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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997.]
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA
(CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA
CRUZ, respondent.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for petitioner.
Ray L. Basbas & Fe Fernandez-Bautista for
respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Miguel Palang married on July 16, 1949. It was his
first marriage. Their only child, Herminia, was
born on May 12, 1950.
On July 15, 1973, Miguel, then 63 years old,
contracted his second marriage with Erlinda
Agapay, 19, herein petitioner. Two months earlier,
Miguel and Erlinda purchased a piece of riceland.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 was issued
in their names.
On September 23, 1975, a house and lot was
purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. TCT No. 143120 was later issued in her
name.
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son,
Kristoper A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlina' s complaint. Two years
later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter
Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private
respondents, instituted an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. Private respondents sought to get back
the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner.
After trial on the merits, the lower court
dismissed the complaint declaring that there was
little evidence to prove that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's decision. Hence, this petition.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. The application law is Art. 148
of the Family Code on the cohabitation of a man
and a woman under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The marriage of Miguel
and Erlinda was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting. Under Art. 148, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
1|Family

Code

Art148

cases

actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
Actual contribution is required by this provision,
in contrast to Art. 147. If the actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price ,of the
riceland, we find no basis to justify her coownership
with
Miguel
over
the
same.
Consequently, the riceland should revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
As regards Kristopher Palang's heirship and
filiation, the same should be ventilated in the
proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose, and cannot be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
recovery of ownership and possession.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY
REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE;
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION BY BOTH
PARTIES, REQUIRED; ABSENCE THEREOF IN
CASE AT BAR. — The provision of law applicable
here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing
for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union
was patently void because the earlier marriage of
Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and
unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed
that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household,
are
regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares. Even
assuming that the subject property was bought
before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership
would still apply and proof of actual contribution
would still be essential. Since petitioner failed to
prove that she contributed money to the

. 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23. A few months after the wedding.. HEIRSHIP AND FILIATION. ID. 1975. DECISION ROMERO. CASE AT BAR. was born on May 12. 4. Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16. Miguel and Erlinda. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother. not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. not having been impleaded. for otherwise. CASE AT BAR. 1975 when she was only 22 years old. the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay. 3.R. Pangasinan. as evidenced by the Deed of Sale. ID. Moreover. A house and lot in Binalonan. allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and 2|Family Code Art148 cases claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession. Consequently. in October 1949. the riceland should. 1 When he returned for good in 1972. Pangasinan with an area of 10. DONATION.." Kristopher. 2 Two months earlier. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. — With respect to the house and lot. BETWEEN PERSONS GUILTY OF ADULTERY OR CONCUBINAGE. but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.080 square meters. Binalonan. but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio. on May 17. 1950. — Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. — The issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent. RATIONALE. SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE. Miguel had attempted to divorced Carlina in Hawaii. J p: Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. VOID. Pangasinan. cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar.00 on September 23. 24199 entitled "Erlinda Agapay v. On July 15. ID. he refused to live with private respondents. Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20. His mother. the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. ID. Dela Cruz" dated June 22. Herminia Palang. REQUIRED. we find no basis to justify her coownership with Miguel over the same.. ID. Erlinda. 1973. 1994 involving the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan. CANNOT BE ADJUDICATED IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP. Miguel and Carlina's only child.. JUDICIAL ORDER. TCT No. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957. CV No. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. 1973. revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. Consequently.. jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. . herein petitioner. Atty. ID. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names. under Article 739 of the Civil Code. was not a party to the case at bar. 2. [Article 134 of the Family Code] The judgment which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred. he left to work in Hawaii.000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.

