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Part I – Preliminary Considerations

Legal System in the Philippines

Under Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking Act),
commercial banks are allowed to invest in real property subject
to the limitation that:

Stare decisis et non quieta movere (To stand by
decisions and not to disturb settled matters)
Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 132051, 25 June 2001
DECISION

Sec. 25. Any commercial bank may purchase, hold and convey
real estate for the following purposes:
(a) such as shall be necessary for its immediate accommodation
in the transaction of its business: Provided, however, that the
total investment in such real estate and improvements thereof,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of

including bank equipment, shall not exceed fifty percent (50%)
of net worth x x x x x x . (Emphasis Ours)

adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and continues to

Investments in real estate made by savings and mortgage

guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability

banks are likewise subject to the same limitation imposed by

in the law.

the aforequoted provision.[1]

The principle finds application to the case now before us.

Bound by such limitation, the management of Banco

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino for

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the

brevity) devised means to pursue its endeavor to expand its

Resolution dated December 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in

banking operations. To this end, Tala Realty Services

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 44257.

Corporation (Tala for brevity) was organized by Banco

Filipinos four (4) major stockholders namely, Antonio Tiu,
Tomas B. Aguirre, Nancy Lim Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre. Tala
and Banco Filipino agreed on this scheme Tala would acquire
the existing branch sites and new branch sites which it would
lease out to Banco Filipino.
On August 25, 1981, pursuant to their agreement, Banco

The facts of the present controversy may be summed up as
follows:
In its complaint in Civil Case No. 51(95) filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Iloilo City on March 29, 1995,
Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of lease executed on
August 25, 1981 which provides in part:

Filipino sold its eleven (11) branch sites all over the country to
Tala. In turn Tala leased those sites to Banco Filipino under
contracts of lease executed by both parties on the same day.

1. That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of
eleven (11) years, renewable for another period of nine (9)
years at the option of the LESSEE under terms and conditions

Years after, dissension between Tala and Banco Filipino

mutually agreeable to both parties.[2],

arose in connection with their lease contracts resulting in a
chain of lawsuits for illegal detainer. Some of these cases are

its contract with Banco Filipino expired on August 31,

still pending in courts. At present, three of the illegal detainer

1992. However, Banco Filipino has continued to occupy the

cases have been passed upon by the Supreme Court.

premises even after the expiration of the lease.

The case at bar, involving Banco Filipinos Iloilo City

On June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon Banco Filipino the

branch site, is one of those cases for illegal detainer filed by

following terms and conditions: that the bank should pay

Tala against Banco Filipino based on these grounds: (a)

P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as of September 1,

expiration of the period of lease and (b) non-payment of

1992, with rental escalation of 10% per year; and advance

rentals.

deposit equivalent to rents for four months, plus a goodwill of
P500,000.00.

Banco Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it
stopped paying rents.
In its letter dated April 14, 1994, Tala notified Banco
Filipino that the lease contract would no longer be renewed;
that it should pay its back rentals, including goodwill, deposit
and adjusted rentals in the amount of P2,059, 540.00 and
vacate the premises on or before April 30, 1994. [3] In its second
letter dated May 2, 1994, Tala demanded upon Banco Filipino
to pay the rents and vacate the premises.[4]
In answer to Talas complaint, Banco Filipino denied
having executed the lease contract providing for a term of
eleven (11) years; claiming that its contract with Tala is for
twenty (20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed on
August 25, 1981 providing:
That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of twenty
(20) years, renewable for another period of twenty (20) years at
the option of the LESSEE under terms and conditions mutually
agreeable to both parties.[5]

On July 1, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment holding that
the eleven (11)-year lease contract superseded the twenty (20)year lease contract. Thus, the court ordered the ejectment of
Banco Filipino from the premises on these grounds: expiration
of the eleven (11)-year lease contract and non-payment of the
adjusted rental. Banco Filipino was likewise ordered to pay
back rentals in the amount of P79,050.00 corresponding to the
period from May 1994 up to the time that it shall have
surrendered to Tala possession of the premises.[6]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City
affirmed the MTC decision.[7]
Banco Filipino elevated the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the challenged decision.[8]
Banco Filipino sought for a reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals Decision, invoking in its Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration the Decisions of the same court in two of the
other illegal detainer cases initiated by Tala against Banco
Filipino, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39104 and 40524. In
these cases, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the
lease contract providing for a period of twenty (20)

years. Finding Banco Filipinos motions for reconsideration

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering that

meritorious, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed

principle of the law of the case finds application in the instant

Resolution, thus:

case.[10]

This Court agrees with petitioner that its Decision of August

Petitioner Tala contends that its complaint for illegal

30, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104, having been declared final

detainer should not have been dismissed by the Court of

and executory by no less than the Supreme Court in G.R. No.

Appeals on the basis of its decision in CA-G.R. SP No.

127586, now constitutes the law of the case between the parties

39104. Petitioner claims that this decision is not a precedent.

in the present case. Accordingly, this Court is not at liberty to
disregard or abandon the same at will without wreaking havoc
on said legal principle.

motion

against the bank which reached the Supreme Court is CA-G.R.
SP No. 39104. This involves the site in Malabon. The Court of

WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration and
supplemental

The first in the series of illegal detainer cases filed by Tala

for

reconsideration

are

hereby

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Courts Decision of August 25,
1997 is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a new one is
rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the appealed
decision and DISMISSING the complaint for ejectment filed
against herein petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo
City.[9]
Tala now comes to this Court on the lone ground that:

Appeals held that Banco Filipino cannot be ejected from the
subject premises considering that the twenty (20)-year lease
contract has not expired. Tala elevated this Court of Appeals
decision to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586. In a
Resolution dated March 12, 1997, the Supreme Court
dismissed Talas petition as the appeal was not timely perfected,
thus:
Considering the manifestation dated January 31, 1997 filed by
petitioner that it is no longer pursuing or holding in abeyance

recourse to the Supreme Court for reasons stated therein, the

however, that the eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because

Court

Resolved

to DECLARE

THIS

CASE

(1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then Executive Vice-President of

of

Court

private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having signed the

to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed

contract; (2) the records of the notary public who notarized the

has become final and executory, no appeal therefrom having

said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include

been timely perfected.[11]

the said document; and (3) the said contract was never

TERMINATED and DIRECT the

Clerk

submitted to the Central Bank as required by the latters rules
We agree with petitioner Tala that the decision of the Court

and regulations (Rollo, pp. 383-384.).

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104 holding that the twenty
(20)-year contract of lease governs the contractual relationship

Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and

between the parties is not a precedent considering that the

simulation that rightly make any court suspicious and wary of

Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586 did not decide the case on

imputing any legitimacy and validity to the said lease contract.

the merits.The petition was dismissed on mere technicality. It is
significant to note, however, that the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 129887,[12] through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, resolved
the identical issue raised in the present petition, i.e., whether
the period of the lease between the parties is twenty (20) or
eleven (11) years, thus:

Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco
Filipino testified that he was responsible for the daily
operations of said bank. He denied having signed the eleven
(11)-year contract and reasoned that it was not in the interest of
Banco Filipino to do so (Rollo, p. 384). The fact was
corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of Banco Filipinos

Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year
lease contract controls. We agree with the MTC and the RTC,

Legal Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract

and whose initials allegedly appear in all the pages thereof. She

what was submitted to the Central Bank was the twenty (20)-

disowned the said marginal initials (id., p. 385).

year lease contract.

The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by

Granting arguendo that private respondent Banco Filipino

requiring submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of his

deliberately omitted to submit the eleven (11)-year contract to

monthly notarial report with copies of acknowledged

the Central Bank, we do not consider that fact as violative of

documents

and

the res inter alios acta aliis non nocet (Section 28, Rule 130,

requirement of the Notarial Law, failure to submit such notarial

Revised Rules of Court provides, viz.: Sec. 28. Admission by

report and copies of acknowledged documents has dire

third party - The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an

consequences including the possible revocation of the notarys

act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter

notarial commission.

provided.; Compania General de Tabacos v. Ganson, 13 Phil.

thereto

attached. Under

this

procedure

472, 477 [1909]) rule in evidence. Rather, it is an indication of
The fact that the notary public who notarized petitioner Tala

said contracts inexistence.

Realtys alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract did not retain a
copy thereof for submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court

It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-

of the proper RTC militates against the use of said document as

year lease contract which is the real and genuine contract

a basis to uphold petitioners claim. The said alleged eleven

between petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco

(11)-year lease contract was not submitted to the Central Bank

Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract

whose strict documentation rules must be complied with by

is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is

banks to ensure their continued good standing. On the contrary,

entitled to the possession of the subject premises for as long as
it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the other terms

in short. Stare decisis et non subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees.R. (Emphasis Court of Appeals [G.R. likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract. we have no option but to uphold the twenty-year The contention is without merit. It is the better practice that when a court has laid against petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts. In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G. contends that the decision in this case should be based on the thus: allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it. Petitioner 137980. What petitioner contends may lease contract over the eleven-year contract presented by be true with respect to the merits of the individual claims petitioner. 281 SCRA 534. ship on April 22.and conditions thereof (Art. with the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere . New Civil Code). Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Courts even though the subject property is different. Inc. 1673. may be gleaned policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance from the pronouncement in Negros Navigation Co. 110398. quieta movere.. No. different and trial was conducted separately. 1980 and its liability for such accident. vs. or. this time. No. of it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases which there is only one truth. arguing that although this case arose out of this Court. falsehood on the other! That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case. 129887). to wit The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was Petitioner criticizes the lower courts reliance on further reinforced on June 20. Otherwise.R. speaking through Madame Justice the same incident as that involved in Mecenas. one would be where the facts are substantially the same. the parties are Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. on the record of this case. No. 2000 when the First Division of the Mecenas case. 542-543 supplied) (1997)]. rendered a Decision in G.

The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: Stare decisis simply declares that. as in this case. the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt in J. but more importantly.. 519.R. Similarly. 217. 401 [1942]). 2d 399. 62 N. if the facts are substantially the same.M. Thomas Colliery Co. we hold that the term of the lease in the present case is also twenty (20) years. . 448. 353 Pa. Tollinger v. Gill (75 Ohio App. Mariano. 23 A.J. Co. 2d 760 [1944]).(Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been different (Heisler v. we can very well apply the conclusion in G. even if the property subject of the Decision of G. hence. this Court relied on its to relitigate the same issue (J. 395 [1922]. 4 A. competent court. 2d 670.E. 2d 909. supra.(underscoring. Thus. 394. non quieta movere. 129887 that it is the twenty-year lease contract which is controlling inasmuch as not only are the parties the same. Ours) Eq. Manogahela Street Ry. 129887 is located in Urdaneta. the same event have been put forward by parties similarly Philadelphia Co. v. a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow.M. 452.. should no longer be relitigated. the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis. Tuason v. Mariano. v. in State ex rel. Pangasinan while that in the instant case is located in Davao. the same questions relating to 118A. the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable principles declared in prior decisions. Considering the above rulings.R.. for the sake of certainty. In Woulfe v. 916 [1944]. the issue regarding its validity is one and the same and. No. 274 Pa. settled. 350 Pa 603. Associated Realties Corporation (130 N.) Where. 39 A. Tuason & Corp. No. even though the parties may be Here. 677 [1945]). therefore. it was held that under the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining 85 the validity of a land title on the principle of stare decisis et SCRA 644 [1978]). In re situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a Burtts Estate.

A. deposited the rents in arrears in the bank. Blg.00 either with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of. opened in private respondents name. No. despite demands to pay and to vacate the From the foregoing facts. However. (P150. it is clear that the lessor was correct premises made by petitioner.800.00 from November 1992 to February 16. It was there the part of the lessor to accept was justified.R. what private respondent could have done was to deposit the original rent of P700.P.R. and with notice to. the monthly rental of P1. Coming now to the issue of whether or not respondent should be ejected for non-payment of rentals. this fact cannot alter he should be granted not only the current rentals but also all the .00 to P1. As this Court held in Uy v. No 129887 that since the unpaid rentals demanded by petitioner were based on a new rate which it unilaterally imposed and to which respondent did not agree.800. Clearly. In such a case.Resolving now the issue of whether or not respondent the legal situation of private respondent since the account was Banco Filipino should be ejected for non-payment of rentals. as amended by R. No. The recent case of T & C Development Corporation vs. 6828. 137980 for the ejectment of private respondent. This deposit in the Bank was made only in 1984 The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay indicating a delay of more than four years. petitioner.00 per month) exceed that allowed by law so refusal on Court of Appeals[13] is instructional on this point. Moreover. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 671. 877. 1993. we do not agree with the ruling in G. Even if private respondent in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee. there could still be ground for ejectment based on non-payment of The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979 rentals. Although the increase held: in monthly rentals from P700.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by B. what the cautioned that lessee should have done was to deposit in 1979 the previous rent. 676 [1989]): there lies no ground for ejectment. there was cause the First Division of this Court in the same G.

rentals in arrears.R. This circumstance.00) Philippine Currency representing advance rental to be applied on the monthly rental for period from the eleventh to the twentieth year. 129887 and 137980 are substantially the same. We reiterate the ruling in T appeal because as ruled by this Court. 1994. it gave petitioner good ground for opposing parties are likewise the same. 1985 to November. 129887. Nos. authorities or in a bank in the name of. Thus.020.000. x x x it should not have completely stopped paying rent but should have deposited the original rent amount with the judicial While advance rentals appear to have been made to be applied for the payment of rentals due from the eleventh year to the twentieth year of the lease.. This is so even if the lessor himself did not instituting ejectment proceedings. the records show that such advance rental had already been applied for rent on the property for the period of August. It bears stressing that the facts of the instant case and those of G. the LESSEE shall pay the LESSOR ONE MILLION TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P1.e. that if ever petitioner instances when substantial justice demands the giving of the took exception to the unilateral or illegal increase in rental rate. 129887. to wit3. i. No. we uphold petitioners right to eject respondent from the leased premises. That upon the signing and execution of this Contract. while we are bound by the findings of this Courts Second Division in that case under the principle of stare decisis. petitioner. .R. The only difference is the site of respondent bank. proper reliefs. supra. the fact that respondents failure to pay any rentals beginning April 1994. 1989. No. there have been & C Development Corporation. which provided ground for its ejectment from the premises. when respondent stopped paying any rent at all beginning April. justifies our departure from the outcome of G. In this case. respondents failure to pay rent at the old rate. does not appear in G.R. and with notice to. The Thus.

Judgment is rendered ordering respondent Banco Filipino to vacate the subject premises and to restore possession thereof to petitioner Tala. no part. concur.. Melo. JJ. and Gonzaga-Reyes. its eviction from the premises is justified.100. SO ORDERED. respondent Banco Filipino may not be ejected on the ground of expiration of the lease. Nos.. Panganiban.R. However. Costs against respondent. WHEREFORE. Former counsel of a party. in light of the Decisions of this Court in G.00 computed from April 1994 up to the time it vacates the premises. SP No. since it stopped paying the rents beginning April 1994. which we follow as precedents. J. the petition is GRANTED.G.Clearly. .R. 44257 is MODIFIED insofar as it denies petitioner Talas prayer for ejectment of respondent Banco Filipino. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA. Vitug. Respondent is also ordered to pay Tala the monthly rental of P21. 129887 and 137980. (Chairman).

[6] been decided one way. No.[1] We ruled then. once a case has Enterprise with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). ladies wear. 177127. 2007 Decision[2] and the March16 .369. v. overalls.528.R. broken down as follows: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the January 15. that failure to print the word zero-rated in the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input value-added tax (VAT) on zero-rated sales. .015.073.. applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000 in the total amount of P8. dresses and other Stare decisis et non quieta movere.918. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[4] It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer[5] and as an Ecozone Export Courts are bound by prior decisions.126.34. as we rule now.276. G.228. courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner. trousers. 54 of the BIR.R.413.: engaged in the manufacture and wholesale export of jackets.R.38 4th quarter 1. polo shirts. J. pants. Trece Martires City. On separate dates. shirts.02 3rd quarter 1. Inc. Philippines. 11 October 2010 Factual Antecedents DECISION Petitioner J. 2007 1st quarter P 2.97[7] [3] Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.060. a domestic corporation.A.97 2nd quarter 2. is DEL CASTILLO. Inc. Thus.J. wearing apparel. Phils. petitioner filed with the Revenue District Office (RDO) No.A.

Petitioner must show that it has complied with the provisions of Section 204 (c) and 229 of the . In his Answer. it is not Proceedings before the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals entitled to tax credit of input taxes pursuant to Section 4. routinary 8.A. refund/ credit. Being allegedly registered with the The claim for credit/refund. In an action for refund.228. pursuant to Section 24 of R. to wit: documented.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 2002.276. remained unacted by Philippine Economic Zone Authority as an export the respondent. 7916 in relation to Section 109 (q) of the Tax Code. No. On April 16. the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund. 6. Hence.[9] respondent interposed the following special and affirmative defenses. petitioner filed a Petition for Review[8] with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT which was docketed asCTA Case No. however. 7-95. petitioner was constrained to file a petition enterprise. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation/examination by the Bureau.5. 7.34 being claimed by petitioner as alleged unutilized VAT input taxes for the year 2000 was not properly 6454 and raffled to the Second Division of the CTA. petitioners business is not subject to VAT before the CTA. The amount of P8. Hence. and failure to [do so] is fatal to the claim for 4.

premises considered. reiterating that failure to comply with invoicing requirements results in the denial of a claim for refund. tendered a Reply. [15] Petitioner. stood firm on its Decision and denied petitioners Motion for lack of merit in a Resolution[17] dated October 5. the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. ACCORDINGLY.[10] The Second Division of the CTA. the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision[11] denying petitioners claim for refund/credit of input VAT Ruling of the CTA En Banc attributable to its zero-rated sales due to the failure of petitioner to indicate its Taxpayers Identification Number-VAT (TIN-V) and the word zero-rated on its invoices.[13] petition as follows: WHEREFORE.Tax Code on the prescriptive period for claiming tax Aggrieved by the Decision. accordingly. SO ORDERED. 2005. the fallo reads: On January 15.[19] Hence. DISMISSED for lack of merit.[12] Thus. 2005 of Second Division of the . Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake the nature of exemption from taxation. the CTA En Banc denied the petition.[16] 9. refund/credit. however. 2005 and Resolution datedOctober 5. and. in turn.[18] After trial. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] to which respondent filed an Opposition. the Decision dated June 30. 2007. it disposed of the WHEREFORE. the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. This prompted petitioner to elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc.

2007.T.A Case No.[21] he dissented. SO ORDERED. RECEIPTS THAT INVOICES ISSUED BY AND/OR A VAT- REGISTERED TAXPAYER. Presiding REQUIRE Justice Acosta maintained his dissent. the instant Petition with the solitary issue of whether the failure to print the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales. SUCH AS THE Issue PETITIONER. IN THAT: Petitioner sought reconsideration[23] of the Decision but the A. however. Acosta (Presiding Justice Petitioner submits that: Acosta) concurred with the findings of the majority that there was failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the invoicing THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED BY requirements. Hence. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS CTA En Banc UNDER THE 1997 TAX CODE DO NOT denied the same in a Resolution[24] dated March 16.Court of Tax Appeals in C. SHOULD BE IMPRINTED WITH THE WORD ZERO-RATED.[20] Petitioners Arguments Presiding Justice Ernesto D. 6454 are hereby AFFIRMED. to the outright denial of DECIDING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A petitioners claim since there are other pieces of evidence proving MANNER THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH petitioners transactions and VAT status. .[22] LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

[EXCEED] THE LIMITATIONS SYSTEM. D. AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE WORDS ZERO-RATED BE IMPRINTED ON THE SALES RECEIPTS REGULATIONS E. PETITIONERS CLIENTS FOR ZERO-RATED ON ITS ABSENCE THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO A ITS TRANSACTIONS TAXPAYERS CLAIM FOR REFUND. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS PETITIONERS PRESCRIBED BY THE 1997 TAX CODE ZERO-RATED TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000. MOREOVER. AS STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED. F. CANNOT UNDULY BENEFIT FROM ITS OMISSION CONSIDERING THAT THEY C. EVIDENTIARY 7-95 RULES THE GOVERNMENT BY REASON OF THE REVENUE ARE AND NO PREJUDICE CAN RESULT TO FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO IMPRINT NOT THE WORD ZERO-RATED THE INVOICES. RESPONDENTS REGULATIONS ARE ARE NON-RESIDENT [THAT] FOREIGN INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT CORPORATIONS ARE NOT IMPLEMENT THE 1997 TAX CODE BUT COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE VAT INSTEAD. INVOICES/OFFICIAL UNDER NO.B. OF THE LAW. A MERE PREPONDERANCE . SUCH REFUND. PETITIONER SUBSTANTIAL UNEQUIVOCALLY PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT PROVED IN CIVIL CLAIMS FOR CASE[S].

invoicing requirements under Section 4. 7-95. 7-95.OF EVIDENCE WILL SUFFICE TO JUSTIFY invoices/receipts is THE GRANT OF A CLAIM.108-1[27] of Revenue Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[28] In that case. Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the The absence of the export sale of goods and services. we sustained the Regulations No. respondent seeks on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input the affirmance of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the VAT is not novel. such . This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic CTA En Banc. which Our Ruling requires the word zero rated to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales. denial of petitioners claim for tax credit/refund for non-compliance with Section 4. [26] He insists that the denial of petitioners claim for Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly tax credit/refund is justified because it failed to comply with the Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v.[25] fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT Respondents Arguments Emphasizing that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions The question of whether the absence of the word zero-rated which are strictly construed against the claimant.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. We explained that: The petition is bereft of merit. When applied to the tax base or the the selling price of the goods or services sold. The tax rate in this word zero-rated on case is set at zero.

registered and must comply with invoicing requirements. 9337. the Secretary of Finance unduly (3) The date of transaction.zero rate results in no tax chargeable against the and spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997 foreign buyer or customer.108-1 of RR 7-95) the letter . the taxpayer has to be VAT- person. x x x (2) The total amount which the purchaser xxxx [paid] or is obligated to pay to the seller with the indication that such Petitioner Panasonic points out. such transactions charges no output tax. prior to their amendment by R. although the seller in NIRC. he can claim Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC. that in requiring the printing on its sales invoices of amount includes the valueadded tax. (1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered For the effective zero rating of such transactions. quantity. which required the VAT-registered taxpayers receipts or allows him to recover the input taxes he paid relating invoices to indicate only the following information: to the export sales. which applied a refund of the VAT that his suppliers charged him. and modified by a mere unit cost and description of regulation (Section 4. the word zero-rated. however. followed by his taxpayers identification number (TIN). But. amended. making him internationally competitive. however.A. expanded. to its payments specifically Sections 113 and 237 The seller thus enjoys automatic zero rating.

it made this particular revenue regulation a client. the rule that applied was Section the covered sales of goods and services. business style.108-1 of RR 7-95. 2005. the . 1996.. customer or 1. a law that did not yet exist at Finance under Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC the time it issued its invoices. 9337 the rule-making authority granted to the Secretary of on November 1. It (4) The name.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from requirement only after the enactment of R.A.A. otherwise known as the explained by the CTAs First Division. This conversion from regulation to law did not diminish the binding force of such Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections 113 and 237 did not require the inclusion of the regulation with respect to acts committed prior to the enactment of that law. As aptly 4. When identification number (TIN) R. address and already required the printing of the word zero-rated taxpayer's on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. if any. (Presidential Decree 1158) for the efficient enforcement of the tax code and of course its But when petitioner Panasonic made the amendments. 1995 and [which] took effect on January 1. The BIR incorporated this Section 4.the goods or properties or Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations. i. from April 1998 in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from to March 1999. which nature of the service. word zero-rated for zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or invoices. and the Secretary of Finance issued on December 9. part of the tax code. 9337 amended the 1997 NIRC on November of the purchaser. 2005. The requirement is reasonable and is export sales subject of this case.e.

a successful claim for input VAT is the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED. the petition is hereby DENIED. absent dated January 15. made. If. the government would be refunding money it did not collect. petitioner Panasonic has been unable to substantiate its claim for refund. SO ORDERED.appearance of the word zero-rated on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers WHEREFORE. 2007 and the Resolution dated March 16. 2007 of such word.Failure to print the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales. the printing of the word zero-rated on the invoice helps segregate sales that are subject to 10% (now 12%) VAT from those sales that are zero-rated. petitioners claim for credit/ refund of input VAT for the taxable quarters of 2000 must be denied. Unable to submit the proper invoices. Further. The from falsely claiming input VAT from their assailed Decision purchases when no VAT was actually paid. .[29] Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence.

G. 18 March 1919 On the return of the record to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. his homestead should remain his property. Apolonio Gamido and consequently directing the exclusion of this portion of the land described in the main decision in Zarate vs. at page 416. Director of Lands [supra]. As was said by the United States Supreme Court in the case of St. The applicant appeals from this order. but if the Court of Land Registration finds that said Gamido has not yet obtained a patent therefor. No. now appearing in volume 34 of the Philippine Reports. J. the dispositive part reads: The judgment of the Court of Land Registration is hereby modified and it is declared that the applicant has the right to register title to all of the lands described in the application. with the exception of that portion claimed as a homestead by Apolonio Gamido.: Land Registration had jurisdiction.then the court shall register title in favor of the “Law of the case” applicant to all lands describe in the application. "The patent of the United States is the conveyance by which the nation passes the title to portions of the public domain. which homestead shall be excluded from registration by the applicant provided the Court of Land Registration shall find that said Apolonio Gamido has obtained a patent for said land. Director of Lands. an order was issued by the judge.. resulting principally through an erroneous conception of the original decision of this court as written in English.R. finding that a homestead patent had been issued to In a decision of this Court in the case of Zarate vs. In other words. Leoncio Zarate vs. Louis Smelting and Refining Co.S. Gamido having compiled with the express mandate of the appellate court. 636)." . which court after the dissolution of the Court of MALCOLM. L13334. Kemp ([1881]). although his contention is not well grounded. The Director of Lands. vs. 104 U.

not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto. 38 Phil. 467. or speculate of this doctrine has been modified (or reversed) by the later chances from changes in its members. 225 U. while it may be reversed in other cases. 480. a patent issued under the homestead litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent Law has all the force and effect of a Torrens title acquired appeal. we must respect order to end litigation. . is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal. decisions Co. Messinger vs. provided it be a fact that the patent has every obstinate litigant could. whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts. Burnham of this court. 343..S. merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided." as applied to a former decision of an appellate court." and that court to listen to criticism on their opinions.) A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court The phrase "Law of the Case" is described in a decision has once declared the law in a case. compel a been secured in any of said homestead proceedings. [1857].) Recognition of the Roberts vs. cooper expression 'Law of the Case" saves the situation. (See for instance De los [1895].." (See Great Western Tel. nakedly and badly but. 162 U. 926. 496. once considered and decided by it. 339. and that being the case .S. Anderson [1912]. 481. were to be that "Under Act No.. 436.. such declaration continues coming from the Supreme Court of Missouri in the following to be the law of that cae even on the subsequent appeal. the rule is necessary as a matter of policy in under Act No. "There would be no end to a suit if the title so secured. Such a rule is "necessary to en bale an appellate court to perform its The general rule. . Reyes vs. which would be impossible Zarate vs. The graphical language: rule made by an appellate court. 20 How." Again. cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. . Director of Lands [supra] announced the doctrine if a question. Razon [1918]. The "Law of the Case.We are not insensible to the fact that the decision in duties satisfactorily and efficiently. by repeated appeals. vs.

(Mangold vs. or It has not been proven by the petitioner that the land occupied on the chance of our rewriting proposition once gravely by Apolonio Gamido was his own property. The Administration of justice is a practical affair. reagitation.. . Johnson. there would be endless litigant were allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court.. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use. and in view of the ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law fact that the said land is not public land. Separate Opinions TORRES. concur. after steps below or above on subsequent appeal.) Judgment is affirmed with costs against appellant. 496. 512. concurring: In Short. J. 237 Mo. and for this reason it follows that on a first appeal. Street. concur rule is grounded on convenience. The JJ. Bacon [1911]. reexamination. Carson. Courts are allowed. So ordered. C.J.. inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. experience. J.but they become and remain the law of the case in all Arellano. Avanceña and Moir. and reason. Araullo. if they so choose. it can not be the object of a given case. Without the rule there would be no end to criticism.. would result in the foolishness of the the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed of a homestead application.. to act like ordinary sensible persons. and reformulation.

29 November 2001 No. Quezon Province. 1690-G. (b) moral and exemplary damages the amount of which she leaves to the court for proper evaluation and (c) attorney's fees of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80. CV No.00) annual unrealized income for the use of her said property from January 4. 9114. which she purchased from Marina M. Lucena City. covered and ultimately. al. et. to place her in the possession and use of her said property.000.. which found its way to this Court via the 3 instant petition. 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. 1983. 2 CA-G. G. favor. is a petition for declaratory relief and damages initiated by petitioner Veronica Padillo4 on December 14. T-9863. Branch 54 Petitioner Padillo prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ in Civil Case No.00) per appearance in court. and prohibiting respondents from disturbing the same. No. .described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. that judgment be rendered ordering respondent Averia and Casilang to pay jointly and severally to petitioner Padillo: (a) One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150. and that respondent Averia even instituted Civil Case 119707. petitioner Padillo alleged that she is the absolute owner of a Two Hundred Fifty-One (251) square meter parcel of land with improvements thereon located in Quezon Avenue.R.000. Petitioner ascribed fault upon Averia and Casilang with unlawful refusal to turn over the property in her Veronica Padillo vs. Jr. Court of Appeals. and one Beato Casilang.plus Six Hundred Pesos (P600.R. de Vera-Quicho and Margarita de Vera. 9114 on the ground of res judicata.00) . and Civil Case No. 1994 in established petitioner's right of ownership over the subject property. In the petition filed against respondent Tomas Averia.5 a suit for rescission of two (2) deeds solely for harassment and dilatory purposes although the suit actually Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the 1 Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 22. 1982. 40142 reversing the Decision dated March 31.

1984. Branch 62 in said Civil Case No. M. 1690-G. He further raised the defenses of litis pendencia. considering the refusal of the Register of Deeds to register said deed of sale in view of a restraining order issued in Civil Case No. 374 82. and Civil Case No. Civil Case No. de Vera-Quicho and the Register of Deeds of Lucena City for specific performance and/or damages which register the deed of sale dated February 10. . No. estoppel. He alleged that as early as June 1. a suit for specific performance against Marina M.C. de Vera-Quicho.10 was instituted by petitioner Padillo on July 6. A subsequent decision dated allegations of the petition. he vacated the subject property and.6 Casilang specifically denied the material involved the lot subject of the sale. 1620-G. 1620-G.9 dismissal of the petition as well as the grant of his counterclaims for damages. 1620-G. 1983 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca. 1982 wherein Margarita de Vera11 sold to petitioner Padillo her one-half (½) pro-indiviso share of the lot and the building erected thereon. June 2. 9114. 1982 to compel the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to It appears that prior to the institution of Civil Case No. No. namely. covered by TCT No. and prayed for the (TCT) No. C.8 The said decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed therefrom.In his Answer. 1620-G ordered against him should be dismissed. there were already three (3) actions which involved the said property. Civil Case No. M. thus. Marina M. T-9863. 1982. laches. de Vera-Quicho to execute the necessary documents over the property covered by said Transfer Certificate of Title On March 2. T-9863 and enjoined the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to desist from entering any encumbrance or transaction on said certificate of title and/or cancel the same except in favor of respondent Averia. the case Quezon. 374-82. respondent Averia filed his Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss7 wherein he invoked the decision rendered in Civil Case No. res judicata and lack of cause of action. 1620-G was instituted by respondent Averia against Marina M. The petition to register the deed was opposed by respondent Averia.

no.13 Petitioner Padillo sought the dismissal of the Section 112 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act). 374-82 via a petition for certiorari and January 5. 1690-G was dismissed by Branch 61 of the court and ordered a new trial where all parties interested in the RTC case may appear and be given opportunity to be heard. 19 The Supreme amended complaint. against spouses Edilberto de Mesa and petitioner Padillo. In a Decision dated December January 11. 54967.R.12 The Lucena City ordered the Register of Deeds to register the deed said case is a complaint for rescission of two(2) deeds of sale. registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of which was registered and annotated at the back of said TCT on an antecedent contract to sell. 1982. No. de Vera-Quicho sold to prohibition in G.17Respondent Averia assailed namely: (a) the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan na may Pasubali" dated the decision in M.15 Respondent Averia interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. T-9863 by virtue of an unregistered contract to sell between the general jurisdiction and the limited jurisdiction of dated January 5. de the Regional Trial Court acting as a cadastral court under Vera-Quicho. 1983 decision of the trial Civil Case No.16 Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision. 1690-G was instituted by respondent Averia rendered in M. 1983. 1529 Respondent Averia claimed ownership of the same lot subject (Property Registration Decree) eliminated the distinction of TCT No. a decision dated September 23.C. No.14 In an Order dated September 30. 374-82.On July 7. 6512918 with the Supreme Court petitioner Padillo her one-half (½) pro-indiviso share over lot contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to order the together with the house thereon. 1983 was Civil Case No. No. T-9863. subject of TCT No.C. 1982 wherein Marina M. jurisdiction since Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.C. No. 374-82 wherein Branch 57 of the RTC. during the pendency of M. Following notice and hearing in . In the meantime. a new trial was conducted in M. 1982 subject of M. 1983. Quezon Province for improper venue. of sale dated February 10.C. and (b) the deed of sale 29. 37482.C. Court set aside the September 23. of Gumaca. 374-82. 1986. 1982 per Entry No. 1982 executed in his favor by Marina M. the Supreme Court declared that the trial court has dated February 10. No.

the trial court rendered a Decision dated May 5.R. 1991.C. 374-82 was finally resolved in the decision dated May 5. which .23 When M. 22 A subsequent motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on October 21.C. 1987 26but resolution of respondent Averia appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition respondent for review on certiorari which was denied in a Resolution dated Dismiss27 was deferred in view of the pendency of M. the dismissal of Civil Case the Court of Appeals20 which rendered judgment on December No.C. 374-82 was appealed to decision dated September 16. 28. 15356. docketed as CA-G. 1988. before the Court of Appeals. 1991 for failure to show that the Court of Appeals had 374-82.24 favor of petitioner Padillo. No. 374-82. 9114. 1984 wherein it deferred the resolution of Thereafter. Dissatisfied. No.29 While the foregoing proceedings ensued in M. SP No. respondent Averia's motion to dismiss and ordered the case 1988. 9114 was resumed on November 19.28 committed any reversible error in the Averia's November 18. which declared petitioner Padillo as sole and exclusive temporarily archived in view of the pendency in the Court of owner of the property in question and ordered the Register of Appeals of the appeal of respondent Averia in Civil Case No. 1987 Motion to questioned judgment. When the Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed. 1987.25 the hearing in Civil Case No. issued an Order dated March 20.C. the trial court in an Order dated June 1. June 17. 1990 sustaining the decision of the trial court. respondent Averia assailed the denial of his motion to dismiss in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. 9114. 1690-G for improper venue. No. No. 1991. in a The decision of the RTC in M.the new trial.21Respondent Averia sought reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated August 26. the trial court in Civil Case No. Deeds of Lucena City to register the questioned deed of sale in 1690-G. 1988 proceeded to deny respondent Averia's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suspend Further Proceeding in Civil Case No.

No. or any persons claiming any right from him. to vacate and surrender the possession of the lot covered by TCT No.R.32 the trial court rendered the assailed March 31. in view of the 3) Moral damages of P50. 9114 to await in the sum of P150.R. SP No. The appellate court ratiocinated: .000. the decision of the appellate court in CA-G. and foregoing 5) Costs of suit.00 every year from the final termination of M. which reads: WHEREFORE. 1992 Decision33 in Civil Case No.000. 37482. 9114. SO ORDERED.000. same.C. the appellate court in CAG.00. to Veronica Padillo and to pay the latter the following amounts: On appeal to the Court of Appeals. T-9863 of the Registry of Deeds of Lucena City and the building erected thereon. 1994 reversing the trial court based on the ground of res judicata.000.30 No appeal was filed therefrom. Jr.000.31 plus P1. considerations.00 per appearance in the hearing of With the Supreme Court denying the petition to challenge the the case and litigation expenses of P10. Court of Appeal's affirmance of the decision in M. 2) Attorneys fees in the sum of P107.000. 1989 rendered a decision therein ordering the 1) Unrealized income from the lot and building suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. No.C. judgment is rendered ordering Tomas Averia. 4) Exemplary damages of P20. hence. 1982 until Tomas Averia vacates the with the Court of Appeals.00. 37442 then pending appeal January 5.00. CV No.on December 21.00 15356 became final. 40142 rendered its subject decision on November 22.

moreover. may not — strictly speaking — be matters little that the instant case is supposedly one for considered an adjudication of the case on the merits . dismissed on account of of the Mountain Province vs. Carandang vs. declaratory relief and damages. On the principle. the court a . passed upon and adjudicated. MC No. . A party cannot — by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case — escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the parties and their privies (Filipinas Investment and Finance Corp. claims. 1620-G. . the Court is guided by the long-standing rule that a final judgment or order on the merits rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successors-in-interest litigating upon the same thing and issue (Vencilao vs. Venturanza. 37482. Court. 165 SCRA 515). but also the ventilation in said subsequent suit of any other issue which could have been raised in the first but was not (Africa vs. 182 SCRA 492. Catholic Vicar Apostolic Civil Case No.The Court finds that res judicata bars the appellee's vs. In finding the decision in the former case a bar to the latter. Bugnay Construction and Development Corp. vs. It improper venue. NLRC. Varo. vs. 374-82 resolved the case on the merits. Laron. 176 SCRA 804). the appellee is correctly perceived by the appellant to have already lost her right to recover the same in the instant suit. 170 SCRA 776). Intermediate Appellate Court. and the clarification of the expanded jurisdiction of the court a quo. 179 SCRA S06. citing Sy Kao documents of title. Court of Appeals. while the former case is one originally for registration of the appellee's xxx xxx xxx Not having claimed the damages she supposedly suffered despite the new trial ordered for MC No. 132 SCRA 302. 133 SCRA 344. that res judicata bars not only the relitigation in a subsequent action of the issues raised.

