Pelaez vs.

Auditor General
15 SCRA 569
FACTS
1. During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964, purporting to act pursuant to Section 28 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines issued EOs 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities.
2. On November 10, 1964, petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted a
civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
3. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
4. RA 2370 provides that Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act of by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of the voters in the
areas affected and the recommendation of the council of municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated.
5. Petitioner argues that If the President under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which
is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
6. Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities as provided in Section 28 of the
Administrative Code, does not amount to undue delegation of power.
ISSUE
Whether or not EO Nos. 93-121, 124 and 126-129 are null and void upon the ground that said Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
HELD
Although Section 68 includes a clause that says that the President may change the seat of the government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.
It is obvious however, that the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities may partake of an administrative nature, the authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature or as in the language or other courts, it is strictly a legislative function.
The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio provided in RA 2370 implies a negation of the
bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is
too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear
manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary.
The Executive Orders in question were declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities referred to in the case at bar.
***
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law be complete in itself and fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate, would in effect, make or formulate such policy. Without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, the delegate could arrogate upon himself the power to make or worse to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by an Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances.

Sema vs. COMELEC

Facts:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts for
Maguindanao. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA
6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its inclusion in November
1989 plebiscite).
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA
Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.
Later, 2 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total
of 11. Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in
29 October 2006 plebiscite.
On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to clarify
the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining
the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted the COMELECs Law Department recommendation under a Memorandum
dated 27 February 2007. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA
Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases), amending Resolution
No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
(formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the COMELEC
pursuant to Resolution No. 772.
Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new province. The province was the first to be created under
Republic Act No. 9054 or the Expanded ARMM law.
Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City
into a single legislative district during the Philippine general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress
representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, Didagen Dilangalen.
Issues:
The Court was asked to rule on "whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and if in the
affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without
need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province."
Further, the High Tribunal had to render judgment on "whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for
maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City)."
Held:
On July 16, 2008 the Supreme Court of the Philippines's 33-page judgment (8-6) penned by Antonio Carpio
annulled "Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201", which created Shariff Kabunsuan (carved out of

Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Justice Antonio Carpio opined: "We rule that (1)
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid."
Carpio stressed that only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts. Creation of province or a city inherently involves
the power to create a legislative district. The Constitution mandates that a province or a city with at least
250,000 inhabitants is entitled to at least one representative."
The Court also declared unconstitutional the RLAs power to create provinces and cities in the region but it did
not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of new municipalities and barangays. Under Republic Act No.
9140 or the Expanded ARMM Law, the RLA has the power to create new LGUs and to set its own criteria in
creating, dividing, merging, or abolishing LGUs.[3]
Carpio further ruled that "in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 district representatives out of the
maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of
total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case
50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much
less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by
law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces."

Notes/summary:
Carpio tersely put the judgment in this manner: "In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation
of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress
because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district
of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI
and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution."

Article VI: The Legislative Department, Section 5: Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment and Representation: Following the return of every census, Congress shall make a
reapportionment)
Bagabuyo vs COMELEC
Date of Promulgation: December 8, 2008
Ponente: Brion
Motion: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
Facts
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oros then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859:
An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or RA
No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, CDOs voters
would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. On March 13,
2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said act. Bagabuyo filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking
for the nullification of RA 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot
implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a local
govt. unit.
Issue:
Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve the division and conversion of a
local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite
Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED.
The Court upheld respondents arguments saying that such law only increased the representation of CDO in the House of
Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries
under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under
Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no change in CDOs territory, population, income and classfication.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371 does not have
the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the
city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter
more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the
total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two
congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.

Art. 6 Sec.1 Exceptions: Delegation to local governments and administrative bodies

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
June 26, 2001
Panganiban, J.
Petition: Petitions challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by COMELEC
Background:
Facts:
Prior to the 2001 Elections, the Comelec received several petitions for registration by sectoral
parties, organizations, and political parties. This is to register their parties and be able to file their
respective Manifestation stating their intentions to participate in the party-list elections. The Comelec
gave due course and approved the Manifestation of 154 parties and organizations in its assailed
March26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Dissatisfied with how the Comelec handles and approves the registered parties, Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party filed a petition before this court on April 16, 2001. This petition assailed COMELEC
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 for the disqualification of some parties that is not supposed to be
registered and included to participate in the party-list elections. On April 17, 2001, Bayan Muna Party
also filed a same petition assailing the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In the resolution dated May 9,
2001, the court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions before it. Thus the case at hand.
Issue/s:
1. WON political parties may participate in the party-list elections? YES
P: Contends the inclusion of the major political parties.
C: the court argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organization.
It is ruled that under the Constitution and RA 7941, the respondents cannot be disqualified from
part-list elections merely on the grounds that they are political parties. Sec 5, Article VI of the
constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a
party-list registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organization or coalitions thereof. Section 3 expressly states that a party is
either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. More to point, the law
defines political parties as an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing an adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
Indubitably, political parties, even major ones, may participate in part-list elections.
2. WON party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations? YES
Ruling:
Wherefore, this case is remanded to the COMELEC, which is hereby directed to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this decision.

Myla
Sara

Ruth

N.

Dimaporo v. Mitra
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections.
Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of
the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and
functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the
Congress.
Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is
not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.
Grounds may be termed to be shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office
ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another
government position
HELD: No.
In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935
Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest
degree of responsibility and integrity.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an
office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate
of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.
The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate
to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of
better service.

PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
Digested by: RL Lagundino

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to
be represented.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions
to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.
Further, Jalosjos admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears
that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has
been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon
one who is presently under detention.
ISSUE: WON being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment and a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law.
HELD: NO. The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accusedappellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant
is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a
few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Antonino v. Valencia [May 27, 1974]

ANTONINO V VALENCIA
MAY 27, 1974
FACTS: Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the
election for governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by
Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a
division in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not Sabotaged and
double-crossed them, the LP would have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon Committee
regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers
Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of
Antonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife)
ISSUES:
1.W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia
2.W/N the Press Release is libelous
Held/Ruling:
YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the following
facts:
1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino.
2.On the press release there was marked For release under the date.
3.It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in the
same numerical order.
4.The press release indicated that it came from Valencia
5.The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the presence of
the press 6.The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and
information he received about Antonino

7.The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time constraint
8.Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.
YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him certain
corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially, malice is presumed
and such presumption was not overcome as Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they
were published with good intentions and with a justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of
the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filedcharges against
Antonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate forelection and that his term as senator
was no yet to expire.
Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in making libelous
statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon.
Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossingcannot be considered libelous ascontemporary
politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.
Tags: antonino, antonino v. valencia, antonino vs valencia, digest, valencia

Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 97710, 26 Sept 1991
Facts:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and
EmigdioBondocof the NP werecandidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner.Bondoc filed a protest in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9
members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the
House of Representatives (5 membersbelong to the LDP and 1 member is from
the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc
won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles of the NP toproclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.On the
eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a
letter informing him thathe was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly
helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly
inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of thedecision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of CongressmanCamasura
to the HRET.
Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, maychange that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunalin an election
contest pending therein
Held:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independentand impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the
tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
completedetachment, impartiality and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
Inexpelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote
in favor of Bondoc, basedstrictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, theHouse of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution.
Itsresolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violatesCongressman Camasuras right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional electioncontests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
theConstitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for

a just cause, such as, theexpiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the politicalparty he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause.
Amember may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty,
short of proof that he has formallyaffiliated with another

G-33. LEGISLATURE

<J.L. TAN>
G.R. No. L-3820

July 18, 1950

Jean L. Arnault, petitioner.

vs.
Leon Nazareno, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and Eustaquio Balagtas, Director of Prisons,
respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner was the attorney-in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected
and the price paid for both estates was PhP 5 million. It was also reported that the Government did not
have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a
deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through
which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt
aggregating P1,500,000.00 were delivered to him; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account
two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with
PNB, and another for P440,000.00 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
The Senate then adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity
of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. An intriguing question which the committee
sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the
total sum of P1,500,000.00 for his alleged interest of only P20,000.00 in the two estates, which he seemed
to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was
asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000.00, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer
this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new
Bilibid Prison until he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who
received the P440,000.00 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. He contended that the Senate has no
power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000.00 because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported
legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the
legislative process. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.00?
RULING:
YES. According to Article VI, Section 1 of the Philippine Constitution, the legislative power is
vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. The very reason for the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function
without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during
recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to

make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to
that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation.
deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the
very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent
with the life to be preserved. But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish
for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

Gonzales vs. Macaraig

Issue:

G.R. No 87636 November 19, 1990

Whether or not veto made by the president is constitutional

Ponente: J. Melencio Herrera

Facts:
December 16, 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 aka
General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1989. December 29,
1988, President signed the Bill into law and had become Rep.
Act No 6688. In the process, seven special provisions and
Section 55 on General Provision were vetoed.
Senate issued Resolution No. 381 expressing the veto by the
president were unconstitutional.
"SEC. 55.
Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of
Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by
Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the
President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to
Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or
increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other
purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any
purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be
deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act."

Held:
Yes.
1) Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts, 1)
President generally can veto the entire bill as exercise of her
power and 2) president shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff bill
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.
2) General provisions made in an appropriations bill shall
ultimately refer to a specific appropriation for it to take effect;
Section 55 did not refer to any appropriations involved in the
entire bill. Similarly, the contents of this section is concerned on
Appropriation Disapproved and/or reduced by Congress that is
not included on the face of the bill.
Court ruled the constitutionality of the presidential veto and the
petition was DISMISSED,

GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding]
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They
issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall
election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul
the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the
most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to
the political minority to equal protection of the law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for
any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ."
By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms
of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it
wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation
by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the

difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the
political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that
the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of
the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political
party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted
cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory
recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of
the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public
place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid
resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality
of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic
Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
PETITIONER'S POSITION
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) is a group of lawyers who have banded
together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country.
According to LAMP, the provision in the GAA of 2004 is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does
not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be
funded out of PDAF (which was the main feature of the previous "pork barrel" systems).
LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the DBM
illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of
Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to
be actually funded by PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because the Members of
Congress cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. Further, the
authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. "It is, in fact, a non-legislative
function devoid of constitutional sanction," and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing
less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENT'S POSITION
For their part, the respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds.
Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF, they argue that the former should not be equated
with "pork barrel," which has gained a derogatory meaning referring "to government projects affording
political opportunism." In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be gainsaid then that the
petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. Without
probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the
accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case
(2) Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and
illegal
HELD:
(1) YES.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations,
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY. An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite
of "ripeness."A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an

alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. A finding of unconstitutionality would

necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to
taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.
LOCUS STANDI. Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in
taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
LASTLY. the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest.
The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of
the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
(2)
NO. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its
implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case
of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation
because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of
the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot
indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful
enforcement.

G.R. No. 180643

March 25, 2008
En Banc: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE,
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
respondents
Case:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be Bnanced by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In
the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testiBed that
several high executive oDcials and power brokers were using their
inEuence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hours and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
A. Whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
B. Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
C. Whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs. Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a recognized presumptive presidential
communication privilege in our legal system?
2. Whether or not there was factual or legal basis to hold that the
communication elicited by the 3 questions were covered by
executive privilege?
3. Whether or not the Committees have shown that the
communication elicited by the 3 questions were critical to the
exercise of their functions?
4. Whether the Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order?
Held:
1. Yes.
In Almonte vs. Vasquez, the Court aDrmed that the presidential
communication privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution.
The Court articulated that there are certain types of information
which the government may withhold from the public, that there is
governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national
security matters; and that the right to information does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings.
2. Yes.
The committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan
does not relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power, because the Constitution does not vest it in the President
alone, but also in the Monetary Board. Quintessential is deBned as
the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated
essence of substance. Non-delegable means that a power or duty
cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor.

The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an

executive power and the Bnal decision in the exercise of the said
executive power is still lodged in the ODce of the President even
when it has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board
because it is only a form of check and balance.
The committees contend that the application of the doctrine of
operational proximity for the reason that it may be misconstrued
to expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to
communications between those who are operationally proximate
to the President by who may have no direct communications with
her. In the case at bar, the danger is absent because the oDcial
involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the
term advisor of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member
of her oDcial family.
The committees contend that the Court erred in upholding the
Presidents invocation, through Exec. Sec., of executive privilege
because between Committees speciBc and demonstrated need and
the Presidents generalized interest in conBdentiality, there is a
need to strike the balance in favor of the former. It must be stressed
that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely
founded on her generalized interest in conBdentiality. The letter
dated Nov. 15 of Exec. Sec. Ermita speciBed presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic
relation with another sovereign nation as the basis for the claim.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction that information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of
national interest. In the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded
the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on government
transparency, accountability, and disclosure of information
The constitutional provisions cited by the committees do not
espouse an absolute right to information. It must be emphasized
that the assailed decision did not enjoin the committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to
respect matters that are covered by executive privilege.
3. No.
The committees contend that the information elicited by the 3
questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative
function, among them:
a. To consider the 3 pending Senate bills, there is simply a
generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the

exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-speciBc

reference to pending Senate Bills and it is further expressed
by the counsel of Committees that even without Neri
answering the 3 questions, the Senate can still come up with
legislations.
b. To curb graft and corruption, the potential culpability of high
government oDcials in a given government transaction is not a
task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to
make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a crime or
wrongdoing.
4. Yes.
The committees contended that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita,
requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry along with the
usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative
to and in furtherance thereof is not provided for by the Constitution
and is merely an obiter dictum. An unconstrained congressional
investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own
abuses.
The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest
mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress power. Witnesses
should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by
the inquiry. It will allow them to prepare the pertinent information
and documents.
The language of Section 21 Article. 6 of the Constitution requiring
that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published
rules of procedure are categorical. It should likewise be stressed that
not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of
the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expresses in Section 21 Article 6 of the
Constitution.

Senate vs. Ermita , April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O.
464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

Torayno vs COMELEC GR No 137329 09 August 2000

Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995 election
and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14 June
1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City which is
geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor
in the said city and stated that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was in the same
city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the residency
requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for annulment of
election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming choice of
the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the
people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano was actually and physically
residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor and even paid his community tax certificate in
the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the possibility of a stranger unacquainted with
the conditions and needs of the community from seeing an elective office to serve that community.

Author: Czar Paguio

Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec (1995)
Petition: Appeal by certiorari
Petitioner: Imelda Marcos
Respondent: Comelec and Cirilo Montejo
Ponencia: Kapunan

DOCTRINE: If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of

the residence requirement, the 1 year period is irrelevant because
wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Second, if a
person reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year
requirement must be satisfied. (Bernas book)
FACTS:
1.) Imelda Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban City, which
was her fathers hometown, in 1938 when she was 8 years old. She
pursued her studies (GS,HS, College) in the aforementioned city and
subsequently taught in the Leyte Chinese School. In 1952, she went
to Manila to work in the House of Representatives. Two years after,
she married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman in Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. In
1959, her husband was elected a Senator and they lived in San Juan,
Rizal where she again registered as a voter. And in 1965, she lived in
the Malacanang Palace when her husband became the President.
This time, she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. After their
exile in Hawaii, she ran for President in 1992 and indicated in her
CoC that she was a resident and register voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
2.) Marcos filed her CoC for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte.
3.) The incumbent Representative, Montejo, filed for her
disqualification alleging that she did not meet the 1 year
constitutional requirement for residency.
4.) Apparently, she wrote down in her CoC in item no.8, which asked
for the number of years of residency, that she had been a resident
for 7 months.
5.) Marcos filed an amended CoC changing 7 months to since
childhood, claiming that it was an honest misinterpretation that she
thought she was being asked for her actual and physical presence in
Tolosa, and not her domicile.
6.) The COMELEC found the petition for her disqualification
meritorious and cancelled her amended CoC. For them, it was clear
that Marcos has not complied with the 1 year residency
requirement.
In election cases, the term residence has always been
considered synonymous with domicile. This is the
intention to reside in the place coupled with the personal
presence.
When she returned after her exile, she did not choose to
go back to Tacloban. Thus, her animus revertendi
(intention to return) #JudgePrincess points to Manila.
Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is not sufficient, there
must be conduct indicative of such intention.
7.) The COMELEC denied her motion for reconsideration but issued a
resolution allowing for her proclamation should she obtain the

highest number of votes. On the same day, however, the COMELEC

reversed itself and directed the suspension of her proclamation.
8.) Marcos found out that she was won by a landslide in the said
elections and prayed for her proclamation. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year.
RULING + RATIO:
The case at hand reveals that there is confusion as to the application
of Domicile and Residence in election law.
Originally, the essential distinction between residence and
domicile lies in the fact that residence is the PHYSICAL presence
of a person in a given area and domicile is where a person
intends to remain or his permanent residence. A person can
only have a single domicile.
It was ascertained from the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution that residence for election purposes is
synonymous with domicile.
It cannot be contested that the petitioner held various residences in
her lifetime. The Courts reiterate that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if she has maintained different residences for
different purposes. None of these purposes pointed to her intention
of abandoning her domicile of origin.
The Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because of the ff reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became
Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law* does not mean the same
thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
*Civil Code kasi sa Art 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. Sobrang distinguished yung residence at domicile sa Civil law.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She
even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

DISPOSITION: COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial

Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013)

Facts:
3

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.

However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied
for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
4
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
5
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance

to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of

Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
9
elections.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a

resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
10
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further
bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
11
travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700
in entering and departing the Philippines.

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued

13
an Order requiring the respondent to personally file his
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved

to declare him in default and to present evidence exparte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken

by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his

verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the

cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
15
misrepresentation,
the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. The First
Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a
18
Filipino citizen. The Court ruled that Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his
US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another

candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered
the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion
for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and
the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of

lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: ruled in favor of arnado

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the

propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US passport, There
are three questions posed by the parties before this
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

Issues:
1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
SC:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is
proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the
winner.
2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his

foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he
filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he
had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American,

Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which

foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the
mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
39
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally
renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30

November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
40
Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a
local electiv
.
3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling
is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio

45
v. Paredes which is the jurisprudential spring of the
principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be
re-examined and its soundness once again put to the
test to address the ever-recurring issue that a secondplacer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that

"the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
47
the legally cast ballots."

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere

obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a

decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office

because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x
with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling
therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number
of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
"declared that no one had been legally elected president
of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in
that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question
raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and
that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in
his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the
highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate
in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time
or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility
might not have been passed upon prior to election date.
Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly
qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the
outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate
remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to
his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects
his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast
in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify
with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run
for public office.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines,
he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
51
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the
sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
disregarded and only the electorates voice spoken
through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
anarchy to set in.1wphi1
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes
the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
54
55
COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate
are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,
and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression
of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible
and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.

56
COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within
the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification
and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere
obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible
ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidates disqualification is not necessary before a
qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified
one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer
in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the
qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been
proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the
first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship. With Arnado being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have
produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior
to the elections because he filed his answer to the
petition when the elections were conducted already and
he was already proclaimed the winner.
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at
all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the
Local Government Code will not apply.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 208566

November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ

REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery,
and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared

unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951
A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from
releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto

are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability;
(e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.

Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and

under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1.

Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of

project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congressrole must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2.

Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the

President constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.
(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES
THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

FUNA vs. COA

G.R. No. 192791 (2012)
Ponente: Velasco, Jr.

FACTS:

Reynaldo Villar was appointed as chairman of COA. Funa, in turn, questioned the
constitutionality of the appointment. The events are as follows:

Feb. 2, 2008 - Villar's 4th year as COA commissioner. He was

designated as acting chairman of COA upon Carague's retirement. Villar's term
as acting chair was supposed to be from Feb. 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.

June 11, 2008 - The Commission on Appointments confirmed

Villar's appointment, and he was to serve as COA Chair until the expiration of his
term of office as COA commissioner, which is on Feb. 2, 2011.

Villar, however, insists that he should be given a fresh term of 7

years as COA Chair. Since he was appointed as Chair in 2008, he should be
allowed to remain in that position until 2015.

This case, however, was rendered moot and academic because

Villar stepped down from the said position in 2011. Consequently, President
Aquino III appointed Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan as his replacement. Although moot,
the Court proceeded to decide on the case.

ISSUE: W/N Villar's appointment as COA chairman is valid despite the term
limitations imposed in Section 1(2), Article IX-D

HELD:

The provision provides that "The Chairman and Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of 7
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for 7 years, one commissioner for 5 years, and the other commissioner for 3 years,

without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

The Court held that Villar's appointment is not valid because he has already served the
full 7-year term -- either as Chairman or Commissioner. The intent of the framers is to
prevent the president from dominating the Commission and thus, encroach on its
independence.

CARPIO - CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

Villar's "promotional" appointment as chairman is prohibited by the

Constitution since it actually required another appointment by the President to a
different office, another confirmation by COA, and another oath of office. When
Villar accepted the appointment as Chairman, he had to resign as Commissioner.

Villar's promotion violates the rule on staggered terms.

MENDOZA - CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

It is unfair to an incumbent commissioner who cannot hope to be

promoted in case of expiration of the term of a chairman. This is what SC
provides in the decision, but this is bereft of constitutional basis.

In the case of promotions, the Constitution does not make any

distinction whether the predecessor is a chairman or a mere commissioner.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs
EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity.
On
March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with
other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim
appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum
address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint 16 with the Law
Department 17against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)
of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service
laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate
the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" 36, this
provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Digest Author: Margreth Rizzini A. Montejo

Pimentel v. Ermita
GR NO. 164978
Petitioner: Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Juan Ponce Enrole, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada,
Jinggoy E. Estrada, Panfilo M. Lacson, Alfreddo S. Lim, Jamby A.S Madrigal and Sergio R. Osmena,
III
Respondent: Execuive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael
T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Aberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa and Arthur C.
Yap
Petition: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary Injuction
to declare unconstitutional appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Ponente: J. Carpio
Date: October 13, 2005
Facts:
On August 25, 2004, the Commission on Appointments composed of senators and
representatives was constituted. President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective department. All of which took their oath of office and assumed duties
thereafter.
On September 23, 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments, which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. Because of
the events that transpired, petitioner alleges the unconstitutionality of President Arroyos appointment
of the respondents without consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress was in
session. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Is President Arroyos appointment of the respondents unconstitutional given that there was no
consent from the Commission on Appointments while Congress was in session?
2. Did she commit grave abuse of discretion upon the appointment of respondents?

Ruling:
1. No.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. Hence, the legislature may not interfere
except in those instance when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Moreover, the
Commission on Appointment does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent
to presidential appointments

In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.
That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient
that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title
I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
2. No.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from Presidents issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. For adinterim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress and must be submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection while acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments and are ways of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

Dispositive: Petition is DISMISSED.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010,
or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation
to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits
the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered
for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices
of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution;
that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or
limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which
the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether
the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make

appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when

continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that
Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section
14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely
within Section 4 (1) thereof.

CASE DIGEST
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC)
G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the
controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days
after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman
Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a
letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the
office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January
18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated
that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC
opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of
February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the
public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any,
not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the
process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to
submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the
controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which
led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to
pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice
by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by
the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which
the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by
the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the
period therein fixed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination.
3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief
Justice.
4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the
submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC.
HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this
case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly
speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set
forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the
proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short

list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them

will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although
the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process
of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to
decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe
for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public
interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be
needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with
finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from
moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of
the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically
done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and
manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can
be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,
among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the
President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in
Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall
issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper
when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct
the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For
mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a)
the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be
the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated
by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the
duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not
discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Due Process is Demandable as a Matter of Right in JBC Proceedings

(Jardeleza vs Sereno, 2014)

Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014
Full Text

Facts:
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application or recommendations
for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included
in the list of candidates. However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the
Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called unanimity
rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in the shortlist when s/he obtains
affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
however, is invoked because an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required.
Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he
would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and direct the JBC to,
among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of his oppositors or any
documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for
nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed a confidential
information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that
CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to crossexamine her in a public hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc
has yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the
shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were
actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the
invocation of the unanimity rule..

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include
him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of
discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the
position.

Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC
proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that an applicants access
to the rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being
a class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing. In cases where an objection
to an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment
of the JBCs duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination
process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its
discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance
to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the
body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just
the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only
test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist
submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not
from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of
its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to
strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of
nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and
the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum
requirements of due process. ##

Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case

Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Courts supervisory authority over
the JBC. Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under the supervision of the
SC. It follows that such supervisory authority covers the overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its
own rules or not.

Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC

No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.

Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
available against the JBC (which is not exercising quasi-judicial functions)
Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to the SC by the 1987
Constitution, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. ##
Full Text
***

IBP vs. Zamora (August 2000)

FACTS:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police
(the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul
LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional.
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule
of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
RULING:
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, *V+iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila... [35] We do not doubt the veracity of the
Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes
judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities,
and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all
these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement
and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed.
Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that
his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to
safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was
conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in
the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
Section 3, provides:
Civilian authority, is at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

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