 2. Sen.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license. 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted. Cavite on January 8. Cavite to apply for a marriage license. and they were married on August 9. He testified that the certification dated July 11. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. Felicitas Goo. Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic). Cavite. and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. to check on their marriage license. 1993. PENAFLOR. VALLEDOR . ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. located at 2676 F. Encarnacion. or a copy thereof. and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number. Chapter I. ELUMBA. On January 9. Cavite. Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. the sponsor of the wedding and the one who asked a certain Qualing to secure the marriage license for the couple. as Marriage License No. to any other person. RTC: held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. testified that he met Gloria. SOLLER. Marriage License No. was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan. In July of 2003. Title 1 of Executive Order No. Leodivinia C. 269. and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. it is stated that Marriage License No. ISSUE: Whether or not a valid Marriage License had been issued for the couple? HELD: No. and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. Manila. 9969967 was issued for ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19. As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony. the solemnizing officer. as provided for in Article 4. and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite. 1993. 1993 was void ab initio. 1993. was presented to the solemnizing officer. 9969967. one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. Muñoz St. CA: gave credence to Gloria’s arguments. Cavite. otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines. GAYADOS. he was at his mother-in-law’s residence. the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9.license. and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license 24 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. IBANEZ. 2003. certifying that Marriage License No. was issued and signed by LeodivinaEncarnacion. and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona. and May Ann Ceriola. The Municipal Civil Registrar. Ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed. a Pakistani citizen. issued at Carmona. and granted her appeal. Atty. namely 9969967. issued a certification on July 11. Cavite. At the trial court. 1993. but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. one of the sponsors of the wedding. as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. CELIS. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted. Gloria testified on her own behalf. VALDEZ. In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed. which was issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona. 9969967. the mother of Gloria. 9969967 was issued. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife. in Taiwan in 1991. It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. and that he had never resided in that area. 9969967. the place where Marriage License No. Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona. in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. 9969967 had been issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan. Malate. LAUS. He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. a Filipino citizen. and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.. when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. Syed. Cavite. Lorenzo Sanchez. and presented Reverend Mario Dauz. For her part. he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona.

VALLEDOR . 36 Psychological incapacity. SUAZO vs. anecdotal at best. It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus. so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. as no license was presented by the respondent. or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks. Cavite. SOLLER. a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. and incurability can be duly established. The Marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions. JOCELYN M. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES It is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity. PENAFLOR. but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art.” CA reversed said decision and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse. IBANEZ.e. having admitted to not reading all of its contents. whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license. Atty. i. Sanchez. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed. A year after their marriage. VALDEZ. based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. neither party resided. admittedly. could not even testify as to the contents of the license. is void ab initio. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. CELIS. LAUS. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. She took no pains to apply for the license. having been solemnized without a marriage license. ELUMBA. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage. Cavite. Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license. otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism. further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed. Without any means to support themselves. Felicitas Goo.In the instant case. and thus. or the failure or refusal 25 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. GAYADOS. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license.. Gloria inexplicably failed to do so. Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin. lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility. FACTS: AngelitoSuazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Jocelyn left Angelito. one of the sponsors. could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity. The evidence that she got from the petitioner. such as “immaturity. a location where. However. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. juridical antecedence. admitted not knowing where the license came from. 18. 10 years later. Her mother. as none of them applied for the license in Carmona. the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence. Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. irreconcilable differences. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. CELIS. do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36. incapacity. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. VALLEDOR . recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. gambling and refusal to find a job. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence. Thus. on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision. (b) alleged in the complaint. HELD: The Court find the petition devoid of merit. by themselves. ISSUE: It is not enough that the respondent. A’s testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness. between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. VALDEZ. show psychological NOTE: The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. ELUMBA. emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like. (c) sufficiently proven by 26 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family. Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychologist was conspicuously silent. had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition. Court of Appeals(Molina) as follows: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder. supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic. All these simply indicate difficulty. IBANEZ. while indicative of psychological incapacity. or was unwilling to perform these obligations. this is not true for Angelito’s. inviolability and solidarity. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link. sexual infidelity or perversion. grave and incurable. Mere difficulty. could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. LAUS.to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. medical or the like. GAYADOS. however. thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. PENAFLOR. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. using meager information coming from a directly interested party. this case. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified. The psychlologist. Hence. neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. alleged to be psychologically incapacitated. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. SOLLER. The psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. do not.

ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensorvinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. which will be quoted in the decision. 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Furthermore. In other words. and incurability can be duly established. further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations. The Solicitor General.juridical antecedence. ELUMBA. the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. GAYADOS. an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have 27 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. neglect or difficulty. to the petition. IBANEZ. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming. Marcos. merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos. as the case may be. should be given great respect by our courts x xx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. CELIS. not a refusal. Marcos v. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Pesca clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending. could not have given valid assumption thereof. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological . (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. not necessarily to those not related to marriage. there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. Thus. proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition. VALLEDOR . subsequent jurisprudence holds. much less ill will. or prior thereto. or knowing them. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. LAUS. and a different view is adopted. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220. PENAFLOR. but the illness itself must have attached at such moment. not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x xx (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. along with the prosecuting attorney. SOLLER. VALDEZ. like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Molina. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time. A later case. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition. Accordingly. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification. occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. mild characteriological peculiarities. mood changes.not physical. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse. it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity. Pesca v. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled. while not controlling or decisive.

the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. not on the basis of a priori assumptions. LAUS. IBANEZ. Yu-Te(Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines. Thus. may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. Te launched an attack on Molina. Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application. Court of Appeals. somehow. the Court. as so intended by its framers. Te said: Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts. VALDEZ. Molina. The subsequent Ting v. it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. VALLEDOR . following Antonio v. Again. explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party. cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated. that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. As a final note though. It said that the resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted. upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings. guided by experience. saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law. predilections or generalizations. by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines. wittingly or unwittingly. ruled that the senseless and Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged. Going back to its basic premise. far from abandoning Molina. forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Reyes. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of 28 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. SOLLER. the Court. VelezTing follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina. although not binding on the civil courts. but that. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. schizophrenics. it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. narcissists and the like. and by decisions of church tribunals. it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Importantly. PENAFLOR. and by decisions of church tribunals that. on a case-to-case basis. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. toTe. has allowed diagnosed sociopaths. Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value. Court of Appeals. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. has become a strait-jacket. non respicit. she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. in conveniently applying Molina. Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing. guided by experience. in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina. been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. ELUMBA. had. but according to its own facts. protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity. With this as backdrop. CELIS. the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines. GAYADOS. the Court. to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lexprospicit. All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals. the Court.Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. in Tsoi v. nymphomaniacs.