1690-G but by that rendered in MC No. 1592 effectively rendered the decision promulgated therein a bar to the claim for damages [Padillo] pursued in the instant case. 1986 together with a clarification of the land registration court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1992 decision which [Padillo] did not and still does not contest. in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration in the negative. the Court's application of the principle of res judicata was neither based nor in any way dependent on the inaccuracies emphasized in the motion and incidents she filed. the passage which states that the self-same was filed ahead of MC No. however. 1995. petitioner sought reconsideration of the same but it proved unavailing inasmuch as petitioners motion for reconsideration35 was denied in a Resolution36 dated April 7. to [Padillo's] position. 1690-G as that which the Gumaca Court dismissed on account of improper venue. It is. SP No.34 however. rendered the following pronouncements: Contrary. barred by prior judgment. moreover.quo clearly erred in not holding the instant action to be though the Court may stand on these particulars. 15356 granted the petition . Considering that the December 21. Corrected account of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. The Court of Appeals. repugnant to the prohibition against multiplicity of suits to allow [Padillo] — or any party-litigant for that matter — to claim in a separate action the damages she supposedly suffered as a consequence to the filing of another.R. While it is readily conceded that the Court was obviously referring to Civil Case No. The fact that its new trial was only ordered on December 29. 374-82. 374-82 is one actually quoted from the trial court's March 31. it bears emphasis that the instant case was determined to be barred by res judicata not so much on Disagreeing with the foregoing disquisition. It consequently matters little that the latter case was originally filed ahead of the former as [Padillo] had been wont to stress. 1989 decision rendered in CA-G.

the Court. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS Hence. NO. CAUSE AND ISSUES. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS E. 200. HIS ACTS TO POSSESS A PROPERTY NOT HIS CV NO. to wit: EQUITABLE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. PETITIONER THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE fails to appreciate the sapience of [Padillo's] invocation COMMERCIAL PROPERTY UNDER TCT NO.R. A. COURT IN G.then filed by [Averia] (p.). 9114.R.R. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS TO GRAVE 'ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ITS ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE JUDGMENT OF THE INCORRECT CITATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT IN CA-G. 18802 AND THAT OF THE SUPREME OWN. THE NO. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ERRED AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISCRETION IN FAILING TO NOTE THE BAD DISREGARDING THE FAITH OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN MOST OF JUDGMENTS OF A CO-EQUAL COURT IN CA-G. petitioner interposed the instant petition for review ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUST AND anchored on seven (7) assigned errors. T- thereof as a bar to the appeal herein perfected by 9863. rec. 15356 FACTS UPON WHICH IT PREDICATED ITS BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES ON THE SAME DECISION. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AMOUNTING D. B. EFFECT 96662 OF DECLARING . [Averia]. x x x37 C. finally.

Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. alleged inaccuracies in the finding that Civil Case No. 96662. Quezon on the ground of improper venue. litigation of the Philippines. having jurisdiction to pronounce the expenses and/or attorney's fees. No.C.F. SP No. No. THE MANDATE ON "CONSULATION" AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 13. 1690-G EXPLOITATION OF OF was filed ahead of M. The doctrine of res judicata is embodied in Section 47.R.C. Neither could she invoke art xxx xxx xxx . as a distinct cause of action in M.38 Sec. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION CONSTITUTIONAL IN VIOLATING 1620-G was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca. NO. — The Petitioner attacks the appellate court's posture that petitioner effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court should have set up her claim for unrealized income. 1989 decision promulgated in REALTY EVEN AFTER THE SUPREME COURT'S CA-G. as well as moral and exemplary judgment or final order.39 which states: ARTICLE VIII OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW. Furthermore. No. Branch 61 promptly FAILING TO NOTE AND OBSERVE THAT PRIVATE dismissed it. Quezon. Effect of judgments or final orders. 374-82 for she contends that it was not anticipated that respondent Averia would oppose M. 15356. 47. petitioner cites anew the DECISION IN G. RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS counterclaim for damages in Civil Case No. 37s82. G. 37442 and that Civil Case No. 1690-G for the COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN Regional Trial Court of Gumaca. res judicata as a ground for the RESPONDENT INTENTIONALLY PROLONG THE dismissal of the instant case was already rejected by the Court UNDUE PFTITIONER'S of Appeals in the December 21.R. may be as follows: damages. Lastly.C.

No. with matter and cause of action. only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined. Under ordinary circumstances. Bar by prior judgment exists when. and not as to matters merely involved therein. between the first case where the judgment was rendered. conclusive between the parties and their as to the claim or demand in controversy. When the three (3) identities are respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any present. not only as to every matter commencement of the action or special proceeding. 9114 since all four (4) essential requisites in order forres judicata as a "bar by prior judgment" to attach are present in the instant case. subject subscribed to the appellate court's conclusion that M.C. to wit: . the judgment or final order is. there is identity of parties. there is no identity of cause of action. the judgment is conclusive in the second case. But where between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest. This is what is termed conclusiveness of judgment. and the second case where such judgment is invoked. this Court would have Section 49 (b) refers to bar by prior judgment while Section 49 (c) enunciates conclusiveness of judgment. It is final thereto. the judgment on the merits rendered in the first other matter that could have been raised in relation constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. have been offered for that purpose. that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged.40 or necessary thereto. or which was actually and necessarily included therein such judgment is invoked. including the parties successors in interest by title subsequent to the and those in privity with them. 37442 barred petitioner's claim for damages in Civil Case No.(b) In other cases. which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim litigating for the same thing and under the same title or demand. but as to any other admissible matter which might and in the same capacity.

374-82 2. The former judgment must be final. Law of the case has been defined Supreme Court.C. the remedy of the parties based on the disclosed facts.43 had obtained the same case continues to be the law of the case. More specifically.45 identity of cause of action.41 However.44 Finally. Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. 374-82 identity of parties. so long as the facts on thereto. following clarification by the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in Supreme Court of its expanded jurisdiction.42 Branch 57 of the as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. No. and and Civil Case No. No. technical or dilatory objections.46 As a general rule. No. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the principle of law of the case. there is identity of parties. is a judgment on the merits. 9114 both involved the petitioner and respondent Averia. identity of subject matter. 374-82. 9114. A judgment is on prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the case whether that question is right or wrong. It must be a judgment or order on the merits. No. M. irrespective of formal. is a final judgment. 374-82. There must be between the first and second action same evidence would support and establish M. whether jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the parties correct on general principles or not. in the new trial it it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the conducted in M. The judgment of Branch 57 of Lucena City in M. party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. T-9863. which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of No.1.C. a different conclusion is warranted under the M.C. The subject matter of both actions is the parcel of land and building erected thereon covered by TCT No. 3.47 . a decision on a Supreme Court.C. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the the case before the court. The causes of action are also identical since the 4. 374-82. and and Civil Case No. subject matter and causes of action.C.

were to be criticism. by repeated appeals.48 thus: coming from the Supreme Court of Missouri in the following graphical language: A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case. reagitation. cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the the same case. whether on the made by an appellate court. such declaration continues The general rule. merely expresses the practice of but they become and remain the law of the case in all the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided.' Again. the rule is necessary as a matter of policy to end intolerable if parties litigant were allowed to speculate litigation. cases. Director of Lands. The rule conclusions announced on a first appeal. experience.The concept of Law of the Case was further elucidated in the The phrase "Law of the Case" is described in a decision 1919 case of Zarate v. The rule is 'necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its rule is grounded on convenience. It would be appeal.' x x x given case. Such a after steps below or above on subsequent appeal. is that legal to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. nakedly and badly put. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal. once considered and decided by it." as applied to a former trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto. The "Law of the Case. litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent In short. while it may be reversed in other general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts. which would be impossible reason. 'There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate on changes in the personnel of a court. and duties satisfactorily and efficiently. Without the rule there would be no end to if a question. compel a court to listen to of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on criticisms on their opinions. there would be endless litigation. or on the chance litigant could. reexamination. and reformulation. or speculate of chances from solemn argument and handed down as the law of a changes in its members. would result in the foolishness of the . decision of an appellate court.

9114 was docketed. SP .). it is generally is a practical affair. It pendency of M. to act like although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the ordinary sensible persons. SP No. No. 374-82. Civil Case No. 15356. No. 9114 has been settled in CA-G.51 a further distinction was made in this manner: It is worthwhile to consider that at the time this Court in G.inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it of fact. 50 In the 1975 case of Comilang v. And when the The doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it said issue of litis pendentia was raised before the Court of is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues Appeals via a special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. 374-82 was raised before the trial court relates entirely to questions of law. whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. The administration of justice same action or general proceeding.R. court chose to merely defer resolution thereof. 374-82 to bar Civil Case different from the concept of res judicata.C. the trial operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case.C. not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata. if they so choose.R. No. Court of Appeals (Fifth Division. Law of the case does No.C. 65129 ordered the new trial of M. and grew. The appellate court apparently overlooked the significance of Significantly in the instant case. and is confined in its wherein the said Civil Case No. after clarifying the expanded jurisdiction of the trial court with authority to decide non-contentious and contentious issues. and applies only to that one case. x x x49 independent proceeding. 9114 on the ground of adjudication. 9114 was already existent. The rule is a practical and a good concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly one of frequent and beneficial use. although it may include questions of law. but is more limited in its application. Courts are allowed. When the issue of The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former the dismissal of Civil Case No. No. the law of the case on the this principle called the law of the case which is totally matter of the pendency of M.

instead of of Appeals in CA-G. in CA-G. Since no appeal was filed from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 9114 be filed in M. No. M. The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion. 9114.C. SP No. 9114 for damages in Civil Case No. the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. and may no longer be disturbed or modified.53 we consider such amount of expected profit highly conjectural and speculative.R. SP No.C. 374-82.C.C. the Court of Appeals.000. should dictate all further proceedings. the resolution therein of the appellate court which ordered the suspension instead of dismissal of Civil Case No.R. should not be faulted for yielding in good respondent Averia's arguments on the existence of litis faith to the ruling of the Court of Appeals. 15356 and continuing to pursue her claim incorrectly ordered the mere suspension of Civil Case No.R. 15356 on the matter of the issue dismissing the case and/or ordering that the claim for damages of existence of M. No. No. 15356. Court of Appeals. while agreeing with Petitioner. Concerning the alleged forgone income of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150. No. Fourteenth Division.52 It is not subject to review or reversal in any court. SP No. 15356 has become the law of the case as between herein petitioner Padillo and respondent Averia. 9114.00) per year since 1982 as testified on by petitioner as the income she could have realized had possession of the property not been withheld from her by respondent Averia. therefore. petitioner's testimony regarding the matter of unrealized income is sadly lacking of the requisite . The decision of the Court to await the final termination of M. Thus. 15356. With an allegation that respondent made millions for the improper use and exploitation of the property. 374-82. 1989 and by then. 374 82 had long inclined to sustain the monetary award for damages granted by been resolved by the trial court and pending appeal with the the trial court. became final.R. this Court is not December 21.No. 37442 as a bar to Civil Case No. SP No. pendentia. even if erroneous. which would ultimately result in res judicata.

600. 1690-G The only amount of unrealized income petitioner should be while M. and (P97. testimonial no damages evidence on will be alleged unrealized income earlier referred to is not enough to warrant the award of damages.00) for that period of time.600. 374-82 was pending. No. we find that there is no sound basis for the award. It cannot be logically inferred that just because respondent Averia instituted Civil Case No. and respondent Averia.R.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20. No. respectively.00) a month or Nine Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P9.56 it is but just for him to pay petitioner the possible. Petitioner did not detail out how such huge amount of unrealized rentals of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred income could have been derived from the use of the disputed Pesos (P97. as Lessee. 1986 60 long after the dismissal of Civil Case No.600. in the this case. (P800. 65129 on December 29.00). amount of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Pesos compensatory and consequential damages must be proved. said lot and building. Furthermore.C. If the proof adduced thereon is flimsy and from the finality of this decision.00) a year during the sixth (6th) to tenth (10th) year of the Contract of Lease between Marina de Vera Quicho. It is too vague and unspecified to induce faith and reliance. On the award of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50.000. as Lessor.C. as allowed.details on how such huge amount of income could be made vacated the property. which fell on 1982 to 1986. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual.000. 374-82 could adjudicate contentious issues was only resolved by this Court in G.54 Verily.00) shall earn interest57 at the legal rate58 computed cannot be presumed. 1690-G which was instituted by respondent Averia.59 insufficient.55 Inasmuch as respondent Averia had been in possession of the property from January 1982 to February 1992 when he The issue of whether the trial court in M.61 That respondent Averia instituted a . No. malice or bad faith is entitled to is the unrealized monthly rentals which respondent immediately ascribable against the said respondent to warrant Averia admits to be in the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos such an award.

In not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. award of moral damages. there is no sufficient justification for the grant of such award. and Thereunder. Such right is so precious that moral damages may attorney's fees in the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. No. the award thereof is the or appeals taken by respondent Averia relative to M. exemplary damages. exception rather than the general rule.63 The emotional distress. counsel's fees are not 374-82 does not per se make such actions or appeals wrongful awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the and subject respondent Averia to payment of moral damages. the trial court may award attorney's fees where it must therefore be deleted. we find the award of the trial court of attorney's fees in the sum of One .66 suffered by a person for having been made a party in a civil case is not the kind of anxiety which would warrant the award Attorney's fees as part of damages is awarded only in the of moral damages. the mental anguish damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.separate suit which was subsequently dismissed and all actions With respect to attorney's fees. Therefore. attorney's fees represent the reasonable may have erred. deems just and equitable that it be so granted.62 services he has rendered to the latter. more so. policy that no premium should be placed on the right to The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right litigate. 67 As such. and in all cases it must be reasonable. While we respect the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this case.65 Attorney's fees as part of damages are not the same as to litigate. but error alone is not a ground for moral compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal damages. worries and instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. anxieties suffered by her and her husband64 are only such as are it is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law usually caused to a party hauled into Court as a party in a that would bring the case within the exception and justify the litigation. One the ordinary sense. while in its extraordinary concept. they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for In the absence of malice and bad faith.C.

Bellosillo. 1994 in CA-G.000. 40142 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING respondent Tomas Averia.600.00). and (b) Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 22.000.000. to be unreasonable and excessive.00) as attorney's fees. there is no need to delve any further on the other assigned errors. on official leave.Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos (P107.. Thus. Attorney's fees as part of damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant.000.000. and Quisumbing.. Buena. JJ. Mendoza.00) as unrealized rentals which shall earn interest at the legal rate from the finality of the this decision until fully paid.00).00) plus One SO ORDERED.00) per appearance in the hearing of the case and litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. concur. it should be reasonably reduced to Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25.. Jr. Because of the conclusions we have thus reached. to pay petitioner Veronica Padillo the amounts of (a) Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P97. CV No. . the instant petition is GRANTED. Thousand Pesos (P1. J. WHEREFORE.R.

Desierto in OMB-ADM-1-99-1035. as narrated in the assailed Court of Appeals ruling. 27 July 2011 On November 9. the May 28. Roy Loyola. Loyola requested the dismissed the administrative complaint that petitioner filed Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona. The December 3. J. Gross Neglect of Duty. No. On the other hand. entitled Eloisa L. the petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging DECISION respondents with Violation of Section 3 (e) of LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. Roy M. creation of twenty-four (24) unappropriated 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denied the motion for positions for the inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla. 61841. for Malversation of This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Public Funds thru Falsification of Public 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside Documents and. respondent Municipal Aniano Mayor A. as well as its Resolution[2] dated May 28.: R. for Grave the Decision[1] dated December 3. No.Eloisa Tolentino vs.R. 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals The complaint averred that in a letter affirmed the Decision[3]dated May 23. 2001 of the Court of Appeals Misconduct. Atty. 2000 of Ombudsman dated October 6. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. G. to wit: The facts of this case. are as follows: xxxx . administratively. Dishonesty. 153809. 2002 in CA-G. 1998. reconsideration filed by petitioner.R. 1999. Loyola. et al. Cavite for the against herein respondents. which Roy M.. et. SP and Falsification of Official Documents.A. al. Tolentino v.

One (1) Local Rev. Coll. One (1) Supply Officer III SG 18 Specialist II SG 15 Eight (8) Driver I SG 3 One (1) Clerk III SG 6 Two (2) Utility I SG 1 DA HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICE Agriculture Chief Center IV SG 18 One (1) HRM Officer II SG 15 Farm Foreman SG 6 Three (3) Farm Worker II SG 4 TREASURERS OFFICE . Officer OFFICE OF THE MAYOR II SG 15 One (1) Computer Programmer ACCOUNTING OFFICE III SG 18 One (1) Licensing Officer II SG One (1) Bookkeeper II SG 9 15 ENRO GENERAL SERVICE OFFICE Two (2) Environment Mngt.

Alumia Farm Worker II Agriculture Chief Center IV SG 18 4. Tolentino. Mojica Farm Worker II DA 3. The following proposed positions were [allegedly] set aside: 1.On November 23. Tenedero and positions. Cavite passed Samson. Domingo R. the Municipal Mayor as Chairman with Amelia C. together with Municipal Resolution No. Paduyos Farm Foreman xxxx 2. Lilibeth R. Irene C. the Personnel Selection Board presided by the respondent Civil Service Commission. Cecilia F. as Secretary. Mustiola A. Manarin. Ma. Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona. filled-up the aforesaid Municipality of Carmona for inclusion in the inexistent positions and appointed the following: 1998 Plantilla of Personnel. 1998. 1999. Bayugo Farm Worker II Farm Foreman SG 6 Three (3) Farm Worker II SG 4 The appointment papers of the aforesaid personnel were subsequently approved by the Despite the disapproval of the aforesaid positions. on April 5. 061-98 approving the the following respondents Board Members: creation of only 19 out of the 24 requested Edwin E. HRMO V. . under the different offices of the Roel Z.

2000. Alumia. Ordinance No. the causing the unlawful payment of salaries to appointments were approved by the Civil illegally appointed employees. requested in the letter-request dated October 6. the respondents are allegedly liable administratively On March 9. to which documents. L. Likewise. and falsification of official respondent Mayor Loyola filed a RejoinderAffidavit. the respondents Service Commission and the salaries were paid are liable for malversation of public funds thru out of savings. Olimpo.Thereafter. 2000. Consolidated Reply refuting the allegations in dishonesty the respondents Counter-Affidavits. the petitioner filed a for gross neglect of duty. The approval of the budget was that the inexistent positions were created. the petitioner submitted a Consolidated Rebuttal. Municipal Accountant Annaliza L. in the form of an ordinance. Municipal Treasurer Alicia Counter-Affidavits on February 16. alleging among others that the Appropriation Barabat. falsification of public documents. respondents Budget Officer The respondents filed their respective Domingo C. 006-98 which is the Annual Ernacio and Municipal Administrator Amador Budget of the Municipality of Carmona for the B. 1998 of the respondent Mayor for the inclusion The petitioner further alleged that by the of such 24 positions in the proposed 1998 respondents concerted efforts to make it appear Annual Budget. allowed and caused the payment of year 1999 carries with it the 24 positions salaries of the aforesaid employees. On April 3. Moreover. grave misconduct. . Municipal Agriculturist Nenita L. Flores. 2000.

2000. DOCUMENTS[5] DISHONESTY OF AND PUBLIC for .Petitioner On May 23. Gonzales III. GROSS NEGLECT Resolution. Undaunted.[4] II Petitioner appealed the Ombudsmans dismissal order to WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE the Court of Appeals but the appellate court merely affirmed COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT the 2001 HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD Decision. OF assailed ruling in its December 3. 2002 GRAVE MISCONDUCT. The said motion for reconsideration WERE CREATED BY CIRCUMSTANCES THE QUESTIONED POSITIONS was however denied. DUTY. petitioner moved for reconsideration but BE DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE FOR this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its May 28. FALSIFICATION Hence. Ombudsman Aniano A. the instant petition. The WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE respondent moved for a reconsideration of the COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING aforesaid Decision which the respondents THAT opposed. I Desierto ordered the dismissal of the instant administrative Complaint for lack of merit. upon recommendation submits the following issues consideration: of the OIC Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Emilio A.

then Vice-Mayor of Carmona. 1998. reviewed by respondent Flores. it was petitioners theory that 5 of the maintains that when Appropriation Ordinance No. the 1999Plantilla of Positions was submitted together with the same did not create the 24 government positions at issue. Loyola (Loyola). Cavite was passed. members of the positions out of the 24 government positions requested by Sangguniang Bayan. She Municipal Mayor. 1998 when and vacant. This was made possible because the preparation of the said ordinance was passed. and municipal officials to expose the respondent Roy M. When the Municipal Government of Carmona. and 1999 Plantilla of Positions was submitted by respondent approved by respondent Loyola. Aside Appropriation Ordinance No. Samson to the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner alleges that this is a clear case of falsification because the 1999 Plantilla allegedly did not indicate a specific .On November 23. Cavite was undertaken was deferred until such time that the copy of the proposed by respondent Samson. Amelia C. 006-98. no intent on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan to changed by respondents Loyola. Cavite filed 98 was passed. Samson and Domingo Flores. include said positions can be gleaned from the Minutes of the making it appear that the five questioned positions were created Sangguniang Bayan Session held on November 9. 24 positions requested by respondent Loyola for inclusion in [6] the otherwise known as the 1999 Annual Budget for the plantilla were not validly created. mentioning the creation of 19 government the present case against respondent Mayor. Thus. The Minutes would allegedly the Plantilla or Personnel Schedule for the different offices of show that the proposed creation of 19 government positions the Municipal Government of Carmona. who was then the alleged malfeasance committed by the respondents. Municipal Resolution No. the Plantilla or Personnel Schedule government positions at issue can be found in the said for the Department of Agriculture was allegedly drastically ordinance. 006-98 to the Sangguniang from the fact that no express provision for the creation of the Panlalawigan for approval. 061Petitioner.

respondents counter petitioners deliberate on such unwarranted inclusion. Budget for 2000) on November 8. Sangguniang Bayan during its regular session on November 8. hence. the funding for the government positions at approved are falsified and uncreated government positions. 001-99 (Annual cured by Municipal Resolution No. petitioner assertions by asserting that the dismissal of the criminal case. void ab initio. 012-00 dated March 13. as the administrative case at bar. Hence. contrary to the Ombudsmans findings. as purportedly admitted by with illegality. The said Resolution is also allegedly funded. the Sangguniang Bayan members did not On the other hand. 1999 with the government 2000 passed by the Sangguniang Bayan. is also an act of falsification committed by an act of falsification committed by the Sangguniang Bayan respondents.amount allocated for the created but vacant government Petitioner likewise asserts that the approval by the Civil positions at issue in the Proposed Budget for January- Service Commission of the questioned appointments is tainted December 1999. 1999. In her view. 1999. by the Ombudsman and later affirmed successively by the Court of Appeals via a Decision[7] dated June 8. SP No. 61840 and . whatever flaw that attended the In the same manner. Consequently. allegations and arguments Panlalawigan on November 16. Moreover. wrote a letter to the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang which involved the same set of facts. appointments has no force and effect. petitioner argued that the creation of the government positions at issue had not been enactment of Appropriation Ordinance No.R. The said continuing act of falsification prompted members because they made it appear that the said positions the petitioner to bring the same to the attention of the were created. However. the confirmation or approval of the invalid 1999. issue was sourced from the savings of the municipal budget for therefore. 2001 in CA-G. what were respondent Flores. affirming the creation positions at issue again reflected to have been created and of the assailed positions.

respondents aver that under Section 7. No.R. the decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case absolving a respondent Law of the case has been defined as the opinion of the charge filed against him is final and unappealable. Lastly. whether correct on general principles or . subsequently. More specifically. as per jurisprudence on the matter. effectively barred the review of the should be accorded great weight and finality.by this Court in a minute Resolution [8] dated September 25. dismissal of the administrative complaint before this Court because of the application of the law of the case doctrine. In any case. to wit: III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. delivered on a former appeal. factual findings of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals 2001 in G. respondents contend that it is axiomatic that the case continues to be the law of the case. In Padillo v. Cavite during the May 14. After a careful review of the records. the reelection of respondent Loyola as Mayor of the Before proceeding to the discussion on why the Municipality of Carmona. the appeal established as the controlling legal rule or before the Court of Appeals was filed beyond the reglementary decision between the same parties in the same period. we find the petition to be without merit. Rule explain this principle. thus. allegedly committed during his preceding term. the petition before the Court of Appeals and.[9] we had occasion to Moreover. Court of Appeals. Respondents further argue that. this it means that whatever is once irrevocably Court should have been disallowed. it is appropriate to local election had the effect of automatically abating the restate here the law of the case doctrine in light of respondents administrative charge leveled against him for an offense erroneous appreciation of the same. 2001 petitioners contentions fail to convince. 149534.

[11] to wit: of policy to end litigation. the remedy of the appellate party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a satisfactorily and efficiently. cannot and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further be departed from in subsequent proceedings in proceedings." as was predicated continue to be the facts of the applied to a former decision of an appellate case before the court. a court. which would be rehearing. once considered and court to perform its duties decided by it. "There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could. so long as the facts on which such decision the same case.not. merely expresses the practice of the decision on a prior appeal of the same case is courts in refusing to reopen what has been held to be the law of the case whether that decided. the rule is necessary as a matter The concept of law of the case was further elucidated in the 1919 case of Zarate v. Director of Lands. by repeated appeals." x x x. such declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where appeal. The "Law of the Case. Such a rule is "necessary to enable an question is right or wrong.[12] the law in a case. The rule made by an appellate court. the question settled by the appellate court ." Again. As a general rule. were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. compel a court to listen to A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared criticisms on their opinions. an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal while it may be reversed in other cases. or speculate of chances from changes in its members.[10] impossible if a question.

[14] While in criminal cases. thus. 7). substantial evidence is required of the Ombudsman). therefore. Substantial evidence is such relevant Administrative Order No. Series of 1990 (Rules of Procedure of the Office In administrative cases. 7.[13] reasonable doubt.[16] because what was involved in G. not subject to appeal. Having disposed of that issue. the act or omission complained of. they do not serve the same objectives and do not require the same quantum of evidence On a procedural note. Series of 2003 (Amendment of evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to Rule III.becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any entitled to an acquittal. the accused is and in case of conviction where the penalty . allegations and arguments. only Contrary to respondents assertion.R. we now proceed to discuss the reasons why the instant petition must fail. FINALITY OF DECISION. which states that: support a conclusion. Although both cases possess a similar set of facts. the assailed ruling of the necessary for a finding of guilt or conviction/liability which Ombudsman obviously possesses the character of finality and. unless his guilt is shown beyond a subsequent appeal. the law of the case doctrine does not find application in the case at bar simply moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. makes them entirely different cases altogether and. even if the evidence might Where the respondent is absolved of the charge not be overwhelming.[15] Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean evidence that which produces absolute certainty. before it was amended by Ombudsman to support any finding. 17. The pertinent provision in this case beyond the purview of the legal principle of law of the case. Administrative Order No. is the old Section 7. 149534 was a criminal proceeding while what we have before us is an administrative case. No. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of Sec. 7. Rule III of Ombudsman Administrative Order No.

Notably. Section 27. Belisario.[17] to wit: Decisions. or a Ombudsman when supported by substantial fine equivalent to one month salary. as we held in Barata xxxx v. reprimand . month's salary shall be final and reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act). directive or shall be final and unappealable. a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of an The basis for the said rule of procedure is Section 27 of administrative charge is final and unappealable. the decision evidence are conclusive. However. the decision shall become final after the or reprimand. As shown by the aforementioned regulation and statute. Republic Act No. Abalos. unless a motion for unappealable.imposed is public censure or reprimand. suspension of not more than one expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof (1) by the respondent. Any order. exoneration is not mentioned in Section 27 as final and unappealable. if a sentence of censure. its inclusion is implicit for. Findings of fact by the Office of the suspension of not more than one month. Effectivity and Finality of Jr. In all other decision imposing the penalty of public censure cases. to wit: The Court categorically upheld this principle in Reyes. v.

or by appeal to implemented the courts. resolve a case). as in this case. and unappealable. reprimand. that the complainant is left with absolutely no remedy. The complainant. however. Over and above our statutes is the The clear import of Section 7. whether by motion for reconsideration and instrumentalities of the government and is in the Office of the Ombudsman.e. instrumentality of the Government. or in excess of jurisdiction (i. Article VIII the empowers the courts of justice to determine complainant in an administrative complaint the whether or not there has been a grave abuse of right to appeal where the Ombudsman has discretion amounting to lack or excess of exonerated the respondent of the administrative jurisdiction on the part of any branch or charge. clothed with judicial or quasi- and the penalty imposed is higher than public judicial authority. acted without jurisdiction censure. This is an therefore. through the petition although clothed with the appropriate power to The absence of any statutory right to resolve a case.e. is not entitle to any corrective overriding authority that cuts across all branches recourse.. to effect a reversal of the for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court exoneration. Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny Constitution whose Section 1. it oversteps its authority as appeal the exoneration of the respondent in an determined by law. or that it committed grave . Only the respondent is granted the provides. without the appropriate legal power to fine equivalent to one month salary. A petition for certiorari is appropriate right to appeal but only in case he is found liable when a tribunal. so should exoneration. one-month suspension or a (i..and a one-month suspension is considered final administrative case does not mean.

Ombudsman for an administrative charge. it is beyond the filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence. are the Elementary is the rule that the findings of fact of the rules the parties have to contend with in going to Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by the CA. the petitioner did not file a petition Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and instead made. It is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties evidence all over again . especially when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Rules of In any event. whimsical. with the Court of Appeals. The Rules of Court are Court to overturn it. In reviewing administrative decisions. the instant petition failed to show any Court and its provisions and jurisprudence on grave abuse of discretion or any reversible error on the part of writs of certiorari fully apply to the Office of the Ombudsman in issuing its assailed administrative decision. also the applicable rules in procedural matters on recourses to the courts and hence. The latter is effectively an appeal to determine the credibility of witnesses.abuse of its discretion by acting either outside Ombudsman Act in case the respondent is exonerated by the the contemplation of the law or in a capricious. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the In the case at bar. the Ombudsman as these Rules are suppletory to as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[18] substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight. or otherwise substitute the Court of Appeals which is disallowed by the Rules of its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman as well as the to the sufficiency of evidence. arbitrary or despotic manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction). which would compel this the Ombudsmans Rules.

particularly the creation of position. It is the CSC which is Sanggunian in its session and traces of favorable empowered to look into the validity of creation action thereon has been shown in the minutes of of positions and appointments thereto. 3-4. Evidence shows that on October 6. confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. the Sanggunian session held on November 19. such confirmation further strengthened the 1998 when the 1999 Annual Budget was taken presumption of regularity of official functions up (pp.[19] in the 1999 Plantilla of Positions under Ordinance No. creation of positions has been rendered moot Such creation has been taken up by the and academic. 006-98 enacting the 1999 Annual The Court quotes with approval the findings and Budget. Mayor Loyola requested Though the four (4) positions had not been created by a separate ordinance. Since respondent the confirmed/approved by the CSC all questions Sanggunian to create twenty-four (24) positions pertaining thereto including the validity of the by including the same in the 1998 plantilla. its creation has the appointments were . personnel were appointed thereto by the We believe that the questioned positions respondent Mayor which appointments were had been created under the circumstances. 1998. Also. Complainants Consolidated Reply).except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible been made when the Sanggunian included them miscarriage of justice would thereby result. conclusion of the assailed Ombudsman ruling which was also adopted by the Court of Appeals: The positions having been created.

Alumia as Administrator Moreno). the processing and Loyola including the selection and screening of payment of their salaries was but legal and employees by the Selection Board could not be proper and does not constitute dishonesty. The payment of appointments salaries to the employees who has rendered Commission should have so stated when the service to the government does not constitute appointments grave approval/confirmation. Had were vacant positions caused by the creation of respondents refused to pay the salaries of the . evidence show that and Ernacio as the Agriculturist/Head of Office respondents did not transgress some established acted in accordance with law when they and definite rule of action.There being appointment positions and the exigencies of the service confirmed by CSC and the concerned personnel demand that these vacancies should be filled up. Since the appointed personnel has The appointments made by respondent already rendered service. payment of their There is misconduct if there is a transgressi[on] salaries is proper and legal. Had there been a processed and allowed the payment of salaries transgression in the creation of positions and to the four (4) employees. were the Civil submitted Service for dishonesty. Olimpo as Treasurer. (Phil. misconduct. There the respondents responsible therefore. respondent of some established and definite rule of action Flores. a valid neglect of duty and thereto. Thus. having rendered services. Federico B. Barabat as Accountant. In the instant case. Law Dictionary. considered grave misconduct and dishonesty by falsification and neglect of duty on the part of respondents who compose the Board. as Budget Officer. 3rd Edition.

Bartolome. 1 creating the position of decision.concerned employees.[21] We are also "Sangguniang Bayan" Secretary as a "vital" guided by the ruling in Cortes v. accordance with the law. Ilocos Bayan" Secretary formally existed. and ultimately payment of salaries were all in Respondent took his oath of office before Mayor Aquino on February 1. and Resolution No. inexistent office. there was no existing position of "Sangguniang While it may be that at the time of Bayan" Secretary in the organizational set-up of appointment. Neither was there any appropriation for held liable for neglect of duty. they could have been Norte. whatever . that decision will not be overturned. To reiterate. to wit: xxxx It is undisputed that on January 1. actions starting from the creation of positions to selection of personnel. 1976. appointment.[20] In a special session held on February 23. respondents could not be held administratively liable since their official position of Municipal Secretary was retained in said budget. the "Sangguniang Bayan" of Piddig there is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsmans passed Resolution No.[22] which similarly position. no position of "Sangguniang the municipal Government of Piddig. the Court is not a trier of facts. As long as 1976. 1976. 2 revalidating the dealt with a purportedly invalid appointment to an allegedly appointment of respondent as such. the said position in the municipal budget for 1975-1976 although an appropriation for the In sum.

petitioners underlying premise for her administrative complaint. The assailed Decision dated May 23. premises considered. 2000 of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-1-99-1035 is likewise AFFIRMED. the revalidation of respondents appointment. Subsequently. i. In view of the foregoing. the alleged non-creation of the subject positions. It is likewise undisputed that the questioned appointments were all approved by the Civil Service Commission. 1976 hereby DENIED. 006-98 enacting the 1999 Annual Budget. the Sangguniang Bayan later affirmed the creation of all questioned positions in separate resolutions and continued to include the said positions in the appropriations in subsequent budget ordinances. The assailed Decision dated December 3.R. That appointment was ultimately approved by WHEREFORE. 2002 of the Court (Emphases supplied.defect there may have been initially was cured longer necessary to pass upon the remaining corollary issues of subsequently by the creation of said position and the instant petition.. x x x[23] 2001 as well as the Resolution dated May 28. cannot be upheld and thus. 61841 are AFFIRMED.) of Appeals in CA-G. SP No. the 24 new positions were included in Ordinance No. . the petition is the Civil Service Commission on May 11. In the case at bar. it is no SO ORDERED.e. thus giving it the stamp of finality.

J. it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of . Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest". a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second. participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". its dealers and its advertising agency. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each next closest. L-19650. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize.: estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize. 29 September 1966 A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila.R. Palomar. No. called "Dealer Contest". G. no fee or consideration is required to be paid. and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. and their immediate families excepted.Part II – Statutory Construction. the third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions.. and the next. Interpretation and Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the Judicial Legislation deposit of accomplished entry stubs. in order to take part in the "National Contest". the contestant whose CASTRO. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first. For the privilege to participate. At the station level. accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers. second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. the In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. the second. Definition of Statutory Construction Caltex v.