an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta. San Felipe. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang. Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz. Palang. Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. 101736. 2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at Poblacion. 3|Family Code Art148 cases as to damages and SO ORDERED. the lower court rendered its decision on June 30. herein private respondents. Pangasinan. particularly of Kristopher Palang. Miguel died. within 15 days after this decision becomes final and executory. 143120 is her sole property. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owner of the properties in question. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda). PREMISES CONSIDERED. Pangasinan (Civil Case No. as evidenced by TCT No. the one-half (1/2) of the Agricultural land situated at Balisa. 4 Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son. U-4265). In 1979. 4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father. this petition. provided that the former (Kristopher) executes. dated October 30.On October 30. she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. 3) Confirming the ownership of one half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa. 3 The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child. Petitioner.080 square meters and as evidenced by TCT No. a quitclaim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her parents. instituted the case at bar. otherwise. 1989 dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. Pangasinan. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 22. as defendant below. judgment is hereby rendered — 1) Dismissing the complaint. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants. Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. San Felipe. premises considered. 1975. No pronouncement as to costs. 1981. 1981. the state of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate action. the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered: 1. under TCT No." 7 Hence. Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay. having bought the same with her own money. Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. 143120. 5 Two years later. Binalonan. 2. After trial on the merits. 3. Miguel Palang. Miguel's illegitimate son. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia. Binalonan. on February 15. Binalonan. contented that while the riceland covered by TCT No. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: "WHEREFORE. consisting of 10. On July 11. with cost against plaintiffs. 1975. She added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. Pangasinan. born on December 6. Kristopher A. Lot 290-B including the old house standing therein. Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of the plaintiffsappellants. 5) No pronouncement attorney's fees. 1994 within the following dispositive portion: "WHEREFORE. . Herminia Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties. 1977." 6 On appeal. respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.

we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Third. respondent court erred.S. the Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals. In any case. said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of the conveyance. Palang or Christopher A. Under Article 148. it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3.R. Consequently. Palang should be considered as party defendant in Civil Case No. in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household. as well as the pertinent provision of law and jurisprudence. Considering her youthfulness. May 17. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced. Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes. petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher A. There is no dispute that the transfer of ownership from the original owners of the riceland and the house and lot. petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U. even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation. according to petitioner. 1973.750. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second. The sale of the riceland on May 17. are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. Second. it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan. 11 there being no proof of the same. revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property. No. Furthermore. as correctly held by the Court of Appeals." 12 Separation of property between spouse during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. 1973. The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action. in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. 24199. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man or woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. 8 After studying the merits of the instant case. said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. were valid. there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. U-4625 before the trial court and in CAG.Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot. 9 cda In the case at bar. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store 10 but failed to persuade to us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Pangasinan. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement "in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership. the riceland should. Government. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision. was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. the rules of coownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15. If the actual contribution of the 4|Family Code Art148 cases party is not proved. we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. 1973. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate. "in not finding that there is a sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer A. In the nature of an afterthought. 13 The judgment which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for . respectively. Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land.

R. not a party to the case at bar. was therefore. but they are not married. the registered owner of the subject passenger jeepney. for appellants. Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. JJ . the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Atty. defendants and appellants. 15 for otherwise. 19 Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights has been pointed out. just because she had cohabited for many years as wife of Eugenio Jose. L-50127-28. the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership (Article . 14 The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda.00 on September 23. SYLLABUS 1. Rosalia claims that it was error for the trial court to consider her a coowner of hte said jeepney. is on leave. Jr. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.000." 17 As regards the third issue.. etc. ordering Eugenio Jose. Decision modified. plaintiffs and appellees. or may be caused to any of the passengers therein. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. and Rosalia Arroyo to jointly and severally pay damages to the victims of the accident. Nos. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is the illegitimate son of Miguel. Regalado. Erlinda. cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY. Fabros. Jr. concur. under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Leus. a legally married man. 18 The trial court erred gravely. Moreover. and ROSALIA ARROYO. EUGENIO JOSE. MARRIAGE. The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not be incapacitated to contract marriage. for appellees. — When a man and woman live together as husband and wife.. SYNOPSIS The trial court rendered a decision in a civil case for damages arising from a vehicular accident. Luis Viscocho and Francisco E. Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. FIRST DIVISION [G.. Heirs of Josefa P. Torres. With respect to the house and lot. but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. March 30. in order to avoid 5|Family Code Art148 cases multiplicity of suits. J .. 1979. 1975 when she was only 22 years old. Javier and Ricardo A. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee.separation of property and should not be so inferred. or their marriage is void from the beginning. COMMON LAW SPOUSES. Jr. Costs against petitioner. et al. Kristopher. INC. and that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation. PROPERTY RELATIONS.] VICTOR JUANIZA. 16 The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent. Victoriano O. His mother. not having been impleaded.. proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession. Rodrigo. Puno and Mendoza. petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial court's decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem.. vs. the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