Marcosasserts. 19. GAYADOS. the evidence must show a link. that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. ELUMBA. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity. what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders. for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave. And as Marcos v. Verily. therefore. If all these sound familiar. instead. gravity and incurability requisites. at that time. and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. for they are but iterations of Santosjuridical antecedence. irreconcilable differences.Mere difficulty. SOLLER. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases. must not discount but. LAUS. in 2001 Enrique filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Art.[25] It is not enough that the respondent. refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code. that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert. medical or the like. 36 of the Family Code) FACTS: Enrique A.[Underscoring supplied] This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. They contracted marriage in 1973 and were blessed with four children. 170729. CELIS. had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations. Te. they do. courts. sexual infidelity or perversion. clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. x xxx Hernandez v. Enrique. Velez-Ting. was 24 yrs old while Erlinda was 17 years old. which it expounded on as follows: By the very nature of Article 36. if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. VALDEZ.psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference. Agraviador (Enrique) met Erlinda A. ERLINDA AGRAVIADOR G. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity. must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like. December 8.R. J Topic: Psychological incapacity(Art. Under this evolutionary development. there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician. However. Agraviador (Erlinda) in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. PENAFLOR. severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. but we mention nevertheless for emphasis. between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. or was unwilling to perform these obligations. despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making. 2010 Brion. No. alleged to be psychologically incapacitated. IBANEZ. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36. instead of substantially departing from Molina. VALLEDOR . ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR VS. This is not to mention. 36 of the Family Code citing psychological incapacity to exercise the essential 29 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY.

refuses to do household chores.obligations of marriage on the part of Erlinda. the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. She also denied having extra marital affairs and maintain that it was Enrique who refuse to do marital act with her and that He wanted to have their marriage annulled inorder to marry their former household helper Enrique presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his claims through the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. GAYADOS. PENAFLOR. He also claimed that she refuses to have marital act with him because she became close with a male bolder and discover their love notes to each other and caught them inside his room several times. the totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity. ELUMBA. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondent’s personality disorder was serious. in resolving all COURT’S RULING: No. his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondent’s condition. consulted a witch doctor to bring him bad faith and refuses to use the family name ‘Agraviador’ in her activities. CELIS. carefree.Petitioner’s testimony failed to establish that the respondent’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. IBANEZ. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. as the one in Molina. RTC nullified the marriage finding merit on in Enrique’s testimony and Dr. the cure would be beyond the respondent’s means to undertake. Dr. or if it were otherwise. had an affair with a lesbian. did not care for their sick child. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. he relied only on the information fed by the petitioner. neither did he mention that the respondent’s malady was incurable. involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. Thus. the parties’ second child. with respect to psychological incapacity. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation report. Erlinda moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition. Petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage. while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner’s own psychological condition. grave and permanent and that no proof of a natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated Erlinda from accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Juan Cirilo Patac.” “does not want to change. grave or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Court of appeals reversed the RTC’s decision and find that Dr. and household helper. forcing all cases only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because. as she was irresponsible. which is not cases of psychological incapacity. no case can be considered as on "all 30 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent. Molinaunintentionally became a straightjacket. The court also finds that Dr. Yu-Tedeclared that it may have been inappropriate for ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations the Court to impose a rigid set of rules. The petitioner’s declarations that the respondent “does not accept her fault. stay away from their house for long period of time. NOTE: The court in Ngo Te v. SOLLER. VALLEDOR . LAUS.” and “refused to reform” are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious. VALDEZ.

we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina. Kenneth filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Rowena. The Rowena. after investigation. The said relationship between Kenneth and involving psychological incapacity must be resolved on a case-to-case basis Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. After marriage. Rowena incapacity. Rowena however suggested that he should get in his inheritance instead so that they could live together separately or just stay Molina. 161793 February 13. IBANEZ. The Chinese gathering at a school campus.fours" with another. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity college. Four years later. The Solicitor General (OSG) appealed and the Court of Appeals that they share the same angst with their families. Ngo Te. while Rowena was still egocentrically involved with herself.R. money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their respective home. One month later. Kenneth of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or initially refused on the ground that he was still young and jobless. far from hidden from Rowena’s family. petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological Kenneth however was already disinherited. submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the two parties. GAYADOS. put into question the applicability of a court and had had them be married. In be disinherited. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine Rowena’s persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. 20 EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YUTE G. simply We suggested also explained Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering with her uncle. Rowena proposed to Kenneth that they should elope. Kenneth was able to escape and he was these cases. stayed with her uncle’s house where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner. ELUMBA. Suazosquarely met the Meanwhile. They did not have interest with each trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the findings of the expert other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact psychologist. No. Upon knowing this. SOLLER. Subsequently. CELIS. Velez-Ting and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Every case psychologically incapacitated. But due to incurable (Molina case). The City Prosecutor. said that it is better if they live separate lives from then on. LAUS. it relaxation of its stringent requirements. Eventually. Ting v. and relied only on the information provided by Kenneth. Kenneth and Rowena time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina. therefore. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to abandoning the live with his parents instead. Kenneth was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu at a Filipino- boredom. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. In 1996. PENAFLOR. The FACTS: break-up was caused by both parties’ unreadiness to commitment and their young age. 2009 Rowena did not file an answer. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will issue and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. while still in ruled in favor of the OSG. VALLEDOR . The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are Article 36: Psychological Incapacity – Molina Case Merely a Guideline. Rowena’s uncle brought the two before 31 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. VALDEZ. the case was tried.

the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines. predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. and by decisions of church tribunals. All these were requirements without advice from others. guided by experience. the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines. Opinions of psychologists. Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected 32 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. VELEZ-TING admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina. such is possible. guided by experience. He is too dependent on others. and they were wed on July 26. In her complaint. are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. and by decisions of church tribunals. physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be impulsiveness. On October 21. only became manifest thereafter. They fell in love. the SC merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. as “courts should interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis. petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. severe and incurable psychological incapacity. And. Carmen stated that prior to their marriage. juridical antecedence and incurability. LAUS. The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly. not on the basis of a priori assumptions. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together. SOLLER. after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old. GAYADOS. The SC ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. COURT’S RULING: DOCTRINES: Yes. Because of his drinking habit. Both parties being afflicted with grave. SC did not abandon the Molina Doctrine. But after they were married. the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by and rendering help and support. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein and that there is not much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently. however. TING v. He would confront and insult respondent. The principle that each case must be judged. Rowena cannot set forth in the Molina caseto be followed as guidelines. 1993. VALDEZ. the it may a. IBANEZ. which. for he is unable to make everyday decisions gravity. to repeat for emphasis. ELUMBA.Further. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house. CELIS.” The SC however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines. respect and fidelity b. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage. VALLEDOR . while highly advisable. PENAFLOR. observing love. 21.

The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio by reason of psychological incapacity RULING: 1. it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules. guided by experience. forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. In fact. must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. but such statement. In EdwardKenneth Ngo Te v. with respect to psychological incapacity. CELIS. as in any other given case presented before it. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. ELUMBA. courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. GAYADOS. 2. She merely cited that prior to their marriage. it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause. accordingly. are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. by itself. no case can be considered as on all fours with another. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. Now.But where. petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine. the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines. which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because. ISSUES: 1. in hindsight.to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. and more particularly. Accordingly. she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends.We have not. while highly advisable. In this case. Coming now to the main issue. we reverse the trial courts and the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio. SOLLER. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable. By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. VALDEZ. and by decisions of church tribunals. be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. juridical antecedence. We said that instead of serving as a guideline.At best. the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause. Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket. as in this case. No. then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. IBANEZ. as the one in Molina. if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. then such expert opinion should be presented and. VALLEDOR . 2. gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity. we declared that. PENAFLOR. is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem. but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same. However. The trial court. LAUS. Whether or not the Molina Doctrine was abandoned. 33 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband. such opinions. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te.