1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. or enterprise for transmission thereto. property by lot. or similar Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or the media for publicizing the contest but also for the chance. At the national level. obtaining any money or property of any kind by means representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities of false or fraudulent pretenses. the pertinent provisions of which read as follows: "SECTION 1982. or scheme for the SECTION 1954.P500 and P300. gift enterprise. and P650 as consolation Written or printed matter in any form advertising. or in any manner pertaining to. describing. chance. device. representations. gift enterprise. or any scheme. the stubs of deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines. having in promises. Absolutely non-mailable matter. or that whether sealed as first-class matter or not. or for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. Pl.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3. employee of the Bureau of Posts: second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. P2.000 for second. or of any real or personal No matter belonging to any of the following classes. concerning any lottery. shall be any person or company is conducting any scheme. Fraud orders. respectively. or conveying or purporting to convey any information prize for each of the remaining four participants.000 for first. or drawing of any kind. or enterprise for obtaining money or property of .500 for third. the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize. imported into the Philippines through the mails. of communications relative view sections 1954(a). or to be device. — distribution of money.

or that any person or the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant company is conducting any scheme. the order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other or to the agent of any such person or company. thru of Posts may. or promises. Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within chance. Deprivation of use of money order The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster system and telegraphic transfer service. upon evidence satisfactory to him that counsel. with the word corporation. or of any real or personal property by lot.—The Director General. person. or association of any kind. or the requested clearance. representations. dated October 31. SECTION 1983. gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of lottery provisions of the Postal Law. whether officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm. any mail matter of whatever class the sums named in money orders or telegraphic mailed by or addressed to such person or company or transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company. In its counsel's letter of December 7. in which the Caltex. or promise. through the mails by means of false or fraudulent stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part pretenses. under controlling . the then money. depositing the same in the mails. and may "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of outside cover thereof. enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to any person or company is engaged in conducting any justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti- lottery. or drawing of any kind. forbid the issue of any contestant. 1960. bank. its agent. the contest was not.any kind through the mails by means of false or or payment by any postmaster of any postal money fraudulent pretenses. Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand. enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind 1960. Unimpressed. device. representations.

. however. Rule 64. on an In view of the foregoing considerations. .authorities. Revised Rules of Court). if it does not. statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1. condemnable as a lottery. The parties are now before us. to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails. praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law. . . whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. . and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". Relying. the announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not involves consideration. "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives". the trial court rendered judgment as follows: The respondent appealed. After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties. and second. which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked. whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief. declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . it is nevertheless a violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law. Series of 1953). 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted. 1. In amplification. the Court holds opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' case seven years before (Opinion 217. We shall take these up in seriatim. and in his letter of December 10. to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . or that. Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court. arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first.

the appellant saw a thereof upon the foregoing crucible. G. vs.R. 576. admittedly has the wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy. Obviously pursuing its right must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. and (4) the issue involved legally non-mailable schemes. as the authority charged matter. No.. violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. However. as a business enterprise of some consequence. L- amongst other media.R. et al. conformably to established jurisprudence on the products. a number of significant points stand out in bold relief.this Court. L-3062. 1956). (2) the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof — controversy must be between persons whose interests are particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders. 578-579. against legal interest in the controversy. (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. our duty is to assay the factual bases pertinent provisions of the Postal Law. To forestall possible difficulties 1951. under Sections adverse. 50 O. in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails. Edades vs. concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means. the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion Board of Accountancy. The appellee (Caltex). the appellant. Edades. it was found expedient to request the 8964. et al. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. Republic of the Philippines. The aforesaid. July 31. No. Delumen. pp. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. 2.G. and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. likewise being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the for declaratory relief. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open . laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor. scheme hereinbefore detailed. September 28. No.. to with the enforcement of the Postal Law. The gravamen of the appellant's stand appellant for an advance clearance therefor. A point of difference as to the correct As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy. et al.. In contrast. G.

warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was

confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and

"conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and

inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and

all its representatives."

stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955).

Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy
prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the
use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge
thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege
demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The
justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a
denial thereof on the other, concerning a real — not a mere
theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are as real as
their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty

And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is
long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's
"desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
others" — which admittedly does not confer a cause of action.
Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a
positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing:
Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284
Pac. 350).

occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its

We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that

business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's

there is here no question of construction because the said

proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to

appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a

uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's

given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest",

bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a

hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of

fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are

this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption

that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the

nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape,

legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their

presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate

application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible.

resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of

Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and

speaking, the propriety — nay, the necessity — of setting the

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the

dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper,

law with respect to its application to a given case, where that

animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which

intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the

looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,

fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the

1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded.

law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the

Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d.,

case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee

901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur.,

is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the

2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the

Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended

situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to

meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as

choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a

much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.

final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the antilottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a
pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing
more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is
anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of
the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the
disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer

contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the
contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only
incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain
imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which
may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if
it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or

permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous

extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control

censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh

the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby

these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of

but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.

liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in

Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of

order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules

this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

of Court) — which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights
and duties under a law — we can see in the present case any
imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity
in our intervention.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion
we have herein just reached is not without precedent.
In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d.,
487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising
was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding

promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if

effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes

such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be

that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a

subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation

declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very

was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the

least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he

county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales

obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions

promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway,

applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal

17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs.

system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect,

Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82

judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself

A. 2d., 903.

and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for

that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous

declaratory relief.

cases having to do with the power of the United States
Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative
Code, using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a),
1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely nonmailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud
orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the
postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any
real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second
issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As
early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278,
283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal
authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal
Law, this Court declared that —
While countless definitions of lottery have been
attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is

all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts,
raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner
vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House
vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and
Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil.,
962;

Valhalla

Hotel

Construction

Company vs.

Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the
elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed
scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the
appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed
down to the existence of the element of consideration therein.
Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened

inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be

down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms —

paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or
any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate.

In respect to the last element of consideration, the law
does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in
which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid
directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by
the clarity of the language in which the invitation to participate
therein is couched. Thus —

A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station,
request for the entry form which is available on demand, and
accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a
lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask
the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is
seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p.
291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only
appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers,

property by chance.

labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything?
Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex
gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer
will dispense from — to —, and win valuable prizes . . .
." .

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex
customers who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize
would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the
privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if
the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex

service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A

way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the

contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy

drawing;

anything or to give anything of value.1awphîl.nèt

consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex.

does

not

supply

the

element

of

Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being
admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the

sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be

"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not

encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance

a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with

to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element

under the Postal Law.

of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the
proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People
vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether
the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance,
and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive
something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.
Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant
is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled
from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:

But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is
equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief
appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this
aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here
invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of
both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the
appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby

Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which

to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in the

opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of

.: Crimes vs. 132 P.. 178 So. 34 Am. Co. a gift enterprise comes within the State.. 55. Ballantine. 509). 13.S. 193 S. 2nd Corporation. however.. prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of 507. As stated yet to be spelled out in explicit words. which goods are sold for their market value but by way of is prohibited (E. 563. and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended. Frueauff. declare that. 817. People. 4th ed. 2d.consideration. 113 Colo. 114 Mont. 394. Jacobs. Black. p. 12 N. 389. The contest is open City and County of Denver vs. Psallis. like a lottery. 2d.. 154. 88. 796. C. may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they that element is not essential. 39 .. 73. inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 Russell vs. not the proposed contest — wanting in consideration as we have found it to be — is a prohibited gift enterprise. there appears to be a in the opinion relied upon. Equitable Loan & Sec. 129 Ga. D'Orio vs.. we think While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. 88 P.. rulings there are indeed holding that consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance.g. 52).: Bills vs.. attached as an inducement to the purchaser. 326. 235 Ala 192. 37 Tenn. Fox-Great Falls Theater p.. 654. Kieck. 142.W. 128 Neb. 509. 698. Equally impressive authorities Plattsmouth vs. Law Dictionary with Pronunciations. 507. chance and consideration (E.. Jur. even in default the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery. cannot be passed over sub silencio. State ex rel.E.E. 58 S. As thus conceived. Barker vs.. 689. States. 157 P. People vs.. the determination of whether or buy the appellee's products. Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of is only one side of the coin. 493. 257 N. Bell vs. the term prize.S. Stafford vs.J.. 694. Law Dictionary.. App.g. Going a step farther. there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is 565. As already noted. 5 Sneed. 151 Wash. 705. 275 P. 605.Y. clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. 2d. 56 Ga. But this ed. 850. 139.. 297. State.

Significantly. This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law. Super.E. 7 L. 20. it is axiomatic. consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. and consonant to the well-known morals (Com. State. vs. if lottery is prohibited only if it specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. the necessity for the element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.. term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning 705. 521. In involves a consideration. the terms "lottery" be so construed. 18 Words and Phrases. N..S.. With the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public meaning of lottery settled..Colo. As applied to lotteries. Hence. (54 C. App.J. pp. 851..J. Taking this cue. supra).R. citing Barker vs. are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable.. 208). 2d. as pointed out in 54 C.A.S. State. the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the 851. we note that in the Postal Law. perm. supra). 351-352. 54 C. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation.J. The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is. Lund. gift enterprises and similar schemes. citing: Barker vs. 15 A.. The than that which is consistent with the nature of the word apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the associated therewith. it follows . that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. 1131. 56 Ga... Cas.S. State ex rel. slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of People. the term in justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their question is used in association with the word "lottery". 193 S.S. principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount. 12 Ann. 605.supra. Mail fraud orders.. resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. therefore. there is not in the law the and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. 143 Pa. 839. 590-594). 607. ed. Stafford vs. in others.. so also must the term "gift enterprise" some cases.

they involve the element of consideration. if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived. Zaldivar and Sanchez. Finding none in the contest here in question.P. J. under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined. Jones.M. gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if. p.L.. we are persuaded to hold that. ACCORDINGLY. 2d. like lotteries. 695. we hold that the petition herein states a contestant to participate. 67 P.J.. In the end. 22 February 1991 . perm. Barrera. ed. gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. Bengzon.ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the Recapitulating.. 83896. G.. City of Roswell vs..B. from the party receiving the costs. 286. No. Regala. J. the judgment appealed from is affirmed." (25 Words and Phrases. we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof. Constitutional Construction Civil Liberties Union vs. chance. C. JJ. Concepcion. the reason behind the law can hardly sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief.R. Executive Secretary. concur. 258. Makalintal.. No directly or indirectly.. emphasis supplied). as it has been held — "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance the Postal Law. we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. does not constitute "lottery". Dizon. Reyes. and that the be said to obtain. If. 41 N.

FIDEL V. Lacsina. as Secretary of Transportation and positions in the government and government . JR. as Secretary of Agriculture. as Secretary of Science functions of his position. ANTONIO ARRIZABAL. as Secretary of Agrarian Reform. as Head of the ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES. National Economic Development Authority. 284 issued by President Corazon C. as Secretary of Health. Ignacio P. 83815 February 22. Luis R.:p These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9. Aquino on July 25. as Secretary of Labor and Employment. No. as Press Secretary. as Commissioner of the Budget. JAYME. David for petitioners in 83896. Antonio R. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are: Defense. RAMOS. Mauricio. petitioners. JUANITO FERRER. DRILON. in addition Tourism. as Secretary of Education. and CRISPIN T. Coronel for petitioners in 83815. INC. as Secretary of officials of the Executive Department may. SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ. to his primary position. REYES. BENIGNO. 1987. 1. FRANKLIN N. JUICO. as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ. as Secretary of Finance.A. BENGZON. as Secretary of Justice. Culture and Sports. as Secretary of Trade undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive and Industry. hold not more than two REINERIO D. FULGENCIO FACTORAN. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary Highways. ALFREDO R. LOURDES QUISUMBING. TEODORO F. 1991 Communication. GUILLERMO CARAGUE. Quintos and PHILIP ELLA C. VICENTE V.G. C. and Technology. DOMINGUEZ. respondents. 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No..R. as Secretary of Public Works and Sec. LUIS SANTOS. and SOLITA MONSOD. as Secretary of Local Government. T. vs. JOSE CONCEPCION. Juan CARLOS Antonio P. a member of the Cabinet. as Secretary of National FERNAN.J. REYES.

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary. they (sic) must the Cabinet. or in any franchise. directly or indirectly than his primary position. 13.corporations and receive the corresponding Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which. relinquish the excess position in favor of the unless otherwise provided in this Constitution. in effect. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. If a member of the cabinet. or assistant secretary. albeit subject to Chairman. their undersecretaries and shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees. or be financially interested in any contract Sec. Provided. hold any subordinate official who is next in rank. councils or bodies of which the President is the positions in addition to their primary positions. and their deputies or assistants shall not. The President. or undersecretary. the Members of is allowed in Section 1 hereof. with. that this limitation allows members of the Cabinet. agency. practice any other profession. runs counter to Section 13. the limitation therein imposed. 2 which provides as Sec. Vice-President. or instrumentality thereof. during said tenure. compensation therefor. . They shall any official hold more than two positions other shall not. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled corporations. but in no case other office or employment during their tenure. or to assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or boards. or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision. 3. 2. undersecretary or follows: assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what Sec. participate in any business.

any other office or employment during their tenure. as members of the Cabinet. 284. and President of the Philippines. 83815 the issuance of the public office. 73 and Executive Order No. series of to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive 1987. Article VII Specifically. construing Section 13.R. paragraph 1. then the No. par. that Cabinet members. Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No.It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13. Article IX-B. or (b) if allowed by authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any law. reimburse or refund before Congress convened on July 27. No. on July 25. their deputies from such positions. 6 petitions as Annex "C" in G. 1987 Opinion No. along charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and with the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution. 83815 3 and as Annex "B" in G. 284 as they .R. petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines prohibits public respondents. dual or multiple positions other than those under Section 8. or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their salaries. 73. allowances. petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other further seeks in G. as well as a government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the temporary restraining order directing public respondents Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is therein to cease and desist from holding. 83896 4 from holding Article VII in relation to Section 7.R. the and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions. including membership in the boards of extraordinary writs of prohibition andmandamus. No. 1987: promulgated any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received Executive Order No. In addition rendered on July 23. per diems and other forms of privileges respective positions. in addition to their made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council primary positions. and that on the basis of this Opinion. 284. 1987 or two (2) days compelling public respondents to return. Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez. 5 declaring Order No. (2). Article VIII.

lead by example. 129. and their deputies other than his primary position. or controlled series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed by E. the President and her official family. (2) of Section 7. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions.O.allegedly "lumped together" Section 13. exclusive. Article VII and the The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ general provision in another article. series of 1987 9 and DOJ addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers –– Opinion No. but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate positions). series of 1987. 155. par. 10 being the first official one. and mandatory constitutional rank assigned of the Constitution. series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. and the other. Article VII and par. Section 7. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which. It is worth noting that DOJ Sec. Opinion No. including government-owned corporations or their subsidiaries. Section 7. the or designations of an appointive executive official to positions Vice-President. 73. although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official. who are the leaders of government expected to constitutionally firm. Section 13. (2) 8 provides: promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. the members of the Cabinet. . 7. ." 7 Article IX-B. Article I-XB higher. each clarified by DOJ Opinion No. . agency or instrumentality thereof. public construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of servants in general –– allegedly "abolished the clearly separate. 129. 155. is "reasonably valid and and subalterns. series of 1988. 73. 284. series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. . (2). ." and that Executive Order No. involving the same subject of appointments to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President. Article Opinion No. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision. par. as further elucidated and I-XB. . No.

and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex- of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3. According to petitioners. by Government admits of certain exceptions. 284 is There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President. Petitioners insist that office or employment in Government are those provided in the because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution. Sec. the members of the Cabinet and their deputies that it adds exceptions to Section 13. namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII. Article VII which applies VIII. the exception as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3. par. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as . par." the only exceptions against holding any other constitutional basis of the exception. (2). on the other hand. Article VII other than or assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the those provided in the Constitution. Article must be expressly provided in the Constitution. (2). The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13. (2). being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission Vice-President. as in the case VII thereof. Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13. Article VII makes reference to Section 7. The disagreement virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this between petitioners and public respondents lies on the Constitution. Article Section 8 (1). specifically to the President. Public respondents. Vice-President. the constitutionality of Executive Order No.In sum. Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants. Article VIII. par. maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13. VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7. 8 (1).

11 law or by the primary functions of his position. Thus. for easy whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and reference is quoted anew. their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the proliferation of newly-created agencies. and the evils. and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. emoluments. allowances and other perquisites of office. per diems." The practice of designating members of the Cabinet. sought to be prevented or remedied. if any. There was a A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by calculated to effect that purpose. . agency or instrumentality thereof. including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. in order to construe the general under Section 7. it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption. became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this We rule in the negative. country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. (2). Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. par. their deputies or assistants are concerned Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in sought to be accomplished thereby.Cabinet members. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to the present time. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times. including government-owned and controlled corporations. their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries. instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision. Article I-XB which.

as keenly observed by Mr. Ruben B. contained therein that Roberto V. governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies." The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No.This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the (13). Jesus S. Zalamea of thirteen . In fact. members holding multiple positions in the government and Velasco. should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy. Tanco. Peña of enrichment. Virata of twenty-two (22). of fifteen (15). Ongpin was a member of the Justice Isagani A. Roño of twelve (12) each.A. of fourteen each (14). It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Ancheta and Jose A. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31. 12 This condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit. Alba. government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials Manuel P. Marcos of during the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given twenty-three (23). if not correct. Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental propriety and morality in government service were the data offices and employment. and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Arturo by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet R. 13 government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. Cesar E. Gilberto O. convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos. and Edgardo Tordesillas who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self- of eleven (11) each. Cruz during the deliberations in these cases. Cesar C. Jr. the holding of multiple offices in ten (10) each. entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations. 1983. one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution instrumentalities and corporations. In fact. Imelda R. Teodoro.

Under Section 5(4). specifically prohibiting the President. Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7. relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. In striking contrast is the wording of . members of the Cabinet. Section 13. . "(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . Article IX-B. Vice-President. Under Section 13. at any time. their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials. 13." Even Section 7 (2). . from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question. Article VI.including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government. the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. Article XVI. or employees from holding other offices or employment. "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government. such intent is underscored by a comparison of would be discontinued. unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Article VII. Evidently.collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom Moreover. the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Sec. the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision."." It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment.

" 14 or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. during said tenure. directly or Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive indirectly. Article VII. tenure.Section 13. which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress. the Members of the Cabinet." These sweeping. deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between Going further into Section 13. Article VII which states that "(T)he President. participate in any Department. therefore. "We actually business. Commissioner Foz Commented. hold any other office or employment during their impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. President. or any subdivision." In the latter provision. agency or instrumentality thereof. practice any other profession. the second sentence the Civil Service prohibitions. originally found in the General provides: "They shall not. or be financially interested in any contract with. and their deputies or are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the assistants shall not. including more cheeks and restraints on them are called for because there government-owned is more possibility of abuse in their case. or in have to be stricter with the President and the members of the any franchise. not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government. members of Thus. unless otherwise provided in this President and his official family as a class by itself and to Constitution." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor office or employment. Vice- the civil service in general and members of the armed forces. or special privilege granted by the Government Cabinet because they exercise more powers and. the disqualification is absolute. all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family. while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the .

Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking authorized by the Constitution itself. Section 7. the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. the Vice. par. other offices or employment in the government during their Article VII has reference to Section 7. to say that the phrase "unless Cabinet. on the other. on the one hand. their deputies and assistants with respect to holding otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13.primary functions of their positions. Article VII is meant to be the exception downwards. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article would render meaningless the specific provisions of the VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7. but qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do. (1) of render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter designation in any capacity to any public office or position prohibition on the President. Members in the government during their tenure. To construe said or employment when so authorized by the Constitution. officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to Assistant Secretary. possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office 7. and the generality of civil all elective and appointive public officials and employees. members of the Cabinet. their deputies and assistants. Vice-President. Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover. (2) of Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a . may hold any other office or position applicable only to the President. servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary while Section 13." Surely. Members of the during his tenure. would who as an elective public official under Sec. respondents' reading of the provisions in question This being the case. 7. par. This provided in this Constitution" in Section 13. of the Cabinet. Article VII cannot observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who.President. In other words. par. (1) of Article I-XB tenure.

the court must harmonize them.. Section 7. In the same manner must Section 7. par. members of the Cabinet. Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. the two can be made to stand together. the language of Section 13. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-avis Section 13. Vice-President. Article VII is the others. Section 13. par. 19 to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself. their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure. wherever the instrument. 20 consideration as one. the It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. to be considered alone. rather than one which may make the can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under words idle and nugatory. i. no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all On its face. to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the .16 Such absurd consequence every word operative. relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not and must lean in favor of a construction which will render nave been chosen or fails to qualify.member of the Cabinet. 17 Sections bearing on a particular subject the language used in the constitution is prohibitory. Verily.. Article VII.15 and to act as President without In other words. but that all the provisions prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of multiple government offices or employment. Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President. if practicable.e. 21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this to be allowed to defeat another.e. it is to be should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal the whole purpose of the Constitution 18 and one section is not negation. if by any reasonable Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only construction. i. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other.

A Constitution. 24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. agencies. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money. 115 (December 24. and the Secretaries of National Defense. viewed as a . Labor and The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board. pars. Article VII. both of which are attached to his by the Executive officials specified therein without additional department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can the Vice-President. and. The respective undersecretaries and assistant officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of secretaries. Article VII. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. (2) would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and (3). the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth employment under Section 13. or acting as Employment and Local Government sit in this Council. the Secretary of Justice being ex- and members. be construed as applying to posts occupied Administration (POEA). banking and credit. however. Section 8 (1). (2). 23 To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences. the Executive Secretary.Cabinet under Section 3. would also be prohibited. among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. par. Article VII of the Constitution Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment must not. Justice. which President in those instances provided under Section 7. Article VIII. 1986). Neither can compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials' office.25 Indeed.

and without any other appointment or representative from that office. holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law. the prohibition under Section 13. cannot.A. the Board in addition to those already performed under their Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex- original appointments. 26 The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an exofficio position in Rafael vs. 3137) reveals that for the chairman compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as and members of the Board to qualify they need only be required by the primary functions of the concerned official's designated by the respective department heads. The same is true with respect to authority than that conferred by the office.continuously operative charter of government. Article VII is not and Inspection Board." 27 An ex- the officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of appointments are necessary. for but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise instance. No new . one who does not hold a previous appointment in the denotes an "act done in an official character. should be avoided. 29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority. not expressly conferred upon the individual character. Thus. under the act." 32 representatives from the other offices. This is as it should be. Authority. by express provision of law. Embroidery and Apparel Control To reiterate.31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional the questioned statute (R. be designated a consequence of office. The term ex-officio means "from office. 28 To illustrate. and without further warrant or representatives so designated merely perform duties in the appointment. they office. In order to be designated they must already be merely. 30 and unreasonable or absurd consequences. if possible. With the office. by virtue of exception of the representative from the private sector." It refers to an "authority derived from official character sit ex-officio. or as a Bureau of Customs. because the his title to a certain office. is not to be officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable.

An example would be the Press vested on the President and his alter egos. continuity and coordination among the different If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental. offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its remotely related. to have control of all the executive departments. The same bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet executed. their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge. expertise and skill in their respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. Cabinet Members. the Cabinet Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the members. 35 Without these additional duties and functions being official management functions and/or monetary compensation. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency. policy direction.The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. government-owned or controlled corporations and their The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the subsidiaries. plural. or otherwise alien multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws to the primary function of a cabinet official. Mandating additional duties and functions to the President. It is consistent with the power prohibited by the Constitution. assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the . incompatible. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board. and the Secretary of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority 34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board. such additional affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" basic services to the people. Vice-President. inconsistent. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. but must be required by the official's primary functions. 33 The additional duties must not only be closely related to.

Article IX-B. therefore. which come under the jurisdiction of his resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy. who is to perform It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law. he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation. per them or an honorarium or an allowance. Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when although not required by current law. whether it be in the form of a It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13. he is instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary and as required by their primary functions. thereby deprived of the means for control and and banking matters. originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions. par. such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned. membership of certain high-ranking executive officials in other offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said . For such attendance. the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting functions of his position." 36 express reference to certain highranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet were made. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. (2). 7. By whatever name it is designated. It should be obvious that if. or some other such euphemism. such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. the exception "unless required by the The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office. 37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. say. they would be function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary supervision. without proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section receiving any additional compensation therefor. department.governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof. it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.

39 At that time. Executive Department.officials' primary functions. 41 It was only after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the Committee on That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President and his official family is by reason of the legal principles governing additional functions and duties of public . . This colloquy functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule between the two Commissioners took place in the plenary covering all appointive public officials. be taken as authority for saying that this exception is adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase "primary by virtue of Section 7. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless Industry. containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission. . later placed as Section 7. had also been earlier approved on third reading on August 26. it cannot. The example given by Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade and Section 7. 1986. What was constitutional prohibition under consideration. ." While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be used as authority for saying that additional What was clearly being discussed then were general principles functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of the which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence official may be imposed upon him without offending the of specific constitutional provisions on the matter. (2) of Article I-XB. 1986. 38 otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. Had the Constitutional session of September 27. Under consideration then was Commission intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. primarily at issue and approved on that occasion was the however. par. the 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Section article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on 3 of the proposed general Provisions. 40 while the article on the par. third reading on July 22. par. it could have re-worded said Section proposed article on General Provisions. 531 which was the Section 13 of Article VII. 1986.

" as opposed to "allowed. members of the Cabinet. Article IX-B It being clear. as it was in fact one of its best selling points. 1987 is appears upon its face. Vice- functions and duties "required. (2). par. undersecretaries or assistant secretaries it than in the framers's understanding thereof. and as indicating the reasons for their votes." employment in the government. par. the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof. 2. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what Constitution. give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk. much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose In the light of the construction given to Section 13. we have made it clear that only the additional the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President. Article VII votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental in relation to Section 7. their deputies or assistants the primary functions may be considered as not constituting from holding during their tenure multiple offices or "any other office. 284 dated July 23. 44 may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than . resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail 42 as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. that At any rate. but they posts held without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting that Cabinet members." 43 The proper interpretation therefore unconstitutional. Executive Order No.officials rather than by virtue of Section 7.1âwphi1Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members. Article IX-B of the 1987 law." by President. except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution.

Jr. which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility. Secretary of held by virtue of legislation. he should be allowed to attend to his duties and The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13. Executive Order No. Article VII of the 1987 job.. . He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts.two (2) positions in the government and government controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. unless otherwise specialized knowledge. particularly at this stage of our national and economic development. that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle. considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an exofficio capacity. benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and expertise. 284 to be constitutionally infirm. With respect to other offices or Finding Executive Order No. far outweigh the benefits. If maximum provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. if any. Constitution prohibiting them from doing so. suffice it to say corporations. employment including the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran. Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention. As earlier clarified in this decision. It is more than a full-time job. definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. knowledge and expertise. 284 actually allows them to that the feared impractical consequences are more apparent hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of than real. skills and expertise. exofficio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment. requiring full attention. Being head of an executive department is no mean the express mandate of Section 13. Article VII on the operations of the Government. by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation.

During their tenure in the questioned positions.Local Government 45 Luis Santos. is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office. a de facto officer. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside. one for such services. Medialdea. JJ. Secretary of Health Alfredo R. allowances or other Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual immediately relinquish their other offices or employment. 46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure. fees and other compensations attached to the office. Davide. who. concur.officer. as services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be herein defined. respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. Regalado and undoubtedly. No. Ramos. and may in an WHEREFORE. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet (The construction of law obtains the force of law) People v. took no part.:p . JJ. G. including government- retained by them.. Melencio-Herrera. Jr. SO ORDERED Narvasa. 47 Any per diem. With respect to the other named respondents. the petitions are GRANTED.. Bidin. J. owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Secretary of National officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any Defense Fidel V. Feliciano. ANTONIO.A. in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto. Executive Order No. subject to the qualification above-stated.R. Jabinal. Paras. This doctrine is. Gutierrez. Gancayco. the petitions have become moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the positions complained of. in the government. L-30061. Padilla. Cruz... supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an Jr. Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino. 27 February 1974 appropriate action recover the salary.

although he had The complaint filed against the accused reads: no license or permit.. 889. he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint. unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste. custody and direct control a revolver Cal. however. Mapa. and within the jurisdiction of this to possess and carry the firearm in question. in the Honorable Court. without the requisite license or permit. . the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority Philippines. as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander. first securing the necessary permit or license to finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of possess the same. dated December 10. September. 1964. 1962.Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas ammunition and four (4) empty shells without (provincial capital). after which trial was accordingly held. RG8 German Made with one (1) live Indeed. in Criminal Case No. the accused had appointments from the abovementioned officials as claimed by him. did then and there wilfully. the 5th day from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment of poblacion.22. p. reads: . the accused entered a plea of not guilty. the above-named accused. Batangas. 1 At the arraignment on September 11. which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. and Municipality of Batangas. The accused admitted that on September 5.m. Province of Batangas. with the accessories provided by law. a person not authorized by law. Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment. claimed to be entitled to exoneration because. he had an appointment as Secret Agent That on or about 9:00 o'clock. 1964. He. 1964.

the suppression of trafficking in explosives. 1964. No. civic spirit. your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in Kind: — ROHM-Revolver the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us. cattle rustling. robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms. illegal cockfighting. or as soon as you have By virtue hereof. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be Make: — German SN: — 64 Cal:— . As such Secret Agent. jueteng. 1959. for use in connection with the province of Batangas. and trusting that you will be an L-12088 dated December 23. the accused was also appointed by the PC separation from the service. you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned.R.22 considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate On March 15. In accordance with Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with .Reposing special trust and confidence in your the decision of the Supreme Court in G. especially with respect to performance of your duties. FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: qualified for the position. particularly the preservation of peace and order in the described below. you will effective agent in the detection of crimes and in have the right to bear a firearm. the appointment to take effect immediately.

People v. he was entitled to acquittal without license or permit.duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities. supra. nevertheless. Lucero. and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to . supra. and in connection with these duties he was circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver. We therefore held that while it is true that the by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or of Batangas. Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the Macarandang 2 and People vs. with authority to possess and carry permit. 3 The trial court. with authority to possess the firearm time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition subject matter of the prosecution. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of In Macarandang. conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent ammunition. The court considered as mitigating Batangas province. Lucero. Macarandang. We reversed the trial court's judgment of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the Confidential Agent. RG-8 SN-64. respectively. while maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes. Mapa. section 879 of the Revised Administrative the firearm described in the complaint. Mapa. criminally requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the firearms. supra. nevertheless held the Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the accused in its decision dated December 27. and People v. Cal. supra. he had an appointment from the on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.22 and Confidential Agent. for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties. 1968. subversives and other similar of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in in People vs. ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases wanted persons. loose firearms. Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. .

Forces of the Constabulary. provincial treasurers. municipal police. detached The law cannot be any clearer. and by implication. 4. sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace Administrative Code. or exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of marines license to possess firearms. possess any firearm." are not in Lucero.) specifically allowed. "it shall be unlawful for any person to . [of the Armed the Philippine governors. Revised crimes. the granting of the temporary use of guards in the employment of the Bureau of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out Prisons.) The next section provides officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police that "firearms and ammunition regularly and who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are lawfully issued to officers. No provision is parts of firearms or ammunition therefor. municipal mayors. InMapa. circumstances of the case. 878. . or any made for a secret agent. the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the lieutenant capture of a Huk leader. expressly abandoning the municipal treasurers. provincial governors." (Sec. In Lucero. soldiers.. The law is explicit that except as thereafter 879.assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of amended by Republic Act No.. We sustained the judgment of conviction on the covered "when such firearms are in possession following ground: of such officials and public servants for use in in Macarandang. . and doctrine that guards of provincial prisoners and jails. or ammunition. We held that under the Philippines]. Revised Administrative Code.. as .. As such he is not instrument or implement used or intended to be exempt. the performance of their official duties. used in the manufacture of firearms. parts of firearms. sailors." (Sec.

This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws. The sole question in this appeal is: Should in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence. . and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution thereof. that considering that appellant conferred as of the date that law originally passed. the new doctrine reversal of the appealed judgment. Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964. reversal merely establishes the contemporaneous who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith Decisions of this Court. restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim Macarandang (1959) Our obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a decision in People v. since this Court's his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and . where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings hence of the law.It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret construction Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine competent court has the force of law. a part of the law It follows. in a way." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes. are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean. and he accordingly recommends overruled and a different view is adopted. shall form a part of the legal system . therefore. and should not apply to parties of the and People v. at the time appellant was found in in Macarandang and Lucero. the prevailing The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. and Confidential legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. or should his conviction stand in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by view of the trial court. should be applied prospectively. although in themselves not laws. of the land... complete Lucero (1958). but when a doctrine of this Court is General is of the first view. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in theMacarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor the Mapa case in 1967. The doctrine laid down came only in 1967.

. J. WHEREFORE. Certainly.. Fernando. under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor. appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. Zaldivar (Chairman). took no part. G. No. JJ. the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. and appellant is acquitted. with costs de oficio. Barredo.R. J. concur. Fernandez and Aquino. 17 April 2001 DECISION VITUG. Pesca. appellant must be absolved.authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero. Pesca v. 136921.: .

G. 17-year old Rez. No. 11-year old Ryan. petitioner said. It started in 1988. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children. (RTC) of Caloocan City. He was cruel and violent. After a whirlwind courtship. CV. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the . which has declared the they got married on 03 March 1975. the young couple marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the and respondent. and 9-year old Richie. promulgated on 27 May 1998. reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court vessel bound for Bacolod City. when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. Six months later. 19-year old Ruhem.Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Petitioner Lorna G. Initially. the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. in C.R. first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island 52374. Pesca Appeals. He was a habitual drinker.A. had to leave the country on board an part of respondent. a seaman. Branch 130.

appearance within the reglementary period. and she returned home to give him a chance to change. Prosecutor Rosa C. on 03 August submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City 1994. Petitioner sued respondent before Finally.afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. slap and kick her. respondent. submitted her report to the effect that she found no General Hospital. When cautioned to physical injuries. he chased petitioner with a imprisonment. Petitioner likewise Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for ways. the trial court respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion presence of the children. Reyes. to at least. loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. Two months later. petitioner and her children the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in marriage invoking psychological incapacity. about eight oclock. She was battered black and blue. petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. matters became worse. was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed. they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay parties. At one time. respondent would Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of beat. Eventually. minimize his drinking. authorities. on 19 November 1992. She between the parties. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his On the morning of 22 March 1994. to her dismay. Summons. and a case was filed against respondent for slight . together with a copy of the complaint. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial stop or. This time. which diagnosed her injuries as contusions evidence to establish that there was collusion between the and abrasions. petitioner decided to forgive support pendente lite. But.

On 15 November 1995. Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. and has been proven by an expert. court and declared the marriage between petitioner and was admitted by the court. respondent belatedly filed. and the same. without The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial leave of court. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property."[1] Petitioner. however. would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the . not physical illness. in her plea to this Court. contending that the trial court erred. The appellate court said: the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. partnership.On 11 January 1995. that the incapacity is grave. as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code. following hearings conducted by it. the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological. respondent admitted respondent valid and subsisting. that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically. particularly. Respondent vehemently denied. "Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. an answer. in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case. the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated. and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. In his answer. although filed late. has preceded the marriage and is incurable.

petitioner argues. the guidelines psychoses as. as a ground for the incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage Family Code. Be that as it may. Court of Appeals. the deliberations of the set out in Republic vs. and like mandatory in nature. The Court. that the use of the [3] phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code promulgated on 13 February 1997. Family Code Revision Committee itself. the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly The term psychological incapacity. but must stand in conjunction with. . reiterated in Molina. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of. [2] promulgated on 14 January 1995. Court of Appeals and Molina. concluded: include their mutual obligations to live together. respondent submits. should have no retroactive application and. In any case. on the assumption that has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively. in Santos. likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not authorities. as well as the guidelines including. extremely low intelligence. immaturity. `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental Indeed. has been explained by the Court in Santos and which. and most importantly. the circumstances (cited in Fr. existing precepts in our law on marriage. there is no merit in the petition. observe love. Artemio Balumad's `Void and application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings Canon Law. Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of and not its dismissal. as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code. Thus correlated. "It should be obvious. Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association. looking at all the foregoing disquisitions.

" ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code. Molina. petitioner has utterly failed. It is in Santos when. that followed. Molina has strengthened. [4] The phrase psychological incapacity. Emotional later overruled. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. so as to enacted. is an entirely novel provision in our statute books. . invoked by her. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts At all events. to make out a law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. There is parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most lex prospicit. let constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is alone at the time of solemnization of the contract. for the first time. non respicit. that the new immaturity and irresponsibility. borrowed from Canon law. and a different view is adopted. until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code." The "doctrine of stare decisis. cannot be doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of equated with psychological incapacity. and. Santos. not overturned. the Court has given life to the term. the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.respect and fidelity and render help and support. expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. both in her establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the allegations in the complaint and in her evidence.

JJ. Melo. No costs. may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. Panganiban. Gonzaga- . totally terminating that relationship. the herein petition is DENIED. the law has not quite given up. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent. SO ORDERED. (Chairman). neither should we. concur. Reyes. WHEREFORE.The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and protects.. however. In these cases. and Sandoval-Gutierrez.