or their marriage is void from the beginning. Rosalia Arroyo. New Civil Code). are coowners of said jeepney. 102 Phil. At the time of the accident.000." (pp. (Camporedondo vs. Aznar.00 plus legal interest from date of complaint until fully paid and costs of suit. 54 OG 5526. Rodriguez." (p. the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision. 2. or may be caused to any of the passengers therein. on the erroneous theory that Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo. however. 1055. 47-48. requires that both parties are not in anyway incapacitated to contract marriage. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. Appellant's Brief). and costs of suit. SP-872. there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. certified the same to Us. 2. the dispositive part of which reads as follows: "(4) In Civil Case No. Leus. without the benefit of marriage. for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. Fausto Leus Retrita. the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.500. with legal interest from date of complaint. the question raised being purely legal as may be seen from the lone assigned error as follows: "The lower court erred in holding defendantappellant Rosalia Arroyo liable 'for damages resulting from the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers' of the jeepney registered in the name of Eugenio Jose. Osmeña vs. Malajacan vs. 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. J p: This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the ground that the questions raised in the appeal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law. but they are not married. TORTS AND DAMAGES. The lower court based her liability on the 6|Family Code Art148 cases provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads: "When a man and woman living together as husband and wife. decision was rendered. having lived together as husband and wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of. February 4. Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23. DECISION DE CASTRO. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos. REGISTERED OWNER OF PUBLIC SERVICE VEHICLE SOLELY LIABLE. It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. L-11483.00 for the life of each of said deceased. Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. Rollo). as previously stated. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant. (5) In Civil Case No. The co-ownership contemplated. Rosalia Arroyo. who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. The issues thus to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry. but was denied. SP-867 ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of P1. Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant. Nestor del Rosario Añonuevo and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12. 1068. 42 OG 5576). — It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation. Rubi. and physical injuries suffered by. It is settled in our . Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code. prcd In the resulting cases for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna." Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals which. ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay the respective heirs of the deceased Josefa P. and (2) whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same.144. 1958.

Guerrero and Melencio Herrera. and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments.] GUILLERMA TUMLOS. The court further ruled that Guillerma and respondent Mario acquired the property during their cohabitation as husband and wife.. (De Peralta vs. Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared free from any liability for damages and the appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly. SYLLABUS 1. We disagree. Hence. Liwanag Law Office for respondents. petitioner. July 31.REMEDIAL LAW. the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not raised during trial could not be considered for the first time during appeal. Tamayo vs. In the second place. 1959. APPEALS. prevails over the right of respondents to eject her because said issue is not relevant to the ejectment case which deals solely with the issue of possession of the property in dispute.' It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years.R. procedural rules are generally premised on considerations of fair play. The Court ruled that petitioner is not a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code because said provision applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other. 1955. Mangusang. concur. The allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a mere elaboration of her initial theory. PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE. ISSUES NOT RAISED DURING TRIAL. L-12634 and L-12720.CIVIL LAW. petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that respondent Mario Fernandez and petitioner Guillerma had an amorous relationship. SYNOPSIS Private respondents spouses Mario Fernandez and Lourdes Fernandez filed a complaint for ejectment against herein petitioner Guillerma Tumlos. 11 SCRA 598. April 12. they cannot claim unfair surprise or prejudice. November 18. Aquino. Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos. Roque vs. The relationship between petitioner and respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. THIRD DIVISION [G. 1964. In the first place. December 29. L-5868. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC. which necessarily includes shelter. until she discovered that respondent Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals. there were no new matters or issues belatedly raised during the appeal before the RTC. L-8561. The Court also considered the fact that petitioner failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. No. 2. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. Fernandez. P. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Ignacio. Malibay Transit. or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. CASE AT BAR. The Court also dismissed petitioner's contention that her children's right to support. Thus. who was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ. May 29. respondents. 1953). To support her claim. CIVIL PROCEDURE. No costs. prcd Teehankee (Chairman). JJ. Toto Tumlos and Gina Tumlos. 2000. or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein. averred that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. WHEREFORE. she presented a Contract to Sell dated November 14. Respondents never objected when the assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. On appeal. Montoya vs. The trial court concluded that petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was a 7|Family Code Art148 cases co-owner of the subject property and could not be ejected therefrom.jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation. Makasiar. the present petition filed by Guillerma Tumlos only. The defense invoked by petitioner at the very start was that she was a coowner. 1986. Del Prado Diaz & Associates for petitioner. — In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence presented by petitioner. which stated that Mario Fernandez was legally married to her. L18110. 137650. I. and that they acquired the property in question as their 'love nest. FAMILY CODE. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of private respondents. although without the benefit of marriage. vs. APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW IN CASE AT . in view of the foregoing. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC.