These are clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligation to his wife such as showing respect. GAYADOS. and also his uncalled for display of his jealousy. prevail. 34 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. Oate did. In this case. his being indolent by not at least trying to look for a job so that he could also help his wife in supporting his family. the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his immaturity. Dr. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. VALLEDOR . CUISON-MELGAR DOCTRINE: As the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. constitutional laziness. maltreatment. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder. SOLLER. the balance tilts in favor of Dr. In the present case. Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. Moreover. there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Arneldo. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Norman. understanding and love to her. we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. 22.The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins brothers. According to Norma. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. IBANEZ. therefore. 1996. In fact. which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. LAUS. Obras opinion because. habitual alcoholism. Logically. The attendant circumstances in this case really point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply with his responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his wife and a loving father to his children. Without any communication to his family since 1985. the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must.. however. namely. It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person. ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void ab initio by reason of psychological incapacity RULING: No. Defendant also became indifferent to the needs of his own children who really longed for a father who is willing to make the sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them. Norma admitted in her testimony that her marital woes and Eulogio’s disagreeable behavior started only after the birth of their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job. 1965. On August 19. and abandonment of his family since December 27. The RTC nullified the marriage by reason of psychological incapacity. Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. PENAFLOR. it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological. Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan City. unbearable jealousy. The RTC reasoned that: With the testimony of the petitioner. Fermin. Eulogio was already suffering from a psychological defect. perforce. VALDEZ. Sadly. subjecting his family to physical maltreatment and many times caused them to be scandalized. aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. 1985. CELIS. certaining [sic] reconciliation and love would be improbable. Molina. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin. the Court is convinced that defendant has been incorrigible in his vices such as habitual alcoholism. Obras findings. ELUMBA. REPUBLIC v. She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married. as well as his (Dr. Their union begot five children. illness. not physical. Marion Joy. while Dr. and Eulogio III. FACTS: On March 27.

he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment. Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. illness. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature. constitutional laziness. They begot three children: Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another mans child. The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogio’s immaturity. not physical. and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. These circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. FACTS: Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. at the time of.43 At best. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family. and abandonment of his family. Richardson. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and void. CELIS. already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. and his and Dr. psychiatrist Dr. LAUS. IBANEZ. She left the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. unbearable jealousy. the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. 221. it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological. Rachel Anne. He was an overseas seaman. Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract. Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4. Cecilia R. Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. VALDEZ. and not merely physical. it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person. so their children had to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardo’s parents. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. and Ric Jayson. PENAFLOR. no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72. 35 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. Molina. RemigioZari of the City Court of Quezon City.220. Many times. RICARDO TORING v. he 23. GAYADOS. the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person.Further. On February 1. 1999. Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her. coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo. ELUMBA. As the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. and 225 of the Family Code. without more. habitual alcoholism. Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children. VALLEDOR . maltreatment. During one of his visits to the country. TERESITA TORING DOCTRINE:We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson (children). At the trial. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the petition. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to. Albarans respective testimonies. When confronted by Ricardo. however. more than twenty years after their wedding. SOLLER. Albaran. and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife. was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Teresita. 1978 before Hon. an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

stayed at home as a housewife. and went out on dates with other men when he was not around. Dr. became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage. earning P8. we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that. Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar contracted marriage in Pampanga. but the notice remained unanswered. VALLEDOR . Apparently relying on the same basis. derived solely from onesided sources. as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu.noticed that Teresita’s stomach was slightly bigger. and was most painfully unmindful of him. also most unsupportive.500. Ricardo reported. 1999. The respondent worked as an artistillustrator at the Clark Development Corporation. He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another. GALANG DOCTRINE: The psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. IBANEZ. ELUMBA. REPUBLIC v. the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the 36 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. LAUS. controlling and demanding person. of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single. coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson. Christopher. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage. presented in evidence. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations. was stubborn and independent. Albaran added that Teresitas disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his. that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita. VALDEZ. critical and uncooperative. On August 4. had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife. GAYADOS. in this case. They have one child. already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations.00 monthly. she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson. on the other hand. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. other than these. which she narrated in her evaluation. no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired. FACTS: On March 9. Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant. Mabalacat. Dr. Dr. though. Cecilia R. To say the least. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. who mostly had her way in everything. without more. Pampanga. PENAFLOR. as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by withdrawals. She admitted. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio by reason of psychological incapacity RULING: No. too. 1994. She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest son). SOLLER. They resided in the house of the respondent’s father in San Francisco. CELIS. 24. Juvy. To support her findings and conclusion. materialistic. she sent Teresita a personally delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation. was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family.

even if true. VALLEDOR . the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Again. these allegations. IBANEZ. In Brenda B. to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was extremely serious and appears to be incurable. She. innate immaturity. We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account. all occurred during the marriage. she jumped to the conclusion that Juvyappeared to be incurable or incorrigible. deceived people to borrow cash.These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty.00 that the respondent entrusted to her. Previous doctrines laid down by the SC. According to the respondent. as amended. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and associations. the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity. The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. which was discussed in this case: In Leouel Santos v.. LAUS. Juvy was hesitant to change. ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void ab initio by reason of psychological incapacity RULING: No. GAYADOS. distorted discernment and total lack of care. and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause.. To hark back to what we earlier discussed. under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence. ELUMBA. love and affection [towards him and their] child. (b) juridicalantecedence." "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage. failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects. From this premise. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money. as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler.000. how she acted before and at the time of the marriage. Marcos v.declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy. (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check. The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast. Juvy suffers from mental deficiency. Court of Appeals. that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible. These acts. played mahjong and kuhawo for money. psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. stole money from the respondent. Court of Appeals and RoridelOlaviano Molina. et al. whose salient points are footnoted below. SOLLER. and (c) incurability. and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house. to our mind. CELIS. (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives. PENAFLOR. she merely stated that despite the respondent’s efforts to show love and affection. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15. VALDEZ. likewise. and (g) indulged in gambling. Simply put. Marcos we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 37 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. gravity or incurability of Juvy’s alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e. Wilson G.

as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. at the time of his death. 25. Ma. VALDEZ. Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise). Jenneth and Jennifer. Thereafter. if any. PENAFLOR.M. Elise.The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate. since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as completely on "all fours" with another. In the same petition. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime. which was affirmed in toto by the CA. Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket. Pursuant to Section 1. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. SOLLER. Amelia. the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas. Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate. filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Yes. the Court promulgated A. AngelitoSuazo. juridical antecedence. Is the venue proper? Can the validity of marriage be attacked in a petition for letters of administration? FACTS: RULING: Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity. Ting v.00 and personal properties worth P2. however. among others. Eliseo resided at No. On 12 September 1994. 02-11-10SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) which provided that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. 26 38 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. CELIS. Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court.100. Suazo v. In these cases. together with her children. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a guideline. it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes). ELUMBA. Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. Far from abandoning Molina. Velez-Ting and Jocelyn M. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. 2. it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON vs. LOURDES BELEN. for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON DOCTRINE:Validity of marriage can be collaterally attacked in a petition for letters of administration Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one FilipitoSandico (Filipito). MA. Carmen M. Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. No. ISSUES: 1. This is contrary to the intention of the law. Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid. Ngo Tesimply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value.000. and incurability can be duly established. Eliseo was a resident of Capas. we clarified that NgoTedid not abandon Molina. Benjamin G.040. Viewed in light of the foregoing principles. laid to rest any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina. No.00. GAYADOS. To prove her filiation to the decedent. represented by her mother. VALLEDOR . IBANEZ. the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. M-3957. attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON. opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. We also explained that Suazothat Ngo Temerely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. Rowena Ong Gutierrez YuTeplaced some cloud in the continued applicability of the time-tested Molinaguidelines. LAUS.000.