Respondent-Appellee" and NLRC Case No. 4) an application seeking clearance to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco.E.. they petitioners separation pay equivalent to their one month salary received commissions for every sale they made.) for every year of service. F. Inc.. No.: Office No. RB-IV-20840-78-T entitled. v. petitioners manifested that they are no longer T entitled. Zuellig (M). The antecedent facts are as follows: Private respondent F. their membership in the union. RN. etc. Complainant-Appellant. At the last hearing of the case. Zuellig (M). NLRC. This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision This application was seasonably opposed by petitioners of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case alleging that the company is not suffering from any losses. and Amancio Manuel (hereinafter referred to as petitioners) allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses.(exclusive of commissions.E. allowances." which dismissed the issue to be resolved is the basis of the separation pay due to appeal of petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the decision petitioners. "Amancio Manuel. Complainants-Appellants. The parties then agreed that the sole Zuellig (M). Inc. Petitioners. F.. contesting their dismissal. Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Zuellig) filed with the Department of Labor (Regional When is there room for interpretation or construction? Songco v.E. "Jose Songco and Romeo They alleged further that they are being dismissed because of Cipres. Respondent-Appellee. Romeo Cipres. who were in the sales force of Zuellig of the Labor Arbiter ordering private respondent to pay received monthly salaries of at least P40. GR L-50999 23 March 1990 MEDIALDEA. In addition. v.IV-20855-78- however.000. J. .

and Section l(a)-Any employee. a fraction of at least six months being considered one year. shall entitle the employee affected thereby to separation pay. whichever is higher. death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year of service. the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service. whichever is higher. In case of termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy.The collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between On the other hand. Reduction of personnel. Article 284 of the Labor Code then Zuellig and F. years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total service credits.E. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. sickness. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and other similar causes. 284. of which prevailing provides: petitioners are members. Rollo): termination of employment of any employee ARTICLE XIV — Retirement Gratuity due to the installation of labor saving-devices. redundancy. — The 71. One month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at date of retirement. who is separated from employment due to old age. the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service. retrenchment to prevent losses. contains the following provision (p. (Emphasis supplied) other similar causes. Zuellig Employees Association. (Emphasis supplied) . including probationary employment. Art.

Sec. Book VI of the Rules employee as provided herein shall be based on Implementing the Labor Code provide: his latest salary rate. allowances. in which case the basis of computation shall be the rate before its deduction. ordered to to termination pay equivalent at least to his one pay the complainants separation pay equivalent month salary. the dispositive portion of which reads (p. a fraction commissions. (Emphasis supplied) On June 26. Rollo): his continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health or to the health of RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING.1978. Basis of termination pay. his co-employees.) for every year of of at least six (6) months being considered as service that they have worked with the one whole year. etc. Rule 1. 10. — The The appeal by petitioners to the National Labor Relations computation of the termination pay of an Commission was dismissed for lack of merit. the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision. xxx SO ORDERED. unless the same was reduced by the employer to defeat the intention xxx Sec. the employee shall be entitled respondent should be as it is hereby.In addition. Where the termination of employment is due to retrechment initiated by the employer to prevent losses or other similar causes. whichever is higher. Sections 9(b) and 10. . or to one-half month pay for every to their one month salary (exclusive of year of service. company. 9(b). or where the employee suffers from a disease and of the Code. 78.

to his full and complete satisfaction. which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done. to wit. of board. The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay. 1980 filed by petitioner Romeo Cipres. the Court. as determined by the Secretary of Labor. based on the ground that he wants "to abide by the decision appealed from" since he had "received. or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the The petition is impressed with merit. amount of separation pay due them. said so in clear and unequivocal terms.Hence. or for services rendered or to be rendered. On June 2. 'Fair reasonable value' shall not include any profit to the employer or to any Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal person affiliated with the employer. 1980. it could have explicitly one's salary. employee. or commission basis. or other method of calculating the same." resolved to dismiss the petition as to him. whether under the Labor Code or the CBA. They cited Article Code as well as its implementing rules to include commission 97(f) of the Labor Code which includes commission as part on in the computation of separation pay. lodging. task. capable of being expressed in terms of money. in the . the present petition. his separation pay. Furthermore. piece. acting on the verified "Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of Petition dated April 7. earned sales commissions Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor and allowances should be added together. (f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings. their basic salary. whether fixed or ascertained on a time. however designated. and includes the fair and reasonable value.

et al. We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or not earned sales commission should be included in the monthly salary of petitioner for the purpose of computation of their separation pay. v. 1987. et al. in Planters Products. construction. "commission" is used only as Article 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in one of the features or designations attached to the word the definition of the term "wage". September 21. In this regard. 75510. No. 1987. 78524. It has been repeatedly remuneration or earnings. 7476. Inc. How ever.1973. Municipality of Naga. NLRC. August 22. June 28. declared by the courts that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language. 76721. G. v. G. Gonzaga v. January 20. Nos." This ruling was reiterated in Soriano v. 24 SCRA 708. G. G.definition of the term "wage". Rollo): The definition of 'wage' provided in Article 96 (sic) of the Code can be correctly be (sic) stated as a general definition. there is no room for interpretation or Insofar as the issue of whether or not allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay is concerned. 1989.R. NLRC.R. et al. 154 SCRA 166. the Labor Arbiter rationalized his decision in this manner (pp. Court of Appeals. Article 284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules. this has been settled in the case of Santos v. NLRC. there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co..R. account must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living allowances. 1968. A careful perusal of the same does not . G. L-2 7455.R. October 27. there appears to be an ambiguity. it may be argued that if We correlate Article 97(f) with Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 24116-17. 51 SCRA 381). A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for itself. No.R. 155 SCRA 124 and recently..No.. where We ruled that "in the computation of backwages and separation pay. and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity. No. It is 'wage ' in its generic sense.

. . This is not express the intent of the framers of the law that something novel for it cannot be gainsaid that for purposes of separation pay they mean to be certain types of employees like agents. Each particular benefit provided in the Code and other Decrees on Labor has its own pecularities and nuances and should be Upon the other hand. field specifically referring to salary only. concerning termination pay should be the should be controlling in matters specific provisions of both Book VI of the Code x x x.. weekly or monthly salaries. the latter should prevail. Thus. that legally separated from the service is 'his latest what salary rates. At any rate. Book VI of the implementing rules provision.show any indication that commission is part of The above terms found in those Articles and the salary. We can say that commission by itself particular Rules were intentionally used to may be considered a wage. personnel and salesmen do not earn any regular daily.or specific provision. Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use 'monthly pay or monthly salary'... The the Code specifically states that the basis of the general guidelines in (sic) the formation of termination pay due to one who is sought to be specific rules for particular purpose. a specific meaning is attached to in conjunction with Articles 273 and 274 (sic) of simplify matters that may arise there from. for a specific 10. the provisions of Section interpreted in that light. and the Rules. but rely mainly on commission earned. Thus. settled is the rule that in matters of conflict between the general provision of law and that of a particular. Rule 1.

Indeed. there is eminent authority for holding that the words "wages" and "salary" are in essence synonymous (Words and Phrases.Y.89 App. piece or commission basis or other method of calculating the same. Rollo): We rule otherwise. "pay" is the synonym of "wages" and "salary" (Black's Law Dictionary. Cromwell. 38 Am. 839.On its part. This situation. a reward or recompense for services performed. mean that commission. it could be deduced that wage is used in its generic sense and obviously refers to the basic wage rate to be ascertained on a time." the etymology of which is the Latin word "salarium. Jur.). Article 284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules. Likewise. Bargaining Agreement. Whether it be derived from "salarium. p. the word "salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. 496). 13th month pay. Div.S. is not the real intent of the Code and its rules. construction of the word "salary." the pay of the Roman soldier. Inasmuch as the . Broadly. and premium pay. allowances or analogous income necessarily forms part of the employee's salary because to do so would lead to anomalies (sic). The ambiguity between Article 97(f). It does not. overtime. that is. it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. is more apparent than real. which defines the term 'wage' and Article XIV of the Collective From the aforequoted provisions of the law and the implementing rules." or more fancifully from "sal. 38 Permanent Edition. which mention the terms "pay" and "salary"." is often used interchangeably with "wage". "Salary. the etymology of which is the Middle English word "wagen". if not absurd. however. 44 citing Hopkins vs. 85 N. 5th Ed. 110. Both words generally refer to one and the same meaning. task. 481. and other fringe benefits should be added to the computation of their separation pay." For what will prevent the employee from insisting that emergency living allowance. the NLRC ruled (p. Vol.841. to our mind.

not entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. citing Weiner v. the logical services rendered demonstrate clearly that commission are part conclusion. We take judicial notice of the fact The aforequoted provisions are not the only consideration for deciding the petition in favor of the petitioners. 123. in effect. Will this not be absurd? This narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of our labor laws and considering the purpose of separation pay which is. salesman. and salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for commission is included in the definition of "wage". in gratia argumenti. if we adopt the opposite view that commissions. 217 Md. Bearing in mind the preceeding dicussions. that the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement. We agree with the Solicitor General that granting. trustees. therefore. "pay" and "salary" have the same meaning. so that the petitioners would be inspired to put a little more industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them. We will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and therefore. to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown the the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.words "wages".. The nature of the work of a that some salesman do not received any basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone. compensation or reward of an agent. broker or bailee. factor. Commission is the recompense. then. Swales. when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal (Black's Law Dictionary. are part of petitioners' wage or salary. although an employer-employee relationship exists. in the computation of the separation of petitioners' wage or salary. their salary base should include also their that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend earned sales commissions. executor. . is. on commissions and allowances or commissions alone. do not form part of wage or salary. 5th Ed.2d 749. We take judicial notice of the fact pay of petitioners. still these commissions are direct remuneration services rendered which contributed to the increase of income of Zuellig . receiver. 750). 141 A.

Manila Electric Company v. The final consideration is.. supra. in resolving the substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as issue of the salary base that should be used in computing the provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that separation pay. The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of said separation pay. what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned during their last year of employment. and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt.1987. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v.R.R. . G. NLRC. 71812. Applying this by analogy. In the computation thereof. G. since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioners.1989). No. SO ORDERED.Additionally.. ACCORDINGLY. NLRC. 78763. July 12. The decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by including allowances and commissions in the separation pay of petitioners Jose Songco and Amancio Manuel.152 SCRA 140. et al. NLRC. We held that: "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules The commissions also claimed by petitioner ('override commission' plus 'net deposit incentive') are not properly includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioner. the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. in Soriano v. July 30. these should be included in their separation pay. in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations. No. the petition is hereby GRANTED. et al. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

GR 189600. 09-130 of August 6. Milagros E. among other things. private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation Amores v. In her Petition for Quo Warranto[1] seeking the ouster of private respondent. which respectively dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto questioning change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14. 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. private respondent was deemed to have entered a general denial pursuant to public respondents Rules. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14. concur. the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J.: limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. petitioner alleged that. and his Via this petition for certiorari. Cruz. HRET. 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent). and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Gancayco and Griño-Aquino. J. 7941.[2] . 2009 and Resolution No. Not having filed his Answer despite due notice. 7941.Narvasa (Chairman).. JJ. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the partylist organization Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives. otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. 29 June 2010 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). he was already 31 years old or beyond the age CARPIO MORALES. at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance. he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC DECISION since.

and that he became a their families sector. 2007 to be out of time. and NBC Resolution No.As earlier reflected. 2007. public respondent held that Section 15 of . among other things. public respondent.[3] dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto. party-list affiliation. which was a partial held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the proclamation of winning party-list organizations. was not first three congressional terms after the ratification of the enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July Constitution or until 1998.[5] 2007. RA No. by Decision of May 14. Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions. 07-60. 2007. unless a sectoral party is thereafter 10. 7941. 2009. the present Petition for Certiorari. which own Certificate of Proclamation only on December 13. public respondent from private respondents proclamation. It also found the petition which was filed on October 17. public respondent laws.[6] private respondent avers in the main that In the matter of private respondents shift of affiliation petitioner has not substantiated her claims of grave abuse of from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and discretion against public respondent. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in 2009. is not. a multi-sectoral organization. especially considering that he admitted receiving his registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. CIBAC. 07-60 dated July 9. finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by least one seat in the House of Representatives through National Resolution No. In his Comment. the reglementary period being 10 days Petitioner contends that. created distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 09-130 dated August 6.[4] petitioner filed Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No.

according to their ranking in said list. 10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules[8] from the 07-60 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and issuance of NBC Resolution No. 2010. and academic. by the respective parties. COMELEC[10] after revisiting the formula for erroneous. Its counting of the AT ALL EVENTS.[7] Section Representatives 13. or coalitions to the COMELEC respondent.[9] it was by no representatives elected in the May. 7941. while NBC Resolution No. 2007 elections. To be sure. to representatives shall be proclaimed by the wit: (1) whether petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto was COMELEC based on the list of names dismissible for having been filed unseasonably. thus. 2007 is Transparency v. While the petition has. On the first issue. allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations. and (2) submitted whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. 2007 elections will expire measure a proclamation of private respondent himself as on June 30. . How are Party-List Chosen. 7941 apply to private organizations. become moot required by Section 13 of RA No. Party-list The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent. 07-60 on July 9. It bears noting that the term of office of party-list along with other party-list organizations. rendering of a decision on the merits in this case would still be of practical value. this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May.member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector years before the 2007 elections.

7941 reading: expiration of his underscoring supplied. the Court party-list representative unless he is a natural- overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the born citizen of the Philippines. the Court shall first attains the age of thirty (30) during his term discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under shall be allowed to continue in office until the Section 9 of RA No. his title may be seasonably he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more challenged. qualifications is lost.Section 9. able to read and write. Once required In case of a nominee of the youth sector.) term. a registered merits. Alternatively. (Emphasis and . entire tenure. a bona fide member of the party or Qualifications for public office are continuing organization which he seeks to represent for at requirements and must be possessed not only at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the the time of appointment or election or election. that the records do not disclose the Nominees. Any youth sectoral representative who On the second and more substantial issue. No person shall be nominated as exact date of private respondents proclamation. a resident of the Philippines for a period private respondents qualifications. any of the [11] than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. however. Qualifications of Party-List Considering. preceding the day of the election. and is at least twenty-five (25) years of assumption of office but during the officer's age on the day of the election. since petitioners challenge goes into voter. it may be filed at anytime of not less than one (1)year immediately during his term.

which expired in 1998. This is certainly not A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee Section 9 of RA No. elections where Section 9 applied were held in May. There is thus no reason to apply Section 9 during the first three congressional terms after the ratification thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the of the Constitution or until 1998. the Party-List System Act. there is no room for construction or interpretation. 7941. This more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election .[12] sound legislative intent. Ubi lex non distinguit it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day nec nos distinguire debemus. Since this distinguish. we must not distinguish. There is only room for application. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.The Court finds no textual support for public respondents As petitioner points out. so distinction is nowhere found in the law. Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941. There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondents ratiocination that after the third congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution. 1995. unless a sectoral party is first three congressional terms after the ratification of the thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth Constitution in 1987. 7941 was enacted only interpretation that Section 9 applied only to those nominated in March. 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. and could not have been the objective of RA No. the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public respondents . it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats. 7941.[13] mandate is contained in RA No. RA No. Under this interpretation. the last sector. When the law does not is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee.

it must be Effect. Any elected party-list representative who given its literal meaning and applied without attempted changes sectoral interpretation. 1975. [15] Moreover. he may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before . since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.[14] seat: 15. therefore. beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. or underscoring supplied. as affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the his index of intention. (emphasis his as new and party-list party It is. a nominee who changes his sectoral overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Change his political Provided. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis. Hence. Section 15 reads: nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections.) The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May. 2007. 7941 apply to private respondent. The records disclose that private respondent was What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes already more than 30 years of age in May. 2007 elections.ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its party-list system. And the latter stipulated that he was born in August. it being in both political party and sectoral affiliation. Section Affiliation. of party That or if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election. Again. he shall not be eligible for representative nomination under organization.

2009 and Resolution No. 2007. It not being contested. 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. representing the party-list organization sector only on March 17. however.CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC.[16] SO ORDERED. A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference. The Decision dated May 14.[17] WHEREFORE. Emmanuel Joel J. he is entitled to keep the compensation and emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the same. their qualifications according to law are a different matter. that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a party-list representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such. 2007. 09-130 dated August 6. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Associate Justice . is of no moment. whose victory was later upheld. the petition is GRANTED.May. public respondent itself having found that he Representatives shifted to CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families CIBAC.

: (SEC Case No. J. the pertinent facts as stated in our decision are reproduced herein. No. 002693) with the Securities and Exchange On September 14. dismissing the petition of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). This will now resolve petitioners On October 26. 74851. the Court passed upon the case at Commission (SEC). 1984.supplemental papers. 1984. the submission of . withdrawal and change of lawyers. not to speak of the case having been passed from one departing to another retiring justice. to wit: RESOLUTION On September 28. The delay was occasioned by exchange of pleadings. It was not until May 3. BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments MELO. although filed in 1992 was not deemed foreclosure sale was issued by the Sheriff on October 29. when the case was re-raffled to herein ponente. RCBC v. but the record was given When can courts construe or interpret the law? to him only sometime in the late October 1999. 1999. A notice of extra-judicial reconsideration which. thereby affirming One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors and the decision of the Court of Appeals which canceled the liabilities was RCBC. RCBC requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on motion for some properties of BF Homes. 1984. G. and reinstating that of respondent BF Homes. 1992. bar and rendered its decision. submitted for resolution until in late 1998.R. transfer certificate of title issued in favor of RCBC. IAC. 9 December 1999 By way of review.

002693 a temporary restraining order On February 13. consolidated motion to annul the auction sale and to cite RCBC and the sheriff for contempt. the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes. 002693. RCBC On January 25. effective for 20 days. copies furnished both BF Because of the proceedings in the SEC. On March 18. 1984. the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of filed with the Regional Trial Court. unaware of the filing of the bond. the sheriff withheld the Homes (mortgagor) and RCBC (mortgagee). and his deputy to compel them to execute in its favor a 1985. the SEC issued on November 28. 1985. the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction sale on January 29. 1985. 1985. the SEC in Case No. Presumably. On March 13. the very day of the auction sale. petitioner did not file a bond until January 29. Br. 1985. 1985 because no writ of preliminary injunction had been issued by SEC as of that date. 002693 belatedly (TRO). . in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. 1985. injunction upon petitioners filing of injunction was issued by the SEC. 1984 in SEC Case No. The sale was which had been conducted by the sheriff two weeks earlier.scheduled on November 29. In answer. On motion of BF Homes. so no writ of preliminary certificate of sale of the auctioned properties. delivery to RCBC of a certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties. but they informed the SEC that they would suspend the On February 5. 140. Rizal (CC 10042) preliminary a an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal bond. rescheduled to January 29. However. 1985. despite SEC Case No. enjoining RCBC and the sheriff issued a writ of preliminary injunction stopping the auction sale from proceeding with the public auction sale. BF Homes filed in the SEC a issuance of a certificate of sale to RCBC. the sheriffs alleged that they proceeded with the auction sale on January 29. 1985. RCBC opposed the motion.

On RCBCs motion in the mandamus case. setting aside the decision of the trial court. 10042 is hereby annulled and set aside and the case is hereby dismissed. 1986. . 129 praying for the annulment of the judgment. petitioners Motion for Judgment on the pleadings is granted and judgement is hereby rendered ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of the Auction Sale of January 29. the dispositive judicially foreclose its mortgage on petitioners properties. the trial court issued x x x: (1) even before RCBC asked the sheriff to extra- on May 8. 1985 a judgment on the pleadings. the judgment dated May 8. 1985 in Civil Case No. 1985. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. 87. premised on the following: suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles. Rollo). . properties sold therein. respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. 1985. involving the judgment because the petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the mandamus case. 88. more particularly those described in Annex C of their Answer. Homes filed an original complaint with the IAC pursuant to Section 9 of B. (CA Decision. until the resolution of case by SEC in Case No. In view of the admission of respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation that the sheriffs certificate of sale has been registered on BF Homes TCTs .P. and it was deprived of its right to be heard. (p. the portion of which states: SEC had already assumed exclusive jurisdiction over those assets. dismissing the mandamus case and On June 4. p. 002693.F. B. Rollo. the IAC rendered a decision. (here the TCTs were enumerated) the Register of Deeds for Pasay City is . and (2) that there was extrinsic fraud in procuring the WHEREFORE.) On April 8.

257-260. the basis for the suspension Emphasis in the original. 2. back to its old revered 4. of the contemplated under Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. of Presidential Decree No.hereby ordered to suspend the issuance to the mortgagee- these do not constitute actions against private respondent purchaser. 10042. On June 18. the Court gave due course to the petition. matter shall have been resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 2693 cannot be invoked to suspend Special Civil Case No. the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in petitioners favor. 10042. Rollo. 002693. also pp.) thereof did not exist so as to adversely affect the validity and regularity thereof.) On November 12. Case No. 213 SCRA 830[1992]. as (p. 1986 in Case No. RCBC appealed the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now. The Regional Trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance name.002693. and for that matter. Rollo. SEC Case No. owners copies of the new land titles replacing them until the 902-A. 832-834. 3. its participation not being necessary for the full resolution of the issues raised in said case. 1986. During the pendency of the case. the Court of Appeals) to this Court. arguing that: of Special Civil Case No. 10042 as private respondent was not indispensable party thereto. 1. 10042. Even assuming arguendo that the extra-judicial sale constitute an action that may be suspended under Section 6(c) (p. 1986. denying the consolidated Motion . 902-A. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. RCBC brought to the attention of the Court an order issued by the SEC on October 16. 5. Petitioner did not commit extrinsic fraud in excluding 5. The Regional Trial court had jurisdiction over Special Civil private respondent as party defendant in Special Civil Case No.

the Court upheld the decision of SO ORDERED. theorizing that the issuance of said new transfer certificates of title in its name rendered the WHEREFORE. Chief Justice Narvasa. Justices While we cannot direct the Register of Deeds to allow the Bidin. should be as is. whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of payments. 1985. a greatly divided Court (Justices Gutierrez. then Justice. Setting aside RCBCs acquisition of title By virtue of the aforesaid order. In the decision sought to be reconsidered. hereby DENIED. and the issuance of new titles in . RCBC presented a motion for the Contempt. Nocon. and Melo concurred with the ponente.) the Intermediate Appellate Court which dismissed the mandamus case filed by RCBC and suspended the issuance of new titles to RCBC. nullifying and setting aside the TCTs in the name of RCBC. and therefore. denies said Motion. and ruling as follows: dismissal of the petition. .to Annul the Auction Sale and to cite RCBC and the Sheriff for its name. 143. Sheriff and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation for Contempt and to Annul Proceedings and Sale. . Ruling on the merits. finding basis for from effecting the said consolidation. Regalado. and Bellosillo concurred only in the result. preferred creditors . dated February 5. (p. the petitioners Consolidated Motion to Cite petition moot and academic. Rollo. Justice Medialdea. the Court held that: Pasay City effected the transfer of title over subject pieces of property to petitioner RCBC. Thereafter. neither can this Romero. consolidation of the titles subject of the Omnibus Motion dated while Justice Feliciano dissented and was joined by Justice September 18. the Register of Deeds of and nullifying the TCTs issued to it. Justices Grio-Aquino and Campos took no part) Commission restrain the said bank and the Register of Deeds denied petitioners motion to dismiss. now Chief Justice Davide. and Justice Corporation. 1986 filed by the Rizal Commercial banking Padilla.

(pp. only upon the preferred over the others. He opined that the as not to prejudice other creditors. The dissent maintain that Section shall not be delivered pending rehabilitation.Likewise. Thus. partnerships.) In support of its motion for reconsideration. The sooner the SEC takes over and imposes a freeze on all the assets. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is body. is to effect a feasible and viable management committee. 265-266. also p. appointment of the Management Committee for BF Homes on March 18. board or rehabilitation. in the case under consideration. but . the certificate of sale with the public auction sale. the better for all concerned. the prohibition against foreclosure attaches against BF Homes have taken effect and not earlier. if this 6 (c) of Presidential Decree 902-A is clear and unequivocal has also been done. should the suspension of actions for claims In this connection. what is to prevent the petitioner from delaying the creation of a Management Committee and in the meantime dissipate all its assets. as soon as a petition for rehabilitation is filed. 1985. or cause discrimination SEC acted prematurely and without jurisdiction or legal among them. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so dissented and voted to grant the petition. footing with other creditors. The rationale behind PD associations shall be suspended only upon the appointment of a 902-A. RCBC contends: The restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission enjoining the foreclosure sale of the properties of respondent BF Homes were issued without or in excess of its jurisdiction because it . or within the period of rehabilitation. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the fact that a authority in enjoining RCBC and the sheriff from proceeding petition for rehabilitation has been filed. Rollo. . rehabilitation receiver. 838. stand on equal Then Justice Feliciano (joined by three other Justices). claims against the corporations. . that. 213 SCRA 830[1992]. Were it otherwise. as amended. no transfer of title shall be effected also.may no longer assert such preference.

was violative of the clear provision of Presidential Decree No.

The law on the matter, Paragraph (c), Section 6 of

902-A, and are therefore null and void; and

Presidential Decree 902-A, provides:

Petitioner, being a mortgage creditor, is entitled to rely solely

Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the

on its security and to refrain from joining the unsecured

Commission shall possess the following powers:

creditors in SEC Case No. 002693, the petition for
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and

rehabilitation filed by private respondent.

personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the
We find the motion for reconsideration meritorious.

Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the

The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of
distressed corporations stand on equal footing with all other
creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body. Insofar as petitioner RCBC is
concerned, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are
not yet applicable and it may still be allowed to assert its
preferred status because it foreclosed on the mortgage prior to
the appointment of the management committee on March 18,
1985. The

Court,

therefore,

reconsideration on this score.

grants

the

motion

for

Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary to
preserve the rights of the parties-litigants to and/or protect the
interest of the investing public and creditors; Provided,
however, that the Commission may, in appropriate cases,
appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships
or other associations not supervised or regulated by other
government agencies who shall have, in addition to the powers
of a regular receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court,
such functions and powers as are provided for in the
succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: Provided, finally, That upon
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for

claims against corporations, partnerships or associations

speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion

under management or receivership pending before any court,

for interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu

tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. (As

Portland Cement Co. vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708

amended by PDs No. 1673, 1758 and by PD No. 1799.

[1968]).

Emphasis supplied.)
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
It is thus adequately clear that suspension of claims against

mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see

a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only

to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank Employees

upon the appointment of a management committee or a

Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon Surety Co.,

rehabilitation receiver. The holding that suspension of actions

Inc. vs. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969]; Quijano vs.

for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes

Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [1970]).

effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation
is filed with the SEC may, to some, be more logical and wise
but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language
of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and
noble, would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to
define the wisdom of the law plainly judicial legislation.

Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning
may the court interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity is
a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or
more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is
admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case,

It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the
Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law

the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial
functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true
intent.

Furthermore, as relevantly pointed out in the dissenting

2. protect the interest of the investing public and

opinion, a petition for rehabilitation does not always result in
the appointment of a receiver or the creation of a management
committee. The SEC has to initially determine whether such
appointment

is

appropriate

and

necessary

under

the

circumstances. Under Paragraph (d), Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A, certain situations must be shown to exist
before a management committee may be created or appointed,
such as;

creditors. (Section 6 (c), P.D. 902-A.)
These situations are rather serious in nature, requiring the
appointment of a management committee or a receiver to
preserve the existing assets and property of the corporation in
order

to

protect

the

interests

of

its

investors

and

creditors. Thus, in such situations, suspension of actions for
claims against a corporation as provided in Paragraph (c) of
Section 6, of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is necessary, and

1. when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss,

here we borrow the words of the late Justice Medialdea, so as

wastage or destruction of assets or other properties;

not to render the SEC management Committee irrelevant and

or

inutile and to give it unhampered rescue efforts over the

2. when there is paralization of business operations of

distressed firm (Rollo, p. 265).

such corporations or entities which may be

Otherwise, when such circumstances are not obtaining or

prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders,

when the SEC finds no such imminent danger of losing the

parties-litigants or to the general public.

corporate assets, a management committee or rehabilitation

On the other hand, receivers may be appointed whenever:

receiver need not be appointed and suspension of actions for
claims may not be ordered by the SEC. When the SEC does not

1. necessary in order to preserve the rights of the
parties-litigants; and/or

deem it necessary to appoint a receiver or to create a
management committee, it may be assumed, that there are

sufficient assets to sustain the rehabilitation plan and, that the

clarified, might mislead the Bench and the Bar, the Court

creditors and investors are amply protected.

resolved to discuss further.

Petitioner

additionally

argues

in

its

motion

for

It may be recalled that in the herein en banc majority

reconsideration that, being a mortgage creditor, it is entitled to

opinion (pp. 256-275, Rollo, also published as RCBC vs. IAC,

rely on its security and that it need not join the unsecured

213 SCRA 830 [1992]), we held that:

creditors in filing their claims before the SEC-appointed
receiver. To support its position, petitioner cites the Courts
ruling in the case of Philippine Commercial International Bank
vs. Court of Appeals, (172 SCRA 436 [1989]) that an order of
suspension of payments as well as actions for claims applies
only to claims of unsecured creditors and cannot extend to
creditors holding a mortgage, pledge, or any lien on the
property.

. . . whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for
rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors
may no longer assert such preference, but . . . stand on equal
footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so
as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination
among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the fact that a
petition for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale
shall not be delivered pending rehabilitation.Likewise, if this

Ordinarily, the Court would refrain from discussing
additional matters such as that presented in RCBCs second
ground, and would rather limit itself only to the relevant issues
by which the controversy may be settled with finality.
In view, however, of the significance of such issue, and the
conflicting decisions of this Court on the matter, coupled with
the fact that our decision of September 14, 1992, if not

has also been done, no transfer of title shall be effected also,
within the period of rehabilitation. The rationale behind PD
902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is
preferred over the others.

In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches

SEC (pp. 269-270; emphasis in the original). This ruling is a

as soon as a petition for rehabilitation is filed. Were it

reiteration of Alemars Sibal & Sons, Inc. vs. Hon. Jesus M.

otherwise, what is to prevent the petitioner from delaying the

Elbinias (pp. 99-100;186 SCRA 94 [1990] per Fernan, C.J.:

creation of a Management Committee and in the meantime

Third Division).

dissipate all its assets. The sooner the SEC takes over and
imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all concerned.
(pp. 265-266, Rollo; also p. 838, 213 SCRA 830[1992].
Emphasis supplied.)

Taking the lead from Alemars Sibal & Sons, the Court also
applied this same ruling in Araneta vs. Court of Appeals (211
SCRA 390 [1992] per Nocon, J.: Second Division).
All the foregoing cases departed from the ruling of the
Court in the much earlier case of PCIB vs. Court of

The foregoing majority opinion relied upon BF Homes,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 262 [1990] per Cruz, J.:

Appeals (172 SCRA 436 [1989] per Medialdea, J.: First
Division) where the Court categorically ruled that:

First Division) where it was held that when a corporation
threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all the

SECs order for suspension of payments of Philfinance as well

creditors should stand on an equal footing. Not anyone of them

as for all actions of claims against Philfinance could only be

should be given preference by paying one or some of them

applied to claims of unsecured creditors. Such order can not

ahead of the others. This is precisely the reason for the

extend to creditors holding a mortgage, pledge or any lien on

suspension of all pending claims against the corporation under

the property unless they give up the property, security or lien in

receivership. Instead of creditors vexing the courts with suits

favor of all the creditors of Philfinance. . .

against the distressed firm, they are directed to file their claims
with the receiver who is a duly appointed officer of the

(p. 440. Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in BPI vs. Court of Appeals (229 SCRA 223 [1994]
per Bellosillo, J.: First Division) the Court explicitly stated that
. . . the doctrine in the PCIB Case has since been
abrogated. In Alemars Sibal & Sons v. Elbinias, BF Homes,
Inc.

v.

Court

of

Appeals,

Araneta

v.

Court

of

Appeals and RCBC v. Court of Appeals, we already ruled that
whenever a distressed corporation asks SEC for rehabilitation
and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer
assert such preference, but shall stand on equal footing with

Bench and the Bar, the following rules of thumb shall are laid
down:
1. All claims against corporations, partnerships, or
associations that are pending before any court, tribunal, or
board, without distinction as to whether or not a creditor is
secured or unsecured, shall be suspended effective upon the
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

other creditors. . . (pp. 227-228).
2. Secured creditors retain their preference over unsecured
It may be stressed, however, that of all the cases cited by
Justice Bellosillo in BPI, which abandoned the Courts ruling
in PCIB, only the present case satisfies the constitutional
requirement that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc (Sec 4,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). The rest were division

creditors, but enforcement of such preference is equally
suspended upon the appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board, or body. In the event that the
assets of the corporation, partnership, or association are finally
liquidated, however, secured and preferred credits under the
applicable provisions of the Civil Code will definitely have
preference over unsecured ones.

decisions.
In
It behooves the Court, therefore, to settle the issue in this
present resolution once and for all, and for the guidance of the

other

words,

once

a

management

committee,

rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed pursuant to
P.D. 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed

Araneta.D. or body. and RCBC insofar as enforcing liens by However. as opined in the dissent. vs. must be read and understood in the light of the foregoing rulings. Petitioner RCBC. tribunal. in the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled. BF Homes. board or body shall be suspended accordingly. in a way. the secured creditors shall enjoy over the unsecured creditors (still maintaining PCIB ruling). preferred creditors are concerned. All claims of both a secured or unsecured creditor. that this shall only take effect upon the appointment of a management committee. board. Court of Appeals. This should give the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so. P. 902-A does not state anything to this effect. shall not be allowed to assert such preference before the Securities and Exchange Commission. the Court grants the motion for reconsideration for the cogent reason that suspension of actions for claims commences only from the time a management committee or receiver is appointed by the SEC. are suspended once a management committee is appointed. It may be stressed. (This will be in consonance with Alemars. . therefore. partnership or association shall be suspended. as it did. rehabilitation receiver. Inc. 1984 because a management committee was not appointed by the SEC until March 18. Secured creditors. creditors of distressed corporations shall. 1985. move for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26. stand on This suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor.) preference The majority ruling in our 1992 decision that preferred In fine. without distinction on this score.corporation pending before any court. in the meantime. subject only to the provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit (our ruling in State Investment House. 277 SCRA 209 [1997]). however. equal footing with all other creditors. could have rightfully. What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the corporation.