4. It is also clear that. — The relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. her claim of having administered the property during 8|Family Code Art148 cases the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. there is no basis for petitioner's claim of co-ownership.. as readily admitted by petitioner. whose right to possess is based merely on their tolerance. but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand. Moreover. As correctly held by the CA.. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other. ID. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 1997 Order of the . assailing the November 19. Justice Alicia V. LAWS CAN BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IF IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE VESTED OR ACQUIRED RIGHTS. — In this case. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of the property in dispute. may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. J p: Under Article 148 of the Family Code. Therefore. for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. but Article 148 of the Family Code. petitioner's argument — that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity — deserves scant consideration.. Hence. Here. Clearly.. this fact by itself does not justify her claim. The CA was correct when it said: "Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented. it would be highly improper for us to rule on such issue. Sempio-Diy points out that "[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. In this case. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage. ID. Likewise. the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code. a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each other. 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA). it has been shown that they have a better right to possess it than does the petitioner. ID. None was made here. 3. ID. we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively. which reversed the October 7.ID. we cannot accept petitioner's submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez. EJECTMENT. for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure to repudiate petitioner's claim of filiation is not relevant to the present case. the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance. DEALS SOLELY WITH THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE." Hence. mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership. but who nonetheless live together conjugally. to resolve similar issues. Besides. Based on evidence presented by respondents. Indeed. In any event. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS.. it was not properly taken up below.ID. petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Moreover. or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC. — Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC. Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable." DECISION PANGANIBAN.. prcd The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. SIDEaA 5. the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. — It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over their property. petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question. PETITIONER NOT A CO-OWNER UNDER ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE. In any event. ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION TO PURCHASE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.BAR. she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage.REMEDIAL LAW. Hence. Indeed. it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. EVIDENCE OF CLAIM OF COOWNERSHIP. Article 298 of the Civil Code requires that there should be an extrajudicial demand.

. [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position paper on November 29. and the questioned orders of the court a quo dated October 7. 1997.] xxx xxx xxx "Upon appeal to the [RTC]. since she is a coowner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. the decision of this Court rendered on June 5." 3 "[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. 1996. which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. In their complaint dated July 5. their presence there [was] only transient and they [were] not tenants of the Fernandez spouses. . pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. 1997 is hereby REINSTATED.000. 1996. and that they acquired the property in question as their ‘love nest. 1996. since 1989. defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1. They then prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the property in question and 9|Family Code Art148 cases "After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15. Valenzuela.000. and that they have also demanded payment of P84. Costs against the private respondents. as well as to jointly pay P30. until she discovered that [Respondent Mario] deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. both as rental. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her. vacate the premises. "WHEREFORE. Metro Manila. that it was agreed upon that after a few months. that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years.00 a month. 1996. 6756. 1997 and November 11. 1997[. and the Contract to Sell over the disputed property." 4 Petitioner also assails the February 14. 1997 affirming in toto the appealed judgment of the [MTC] is hereby reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision of the [MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case. The MTC thereafter promulgated its judgment on January 22. [petitioner and the two other] defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that [Respondent] Mario Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship. 1999 CA Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. [petitioner and the two other] defendants further averred that it was only recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. It was also during the early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario] accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy]. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. the MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of such order. The judgment of the court a quo dated June 5.Regional Trial Court (RTC). while the [respondents] filed their position paper on December 5.’ It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten(10) years. Toto Tumlos. as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.600.600. and Gina Tumlos. In short. . attaching thereto their marriage contract. "In the same memorandum. but the said demands went unheeded. that they have demanded several times [that] the defendants . and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7) years. The Facts The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows: "[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows: "Wherefore.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1. the instant petition is GRANTED. the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III. letters of demand to the defendants.000. are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. without the payment of any rent. Lawang Bato. an action for ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela. 2 The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads: to pay the stated unpaid rentals.00 in attorney’s fees.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P143. Metro Manila against [herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos.