IBANEZ. The petitioners filed before the RTCa petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register under Rule 108. in no uncertain terms. were married. In opposing the issuance of letters of administration. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married. LasPiñas City.Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. Bayadogapplicable four-square to the case at hand. NEGROS OCCIDENTAL G. The entries show that Patrick’s father is Pablito S. it cannot be the source of rights. and the use of the last name "Braza". however. the contents thereof.R. in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 2. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. December 4. VALDEZ. BRAZA vs. Cristina) and Pablo SicadBraza. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines. it was though no marriage has taken place. (Pablo). the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza”. It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia. PENAFLOR. Pilar Village. the Court.2) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick and declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.Everlasting Road. Janelle Ann and Gian Carl. Henceforth. LAUS. They prayed. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. among others. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death. West Java. the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas. 181174. ELUMBA. CELIS. VALLEDOR . Ma. No. RTC: dismissed the petition and held that in a special proceeding for correction of entry. which is not acting as a family court under the 39 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation. Jr. respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either. Braza and annotated in the Birth Cert are: “"Acknowledged by the father PablitoBraza" Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22. the court. and not the Family Code. thus. and not through collateral attack such as the filing of a petition to correct entries. Phase 5. For this reason. Ma. 1998 at Manila. the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city. unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. Respondent Patrick filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. to wit: Consequently. the law in effect was the Civil Code. also known as PablitoSicadBraza. the name of the father and his acknowledgment. They contend that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar. Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. Yes. making the ruling in Niñal v. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Cristina Torres (Ma. Pablo diedin a vehicular accident in Bandung. said marriage being bigamous. CITY REGISTRAT OF HIMALAYAN CITY. is not binding on the courts. The union bore Ma. FACTS: Petitioner Ma. allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father. 2009 Doctrine: Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo. 26. by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages. SOLLER. GAYADOS. In a void marriage. In Niñal. Indonesia.

She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh. can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108. LAUS. She filed a Petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract. but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in a Pension House. Respondent also presented as witness a certain EufrocinaNatinga. Petitioners’ position. respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge Califlores of the MTCC. the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings. who owned a travel agency. they contend that even substantial errors. No. because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in HansaoPharma. that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. an error made by a clerk or a transcriber. The allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation. at the MTCC. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband. 189538. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code. an employee of MTCC. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. VALDEZ.The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical. she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune. at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated. especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.Family Code. the supposed solemnizing officer. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. has no jurisdiction. VALLEDOR . No. who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed 40 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. such as those sought to be corrected in the present case. IBANEZ. Petitioners’ contention: court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. During trial. Citing 3 cases. OLAYBAR G. Controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. spelling. of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy.The petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in the Family Code. a mistake in copying or writing.R. She completely denied having known the supposed husband. as well as her alleged husband. CELIS. February 10. in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. Branch 1. A. a Korean National. as parties to the case. on June 24. 02-1110-SC and other related laws. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108. ELUMBA. 2014 Doctrine: A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. and. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo can pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar? RULING: No. They filed a petition for review to the SC. MR also denied. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration 27. that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 2002. PENAFLOR. REPUBLIC vs. typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. does not lie. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City. Upon receipt thereof. she did not appear before the solemnizing officer. whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. GAYADOS. SOLLER.M. FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years.

as long as the The procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. the SC ruled that it cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent. Yes. The SC maintained that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage. she was not the one who entered into such contract. claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. LAUS. No. VALLEDOR . Respondent indeed sought. In other words.celebrated in their office. testified. the trial court did not. More importantly. 2. In this case. Thus. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. in any way. Clearly. procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed. and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. GAYADOS. RTC: rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondent and directed the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune. was forged. the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. it was established that. 41 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. the court found basis in granting the latter's prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. the procedures were followed. the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108. it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction. formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with. but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. SOLLER. a special proceeding is not always summary. The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and. she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was. in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. therefore. trial was conducted where respondent herself. The latter. and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. VALDEZ. but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. If the correction is clerical. with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. it is deemed substantial. however. and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings. as she claimed in her petition." It is true that in special proceedings. Valencia in 1986. no such marriage was celebrated. Lastly. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. If the rectification affects the civil status. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent. ELUMBA. With the testimonies and other evidence presented. Did the RTC correctly apply Rule 108 of the Rules of Court? 2. However. it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Otherwise stated. citizenship or nationality of a party. a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. Since the promulgation of Republic v. then the procedure to be adopted is summary. if any. the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent's signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. Several documents were also considered as evidence. the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted. not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of. ISSUES: 1. CELIS. it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition. it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. as well as a document examiner. IBANEZ. It requires publication of the petition. Is the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract in effect a declaration that the marriage is void ab initio? RULING: 1. PENAFLOR.

PetitionerJarillo was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasay City. Emmanuel Uy filed against the petitionera case for annulment of marriage before the RTC of Manila. 8369).On May 4. partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. A. a case for declaration of nullity of their marriage. In the meantime.VictoriaJarillo and Rafael Alocillo(1st Husband) were married in a civil wedding ceremony. respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code. 28. such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. the SC found that aside from the certificate of marriage. 1979. the RTC of Makati Cityrendered a Decision dated March 28. declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. 1995. however. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage. VALDEZ. Rather. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. 2003. This aspect is being determined by the RTC of Manila. Maria Paz GalelaMarinay. IBANEZ. the SC ruled that a "petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. RTC (trying the Criminal Case):found accused Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.In Minoru Fujiki v. GAYADOS. LAUS. Petitioner and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila. and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage was a forgery. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. 1974. the liquidation. the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. PENAFLOR. Said decision became final and executory on July 9. 2000." In this case. Petitioner’s defense: (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo (1st Husband) was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocilloagain celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony. (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license. No. No. 2009 Doctrine: Without a judicial declaration of its nullity. and (3) the action had prescribed. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. FACTS:On May 24. Thereafter. In cases filed charging bigamy. PEOPLE G. as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. Shinichi Maekara.M. Petitioner Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Uy. the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity. On October 5. at the City Court of Pasay City. CELIS. JARILLO vs. petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. Petitioner filed against Alocillobefore the RTC of Makati. a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. VALLEDOR . In her MFR. In 1999. 2003. 164435. On November 26. since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. SOLLER. Such court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case. 1975. ELUMBA. In other words.R. 42 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. support pendente lite of the spouses and children. On April 16. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. September 29.

during the subsistence of the said marriage. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. was deemed valid and subsisting. Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void. is therefore wanting. Said decision became final andexecutory on October 13. 29. MONTANEZ vs. CIPRIANIO G. respondent married Silverio V. VALLEDOR . 1983. the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage. two valid marriages. because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. As held in Tenebro v. GAYADOS. 2003. 43 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. On January 24. VALDEZ.CA: affirmed RTC’s (the court trying the criminal case) ruling in toto. i. On May 14. Laguna. Before her arraignment. CELIS.R. 1983. among others. petitioners marriage to Alocillo. 2003. the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. an Information for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro. since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void. respondent. 1976. respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. ELUMBA. which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.e. thumbmarked and signed by Silverio. A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code].. No. a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro. IBANEZ. On November 17. Laguna. there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24. Without a judicial declaration of its nullity. CA denied reconsideration and ruled that the subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit (MalayangSinumpaangSalaysay) dated August 23. 2004. filed with the MTC of San Pedro. On July 18. October 22. the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In 2001. that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. Branch 31.rendered a decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. the said marriage is not without legal consequences. while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned. therefore. SOLLER. among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. 181089. which alleged. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred inaffirming the conviction of Petitioner despite the supervening proof that the first two marriages of Petitioner to Alocillo had been declared by final judgment null and void ab initio? RULING: No. respondent Lourdes Ciprianomarried Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo. PENAFLOR. Aklan. 2004. the RTC of Muntinlupa. would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. LAUS. a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. petitioner MerlindaCiprianoMontañez. thus. that the basic element of the crime of bigamy. 2012 FACTS: On April 8. the crime had already been consummated.The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy. CA. Laguna.The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity. 2004.