WHEREFORE. 3. SEC.R. Section 3 (a) allowed such partnerships. 10042 REINSTATED. fish. J. The law was to take effect on January 1. Go Ka Toc Sons v. and the vegetable oil extracted from corn.R. However.: from engaging. 1960. No. Branch 140. upon registration with the municipal treasurer. petitioners motion for reconsideration is Plaintiff-appellee Go Ka Toc Sons & Co. Section SO ORDERED 1 of which prohibited. copra. On August 2. engaged since vacated. processing and marketing of G. not wholly owned by Filipinos. 23 May 1967 BENGZON. associations. Republic Act 3018 was approved. among others. directly or indirectly. if they so apply. 1961. Rice and Corn Board.. shall be allowed to continue to engage in their respective lines of activity in the rice and to and/or corn industry only for the purpose of liquidation. partnerships whose capital was not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines When courts need not resort to interpretation or construction. partnerships or corporations that have complied with the requirements provided in Section two hereof. 1951. judgment of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial peanuts. 1äwphï1. soybean. The decision dated September 14. as follows: . and other vegetable products. is a duly registered hereby GRANTED. rice. No. to continue business until two years from and after January 1.P. G. the decision of Intermediate Appellate Court in AC- 1958 in the manufacture. in Civil Case No. All such persons. SP-06313 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. L23607. 1992 is partnership.ñët Region. J. in the rice and/or corn industry.

amount of capital investments of alien persons and entities transporting. the parties entered into a stipulation of facts. the lower court rendered judgment (a) declaring Republic Act 3018 not applicable to ." "tanop. 1960. as amended. as inapplicable to it. filed action in the Court of First Instance to declare the said law and RICOB Resolution No.(a) Those engaged in the retail. products thereof shall be allowed to continue to engage therein for a period of two years from the date of These two circulars have been duly published and translated into the local dialect pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act effectivity of this Act. corn starch. and cleaning of palay and corn. distribution or acquisition for engaged in the rice and/or corn industry to the amount stated in the purpose of trade of rice and/or corn and the by- their statement made pursuant to Section 2 of the law. having been required by agents of RICOB to On November 21. the lower court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. 1961. the RICOB issued Gen. Pending trial on the merits. wholesale. Circular No. culture. 1961. 1961. To abbreviate the proceedings. handling. 3018. grinding. pursuant to Section 6 of the resolution." "corn husk. July 10. 1960 and Gen." "tiktik." "darak. rice wine. 21. the newly created Rice and Corn register in accordance with Section 2 of the law and the latter's Board1 issued Resolution No. 1." And on July 10." and "corn meals." "corn drips. 10. as follows: and/or dealers of bijon. which defined the term "capital investment" used in Section 3 of Republic Act 3018 which limits the maximum covered by the law.gawgaw. ruling that manufacturers law. but not limited to "binlid. such as. Circular No. dated January 3. poultry feeds and other by products of rice and corn are By-product shall mean the secondary products resulting from the process of husking. milling. 10. Nov. xxx xxx xxx Plaintiff-appellee. noodle. 1. Thereupon. defining the term "by product" used in the law.

the provisions of Republic Act secures from others who mill rice and corn. or association. dated November 21. (b) declaring null and void RICOB's Section 1 of the law defines "rice and/or corn industry" as Resolution No. 1960 and General including the handling of distribution. the term rice "and/or corn industry" year period from the effectivity of the law. Admittedly. processing andmanufacture of corn and warehousing. Are these activities covered by Republic Act 3018? products thereof:Provided. 10. the capital or capital stock of which is now wholly through the Solicitor General has taken the instant appeal to owned by citizens of the Philippines. defendant RICOB. milling. either in . exportation. or the acquisition for the purpose of called "corn meal" or "corn meal germ" which it sells and trade of rice (husked or unhusked) or corn and the by- trades. either in wholesale or Circular No. shall directly or raise questions purely of law. distribution. It has limited its shall activities to the trade. No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines. of the by- they were and are being made applicable to plaintiff's business products of rice and corn. dated July 10. transporting. indirectly engage in the rice and/or corn industry except as provided in Section three of this Act. partnership or Corporation. plaintiff also produces a residue notwithstanding. rice oil from raw materials consisting of corn germ proper or importation. and (c) making and declaring permanent and perpetual the preliminary writ of injunction issued in the case. handling embryo ("sungo") and "tahup. SECTION 1. Not satisfied with the foregoing ruling.plaintiff's business. and the acquisition for purpose of trade. In the processing Numbered Eleven hundred and eighty to the contrary and manufacture of coin oil. 10. 1961 in so far as retail. as amended." as well as from rice husk it wholesale or retail. That public utilities duly mean and include the the culture. plaintiff-appellee has stopped from engaging in the purchase and sale of rice and/or corn since the lapse of the two- As used in this Act.

manufacture of corn and rice oil from the raw materials of corn germ proper or embryo (sungo) and tahup and from rice husk converting the remaining parts into "corn meal" or "corn germ meal" which is traded and sold and that it acquired its raw materials Finally. the Court is of the opinion that in the trade. intention of the Legislature in enacting Republic Act No. "tahup.2 Assuming. intended to include in its object the nationalization not only of the rice and corn industry but also the trade of the by-products just mentioned above. "corn germ meal" that it subsequently distributes and sells are clearly by-products of rice and/or corn. its inclusion in the body of the law is not invalid. . thus: from those engaged milling rice and/or corn. as is at present. (Emphasis supplied)." "sungo" and "rice husk. as the lower court held. . This definition is part of the law itself.licensed and registered in accordance with law may x x x In the opinion of the Court. since it is germane to the subject matter expressed 3 in the title of the law. that the law in question really Although the term "by-product" is not particularly and by specifically stated in the title of Republic Act 3018. the said . the business in which the plaintiff has been engaged and since December 31. engaged. . as the lower court also ruled. processing. . the lower court determined the purpose and intention behind the law. it was never the transport corn or rice. Neither is the statutory inclusion of said term in the definition of the phrases "rice and/or corn industry" an invalid legislative usurpation of the court's function to interpret the laws. without admitting. 1962. 3018 to include in its purpose or scope the Now." which plaintiffs acquires from rice and corn millers and from which it manufactures the vegetable oil and produces the "corn meal" or processing of the by-products of rice and corn because Filipinos do not depend for their survival by eating the by-products of rice and corn.

and in which it has been engaged partly engaged since This is a fair and reasonable interpretation and its formation in 1959. 10. law only in case of ambiguity.5 There is none here." but associations. 1962. But this was improper as well as incorrect. 3018. it must necessarily follow that the Resolution No.6 since it struck off the phrase "byproducts thereof" from the text of the law. So the court's only duty was to apply the law processing and extracting of oil from rice and corn and as it was. rather than apply and effectuate its provisions. quoted under paragraph 3 of the parties' Stipulation of Facts are hereby declared null and Since plaintiff-appellee is covered by the statute. application of said Republic Act No.4 The purpose of the Act. there is no void in so far as they attempted to include in the scope necessity for an extensive discussion regarding the validity of . would be not construction. the court below's interpretation would render the As a logical result of this interpretation of the law spelled out by this Court.Republic Act No. 3018 does not cover the plaintiff's of said law the defendant's business activities described business activities just mentioned. Furthermore. partnerships or corporations 100% Filipino can also to unreasonably stretch out and expand the scope engage even in the trade and acquisition of the by-products of and intention of the law to include in its context the rice and/or corn. Annex 1 and the general circular statute nugatory and defeat its aims. can control the language of the the selling and trading of the same. dated July 10. 1961. above in which it engaged since December 31. as expressed in the the manufacture of corn meal or corn germ meal and introductory note of the bill. The only to render the said law unconstitutional for not law is clear in enunciating the policy that only Filipinos and including in its title "and the by-products thereof. because to include in its control. limitation and prohibition the What the court a quo did was to resort to statutory business of the plaintiff mentioned above.

.7 Said resolution. the judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ of injunction issued therein is annulled and set aside. by enumerating some specific examples of by-products of rice and/. Zaldivar and Castro Makalintal.. 1 on July 10. concur.. 1960. . Concepcion.L. Wherefore. 10 of November 21. J.Resolution No. merely carried out the provisions of law. JJ.or corn. Dizon. Regala. was its mistaken stand that the term "byproduct" ought not to have been made a part of the statute.J. The power and authority of appellant RICOB to issue such rules and regulations implementing the law. C.B. So ordered. took no part.. 1961. proceeds from the law itself. And the sole reason why the lower court invalidated it. The foregoing considerations render moot and academic the question regarding the validity of General Circular No. J. No costs. Reyes.

Contrary to law. L-22301. the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession People v. 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code.The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4. as amended by Commonwealth Act No. without serial number. with six (6) rounds of FERNANDO. J. without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. We hold that it does not.: ammunition. in the City of Manila. Philippines.R. Mapa. 1962. committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August." . No. 22. G. 30 August 1967 and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik). The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14. Cal.

now the appellant." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon." then Governor of Batangas.3 a certificate dated March 11. the "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in lower court made a statement: "The accused admits. dated June 2. 4 Counsel document so that he could pass on their authenticity. the fiscal for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the pistol cal." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits. Yes. and possession of the gun involved in this case. in the City of Manila without first having requirement of having a license of firearm. 1962. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila.1 another document likewise issued by Gov. he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm. Leviste. Feliciano Leviste. corresponding authority?" The accused." Upon which. that he has neither a his counsel Atty. the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision.When the case was called for hearing on September 3. the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: answered categorically: "Yes. Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission. 1962." The exhibits were secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the . 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and mentioned in the information was found in his possession on qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the August 13." permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary. Your Honor. to the effect Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. 1963. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits. the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision.2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent. 1963." Forthwith.

As such he is not exempt. . "Construction and interpretation come only after it has of firearms. the appeal was taken to this Court. or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms. provincial treasurers. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the The only question being one of law. Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang. municipal mayors. The decision must be affirmed. parts law. . "it shall be unlawful for any person to . memoranda." secret agent. sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member ."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. Our task is equally clear. sailors.8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes. soldiers. It cannot be set aside. provincial governors." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers. or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines]. and guards of provincial Thereafter on November 27. No provision is made for a are forfeited in favor of the Government." are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.ñët lieutenant governors. the Philippine Constabulary. municipal police. possess any firearm. 1963. been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed."6 penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him The law cannot be any clearer.admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective Bureau of Prisons. the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate prisoners and jails. municipal treasurers. guards in the employment of the without them.1äwphï1. or 5 ammunition. detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor.

against the respondent Vicente Garcia . . De Garcia. the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Petitioner Luzon Surety Co. Macarandang.. pursuant to a writ of garnishment issued by virtue of a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. it no longer indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate speaks with authority." The crucial question in this petition for the review of a decision Such reliance is misplaced. L-25659. J. JJ. We do not see it that way.J. No. concur.: Vicente Garcia "to enjoin [such Sheriff] from selling the sugar allegedly owned by their conjugal partnership.. Sanchez.of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879. Inc.P.. a third party in favor of a surety company. C.. J. The Court of Appeals held that it could not. We affirm what it did.R.. dissatisfied with such a judgment. to be passed upon for the first time. Zaldivar. on October 18. is Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory whether or not a conjugal partnership. Bengzon... J. Wherefore. It is not within the power of this of the Court of Appeals. Reyes.. would have us reverse. Makalintal. a suit for injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against its Provincial Sheriff by respondents-spouses. could be held liable on an with what was held in People v.. As noted in the brief of petitioner Luzon Surety Co. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts showing of benefits received.L..."1 . Inc. Dizon. G. Josefa Aguirre de Garcia and Luzon Surety v.B. in the absence of any provision. Castro and Angeles.. which was an affirmance of a lower court decision. 3893 of the same Court of First Instance . The Court of Appeals adjudicated the matter in accordance with law. 1960. 31 October 1969 FERNANDO. Concepcion.

to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of P4. based on the indemnity agreement. a loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of third-party complaint against Ladislao Chavez. stamps. to pay Luzon Surety Co.577. in interest. and to pay the costs. There is no question First Instance of Negros Occidental. as principal. computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid. penalties. and petitioner Luzon No. P9. signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves. Inc.. charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the petitioner may at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond. as was instituted by Luzon Surety Co. plus the sum of P100. guarantors. Philippine National Bank. until fully paid. Inc. as set forth by the parties. On or about the same date.000. 1957. losses. Vicente Garcia. Lacson.95 representing the principal and accrued interest of the obligation at the rate of 6% per annum as of January 6. Then. On or about August 8. the lower court rendered a decision condemning Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. against any and all damages. in turn. 1958. Inc. and Ramon B. 3893. the Philippine National Bank filed a complaint before the Court of plaintiff Philippine National Bank. to guaranty a crop and costs of the suit. to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum.330... Inc. 1956. Lacson. The same decision likewise ordered the third party defendants.. and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for attorney's fees.7119 on P4.00.There was a stipulation of facts submitted. docketed as its Civil Case as to one Ladislao Chavez.95. Inc. Surety Co. . to indemnify now petitioner Luzon Surety Co. executing a surety bond in favor of the to recover the amount of P4.. 1956.577. taxes. Vicente Garcia. attorney's fees. Inc. jointly and severally... on September 17. costs.00 as attorney's fees. against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co.. with the said Ladislao Chavez and one Ramon B. Ladislao Chavez. Ramon B. Victorias Branch. together Lacson and Vicente Garcia.91 from January 6.. the total amount to be paid by it to the It was likewise stipulated that on or about April 27. 1956. with a daily interest of P0.

1960. registered in the names of both of them. as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor. of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued a writ of There is no reason for a reversal of the judgment. as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career. it declared that the garnishment in question was case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as contrary to Article 161 of the Civil Code and granted their guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as petition. Hence this petition for review. The decision execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the sought to be reviewed is in accordance with law. from their sugar plantation. the Garcias. In its decision of doing right for the benefit of the family.839. 163 of the New Civil Code. pursuant to the aforesaid decision. profession or business with the honest belief that he is As noted. Thereafter.97. when no proof is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting result. 1962. However.On July 30. likewise reached the same case.2 The suit for injunction filed by the Garcia spouses was the result. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. a writ of garnishment was issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental dated August 9. levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the now respondent-spouses. Such inference is more emphatic in this which. making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent."3 . as mentioned at the outset. As explained in the decision now under review: "It is true that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art. 1960. the lower court found in their favor. conjugal partnership. This is not true in the April 30. Inc. that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the Luzon Surety. which may redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. claim of petitioner in the sum of P8. the Court We reiterate what was set forth at the opening of this opinion.

such an argument does not above holding of the Court of Appeals that under Article 161 of carry conviction. Nor could there be. no discretion is left to . It peremptorily calls for application. Its acceptance would negate the plain the Civil Code no liability was incurred by the conjugal meaning of what is expressly provided for in Article 161. without basis. by our given agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or definitions. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to. in behalf of a third person.In the decision before us. even if hypothetically accepted. the the benefit was clearly intended for a third party. adds to his reputation or esteem. A Chavez. in its well-written provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations brief submitted by its counsel. the principal error assigned is the While not entirely. plausibility to this view thus: "The present case involves a There is none in this case. it does not admit of doubt." There must be the requisite showing then of some conjugal partnership. such benefit. and earns the provision. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms. He can thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal partnership. While the husband by thus signing the indemnity transaction based on credit through which. considering that contract of suretyship entered into by the husband. would impress on us that in this contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal case it could not be said that no benefit was received by the partnership. petitioner. a conjugal partnership under that Article 161 of the Civil Code. enhances his standing remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the as a citizen in the community in which he lives. In the partnership. is too trusted. respondent Vicente Garcia. acquires the capacity of being community. confidence of the business community. It sought to lend some semblance of advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. by acting as guarantor esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business and making good his guaranty."4 Its language is clear. While fully conscious of the express language of most categorical language. one Ladislao respondent Vicente Garcia.

5 husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the Moreover. if raised earlier. merely inchoate or a mere expectancy in view of the conclusion thus reached as to the absence of any liability on the part of the conjugal partnership. it ought to have been . 7 The husband. Nor was it error for the Court of Appeals to refuse to consider a question raised for the first time on appeal. He is supposed to conserve and. Certainly. So it That is but fair and just. one of the errors the observation made by the Court of Appeals as to the husband's interest in the conjugal property being This particular emphasizes the codal provision in responsibility of question the rightfully husband as 6 administrator. neither the Court of Appeals nor the lower court having been asked to pass upon it. then the family stands to suffer. it would negate the plain object of the additional requirement in the present Civil Code that a debt contracted by the husband to bind a conjugal partnership must redound to its benefit. Its interest is paramount. to which our attention is invited. Of course. No objection need arise if the obligation thus contracted by him could be shown to be for the benefit of the wife and the progeny if any there be. That is how the Court of Appeals acted. therefore. not dissipate them. its welfare uppermost No useful purpose would be served by petitioner assigning as in the minds of the codifiers and legislators. if possible. solicitude and tender regard that the law manifests for the family as a unit.the judiciary. is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. to make a conjugal is in this case. If out of friendship or misplaced generosity on his part the conjugal partnership would be saddled with financial burden. Now as to the question of jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain this petition for injunction against the Provincial Sheriff. as is wisely thus made certain. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. That is still another provision indicative of the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. however. augment the funds of the conjugal partnership. and partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the what it did cannot be impugned for being contrary to law.

J. that under all the Article 161 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in describing circumstances of the case. Castro. Osmeña. the decision of the Court of Appeals of December 17. would produce such benefit for the partnership..8 behind our ruling in Javier vs.. but would like to make of record that.J.seriously inquired into. Concepcion. C. This is the ratio Sibonghanoy. in my opinion. concur Separate Opinions REYES. do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue interpose such a barrier. however. concurring: I concur in the result. We feel. 34 Phil. . Dizon. The conclusion that thereby laches had to the conjugal partnership from the husband's transactions. but intervened is not unreasonable. 336. the words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" used in profession are collectible from the conjugal partnership. that obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his WHEREFORE. Zaldivar Sanchez. Makalintal.. now under review. Inc. 1965. JJ.. Such a response on our part can that it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally be predicated on the authoritative holding in Tijam v. Teehankee and Barredo. is affirmed with costs against petitioner Luzon Surety Co. substantial justice would be served if the charges and obligations for which the conjugal partnership petitioner be held as precluded from now attempting to is liable.

The evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge about two or three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge. Hart. and were each sentenced to six months' imprisonment. that he raised imported hogs which he sold to the Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg. The defense showed that Hart and one Dunn operated a hotel and saloon at Angeles which did a business.TRENT. and Natividad to a fine of P100. that Hart was also the sole proprietor of a saloon in the barrio of Punctuation and Grammar: An Aid to Construction US v. 519. found guilty. the games running every night. Hart. J. were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. of P96.: The appellants. Hart and Miller were further sentenced to a fine of P200. that he had been conducting two gambling games. All appealed. according to the bookkeeper.R. which business netted him . 21 November 1913 Tacondo. Miller. one in his saloon and the other in another house. G. L-8848. No.000 during the nineteen months preceding the trial. for a considerable length of time. and Natividad.

that he received rating as "excellent" on being discharged. said school being under Government supervision. that he pleaded guilty and charge of gambling and had been sentenced to pay a fine was fined for participating in a gambling game about two therefor about two weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy weeks before his arrest on the present charge of vagrancy. and that he had pleaded guilty to a the reputation of being a gambler. participating in gambling games which are expressly . which was without contradiction that Miller had been discharged from the sufficient to support his family. Miller having contributed P1. and that to sell several hundred hectares of land owned by one Carrillo his work was first class.000. The evidence of the prosecution as to Natividad was that he had gambled nearly every night for a considerable time prior to his arrest on the charge of vagrancy. that he was seen in houses of prostitution and in a public dance married. and had a house of his own. that he made good hall in Tacondo on various occasions. that since his discharge he had been engaged in the tailoring business near Camp Stotsenberg under articles of partnership with one Burckerd. quite sufficient to support himself in comfort. The defense showed clothes. the same property. Army about a year previously. and earned from P80 to P100 per month. and charge. that Miller From this evidence it will be noted that each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business. that the business netted each partner about P300 per month. in the saloon of one Raymundo. in Tacondo.000 to the partnership. that Natividad The evidence of the prosecution as to Miller was that he had sometimes acted as banker. The defense showed that Natividad was a tailor. and that he furnished a building for and paid the teacher of the first public school in Tacondo. as well as in Hart's saloon. and that the evidence which the prosecution must rely upon for a conviction consists of their having spent their evenings in regularly licensed saloons.during the preceding year about P4. that he was authorized attended to business in an efficient manner every day. that he administered. that during his term of enlistment he had been made a sergeant. under power of attorney.

and number each of these seven clauses. is a vagrant. 1757. No. or hours of the night. within the meaning of this statute. who has the physical ability to work. separated by semicolons. (3) every person known to be a pickpocket. Relying upon the second clause to sustain the guilt of the defendants." but is confined entirely to "or tramping or straying through the . outhouse. or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support. Each clause enumerates a certain class of persons who. (5) every idle peron who lodges in any barn. For the purposes of this discussion. 519 is divided into seven clauses. are to be considered as vagrants. and that Miller in any outlying barrio of a pueblo. vessel. we quote this section below. cockpit. either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of either of said offenses.made unlawful by the Gambling Act. (2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the possession thereof. (1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence. ladrone. or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposes. dissolute person or associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual Section 1 of Act No. (4) every idle or frequented a dance hall and houses of prostitution. the Attorney-General then proceeds to argue that "visible means of support" as used in that clause does not apply to "every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling. and having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling house. (7) every common prostitute and common drunkard. (6) every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill fame. It is insisted by the Attorney-General that as visible means of support would not be a bar to a conviction under any one of the last four clauses of this act. it was not the intention of the Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no visible means of support. burglar. shed. thief.

" It is insisted that had it been intended for "without The Attorney-General has based his argument upon the visible means of support" to qualify the first part of the clause. the true legislative intention. hence. and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect. necessary to make it apparent accord with the legislative will. The time spent in saloons. dram shops. for which superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks. and gambling houses is seldom anything but that. proposition that neither visible means of support nor a lawful either the comma after gambling houses would have been calling is a sufficient defense under the last four paragraphs of ommitted. upon punctuation alone is not conclusive. not being universally a defense to a charge inserted. disregarding frequent such places commit a crime in so doing. to give So that under the proposed construction. if possible. What is loitering? The dictionaries say words of the statute as thus punctuated. He then proceeds to show. and the courts will dram shops. We others where necessary. that the Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of support or a lawful calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy founded on the charge that the defendant was found loitering around saloons. cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to . But an argument based it is idling or wasting one's time. or else a comma after country would have been the section. and inserting they are liable to punishment under the Vagrancy Law. and gambling houses. The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the "mere grammatical criticism" of the second paragraph. not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary. they should not be allowed except where the Legislature has so provided. it may be used as an sound. it is the duty of the courts to ascertain. by a When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in A most important step in reasoning. mere punctuation found in the printed Act. of vagrancy. is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such a additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the construction of the law.country. practically all who to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature.

and as to the other of which such a defense is sufficient. which makes no distinction whatever between loitering around saloons and dram shops. and loitering around gambling houses. Comp. 2228. separated by semicolons. If it be urged that what is true of saloons 3023). Their sole offense was gambling. would imply a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature of the various classes of vagrants. 519. sec. Laws 1897.net and dram shops is not true of gambling houses in this respect. in the case of saloons and dram shops. Of those statutes we have had an opportunity to examine. all three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher that the average. sec. N. or of any person to be found loitering about saloons or dram shops. however. we encounter the wording of the law. D. as to one of which visible means of support or a lawful calling is not a good defense. (Mo. The section. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and harmful parasites of society. While the statutes of the various States of the American Union differ greatly as to theclassification of such persons. with the same punctuation:lawph!1.. The offense of vagrancy as defined in Act No.) That the absence of visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under these statutes to a conviction for loitering around saloons. the law's protection. Ann. sec. their scope is substantially the same. In the State of Tennessee. which the legislature deemed advisable to make the subject of a penal . Stat. as stated above. is under paragraph 2 of section 1 of our own Act (Code of Tenn. To say that two classes of vagrants are defined in paragraph 2. gambling houses. M. sec. or houses of ill fame. but two or three contain a provision similar to the second paragraph of Act No. . 8952. This we are not inclined to do. and gambling houses is not even negatived by the punctuation employed. Codes.. 1314. . or tramping or strolling through the country without any visible means of support. Rev.penalize what. is divided into seven clauses. we find an exact counterpart for A further thought suggest itself in connection with the punctuation of the paragraph in question. In the case at bar. . N. dram shops.

ANTONIO JEAN and ELY. if enforced. L-30642 30 April 1985 SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. FLORESCA. PEDRO S. FLORESCA. and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ. DE OBRA. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. FLORESCA.law. ESTELA. JULITA SALUD and DANILO. the defendants are acquitted. MELBA S. in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S.. Internal. JUDITH S. CELSO S. and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO. external aids in construction Floresca v. 1985 PERFECTO S. 1775 is adequate. Philex Mining. FLORESCA. No. FLORESCA. EN BANC G. No. . For these reasons. FLORESCA. G.R. LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. in a licensed public saloon. all surnamed Martinez. all surnamed OBRA. to supress the gambling proclivities of any person making a good living at a lawful trade or business. ROMEO. JR. It is Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila believed that Act No.R. L-30642 April 30. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA. where the officers of the law could have entered as easily as did the patrons. with the costs de oficio. The games in which they participated were apparently played openly.

the complaint alleges that Philex. That for sometime prior and up to June 28. Branch XIII. LARRY III. DE LANUZA.: reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection of the lives of . in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. NESTOR and Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex).LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. MAKASIAR. Benguet on June 28. 9. died as a result of the cave-in EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. all surnamed LANUZA. VENUS and FELIX. 1967. who. petitioners. Presiding Judge of Branch XIII.. respondents. DE VILLAR. J. Villaluna for respondents. RAYMUNDO. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JR. MARIA. while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba. Specifically. JR. GEORGE and First Instance of Manila. the defendant PHILEX. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA. dated December 16. DIVINA. negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Pacampara for petitioners. JESUS P. that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. with gross and Tito M. vs. in her own behalf This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of and on behalf of her minor children EDNA. in violation of government rules and regulations. AURELIO. all surnamed ISLA. Court of First Instance of Manila.1967. xxx xxx xxx Rodolfo C. Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex ELIZABETH. Portion of the complaint reads: MORFE. DE ISLA. LORENZO. all surnamed VILLAR. DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA.

xxx xxx xxx timber supports and carried off materials. with the result that. allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. machines and equipment which blocked all 13. accompanied by surface boulders. in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises. and the rest. That defendant PHILEX not only violated avenues of exit. approximately 500. five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust. column of broken ore and rock below it.its men working underground at the time. 22 were rescued within the next 7 days. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date.000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks. the underground workings. including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove. utter violation of the laws and the rules and including those named in the next preceding regulations duly promulgated by the paragraph. 21 in number. represented by the plaintiffs herein. thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level. a great many of them were still alive. ripped 10. Government pursuant thereto. at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in. but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations. and in tunnels of all its men above referred to. were left mercilessly to their fate. entombed in the tunnels of the mine. mud and water. notwithstanding the fact that up to then. thereby trapping within its the law and the rules and regulations duly . with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure. in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes. on the said date.

) Art. 42-44. Art. as amended by RA referred to. is obliged to pay for the damage done.00 as of December 31.794. Such fault or negligence. as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31. (pp. a total damages. 2178. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.117. Petitioners filed an opposition dated completely to provide its men working May 27. 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no pages 7-13.00. or net earnings. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. rec. A motion to dismiss dated May 14. but also failed jurisdiction over the case. 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the underground the necessary security for the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the that it had vast financial resources. in their Report of investigation. it having Civil Code allowing the award of actual. Annex 'B' hereof. if there is no pre. during the year 1966 alone. and with aggregate assets totalling P 45. 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an . is called a quasi-delict and is governed xxx xxx xxx by the provisions of this Chapter.promulgated by the duly constituted authorities industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the as set out by the Special Committee above Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428.220.254. after taxes of P19.00. moral and exemplary made. particularly: operating income of P 38.existing contractual relation between the parties. 1966. 2176. 1966. there being fault or negligence.103.394.

irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. paragraph 2 shall apply. bad faith. pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act. respondent Judge. Articles 1171 and 2201. pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order negligence shows bad faith. After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed. 2231. 1173—The fault or negligence of the the Workmen's Compensation Commission. of the time and of the place. 1968. respondent Judge dismissed the case Art. x x x x x x x x x for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence. respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27. the Workmen's Compensation In case of fraud.(b) Art. the provisions of which was opposed by petitioners. 1968. reconsidered and set aside his order of and corresponds with the circumstances of the June 27. the employer shall. Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees. When complaint. 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of Petitioners thus filed the present petition. Art. 2201. 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the persons. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. On December 16. . adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries. malice or wanton attitude. which is required by the nature of the obligation on September 23. In quasi-delicts. On petitioners' obligor consists in the omission of that diligence motion for reconsideration of the said order.

and not on the provisions of the Workmen's I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFSPETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 1173. particularly Articles 2176. compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer. Compensation Act. petitioners asseverate that TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE Philex under the Civil Code. petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the through industrial accident or disease. petitioners raised the following assignment of complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on errors: damages. the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the II annexes are deemed admitted. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING In the second assignment of error. They point out that workmen's WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 2178. 2201 and 2231. disability or death of the working man A In the first assignment of error.In their brief. while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the . They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo.

which read: the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission.. subject to appeal to the for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the Supreme Court.—The appeal to the Supreme Court. Philex asserts that work-connected injuries 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. refers to the employer's liability for reckless and for compensation under the Workmen's wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and Compensation Act. Philex cites the case of Manalo vs.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims of the deceased miners." subject to SEC. In fact.. his personal representatives. except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca . Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in dependents or nearest of kin against the case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of employer under the Civil Code and other laws safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil.regular court. it points because of said injury . 5. On the other hand. 46. Exclusive right to compensation. rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent. Jurisdiction. same. out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf SEC. because employee. . entitling him to compensation shall exclude all does not remove the case from the exclusive character of other rights and remedies accruing to the recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act...

choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's In the hearing of this case.e. and Commissioner on Elections. moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions. Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. or the heirs in case of his death. is: Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive.. i. 1976. formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in . whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation in addition for damages in the regular courts.who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of Act or whether they have a right of selection or damages under the Civil Code. Angara believes otherwise. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker. that is to say. then Atty. collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26. Atty. Edgardo Angara. There are divergent opinions in this case. now President of the University of the Philippines. appeared as amici curiae and thereafter. submitted their respective memoranda. selective or cumulative. then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo. may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Justice Manuel Lazaro. as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department.

The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a On August 3. Co. 97 Phil. In fact. while Atty. they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court. Bacungan's position is that the action is to try the case. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Atty.00) pesos. the test it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.000. is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. . Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act. selective. Inc. in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the In the resolution of September 7. damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code. and vice versa.accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction Act. 1978. no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. WE dismissed the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected.. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. 100). 1978.. Lopez Sugar Mill. exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825. It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual. petitioners-heirs of deceased employee consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter.

fraudulent. Articles 2216 et seq. In contracts and quasi-contracts.J.In the present case. reckless. malice or wanton deceased employees a contractual relationship. read: Art. 36). the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton. oppressive or malevolent manner. the as damages (99 C. constitute a breach of the non-performance of the obligation. The alleged attitude. allow the payment of all kinds of damages. The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. and which the parties have Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C. Hence.J. bad faith. 2201.S. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages. Furthermore. 53). an employer is liable whether natural and probable consequences of the breach negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. as assessed by the court.S. under the compensation acts. In other words. as long . there exists between Philex and the In cases of fraud. 2232. the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith.. contract for which it may be held liable for damages. payments under the acts being made as compensation and not Art. In contracts and quasi-contracts. the time the obligation was constituted. of the obligation. Compensation is given to mitigate damages for which the obligor who acted in the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman good faith is able shall be those that are the and his family. the obligor shall be responsible for all gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that damages which may be reasonably attributed to amount to bad faith on the part of Philex. Civil Code.

While under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Carino vs. It is the indemnity recoverable right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in by a person who has sustained injury either in his person. Angeles vs. compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then. WCC. Workmen's Compensation Act). vs.S. On the other not contain any provision for an award of actual. 12 and 13.000.J. and medical (25 C. Ibid. What the Act provided was merely the wrongful invasion of his rights. sickness or injury is work-connected or work- Compensation Commission. 94 SCRA 308. and an additional compensation of only The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. 452). there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated. the amount of six thousand (P6.00) pesos. Moreover. the Workmen's Compensation Act did the employer (Murillo vs.00) pesos plus burial property or relative rights. 66 Phil. GSIS. expenses when incurred (Sections 8. In the case at bar. moral and hand. 93 SCRA 551. is strengthened by the fact that aggravated. 60 SCRA 228).). even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of unlike in the Civil Code. through the act or default of another expenses of two hundred (P200. Mendoza. damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the exemplary damages. WCC.as the death. 689). the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission. and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A. now Employees suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside . under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp.

involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third. SCRA 379). pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. Justice J. Munoz Palma. again speaking for the Court. 32 SCRA 442.the industrial plant of his employer. depends on breach of contract or tort. Autobus Company.B. Mr. . this Court in Pacana vs.party tortfeasors in the regular courts. i.e. WCC. Reyes. Under the Civil Code. 54 simultaneously. Cebu liability of the employer. In the analogous case of Esguerra vs..L. collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. It is a social amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. ruled that an injured worker The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed afford protection to the employees or workmen. In Pacaña WE said: WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. the In disposing of a similar issue.

44549 of the Compensation staked his fortunes on a particular remedy. a sum greater than the indicated. . because he and of having to establish the extent of the has elected to seek compensation under the damage suffered. the injured laborer was initially free compensation he may have paid the herein to choose either to recover from the employer petitioner. the excess accrues to the latter. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. While perhaps not as profitable. to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. and his claim troublesome to establish satisfactorily. at least until the prior claim is is argued for petitioner that as the damages rejected by the Compensation Commission. As already the alleged tortfeasors. the respondents (defendants below). they Company recovers. issues that are apt to be Workmen's Compensation Law. It alternate course. recoverable under the Civil Code are much more Anyway. said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor. the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. under the proviso of Section 6 extensive than the amounts that may be awarded aforequoted. Having (case No. applies to third-party tortfeasor. Commission) was being processed at the time he petitioner is precluded from pursuing the filed this action in the Court of First Instance. if the employer Franklin Baker under the Workmen's Compensation Act. petitioner Esguerra proving the causal connection between the cannot maintain his action for damages against defendant's negligence and the resulting injury.As applied to this case. 582). the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else. by derivative action against should not be deemed incompatible.

Larry Villar.). the petition has been dismissed in the resolution Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19. that the heirs of the deceased employees. The case should therefore be remanded to that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation the lower court for further proceedings.). 1968 (pp. Had compensation to the Regional Office No. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27. the created to investigate the accident which established the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex. but they set up the defense intelligent choice. However. except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation decided that they be paid in installments (pp. Jr. 106-107. and of its negligence. WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the With regard to the other petitioners. and which .. 76. of September 7. rec.Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned. namely Emerito because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been Obra. as report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then already stated. 1978 in view of the amicable settlement 1967 only (p. they would not of August 25. it was alleged by Philex in benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. should the Act before they learned of the official report of the committee petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court. mistake of fact. Lorenzo Isla and remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for only after receiving compensation under the Act. 1968 before the court a preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court quo. such may not its motion to dismiss dated May 14. reached by Philex and the said heirs. Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. 1 of the then petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as and regulations by Philex.) in the lower court. rec. rec. 1967. which nullifies the choice as it was not an 121-122. Aurelio Lanuza.

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity. 5. the 1935 Constitution declares that: industry and in agriculture.. II.. welfare. their favor. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution. people should be the concern of the State (Art. especially to working women.. 1973 Constitution. II. emphasis supplied). and now by Sections 6. ". and shall regulate the relations between landowner B and tenant. 9.. and regulate the relations between workers and employers . as amended... 6. and minors.. and as implemented by Articles 2176. housing.. 2216. The promotion of social justice to insure assure the rights of workers to . 2201. just and humane conditions the well-being and economic security of all the of work"(Sec. The State shall afford protection to labor. regulate the use . the field of education. To emphasize. 7.. Art. 2178.. and security of all the people ". health. the Court does not legislate in the instant case. Art. and between labor and capital in Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion. employment... II). and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution. and Sec. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. . .. 1173. afford protection to labor. and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish.should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in Sec. XIV). welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7. 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. 2177. 1973 Constitution). maintain and ensure adequate social services in.

which obey the constitutional mandates of Article 3 of the New Labor Code. The The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6.A. has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 New Civil Code. 3. 7 and State shall assure the rights of workers to self- 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal organization. Declaration of basic policy.The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor Code. predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor establish them as legal principles to be applied . regardless of sex. and regulate the relations between workers and employers. Justice tenure. Mr. No. collective bargaining. Barnette. 772 on the reach of majorities and officials and to June 20. race or creed. 1950. security of principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. promote full employment. and just and humane conditions of work. thus: social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Section 5 of the Workmen's of political controversy. 1952).ensure equal work opportunities seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code. enunciated: The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of the New Labor Code. to place them beyond Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.—The State shall afford protection to labor. which took effect on Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in August 30. with characteristic eloquence. Education vs. a subsequent law. Article 173 of the New Labor Code Art. Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of (emphasis supplied).

" In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code.S. 5. and Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in property. as amended. provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code.. because of said injury (emphasis supplied). it is presumed that the worship and assembly. More specifically. 772 on June 20. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided: Sec.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. 625. otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. but which took effect six months thereafter. and other fundamental law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees. including its implementing rules and regulations. 638. 87 L. " rights may not be submitted to vote.ed. Labor Code). 1952. . 2. freedom of the interpretation or application of laws. promulgated on May 1. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer. his personal representatives. Thus. a free press. Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. emphasis supplied). shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. One's right to life. Exclusive right to compensation. to free speech. "In case of doubt. 1974. Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. Article 4 of the New Labor Code. liberty. 1638.by the courts. they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U. 442.

Employers contracting laborecsrs in the dependents or nearest of kin against the Philippine Islands for work outside the same employer under the Civil Code and other laws. 3428. thus: place where the accident occurs. Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. was amended by Commonwealth of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the Act No. Such stipulation shall not Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits Compensation Act No. . Exclusive right to compensation. 772 on June 20. 1952. other rights and remedies accruing to the because said Article 173 provides: employee. remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment.. and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement. 5.The section 5 of Republic Act No. his personal representatives. should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by Sec. may stipulate with such laborers that the because of said injury. 772). rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly entitling him to compensation shall exclude all nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code.

Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten.six. 4864. that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence. as amended. 610. 173. as amended. the liability of the State repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code. as amended. C. behalf of the employee or his dependents. . R. repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted. therefore. Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly otherwise provided. which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. as amended. No. Exclusiveness of liability.A. as amended. and conversely (emphasis supplied)..A. No. much less expressly. as amended.Unless As above-quoted. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. as amended. Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one. as amended. Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even remotely. No. Insurance Fund under this Title shall be R. and all other the employer to the employee.Art. 186. [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code). R.A. It is patent.A. exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of No. 1161. his dependents or laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on to the GSIS or SSS). 167 [c]. Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty. and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death. is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the SCRA 270. The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's The Court. 772 on June 20. through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. Palomer. decisions application or interpretation merely establishes of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. in People vs. although in themselves not laws. 1952. WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. These decisions.Furthermore. under Article 8 of the New Civil Code. constitute evidence of what the laws mean. 763). Said Pacana case . limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased. ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Philippines. 18 SCRA 247. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. 272-273 [1975]). Licera ruled: Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. 8. but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's Compensation Act. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages. 124 Phil.