] xxx xxx xxx "It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision. and household. otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines[. Hence. xxx xxx xxx "The [RTC]. in determining the question of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession. (RTC). p. but the same was denied by the [RTC]. 1988 ed. Hence. and that she bore him two (2) children. the CA reversed the RTC. 276 SCRA 340). even if the said allegations and documents could be considered. 1997. children. 45. as correctly held by the trial court. and that the [respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized by law. as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper before the trial court (MTC). Hence. 209). or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the other. No other evidence was presented to validate such claim. the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC. the Contract to Sell originally named ‘Guillerma Fernandez’ as the spouse of [Respondent Mario]. the court concluded that [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject property and could not be ejected therefrom. if actual contribution of the party is not proved. except for the said affidavit/position paper. a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers naming the [respondents] as the buyers after the latter presented their marriage contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife. Thus. The care given by one party [to] the home.. "The [respondents] then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of reversal. As [herein Respondent] Mario Fernandez is validly married to [Respondent] Lourdes Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract dated April 27. From such findings. 348. Attached to her memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. . The CA ruled: 10 | F a m i l y Code Art148 cases "From the inception of the instant case. as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. 209. as amended. alleging that the decision of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was based vis-à -vis the statements of issues they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. 1997. the claim of coownership must still fail. the contract presented by the [respondents] cannot be given any weight. there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares (Agapay. . ruled therein that the Contract to Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be authentic. Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner thereof. of legal age. citing Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the . They also averred that the Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as ‘Mario P. The court further ruled that Guillerma and [Respondent Mario] acquired the property during their cohabitation as husband and wife. this Petition filed by Guillerma Tumlos only. xxx xxx xxx "However. Original Record)." 5 As earlier stated. married to Lourdes P. p. Sempio-Diy. supra at p. 1968. Fernandez. As found by the [RTC] in its judgment. 6 Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA rejected petitioner’s claim that she and Respondent Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property. According to them. "The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on July 3. Such contentions and documents should not have been considered by the . Fernandez.’ should not be given credence as it was falsified to appear that way. As previously stated. the only defense presented by private respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject property[. it was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitioner-husband without the benefit of marriage.] xxx xxx xxx This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. the property relations governing their supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. although without the benefit of marriage."On June 5. Palang. in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry (Agapay v. is not included in Article 148 (Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other.

Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. "The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent Mario] has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in her custody. Hence.It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not attached. Ricafort. a close perusal of the records shows that they did not file any responsive pleading.The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in not outrightly dismissing the petition for review filed by respondents. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the subject apartment building. 1998. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance." 7 (emphasis in the original) The Issues In her Memorandum. it being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other proof to the contrary (please see Article 116 of the Family Code). This bias. 500). v. and that to eject them from the apartment building would be to run counter with the obligation of the former to give support to his minor illegitimate children. we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property? (b) Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit? We shall also discuss these preliminary matters: (a) whether the CA was biased in favor of respondents and (b) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. The said property is thus presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez.The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the substantive right of support vis-Ã -vis the remedy of ejectment resorted to by respondents. Preliminary Matters Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of herein respondents. 11 2. no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject property was presented. . despite the clear mandate of Section 11 10 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court and despite the ruling in Solar Team Entertainment. "IV. it relied on evidence not properly presented before the trial court (MTC).Philippines Volume I by Arturo M. is manifest in the following: 1. As previously discussed. Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. such finding has no leg to stand on. it being based on evidence presented for the first time on appeal. which indispensably includes dwelling. judgment may be rendered against them as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not the co-owner of the property in litis. There was 11 | F a m i l y Code Art148 cases no basis for the public respondent to dismiss the complaint against them. p.. petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration of the Court: "I. The Court’s Ruling The Petition has no merit. LLphil 3. 1990 ed.It considered respondents' Reply dated May 20. We find no basis to justify her co-ownership with [Respondent Mario]. "III. 12 . "II.Corollary thereto. "With regard to the other [defendants]. which had allegedly been filed out of time. but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand . the RTC instead presumed that Guillerma and her children needed support from [Respondent Mario]. "In the instant case. she argues. "In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court." 8 In resolving this case. Gina and Toto Tumlos. Worse. the Court of Appeals erred in applying Art. the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. pursuant to Section 6. 4. as provided for in Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. 148 of the Family Code in the case at bar.It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first determining whether to give due course to the Petition.The CA considered the respondents’ Petition for Review 9 despite their failure to attach several pleadings as well as the explanation for the proof of service. Tolentino. xxx xxx xxx "Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented. . Inc.