She alleged that her marriage with respondent Beronillain 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991."The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. People.e. ELUMBA. Yes.e. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting. no vested right may attach to. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code.. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. before the Family Code. VALLEDOR . since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976. 44 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. Article 40 of the Family Code has been established as a new provision expressly requiring judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage for purposes of remarriage. Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent. that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed. Therefore. nor arise from. the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity is guilty of bigamy. The reason is that as a general rule. an Information has been filed.R. RTC: dismissed the criminal case. the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. because prior to the declaration of nullity. 2. PENAFLOR. i. FACTS: Petitioner Myrna P. 183824. GAYADOS. i. before the effectivity of the Family Code. In Abunado v. As far back as 1995. BERONILLA G. ISSUES: 1. Yes. CELIS. that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. By virtue of such complaint. ANTONE vs. thus. VALDEZ. should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. procedural laws. RTC invoked the Mercado Ruling. 2010 Doctrine: As reiterated in a long line of cases. Jr. 1983. IBANEZ. the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24. 2. the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.. Tan. December 8.RTC denied the motion. 30. that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage. in Atienza v. Since her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. SOLLER. In Mercado v. Brillantes. No. which is a rule of procedure. the Court already made the declaration that Article 40. Respondent filed a MFR claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable. In so ruling. can Article 40 of the Family Code be given retroactive effect? RULING:1. the point is. both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. and. Aggrieved.. SC ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. LAUS. petitioner directly filed the present petition with SC. it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003. Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio. SC held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

VALLEDOR . because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a private act. The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case. Sally’s father was against the relationship. Furthermore. 2004. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN. that the decision became final and executory on 15 May 2007. this petition. which renders the elements of bigamy complete. LAUS. JR GR. 31. People was promulgated after Mercado. the facts are different. and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect In fact. Tan. accused Beronilla was actually never legally married to Myrna Antone. under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because. ISSUE: Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after contracting the subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy RULING: Yes. They had three children namely. CELIS. Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of People v. On this score alone. no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.” Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. It stated that. JULY 3. Hence. there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. he married Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City.it ruled: “Hence. Prosecution. Applying Morigo v. In Mercado. 1973. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. although later declared void ab initio. 1982 in order to 45 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. through herein petitioner. On March 7. such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all. contrary to what was stated in the Information. a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy. Azucena left for the United States of America. there is no need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage. PENAFLOR. In 1979. Benjamin alleged that on September 10.Respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally HoBangayan who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. the first element appears to be missing. SOLLER. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16 February 1991. and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007. In December 1981. NO. Jr. 2013 FACTS: On March 15. by then the crime had already been consummated. CA dismissed the petition. ELUMBA. While Morigo v. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Manila. maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. Rizalyn. He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning. Absent a first valid marriage. Mendoza (under the Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid. Otherwise stated. Emmamylin and Benjamin III. the first marriage was actually solemnized. GAYADOS. People. VALDEZ. the statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void. the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. In February 1982. The RTC quashed the information. IBANEZ. Thus. Benjamin Bangayan. While in Morigo. this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. 201061. He alleges thathis marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the RTC of Biliran on 26 April 2007.

8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally married to Benjamin. The CA ruled that property number 3 and 4 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. 4. CELIS. 2. VALLEDOR . The trial court also ruled that properties no 1. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. It gave weight to the certification dated July 21. 2 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. Sally named 37 properties in her answer. Properties under TCT Nos. Property under TCT 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses 2. The trial court also ruled that the marriage between Sally and Benjamin was not bigamous. IBANEZ. On the issue of partition. Properties under Condominium Certificate of title No. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code. 4 in favor of Bernice and Bentley. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code. GAYADOS. The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. married to Sally. Sally knowing Benjamin’s marital status assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan. LAUS. N07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. PENAFLOR. for his appointment as administrator during the pendency of the case and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. SOLLER. was confirmed during trial. including Benjamin as advance inheritance. 2004 from the Pasig Local civil registrar which 46 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. It ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes. particularly the lack of marriage license. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin. using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Aside from the 7 properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition. Properties under TCT Nos. they acquired the following real properties: 1. Bernice and Bentley. Sally then filed criminal actions for Bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin. 3. Property number 1 shall be owned by Benjamin and Sally in common. the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as her conjugal properties with Benjamin because such properties were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave those properties to his children. During the period of their cohabitation. Benjamin on the other hand filed a Petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was Bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. VALDEZ. the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in Property no. 3 (listed above) were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena. The trial court did not rule on the issue of legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. ELUMBA.appease her father. Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. As regards the 7 properties claimed by both parties only property no. that the purported Marriage License No. The CA also ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family code and that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. COURT OF APPEALS: The CA ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring the marriage of Sally and Benjamin null and void. ISSUE/S: TRIAL COURT: the trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The supposed marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the NSO.1. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In this case. Yes. PENAFLOR. 200233. 3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another. Estela Galang testified that as early as March and April 1997 she met Leonila on which occasions. the marriage between them is non-existent. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. CELIS. The RTC 47 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. For bigamy to exist. Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The Supreme Court did not see any inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and the same time non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family code. 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry. a marriage solemnized without a license. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. Leonila Santiago and Nicanor Santos faced an Information for bigamy. 2. his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of Article 148. the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of marriage license. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. She also averred that for there be a conviction for bigamy. 32. Leonila asserted affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accusedin the crime of bigamy because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. If the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license. 1997. July 15. but in this case. No. IBANEZ. the crime of bigamy was not committed. 2015 FACTS: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on July 29. the first wife. the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue absolutely to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. there was really no subsequent marriage. Whether or not the Trial Court and the CA erred in ruling that the marriage of Sally and Benjamin is non-existent and at the same time void ab initio 2. Whether Article 148 of the FC should govern the property relations between Sally and Benjamin HELD: 1. the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a marriage license. GAYADOS. Whether the marriage between Sally and Benjamin was bigamous 3. LAUS. except those covered by Article 34 where no license shall be necessary. In this case. 1974 asked Leonila to marry him. It was alleged that Nicanor who had been married to Estela Galang since June 2. SOLLER. Thus. RTC: Based on the more credible account of Galang that she already introduced herself as the legal wife of Nicanor. VALLEDOR . “shall be void from the beginning”. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. Leonila who was a 43 year old widow then married Santos on July 29. Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case. only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money. his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecutor. Consequently. VALDEZ. LEONILA SANTIAGO vs. the trial court rejected the affirmative of Santos that she had not known of the first marriage. No. If one of the parties is validly married to another. she should choose someone who was without responsibility. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. ELUMBA.

declared that as indicated in the certificate of marriage “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article
34 of the Family code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos
long before the celebration of their marriage. Thus the trial court convicted
petitioner with the crime of bigamy.
Leonila moved for reconsideration and contended that her marriage to
Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with
Article 34 of the Family code. Hence, she argued that the absence of a
marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying
the acquittal for bigamy. The RTC denied toreverse Leonila’s conviction. It
ruled that in advancing that theory, Leonila wants the court to pass
judgment on the validity of her marriage to Nicanor, something that the trial
court cannot do. The best support for her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such
proof, the court cannot declare their marriage null and void.
CA: upheld the decision of the RTC
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Leonila Santiago should be liable for Bigamy
2. Whether or not the trial court and the CA erred in not ruling on the
validity of the marriage between Leonila and Nicanor
3. Can Leonila be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
HELD:
1. Yes. The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a.) the offender has been legally married;
(b.) the marriage has not been legally dissolved;
(c.) the he contracts a second and subsequent marriage; and