The right to life is guaranteed reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. Manila the various state constitutions of the American Union. against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining.penned by Mr. Valencia and relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. especially Justices J.1969) and the 1958 case of Consequently. with greater property rights of the employer. as amended.L. in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then. Zaldivar. both penned by on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range Justice J. Reyes. Munoz Palma (104 Phil.B. on social justice in the American Federal Constitution. nor in reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. to the Civil Code as The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did. and Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of now Sections 6. New Labor Code. Makalintal. the Workmen's Compensation Act. Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724. vis-a-vis Article 173 of the Fernando and Villamor.B. To interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana. 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution. Castro.L. Reyes. neither expressly nor impliedly. applied Article 1711 of the It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act. is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the . June 30. Dizon. and does not even refer. the restrictive nature of the American decisions Esguerra vs. Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. 582). Said Pacana case was concurred in by and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws. Justice Teehankee.

93. unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries . No man is an island. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper.consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. because or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of protection of the life. limb and health. is not legislating in the instant case. to repeat. other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to life. The Court. Fowler (3 MN 1. The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Even from Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia. limb and health of his worker. as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code. In this our civilization. The employees. otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. 21. is not an exercise of the power of law-making. Vol. To assert constitutional provision. such attitude is un-Christian. p. has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution. which the moral viewpoint alone. Only ruthless. each It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a one of us is our brother's keeper. 1964). but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.150 reprint 1030) invoked The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining by the dissent.

obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer. because the the courts cannot legislate. the court. To stress this affront to human dignity. like all human beings. . even the legislator himself. thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence." C That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code. In the words of Shakespeare. in the language of Justice Holmes. through Article 9 of the New Civil Code. "the letter of the law killeth. WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley. recognizes that in certain instances. "Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code. because the mind of the legislator." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him.continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. " Hence. "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law. The It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him. its spirit giveth life. the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864. is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter. 503-511. which view is also Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. He legislates only workers.). It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 likewise share the same view. 113). 1937 ed. into the inert pages of the Constitution and all independent of the Nation itself (A. the employer between gaps. pp. American Sash statute books. vs.S. 1937). 1 Dissenting Opinion. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Madison I Cranch 127 1803). p. 1907. In the language of Chief whose death. Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U. Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even feeble or strong. He fills the open spaces in the law. 79). or Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the Article 173 of the New Labor Code. (The Federalist. Butler 297 legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the U. "The only limit to the judicial employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety . of the employers. This was negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the law for the protection of the life. Modern Library. 1949 335 US 538). Under either Section 5 or Article 173.'Thus. even if the Justice Harlan F. ailment or injury pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the caused by the nature of the work. without any fault on the part Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. ailment or injury is work-connected. limb and health of the the limits for the judge are narrower. as amended. "the courts breathe life. vs. p. quoted by President liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9.S. which was re-stated by Chief Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. does not cover the tortious judge says it is (Address on May 3.F. Chief Justice Marshall of the New Labor Code is limited to death. Stone.L. " (The remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee Nature of the Judicial Process." Company.

outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise Even the more specific of them are found to word was the sovereign talisman. The Nature of one extreme to the other. When we come the Judicial Process 100). Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do pragmatically admitted. 852. Justice Cardozo warned that: to the fundamental distinctions it is still more "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an obvious that they must be received with a interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. pronounced: The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman. Cardozo. interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Precedents certain latitude or our government could not go established in those items exert an unhappy influence even on. 387). . Government xxx xxx xxx . although with a cautionary undertone: whenever they determine which of two "that judges do and must legislate. And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Justice Cardozo. now" (citing Pound." In the The great ordinances of the Constitution do not epigrammatic language of Mr. Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383. 72 L. 845. To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free Finally. Justice Holmes employee.ed. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88. 244 US 204 1917). and every slip was fatal" terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from (Wood vs.853).. x x x..measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the (277 US 188. Jensen. 210-212. "the law has establish and divide fields of black and white. but they can do so only competing principles of policy shall prevail.

Gideon vs. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20. Justices. Rolf from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Sartorious. or that the Constitution requires. but grudgingly concede that in certain US 436 1964). or adherents were critical of the activism of the American decry the exercise of such power. They criticize the assumption by the vs. Escubedo cases judges do legislate. Only the peace-and-order power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law. jurists or legal commentators. who either deny the Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. were it ever so underprivileged. particularly the lowly workers or the into waterlight compartments. Justice David Brewer. Justice Black. Foremost among True.It does not seem to need argument to show that of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in however we may disguise it by veiling words the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases we do not and cannot carry out the distinction that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such between legislative and executive action with judicial legislation has not protected public interest or mathematical precision and divide the branches individual welfare. Justice against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession Roberts. Justice Harlan. Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. They include Blackstone. On the other hand. which I am far from believing that it is. desirable to do so. which guaranteed the accused under courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel degenerate into Judicial tyranny. . have not pointed to examples Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him Jeremy Bentham. there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Illinois (378 US 478). Ronald Dworkin. Arizona (384 should not legislate. But said Rights. Wainright (372 US 335).

Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Pomar is no longer the rule. the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Again. The case of People vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities. not segregation. capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. 949). De-segregation. 937. is now the governing principle. 73 Phil. which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Parish (300 .Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites- decisions. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. Among other examples. in the case of Lochner vs. And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 49 L. ed. Pomar (46 Phil. public parks and public buses. the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. 260. 76. 440) by a conservative. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294). 261-268). not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense. Ylagan (58 Phil. The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. 851-853). In both provisions. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. As early as 1904. Tarok. New York (198 US 45.

. powers as well as the rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. There are numerous cases in Philippine SO ORDERED. Springer vs. 72 L.US 377-79. Escolin. . Miller. is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. Unlike the American Constitution. penned a separate concurring opinion in the THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S case of Coleman vs. Cuevas and Alampay JJ. 83 L. 852. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. NO political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. Madison. 703) where the American Supreme Court jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of and political questions and invoking American precedents. ed.J. both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of legislative enactment or executive act. De la Fuente. 1385. WHEREFORE. 853). ed. supra. Miller. Government. and maternity leave for women employees. Fernando. There COSTS. ed. working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily. guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN It is noteworthy that Justice Black. 307 US 433. affirming the doctrine of COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. C.. supra Coleman vs. THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO judicial legislation. who seems to be against PETITIONERS. 277 US 210-212. Teehankee. 81 L. concur. Plana.

and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. JJ.Concepcion. took no part. to an election of remedies. can be no other than the Workmen's COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND Compensation OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH.. Jr. Justice J. Abad Santos and Relova. 104 Phil.L.. both options cannot be exercised simultaneously. That "special law". In Esguerra vs.B.. J. dissenting: The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of A indemnity for damages suffered.. however. MELENCIO-HERRERA. being awarded This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the in the course of employment.. in reference to the complaint. It By the very provisions of the Civil Code.. J. as the majority rules. which has to apply to the complaint Title XVIII-Damages that: involved in the instant case. Reyes had said: Separate Opinions Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. . without conceding. The petitioners had . is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code. 586. INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY Even assuming. general provisions of the Civil Code. it is a "special law". et al.. provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. This argument is but a play on words. etc. Muñoz Palma. The Civil Code itself. 582. is on leave. Compensation and damages are synonymous. found in not the Code itself.. that an employee is entitled SPECIAL LAWS.

1928. This was not done in the case before the Court. it should be plainly equitable that. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. Compensation Act." I may further add: There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code.already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's B. . p. 266. when the Act is applicable. pp. (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii. Stated differently. if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof. 2] Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii. the remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text. [Morabe & Inton. In the first place. in disregard of the first election he has made. the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies". Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1927 and took effect on June 10. 1925). It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes. he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. 3428) was approved on December 10. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature. because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction". 'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. if he wants to make a second election. At the very least. In the second place. 267. Act No. Workmen's Compensation Act. the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction". in Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii. when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. 1. and they have already received compensation payable to them under that Act.

7482.S. 714.) shall exclude all other rights and remedies Compensation is not payable when injury is due accruing to the employee. 1. (Sections 7480-7481.) supplied) 2. (Sec.. Exclusive right to compensation. Hawaii SEC. compensation p. against the employer S. first of all in the . his personal to employee's willful intention to injure himself representatives. because of When the act is applicable the remedy said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis thereunder is exclusive (Sec. The act is compulsory as to employee employees in 'all industrial employment' and employees of the territory and its political by reason of a personal injury entitling him to subdivisions. the Philippine Legislature provision: worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the lawmaking body must be sought. p. 713. dependents or nearest of kin or another or to his intoxication. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing Workmen's Compensation Act. S.) under the Civil Code and other laws.S... p.S. 7483.Sec. S. 112. 713. Vol. 5.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an Statutory Synopsis.

commonly-accepted the exclusory provision of the Act. read and considered The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of in their natural. Liability of third parties. (Emphasis supplied) with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts. according to which may be provided in the Act itself.words of the statute itself. it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92. the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. (Italics supplied) If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code. Consequently. It might be mentioned that. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: 4. under this Act.. ordinary. That that was not done shows the legislative intent . Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine or sue such other person for damages. 98) [Italics supplied] 3. 6. therefore. the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6.. . as a rule.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer. provides: SEC. Section 6. in part. provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus. cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. within the Act itself. in Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate accordance with law. subject only to exceptions and most obvious significations. (Espino vs.

That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself. 1952. the legislator could have amended the first paragraph with such laborers that the remedies prescribed of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue . the legislator refrained from doing so. provided that an injured worker or duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such agreement). and the addition of this sentence at the had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 end of the paragraph: such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive. (Emphasis supplied) (a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: It will be seen that. should such law be more favorable to them. within the Act itself. cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil On June 20. or his heirs. if entitled to compensation under the Act. through RA 772. the exclusory Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine character of the Act was amended. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. the foregoing second Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined employer.not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act. if he had so Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate desired. there were occasions when the legislator words in parentheses. formulated in 1927. yet. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs. After 1927. At that time. employee. received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the 5.

but he did not. should the On June 20. the Court is unjustifiably chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. the option to an employee to sue under (b) The Workmen's Compensation Act. by RA 4119. dissenting: To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. on June 20. injured with negligence on the part of the employer. grants compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the employer.the employer under the Act. or under the Civil Code. 1952. which took effect in the Act or under the Civil Code. to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code. Based on that thinking. The legislator was again given the opportunity to provide. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee. it must have been thought that it was inequitable to trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint. caused by negligence on the part of the employer. have the amount of compensation. to be the same amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Section 4A 1 was included into the Act. It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the In time. At the very least. The compensation is deemed an expense the intent of the law-maker. 1927. 66 Phil. 689 legislating.. through RA 772. J. [1938]). Mendoza.. 1964. JR. it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of . Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. GUTIERREZ. Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) latter be more favorable to him.

contributory negligence. an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith. by the employer and not a fellow worker. and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a Before workmen's compensation. inexpensive. worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and guard against himself. receive compensation for work- imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care related injuries. As stated in the leading case of Priestley to have simplified. 1. The of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was accepted employment." By entering into a contract of employment. the present Labor Code on employees' compensation. the principle of suits to get recompense. Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial The problems associated with the application of the fellow revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage servant rule. and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. the assumption of risk doctrine. Fowler (3 M. 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can readily. The employer could employ The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element host of common law defenses available to him as well. a provision reiterated in the himself. and non-litigious u. expeditious. & W.the Workmen's Compensation Act. that his injury was caused system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated. if not automatically. of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of .

individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire working class. employers liability legislation certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law. However. Legislative reform led to the workmen's worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit compensation. the injured proved inadequate. for huge amounts of damages. liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre. An administrative agency supervises the program. the actual cost of rehabilitation. The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows: . In return for the near desired direction. employers' liability acts were a major step in the compensation represents a compromise. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. Thus.Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being I cite the above familiar background because workmen's recognized.determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims.

and government was faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. Even here. were torn between friendship or loyalty to their class.An appreciation of the nature of the officially at the employer or his agents. who were usually fellow workers interpreting them. The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late. In most compensation principle is essential to an cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. on the other. a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted. understanding of the acts and the cases The witnesses. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed xxx xxx xxx . The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a of reprisal by the employer. substantial disadvantage. existing tort principles offered some measure of redress. and fear By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous. on the one hand. the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest. while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents. of the victim. If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. however.

and compensation consumers. . ..Workmen's Compensation rests upon the advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by economic principle that those persons who reason of the general adoption of the enjoy the product of a business. the form of goods or services. considerations.. So long as each competing unit in a payable according to a definitely limited given industry is uniformly affected.. Thus Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to broader economic predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint..whether it be in compensation principle. In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that xxx xxx xxx will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially.. All producer can gain any substantial competitive compensation acts alike work these two major . preparation and distribution of the product. then. differs from the this cost will eventually pass down the stream of conventional damage suit in two important commerce in the form of increase price until it is respects: Fault on the part of either employer or spread in dilution among the ultimate employee is eliminated. no schedule is substituted for damages.should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture. it is expected that Compensation.

and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials. Workmen's Compensation American Casebook Series. represented by compensation. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced greatly Compensation. and conversely. 63-65). Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this. irrespective of how they may differ in are matters concerning which the acts differ other particulars. pp. The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault. considerably. it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument.changes. In this way. when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. ." (Malone & Plant. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance.

his personal representatives. 173.—Unless otherwise provided.-The compensable injuries and diseases. . For instance. the SEC. the entire structure is endangered. If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without Article 173 of the labor Code also provides: touching the related others. Exclusive right to compensation. the premiums paid by rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employers to the present system. I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings.The schedule of compensation. Exclusivenesss of liability. The basic theory has to be dependents or nearest of kin against the followed. If . which reads: ART. the actuarial stability of the employee by reason of a personal injury trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been entitling him to compensation shall exclude all carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in other rights and remedies accruing to the to law. 5. whom the law allows to receive employment compensation. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious employee.. employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. Certainly. with one another if it is to succeed. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.. the rates of payments. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. only harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen. I am personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated.

The general provisions of the Civil Code. I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. 586. found in workmen's compensation and all employers who employ Title XVIII-Damages that: covered employees are affected. provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. Separate Opinions Reyes had said: Petitioner also avers that compensation is not MELENCIO-HERRERA. Compensation and damages are synonymous. Justice J. COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH. 582. INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS. dissenting: damages.. et al. All workers covered by is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code... a major study will be necessary.employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the insurance for that purpose. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims. It poor victims and their families.L. issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the however.B. 104 Phil. Muñoz Palma. In Esguerra vs. J. The Civil Code itself. etc. being awarded . This argument is but a play on words. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act A 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered.

and they have already received compensation payable to them under that Act. without conceding. By the very provisions of the Civil Code. both options cannot be exercised simultaneously. which has to apply to the complaint In the second place.for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in in the course of employment. the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction". and the exercise of one first election he has made. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. it should be plainly equitable that. will preclude the exercise of the other.. that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies. in reference to person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first the complaint. because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction". if a involved in the instant case. can be no other than the Workmen's election and accepts the benefits thereof.. the proceedings under the ." I may further add: There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. in disregard of the Even assuming. he should no longer Compensation be allowed to avail himself of the second option. This was not done in the case before the Court. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's B. when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. it is a "special law". In the first place. Compensation Act. Stated differently. not the Code itself. regards to" the "election of remedies". as the majority rules. At the very least. 'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. That "special law". if he wants to make a second election. .

[Morabe & Inton.. The act is compulsory as to approved on December 10. 2. (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws to employee's willful intention to injure himself of Hawaii. the Philippine Legislature Sec. 5. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act. when the When the act is applicable the remedy Act is applicable. Vol. Compensation Act.1. 1. 714.. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes. 3428) was Statutory Synopsis. (Sections 7480-7481.S. pp. 266. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. employees of the territory and its political subdivisions.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee . S. 1927 and took effect on June 10. 112. Hawaii worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: SEC.S. p. 713.S.) legislature. 713.) following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine p. in Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota Compensation is not payable when injury is due and Hawaii. 2] S. (Sec. S. the remedy under the Act is exclusive The thereunder is exclusive (Sec. p. 267. employees in 'all industrial employment' and 1928. 7483. Exclusive right to compensation..) Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii. 1925). 7482. p. Workmen's or another or to his intoxication. Act No.

(Espino vs. commonly-accepted and most obvious significations. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied) Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision: with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the lawmaking body must be sought. . dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. 98) [Italics supplied] 3. the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.by reason of a personal injury entitling him to to forced or subtle construction Courts. Consequently. compensation therefore. his personal representatives. subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself. according to good and approved usage and without resorting received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. first of all in the words of the statute itself. ordinary. read and considered in their natural. as a rule. cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92. (Italics supplied) The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act. because of words and the rules of grammar.

in accordance with law. provided that an injured worker or employee. It might be mentioned that. by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents . paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. . After 1927. the legislator refrained from doing so.. provision is 5. (a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: the Civil Code. it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer. within the Act itself. (Emphasis supplied) If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under Act..4. if entitled to compensation under the SEC. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself. the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer with such laborers that the remedies prescribed under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act. Thus. Section 6. or his heirs. or sue such other person for damages. provides: formulated in 1927. 6. under this Act. yet. There should be no question but that the original first made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer. in part. cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive.

On June 20. Section 4A 1 was included into the Act. employer was not negligent. within the Act itself. 1964. 1952. through RA 772. which took effect in duties of the employment (and all service 1927. 1952.happening in and during the performance of the (b) The Workmen's Compensation Act. injured with negligence on the part of the employer. caused by negligence on the part of the employer. if he had so desired. Mendoza. Based on that thinking. Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. it must have been thought that it was inequitable to end of the paragraph: have the amount of compensation. and the addition of this sentence at the In time. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. 66 Phil. should such law be more favorable to them. to be the same amount payable when the Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs. At that time. the employer. should the latter be more favorable to him. through RA 772. grants compensation to an injured employee without contracts made in the manner prescribed in this regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of section be presumed to include such agreement). 689 On June 20. the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act. the exclusory character of the Act was amended. the foregoing second [1938]). The legislator was again given the opportunity to . (Emphasis supplied) It will be seen that. paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses. or under the Civil Code. on June 20.

an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint. the option to an employee to sue under Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils the Act or under the Civil Code. that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker. As stated in the leading case of Priestley of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the u. a provision reiterated in the himself..." By entering into a contract of employment. the present Labor Code on employees' compensation. the Court is unjustifiably legislating. worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and guard against himself. 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 principles evolved in the long history of workmen's "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can compensation. . The accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions accepted employment. associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with suits to get recompense. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial host of common law defenses available to him as well. GUTIERREZ. JR. but he did not. it should be the legislature and imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Fowler (3 M. At the very least. Before workmen's compensation. the intent of the law-maker. J. dissenting: was either negligent or in bad faith. and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. 1.provide. & W.

employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated. if not automatically. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system. employers' liability acts were a major step in the contributory negligence. and the many other defenses so easily desired direction. The worker does not readily. the actual cost of rehabilitation. Thus. could otherwise claim in a civil suit. I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. the injured solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the for huge amounts of damages. However. the principle of recognized. Legislative reform led to the workmen's system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered compensation. An administrative agency supervises the program. and non-litigious amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more cases. receive compensation for work- receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he related injuries. individual workers who may want to sue for big . liability not only employee-disregarded became obvious. the assumption of risk doctrine. Another objective was disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre. employers liability legislation raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a proved inadequate. inexpensive.determined to have simplified. expeditious. In return for the near The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law.The problems associated with the application of the fellow Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being servant rule. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims.

If the accident was avoidable and were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern a large share of the proceeds of the judgment industry. torts litigation in court placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. the only a part of this enured to the benefit of the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was injured employee or his dependents.amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire manifest. however. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. Even here. on the other. The the toll of industrial accidents of both the expense and delay of litigation often prompted avoidable and unavoidable variety had become the injured employee to accept a compromise enormous. could be attributed to the carelessness of the Thus the employer against whom judgment was employer. The witnesses. while measure of redress. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted. existing tort principles offered some cast often paid a substantial damage bill. on the one hand. and government was faced with the settlement for a fraction of the full value of his problem of who was to pay for the human claim. officially at the employer or his agents. who were usually fellow workers of the victim. The . and fear By the turn of the century it was apparent that of reprisal by the employer. were torn between friendship or loyalty to their class. The uncertainty of the outcome of working class. So long as liability The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows: depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.

considerations... Thus Under this approach the element of personal predictability and moderateness of cost are fault either disappears entirely or is necessary from the broad economic subordinated to broader economic viewpoint. it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is Compensation. consumers.. preparation and distribution of the product. xxx xxx xxx producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle. differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on the part of either employer or .employee's judgment was nearly always too spread in dilution among the ultimate little and too late. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is uniformly affected. then. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially.whether it be in the form of goods or services. . no xxx xxx xxx Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the product of a business. .should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture. In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected...

The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault. it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout . considerably. irrespective of how they may differ in are matters concerning which the acts differ other particulars. The amount of weekly schedule is substituted for damages. and conversely. In this way. The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. and compensation statutes vary a great deal with reference to the payable according to a definitely limited proper point of balance. All compensation payments and the length of the compensation acts alike work these two major period during which compensation is to be paid changes. represented by compensation. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced greatly Compensation. The by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer. when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument.employee is eliminated.

the various jurisdictions must be attributed to compensation can arise if workmen. It was precisely for this 63-65). reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 5. the premiums paid by SEC. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of .—Unless otherwise provided. I am personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Exclusivenesss of liability. 173. which reads: The schedule of compensation. the compensable injuries and diseases. the entire structure is endangered. followed. . The basic theory has to be employee.. only harmful results to the principle of workmen's ART. spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others." (Malone & Plant. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious other rights and remedies accruing to the with one another if it is to succeed.. damage suits for industrial accidents. the rates of payments.-The employers to the present system. his personal representatives. the actuarial stability of the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been employee by reason of a personal injury carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in entitling him to compensation shall exclude all to law. can still elect to file Compensation American Casebook Series. whom the law allows to this. pp. Exclusive right to compensation. Certainly. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a because of said injury. Workmen's receive employment compensation. Article 173 of the labor Code also provides: For instance.

I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. injury or employer violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its amendments or fail to install and maintain safety appliances. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. Right to additional compensation. . Footnotes 1 SEC. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims.the employer to the employee his dependents or sickness due to the failure of the to comply with anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on any law.In case of the employee's death. the Workmen's Compensation Commission or the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. or with any order. 4-A. The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. he shall be liable to pay an additional compensation equal to fifty per centum of the compensation fixed in this Act. or take other precautions for the prevention of accidents or occupational disease. rule or regulation of behalf of the employee or his dependents. a major study will be necessary.

" Since the Code's effectivity. Essentially.to resolving the present case. 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G. based on this ground. that after a year of marriage. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and . which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio. Molina was born. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case The Facts ofSantos vs. 3 Benguet. still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code. the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14. finds the need to lay down Statutory Construction vis-a-vis Judicial Legislation specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Republic v.: challenging the January 25. our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void 14. 13 February Article 36 of the Family Code. 1997 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 PANGANIBAN.R. namely. the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world. 108763. Court of Appeals. 34858 affirming in toto the May The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage.R. that a son. CV No." Hence. 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila. CA and Molina. this Court in addition This case was commenced on August 16. 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Andre O. 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. "psychological incapacity. J. No. G.

irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted

spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he

that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband

squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid

and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and

and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to

frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of

their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that

insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their

sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job

marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital

in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole

duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run

breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had

the household and handle their finances.

a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child,
and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married
on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;

with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself

2. That out of their marriage, a child named

as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best

Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July

interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order

29, 1986;

to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more
than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her

The Issue

and her child;
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
5. That the respondent is not asking for

Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the

damages;

phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to

6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.

the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that
"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of
one spouse indicative of how he or she regards

the marital union, his or her personal

incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply

relationship with the other spouse, as well as his

the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their

or her conduct in the long haul for the

responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological

attainment of the principal objectives of

nature which renders them incapable of performing such

marriage. If said conduct, observed and

marital responsibilities and duties."

considered as a whole, tends to cause the union
to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough

The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

reason to leave the spouses to their individual
fates.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge
committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of
the Court of Appeals.

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and

presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the

conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological

Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she

(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some

juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony
of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified: 8

marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

COURT

constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the
Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the
marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is

existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort

also living with another woman.

was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's

Q Is it also the stand of the
psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each
other but they are
psychologically fit with other

part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part
of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.

parties?
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they
psychologically unfit for their

merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite

professions?

two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
A Yes, Your Honor.

Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

The Court has no
more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity

Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral

argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

written memoranda.

and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,

guidance of the bench and the bar:

(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family,

11

recognizing it "as the foundation

of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.

incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

" The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable changes. Furthermore. occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted at such time. mood do's. bear and raise his/her own children as an essential petition. there is a natal or supervening (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. or prior thereto. neglect or difficulty. The evidence must show that disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I marriage. a pediatrician may be effective in husband and wife as well as Articles 220. decision. not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. nor a refusal. Hence. an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. like the exercise of a profession or by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the employment in a job. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse. "mild characteriological peculiarities. Such non- cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the procreate. not necessarily to those not (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced related to marriage. In other words. much less ill will. The illness must be shown as downright moment. such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations. disabling factor in the person.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the the celebration" of the marriage. 221 and 225 of the diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to same Code in regard to parents and their children. . but the illness itself must have attached at such as root causes. Thus. proven by evidence and included in the text of the obligation of marriage. incapacity or inability.

Here. courts. as the case may be. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code the State and the Church — while remaining independent. great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. contemporaneous controlling or decisive. Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal essential obligations of marriage due to causes and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. . to the petition. along with the prosecuting attorney. 14 decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification. No of psychological nature.(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial This is one instance where. Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in Canon Law. while not purpose of the Family Code provision. should be given great respect by our religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. in view of the evident source and Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition. which will be quoted in the decision. it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization. The Solicitor General. which became effective in 1983 and which synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and provides: cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. JJ. I maintained. and I still maintain. basis of a prioriassumptions. ROMERO. 20-36.. Melo. incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage. Separate Opinions PADILLA.. In the field of psychological Hermosisima. the petition is GRANTED..J. case. Obviously. concur. upheld . J. and Torres. overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. do not support a similar conclusion.. No. 4 January 1995. 240 SCRA WHEREFORE. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.. depends ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more crucially. G. predilections or generalizations Narvasa. J. C. we have already given case calling for annulment of a marriage. it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. Bellosillo. on the facts of the cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.. as much as possible. Kapunan and Mendoza. 112019.R.. after an indepth study. Jr. separate opinion: The majority opinion. not on the SO ORDERED. Jr. avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. JJ. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. InLeouel Santos v.In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos. but according to its own facts. more than in any field of the law. concuring opinion: I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must. Davide. Jr. concurs in the result. The facts of the present case. each case must be judged. Court of Appeals and Julia RosarioBedia Santos. Puno Francisco. The trial Regalado.

even . incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties. due to some psychological (not physical) illness. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to In the present case. the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the incapacity. it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so." if not outright "refusal" or provision in question underwent revisions. understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly the husband.P." At the Committee meeting of July 26. but vice of consent. there is a resultant defect of parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties. 1986. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations. 45 of the Family Code. thus rendering the marriage annulable under a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them Art.petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological mental illness. That the intent of the members of the U. "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. the draft provision read: (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who. did not constitute so much "psychological on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the incapacity" as a "difficulty. at the time of the celebration. for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the mental faculties short of insanity.

incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations. that is why it is considered a weak phrase. at the time of the celebration. which is not the idea ." 1 session was over: My own position as a member of the Committee then was that (7) That contracted by any party who. . 1984 session that this term "is Noticeably. was psychologically psychological incapacity is. appreciation of one's marital obligation. even if such lack or incapacity As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term becomes manifest after the celebration." Justice Ricardo C.if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are the celebration. . insanity of a lesser degree." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated. . . 36 is: "Such . . but lack of an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent. "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is the interpretation and application of Art. lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. ." Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9. it refers to obligations attendant to marriage. "psychological or mental impotence. Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the do with consent. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. in a sense." There being a defect in consent. .

not necessarily situations.incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically 2. beginning. through Prof. some marriages are void from the 1. For clarity. permanent or incurable. Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature. Esteban B. for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites. Such incurability may be absolute or 3." The Committee. . lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract. Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation. the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages. Barrera. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic." hence its special treatment in Art. time of the marriage. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted. Araceli T. special cases and special even relative only in regard to the other spouse. reasons of public policy. viz: On the other hand. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the remarry. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations. absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing. Civil Law. Canon 1095 which states. at the time of the celebration. When anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage. was down by Canon Law. a properly performed and consummated practices of the time. now open to fresh winds in the first place. some persons It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law. it never really existed provisions on Marriage. not being congruent with those laid any party who. Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. recognizes an It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such intermediate state. the former being more strict. i. however..e.With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code. are unable to assume the Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. the drafters. (those) who. it actually decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological . shall likewise be void even if freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. because Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by of causes of a psychological nature. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by nullifying civil marriage. took a leaf from the relatively liberal marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be provisions of Canon Law. Heedless of civil law sanctions. quite a psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — marital obligations of marriage. The grounds for is now Art. Canon Law contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. for a valid sacramental marriage can never be of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and dissolved. particularly the declares the marriage null and void. the voidable or annullable marriages. Hence. inter alia.

The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment. homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). called 'lack of due discretion' psychological grounds for annulment. Data about the person's entire life. in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent. the professional opinion the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity. both before and carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made after the ceremony. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a "Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as existent from the beginning.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at Furthermore. and 'lack of due competence. the way was paved for what came after 1970. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. were presented to these experts and they during the wedding ceremony. This Old Code. Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight. Lack of a psychological expert became increasingly important in of due competence means that the person was incapable of such cases. were asked to give professional opinions about a party's . and equally significant.

The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. i. all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality. and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and . lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. but is. During the 1970s. . "not only to sexual anomalies but to lack of valid consent. is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts.mental at the time of the wedding. in its totality. but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades..e. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. the right to the community of the whole of life. the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. For marriage . . The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature. lifelong relationship. that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love. the right to a developing. 2 obligations of marriage. on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. These opinions were rarely Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of psychological incapacity. according to Church decisions.

. in an article in Catholic Mind. (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of The psychological grounds are the best marriage. (3) stability. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage: terms. (5) (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values. where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice. Among the psychic reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. The marital precluding conjugal communion even with the capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in best intentions of the parties. (2) hyperesthesia. (2) openness to children and partner. approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other Fr. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category. the At stake is a type of constitutional impairment ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.support is held to impair the relationship and consequently. (4) emotional maturity. etc. xxx xxx xxx financial responsibility. 3 factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: Fr. Green. (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations. lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship: The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner.

the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion). 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 4 However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. incapacity. a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which. after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her.As new as the psychological grounds are. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at subsisting." the wife brought the action in the lower court the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological to declare the marriage null. a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic . Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic In the instant case. Court of Appeals. however.S. quoting Dr. he failed to prove. recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). "opposing and conflicting personalities" of end of marriage. or to communicate with her husband The Court. Gerardo Veloso. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia. An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. for more then five years is not proof of her psychological experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Art. As well in Santos v. 5 Therefore. Said petitioner husband. the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.

209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both If a spouse.Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity 1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage concluded: remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. although physically capable but of the spouses. the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.. Thus. Thus — Art. and the refusal is senseless and constant. finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. We declared: This Court. simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations. concurring: I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. J. can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court. at the time of the celebration. Justice Artemio V. VITUG. Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Panganiban in his ponencia. and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who. .

may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. to be given and accepted Code explained: mutually. the other grounds incapable of contracting marriage. unable to assume the essential obligations of guided by experience. but for distinct reasons.P. 37. (those) — enumerated in the Code. and by decisions of church tribunals which. Thus. like Articles 35. the findings of experts marriage — and researchers in psychological disciplines. Law Center. render the marriage . (The following persons) are with. which drafted the rights and duties. 2. 2 The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. albeit to be taken as distinct from. becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (T)he Committee would like the judge to 3. who lack sufficient use of reason. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion The Revision Committee. 1 Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law — that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. although not binding on the civil courts. who for causes of psychological nature are interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36. 38 and 41 that would likewise.shall likewise be void even if such incapacity 1. constituted under the of judgment concerning essential matrimonial auspices of the U. one must also read it along Canon 1095.

existing precepts in our law on marriage. observe love. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. . 3 viz: (T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as.merely voidable. homosexuality . This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate. extremely low intelligence. "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital and render help and support." The other forms of psychoses. include their mutual obligations to live together. or Article 55 that could justify a petition for covenants that concomitantly must be assumed legal separation. and like circumstances. habitual alcoholism. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of. if existing at the inception of marriage. likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities. Care must be observed so that these various and discharged by the parties to the marriage circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law which. . immaturity. Family Code. as so expressed by Article 68 of the were indifferent on the matter. Thus correlated. respect and fidelity I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction. but must stand in conjunction with. Court of Appeals.

to be a alternative to divorce. assume end discharge marriage and the family. has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard Second. and Fourth. however. no less. remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out. possibility of these various circumstances being themselves. the fact still In fine. merely renders the marriage the basic marital obligations of living together. It might have indeed turned out for the better. to understand. The fundamental law itself. as still others would also put it. observing love. any such intendment. there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. contract voidable pursuant to Article 46. do not necessarily preclude the Third. thus — . Code. 4 another form of absolute divorce or. in nature. the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter. as not a few observers would suspect. not physical. the incapacity must be psychological or mental.or lesbianism. the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable. These provisions of the Code. even if true. lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage. depending on the degree and It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has severity of the disorder. habitual alcoholism. viz: First. the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability. as incapacity. the term "psychological incapacity. must be able to pass the following tests. if it were otherwise. they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. not mere refusal. Family respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support." to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. indicia of psychological envisioned Article 36. however. If drug addiction.

Article XV: for the tone it has set. Section 1. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless Sec. Marriage. . family as a basic autonomous social institution . is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.Section 2. 121 SCRA 51. Section 12. 1. (The 1987 Constitution) The case of Marcelino vs. depends crucially. as an inviolable social institution. more than in any field of the law. Accordingly. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario- . It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character. but one that demands a family life and shall protect and strengthen the meaningful. a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. not half-hearted. J. Cruz. concuring opinion: I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. InLeouel Santos v. . 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of expediency or convenience. might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but Separate Opinions PADILLA. Article II: by necessary implication. Article XV: Sec. respect. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.. nor for mere Sec. 2. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. on the facts of the case. .

not on the basis of a prioriassumptions. ROMERO. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. separate opinion: In the present case. as much as possible. conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.Bedia Santos. thus rendering the marriage annulable under petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and Art. upheld vice of consent. each case must be judged. case. No. it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so. due to some psychological (not physical) illness. for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the That the intent of the members of the U. avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. but 20-36. after an indepth study. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must." if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo. overturning that of the Court of Appeals mental faculties short of insanity. that there was a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously. 112019..R. 4 January 1995. I maintained. did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty." I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness.P. The facts of the present duties. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to . there is a resultant defect of which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. J. and I still maintain. the husband. 240 SCRA parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the The majority opinion. G. 45 of the Family Code. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage. it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.

becomes manifest after the celebration. was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations. but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. at the time of the celebration. . at the time of the celebration.understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly incapacitated to discharge the essential marital on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the obligations. which is not the idea . even if such lack or incapacity provision in question underwent revisions. At the Committee meeting of July 26. The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over: (7) That contracted by any party who." 1 . "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. 1986. even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. it refers to obligations attendant to marriage." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent. was psychologically marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated. ." There being a defect in consent. the draft provision Noticeably. . the immediately preceding formulation above has read: dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who. . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent. .