she presented a Contract to Sell dated November 14. In this light. Neither have they questioned all the resolutions issued by the Court after their filing of such comment. 19 We disagree. be now considered in estoppel to question the same. we reject her claim that she was a co-owner of the disputed property. Such posturing only betrays the futility of petitioner's assertion. First Issue: Petitioner as Co-owner Petitioner's central theory and main defense against respondents' action for ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the property with Respondent Mario Fernandez. she presented a Contract to Sell 12 | F a m i l y Code Art148 cases indicating that she was his spouse. The MTC found this document insufficient to support her claim. the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code. Since the issue of possession cannot be settled without passing upon that of ownership. however. More important. on the one hand. 15 Such disposition. ." 18 We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering the evidence presented before it. 17 ruled in her favor. when the private respondent filed their comment to the petition on April 26. she maintains that the MTC should have dismissed the case. after considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence presented before it. Hence. there were no new matters or issues belatedly raised during the appeal before the RTC. she cannot invoke Solar 14 because she never raised this issue before the CA. 20 As correctly held by the CA. if not its absence of merit. Petitioner never raised these matters before the CA.The CA. on the other hand. on these procedural technicalities to overcome the appealed Decision and. . Evidence Presented on Appeal Before the RTC In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence presented by petitioner.In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article. In the second place. we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitioner's part to rely." alleging that the real question involved is one of ownership. This contention is erroneous. 1998. for its part. but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides: "ARTICLE 148. therefore. is not final insofar as the issue of ownership is concerned. succinctly dismissed these arguments in this wise: "It is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural error after we have rendered the decision. Thus. assert that the RTC may consider the new evidence she presented for the first time on appeal. they cannot claim unfair surprise or prejudice. we cannot accept petitioner's submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. which stated that Mario Fernandez was legally married to her. One other preliminary matter. however. Having resolved these preliminary matters. The issue of ownership may be passed upon by the MTC to settle the issue of possession. To support her claim. The defense invoked by petitioner at the very start was that she was a coowner. On the other hand. More importantly. The allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a mere elaboration of her initial theory. 16 which may be the subject of another proceeding brought specifically to settle that question. 21 only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. She cannot be allowed now to challenge its Decision on grounds of alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an afterthought. the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). The RTC. we now move on to petitioner’s substantive contentions. 1986. did not have jurisdiction over the "nature of the case. the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not raised during trial could not be considered for the first time during appeal. or industry shall be owned by them in common in . the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the RTC could no longer be considered because they had not been submitted before the MTC. procedural rules are generally premised on considerations of fair play. they failed to question such alleged procedural error. Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under Article 144 of the Civil Code Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC. They should. Respondents never objected when the assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. Nonetheless. At the first instance before the MTC." 13 We agree with the appellate court. In the first place. Petitioner implies that the court of origin. property. the appellate court concluded that "[t]he claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven .

are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved. In Agapay. her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. Arguing that Mario is liable for support. for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. 22 or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void 23 from the beginning. to 13 | F a m i l y Code Art148 cases resolve similar issues. Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. . his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question. prevails over the right of respondents to eject her. the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises.proportion to their respective contributions. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights." Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other. 27 In this case. Hence. this fact by itself does not justify her claim. as readily admitted by petitioner. "If one of the parties is validly married to another. In the absence of proof to the contrary. Second Issue: Support versus Ejectment Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to repudiate her claim regarding the filiation of his alleged sons." Hence. she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez. petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage. 28 No Evidence of Actual Joint Contribution Another consideration militates against petitioner’s claim that she is a co-owner of the property. in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household. "The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Justice Alicia V. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another. Clearly. 29 the Court ruled: "Under Article 148. we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively. It must be stressed that the actual contribution is required by this provision. It is also clear that. Likewise. the relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. which necessarily includes shelter. petitioner’s argument — that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity — deserves scant consideration. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. Mark Gil and Michael Fernandez. she advances the theory that the children's right to support. his silence on the matter amounts to an admission. for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. Moreover. as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC. 25 Based on evidence presented by respondents." (emphasis ours) In this case. As stated above. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Indeed. In any event. 24 It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. Sempio-Diy points out 26 that "[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Therefore. there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership.

Costs against petitioner.. The CA was correct when it said: WHEREFORE.. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over their property. Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure to repudiate petitioner’s claim of filiation is not relevant to the present case. . the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand. Vitug. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of the property in dispute. 32 None was made here. JJ." 33 Moreover.concur. Article 298 31 of the Civil Code requires that there should be an extrajudicial demand. Indeed. J. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance. it has been shown that they have a better right to possess it than does the petitioner. "Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented. Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes. Here. it would be highly improper for us to rule on such issue. it was not properly taken up below.We disagree. is abroad — on official business. Melo. Besides. 30 In any event. cdphil 14 | F a m i l y Code Art148 cases SO ORDERED. whose right to possess is based merely on their tolerance.