(d.) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage having all the essential requisites would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
For the second spouse to be indicted as co-accused in the crime, she/he
should have knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. The knowledge
of the second wife of the existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy which makes him/her responsible
as an accomplice.
Both courts consistently found that Leonila knew of the first marriage as
shown in the totality of circumstances.
2. Yes. if the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can
do it as a matter of defense during the trial proper of the criminal case.
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue.
After the perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between Leonila
and Nicanor took place without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of marriage which
reveals that their union was celebrated under article 34 of the Family code.
All told, the evidence on record shows that Leonila and Nicanor had only
known each other for less than four years before their marriage. Thus, it
follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years
prior to their marriage. Leonila and Nicanor however reflected the exact
opposite. Unfortunately, subsequent to his lie was the issuance of the
Certificate of Marriage in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath
that no marriage license was necessary because the marriage was solemnized
under Art. 34 of the FC
3. No. The court cannot countenance Leonila’s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and in the same breadth, adjudge her innocent of the crime. To do
so would only make mockery of the sanctity of marriage. Furthermore, it is a

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basic concept of justice that no court will lend its aid to one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,
Leonila married Nicanor while knowing fully well that they had not
complied with the five year cohabitation requirement under art 34.
Consequently it will be the height of absurdity for this court to allow Leonila
to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
33. JAMES WALTER CAPILI vs. PEOPLE and SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI
GR No 183805, July 3, 2013
FACTS:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner Walter was charged with the crime of bigamy
before the RTC of Pasig City. It was alleged that on or about December 8,
1999, the accused being previously united with Karla Medina-Capili and
without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled contracted
a second marriage with Shirley Tismo. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to
suspend proceedings alleging that (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared
null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC Pasig in
view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Petitioner.
In the interim, RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted
by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his manifestation and Motion to dismiss
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on
the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent

had already been declared void by the RTC. The RTC granted the
manifestation and motion to dismiss. The CA on the other hand reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage
is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case of bigamy
HELD:
No. The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a.) the offender has been legally married;
(b.) the marriage has not been legally dissolved;
(c.) the he contracts a second and subsequent marriage; and
(d.) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy
were present when the information was filed on June 28, 2004. It is
undisputed that the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a
valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Medina-Capili contracted
on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent declaration of the second marriage being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime
og bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy even there is a subsequent declaration of
nullity of the second marriage so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. In Jarillo vs. People, the
court affirmed the accused’s conviction dor bigamy ruling that the crime of

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ARITCHETA, CELIS, ELUMBA, GAYADOS, IBANEZ, LAUS, PENAFLOR, SOLLER, VALDEZ, VALLEDOR

bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void.

petitioner did not hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was
alive or not.

“Thus, under the law, marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.”

Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on
June 20, 1985. Subsequently however, Virgilio’s application for naturalization
filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied
because petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, petitioner filed
a petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio. RTC rendered its decision dismissing the
Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita was not to able to
prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio was already dead.
This belief must be result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.

“What makes a person liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. The
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy”.
The finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second
marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against
him.
34. ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
FACTS:
Angelita married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December
13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to their only child, Nancy. According to
petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was
unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left
their conjugal dwelling. In May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her
parents’ home in Bancay, Camiling Tarlac .Three years passed without any
word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed in Bancay. He and petitioner
talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a
document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that,

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that it is the Civil
Code that applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioner’s
marriage to Sofio was celebrated January 11, 1971, long before the Family
Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested
right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the
Family code should not be applied against her. It was claimed by the
petitioner that to apply the stricter provisions of the Family code will impair
her rights which she acquired under the Civil Code. The RTC denied the MR.
In its Manifestation and motion, the OSG recommended that the court set
aside the assailed RTC decision and grant the petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of “well-founded
belief” under Art. 41 of the FC is not applicable to the instant case because it
was not yet in existence during her marriage with Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The
OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the FC petitioner already
acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes
based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial court erred in applying the Family Code in the case at bar
HELD:

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ARITCHETA, CELIS, ELUMBA, GAYADOS, IBANEZ, LAUS, PENAFLOR, SOLLER, VALDEZ, VALLEDOR

Koronadal City. December 10. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead HELD: GR No. In the hope sof finding Jerry. there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the civil code. the respondent’s “well-founded belief” was anchored on her alleged earnest efforts to locate Jerry. IBANEZ. On May 21. she had not seen. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed. Since death is presumed to have taken place the seventh year of absence. Further. All these earnest efforts. FACTS: After their quarrel. 2002. proved futile. at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio. PENAFLOR. and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father. In the case at bar. RTC: issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. 184621. Since then. her sisters-in-law as well as her neighbors and friends. The respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. Sometime in January 1998. it can be gleaned that presumption of death id established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. considering that it is the civil code that applies. GAYADOS. the respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her 2. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the FC was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage with Virgilio. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. It is readily apparent however that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code. under the present conditions. the court finds it proper and prudent for a present 51 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. They lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes. Those efforts however fell short of the stringest standard and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons: The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20. the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach sexual climax whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR husband’s declaration of presumptive death. SOLLER. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the FC and holding that petitioner needed to prove a “well-founded belief” that Sofio was already dead. VALDEZ. or more than 4 ywars from the time of Jerry’s disappearance. She did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. Consequently. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. communicated nor heard anything from jerry or about his whereabouts. Under the civil code. her brothers-in-law. She claimed that she had inquired from her mother-in-law. CELIS. VALLEDOR . 2013 No. It can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. LAUS. CA: (OSG appealed the case) The court of appeals fully affirmed the decision of the trial court. prompting her to file the petition in court. The Supreme court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead. South Cotobato. 35. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. ELUMBA. proof of wellfounded belief is not required. 1997. 1. the respondent claimed. but to no avail.Yes.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. 4. Worse. when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down. notwithstanding efforts to locate him. CELIS. she had not received any communication from her husband. Hence. the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA. an electronics company where both were then working. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in laws about her husband’s whereabouts. ELUMBA. thus. RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. G. Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. PetitionerRepublic argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.. the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The two eventually got married on 3 March 1993. PENAFLOR. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts. but its motion was likewise denied by the CA. 187512 Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death FACTS: In May 1991. GAYADOS. In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009. not appealable. Bermudez-Lorino. this petition. respondent Yolanda Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines. R. ISSUE: On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and. Sometime in May 1994. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. these persons whom she allegedly made inquiries were not even named. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death. Lastly. However. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. the appellate court noted that a petition 52 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. LAUS. She did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends. VALLEDOR . to no avail. is not subject to ordinary appeal HELD: No. 3. the RTC denied the motion. SOLLER. After nine (9) years of waiting. in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and. hence. In sum the court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a passive search where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries. the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. VALDEZ. there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search. As held in Nolasco.spouse whose spouse had been missing to seek the aid of authorities or at the very least report his/her absence to the police. No. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. Yolanda claimed that from that time. was a summary judicial proceeding. In its 23 January 2009 Resolution. based on Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. 36. IBANEZ. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.