. considered psychological incapacity is. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy." 2." Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9. through Prof. lack of one or more of the the interpretation and application of Art. Barrera. B." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as agreed that it would be more problematic. insanity of a lesser the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. .My own position as a member of the Committee then was that The Committee. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be For clarity. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence. . not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse. 36 is: "Such essential requisites of marriage as incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically contract. 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists. permanent or incurable. in a sense." Justice Ricardo C. "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. void marriages. 3. viz: One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for 1. reasons of public policy. special cases and special situations. . the Committee classified the bases for determining psychologically impotent with one but not with another. that is why it is considered a weak phrase. Araceli T. Esteban degree.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed Canon 1095 which states. at the time of the celebration. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. some marriages are void from the beginning. Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void." hence its are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who. the voidable or annullable marriages. the drafters. recognizes an intermediate state. now open to fresh winds dissolved. i. tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing. that the following persons under "special cases and special situations. any party who. On the other hand. . for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites. 36 in the Family Code as of causes of a psychological nature. inter alia. however. it never really existed With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code. Civil Law. essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. because special treatment in Art. a properly performed and consummated of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be practices of the time. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature. took a leaf from the relatively liberal nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full provisions of Canon Law. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation. Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage.e. for a valid sacramental marriage can never be provisions on Marriage. are unable to assume the finally enacted. Hence.. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage. It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law. it actually declares the marriage null and void. particularly the in the first place.

called 'lack of due discretion' state laws. Lack It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony. some persons and 'lack of due competence. the former being more strict. Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not nullifying civil marriage. 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. not being congruent with those laid ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage. incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in "Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the existent from the beginning.Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under related grounds for annulment. This Old Code. in effect recognized the same indirectly from a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The grounds for consent. Heedless of civil law sanctions. and down by Canon Law.' Lack of due discretion means contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid . quite a Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic be valid. while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity.

the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. were presented to these experts and they considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial were asked to give professional opinions about a party's consent. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually Furthermore. "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for obligations of marriage. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and willingness to use this kind of hindsight. Data about the person's entire life. what came after 1970. The ability to both grasp and assume such cases.consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in annulment. lifelong commitment are now after the ceremony. The nature of this change was nothing short of decades. . Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. There was now the expertise to provide the all- revolutionary. For marriage . both before and the real obligations of a mature. is not merely . . These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent. and equally significant. the professional opinion understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give of a psychological expert became increasingly important in valid consent to marry. Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity. but rather was an accommodation by the Church to persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the the advances made in psychology during the past marriage. During the 1970s. 2 mental at the time of the wedding. the way was paved for premarital causes.

on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. Fr. (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage. the right to the necessary to the mature marital relationship: community of the whole of life. lifelong relationship. Among the psychic capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.e. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and At stake is a type of constitutional impairment support is held to impair the relationship and consequently. The marital best intentions of the parties. as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person. but is. (5) financial responsibility. 3 to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental . Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality.cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for Fr. lists six elements heterosexual acts. etc. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage: to Church decisions. that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. in an article in Catholic Mind. Green. (4) emotional maturity. the right to a developing. i. in its totality. (3) stability. according The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner.. (2) openness to children and partner. the precluding conjugal communion even with the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities.

5 Therefore. 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and . As new as the psychological grounds are. "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. An advantage to using the has no real freedom of sexual choice. Art. divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as xxx xxx xxx promised at the time the marriage was entered into. However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia. (2) hyperesthesia. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion). where the individual of due competence). recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their In the instant case. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack values. As well in Santos v. experts are already detecting a shift in their use. the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U. Court of Appeals. 4 The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. (3) the ground of lack of due competence is that the at inadequate personality where personal responses the time the marriage was entered into civil consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.S.

and the refusal is senseless and constant. a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded: We declared: This Court. quoting Dr. he failed to spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her prove. Said petitioner husband. a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to incapacity. can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court. . however. finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations. the prolonged refusal of a the physical disorder of his wife which. Senseless and after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological with her. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses. than to stubborn refusal." the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological attribute the causes to psychological incapacity incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court. although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations. Gerardo Veloso. Thus. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her spouse is considered a sign of psychological husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to incapacity. procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. 1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage If a spouse. Catholic marriage tribunals remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art.

and by decisions of church tribunals which. Thus — Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Art. Panganiban in his ponencia. at the time of the celebration. The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified guided by experience. incapable of contracting marriage.VITUG. . I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. constituted under the auspices of the U. 1 by the Family Code. and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with Canon 1095. (The following persons) are the essential marital obligations of marriage.P. to be given and accepted mutually. 36. although not binding on the civil courts. concurring: (T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. J. Law Center. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties. may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines.. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). who lack sufficient use of reason. 2. The Revision Committee. Justice Artemio V. A marriage contracted by any party Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law — who. (those) — shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. which drafted the Code explained: 1.

Thus correlated. who for causes of psychological nature are (T)he use of the phrase "psychological unable to assume the essential obligations of incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not marriage — been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as. Thus. "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which. likewise mentioned by that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. the other grounds enumerated in the Code. or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. 3 viz: confine the meaning of "psychological . in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36. . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of. include their mutual obligations to live together. 37. Court of Appeals. albeit to be taken as distinct from. but for distinct reasons. one must also read it along with. respect and fidelity and render help and support. immaturity. existing precepts in our law on marriage. like Articles 35. observe love. 2 The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. 38 and 41 that would likewise. render the marriage merely voidable. There is hardly any I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos doubt that the intendment of the law has been to vs. and like circumstances. as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code. but must stand in conjunction with.3. extremely low intelligence. some ecclesiastical authorities. .

viz: First. the psychologic condition must exist at the time the during the marriage. to understand." to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. indicia of psychological have sexual relations with the other. Family In fine. lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only Third. If drug addiction. homosexuality or lesbianism. not physical. Second. and Family Code. must be able to pass the following tests. do not necessarily preclude the . This incapacity. merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46. the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability. habitual alcoholism. assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together. respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support. the term "psychological incapacity. observing love." The other forms of psychoses. the incapacity must be psychological or mental. however. if existing at the inception of marriage.incapacity" to the most serious cases of possibility of these various circumstances being personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an themselves. depending on the degree and utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to severity of the disorder. not mere refusal. These provisions of the Code. habitual alcoholism. they become mere grounds marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the for legal separation under Article 55 of the marriage may occur only thereafter. Code. like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction. in nature. 4 conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate.

family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has institution . Article XV: put it. if it were otherwise. however. as not a few observers would suspect. . (The 1987 Constitution) The case of Marcelino vs. nor for mere .Fourth. the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out. might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. is the foundation of the family and that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than shall be protected by the State. . Accordingly. 12. 1. The State recognizes the sanctity of incurable. to be a alternative to divorce. envisioned Article 36. Article XV: Sec. The fundamental law itself. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless Sec. as an inviolable social by necessary implication. as still others would also Section 1. Article II: meant to be simply directory in character. as another form of absolute divorce or. It might have indeed turned out for the better. Cruz. by disregarding them. a different intention is manifest such institution. 121 SCRA 51. no less. there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been Section 12. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. 2. . Marriage. it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. even if true. the mental disorder must be grave or serious and Sec. any such intendment. has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family. thus — Section 2.

vs.expediency or convenience. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5. petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the decision dated August 14. No. not half-hearted.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. respect. L-39419 12 April 1982 Philippines. Inc.R. unlawfully and feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2. registered under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. follows: That on or before the 21st day of June. for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros. G. then and there. 1971 which found the petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. wilfully. 2427.: In this petition for certiorari. 1970 in an information 3 which reads as meaningful. resulting in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy No. without said Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of accused having first secured a certificate of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act authority to act as such agent from the office of .R. a duly organized insurance company. Mapalad Aisporna. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. J. but one that demands a on November 21. as amended) and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500. 1969. 13243-CR entitled "People of the Philippines. No. Republic of the Aisporna v.000. 1969. plaintiffappellee. Isidro.00) dated June 21. did DE CASTRO. and to pay the costs.. in How must legislative intent be ascertained? the City of Cabanatuan. 1974 1in CA-G. CA. the above-named accused.

Isidro. at Cabanatuan City. . . as clerk. 1969. present information was filed by Fiscal. and for P5. The facts. Rodolfo. 1969 and as of 21 June. D was issued by Perla thru its author representative." to Perla Compania de Seguros. with license to expire on 30 June.. insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. apparently.00. unlawfully. C. Rodolfo S. 189 of Insurance Law for having. Republic of the of private prosecutor. People presented evidence that was hardly disputed. and for reasons not explained in record. Republic of the duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent Philippines. on that date.. Rodolfo S. Aisporna was Insurance Commission. and feloniously CONTRARY TO LAW. with violation of Sec.the Insurance Commissioner. for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. act as such agent from the office of the appellant's husband. she naturally helped him in his work. against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife of true agent. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña de Seguros. and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew. Personal Accident Policy. wilfully. Aisporna. charging wife of Rodolfo Philippines.000. 1970. without said accused IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that having first secured a certificate of authority to since 7 March. and at that time. "as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the application of one Eugenio S. Exh. Exh. 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder: acted. that aforementioned policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo. with assistance and in the trial.

without giving due course to this instant petition. We find the petition meritorious. In the ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO comment 7 filed on December 20. 1974. EXHIBITS F. INCLUSIVE represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. to require the 2. On appeal. the trial court's decision was affirmed by 1.. TO F-17.. . this present recourse was filed on October 22. Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 3. on behalf of the respondent. was absent and so she left In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction. submitted SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S that petitioner may not be considered as having violated GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. the respondent. 6 this Court resolved. filed a manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on May 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER. ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY 1974. 1975. 8 On April 3. 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence. assigns the following errors 11 allegedly committed by the appellate court: Consequently. petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the Solicitor General. 1974. 5 THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT. Rodolfo.her husband. petitioner a note on top of her husband's desk to renew . THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of a ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL Act. In its resolution of October 28. F-1.

and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner. No person shall act as agent. from the Insurance Commissioner. it is necessary to determine any insurance company doing business in the whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the Philippine Islands. unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as hereinafter provided. of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph any commission or other compensation from of the same section. nor any agent thereof. or broker in the solicitation of or within six months thereafter.The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be procurement of applications for insurance. such application being approved and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent. however. without first aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance procuring a certificate of authority so to act agent found on its second paragraph. No such certificate shall be valid. shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance. which must be renewed annually on the first day of January. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority. subagent. or convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 receive for services in obtaining new insurance. The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows: No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands. In other words. or agent thereof. giving such information as he may require. in any event after the first day of July of the year . The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion.

to or from such company or offers or assumes to sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of act in the negotiating of such insurance.. liabilities. and shall thereby become liable to all its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the duties. subject. On the conviction of any person acting as agent. she was there and . finally. and the intent of this section and. certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such Any person who for compensation solicits or convicted person. obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company. Thus — hundred pesos.. the third paragraph penalties to which an agent of such company is thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. requirements. shall be applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate an insurance agent within the intent of this of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner. business of insurance. of the commission of any offense connected with the . it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to Isidro. The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is Any person or company violating the provisions prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 of of this section shall be fined in the sum of five the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. sub-agent.following the issuing of such certificate. or transmits for a person other than A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the himself an application for a policy of insurance first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent. or broker. while section. the Insurance Renewal certificates may be issued upon the Commissioner shall immediately revoke the application of the company.

and shall thereby become solicitation or procurement of liable to all the duties. any person who for for compensation compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph. or requirements. sub- agent within the intent of this agent. to which an agent of new insurance any commission . neither her point that she received no compensation for issuance of the policy because now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained the insurance. and receive for services in obtaining penalties. shall be an insurance No person shall act as agent. applications for insurance. or broker. liabilities. thereof — her defense that she was only acting paragraph 2. 189 wherein it is provided that. Sec. 189. Insurance as helper of her husband can no longer be Law. sustained. but what appellant apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. act in the negotiating of such insurance. in the section. and received the pay such company is subject.then acting as agent.

procuring a certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner.or other compensation from any agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation. solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an or agent thereof. . insurance company doing but. it is explicitly provided that the definition of therefore. there is no necessity that a person business in the Philippine Island. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended . a person is an insurance Patently. without first insurance agent. under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph... As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General.. so that Errors 2 and 4 — must be overruled. Hence wording of the charge. shall be From the above-mentioned ruling. in its second paragraph. in its first paragraph. We find this to be a reversible error. Parenthetically. or within six months thereafter. the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. the respondent appellate an insurance agent within the intent of this court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance agent section. which must be renewed annually on the first day of January.. the respondent court concludes that under the second paragraph of Section 189. 12 Any person who for compensation . More significantly. the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. there was no technical defect in the an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.

16 More paragraphs of the aforesaid section. clauses and phrases should not be studied as Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found detached and isolated expressions. the of the act as a whole. The appellate court has all its provisions whenever possible. parts.to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third enactment. importantly. 15 Every part of the statute must be receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not interpreted with reference to the context. portion or section or from isolated words and phrases. 17 ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. 14 The meaning of the law. 13 A the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to paragraph of the aforesaid section. according to the latter. and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole . established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not it must be borne in mind. not separately and independently. policy of Eugenio Isidro. to receive a compensation by of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. This means that every an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of part of the statute must be considered together with the other Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Legislative intent must be statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. The particular words. but the whole and every part in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any mentioned in the first paragraph. Nevertheless. the accused was clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view convicted by the appellate court for. is not to be extracted from any single receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance part.

It must be noted that the Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera. This allegation is essential. 20 Plana. Fernandez. JJ. De Castro.. Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only WHEREFORE. took no part.) Makasiar. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction. Stake. who acted as insurance solicitors without license. concur. information.. every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. and having been omitted. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or convinced. SO ORDERED. 19 the provision of Section 3750. of authority to act as an insurance agent. Article After going over the records of this case. an information. as the Solicitor General maintains. with costs de oficio.. and while acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance Teehankee (Acting C. in the case at bar. . that accused did indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act. failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly. a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. J.We rule otherwise. We are fully 689.J. contracts for compensation. the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged. charges no offense. does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation.

R.R." Since the Code's effectivity. No. our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25. still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. this Court in addition to resolving the present case. CA and Molina. CV No. G. finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.Republic v. Court of Appeals. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. J. "psychological PANGANIBAN. 13 February The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new 1997 ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage. the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence. namely.: incapacity. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case ofSantos vs. 34858 affirming in toto the May . 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G. 108763.

Essentially. Reynaldo was relieved of his job and had since then abandoned them. 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La in Manila.14. as a result of which their relationship the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of was estranged. In his Answer filed on August 28. Andre O. that in October 1986 the couple had Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio. and since then Roridel had been the sole Trinidad. which declared the marriage of respondent breadwinner of the family. 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. 3 Benguet. the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money. (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital . job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. Roridel resigned from her the Family Code. Reynaldo left Roridel and their child. that a son. 1989. on a very intense quarrel. and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. that in March 1987. that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served. and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. that a few weeks later. resulting in frequent quarrels between them. that after a year of marriage. Molina was born. that sometime in February 1986. The Facts This case was commenced on August 16. 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila. but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife. that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance.

and (3) Roridel's failure to run 6. the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. custody of the petitioner wife. 1990. 1. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child. That out of their marriage. That the respondent is not asking for damages. 2. Augustine. Manila. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison. On May 14. a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29. 1991. 1986. the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. Hence. 36 of . a social worker. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.duties such as cooking meals. the present recourse. the following were Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own stipulated: testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. 3. The Issue In his petition. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1. During the pre-trial on October 17. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years. 5. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14. and of Dr. That the common child of the parties is in the the household and handle their finances. 1985 at the Church of St. Lalas. a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. 4.

relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and In the case at bar. as it did. the respondent Court fates." Then. We view Respondent. observed and the facts of the case. in her Memorandum." It concluded that: conclusions thus made. We find that the trial judge conflicting personalities. tends to cause the union "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the to self-destruct because it defeats the very world which is anathema to our culture. . his or her personal relationship with the other spouse. . As ground for annulment of marriage." adding that the appealed Decision tended considered as a whole. mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union. then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual In denying the Solicitor General's appeal. it added it sown opinion that committed no indiscretion in analyzing and "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as deciding the instant case. but a defect in their psychological . adopts these discussions of psychologically incapacity as a broad range of the Court of Appeals. We Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and laws on personal and family rights. on the other hand. hence. explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties." objectives of marriage. argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to marriage. . If said conduct. as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of The petitioner.

. due to some psychological (nor intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of physical) illness." Citing Dr. Vitug. not psychological incapacity. ruled that "psychological that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) married persons. and (c) incurability. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise In Leouel Santos vs. a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity. outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Justice Jose C. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. speaking constitutes psychological incapacity. neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Gerardo Veloso. Sison testified: 8 COURT . It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty. 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility. It is not enough to prove thru Mr. in the present case. it is essential that they must be shown to incapacity .nature which renders them incapable of performing such On the other hand." if not The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious. and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the be incapable of doing so." The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other." showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. Court of Appeals 6 this Court. (b) juridical antecedence. . there is no clear marital responsibilities and duties. Dr.

the man is also living with another woman. Your Honor. recommendation of the Q Neither are they psychiatrist based on your psychologically unfit for their findings that it is better for the professions? Court to annul (sic) the marriage? A Yes. Q There is no hope for the marriage? A There is no hope. Your Honor. such failure of expectation is nor indicative of other but they are antecedent psychological incapacity. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial Q Is it also the stand of the impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's psychiatrist that the parties are part of being "conservative. . there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. Your Honor. The Court has no more questions. In the case of Reynaldo. homely and intelligent" on the part psychologically unfit for each of Roridel. it merely shows psychologically fit with other love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the parties? beloved. If at all. A Yes.Q It is therefore the A Yes.

1996. 11 recognizing it "as the foundation Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the of the nation. 36 of the Family of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts its dissolution and nullity. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their the state. informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3. namely. (b) alleged in the complaint. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified. In view of the novelty of Art. 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National entire Article on the Family. Thus. and Justice Ricardo C. Puno. The Court takes this parties. although its . the Court decided to go beyond (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and belongs to the plaintiff." Philippines. 10 a member of the thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the Family Code Revision Committee.During its deliberations. and unity of the family. This is rooted in the fact that both interpreting and applying it." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable. the Court decided to invite our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage two amici curiae. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. the Most Reverend Oscar V. inviolability and solidarity From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations. (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. which they followed up with written memoranda. our Constitution devotes an Cruz. The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence. Any doubt should be resolved in favor jurisprudence.

but the illness itself must have attached at such incapacity or inability. Hence. a pediatrician may be effective in here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to principle ofejusdem generis. not evidence must convince the court that the parties. Expert evidence may be given obligation of marriage.manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Although no example of such incapacity need be given employment in a job. The evidence must show that marriage. nor a refusal. qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists. mood the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I changes. Such incurability may be the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the . them. or prior thereto. The absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse. "mild characteriological peculiarities. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of the celebration" of the marriage. such incapacity must be relevant to the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming. there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person. was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the Furthermore. The illness must be shown as downright at such time. or one of necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. neglect or difficulty. an adverse integral element in (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. less ill will. In other words. bear and raise his/her own children as an essential incapacitating nature explained. assumption of marriage obligations. not necessarily to those not or knowing them. 13 nevertheless such root cause cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to must be identified as a psychological illness and its procreate. like the exercise of a profession or thereof. occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted do's. could not have given valid assumption related to marriage. Thus." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable as root causes. much moment.

221 and 225 of the Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non- Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the our people. Here. should be given great respect by our This is one instance where. while not controlling or decisive. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial should also be decreed civilly void. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code purpose of the Family Code provision. marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced of psychological nature. in view of the evident source and courts. great persuasive weight should be given to decision. Canon Law.person from really accepting and thereby complying with the The following are incapable of contracting obligations essential to marriage. Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. decision of such appellate tribunal. which became effective in 1983 and which the State and the Church — while remaining independent. 14 by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220. proven by evidence and included in the text of the harmonization. provides: separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. it stands to reason that to achieve such petition. contemporaneous Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. .

The facts of the present case. Jr. briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or Regalado. and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. and I still maintain. along with the prosecuting attorney. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario- cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines. psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. C. on the facts of the ruled to grant the petition. decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage.. which will be quoted in the decision. concurs in the result. Davide. to the petition.. J. 240 SCRA 20-36. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. 4 January 1995. G. depends In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos..R. do not support a similar conclusion.J. not on the basis of a prioriassumptions. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.. The Solicitor General. Jr. concuring opinion: the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. as the case may be. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. concur.(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal Narvasa. Jr.. JJ. Kapunan and Mendoza. each case must be judged. No.. Bedia Santos. Melo. predilections or generalizations . Such ruling becomes even more case. I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. I maintained. InLeouel Santos v.. Separate Opinions opposition. SO ORDERED. the petition is GRANTED. after an indepth study. that there was WHEREFORE. JJ. and Torres. No Hermosisima. Bellosillo. shall submit to PADILLA. Puno Francisco. Obviously. more than in any field of the law. 112019. we have already crucially.

upheld vice of consent. the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo. In the field of psychological "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. At the Committee meeting of July 26..but according to its own facts. due to appellate court must. The trial responsibilities and duties as married persons. but understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and provision in question underwent revisions. for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties. 45 of the Family Code. 1986. duties. did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty. overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling." own judgment for that of the trial court.P. petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological That the intent of the members of the U. Law Center's Civil incapacity. I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of ROMERO." if not outright "refusal" or read: . avoid substituting its some psychological (not physical) illness. the draft provision In the present case. "It is incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity. it is essential judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so. J. as much as possible. it is trite to not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. the husband. there is a resultant defect of The majority opinion. separate opinion: mental illness. thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art.

" He said ." Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9. which is not the idea . lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. even if such lack or incapacity As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term becomes manifest after the celebration. . was wanting that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to vitiating consent. . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the do with consent. even marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are the celebration.(7) Those marriages contracted by any party marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated. insanity of a lesser degree." It was explained who. ." There being a defect was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to in consent. incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations. the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists. at the time of the celebration. but lack of understand the essential nature of marriage or appreciation of one's marital obligation. that is why it is considered a weak phrase. was psychologically psychological incapacity is. ." 1 session was over: My own position as a member of the Committee then was that (7) That contracted by any party who. "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable discharge the essential marital obligations. "psychological or mental impotence. . 1984 session that this term "is Noticeably. at the time of the celebration. it refers to obligations attendant to marriage. in a sense.

viz: 1. . Esteban Ricardo C. of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. . Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question psychologically impotent with one but not with another. special cases and special situations." Justice the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Barrera.that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as The Committee. . not necessarily that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Yet the possibility One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages. 2. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be B. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. ." For clarity. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract. Araceli T. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry. absolutely against everyone of the same sex. considered "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. through Prof. 3. reasons of public policy. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse.

On the other hand. however. it actually declares the marriage null and void." hence its are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. because special treatment in Art. essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 in the Family Code as of causes of a psychological nature. It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law. Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature. Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage. the drafters. recognizes an intermediate state.The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed Canon 1095 which states.e. at the time of the celebration. tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing. particularly the in the first place.. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. inter alia. a properly performed and consummated of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be practices of the time. Hence. for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites. . Civil Law. took a leaf from the relatively liberal nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full provisions of Canon Law. the voidable or annullable marriages. that the following persons under "special cases and special situations. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. some marriages are void from the beginning. it never really existed With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code. now open to fresh winds dissolved. are unable to assume the finally enacted. such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation. i. (those) who. for a valid sacramental marriage can never be provisions on Marriage. any party who.

This Old Code. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under related grounds for annulment. Heedless of civil law sanctions. not being congruent with those laid ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid . quite a Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic be valid. some persons and 'lack of due competence. and down by Canon Law. while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity. in effect recognized the same indirectly from a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in "Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the existent from the beginning. Lack It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony. 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not nullifying civil marriage. The grounds for consent. that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid.' Lack of due discretion means contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. called 'lack of due discretion' state laws. the former being more strict.

were presented to these experts and they considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial were asked to give professional opinions about a party's consent. The nature of this change was nothing short of decades. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. For marriage . Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and willingness to use this kind of hindsight. During the 1970s. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent. lifelong commitment are now after the ceremony. both before and the real obligations of a mature. what came after 1970. the professional opinion understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give of a psychological expert became increasingly important in valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume such cases. . .consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in annulment. Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity. 2 mental at the time of the wedding. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually Furthermore. the way was paved for premarital causes. but rather was an accommodation by the Church to persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the the advances made in psychology during the past marriage. There was now the expertise to provide the all- revolutionary. the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for obligations of marriage. and equally significant. Data about the person's entire life. is not merely .

. (3) stability. in its totality. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality. lifelong relationship.cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for Fr. (5) financial responsibility. the right to a developing. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and At stake is a type of constitutional impairment support is held to impair the relationship and consequently. (2) openness to children and partner. in an article in Catholic Mind. that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love. The marital best intentions of the parties. lists six elements heterosexual acts. i. Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage: to Church decisions. (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage. but is.e. (4) emotional maturity. and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. according The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner. as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. the precluding conjugal communion even with the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. 3 to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental . on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. Among the psychic capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. Green. etc. the right to the necessary to the mature marital relationship: community of the whole of life.

"opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. where the individual of due competence). As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals. Art. An advantage to using the has no real freedom of sexual choice.lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack values. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.S. 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and . (3) the ground of lack of due competence is that the at inadequate personality where personal responses the time the marriage was entered into civil consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations. However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as xxx xxx xxx promised at the time the marriage was entered into. the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U. (2) hyperesthesia. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion). experts are already detecting a shift in their use. 5 Therefore. recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their In the instant case. 4 The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. As new as the psychological grounds are.

J. however. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her spouse is considered a sign of psychological husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to incapacity. The Court." the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null. finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations. Gerardo Veloso. Catholic marriage tribunals remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded: We declared: This Court. quoting Dr. he failed to spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her prove. a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to incapacity. Senseless and after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological with her. concurring: .the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological attribute the causes to psychological incapacity incapacity on the part of the husband. procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. and the refusal is senseless and constant. the prolonged refusal of a the physical disorder of his wife which. 1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage If a spouse. although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations. than to stubborn refusal. Thus. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses. Said petitioner husband.. VITUG. can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

Law Center. the findings of experts unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage — . Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage. who lack sufficient use of reason. who for causes of psychological nature are (T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. Panganiban in his ponencia. 1 "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. guided by experience. 36. which drafted the rights and duties. 209 persuasive effect since the provision was taken ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). (those) — 1. to be given and accepted mutually. 2. although guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the not binding on the civil courts. The term from Canon Law. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. may be given proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. A marriage contracted by any party who. constituted under the auspices of the U. at the time of the celebration. Thus — Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law — Art. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial The Revision Committee.I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Code explained: 3. and V.P. and I find to be most helpful the by decisions of church tribunals which. Justice Artemio and researchers in psychological disciplines.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. . Court of Appeals. I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. like Articles 35. in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36. as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code. immaturity. existing precepts in our law on marriage. one must also read it along with. respect and fidelity and render help and support. extremely low construction of the statutory enactment. but for distinct reasons. Thus. but must stand in conjunction with. . and like circumstances. 37. Thus correlated. likewise mentioned by jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and some ecclesiastical authorities. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. 3 viz: and construed independently of. 2 intelligence.that should give that much value to Canon Law cases of psychoses as. include their mutual obligations to live together. observe love. the other grounds enumerated in the Code. 38 and 41 that would likewise. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological (T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an been meant to comprehend all such possible utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to . or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. render the marriage merely voidable. albeit to be taken as distinct from. "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which.

habitual alcoholism. homosexuality nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.have sexual relations with the other." or lesbianism. depending on the degree and severity of the disorder. These provisions of the Code. 4 In fine. lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage. indicia of psychological incapacity. If drug addiction. habitual alcoholism. This The other forms of psychoses. if existing at the conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the inception of marriage. do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves. they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. like the state of a party Family Code which considers children being of unsound mind or concealment of drug conceived prior to the judicial declaration of addiction. viz: . the term "psychological incapacity. merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46. however. Family Code. must be able to pass the following tests.

any such intendment. as not a few observers would suspect. there could be good Section 1. no less. as an inviolable social Third. is the foundation of the family and marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the shall be protected by the State. thus — inability. Accordingly. . in nature. fundamental law itself. It might have indeed turned out for the better. the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable. Article XV: Sec. 2. Marriage. Sec. the psychological incapacity must relate to the marriage and the family. not mere refusal.First. the psychologic condition must exist at the time the institution. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. as institution . . even if true. the incapacity must be psychological or mental. marriage may occur only thereafter. however. 12. The physical. observing love. if it were otherwise. it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively . . as still others would also put it. Sec. to understand. Article XV: respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support. to be a alternative to divorce. Section 2. not reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard Second. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has family as a basic autonomous social envisioned Article 36. and Section 12. 1. the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out. assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together. another form of absolute divorce or. Article II: Fourth.

promote its total development. not half-hearted. it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. as much as possible. 121 SCRA 51. more than in any field of the law. I maintained. The facts of the present case. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character.. Justice Constitution) Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. Court of Appeals and Julia RosarioBedia Santos. separate opinion: . concuring opinion: own judgment for that of the trial court. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication. depends crucially. after an indepth study. 240 SCRA 20-36. ROMERO. 4 January 1995. Obviously. nor for mere expediency or convenience. 112019. not on the basis of a prioriassumptions. but one that demands a meaningful. No. each case must be judged. do not support a similar conclusion. a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. Cruz. J. The trial Separate Opinions judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must.. respect. J. might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. InLeouel Santos v. and I still maintain. (The 1987 I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a The case of Marcelino vs.R. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage. given case calling for annulment of a marriage. G. avoid substituting its PADILLA. on the facts of the case.

"It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.The majority opinion. it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so.P. . did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty. conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions. even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the That the intent of the members of the U. for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties. 1986. overturning that of the Court of Appeals mental faculties short of insanity. the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo. was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations." if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. 45 of the Family Code. the draft provision read: (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who. due to some psychological (not physical) illness. In the present case." I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. upheld vice of consent. the husband. At the Committee meeting of July 26. but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties. at the time of the celebration. there is a resultant defect of which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. thus rendering the marriage annulable under petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and Art.

Psychological One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. that is why it is considered a weak phrase." There being a defect psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Such incurability may be absolute or . . . in a sense." Justice vitiating consent." Archbishop Oscar Cruz Noticeably. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable." He said marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated. but lack of Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be appreciation of one's marital obligation. . . was psychologically psychological incapacity is. it refers to obligations attendant to session was over: marriage. 1984 session that this term "is dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or canonists." It was explained that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence. . insanity of a lesser incapacitated to discharge the essential marital degree. the immediately preceding formulation above has opined in he earlier February 9. which is not the idea . obligations. . at the My own position as a member of the Committee then was that time of the celebration.The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to produced the following revised provision even before the do with consent. in consent." 1 (7) That contracted by any party who. even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration. . .

" hence its B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question special treatment in Art. not necessarily 3. agreed that it would be more problematic." situations. Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage. reasons of public policy. such marriage which stands valid until For clarity. considered The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. through Prof. The Committee.even relative only in regard to the other spouse. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry. 2. Barrera. Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract. Esteban under "special cases and special situations. On the other hand. special cases and special absolutely against everyone of the same sex. particularly the provisions on Marriage. some marriages are void from the beginning. the drafters. With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code. 36 in the Family Code as of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa finally enacted. Araceli T. the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages. essential requisites. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. now open to fresh winds . viz: annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation. for reasons of public policy or lack of 1.

Heedless of civil law sanctions. at the time of the celebration. shall likewise be void even if freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. for a valid sacramental marriage can never be . the voidable or annullable marriages. it never really existed incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a in the first place. When anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage. are unable to assume the Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. the former being more strict. recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. was down by Canon Law. took a leaf from the relatively liberal marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be provisions of Canon Law. recognizes an It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such intermediate state. The grounds for is now Art. Civil Law. a properly performed and consummated practices of the time. i. Canon 1095 which states. because Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by of causes of a psychological nature. however. not being congruent with those laid any party who. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by nullifying civil marriage. some persons It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law. Canon Law contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.. Hence. quite a psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — marital obligations of marriage.of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and dissolved. (those) who. it actually decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological declares the marriage null and void. that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. inter alia. Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.e.

This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment. and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). both before and during the wedding ceremony. that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. and equally significant. Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage.' Lack of due discretion means broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity. called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. after the ceremony. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. the professional opinion of due competence means that the person was incapable of of a psychological expert became increasingly important in carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made such cases. Lack Furthermore. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight. were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's . This Old Code.ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in "Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the existent from the beginning. the way was paved for what came after 1970. in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent. Data about the person's entire life.

e. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature. on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. During the 1970s. as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person. the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. For marriage .mental at the time of the wedding. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality. and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. These opinions were rarely Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of psychological incapacity. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts. i. but is. but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. the right to the community of the whole of life. in its totality. that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. "not only to sexual anomalies but to lack of valid consent. the right to a developing. . lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2 obligations of marriage. all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment. . according to Church decisions..

(6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of The psychological grounds are the best marriage. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category. (2) openness to children and partner. (3) stability. in an article in Catholic Mind. The marital precluding conjugal communion even with the capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in best intentions of the parties. etc. . xxx xxx xxx financial responsibility. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage: terms. where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice. (2) hyperesthesia. (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations. (4) emotional maturity. the At stake is a type of constitutional impairment ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. (5) (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values.support is held to impair the relationship and consequently. lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship: The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner. Green. Among the psychic reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other Fr. 3 factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: Fr.

4 However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Gerardo Veloso. incapacity. As well in Santos v. An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at subsisting. the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U. recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence).S. "opposing and conflicting personalities" of end of marriage. a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic . quoting Dr. a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which. Said petitioner husband. Court of Appeals. the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion). after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her. or to communicate with her husband The Court." the wife brought the action in the lower court the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological to declare the marriage null. 5 Therefore. for more then five years is not proof of her psychological experts are already detecting a shift in their use.As new as the psychological grounds are. 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic In the instant case. Art. he failed to prove. however.

simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both If a spouse. 36.Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity 1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage concluded: remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. appellate court. Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. was This Court. A marriage contracted by any party who. concurring: and constant. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). and the refusal is senseless VITUG. although physically capable but of the spouses. The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No.. J. the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Justice Artemio V. Thus — Art. at the time of the celebration. unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations. finding the gravity of the failed relationship in psychologically incapacitated to comply with which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of the essential marital obligations of marriage. Panganiban in his ponencia. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. . Thus. We declared: I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. can shall likewise be void even if such incapacity do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

1 Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law — that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. constituted under the 2. 3. in determining the import of "psychological Canon 1095. render the marriage merely voidable. 2 The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus. which drafted the of judgment concerning essential matrimonial Code explained: rights and duties. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion auspices of the U. but for distinct reasons. one must also read it along incapable of contracting marriage. may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.P. who lack sufficient use of reason. to be given and accepted mutually. like Articles 35. the other grounds enumerated in the Code. (those) — with. Law Center. (T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis. albeit to be taken as distinct from. who for causes of psychological nature are guided by experience. the findings of experts unable to assume the essential obligations of and researchers in psychological disciplines.The Revision Committee. Care must be observed so that these various . although not binding on the civil courts. 37. (The following persons) are incapacity" under Article 36. and marriage — by decisions of church tribunals which. or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. would likewise. 38 and 41 that 1.

immaturity. as so expressed by Article 68 of the were indifferent on the matter. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate. likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities. Thus correlated. extremely low intelligence. existing precepts in our law on marriage. "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage and render help and support. Family . Family Code. habitual alcoholism. merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46. include their mutual obligations to live together. viz: (T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as. and like circumstances. Court of Appeals. . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of. but must stand in conjunction with. . observe love. like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction." The other forms of psychoses.circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law which. respect and fidelity I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos 3 vs. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. homosexuality or lesbianism. if existing at the inception of marriage.

do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves. If drug addiction. It might have indeed turned out for the better. the psychologic condition must exist at the time the lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the during the marriage. Article XV: . 4 In fine. thus — Second. even if true.Code. no less. observing love. and for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. not fundamental law itself. its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family. The First. habitual alcoholism. to understand. any such intendment. has laid down in terse language physical. the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability. assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together. if it were otherwise. the incapacity must be psychological or mental. respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support. however. the term "psychological incapacity. depending on the degree and severity of the disorder." to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. not mere refusal. they become mere grounds marriage may occur only thereafter. Third. as not a few observers would suspect. there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. to be a alternative to divorce. in nature. It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36. These provisions of the Code. indicia of psychological incapacity. as still others would also put it. however. as another form of absolute divorce or. the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out. Section 2. viz: Fourth. must be able to pass the following tests. the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. 2.Sec. G. Section 1. L-30642 30 April 1985 Sec. (The 1987 Constitution) ERFECTO S.R. that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. FLORESCA. FLORESCA. FLORESCA. It is quite clear to me that the Section 12. MELBA S. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. . institution . FLORESCA and CARMEN S. JR. and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO. . Article II: Sec.. but one that demands a meaningful. nor for mere expediency or convenience. 1. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character. is the foundation of the family and by necessary implication. respect. FLORESCA. not half-hearted. FLORESCA. Philex Mining. No. The case of Marcelino vs. ROMEO. Marriage. as an inviolable social constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless institution. a different intention is manifest such shall be protected by the State. PEDRO S. might here be JUDITH S. Article XV: When is it construction and when is it judicial legislation? Floresca v. . significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. FLORESCA. 121 SCRA 51. The Court there has held that LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. Cruz. CELSO S. Accordingly. . in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. 12.

dated December 16. ESTELA. JR. DE OBRA. Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex). Rodolfo C. and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. J. LARRY III. who. LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. MARIA. all surnamed VILLAR. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA. Branch XIII.: ELIZABETH. NESTOR and AURELIO. DE ISLA. DIVINA. all surnamed LANUZA. petitioners. SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. Presiding Judge of Branch XIII.ANTONIO JEAN and ELY. LORENZO. DE VILLAR. Pacampara for petitioners. Court of First Instance of Manila. DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. all surnamed OBRA. respondents. JESUS P. MORFE. Tito M. all surnamed ISLA. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA. RAYMUNDO. MAKASIAR. JR. VENUS and FELIX. and EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. all surnamed Martinez. GEORGE and vs. This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila. DE LANUZA. in her own behalf DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JULITA SALUD and DANILO. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. Villaluna for respondents. while working at its copper mines underground operations at .. 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

and water. including those named in the next preceding paragraph. with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time. blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in. thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to. ripped timber supports and carried off materials. accompanied by surface boulders. at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon.1967. That for sometime prior and up to June 28. negligently and deliberately failed to take the the said date. died as a result of the cave-in column of broken ore and rock below it. five (5) were able to escape from . machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit. mud xxx xxx xxx 9. required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men with the collapse of all underground supports working underground. the exerting tremendous pressure on the working complaint alleges that Philex. 1967. 10. Portion of the complaint reads: due to such enormous pressure. Specifically.Tuba. Benguet on June 28. the underground workings. thereby that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes. on and regulations. with the result that. and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date. allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. approximately 500. represented by the plaintiffs herein. the defendant PHILEX.000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks. in violation of government rules spaces at its 4300 level.

00. 22 were rescued within protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact the next 7 days. in utter disregard of its bounden 1966.00 as of December 31. and the rest. 21 in number. but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for the A motion to dismiss dated May 14. or net notwithstanding the fact that up to then. a total hereinabove. but were not rescued due to December 31.the terrifying holocaust. entombed in the its llth Annual Report for the year ended tunnels of the mine. as per many of them were still alive.394. during the year 1966 alone.254. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to. a great earnings.220. and with aggregate assets defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue totalling P 45. were left mercilessly to their fate.) 13. as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. operations. legal and moral duties in the premises. in their Report of investigation.00. pages 7-13. after taxes of P19. that it had vast financial resources. operating income of P 38. it having including those referred to in paragraph 7 made.103. 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428.117. 1966. 42-44. Annex 'B' hereof. 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the . xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (pp. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27.794. rec.

1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. is obliged to pay for the damage done. if there is no pre.Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Art. particularly: In case of fraud. 2176. 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the and corresponds with the circumstances of the complaint. paragraph 2 shall apply. the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201. Whoever by act or omission causes damages which may be reasonably attributed to damage to another. the obligor shall be responsible for all Art.existing contractual relation between the parties. bad faith. When which was opposed by petitioners. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. . respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27. After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed. reconsidered and set aside his order of which is required by the nature of the obligation June 27. x x x x x x x x x Civil Code allowing the award of actual. 2231. Art. On petitioners' (b) Art. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order persons. In quasi-delicts. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. respondent Judge. 2178. malice or wanton attitude. moral and exemplary damages. Art. negligence. Such fault or negligence. of the time and of the place. 1173—The fault or negligence of the motion for reconsideration of the said order. negligence shows bad faith. 1968. 2201. there being fault or the non-performance of the obligation. obligor consists in the omission of that diligence on September 23. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In their brief. petitioners argue that the lower I court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages. pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES Compensation Act. respondent Judge dismissed the case THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- established jurisprudence. pay additional compensation equal to 50% UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS of the compensation fixed in the Act. the Workmen's Compensation PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or JURISDICTION. compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of II workmen or employees. and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 1968. 2178. particularly Articles 2176. irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent. the TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION employer shall. They point out that the complaint alleges .On December 16. 2201 and 2231. 1173. Petitioners thus filed the present petition. petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: A In the first assignment of error. adding that if the employer's THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries.

without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer.. 46. which read: Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo.. SEC. subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.—The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury In the second assignment of error. They also assert that since and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. . Exclusive right to compensation. Jurisdiction. 5. They point out that workmen's employer under the Civil Code and other laws compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss because of said injury . disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease.. . Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of dependents or nearest of kin against the Philex under the Civil Code.. petitioners asseverate that entitling him to compensation shall exclude all respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the other rights and remedies accruing to the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation employee. his personal representatives. resulting from injury. Philex asserts that work-connected injuries take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 employees working underground. SEC. while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court. refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to On the other hand. the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.

In fact. whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the In the hearing of this case. is: recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act. and Commissioner on Elections. then Atty. appeared by the Workmen's Compensation Commission.Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. submitted their respective appeal to the Supreme Court. University of the Philippines. now President of the Compensation Act and suing in the regular . then Undersecretary of Labor Israel worker's right under the Workmen's Bocobo. Justice Manuel Lazaro. Edgardo Angara. as 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in Legal Affairs Department. The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of does not remove the case from the exclusive character of November 26. it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners. memoranda." subject to as amici curiae and thereafter. except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code. 1976. selective or cumulative. that is to say. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive. Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent. the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan.

i. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case. whether they may avail cumulatively of both Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy actions. or the heirs in On August 3. while Atty. filing an action for higher damages in the regular court. WE dismissed the employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions.courts under the Civil Code for higher damages benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to (actual. Angara petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected.. collect the limited compensation provided for under the Act. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an In the resolution of September 7. moral and/or exemplary) from the sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the the employer or of his other employees or latter. 1978. may initiate a complaint to recover damages Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. believes otherwise. and vice versa. they are no longer entitled to avail under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by in addition for damages in the regular courts. petitioners-heirs of deceased employee case of his death.e. Atty. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker. 1978. employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He submits that the remedy of an injured it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case. There are divergent opinions in this case. It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a .

constitute a breach of attitude. 2232. bad faith. fraudulent.. reckless. The total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract (P825. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code.000. In contracts and quasi-contracts. no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. Lopez Sugar Mill. oppressive or malevolent manner. there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. In contracts and quasi-contracts. Inc. Art. read: of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. 100).00) pesos. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In fact. exemplary and moral) in the contract for which it may be held liable for damages. 97 Phil..complaint for damages (actual. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton. . The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex. Co. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions when there is fraud or bad faith. malice or wanton In the present case. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. In cases of fraud. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Art. 2201.

689). The compensation acts are based on a theory of The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages. Mendoza. is strengthened by the fact that aggravated. GSIS.S. 551.S. under the compensation acts. Carino vs. It is the indemnity recoverable payment of all kinds of damages. by a person who has sustained injury either in his person. Hence. WCC. now Employees as the death. 452).J. an employer is liable whether that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated. Compensation is given to mitigate suffered. vs. allow the wrongful invasion of his rights. Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. of proving the causal relation between the defendant's payments under the acts being made as compensation and not negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages as damages (99 C.J. through the act or default of another The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's (25 C.J. Civil Code. On the other not contain any provision for an award of actual. there the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee and his family.Furthermore. 60 SCRA 228). property or relative rights. the Workmen's Compensation Act did the employer (Murillo vs. negligence exists or not since liability is created by law.S. 94 SCRA 308. In other words. sickness or injury is work-connected or work- Compensation Commission. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act. moral and hand. 53). Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. as long Workmen's Compensation Commission then. Articles 2216 et seq. What the Act provided was merely the .. 66 Phil. the employer is The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income. and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of Angeles vs. even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of unlike in the Civil Code. WCC. 93 SCRA actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C. 36). as assessed by the court. damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the exemplary damages.

00) pesos.right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has the amount of six thousand (P6. It is a social In disposing of a similar issue. this Court in Pacana vs. moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. Compensation Act).). Under the Civil Code. Workmen's SCRA 379). The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. Cebu Autobus Company. suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer.00) pesos plus burial been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or expenses of two hundred (P200. under the Workmen's Compensation Act. i. Ibid. and medical injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. 54 expenses when incurred (Sections 8. and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A. ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for . the liability of the employer..000. 32 SCRA 442.e. depends on breach of contract or tort. limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. In the case at bar. 12 and 13. WCC. the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission. collect the Moreover. WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual.

because he and of having to establish the extent of the has elected to seek compensation under the damage suffered. the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of As applied to this case. As already indicated. to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. issues that are apt to be Workmen's Compensation Law. the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else.B. the respondents (defendants below). pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. again speaking for the Court. 44549 of the Compensation simultaneously. and his claim troublesome to establish satisfactorily. involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third. they should not be deemed incompatible. Reyes.higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action (case No. It In Pacaña WE said: In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act.L. Munoz Palma. petitioner Esguerra proving the causal connection between the cannot maintain his action for damages against defendant's negligence and the resulting injury. Mr. Justice J. Having .party tortfeasors in the regular courts. While perhaps not as profitable.

the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7. 1968 (pp. Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned. 1967. by derivative action against decided that they be paid in installments (pp. Aurelio Lanuza. rec. but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. petitioner. at least until the prior claim is Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for rejected by the Compensation Commission. that the heirs of the deceased employees. rec. quo. it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14. compensation to the Regional Office No. 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs. Lorenzo Isla and alternate course. 106-107.). and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19. Jr. namely Emerito petitioner is precluded from pursuing the Obra. the excess accrues to the latter. 1968 before the court a Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex. except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs Company recovers. applies to third-party tortfeasor. a sum greater than the Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their compensation he may have paid the herein opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27. 121-122. if the employer Franklin Baker of August 25. Munoz Palma (104 Phil.). 582). 76. rec. Larry Villar.) in the lower court. as already stated. WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. the alleged tortfeasors. such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court . 1 of the then Anyway. With regard to the other petitioners. under the proviso of Section 6 Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as aforequoted..staked his fortunes on a particular remedy. 1967 only (p. said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.

only after receiving compensation under the Act. should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court. they would not Constitution. and minors. especially to working women. and B Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion.because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution. 2231 and 2232 of the Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. Sec. XIV). New Civil Code of 1950. II). and now by Sections 6. . Had 7. 5. as amended. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant. 2177. which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. 6. However. 1173. 2216. and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 and regulations by Philex. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. 2178. The State shall afford protection to labor. 2201. the 1935 Constitution declares that: Sec. the Court does not legislate in the instant case. and as implemented by Articles have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation 2176. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act To emphasize. should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. and of its negligence.

regulate the use .. maintain and ensure adequate social tenure. thus: social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. promote full employment.. a subsequent law. and assure the rights of workers to .. Article 173 of the New Labor Code Art. 772 on June 20. which obey the constitutional mandates of Article 3 of the New Labor Code.A. 1973 Constitution. which took effect on Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in August 30.. 9. 1952). Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R. and regulate the "promote social justice to insure the dignity. and just and humane conditions of work. and relations between workers and employers. emphasis supplied). employment.. services in. security of and profits "establish. predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor Code.. Art. afford protection to labor. just and humane conditions of work"(Sec.. race or creed.. collective bargaining. welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7. Declaration of basic policy. has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 New Civil Code.. The security of all the people ". II. . 1973 Constitution).ensure equal work opportunities seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code. ". (emphasis supplied). The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Art.. 1950. . welfare. and disposition State shall assure the rights of workers to self- of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership organization. health. housing. and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..—The State shall afford protection to labor. No. the field of education.. 3. II.The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to regardless of sex..

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws.S. Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. One's right to life. 7 and In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal of the New Labor Code. it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. 2. Mr. including its implementing rules and the reach of majorities and officials and to regulations. freedom of worship and assembly. Thus. with characteristic eloquence. 1974. promulgated on May The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 1.The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6. and property. they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U. "In case of doubt. liberty. 87 L. Article 4 of the New Labor Code. provides withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the of political controversy. but which took effect six months thereafter. to free speech. Justice Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of the workers and employees.ed. Education vs. to place them beyond provisions of this Code. otherwise known as enunciated: Presidential Decree No. 638. by the courts. and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote. shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 625. emphasis supplied). Barnette. 442. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer." . both the New Labor Code and the principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. " More specifically. 1638. a free press. as amended. Labor establish them as legal principles to be applied Code).

was amended by Commonwealth employee by reason of a personal injury Act No. because of said injury (emphasis supplied).The Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's rights and remedies granted by this Act to an Compensation Act No. may stipulate with such laborers that the because of said injury. 5.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act the manner prescribed in this section shall be provided: presumed to include such agreement. Sec. and all service contracts made in 20.Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. Employers contracting laborecsrs in the dependents or nearest of kin against the Philippine Islands for work outside the same employer under the Civil Code and other laws. 3428. 1952. 5. his personal representatives. Exclusive right to compensation. Exclusive right to compensation. 772 on June 20. 772 on June employment. Sec.. his personal representatives. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws.. thus: entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. 1952. remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received .

A. Commonwealth Act Numbered Six law be more favorable to them (As amended by hundred ten. As above-quoted. should such amended. as amended.Unless otherwise provided. as amended. No. Such stipulation shall not Code.A. R.A. and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS). . 610. as amended. and other laws whose benefits are Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code. Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee. as amended. C. 772). 4864. Commonwealth Act of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the Numbered One hundred eighty. 186. The payment of compensation under this Title shall administered by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death. Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four. as amended. as amended. R. Exclusiveness of liability. his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. as place where the accident occurs. No. as amended.. 1161. No. Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits sixty-one. 173. R.A.outside the Island through accidents happening bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in in and during the performance of the duties of Section 699 of the Revised Administrative the employment. Republic Act section 5 of Republic Act No.six. No. because said Article 173 provides: Art. and conversely (emphasis supplied).

which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. therefore. 167 [c]. upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides: application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270. in for damages arising from negligence. 272-273 [1975]). although in themselves not laws. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code). . constitute evidence of what the laws mean. 8. much less expressly. is not barred by Article People vs. Judicial decisions applying or aforequoted. These decisions. that recovery under the New Civil Code The Court. through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro.Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as Art. Licera ruled: 173 of the New Labor Code. The Furthermore. Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall remotely. It is patent. decisions application or interpretation placed by the Court of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code. under Article 8 of the New Civil Code. repeal the New Civil Code form a part of the legal system of the provisions heretofore quoted. Philippines.

ailing or injured employee even refer. and does not of recovery in favor of the deceased. Fernando and Villamor. 772 on June 20. Valencia and 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Said Pacana case was concurred in by the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act. before and after it was amended by is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. Reyes. the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws. 18 Justices J. neither expressly nor impliedly. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union.B.WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume Justice J. 124 Phil. Justice Teehankee. both penned by It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution. reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. SCRA 247. 763).1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Palomer. Dizon. Zaldivar. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana. especially . 1952. June 30. with greater not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same the 1970 case of Pacana vs. The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code Compensation Act. action against the tortfeasor for greater damages. Consequently. limited the right the Workmen's Compensation Act.L. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. Makalintal. Castro. as amended.L.B. to the Civil Code as to the compensation provided for therein. but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Reyes. 582). Said Section 5 was Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did.

21. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining. is not legislating in the instant case. 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and power of law-making. such attitude is un-Christian. Vol. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive. is not an exercise of the now Sections 6. limb and health of his worker.Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. The right to life is guaranteed The Court. p. as implemented by the Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then. which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and . to repeat. The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. 93. but is rendering obedience to the State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution. Even from the moral viewpoint alone. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life. and provisions of the New Civil Code. The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia. It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision. 1964). in relation to Section 5 of Article II and guarantees of the Constitution. vis-a-vis Article 173 of the It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice New Labor Code. mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned. is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law.

" It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. Those who profess to and valleys from 1861 to 1864. The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the "Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him. be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper." C era of economic royalists and robber barons of America." This is the very selfish doctrine that and health. In this our civilization. thus: "The mere relation of the master That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code. To stress this affront to human dignity. which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence. limb be expected to do himself. The the courts cannot legislate. its spirit giveth life.150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent. Only ruthless. Fowler (3 MN 1. WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. "the letter of the law killeth. " . obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer. each one of us is our brother's keeper. In the words of Shakespeare. No man is an island. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of provoked the American Civil War which generated so much live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains shibboleth of live-and-help others to live.other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably production and transportation which are dangerous to life. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs.

which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. 1937). In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process. Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A. Butler 297 U. 79). Stone. because the mind of the legislator. the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes. is finite and therefore cannot envisage Madison I Cranch 127 1803). Chief Justice Marshall in the language of Justice Holmes. 'Thus. Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. through Article 9 of the Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution New Civil Code. like all human beings. 1907. "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U. p. the court. into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books. In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. pp. This was But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code. recognizes that in certain instances.S.F. 1937 ed.). He legislates only between gaps.L. likewise share the same view. vs. which was re-stated by Chief all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations. American Sash Company.S. p. 1949 335 US 538). He fills the open spaces in the law. quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9. 113). feeble or strong. reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. vs. "the courts breathe life. 1 Dissenting Opinion. Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist." . judge says it is (Address on May 3. 503-511. even the legislator himself. Modern Library. "do and must legislate" to pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the fill in the gaps in the law.Hence.

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman. It is correctly termed no fault liability.ed. Under either Section 5 or Article 173. but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death. Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from . 210-212. liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life. limb and health of the workers. 852. Precedents of the employers.853). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate. 244 US 204 1917). or now" (citing Pound. as amended. ailment or injury is work-connected. even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee. 72 L. and every slip was fatal" Finally. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88. Justice Cardozo warned that: of the New Labor Code is limited to death. ailment or injury "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an caused by the nature of the work. The Nature of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo. Jensen. . Justice Holmes pronounced: The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. 387). "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman.It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under (Wood vs. established in those items exert an unhappy influence even Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Cardozo.." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. without any fault on the part interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. Government (277 US 188. 845. Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted.. does not cover the tortious Law Review 383.

Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. but grudgingly concede that in certain xxx xxx xxx cases judges do legislate. mathematical precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments. x x x. They include Blackstone. Justice Roberts. True. or that the Constitution requires. Justice David Brewer. who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law. Justice Black.one extreme to the other. But said Justices. When we come It does not seem to need argument to show that to the fundamental distinctions it is still more however we may disguise it by veiling words obvious that they must be received with a we do not and cannot carry out the distinction certain latitude or our government could not go between legislative and executive action with on. or decry the exercise of such power. Jeremy Bentham. have not pointed to examples . which I am far from believing that it is. Ronald Dworkin. were it ever so To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do desirable to do so. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. jurists or legal commentators. there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate. whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail. Rolf Sartorious. Justice Harlan.

there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. which guaranteed the accused under The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel of Rights. which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double judicial legislation has not protected public interest or jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in underprivileged. Wainright (372 US 335). against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853). . Gideon vs. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Illinois (378 US 478). Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. 260. Tarok. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. US 436 1964). particularly the lowly workers or the 261-268). Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 On the other hand. Escubedo vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities. 73 Phil. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294). the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense. the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. In both provisions. from him. individual welfare. They were also developed by judicial decisions in and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs.of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such decisions. Again. Arizona (384 Revised Rules of Court. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20.

ed. Miller. Madison. 853). capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. and maternity leave for women employees. who seems to be against judicial legislation. Parish (300 case of Coleman vs. 949). Springer vs. 81 L. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. 1385. 72 L. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated.holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes US 377-79. 277 US 210-212. 852. 440) by a conservative. New York (198 US 45. the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. It is noteworthy that Justice Black. affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. Pomar is no longer the rule. ed. The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have been Among other examples. 937. De-segregation. working public parks and public buses. Miller. The case of People vs. 49 L. Government. is now the governing principle. 307 US 433. 76. property rights over human rights. supra Coleman vs. supra. hours not exceeding eight (8) daily. in the case of Lochner vs. Pomar (46 Phil. not segregation. ed. Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. 703) where the American Supreme Court are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites- upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors. penned a separate concurring opinion in the As early as 1904. ed. There are numerous cases in Philippine . 83 L. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs.

. J. took no part. dissenting: legislative enactment or executive act.. Plana. DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN however. concur. JJ. Jr.. is on leave. De la Fuente.. Cuevas and Alampay JJ. both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA.J. SO ORDERED. Escolin. The Civil Code itself. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the PROCEEDINGS. found in THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S Title XVIII-Damages that: COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED.jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers Concepcion. A WHEREFORE. Teehankee. Fernando. Unlike the American Constitution. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF general provisions of the Civil Code. and political questions and invoking American precedents. It PETITIONERS. J. provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. C. NO COSTS. Abad Santos and Relova. . COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH.. THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code. INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS..

Compensation and damages are synonymous. without conceding. as the majority rules. 582. the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act Petitioner also avers that compensation is not had already become a "finished transaction". he should no longer Compensation be allowed to avail himself of the second option. it should be plainly equitable that. being awarded the Civil Code. already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Muñoz Palma.. regards to" the "election of remedies". 104 Phil. That "special law".B.. which has to apply to the complaint In the second place. . can be no other than the Workmen's election and accepts the benefits thereof. it is a "special law". The petitioners had first election he has made. In the first place. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under indemnity for damages suffered. when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. the proceedings under the for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in in the course of employment.. in disregard of the Even assuming. Compensation Act. By the very provisions of the Civil Code. in reference to person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first the complaint. Justice J. that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies. Stated differently. . damages. and they have already received Reyes had said: compensation payable to them under that Act. This argument is but a play on words. et al. not the Code itself. and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other.. In Esguerra vs. This was not done in the case before the Court. because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".L. if he wants to make a second election. if a involved in the instant case. At the very least. etc. both options cannot be exercised simultaneously. 586.

Compensation is not payable when injury is due 1928. the Philippine Legislature Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii..) 1. 1925). in Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota When the act is applicable the remedy and Hawaii. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act.. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory employees in 'all industrial employment' and provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Vol. Workmen's Compensation Act. p. Sec. 1. 3428) was approved on December 10. 713. p. 267. (Sections 7480-7481. Act No. (Sec. 7482. [Morabe & Inton.S. p. 112. 714.S. S. to employee's willful intention to injure himself or another or to his intoxication. 266. The act is compulsory as to opinion of Mr.." I may further employees of the territory and its political add: subdivisions. 713. 2] 2. p. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine S. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes. the remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text. S. worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: . The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 1927 and took effect on June 10.B. pp.) of Hawaii. 7483. (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws thereunder is exclusive (Sec. Hawaii 'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting Statutory Synopsis.S. when the Act is applicable.) legislature.

therefore. the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. Exclusive right to compensation. according to good and approved usage and without resorting by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. (Italics supplied) . 98) [Italics supplied] under the Civil Code and other laws. as a rule. read and considered rights and remedies granted by this Act to an in their natural. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed provision: by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is received outside the Islands through accidents that the meaning and intention of the law- happening in and during the performance of the making body must be sought. Consequently. ordinary. cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied) In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing 3.-The words of the statute itself. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92. (Espino vs.SEC. first of all in the duties of the employment. commonly-accepted employee and most obvious significations. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer to forced or subtle construction Courts. his personal representatives. 5.

6. Liability of third parties. provision is paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. in part. the legislator refrained from doing so. . That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself. it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer. under this Act. provides: employee. After 1927. (a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code. There should be no question but that the original first 4. It might be mentioned that. provided that an injured worker or Section 6. cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil SEC. there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer. if entitled to compensation under the Act. in accordance with law. made for remedies other than within the Act itself. yet. 5. which may be provided in the Act itself. Thus.. or his heirs. (Emphasis supplied) If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. or sue such other person for damages.. the legislator could very easily have formulated Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate Section 6.The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer the exclusory provision of the Act. subject only to exceptions under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act. within the Act itself. That that was not done shows the legislative intent with such laborers that the remedies prescribed . formulated in 1927.

by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries the employer under the Act. to be the same amount payable when the the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's employer was not negligent. through RA 772. (b) The Workmen's Compensation Act. . and the addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph: In time. which took effect in 1927. within the Act itself. (Emphasis supplied) 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. words in parentheses. should the received outside the Islands through accidents latter be more favorable to him. if he had so desired. Based on that thinking. The compensation is deemed an expense On June 20. happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such agreement). 1952. At that time. 66 Phil. Mendoza. the exclusory character of the Act was amended. it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation. on June 20. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not It will be seen that. or under the Civil Code. to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code. injured with negligence on the part of the employer. should such law be more 772. the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue to give an option to an employee. the foregoing second chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by favorable to them. 1952. Section 4- Compensation Law of the place where the A 1 was included into the Act. through RA accident occurs. 689 paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined [1938]). caused by negligence on the Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of part of the employer. grants compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer.

On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially)

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial

by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the opportunity to

accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a

provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under

radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions

the Act or under the Civil Code.

of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the
principles evolved in the long history of workmen's

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with
the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably
legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the
trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and
not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the
present Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils
associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial
revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage
suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking
damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer
was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused
by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ
not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a

host of common law defenses available to him as well. The

of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the

worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he

employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was

accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley

to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious

u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837

procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more

"the mere relation of the master and the servant never can

readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-

imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care

related injuries.

of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the
worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he
should discover and guard against himself.

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being
recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in the
desired direction. However, employers liability legislation
proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's

The problems associated with the application of the fellow

compensation.

servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of
contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily
raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a
system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered
employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in
order to be compensated.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's
compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near
certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured
worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit
for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created

amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain

solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element

cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not

receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he

wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern

could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required

industry. If the accident was avoidable and

to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative

could be attributed to the carelessness of the

agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming

employer, existing tort principles offered some

mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation

measure of redress. Even here, however, the

system, individual workers who may want to sue for big

woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was

amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire

manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of

working class.

torts litigation in court placed the employee at a
substantial disadvantage. So long as liability

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as
follows:

depended on fault there could be no recovery
until the finger of blame had been pointed

An appreciation of the nature of the
compensation principle is essential to an
understanding of the acts and the cases
interpreting them.

officially at the employer or his agents. In most
cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.
The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers
of the victim, were torn between friendship or
loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear

By the turn of the century it was apparent that

of reprisal by the employer, on the other. The

the toll of industrial accidents of both the

expense and delay of litigation often prompted

avoidable and unavoidable variety had become

the injured employee to accept a compromise

enormous, and government was faced with the

settlement for a fraction of the full value of his

problem of who was to pay for the human

claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted,

a large share of the proceeds of the judgment

Under this approach the element of personal

were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.

fault either disappears entirely or is

Thus the employer against whom judgment was

subordinated to broader economic

cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while

considerations. The employer absorbs the cost

only a part of this enured to the benefit of the

of accident loss only initially; it is expected that

injured employee or his dependents. The

this cost will eventually pass down the stream of

employee's judgment was nearly always too

commerce in the form of increase price until it is

little and too late.

spread in dilution among the ultimate
consumers. So long as each competing unit in a

xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the
economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in
the form of goods or services- should ultimately
bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are
incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx

given industry is uniformly affected, no
producer can gain any substantial competitive
advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by
reason of the general adoption of the
compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may
operate properly and with fairness to all parties
it is essential that the anticipated accident cost
be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that
will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the
product of the industry affected. Thus

predictability and moderateness of cost are

at fault, and the employee surrenders his former

necessary from the broad economic

right to full damages and accepts instead a more

viewpoint. ....

modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation.

Compensation, then, differs from the
conventional damage suit in two important

The importance of the compromise character of

respects: Fault on the part of either employer or

compensation cannot be overemphasized. The

employee is eliminated; and compensation

statutes vary a great deal with reference to the

payable according to a definitely limited

proper point of balance. The amount of weekly

schedule is substituted for damages. All

compensation payments and the length of the

compensation acts alike work these two major

period during which compensation is to be paid

changes, irrespective of how they may differ in

are matters concerning which the acts differ

other particulars.

considerably. The interpretation of any
compensation statute will be influenced greatly

Compensation, when regarded from the
viewpoint of employer and employee represents
a compromise in which each party surrenders
certain advantages in order to gain others which
are of more importance both to him and to
society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not

by the court's reaction to the basic point of
compromise established in the Act. If the court
feels that the basic compromise unduly favors
the employer, it will be tempted to restore what
it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way,
a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme

conservatism may be transformed by a

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a

sympathetic court into a fairly liberal

spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without

instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly

touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered.

favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the

For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and

courts that employers can have little reason to

allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never

complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent

envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated.

conflict in compensation decisions throughout

Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's

the various jurisdictions must be attributed to

compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to

this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's

receive employment compensation, can still elect to file

Compensation American Casebook Series, pp.

damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely for this

63-65).

reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
which reads:

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the
compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The

employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the

rights and remedies granted by this Act to an

trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been

employee by reason of a personal injury

carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in

entitling him to compensation shall exclude all

to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious

other rights and remedies accruing to the

with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be

employee, his personal representatives,

followed.

dependents or nearest of kin against the

dissenting: the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on A behalf of the employee or his dependents. dissent from the majority opinion. provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. . The Title XVIII-Damages that: issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. If general provisions of the Civil Code.. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise provided. Even as I have deepest COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH. The Civil Code itself.. a major study will be necessary. This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. . 173. J.. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA. employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance however. I regret that I am constrained to because of said injury. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. Article 173 of the labor Code also provides: ART. found in insurance for that purpose. It Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code.employer under the Civil Code and other laws sympathies for the victims.

. 104 Phil. 582. it should be plainly equitable that. By the very provisions of the Civil Code.B.. as the majority rules. if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof. At the very . In the second place. Reyes had said: Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. both options cannot be exercised simultaneously.INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY Even assuming. 586. etc. and the exercise of one Compensation and damages are synonymous. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered. being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment.. not the Code itself. because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction". it is a "special law". Justice J. There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. that an employee is entitled SPECIAL LAWS. In the first place. he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. . in reference to the complaint. can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation will preclude the exercise of the other.. and they have already received compensation payable to them under that Act. the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies". This argument is but a play on words. without conceding. That "special law". In Esguerra vs. to an election of remedies. Stated differently. Muñoz Palma. et al. the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction". which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case.L.

p. 7482. 267.S. (Sec. S. in Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota When the act is applicable the remedy and Hawaii. 1925). (Sections 7480-7481. [Morabe & Inton. B. when he makes the second election Act is applicable. p. in disregard of the Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii. Hawaii 'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting Statutory Synopsis. p. 266. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory employees in 'all industrial employment' and provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine S.S. 1927 and took effect on June 10. Vol. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes. (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws thereunder is exclusive (Sec.least.." I may further employees of the territory and its political add: subdivisions. if he wants to make a second election.) legislature. pp. S. This was not done in the case before the Court. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 7483.. Workmen's Compensation Act. 713. 713. Act No. 112. the remedy under the Act is exclusive The he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation election. Text. when the first election he has made. 3428) was approved on December 10.) of Hawaii. 714. 2] .) 1. 1. Compensation is not payable when injury is due 1928. p. to employee's willful intention to injure himself or another or to his intoxication. The act is compulsory as to opinion of Mr.S.. Sec.

against the employer Cleofe 52 SCRA 92. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is Workmen's Compensation Act. the Philippine Legislature that the meaning and intention of the law- worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: making body must be sought. Consequently. Exclusive right to compensation.2. because of 3. as a rule. therefore. his personal the grammatical reading of a statute must be representatives.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation in their natural. ordinary. commonly-accepted and most obvious significations. according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts. cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of shall exclude all other rights and remedies words and the rules of grammar. (Espino vs. accruing to the employee. first of all in the words of the statute itself. 5. read and considered SEC. dependents or nearest of kin presumed to yield its correct sense. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied) Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing with such laborers that the remedies prescribed provision: by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries . 98) [Italics supplied] under the Civil Code and other laws.

formulated in 1927. there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer. (Italics supplied) the Civil Code. Thus. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. provided that an injured worker or employee.. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself. 6. . cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. 5. within the Act itself. subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself. the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act. 4. . it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer. Liability of third parties. provides: SEC. under this Act. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act. (Emphasis supplied) Section 6. yet.. the legislator refrained from doing so. if entitled to compensation under the Act. It might be mentioned that. in accordance with law. provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. in part. or his heirs.received outside the Islands through accidents If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 happening in and during the performance of the were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under duties of the employment. or sue such other person for damages. Section 6. After 1927.

within the Act itself. Based on that thinking. on June 20. through RA 772. it must have been thought that it was inequitable to end of the paragraph: have the amount of compensation. received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the (b) The Workmen's Compensation Act. 66 Phil. and the addition of this sentence at the In time. the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act. or under the Civil Code. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. should the latter be more favorable to him. 689 On June 20. through RA 772.(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: It will be seen that. the foregoing second [1938]). At that time. grants compensation to an injured employee without contracts made in the manner prescribed in this regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of section be presumed to include such agreement). . Section 4A 1 was included into the Act. 1952. to be the same amount payable when the Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs. paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. if he had so Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries desired. Mendoza. (Emphasis supplied) employer was not negligent. should such law be more favorable to them. which took effect in duties of the employment (and all service 1927. 1952. the exclusory character of the Act was amended. caused by negligence on the part of the employer. the employer.

dissenting: was either negligent or in bad faith. At the very least. Before workmen's compensation. The legislator was again given the opportunity to provide. it should be the legislature and of the Civil Code. JR. Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) present Labor Code on employees' compensation. that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker. the Court is unjustifiably legislating.That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the to give an option to an employee. As stated in the leading case of Priestley .. 1964. associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with suits to get recompense. a provision reiterated in the On June 20. GUTIERREZ. the intent of the law-maker. and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. but he did not. not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. to sue the latter under the provisions compensation.. J. by RA 4119. an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint. the option to an employee to sue under Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils the Act or under the Civil Code. The accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions accepted employment. injured with negligence on principles evolved in the long history of workmen's the part of the employer. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial host of common law defenses available to him as well.

and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated. the actual cost of rehabilitation. Thus. I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. the assumption of risk doctrine. liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre. receive compensation for work- imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care related injuries. 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can readily. if not automatically. employers' liability acts were a major step in the desired direction. Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized. However.u." By entering into a contract of employment. employers liability legislation proved inadequate. and non-litigious to act swiftly on compensation claims. The worker does not of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to have simplified. inexpensive. & W. servant rule. the principle of contributory negligence. of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself. the worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and guard against himself. 1. An administrative . expeditious. Legislative reform led to the workmen's The problems associated with the application of the fellow compensation. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law.determined The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element cases. Fowler (3 M.

Even if suit were successfully prosecuted. If the accident was avoidable and were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Even here. were torn between friendship or loyalty to their class. the system. who were usually fellow workers of the victim. on the one hand. and government was faced with the settlement for a fraction of the full value of his problem of who was to pay for the human claim. The uncertainty of the outcome of working class. And because the overwhelming employer. individual workers who may want to sue for big woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire manifest. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses. So long as liability The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows: depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.agency supervises the program. however. and fear By the turn of the century it was apparent that of reprisal by the employer. The the toll of industrial accidents of both the expense and delay of litigation often prompted avoidable and unavoidable variety had become the injured employee to accept a compromise enormous. torts litigation in court placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern a large share of the proceeds of the judgment industry. existing tort principles offered some mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation measure of redress. officially at the employer or his agents. could be attributed to the carelessness of the Thus the employer against whom judgment was . on the other.

considerations. The commerce in the form of increase price until it is employee's judgment was nearly always too spread in dilution among the ultimate little and too late..cast often paid a substantial damage bill. while of accident loss only initially. .. . consumers. The employer absorbs the cost ..should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is uniformly affected. xxx xxx xxx producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle. it is expected that only a part of this enured to the benefit of the this cost will eventually pass down the stream of injured employee or his dependents. Thus Under this approach the element of personal predictability and moderateness of cost are fault either disappears entirely or is necessary from the broad economic subordinated to broader economic viewpoint..whether it be in the form of goods or services. In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. preparation and distribution of the product.. no xxx xxx xxx Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the product of a business.

The interpretation of any other particulars. a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument. and compensation proper point of balance. irrespective of how they may differ in considerably. when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In this way. then. compromise established in the Act. compensation statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of Compensation. and conversely. All period during which compensation is to be paid compensation acts alike work these two major are matters concerning which the acts differ changes. The amount of weekly payable according to a definitely limited compensation payments and the length of the schedule is substituted for damages.Compensation. represented by compensation. differs from the The importance of the compromise character of conventional damage suit in two important compensation cannot be overemphasized. an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to . and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials. The respects: Fault on the part of either employer or statutes vary a great deal with reference to the employee is eliminated. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault.

pp. the rates of payments.. the premiums paid by SEC. conflict in compensation decisions throughout Certainly. whom the law allows to this. Exclusivenesss of liability.complain. I am personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never ART. the liability of the State . damage suits for industrial accidents. which reads: The schedule of compensation. 5. his personal representatives. can still elect to file Compensation American Casebook Series. the compensable injuries and diseases. It was precisely for this 63-65). We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious other rights and remedies accruing to the with one another if it is to succeed. Exclusive right to compensation. followed. spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others.—Unless otherwise provided. 173.. Workmen's receive employment compensation. only harmful results to the principle of workmen's the various jurisdictions must be attributed to compensation can arise if workmen. the entire structure is endangered.-The employers to the present system. Much of the unevenness and apparent envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated." (Malone & Plant. . Article 173 of the labor Code also provides: For instance. reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. the actuarial stability of the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been employee by reason of a personal injury carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in entitling him to compensation shall exclude all to law. The basic theory has to be employee. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a because of said injury.

In case of the employee's death. injury or amendments or fail to install and maintain safety appliances. The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. a major study will be necessary. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims.Insurance Fund under this Title shall be sickness due to the failure of the to comply with exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of any law. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. Right to additional compensation. employer violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. . or with any order. he shall be liable to pay an additional compensation equal to fifty per centum of the compensation fixed in this Act. rule or regulation of the employer to the employee his dependents or the Workmen's Compensation Commission or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the behalf of the employee or his dependents. Footnotes 1 SEC. or take other precautions for the prevention of accidents or occupational disease. 4-A. I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.