124 and 217. 247. Further. by express provision of Section 247. Family Code. Bermudez-Lorino. 2001. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA. Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. Article 253 of the Family Code reads: ART. and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing. the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v. the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal. 41. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. VALDEZ. 96. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void. if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar. Hence. are immediately final and executory.) Clearly. supra. 238. to wit: In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code. xxx xxx xxx But. additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. not a petition for review under Rule 45. insofar as they are applicable. Article 41 of the Family Code provides: Art. Until modified by the Supreme Court. CELIS. The SC affirm the CA ruling. Articles 41. In Republic v. VALLEDOR . GAYADOS. IBANEZ. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 51. the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. and for the RTC to give due course thereto. ELUMBA. there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal. LAUS. let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7. 69. 238. 53 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding. a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Further. unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage. which provide: Art. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41.[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. PENAFLOR. Bermudez-Lorino.for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban. Art. Taken together. 253. 73. Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground. SOLLER. (Underscoring supplied. precisely because judgments rendered thereunder. an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

By express provision of law. Until modified by the Supreme Court. In turn. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage. such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 54 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. CELIS. the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. IBANEZ. (Emphasis supplied. even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding. 124 and 217. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. 96.) In plain text. In reversing the CA. In Jomoc. this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code: the Rules of Court. Jomoc. Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads: ART 247. As a matter of course. It states: ART. Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. GAYADOS. rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. VALLEDOR . The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. To be sure. At any rate. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. refine our previous decisions thereon. SOLLER. petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code. As observed by the CA. the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. expressly falls under the category of special proceedings. under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.[7] issued a few months later. the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. 238.[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. 51. a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. however. In contrast. We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. 253. insofar as they are applicable. VALDEZ. LAUS. 73. From the decision of the Court of Appeals. Tango:[9] ART. It goes without saying. 69. under Article 238 of the Family Code. the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. Bermudez-Lorino. ELUMBA. Section 1(m).In the present case. This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly. PENAFLOR. that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. four years after Jomoc. it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.

he burned all the letters Maria wrote him. Upon inquiry from the latters uncle. None of Marias relatives witnessed the ceremony as they were opposed their relationship. Evidently then. He claims to have forgotten her address since. He also solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas. Yes. RTC: granted the petition and declared Maria presumptively dead. 161062. hence. OSG filed a Notice of Appeal for the Republic. but to no avail. and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. On March 13. TANGO G. The next 14 years went by without any news of Maria. SOLLER. not subject to ordinary appeal. Ledesma though. VALDEZ. Maria assured Ferventino. Ferventino and Maria were married in civil rites before then Mayor Ignacio Bunye of Muntinlupa City. ISSUE: 1. J. ELUMBA. VALLEDOR . and thus. USA. Like. CELIS. On the belief that his wife had died. IBANEZ. affirmed the RTCs Order. Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Out of resentment. 2. 55 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. GAYADOS. July 31. Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she stopped responding to his letters. Ferventino learned that even Marias relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. however. that she will file a petition so he can live with her in the USA. In the event that said petition is denied. PENAFLOR. their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. Antonio Ledesma. Ferventino filed a verified petition before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria within the contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code. 2009 QUISUMBING. 1987. 37. No. CA: Treated the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Luis Aris of the U.: Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death FACTS: In 1987. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. In sum. making a serious procedural lapse. Whether the OSG erred in filing a Notice of Appeal. From the decision of the CA. Maria and her family flew to Seattle. the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final and executory and. he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia in Los Angeles. she promised to return to the Philippines to live with him. in rendering judgment thereon. HELD: 1. under Article 41 of the Family Code. The two had only spent a night together and had been intimate once when Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving for the United States of America (USA).R. Whether Tango has established a basis to form a well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead. LAUS. the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Capt.S. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. in Las Pias. Air Force. But the Supreme Court did not dwell on the substantive portion of the case because the decision of the trial court had long become final due to the procedural lapse made by the OSG and the other courts. Finally. the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that.with the Supreme Court. REPUBLIC v. had made the decision of the RTC become final.

RICARDO SANTOS Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death “A bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: 1. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao. Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband. 41. By express provision of law (See Arts. petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the CA instead of a petition for certiorari. Metro Manila. however. the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita. From the decision of the Court of Appeals.2. As a result. To be sure. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. VALDEZ. respondent Ricardo T. Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan. the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal as the judgment was not appealable. VALLEDOR . did not know their daughter's whereabouts. after they had gotten married on June 18. He believed that she had passed away. There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. Yes. PENAFLOR. too. Manila. IBANEZ. 1980. appeal. by express provision of law. Before us. But. he allowed her to work abroad. 253 and 247. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which. ELUMBA. The cases filed under Art. was immediately final and executory. but no one gave him any information Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. GAYADOS. the CA entertained the appeal and treated the same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. SOLLER. After a year. 38. Without a doubt. even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level.” FACTS: In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death. they moved to Tarlac City. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. FC). FC are summary proceedings. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence. Quezon City. CELIS. or other appropriate remedies. even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends. As it were. but they. CELERINA SANTOS vs. LAUS. the decision of the trial court had long become final. petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In the case before us. petition for relief.) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years. As a matter of course. in February 1995. the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. and There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. It goes without saying. the hands of the Court are tied. Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. Santos 56 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. They were engaged in the buy and sell business. RTC Tarlac City: Declared petitioner Celerina J. Adding to the confusion. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court in this case merely stated the Conditions to be complied with before Article 42 of the Family Code may be applied. (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance. City of Legaspi which described how Extrinsic Fraud can be committed and according to the Court It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest. The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA.) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is bigamous on the ground that the subject marriage was contracted in bad faith HELD: 1st: Yes. SOLLER. The Conditions are: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. or from presenting all of his case.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death 2. Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively dead. GAYADOS. had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15. IBANEZ. appeal. order. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment. The court cited Stilianopulos v. Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence. Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were false. VALLEDOR . and the merits of the petition. 2007 On November 17.” The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. ELUMBA. the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death. petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 2008. Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition. and the "remedies of new trial. or resolution has become final. According to the Court of Appeals. despite his knowledge of her true residence. the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry. and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined. declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. CELIS. VALDEZ. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo. misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment. These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. PENAFLOR. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition CA: Dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. ISSUE: 1.(Ricardo). 2nd: The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years. LAUS. Celerina claimed that because of these. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present. 57 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage.

LAUS. Thus. partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. 2. petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. RTC. ALAIN M. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code. x xx. ART 147 FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. In Valdes.” It is not 58 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply. petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. partition. GAYADOS. HELD: The court erred.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him. Their union is without the benefit of marriage. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other. SOLLER. or their marriage is void All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. there is a need to liquidate. VALLEDOR . and would at times become violent and hurt him. DIÑO vs. the following elements must be present: 1. CARIDAD L. MA. but whose marriage is nonetheless void. the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. PENAFLOR.39. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. ARTS 50 AND 51. ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation. Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains. such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. choosing instead to go impediment to contract marriage. and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. CELIS. In short. the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. DIÑO DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY (ART 40). The Court has ruled in Valdes v. On May 2001. and had abandoned her responsibility to the family. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. ELUMBA. Branch 102. and 3. on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. regardless of its cause. “Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation. IBANEZ. In this case. partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. VALDEZ. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful. Quezon City that in a void marriage.

Presiding Judge.A. on January 2005 Petitioner Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order against Steven and her parents-in-law. No. She alleged that Steven.necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.A 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004)Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and contend that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since as parentsin-law of the petitioner. i. PENAFLOR.R. It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R. husband. No. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. former marriage. Bacolod City. and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA.A. legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.Hence. GO-TAN vs. No. JESSE ANTHONE.e. 9262. it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents-spouses Tan as parents-in-law of petitioner may be included in the Petition for the Issuance of a Protective Order in accordance with R. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. 5. 2008 Provisional Orders Principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R. No. Section 47 of R. conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. IBANEZ. GAYADOS. psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Sec. Tan were married in 1999 and out of their union two female children were born. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. (e)(2)(3)(4).A. 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage. However. or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship. RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case on the ground that respondents being the parents-in-law of the petitioner were not covered as respondents under R.A.A. such as R. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits. September 30. 9262. 9262 FACTS: Sharica Mari L. DRILON. RULING: Yes. par. However.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC. and (i) of R. VALLEDOR . the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. SPOUSES TAN G. No. Spouses Perfecto C. JESUS C. has expressly provide for the suppletory of the RPC. Tan and Juanita L. No. 9262. Regional Trial Court-Branch 41. namely: JO-ANN. LAUS. Considering the Court’s ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R. former husband. It held that while the provisions of R. for herself and in behalf of minor children.A. 40. 9262. ELUMBA. No. SOLLER. No.A. CELIS. JOSEPH EDUARD. or with whom the woman has a common child. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners. No. in which the special law is silent on a particular matter. they were not covered by R. all surnamed GARCIA R. and outlines the 59 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. in conspiracy with his parents were causing verbal. No. or a sexual or dating relationship. 168852.A. The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.A. 9262. (h)(5). 9262. Go-Tan and Steven L.A. 9262. VALDEZ. 41. GARCIA vs.

and deliberately isolated her from her friends. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. When she took up law. Bacolod City. petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. PENAFLOR. health care providers. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. FACTS: Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. 60 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY.A. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the threeday notice rule. LAUS. 2006. whose life revolved around her husband.00 to a more manageable level at P100. In one of their quarrels. On the other hand. Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He even told private respondent's mother. nor apologized or showed pity on her. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance. who is the godmother of one of their sons. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit. the J-Bros Trading Corporation. law enforcers. or on April 26. ELUMBA. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner. that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her. SOLLER. Jessie Anthone J. and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5. GAYADOS. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. the RTC issued a TPO on March 24. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. They have three (3) children. and Joseph Eduard J. When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager.duties and responsibilities of barangay officials. WON R. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him. Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank. at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. controlling. 2005. she would not get a single centavo. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men. IBANEZ.000. petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION. Garcia. petitioner. while at home. namely: Jo-Ann J. CELIS. who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted. Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife.000.who is of Filipino-Chinese descent. VALLEDOR . she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. He forbade private respondent to pray. who lives with them in the family home. All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17. 3 years old. Garcia. 6 years old. and even when she was already working part time at a law office. is dominant. Two days later. social workers.00. VALDEZ. Action of the RTC of Bacolod City: Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur. 17 years old. Garcia. and (2) contain a notice of hearing. Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support.000. 2006 effective for thirty (30) days. prosecutors and court personnel.

and in repeatedly abusing her verbally. VALDEZ. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male. petitioner Ralph Tua. Jesse Ruth Lois. in the case of Go-Tan v." and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. the prosecution and the judges. SOLLER. the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women. harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. GoTan. Imus. that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions. in order to stop his child from crying. They have three children. Spouses Tan. the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. petitioner would threaten him with a belt. and. born on June 27. namely. respondent RossanaHonrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus. CELIS. Thus. 2001. PENAFLOR.HELD: The enactment of R. Cavite. Branch 22.A. with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22." There is likewise no merit to the contention that R. or a sexual or dating relationship. 2000. In her Affidavit3 attached to the petition. and Jezreel Abigail. Cavite a Verified Petition for herself and in behalf of her minor children. there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out. As defined above. petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding 61 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY.A.94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. 1999. were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support. born on December 25. LAUS. MANGROBANG. the victim. emotionally. respondent claimed. HON. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women." Clearly. that R. Petitioner's contention. J. among others. VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. for the issuance of a protection order. RALPH P. 1998 in Makati City. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Jesse Ruth Lois. that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her children’s financial support. former marriage. that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed. and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA PERALTA. VALLEDOR . addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police.: FACTS: On May 20. As a State Party to the CEDAW. Joshua Raphael born on February 9. pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004. mentally and physically. CESAR A. Joshua Raphael. she hid her fears although she was scared. while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage. TUA vs. GAYADOS.A. Moreover. and Jezreel Abigail. Presiding Judge. therefore. IBANEZ. Regional Trial Court. that she was actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children. 2005. ELUMBA. Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from petitioner’s abusive conduct." "husband-bashing. against her husband. when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a protection order. Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10.

Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm. and holding respondent by her nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to come often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of the financial support for the kids. CELIS.A. otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. he cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case. 2005. HELD: A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. The CA denied the petition and upheld the validity of the TPO by the RTC. therefore. Petitioner denied the allegations of the respondent and alleged that it was the petitioner who verbally abused and threatened him whenever their children’s stay with him was extended. Financial support was also ordered. the alleged acts of petitioner among others. Yahon (S/Sgt." against her husband.Yahon to enjoin from threatening to commit or committing further acts of physical abuse aginst the petitioner. 201043. he was ordered in default. VALLEDOR . while she was at work. and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done. GAYADOS. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the TPO issued by the RTC. Respondent Daisy Yahon is his wife. while not conclusive. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence. IBANEZ. the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor. In this case. The trial continued ex- 62 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY.. and possibly even death. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property. VALDEZ. i. are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO.Yahon) is a retired enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army. in the same way. to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence. Charles A. and to grant other necessary reliefs. 9262. petitioner with companions went to her new home and forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her. on May 4.e. 2014 FACTS: S/Sgt. June 16.his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed. PENAFLOR. RTC granted the prayer and issued the Temporary Protection Order (TPO). The RTC initially issued a TPO ordering Sgt. feeding his other children with the food which another child spat out. minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. and. DAISY R. YAHON G. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot.R. their family or household members. be challenged as violative of the right to due process. SOLLER. if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. LAUS. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests. Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of Republic Act (R. No. 44. ELUMBA. and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. Upon failing to appear in subsequent hearings. Petitioner challenged the TPO by filing a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. He was likewise ordered to stay away from Daisy. her residence or place of work.) No. to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) vs.

ELMER RABUYA ARITCHETA. The court found that respondent must be permanently protected after enduring physical. courts should not distinguish. HELD: The SC ruled that R.Yahon. GAYADOS. The RTC then rendered a decision against Sgt. the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons.Yahon. petitioner argued that under the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA 8291) funds or properties (including benefits) cannot be subject to any court processes such as a TPO/PPO. and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary. Where the law does not distinguish. 9262. and to give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. Also. 9262 used the general term "employer.000 spousal support to the respondent. whether private 63 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. IBANEZ. Such exemption was likewise incorporated in the Rules of Court. ELUMBA. verbal and psychological abuse from Sgt.A. VALLEDOR . 9262. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer. No. No. PPO or BPO issued by courts. or government. PENAFLOR. Section 8(g) applies to all employers. CELIS. LAUS.parte. a later enactment (compared to the GSIS Act).Yahon’s employer. should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. ISSUE: Whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel. 50% of whatever benefits or claims Sgt Yahon had from the government were ordered to be automatically deducted in favour of respondent. SOLLER.A. Thus. The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal safety and security. emotional. S/Sgt. A Permanent Protection Order was issued granting a P4. Among these reliefs was withholding salary or income from an employer which thus allows the court to enjoin the petitioner from releasing the benefits to Sgt Yahon." which includes in its coverage the military institution. No. Respondent however argued that RA 9262 enumerates reliefs that may be included in TPO. VALDEZ. Section 8(g) of R. Petitioner AFPFC manifested (by way of special appearance) that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO.