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Journal of the Institute for Euregional Studies

Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence

University of Oradea

University of Debrecen
Volume 3

Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe

Spring 2007
Oradea University Press

Journal of the Institute for Euregional Studies


Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence

University of Oradea

University of Debrecen

Volume 3

Media, Intercultural Dialogue and


the New Frontiers of Europe
edited by

Fabienne MARON, Renaud de LA BROSSE & Luminia SOPRONI

References by

Thomas LUNDEN & Rudolf REZSHAZY

Spring 2007
Oradea University Press

Eurolimes
Journal of the Institute for Euregional Studies
Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence
Spring 2007

Volume 3
Honorary Members

Paul Allies (Montpellier), Enrique Banus (Pamplona), Mihai Berinde, Gheorghe Mahara, Sever Dumitrascu (Oradea),
Robert Bideleux (Swansea), Jean Pierre Colin (Reims), George Contogeorgis (Athens), Gerard Gyula Horvath
(Budapest), Gerard Delanty (Liverpool), Richard Griffiths, Chris G. Quispel (Leiden), Andreas Herdina (Brussels),
Jaroslaw Kundera (Wroclaw), Ariane Landuyt (Siena), Christiane Lemke (Hanover), Livio Missir de Lusignan
(Bruxelles), Jean Nouzille (Strasbourg), erban Papacostea (Bucuresti), Nicole Pietri (Strasbourg), Vladimir
Pessenko (Rostowon- Don), Frank Pfetsch (Heidelberg), Mercedes Samaniego Boneu (Salamanca), Maria Manuela
Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra), Dusan Sidjanski (Geneve), Goran Therborn (Uppsalla), Jose Maria Tortosa (Alicante),
Maurice Vasse (Paris), Vasile Vesa, Vasile Puca (Cluj-Napoca)

Advisory Committee
Bela Baranyi, Czimre Klara (Debrecen), Stephan Bielanski (Krakaw), Rozalia Biro, Anca Dodescu (Oradea), Maria
Craciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, Adrian Ivan (Cluj-Napoca) Gunilla Edelstam (Stockholm), Didier Francfort (Nancy), Tamara
Gela (Orel), Juan Gay Armenteros (Granada), Ion Gumenai, Alla Rosca (Chisinau), Alexandru Ilie, Sorin Sipos,
(Oradea), Ines Kanthenusen (Hanover), Kormos Janos (Debrecen), Renaud de La Brosse, Laurent Beurdeley (Reims),
Giuliana Laschi (Bologna), Ilkka Liikanen (Joensuu), Stephan Malovic (Zagreb), Maria Marczewska-Rytko (Lublin),
Fabienne Maron (Bruxelles), Silvia Mihalikova (Bratislava), Misklevetz Ferenc (Koszeg), Ivan Nacev, Margarita
Shivergueva (Sofia), Zaneta Ozolina (Riga), Procopis Papastratis (Athens), Alexandru-Florin Platon (Iasi), Mykola
Palinschak (Uzhgorod), Daniele Pasquinucci (Siena), Ioan-Aurel Pop, Nicoale Paun (Cluj-Napoca), Stanislav Sagan
(Rzeszow), Angelo Santagostino (Brescia), Grigore Silasi (Timisoara), Barbu tefnescu Lia Pop, Ion Zainea
(Oradea), Szabo Bela (Debrecen), Mihai-Rzvan Ungureanu (Bucuresti), Varnay Erno (Debrecen), Jan Wendt
(Gdansk)

Editorial Committee
Ioana Albu, Mircea Brie, Carmen Buran, Vasile Ciocan, Sorin Cuc, Cristina Dogot, Antonio Faur, (Oradea), Peter
Balogh (Uppsala), Anders Blomquist (Stockholm), Vicent Climent-Ferrando (Barcelona), Vasile Croitoru, Adriana
Dilan (Chisinau), Cskbernyi-Nagy Janos, Komdi Mnika, Kozma Gbor, Pnzes Jnos, Radics Zsolt, Teperics
Karoly (Debrecen), Bohdana Dimitrovova (Belfast), Eliza Dumitrescu (Paris), Anamaria Heranu, (Suceava), Noemi
Hinfray (Tours), Catalina Iliescu (Alicante), Justina Kutrzeba (Krakaw), Peter Kopekcy (Bratislava), Florin Lupescu,
Simona Miculescu, Adrian Niculescu (Bucuresti), Myroslava Lendel (Uzhgorod), Anca Oltean, Dana Pantea, Adrian
Popoviciu, Delia Radu, Alina Stoica, Sorin ipo, Luminia oproni, Mirel Staac, Constantin Toca (Oradea), Sonia
Skyvarova (Prag), Oleksandr Svyetlov (Kharkiv), Toma Tanase (Paris), Natasha Trajkova (Prilep), Esther Gimeno
Ugalde (Wien)
The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors.

Address: University of Oradea


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ISSN: 1841 9259

Cuprins Contents Sommaire Inhalt Tartalom


Cuprins Contents Sommaire Inhalt Tartalom ..................................................... 5
Fabienne MARON (Bruxelles) Mdias, Dialogue Interculturel et Nouvelles
Frontires de lUnion Europenne Introduction ................................................ 7
1. Media and Intercultural Dialogue ......................................................................... 11
Renaud de LA BROSSE (Reims) Dialogue interculturel, diversit culturelle
et rgulation des mdias ......................................................................................... 12
Eser KKER, lk DOANAY (Ankara) Ignoring Radical Media in
Communication Studies in Turkey ........................................................................ 18
2. Media, European Identity, Plural Identity............................................................ 27
Ioan HORGA (Oradea) The Role of the Media in Changing the Meaning of
Borders ................................................................................................................... 28
Thibault BAZIN (Strasbourg) Mdias europens et la non-mention des
racines chrtiennes dans la Constitution europenne............................................. 47
Mria FOLLRICHOVA, Gilles ROUET (Bratislava) Mdias et minorits
en Slovaquie........................................................................................................... 67
3. Media, Borders and New EU Borders ................................................................... 75
Luminia OPRONI (Oradea) The Romanian Hungarian Crossborder
Cooperation in the Regional Press of Bihor County .............................................. 76
Bela BARANYI (Debrecen) The Hungarian-Romanian border region in the
Hungarian national and local press (19902005) .................................................. 87
Alla ROCA (Chiinu) Mass Media Impact on the Democratization
Processes in Society Case of the Republic of Moldova: ........................................ 99
4. Identity, Alterity and Imaginary of Borders....................................................... 109
Bohdana DIMITROVOVA (Belfast) Towards a Controversial Border
Strategy? The Case of Transcarpathia ................................................................. 110
Jos Luis VILLANOVA (Girona) Municipal Administration of Spanish
Protectorate Cities in Morocco (1912-1956): A Model Subordinated to the
Interests of Colonialist Policy .............................................................................. 123
Frank PFETSCH (Heidelberg) Why was the 20th century warlike? .............. 139
Michel MAFFESOLI (Paris) Jeunes et nomadisme tribal ................................ 151
5. Focus ....................................................................................................................... 157
Stjepan MALOVIC (Zagreb) Media and Interculturalism .............................. 158
Reviews and References ............................................................................................ 165
About the Authors ..................................................................................................... 191
The Activity of the Institute of Euroregional Studies Debrecen-Oradea (2006) . 197

Mdias, Dialogue Interculturel et Nouvelles Frontires de lUnion


Europenne
Introduction
Fabienne MARON

Ce troisime volume dEurolimes regroupe une srie darticles autour de la


problmatique des nouvelles frontires de lUnion europenne, du dialogue interculturel et des
mdias.
Les largissements successifs de lUnion Europenne ont ouvert de nouveaux dbats
sur les limites gographiques, culturelles et politiques de lEurope. Certains aspects doivent tre
pingls et analyss : historiques, politiques, stratgiques, pratiques voire oprationnels.
Les nouvelles frontires mettent en exergue les questions didentit, daltrit et de
construction de nos valeurs tant respectives que communes. Elles nous mettent galement face
des enjeux importants concernant nos relations avec nos nouveaux voisins. Des partenariats se
dessinent et dautres, plus anciens, voluent. Les politiques se redfinissent1
Les effets des largissements 2004 et 2007 combins ceux de la mobilit accrue, des
flux migratoires anciens2 et rcents3, des changes importants avec le reste du monde travers
le commerce, lducation, les loisirs et la globalisation en gnral accroissent les interactions
entre les cultures, les religions et les langues en Europe et ailleurs. Face cette ralit de plus en
plus multiculturelle des socits europennes et de son espace dintgration toujours en devenir,
le rle des mdias et la place du dialogue interculturel sont dune grande importance afin de
maintenir la diversit culturelle de lUnion tout en renforant sa cohsion et en promouvant le
respect de valeurs communes. Ils permettent galement lEurope de nouer des partenariats
avec les pays proches.
Lide de dialogue interculturel puise donc ses racines dans la reconnaissance de la
diffrence et de la multiplicit du monde dans lequel nous vivons. Ces diffrences dopinion, de
points de vue et de valeurs existent au sein mme des cultures mais surtout entre celles-ci. Le
dialogue interculturel vise considrer ces diffrences avec le souhait profond de comprendre
lautre. Il ouvre une interaction enrichissante menant au partage respectueux dides et de
valeurs. Il nous encourage identifier les frontires culturelles qui nous dfinissent et nous
propose de communiquer travers elles ou les remettre en question.
A lheure de lorganisation, en 2008, de lanne europenne du dialogue interculturel,
ce volume offre au lecteur des approches diversifies pour comprendre les enjeux du problme.
Dans une premire section, les auteurs nous montrent le rle fondamental des mdias
dans la construction de limage que nous avons de lAutre et dans lexplication des diffrences
qui fondent leur identit. Dans cette perspective, notre dpendance vis--vis des supports
dinformation est mise en exergue. Les mdias sont les vecteurs par lesquels nous prenons
connaissance de lautre, du voisin . La rgulation de la libert de communication et le rle
des organes rgulateurs dans le respect de la diversit culturelle sont analyss. Dautres auteurs
1

Laurent Beurdeley, Renaud de la Brosse, Fabienne Maron (eds), LUnion europenne et ses espaces de
proximit, paratre, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007
2
IIAS-IISA, Groupe de Projet, Histoire de lAdministration: The Comparative Administrative History of
Population Migration, 1800 to the Present, Pavia, 21 avril 2007
3 me
3 Confrence sur PEV : Le prochain Colloque sur la Politique de Voisinage de lUnion europenne
sera organis Ifrane (Maroc) et portera sur la problmatique : La gestion des flux migratoires dans le
voisinage europen du Maghreb lEurope de lEst, Universit Reims Champagne Ardenne- Universit
Al Akhawayn

8
introduisent la notion dinterculturalisme et dmontrent que les mdias sont le reflet des
socits et des comportements des citoyens. Ces derniers ont un effort dempathie faire afin de
mieux comprendre lAutre et ses diffrences. Lattention du lecteur est ensuite dirige sur les
efforts des mdias alternatifs pour sortir de la pense unique. Le cas de la Turquie fait lobjet
dune tude plus approfondie.
La seconde section a pour thme la construction de lidentit europenne et son
caractre pluriel. Les communications visent la transformation de la perception des frontires et
le rle des mdias dans cette volution. Les diffrences se dclinent selon le niveau de
gouvernance vis : du niveau local au niveau europen. Ensuite, la lecture des mdias
europens diffuss grande chelle et sous le prisme du dbat sur la mention des racines
chrtiennes dans la Constitution europenne, les auteurs sinterrogent sur le dialogue
multiculturel en Europe en termes de dfinition de lidentit europenne. Le rle fondamental
des mdias dans la dfinition de cette identit et la protection des minorits est galement
pingl. La situation des mdias en Slovaquie claire cette question et permet daffirmer quils
peuvent apporter des informations critiques utiles contribuant ainsi former les citoyens
europens la diversit culturelle et au dialogue.
La troisime section regroupe des communications mettant en exergue certains aspects
de la coopration transfrontalire4. Cette coopration est un procd fondamental de
lintgration europenne et est base sur un dialogue interculturel renforc.
Enfin, la quatrime section revient sur la gense des frontires et sur les processus
politiques parfois conflictuels qui donnent naissance celles-ci. Les expriences passes des
guerres et des protectorats clairent la dynamique actuelle. Les frontires furent et sont au
centre des proccupations des acteurs nationaux/internationaux et font lobjet de ngociations
importantes. Elles sont llment majeur des nouvelles politiques de voisinage, de scurit et
dimmigration dfinies par les Etats europens et lUnion europenne. Elles donnent naissance
des contradictions: objectifs de coopration (coopration transfrontalire) et objectifs
scuritaires (contrle des frontires).
Dans son roman d'aventures baroque o Histoire et illusion se confondent, intitul La
mission des frontires , Gilles Lapouge5 ma interpelle sur la naissance des frontires, sur leur
cration et limaginaire qui sy rattache : II y a quelques annes, les Brsiliens ont dcouvert,
au fond de la fort amazonienne, une stle formant frontire entre le Royaume du Portugal et
les possessions espagnoles. Nul ne sait qui a charri cette pierre gigantesque, il y a pas mal de
sicles, depuis les montagnes portugaises jusqu'aux confins des choses .
Economie, politique, stratgie, culture, tout est ou devient question de frontires.
Lintgration et le dialogue interculturel comptent parmi les axes prioritaires des prsidences
2007 de lUnion europenne. Les Etats membres doivent apprendre les uns des autres. Des
rencontres sont organises pour changer sur des exemples de bonne pratique en matire
dintgration et de dialogue interculturel. L'Europe peut offrir des rponses des questions
telles que comment garantir la scurit, grer limmigration ou intgrer les diffrentes cultures
sans porter atteinte leur spcificit, rponses qui ne pourraient merger au simple niveau
national et qui ncessitent une coopration renforce.
Les sminaires organiss lUniversit dOradea depuis 2000 et les cooprations
interculturelles et transfrontalires qui en dcoulent sont autant dopportunits qui semblent
entrer parfaitement dans le cadre de la stratgie et des priorits de lUnion europenne.
La rencontre 2007 portera sur la problmatique de la dfinition des notions de
frontires qui se dclinent du naturel (gographique) au culturel (nos valeurs). Ces rflexions
constituent autant dangles dapproche pour une question qui comme lont annonc les
instances europennes concernent chaque citoyen dans sa relation lautre6.
4

Fabienne Maron, Aux coutures de la nouvelle Europe: enjeux et dfis de la gouvernance


transfrontalire. Entre nouvelle politique de voisinage et coopration euro rgionale , Sminaire dt
2006, Oradea, 6-8 juillet 2006: Regional and Euroregional Structures Efficiency in the Area of the New
EU Border
5
Gilles Lapouge, La mission des frontires, Paris, Le Livre de Poche, 2007

9
Les articles de ce recueil, les discussions venir sont autant dchanges interculturels
qui anticipent peu ou prou lvnement 2008: lAnne Europenne du Dialogue Interculturel6.
Ce dialogue des cultures revt un sens nouveau, dans le cadre de la mondialisation et du
contexte politique international que nous connaissons aujourdhui. Il devient ainsi un outil
indispensable pour assurer le maintien de la paix, de la cohsion et de la prennit du projet
europen.
Bruxelles, 9 mai 2007, Journe de lEurope

Pour plus dinformation : EUROPA :


http://ec.europa.eu/culture/portal/events/current/dialogue2008_fr.htm

11

1. Media and Intercultural Dialogue


Renaud DE LA BROSSE (Reims) Dialogue interculturel, diversit
culturelle et rgulation des mdias
Eser KKER, lk DOANAY (Ankara) Ignoring Radical Media in
Communication Studies in Turkey

12

Dialogue interculturel, diversit culturelle et rgulation des mdias


Renaud de LA BROSSE
Abstract: The author of this article tries to underline how much cultural differences (in
languages, social habits, etc.) from a society to another can be sources of misunderstandings
and (sometimes) of troubles. More than the differences themselves, what is problematic is their
ignorance by the others. While Media are still seen as key socialization actors they pay no
attention to their possible role in the dialogue between cultures, or to the promotion of cultural
diversity. Instead of that, they too often contribute to the spreading of caricature-like images of
our near or far neighbors, with a strong risk to encourage intolerance towards the Other.
Taking into account the media concentration process which affects most of the countries
worldwide, and the shrinkage of media pluralism as a consequence, one questions the need for
more media regulation in the name of the publics interest for fair and qualitative information.
Key words: intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, media regulation, tolerance,
democracy
Lintolrance est le produit de lignorance de lAutre. Cette assertion nous semble
valable pour toute socit, son niveau de dveloppement nintervenant que marginalement pour
en corriger la porte. Ce dbut de 21me sicle nous le rappelle quotidiennement, les peurs et les
rflexes de repli sur soi y sont encore trs largement aliments par lirrationnel, autrement dit
par les a priori, les lieux communs (souvent vhiculs par les mdias), les on dit
gnralisateurs do naissent si frquemment amalgames et stigmatisations. Dune faon
gnrale, limage de lAutre - cet tre diffrent par sa culture, son mode de vie, sa langue, sa
couleur de peau, sa faon de shabiller - que pourra avoir un citoyen, fut-il Franais ou Tunisien
par exemple, est presque systmatiquement construite par lintermdiaire des agents
traditionnels de socialisation. En effet, il faut regretter que trop peu dindividus aient loccasion
et la chance de faire par eux-mmes lexprience de lAltrit, de simmerger, le temps
ncessaire sa comprhension, dans une socit diffrente de la leur. Le cot en temps, sans
parler de considrations dordre financier, rend du reste impossible pour le commun des mortels
la connaissance approprie de la culture, de la langue, du mode vie de nos proches ou lointains
voisins. Notre relation eux se construit consquemment au travers de ce que, enfants, nous en
avons appris via notre entourage familial et relationnel, les structures ducatives que nous
avons frquentes, le systme de valeurs religieuses et/ou philosophiques qui a pu nous tre
inculqu - ou de ce que, adultes, nous continuons en apprendre par le biais de notre
environnement professionnel mais aussi et surtout du systme communicationnel et
informationnel dans lequel nous baignons tous. Peter Berger et Thomas Luckman ont mis en
vidence ce processus de construction sociale de la ralit1, par lequel nous arrivons en quelque
sorte dans un monde pr construit, pour ne pas dire pr dtermin, par des reprsentations qui
simposent naturellement nous et influent en retour sur les perceptions que nous avons de
notre environnement. Loin de nous lide de refuser lindividu la part dautonomie et de
libert qui lui revient face cet hritage subi, on doit pourtant admettre que le gros de nos
connaissances sur lAutre se fera malgr tout toujours, pour lcrasante majorit dentrenous, par mdiations interposes, sans interface en direct avec lui. Dans ce processus les mdias
nous semblent aujourdhui occuper une place part, tant il est vrai quils exercent un quasi

1
The Social Construction of Reality, A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge [La Construction Sociale
de la Ralit, Trait de Sociologie de la Connaissance], Paris, Mridients-Klincksiek

13
monopole dans linformation qui nous arrive relative cet Autre et qui faonne malgr nous
limage que nous pouvons nous en faire. A bien des gards, ce sont les journaux, radios,
tlvisions, et aujourdhui Internet, qui donnent voir lextrieur la socit et la culture
laquelle ils appartiennent, quand, dans le mme temps, ils nous renseignent en parallle sur ce
que seraient les autres (au sens dtrangre) cultures et socits: ce double mouvement
dchange dimages, on la dit, nest que rarement enrichi, dans le sens dune confirmation ou
dune infirmation, dune exprience personnelle pour chaque individu. De ce point de vue, ce
dernier na gure le choix, il est en situation de grande dpendance vis--vis de ces supports
dinformation. Il est en quelque sorte li eux par un lien de confiance, on pourrait dire par
contrainte (absence ou quasi absence de choix alternatif), alors mme que les mdias, et les
journalistes qui les animent, ne sont investis daucune sorte de mandat populaire ou lgitimit
pour le faire. Plac devant ce lien asymtrique et ingal, le citoyen consommateur de mdias ne
peut thoriquement esprer ou exiger, en retour, que la garantie dune information de qualit et
honnte, pour ne pas dire objective. Le contrat de confiance tnu qui le lie alors aux
mdias, et sur lequel repose dans une large mesure, aux yeux des publics, la crdibilit des
journalistes peut tre considr comme tant lessence mme de la relation liant les moyens
dinformation et de communication au rgime de la dmocratie, et donc leur apport au bon
fonctionnement et la prennit de celui-ci. Idalement, ces derniers participent en effet
clairer le citoyen, ils laident se forger sa propre interprtation de la ralit (en vrit telle
quelle est rapporte par les mdias) et ultimement se dterminer (y compris
lectoralement) sur telle ou telle question dactualit et de socit. Dans les faits, cependant, la
palette dinterprtations de la ralit offerte par les mdias aux diffrents publics est loin dtre
la hauteur de lenjeu dmocratique en question ici. Non seulement, comme on la vu plus
haut, le public est en quelque sorte contraint de faire confiance ces agents de mdiatisation,
mais en plus son choix est extrmement rduit ds lors quil sagit pour lui de puiser auprs de
sources mdiatiques, et donc dinterprtations de la ralit, diffrentes. Le pluralisme
mdiatique, qui fait office de rgulateur du systme, ne joue plus correctement son rle.
Souvent dnoncs2, la concentration dans le secteur des mdias en Europe et ailleurs, le
caractre de plus en plus commercial de linformation dsormais conue comme une
marchandise part entire, ont conduit la standardisation et luniformisation des contenus
mdiatiques et un appauvrissement de loffre. Car ce pluralisme-l ne saurait tre mesur
exclusivement quantitativement, la qualit, cest--dire la varit de points de vue et des ides
exprimes, ne cesse de se rduire telle une peau de chagrin. Avec elle, cest la possibilit pour
le public daccder une gamme la plus large possible de vrits - et force de
comparaison celle de se forger sa propre vrit ou objectivit - qui disparat
progressivement. Ce constat conduit naturellement questionner, si elle a jamais t prouve
scientifiquement, lide selon laquelle la presse (au sens gnrique) serait indissolublement lie
la dmocratie, ce dans la mesure o elle serait la principale garante de la richesse des dbats
au sein de la sphre publique, dont on sait quils sont indispensables son bon fonctionnement.
Eldorado ou, comme la si bien montr Jrgen Habermas3, ge dor rvolu ? Le fait est
que jamais les mdias et linformation, en tant quobjets de marketing, nont t si uniformes
dans leur mode de fonctionnement et dans leur contenu. Est-ce dire que les lois du march et
de lconomie ont dfinitivement supplant celles du ncessaire dbat dmocratique par presse
interpose ? Il est sans doute trop tt pour laffirmer, mme si lvolution du secteur mdiatique
depuis plusieurs dcennies peut le laisser penser. Quoiquil en soit, les utilisateurs des mdias
devraient pouvoir rester matres de leur comportement, de leur pense et de leurs sentiments
pour devenir des citoyens responsables et libres. Un public auquel il na pas t donn la
possibilit de dcouvrir que plusieurs interprtations et opinions sont possibles partir dun
2

Voir par exemple, la Dclaration Politique Intgration et diversit : les nouvelles frontires de la
politique europenne des mdias et des communications , adopte par le Conseil de lEurope lors de la
7me Confrence ministrielle europenne sur la politique des communications de masse. Kyiv (Ukraine),
10-11 mars 2005.
3
Cf. Lespace public, Critique de la politique, Payot, 1996, 324p.

14
mme fait ne sera a priori pas un public spontanment port l'esprit de tolrance et
louverture vers lAutre.
Les remarques prliminaires exposes ci avant nous laissent imaginer les consquences
qui peuvent rsulter de cette situation en matire de dialogue interculturel (avec cet Autre),
comme de respect et de promotion de la diversit culturelle en gnral La couverture
mdiatique, en amont comme en aval, de ce qua t la seconde guerre du Golfe (mars 2003),
en est une illustration intressante dans la mesure o elle a t symptomatique de la faon dont
on y rend compte des socits musulmanes en gnral. Les mdias occidentaux, quils soient
europens ou amricains, ont dans leur grande majorit fait preuve dun bel unanimisme, ne se
distinguant gure par la diversit de leurs analyses. Nul doute galement que la couverture
traditionnelle faite par les mdias occidentaux de lactualit du continent noir, o lon ne retient
que ce qui revt un caractre sensationnaliste et dramatique (gnocides du Rwanda et du
Darfour, famines, guerres civiles, Sida, malaria), offre aux publics un contenu saisissant de ce
quest dans sa diversit extrme la ralit de lactualit africaine. Le parti pris rdactionnel de
ne rapporter que ce type de faits revient implicitement transmettre au public lide que ces
socits ne savent rien produire dautre, ou tout du moins quun dialogue est impossible tant les
diffrences nous sparent
Comment imaginer, partant de la logique propre au systme mdiatique et son mode
de fonctionnement prsent, que les supports dinformation puissent vritablement uvrer au
rapprochement des peuples et des cultures ? Est-il concevable et alors que partout le
pluralisme mdiatique rgresse que ceux-ci prennent davantage en considration dans leurs
politiques rdactionnelles la diversit des cultures tout en participant activement au dialogue
entre celles-ci ? La concentration dans le secteur des mdias, favorise par le contexte de
mondialisation et donc de concurrence dans la course aux rsultats (linformation est devenue
avant toute autre considration une marchandise), na cependant pas conduit remettre
fondamentalement en cause lide selon laquelle linformation reste un bien public qui doit tre
gr au profit du plus grand nombre et de la socit elle-mme. Cest ici quintervient le
concept de rgulation de la libert de la communication, en organisant celles-ci autour de rgles
du jeu ngocies et en les faisant respecter par les diffrents acteurs.
Dans le contexte des transformations politiques qui ont touch par exemple les pays
dEurope Centrale et Orientale partir de la fin des annes 1980, on a assist une
libralisation du paysage mdiatique tant dans le domaine de la presse crite quaudiovisuelle.
La place et le rle politiques de ces mdias nouvellement indpendants, mais aussi des mdias
publics qui ont considrablement volu ces derniers tant passs il est vrai dune situation
qui faisait deux le bras arm du parti communiste (Lnine) un service pour le public, a
ncessit la mise place darbitres garants de la libert de communication, de lgal accs des
forces politiques aux canaux dexpression ou de la protection des publics destinataires
notamment. Un mouvement similaire a galement t observ pour le continent africain, o des
problmes similaires se sont poss, dans un contexte politique moins favorable dans lensemble.
Ici et l la naissance de ces instances de rgulation de la communication (et parfois de
linformation), qui dune faon gnrale sadressaient essentiellement, et quelques exceptions
prs, aux mdias audiovisuels, a t justifie par la ncessit de prendre en considration
lintrt des publics et de la socit, qui peut parfois tre diffrent de celui des oprateurs
mdiatiques. Lorsque lon sintresse aux attributions qui leurs sont gnriquement dvolues, se
distinguent deux comptences sensibles politiquement dans un contexte de transition et de
consolidation dmocratiques: le fait dassurer lgal accs des formations politiques aux mdias
en temps de campagne lectorale et louverture du paysage audiovisuel, par lattribution de
nouvelles frquences dmission radiophonique et tlvisuelle. A lexamen des textes qui les
ont institues, on peut tre surpris par labsence de toute attribution explicite allant dans le sens
dune action en faveur du dialogue interculturel et de promotion de la diversit culturelle par
mdias interposs. De ce point de vue, le rle spcifique et minemment important des mdias
dans les processus de construction de limage de lAutre, dexplication des diffrences, etc. a
largement chapp aux instances de rgulation de la communication. On peut le regretter dans

15
la mesure o ces arbitres seraient les plus lgitims inciter les mdias sen proccuper et
uvrer dans un sens positif. Si lon considre lespace Francophone, o sest dveloppe la
notion d exception culturelle , un certain nombre de pistes de rflexion sur lapport possible
des instances de rgulation la diversit culturelle et au dialogue entre les cultures ont t
voques, tant au niveau des principes gnraux qu celui de leur mise en uvre par les
organes rgulateurs.
Parmi les principes gnraux, on notera les actions suivantes :
- Mener campagne pour que la promotion et lencouragement de la diversit culturelle
nationale figure en bonne place au rang des comptences et attributions part entire de toute
instance de rgulation. On peut imaginer trois actions complmentaires que seraient le
lancement dune campagne de lobbying en vue dune harmonisation des textes et lgislations en
ce sens action mener dans le cadre des rseaux existants et notamment de lEPRA pour
lEurope (European platform of regulatory authorities) et du RIARC pour lAfrique (Rseau des
instances africaines de rgulation de la communication); lorganisation dune rencontre
(sminaire) spcifique sur cette question pour la sensibilisation des instances et des diverses
autorits nationales comptentes; la formulation (par des experts notamment) de propositions
types acceptables pour tous et sinscrivant dans le cadre des diverses prises de position
internationales (UNESCO, OIF, Conseil de lEurope) sur cette question.
- Sensibiliser le public et les oprateurs audiovisuels la notion de diversit culturelle,
en popularisant la dfinition de celle-ci telle quelle ressort des rencontres internationales
passes (UNESCO, etc.) et en en soulignant les enjeux notamment conomiques.
- Recommander une prsence accrue parmi les membres des instances de rgulation de
la communication, et quel que soit le mode de dsignation de ceux-ci, de reprsentants du
monde la culture dans son ensemble, de faon mieux prendre en considration les enjeux
culturels de la communication.
- Recommander que ce soit dornavant aux instances de rgulation, arbitres neutres
dans le champ de la communication et au service du public, de fixer le contenu des cahiers des
charges des oprateurs audiovisuels publics et de procder la nomination de leurs
responsables.
- Exiger, travers les cahiers des charges, que les oprateurs audiovisuels publics
participent la production et la diffusion duvres cinmatographiques et musicales
nationales et locales; diffusent autant que faire se peut leurs programmes ou une partie
significative de ceux-ci dans les diffrentes langues nationales quand cest le cas.
- Sassurer que les mesures de concentration dans le paysage mdiatique national ne
saccompagnent pas dune offre culturelle locale appauvrie, notamment en exigeant des
productions nationales et locales, par la mise en place de quotas de diffusion.
- Recommander le reversement dune part des sommes dues par les oprateurs
audiovisuels commerciaux en change de la licence dmettre qui leur a t octroye, au profit
dun fonds ( crer ou existant) daide la production cinmatographique et musicale
nationales.
- uvrer au rapprochement des instances de rgulation de la communication avec les
structures nationales en charge du cinma, de la musique, de la danse, etc. afin de fixer certains
objectifs communs atteindre et de lgitimer davantage encore les obligations faites aux
oprateurs audiovisuels en matire de diversit culturelle.
- Dans un contexte de convergence des mdias et des tlcommunications, les
instances de rgulation de la communication devraient se rapprocher de leurs consoeurs
charges des tlcommunications (l o il ny a pas eu fusion), afin de sassurer que les
obligations dictes en matire de diversit culturelle soient galement respectes dans les
contenus diffuss par des canaux diffrents de ceux des mdias dits traditionnels (par exemple
les tlphones mobiles).
- Dans le cadre des rseaux existant (EPRA, RIARC), les instances de rgulation
devraient unir leurs efforts pour surveiller le dveloppement des concentrations des mdias en
gnral, de faon, si cela savrerait ncessaire, prendre toutes initiatives juridiques ou autres

16
quelles pourraient collectivement estimer ncessaires afin de prserver le pluralisme des
mdias.
Du ct de la mise en uvre des principes gnraux par les organes rgulateurs, on
pourrait retenir les dispositions suivantes :
- Aide llaboration et la dfinition des contenus des cahiers des charges inhrents
aux obligations en matire de respect et de promotion de la diversit culturelle par les
oprateurs audiovisuels. Il pourrait sagir par exemple de mettre disposition des instances
inexprimentes en la matire un savoir faire existant ailleurs et dont elles pourront sinspirer au
besoin.
- Crer une mulation parmi les oprateurs audiovisuels pour les inciter dfendre et
promouvoir la diversit culturelle nationale. Un prix pourrait tre organis chaque anne au plan
national pour dsigner le mdia ayant le plus uvr en ce sens ; chaque mdia gagnant aurait
alors le droit de concourir une chelle europenne ou francophone par exemple, un prix
spcial diversit culturelle tant organis et dcern par lEPRA ou le RIARC.
- Lier explicitement tout octroi et/ou renouvellement de licence dmission
audiovisuelle au respect, par les candidats et oprateurs patents, des obligations dcoulant des
cahiers des charges en la matire.
- Tenir expressment compte, dans loctroi de licences des oprateurs audiovisuels
non commerciaux, dun quilibre culturel respecter entre les diffrents groupes nationaux et
rgions et au besoin encourager par des mesures adquates lexpression de ceux dont la
culture est absente ou sous reprsente dans le champ audiovisuel national.
- Recommander que chaque instance de rgulation en partenariat avec les Archives
nationales contribue la valorisation, la conservation et la sauvegarde du patrimoine culturel
local, rgional et national. Les TIC et en particulier Internet permettent ainsi de vhiculer
aisment des modes dexpression culturels ayant pour particularit dtre exclusivement oraux
(chants, contes, etc.) chez de nombreuses communauts : tenant compte, par exemple, des
succs commerciaux du cinma ou de la musique africaines ltranger, les instances africaines
de rgulation, dont la vocation est galement dencadrer le dveloppement dInternet chez elles,
pourraient activement inciter la mise en ligne de tels contenus et appeler les oprateurs
audiovisuels sy intresser.
- Sassurer que, dans le traitement de linformation culturelle nationale et locale, les
mdias audiovisuels respectent un quilibre entre les us et coutumes des diffrentes
communauts et rgions.
- Faire en sorte que la richesse de la diversit culturelle nationale, europenne ou
africaine ait aussi un prolongement dans les personnels des oprateurs audiovisuels appels
passer lantenne.
- Rendre possible la mise en place dun systme de saisine de chaque instance de
rgulation par les membres de communauts sestimant exclues culturellement du champ
mdiatique audiovisuel national ou offenses dans leur patrimoine culturel partag, par la
diffusion de tel ou tel programme radiophonique ou tlvisuel; instruire de tels manquements ou
abus et formuler des recommandations aux oprateurs audiovisuels.
- Enfin, les instances de rgulation devraient svertuer encourager laccs aux
mdias des personnes appartenant des minorits nationales, afin de promouvoir la tolrance et
de favoriser le pluralisme culturel.
Bibliographie
1.

Dahlgren, Peter, "How well the public sphere functions becomes a concrete manifestation
of society's democratic character and thus in a sense the most immediately visible
indicator", in Dahlgren Peter and Sparks Colin, Communication and Citizenship.
Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age, Routledge, London, 1991, p.2.

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

17
Landuyt, Ariane, De La Brosse, Renaud and Horga, Ioan, The Contribution of Mass Media
to the Enlargement of the European Union, International Institute of Administrative
Sciences, Jean Monnet Project, Bruxelles, 2003
Muhlmann, Graldine, Du journalisme en dmocratie, Petite Bibliothque Payot, Paris,
2006
Fdration europenne des journalistes, Etude sur la proprit des mdias europens :
menaces sur le paysage mdiatique , Bruxelles, septembre 2002, avec le soutien de la
Commission europenne.
Action Critique Mdias (Acrimed), La concentration des mdias et ses effets, Adresse :
http://acrimed.samizdat.net/imprimer.php3?id_article=843
La dynamique dune riche identit commune , point de vue prsent par un collectif de
personnalits europennes, in Le Monde, 13 novembre 2003.

18

Ignoring Radical Media in Communication Studies in Turkey


Eser KKER
lk DOANAY
Abstract: Attention to alternative media, which challenges through intermittent
endeavours and minor organizations, the hegemonic strategies and perspectives has been
rather meagre in Turkey is the main argument of this paper. In the field of communication
studies, an important part of the interventions with the aim of securing a critical stance may be
qualified as theoretical studies. These studies are either discussion of basic texts of critical
schools of thought in the West or concentrated on the critique of texts produced by the
hegemonic media. Backed by critical theories, most studies of this kind remain at a remarkable
distance to the communication forms and networks of political groups in Turkey. Examination
by journalists, sociologists or political scientists of the universe of meaning of communication
forms and outcomes of new social movements has not been sufficient in filling the gap of
knowledge in communication studies regarding radical alternative media. This situation
suggests the requirement for a revision of the political priorities of communication studies. This
paper attempts at elaborating on the reasons for this revision and a debate over its possible
outcomes.
Key words: radical media, communication, legislation, Turkey

The radical media have been subject to the communication studies in international
literature for at least three decades: The reasons of this interest are manifold: 1) The radical
media as being democratic alternative to media monopolies are the milieu of encounter in
modern public sphere for the excluded, unheard voices (Alanku, 2003:125). They offer the
means for democratic communication to people who are normally excluded from media
production (Atton, 2003:24). Owing to their connection to international social movements, the
radical alternative media operate as voice of the feminist, homosexual, ecologist, human right,
anti-war associations as well as the minority-ethnic movements. 2) Radical alternative media
can enable people within social movements to communicate [their] insights to one another.
(Downing, 2000:33). They build support, solidarity and networking against policies of the
power structure. 3) The radical media are alternatives to conventional mainstream media, within
their internal organization, interactive structure and reader-centered orientations; the ideas or
events ignored or censured by the mainstream media may find place in the radical alternative
media (Downing, 2000; Atton, 2002). These characteristics of radical media put them into a
specific place -even if not central- in the academic research interest areas; mainly at the
intersection of sociology, political sciences and communication studies. Especially since the
1970s, the communication studies have build up an interest on radical alternative media such
as street theaters, dances, cartoons, posters, parodies, satires, performance arts, graffiti, murals,
popular songs, jokes, novels, alternative printings and pictures, radios, films, documentaries,
videos. In the last decade, the study of the new social movements radical alternative media;
access televisions, radical online journals, internet based networks of independent media
centers; radical use of internet by anti-mondialisation activists or Zapatista guerillas; the news
production processes of the radical media endeavors; comparisons between radical and
mainstream media texts have also been subject to communication studies. (Downing, 2000;
Atton, 2002; 2003; Dillon and McKeel, 2005; Thompson et al. 2005)
The communication studies in Turkey have underestimated the knowledge of the
past that may potentially translate the political /ideological dimension of radical alternative

19
media of 1970s into the present. This indifference may also be conceived as the result of a
deliberate political positioning that play role at the subject preferences of academic studies.
Scrutinized by a critical stance and within an interdisciplinary perspective, radical media may
translate a reinterpretation of oppositional strategies into the academic field. Lack of this
translation renders communication studies rootless, hence leaving undiscussed the forms of
resistance. This situation suggests the requirement for a revision of the political priorities of
communication studies. This paper is written in order to emphasis the inevitability of this
translation to secure a genuine critical stance in communication studies.
1. Lack of interest of the first communication studies to the practices of radical
media
Early in the 1940s, Meyyet Boratav, a young medical student, got arrested and then
exiled after attempting to put up a banner writing Saracoglu is a fascist, denouncing the
political view of the foreign minister of the time, on the minaret of a mosque. Boratavs recently
published memoirs (2006) witness the Turkish lefts fighting years that all started with a banner
to encompass a fanzine of a few pages, a faction bulletin, flyers, handbills, all printed in a
mimeograph, and graffiti and slogans. Ali and Ferhat Boratav who edited their fathers memoirs
pronounced their own testimony as such: When we were children, we used to think that every
Turkish juvenile goes to the primary school, middle school, high school and after having
graduated from university, first to the police, thence to the jail and then to the exile; Because,
every uncle and aunt around us were passing from similar ways. (Boratav, 2006).
1970s were the years when university students armed with paint cans went out at night
to graffitiing on the walls or to stamping flyers on the electricity poles. Proleter (Proletarian),
nc (Pioneer), leri (Advanced), Dnm (Transformation), Aydnlk (Enlightened),
Kurtulu (Emancipation), Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Path), Halkn Kurtuluu (Emancipation
of the People) and Birikim (Amassment) and similar tens of journals were the complementary
mediators of long university canteen chats. The songs they sang and the slogans they shouted,
the red stars in the banners they upheld, and the hammer and sickles, and the down with
imperialisms in the demonstrations and marches were daylight versions of the solidaristic spirit
at night.
These young peoples experiences with posters, placards and other alternative media
may also be observed from the published texts of Dev-Gens - (Revolutionary Youth
Federation of Turkey) or THKP/C s (Peoples Liberation Party/Front of Turkey) tribunal
defences. On the other hand, an attentive regard may distinguish the slogans written on the
placards, posters or graffiti from the background images of the documentaries describing the
epoch.
However, communication studies were yet to be named as such in the 1970s. While
those studying haberleme1 in their offices at the journalism schools in Istanbul and Ankara
strived to establish the difference between information and communication in Turkish, they
steered towards understanding the feedback in the communication process in the context of
behaviouralist schools catered by social psychology, cybernetics and system analysis models.
The first generation of communication scholars, with an undergraduate degree in either law or
political science and then sent by the government to the United States for a degree, studied the
function of communication in the political socialization process and voting behaviours, different
communication systems the world being a bi-polar one, distinguishing between democratic,
socialist and totalitarian communication systems was popular and research some sections of
the history of communication in Turkey. What is uttered in the canteens, doorways and campus
alleys of universities and colleges and what is written by the students were the left practice as
such and the scholars engaged in the theory: The debate around the cultural imperialism and
culture industry was also limited. Works on local press and alternative culture was yet to
1

Literal translation would be exchanging news or correspondence

20
accumulate. In the schools of press and broadcasting, films were collected, radio programmes
were archived, documentaries were recorded, photographs were arranged, newspapers were
bound to be placed in dusty shelves, but alternative and local publications were not collected,
institutes of press could not get established. The local press was labelled as part of the Fed
Press financed by the paid notices from the government.
2. The reappearance and transformation of the radical/alternative media after the
1980 military coup
Despite the active character of the social opposition in 1970s, the coup-detat in 1980
disabled the conditions of existence for radical media by prohibiting any kind of social
organization such as the trade unions, associations or foundations. The atmosphere of political
pressure of the period accompanied by widespread censure or auto censure over the national
mass media has cancelled the re-appearance of radical media until 1990s: Any social
opposition that may be transferred through radical alternative media were exposed to legal or
political pressures; there were no legitimate channel to express the social opposition except for
the authorised political parties. Therefore, even if one can assume the existence of certain
endeavour to express the social opposition against military regime, these endeavours had to
have illegal and thus unregistered character.
Following the military coup in 1980, as the streets and paths were cleared of the left,
the universities were ruptured of its scholars. In the absence of its teaching staff thrown out by
the law 1402, including the author of the very first significant study on the leftist movements in
Turkey with an historical perspective and this is also the first study which makes it possible to
understand the processes and the mindset of leftist publishing (Tunay, 1967, 1992; 2000), the
university lost its already thin connection to the streets. In the ten year period of repression, the
only possibility of radical press materialized in comics magazines. In a work practice similar to
the going-ons of a student canteen, the magazine Grgr talked through its cartoon characters.
Anarchist youth groups formed the narrow path of opposition through their magazines and
fanzines, always with new as a prefix to the name. From the middle of the 1980s, feminist
publishing emerging with Kadn evresi (Women Circle) wrote to avoid heavy censorship, to
strengthen the solidarity and to talk to each other while attesting the possibility of a new kind of
magazine publishing.
In the decade after 1980, for those studying the mass communication, the prefix to the
communication became unnecessary. The translation into Turkish of the works concentrating on
the problematic operation of the communication process in the late capitalistic societies and
unfair development of the international communication order and the fundamental literature of
the critical theory, gave rise to the envision of the communication studies as an interdisciplinary
field. Though, it almost seems impossible to talk about the existence of an interest in the radical
or local media during this ten year period. The very few studies at the time on the leading
publications of the leftist movement in Turkey (e.g., on the journal Yn), do not create much
room for thought on the leftist publishing.
1990s might be described as the period of democratization as a marked policy of
deregulation was in charge and the public monopoly in broadcasting came to an end. During the
first half of this decade, especially the local radio became a medium of alternative voices.
According to Ece Algan, who studied the role of Turkish local radio in the construction of a
youth community, the media environment of the early 90s created a new democratic forum
for many Turks, especially those living in urban centres, to freely challenge the hegemony of
state authority and the official ideology, at least during the first half of the 1990s (Algan,
2005:76). She also states that during the first few years of the emergence of local radio in the
south eastern part of Turkey,
local radio and television were able to broadcast programmes for the first time
that dealt with the various problems in the region, such as corruption in local

21
administration, poverty, the rights of the Kurdish people, and programmes that
reflected the multi-ethnic and multilingual characteristics and culture of the region
(Algan, 2005:76).
However when the new legislation for radio and television came into effect which
prohibited political parties, associations, local administrations and universities from
broadcasting, it cut out one of the main arteries of alternative media. After the establishment of
Radio Television Supreme Council (RTK) (Law No 3984) in April 1994, the Supreme
Council was made responsible for assigning frequencies and issuing broadcasting permits and
licenses to private companies, and, all television and radio broadcasters are placed under its
supervision. The Supreme Council is granted with the authority of giving penalties (for
breaching the legal framework) to the broadcasters, which may range from warning to the
suspension of the TV and radio channels. Together with the emergence of this supervision; the
legal and financial terms of local broadcasting became more complicated; The article 29 of the
Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises prevents any organized group
from broadcasting. Accordingly, political parties, associations, labor and employer unions,
professional associations, co-operatives, foundations, local governments and companies
established or partially owned by local governments, commercial companies, unions [etc] shall
not be granted radio and television broadcast permit; The compulsory broadcasting standards
are too comprehensive and yet very vague such as:
Radio, television and data broadcasts shall be conducted in compliance with
the national security and general moral values; Broadcasts shall not violate the
existence and independence of the Turkish Republic, the territorial and national
integrity of the State, the reforms and principles of Atatrk; the national and moral
values of the community and Turkish family structure. (law no. 3984)
The same law determines that the broadcast shall be in Turkish language. This article
was later amended by the arrangements that enable broadcasts in the different languages and
dialects -as Kurdish- used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. However, the
programmes in native languages would be broadcasted within strict content and time restraints.2
More to the point, the law authorise the Supreme Council to transfer its authority of monitoring
and recording regional and local broadcast to units assigned by the Ministry of Interior. This
delegation of power is mostly interpreted by local bureaucrats as an authority to supervise the
broadcasts rather than monitoring and recording them. This also intensified the self-censorship
of the broadcasters and toned down the radical voices on air. Consequently, with the close
monitoring and application of new broadcasting laws by Supreme Council the local radio and
television stations that may be considered as potential radical media or community media
were either shut down or given warnings so that they again broadcast programming that did
not threaten the states official policies.3 (Algan, 2005: 76). As well, most of them have
2

Only programmes addressed to adults including news, music or promotion of the traditional culture are
permitted; by the condition of not exceeding 60 minutes per day and 5 hours per week for radio
broadcasting and 45 minutes per day and 4 hours per week for TV broadcasting.
3
For exemple, zgr Radyo, a local radio station in Istanbul, was sentenced by the Supreme Council to a
months closure for "inciting violence, terror, discrimination on the basis of race, region, language,
religion or sect or the broadcasting of programmes that arouse feelings of hatred in society." The station
stopped broadcasting on 18 August 2004. Gnes TV, a local television station in the eastern city of
Malatya, was also forced to stop broadcasting for a month from 30 March 2004. This was because the
Supreme Council accused it of "attacking the states existence and independence, and the countrys
indivisible unity with the people and Ataturks principles and reforms" under article 4 of RTK law 3984.
Using the same article, the Supreme Council closed down local TV station ART in the south-eastern city
of Diyarbakir on 15 August 2003 for broadcasting two love songs in Kurdish.
(http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12096 reached at 27. 11 2006). On 23 March 2006, two

22
encountered severe financial problems since they couldnt recompense heavy administrative
fines in case of the repetition of the violation of the law. Furthermore, the capital required for
establishing and enterprising local radio and TV compels these enterprises to develop strong
relationships with local capital owners, financial or power centers or political parties that
unavoidably damage their radical/alternative character; some of them prefer adjusting the codes
of production of the mainstream mass media and to articulate with them. The same conditions
are relevant for local presses which are quite dependent on the local capital groups or political
organizations that control their advertisement incomes. Given this situation, we can speak about
the difficulty of interconnecting local media with local components of social opposition, civil
society organisations or new social movements. Notwithstanding, as Sevda Alanku argues,
among the local radio and newspapers in Turkey there are many examples of family enterprise
managed by persons that bear the pains of this work since they like it; and since they have
words to say; and their political/cultural dispositions cause these enterprises to deal with the
political pressures4 (Alanku, 2003:10). For example, in the south eastern region, mainly in
Diyarbakr, where the Kurdish opposition is alive, we can observe individually distributed
journals having connection with civil society organisations working in the field of human rights.
The journals published by youth organisations, university students, intellectuals or various left
fractions, help also to express and widen the social opposition. Kurtulu Cephesi (Liberation
Front); Aydnlk (Illumination), Sokak (Street) are some of them published by left fractions.
Besides, it is still possible to mention local radio broadcasts that mediate the views of
new social movements and are organically linked to NGOs that kept flourishing in the 90s. Ak
Radyo (Open Radio)5 which went on air in 1995 in Istanbul became a communication centre for
alternative broadcasting as it is in tradition with the free radios that operate on a horizontal
structure independent of any capital and held in common in terms of ownership. Feminists,
environmentalists and anti-militarists join in the programming of Ak Radyo which strays from
the mainstream in also its music programmes.
Furthermore, Bamsz letiim A (Independent Communication Network) (BA)
which was established in 1997 brings together more than 130 local newspapers and radio and
television stations since 2001. The network is a civil endeavour that aims at promoting cooperation of the local media on a productive basis and establishes a new channel for honest
journalism; In so doing, BA pools news and information dispatched by affiliated local radio
stations, TV channels and newspapers; provides news and information related with the
conditions and realities of the ordinary people who are generally neglected by the Turkish
mainstream. It aims at voicing the lives and realities of the voiceless and unheard; provides
legal assistance for local media; produces radio programs for the local media who may not have
the necessary facilities and know-how for quality programmes and also provide a series of
training programmes to improve the social awareness of broadcasters. BA produces also news
analysis to help enhance the reporting of womens and childrens rights issues.
Besides these examples of different and unconventionally organized media, feminist,
environmentalist, anti-militarist, ethno-political and gay and lesbian movements and human
rights advocates deliver a considerable alternative media output both in press and online. The
diversity in the variety and quality of this output is significant. Street theatres, festivals,
exhibitions, murals, posters, photographs with alternative printing techniques, CDs, web sites
and online forums have all become part of daily life in the 1990s. Feminist, Sosyalist Feminist
Kakts, Mavi orap (Blue Sock), Eksik Etek (Lacking Skirt!), Pazartesi (Monday); Jibo,
Rizgariye, Jinan, Juin, Roza published by Kurdish feminists; Feminist Yaklamlar (Feminist
Approaches) (this latter is published upon internet) are some of the most known examples of
private TV channels Gn TV and Sz TV in Diyarbakr and a radio channel anlurfa Medya FM in
anlurfa began broadcasting in Kurdish after a long awaited the Supreme Councils permission. (Ruken
Bar, http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/turkey.html; reached at 27. 11. 2006)
4
Actually, there are 224 local TV channels and 108 regional and 944 local radio channels in Turkey
(www.rtuk.gov.tr; reached at 27. 10. 2006).
5
Ak Radio can be listened from www.acikradyo.com.tr

23
feminist magazines. These magazines have mediated the preparation of campaigns, the
discussion of strategies, the announcement of campaign activities and the organisation of
meetings that enhance togetherness between women groups. Nevertheless, the fact that most of
these magazines are published in stanbul may be considered as one appearance of the problem
of interconnecting the local media with new social movements (Kker, 1996).
We can expand our examples with the publications of the ecologist movements in
Turkey which are mostly fostered by international organizations as Greenpeace Journal.
Arkabahe (back garden), Indigo; and Buday (wheat) published upon internet are some of
other journals published by ecologists. Furthermore, Nisyan published by the anti-war
movement; Cihannma having connection with Mazlum Der functioning on the field of human
rights; Tketici Dergisi, a publication focused on consumer rights, are alternative journals
having connection with the civil society organisations; most of them refuses publishing
advertisements. Moreover, the fact that the last issue of the journal of homosexual movement in
Turkey which could be organised long after its Western equivalents, Kaos GL was confiscated
because of opposing general moral values; exemplifies well the legal restraints on the civil
society media.
Also in this decade, left-wing unions, parties and foundations have re-evaluated their
pasts. As exemplified by DSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Trade Union),
Halkevleri (Peoples Centres) and the Foundation for 78ers, in order to reproduce the leftist
imagination in the 1970s, many organisations have started archive studies, reorganized their
collections of posters, slogans, handbills and stamps and presented these to a wider audience
through exhibitions.
3. The Reasons
radical/alternative media

of

the

Communication

Studies

Indifference

to

the

Unfortunately, like the meagerness of the academic attention to the newspapers and
journals of the leftist movements, the founding agent of oppositional political organizations in
Turkey between 1960-1980; the media of new social movements have not found a place in the
body of knowledge compiled by critical communication studies. It is fairly difficult to say that
the communication studies in the 1990s have begun to cover these alternative media efforts and
study the radical media initiatives in Turkey to a large extent. Just as the weak interest in the
70s on the leftist movements, there is a faint concern on the new social movements and their
media in the 90s. We might argue several reasons for this lack of interest from the
communication studies field.
1. In the communication studies in Turkey, the theoretical frameworks to conceptualize
whats unique to Turkey have not been established and debated. The absence of a link
between the debate on the construction of new public spheres in the context of
Turkeys democratization and the search for alternative media is a consequence of the
insufficient consideration given to the debate on public sphere. The indifference of the
traditional Leftist thought to both the question of alternative media and that of
constructing new public spheres; and its consideration of these questions as a problem
that is discovered and marketed by existing power block to reproduce itself and to
make up for the revolution; and its claim that both questions were nothing but a
regressive rhetoric have become not only an obstruction before the historically
mapping of the public spheres in Turkey, but also given rise to a literature depending
mainly on quotations from primary texts. However, it will be fair to mention three
exceptional works in this context: Firstly, in the articles edited and gathered by Meral
zbek (2004) in a book titled Public Sphere -for instance in the one about Cumartesi
Anneleri (Saturday Mothers)- (Koal, 2004), the attempts to form alternative media
have been revealed. Then again another Meral zbek work (1991) on how arabesque
music became a transforming way of expression sets an example. Third exception is

24
Ece Algans work that displays that local radios create public meeting areas for the
youngsters to escape from the pressure of patriarchal society.
2. The limitations imposed by the disciplines on the new social movement research made
by both political scientist and sociologists have prevented the emergence of
conceptions concerning the environment and process of communication of social
movements. Although the ways in which new social movements create their own
media have become subject mostly to analyses of non-academics it is rather hard to
say that those works were benefited in communication studies. The political and
intellectual distance of the experts working in the field of communication to the people
working at civil society organizations and similar institutions has brought with it an
inadequacy of carrying those researches into academic works.
3. The lack of research on the forms of operation of both Leftist and feminist
broadcasting has been discouraging in making historical comparisons. For instance, it
can be observed that when the lack of knowledge on women magazines published in
the foundation years of the Republic merges with the lack of research on the feminist
reviews of the 1990s the wordings concerning radical media lessen.
4. The news fictions, news gathering practices and references of news value of both the
local and alternative media have been analysed by a very limited number of work one
of which belongs to Sevda Alanku and concerns Independent Network of
Communication (BA). This lack of concern is related to the absolute dependence of
both local and alternative media on the international and national flow of news. The
inability of editing local news and the inexperience of local journalists and
broadcasters in reaching the news sources bring up the question of differentiation from
widespread media.
5. Academic fashions and attractiveness of the new knowledge prevents researchers to
expose the continuity of Turkeys opposing voice; as a result, only a very few masters
and PhD theses take radical media as a subject matter. Two of the exceptional
examples, Sat Atakuls masters thesis on feminist review Pazartesi (Monday) and
Serpil akrs study on Kadnlar Dnyas (World of Women), an important printing
media of the Ottoman Women Movement, analyse the operational practice of feminist
media.
To conclude, as it is pointed out by John Downing, radical media is a constituting
component of the formation of a democratic communication structure. An inner operation
alternative to dominant media, a reader-based news approach, transparency in the institutional
control mechanisms, silenced voices of all subalterns can only be met in radical media. By
being committed to an imaginary of democratic society communication studies in Turkey has to
give up neglecting the blossoming attempts of the collective entities whose words were rejected
and whose views were distorted by commercial media in the last decade and it has to wait no
longer in order to back the word that was written on the walls in Turkeys past by taking great
pains. This paper has been written with faith in that it is necessity and responsibility to point to
the need for a translation of the language of the radical media into an academic one. It is
dedicated to the memory of Dr. Boratav and to Tayfun ten years of whose life were stolen for
he, like thousands of them, wrote on the wall in 1980.
References
1. Algan, Ece, The role of Turkish local radio in the construction of a youth community in
The Radio Journal, vol. 3, no. 2, 2005
2. Atakul, Sat, Popler feminist bir yayn deneyimi: Kadnlara mahsus gazete Pazartesi,
unpublished master thesis, Ankara niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits, Ankara, 2002
3. Atton, Chris, News Cultures and New Social Movements: Radical Journalism and the
mainstream media, in Journalism Studies, vol. 3, no. 4, 2002, pp. 491-505

25
4. Atton, Chris, Reshaping Social Movement Media for a New Millennium, in Social
Movement Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003
5. Boratav, Meyyet, Sakncal Doktor, Ankara, mge, 2006
6. akr, Serpil, Merutiyette Osmanl Kadn Hareketi ve Kadnlar Dnyas Dergisi,
unpublished PhD thesis, Ankara niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits, Ankara, 1991
7. Dillon, John, Mckeel, William, Political Nihilism, Alternative Media and the 2004
Presidential Election, in Simile, May, vol. 5, issue 2, 2005
8. Downing, John, Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements,
Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage, 2001
9. Kker, Eser, Feminist Alternatif Medya zerine, in LEF Yllk, Ankara, 2006
10. Murphy, Brian Martin, Alternative Journalisms, Social Movement Computer Networks and
Africa, in Critical Arts: A South-North Journal of Cultural & Media Studies, 1999, vol. 13,
issue 2, pp. 1-23
11. zbek, Meral, Kamusal Alan, stanbul: Hil Yaynlar, 2004
12. zbek, Meral, Popler Kltr ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski, stanbul: letiim, 1991
13. Stein, Laura, Media and Democratic Action, Peace Review, 11:1, 1999
14. Thompson, Margaret E, Anfossi Gomez, Katerina and Suarez Toro, Maria, Womens
Alternative Internet Radio and Feminist Interactive Communications, in Feminist
MediStudies, Vol. 5, no. 2., 2005
15. Tunay, Mete, Trkiyede Sol Akmlar I, 1908-1925, stanbul: BOS Yaynlar, 2000
16. Tunay, Mete, Trkiyede Sol Akmlar II, 1925-1936, stanbul: BOS Yaynlar, 1992

27

2. Media, European Identity, Plural Identity


Ioan HORGA (Oradea) The Role of the Media in Changing the Meaning of
Borders
Thibault BAZIN (Strasbourg) Mdias europens et la non-mention des
racines chrtiennes dans la Constitution europenne
Mria FOLLRICHOVA, Gilles ROUET (Bratislava) Mdias et minorits
en Slovaquie

28

The Role of the Media in Changing the Meaning of Borders


Ioan HORGA
Abstract: If the borders as a territorial limit lose a little of their significance along
with the deepening of the integration process, the mental perception of border as a difference or
acceptance of multiplying the meanings of border must be assumed by us as a part or our
existence. Transforming the perception of the border from territorial limit into a different
border is a process which is part of the foundations of the European Public Area, in which the
Media must play a very important role by maintaining the balance between close and open and
the balance between memory and identity. The European Public Area will not be the direct
result of the interaction of European public actors; it will be an indirect result by the action of
the local, regional and national media phenomenon mediated by European governance and
alternative media, which could ensure the transformation of the perception of the border from
limit into difference.
Key words: borders, frontiers, media, European Public Area
In the book Europes Next Frontiers, Olli Rehn, the European commissar for
enlargement, offers a topic of deep reflection when rhetorically posing the question instead of
limits and borders Maginot lines trying to insult ourselves from global Interdependence
couldnt we Europeans think in terms of the next frontiers?1.
First of all a rethinking of the concept of border, is highly required and of its sense
of limit. It is acknowledged that the notion of border is closely linked to that of territory
and sovereignty. Analysts in the field of international relations are compelled to reconceptualize its territoriality in connection with the idea of sovereignty and with that of
borders2. According to J.G.Ruggie, the contemporary sovereignty is shared at multiple nodal
points in an international system of power relations that first un-bundles the relations between
sovereignty and territoriality and, second, redesigns the single perspective state as a multiperspective polity3. The European Union is the best example of this new type of politics4.
Borders limit our minds, chain actions, and reduce our influence. If borders are
restrictive, the frontiers are innovative. The frontiers free our minds, stimulate action, and
increase our influence. We mean frontiers that open ways for innovative products and services.
We mean frontiers that improve flexibility and security on the labour market, and thus the
employability of Europeans in the face of global competition. We mean frontiers that promote a
new institutional settlement, and thus a more effective and democratic Europe, better able to
enhance the security and well-being of its citizens. We mean frontiers that enable Europe the
project its civilian power of democratic and economic transformation, especially in the
countries that aspire to become members of the EU5.

Olli Rehn, Europes Next Frontiers, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006, p. 13


Mabel Berezin, Martin Schain, Europe without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity
in Transnational Age, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 2003, p. 5sqq
3
John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,
in International Organization, 1993, 47 (1), pp. 139-174
4
Ioan Horga, Why Eurolimes, in Eurolimes, vol.1, Oradea, 2006, p. 4
5
O. Rehn, op. cit., p. 13
2

29
From what point of view, lEurope est un vritable laboratoire, elle est une avantgarde supratatique exprimentale, une sort de mondialisation mta-statocentrique 6, o il y
a la transition de lanthropocentrisme primaire, conu comme une affaire exclusive de lEtat,
lanthropocentrisme ouvert la dynamique cosmocentrique qui se font entendre, entre autres,
sur quatre niveaux fondamentaux : identitaire, tatique, politique et communicationnel 7.
Secondly it is highly required to assume the concept of frontier as an existential
factor, living with ourselves, but which we have to administer.
Europe as a cultural area [space] is dominated by the emotional attachment8. Europe
does not dispose of yet another common civic space9, a public space10 or of a common cultural
space11, which is the foundation of forging the European identity. There are still many obstacles
in the effective development of a public European space, as a ground of common identity. It is
enough to mention that never the problem of public European space was a priority for the
political and economic elites in the process of European construction12. Paradoxically, a
common European memory exists only from the time of the historic conflicts between the EU
member states.13 Preserving the historical and national memory leads to the enhanced durability
of the nation-state. The continuous hegemony of the nation-state, even in the presence of the
European integration process, underlines the fact that nowadays and for a long period of time,
the problems of the internal borders of the EU has to be viewed only from a trans- national
manner and only timidly as a post-national attribute. That is why there can be heard lots of
discourses that lead to the setting up of a solid coherence beyond the internal EU borders and a
closing up at its external borders14.
The topic of European identity, as a component part of the problems of borders must
be amplified as well with points of view that non-Europeans settled on the continent share.
Adaptation of non-Europeans to the European environment shall have profound consequences
upon the European origin inhabitants, forcing them to rethink their own identity and perhaps to
invent a new one.
Naturally the question arises as to what kind of entity Europe is15. There are two
answers to this. One is given by the majority of its members, and by those who are part of the
old Europe, underlining the unitary character of the European entity. The other one is given by
the new-comers to Europe, citizens of the new member states and non-Europeans settled in
Europe. They emphasize the pluralist character of the European entity, based on the respect of
the difference and diversity. By a closer look at the two answers, there is in all a common
ground, given by the cultural characteristics of European identity.
Thirdly the cultural answers given to the European identity must compulsorily go
through a diversification of the senses and examples of border. The current problems of
6

Georges Contogeorgis, Identit nationale, identit politeiene et citoyennet lpoque de la


mondialisation, in Europa em Mutao. Cidadania. Identidades. Diversidade Cultural (ed. Maria
Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, 2003, p. 160
7
Ibidem; I.Horga, op.cit., p. 5
8
M. Berezin, op. cit., p. 16
9
Renaud de la Brosse, Espace mdiatique europen et communaut de destines : complmentarits ou
oppositions entre chelles continetales, nationales, rgionales et locales ?, in Ideias de Europa: que
fronteiras? (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, Quarteto, 2004, pp. 283-296
10
Ioan Horga, The National Media Impact on European Security, in International and European
Security versus the Explosion of Global Media (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Renaud de la Brosse,
Ioan Horga), Bruxelles, 2004, pp. 25-41
11
Mercedes Samaniego Boneu, Las fronteras socio-culturales de la Unin Europea, in Ideas de Europa:
Que fronteiras (eds. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, Quarteto, 2004, pp. 87-98
12
Craig Calhon, The Democratic Integration of Europe in Europe without Borders. Remapping
Territory, Citizenship and Identity in Transnational Age (ed. M. Berezin, M. Schain), p. 272
13
Yann Laurent, Existe-t-il une mmoire commune europenne?, in Le Monde, 5 mars 2003
14
C. Calhon, op. cit, p. 272
15
Willfried Spohn, Anna Trandafyllidou, Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration. Changes in
Boundary Constructions between Western and Eastern Europe, London, Routledge, 2002

30
European construction constitutional blocking, the competitiveness of the European economy
in the world, creating a very dynamic labour market, affirmation of Europe in the global
intercultural dialogue, transforming the EU into and actor with weight in international relations
can be provided answers that fall within the same area of diversifying the senses of the notion
of border16.
Olli Rehn, is of opinion that in the actual stage of European construction, three
frontiers have to be assumed and overcome in asserting the European identity.17. Rebuilding
Economic Confidence is a first example of frontier that we have to assume. Today Europe
confronts the double challenge. On the one hand there is the globalization of economy, and on
the other hand, there is the problem of population aging. These challenges must be answered
with an increase of investments in education, in forming and reforming the labour market in
order to make it more flexible and more secure. There are a series of countries in the European
area the Scandinavian countries and of late the countries in Central and Eastern Europe
which invest into an economy of knowledge and are highly open to the phenomenon of
internationalization.
Economic performance has obvious political consequences. To be able to lead at
European level, the EUs political leaders first need to convince their citizens that they can
solve pressing problems at home. Legitimacy stems from the prospect of jobs and personal
security. Thats why the economic and social revival of Europe goes hand-in-hand with, or even
precedes, the revitalization of political project of Europe18.
Making Europe Function Well is the second example of the frontier that we could
assume. We must assume the fact that the border between widening and deepening is flexible
and has to lead towards a strong political and institutional integration in parallel with extending
the area of peace, democracy and prosperity across our continent19. The European Union can
develop on the one hand enhanced cooperation between the states that are able to assume this
aim, and on the other hand by being willing to push integration forward among themselves in
certain areas. Any such arrangements would have to be open to any member state able and
willing to participate in them. They should be implemented via the Unions shared institutions.
The new European order must be inclusive of both old and new member states20.
Building a New Consensus on Enlargement, the third example of frontier which Olli
Rehn21 offers to reflection, enables Europe to be understood as a space which is characterized by
exceptionally vigorous economic, political and cross-cultural interaction which continually renews
and replenishes itself by sucking in products, people, ideas, inventions, technologies, doctrines,
practices, skills and talents originating from all over the world and melding them together in
increasingly sophisticated combinations22.
The Europeanness of a country should therefore be judged, not in accordance with
fixed cultural or geographical criteria, but by an empirical assessment of the extent to which it
has actually been participating in, contributing to, and abiding by the currently prevailing rules,
norms and practices of the continually metamorphosing civilization, states system and big
market which go by the name of Europe. Likewise, eligibility for formal membership of the
European Union should be decided primarily on the basis of an applicants actual willingness and
capacity to contribute to the EUs success and to comply with its membership rules, norms and
obligations, rather than on the basis of more arbitrary cultural and/or geographical preconceptions

16
Oliver Zimmer Boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources: towards a process-oriented to national
identity, in Nation and Nationalism (Journal of Association for Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism), vol.
19/2, 2003, pp.173-194
17
O. Rehn, op.cit., pp. 16-22
18
Ibidem, p. 17
19
Ibidem, p. 18
20
Ibidem, p. 19
21
Ibidem, pp. 19-21
22
Robert Bideleux, The limits of Europe, in Eurolimes, vol. 1, Oradea, 2006, p. 53

31
and prejudices. Any country which is meeting or demonstrably willing and able to meet the above
criteria should be considered European and eligible for membership of the EU23.
Apart from the three frontiers mentioned we are of opinion that there must be assumed
at least three more frontiers in order to be able to make the transition from the national identity
to the European one24: the balance between close and open transforming the border into
frontier; balance between memory and identity in transforming the border into frontier; the role
of media in transforming the sense of frontiers.
1. The balance between close and open in transforming the border into frontier
According to Gerard Delanty, the frontiers in Europe thus suggest limits zones, the
end of a territory rather than points of transition25. The term was originally a military zone
where the enemy was engaged26. Such an assertion seems to contradict the logic of our
discourse which sees in frontiers a convergence and transition point. However, the same author
leaves a door open when asserting that borders have symbolic roles in defining the political
community; they have functional roles with respect to the internal administration and political
control of populations and markets, and they have a geopolitical role in respect of territorial
defence. The border should be seen as a reflection of the historically contingent situation and is
an on-going process as opposed to being fixed or territorially determined by the physical facts
of geography27. The EUs constitutive units, its member states, too have been transformed both
by the progressive movement towards the trans-nationalization of the state and by wider
processes of globalization. In this situation then the question of borders takes on a new
significance. Of the many aspects of borders in Europe today is the centrality of the cultural
dimension, which can be viewed, like Europeanization itself, as an open process characterised
by moments of closure28.
The relation between open and closed borders is particularly relevant to the EU and to
the general context of Europeanization. The EU itself is an example of a state system that while
having relatively hard borders does not have fixed borders that are closed. The political borders
of the EU are not final frontiers, but open to new states. The EU member states themselves have
more open borders than non-EU states and within the category of EU member states, the
Schengen countries have more open borders than those that are not within this agreement29.
According to J. Urry, A. Mol and J. Law, the global space can be seen in terms of
regions, networks and flows30. Regions refer to the space of bounded societies; networks refer
to relational constancy between components; and flows refer neither to boundaries not networks
but movement and process. From a conventional point of view, the internal or external
dimension of Europes borders acquires relevance nowadays only at the level of the regional
space, where we notice a process of re-territorialization of the space with regard to the centre.
The process takes place at two levels, by regionalization of the territory and by the appearance
of the Euro-regions.

23

Ibidem
Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and
Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001
25
Gerard Delanty, Borders in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure, in Eurolimes, p.
48
26
M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World, Oxford Polity, 1996, p. 9
27
G. Delanty, op.cit, p. 49
28
Ibidem, p. 47; Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, Yosuf Lapid, Identities, Borders, Orders. Rethinking
International Relation Theory, Minneapolis, University of Minessota Press, 2001
29
G. Delanty, op.cit, p. 54
30
Ibidem, p. 51; J.Urry, Global Complexity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003, p. 40-49; A. Mol & J. Law,
Regions, Networks and Fluids: Anaemia and Social Topology, in Social Studies of Sciences, 1994, 24,
pp. 641-671
24

32
According to Istvan Suli-Zakar, the region is a socio-economic territorial unit, based
on the close co-operation and homogeneity in interest of its components but it cannot always
be defined by definite geographic boundaries31. The borders of the regions are elastic in the
case of regionalism. Partly, in the sense that the influence of several region forming factors may
be present at the same time in one segment defined as an entity of the geographical space, on a
geographically determined area but their fields do not exactly coincide. On the other hand, the
elasticity of the regions is also valid with respect to the changes of the factors and their role in
time32.
The phenomenon of regionalization of the European territory is based on two pillars.
On the one hand one talks about the de-centralization process, which designates the forming of
new territorial divisions, in which the state authority is reduced. On the other hand, the rapid
reforms in the organizational, operational and financial fields of the EU have constituted other
vital sources f the regionalization phenomenon. That is why in Western Europe especially the
borders no longer separate states, but they are the functional limits between the regions, which
become more and more the grounds of European cooperation33.
The success of the regions, as actors of European integration is doubled also by the
appearance of the Euro-regions, as regional structures which re-territorialize the space at the
border between two or more states.34, which agreed to harmonise their activities for the more
successful development of their common areas35. It is encouraged the construction of crossborder links and of an infrastructure which would make borders more and more permeable. The
mechanisms are still far from being fully functional, because of a lack of a legal quasi-European
framework36 and of certain well defined administrative competences37.
In the context of the balance between closed and open in the management of
transforming the border into frontier at a European level, remarkable things have been done. On
the one hand there was achieved the harmonization of the administration and regional planning;
the management of the problems of the employees and cross-border communitarians; the
financing of the institutional system of the joint education and training; the mutual recognition
of qualification; and the harmonization and financing of the cross-border infrastructural
developments. As a result of the achievements, the support of cross-border co-operation was
given more and more emphasis in the EU policies38.
On the other hand there have appeared the examples of some actions that have gone
beyond the strict stage of cross-border cooperation projects, moving onwards toward strategic
integrating forms, which should generate, centers of excellence and agglomerations of
development About the agglomeration Basel-Mulhouse, many things are known because they
have a tradition of action and there is written literature o them. But about the project DebrecenOradea Cross-border Agglomeration, launched on December 8-th 2006, and aims at coagulating
efforts of research, development and technical and scientific innovation in Oradea and
Debrecen, very little is known, but there are favorable premises for a successful action.
In addition to these new borders, which are generally products of re-territorialization,
there is also the increasing salience of the imperial limes, the border as a diminishing zone of

31

Suli-Zakar Istvan, Regions in the United Europe, in Eurolimes, vol. 1, p. 16


Ibidem, p. 17; H.W. Amstrong, R. W. Vickerman (eds), Convergence and Divergence Among European
regions, London, Jessica Kingslay Publishers, 1995
33
Esther Gimeno Ugalde, Regions and ethnoregions in Europe. The particular case of Catalonia, in
Eurolimes, vol. 2, Oradea, 2006, pp. 45-53
34
Alexandu Ilies, Romania. Euroregiuni, Oradea, Editura Universitatii din Oradea, 2004
35
Klra Czimre, Cross-Border Co-operation. Theory and Practice, Debrecen, 2006
36
Henri Comte, Nicolas Levrat, Aux coutures de lEurope. Dfis et enjeux juridiaues de la coopration
transfrontalire, Paris, LHarmattan, 2006, p. 15
37
Ibidem, pp. 24-25
38
Suli-Zakar Istvan, op.cit., p. 28; H. Donnan & T. Wilson (eds), Border Approaches: Anthropological
Perspectives on Frontiers, University Press of America, New York & London, 1994
32

33
control over which the centre loses control of the periphery39. This border is less a new
European version of what W.P. Webb called the Great Frontier40; rather it is the zone of semiperipheries, which in earlier times were buffer-zones but today are borderlands. In the terms of
M. Hardt and A. Negri, this aspect of Empire is a feature of states in the present day: In
contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial centre of power and does not rely on
fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentred and de-territorialized apparatus of rule that
progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontier41. It
designates a territorial situation in which there is a general weakening of the border beyond the
areas directly controlled by the centre, where the periphery fades into an outer borderland.
In these new borders it is more difficult to conceptualize borders as an edge or frontier
separating one region from another exterior space for the outside is often within the inside.
Instead it is more helpful to see the border in terms of interconnecting axis, such as those
discussed above. For example the central and eastern European countries who have recently
joined the EU provide a policing role to the rest of the EU, which provides subsidies for such
policing controls. However, the border that they establish is not a straightforward frontier but a
more complicated mechanism of control involving policing, economic and military functions.
In general the emphasis is less on the military and more on the policing42.
Another example of the changing relation of the centre to the periphery in Europe is
the emerging of a new kind of governance whereby the EU expands its governance beyond the
member states to neighbouring regions. Such regions, while being formally excluded from legal
membership, are also not excluded but part of a networked political system in which fuzzy
borders come into play43. Examples of this are accession association (for potential members),
neighbourhood association (Mediterranean and near eastern countries), development cooperation (Africa and wider Asian countries) and various kinds of co-operation44.
The balance between open and closed in administering the transformation of border
into frontier is much more visible in area networking. Such forms of space are present within
European space and have implications for the European border.
Massimo Cassiari thus describes Europe as an archipelago of spaces connected by
various links45. He argues Europe is a network of differences, a mosaic of overlapping and
connecting diversities. There is no overarching or underlying unity, only connections. This
notion of Europe is clearly different from the vision of a fortress in which space is bounded by
an outer frontier46.
The administration by means of networks must become a lever by which the
community model or the partnership model is transferred all over Europe at the same standards,
there being produced a strong transfer of loyalty to the participating actors in such networks47.
One first advantage of the networks consists in valuing the spirit of initiative in the direction of
experimenting and implementing European policies, by very dynamic levers highly
communicative, trans-national and with low costs. A second advantage is that of spreading out

39

G. Delanty, op. cit., p. 51


W.P. Webb, The Great Frontier, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952
41
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire, Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 2000, p. Xii; apud G.
Delanty, op.cit., pp. 51-52
42
P. Andreas, Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twentyfirst Century, in International
Security, 2003, 28 (2), pp. 78-111
43
S. Lavanex, EU external governance in wider Europe, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2004,
11(4), p. 681
44
G. Delanty, op.cit., p. 52
45
Massimo Cacciari, LArcipelago, Milan, Adephi, 1997
46
G. Delanty, op.cit., p. 54
47
John Peterson, Policy Networks, in Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory,
Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 117-135
40

34
at the level of whole Europe of a new type of solidarity48, the professional solidarity, which in
Eastern Europe is almost non-existent at the level of the elite.
Of course that, until the implementation of a functional system of networks a certain time
shall pass: as the officialdom and the independent non governmental actors in the new member
states must learn the rules of the game applied to the political networks and they must get used
to negotiate among themselves49; since the majority of actors in the new member states are nonexperimented in international organizations and many of them have not worked in the Western
system of lobby. This fact indicates another problem, if the political network in an extended EU
shall be able to disseminate the norms of conforming to the EU rules, in spite of the great
disparities between the levels of re economic modernizing and very strong influence of the
public sector upon the private one50.
Having in view the fact that the governing through networks is done at several levels of the
political networks with actors in the public and private sector shall be more and more difficult
to reform EUs system of functioning with 27 de members, having in mind that the reformers
are not omnipotent51. Since there is no unique sovereign centre having a authority and power to
fundamentally change the politics, sustaining a process of reform of the system in the direction
of political networks shall be very difficult. Therefore, the development of political networks as
future structures of non-state government paradoxically has to be sustained right by the
institution it denies, i.e. the national state. Here is the very important problem that the civic will
should meet the public transparency. Here is the key of setting up networks and of governing by
networks.
Finally there takes shape un systme triple de solidarits qui simposent comme
acteurs dans lespace du gouvernement: solidarits entre les individus, citoyens ou pas,
prsents au mme temps et dans le mme endroit ; solidarits entre les territoires avec emphase
sur la dcentralisation et affirmation des droits dautonomie collective et personnelle ;
solidarit entre les gnrations et les sexes pour sauvegarder lenvironnement, pour protger
les ressources et pour appuyer le dveloppement .
Global networks and flows produce borders and also produce new kinds of closed
systems as well as new kinds of hierarchies. For example, networks produce lines of
demarcation between different networks and also between the spaces that are not networked,
spaces in which exclusion is more likely to be high. It is a striking feature of current patterns of
territorialization that these spaces can be found in national space, within cities, in abandoned
territories, in rural hinterlands. In other words, networks and flows produces less visible borders
and ones that are manifest in social fragmentation52.
2. The balance between memory and identity in transforming the border into
frontier
Suppressing state borders and enhancing the limits of the community borders have
direct effects. First and foremost, suppressing the physical barriers, without suppressing the
mental circles, that have served to the creation of distorted images about the other, as defence

48
Thomas Risse, Social Constructivism and European Integration, in Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez,
op.cit, pp. 159-177
49
Gerard Timsit, Globalisation and Governance at the Start of the 21st Century. The Case of Continental
Europe, in The Turning World. Globalisation and Governance at the Start of the 21st Century (ed. by
Guido Bertucci and Michael Duggett), IOS Press, 2002, pp. 25-32
50
Grigore Silasi, Integrarea monetara europeana. Intre teorie si practica, Timisoara, Editura Orizonturi
Universitare, 1998
51
Fabienne Maron, Le role de lEtat et la bonne gouvernance. Une perspective europenne; in Media
and the Good Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement (eds. Fabienne Maron, Ioan
Horga, Renaud de la Brosse), Bruxelles, 2005, pp. 44-58
52
G. Delanty, op. cit, p. 55

35
mechanisms, shall maintain or shall create new borders. Secondly, it is impossible to be ensured
a material development by giving up the potential of mutual cooperation53.
Heading towards this direction Enrique Banus noticed that in real cultural life frontier
often have been not so relevant. But we have to speak not only about mental frontier, but also
about the significance of the real frontier in the mental world, this collective inner world also is
part of culture54. If we combine a real need, the need to belong to a community, whit the
historically consolidated collective identity, which for long times been the States, the frontiers
a political reality can become a cultural reality, can distinguish, can be significant as defining
elements of otherness: the other is who lives on the other side of the frontier not to speak
about the problem when the other is living within the own community, the problem of the so
called minorities, people belonging to the same political community, but unified by a
different cultural code. Indeed a society in which in a relevant manner different cultures coexist
can create insecurity to people needing a clear adscription to an identity55.
The population chooses today a few identity types: regional, religious, racial and
linguistic. There is a division in the world between the new states and the old states from the
point of view of the identity paradigm: the new states, e.g. USA, a civic nationalism replaced
the ethnic nationalism56, thus the state tries to make an effort to promote civic nationalism
that is ultimately weaker57.
Physical borders are mentally assumed as cultural frontiers. These mental frontiers try
then to divide the world in closed cultures58, in civilizations which have nothing in common
with the other civilization, with which they often share (physical) frontiers or in the
aforementioned case even the space.
The balance between memory and identity in approaching the frontier mentality is
highly visible in the communities that have different perceptions about the historic past. In a
study published in no. 2 of Eurolimes, the young Swedish researcher, Anders Blomqvist
starting from the case study of the Romanian and Hungarian community in the city of Satu
Mare/Szatmar, reaches the conclusion that although the city has a true interethnic mixture with
a strong tolerance if you stay more you will notice that Romanians and the Hungarians have
their own network of contacts59.
The historical perception of the past has created two different images of the citys
history. These mental borders have the origin in a process of constructed boundaries and
identities of Hungarians and Romanians. In this process factor as ethnocentrism, perception of
history, great power politics, linguistic and religious differences play an important role.
Perceptions on history, as well as linguistic and religious difference are used as social boundary
markers. Both groups have a strong ethnocentrism, which created one city with two images and
two communities. However, within the city there are some people who have a kind of
situational identity, thus shifting between being Hungarian and Romanian depending on the
situation60.

53
Mercedes Samaniego Boneu, Las fronteras socio-culturales de la Unin Europea, in Ideas de Europa:
Que fronteiras (eds. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, Quarteto, 2004, p. 90
54
Enrique Banus, The cultural relevance of the borders, in Eurolimes, vol. 2, Oradea, 2006, p. 201
55
Ibidem, pp. 201-202
56
Sandra F. Joireman, Nationalism and Political Identity, London, New York, Continuum, 2003, p. 25
57
Ibidem, p. 46
58
Thomas Lundn, On the boundary. About Humans and the end of territory, Stockholm, Sdertrns
Hgskola, 2004
59
Anders Blomqvist, One City Two Images Two Communities: The case of the Romanian-Hungarian
City of Satu Mare/Szatmrnemeti, in Eurolimes, vol. 2, Oradea, 2006, pp. 37-44. In another study Justyna
Kutrzeba follows this difference in the perception of the past in the region Pokuttya and Carpathian region
(Justyna Kutrzeba, Jewish inhabitants of the Pokkutya and Carpathian region, as seen by their neighbors
based on the folklore of Oskar Kolberg, in Eurolimes, vol. 2, Oradea, 2006, pp. 96-102)
60
Ibidem, p. 42

36
The mental borders, the insistence on significance of the geographical borders are
underlined in times in which the identity is threatened. It is in the fight for diversity in Europe
that the borders have acquired a quasi metaphysical dimension. This is a bitter irony of history.
But the irony of history has caused also that the especially people coming from the
borders have contributed to make borders relative. And this has succeeded in a project whose
core is precisely the relativization of Nation-State, which was dominant during centuries: the
project of European integration61.
The boundary between the groups is the point at which differences and criteria for
inclusion are most clearly articulated62. In national communities, where the boundaries have the
role to establishment of political sovereignty63, the boundaries represents the limits of
communal imagination and the borders are used to exclude the non-members64. The borders are
the physical manifestation of the social boundaries existing around the community65.
This geographic criterion cannot be automatically transformed into a social reality.
Border communities, although officially national community members, are also socially
integrated with the other, resulting in their being viewed with some suspicion66. The literature
referring to the communities at the borders of the national community and identity demonstrates
how ambiguous the situation of the members of a community or identity is, to be defined by the
people they belong to as well as by the other members of the community they live in67. Should
things be viewed from the point of view of the nature of the border and particularly of its role of
integrating or exclusion factor, one can define what is meant by us and who the others are.
If things are viewed from the perspective of the social community, we and the others live
here. The same social space is inhabited, knowing the same characteristics and similarities. In
other words, we and they are one and the same, sharing one identity68.
The border communities have a double role to play in the national imaginary,
according to R. Shields69. On the one hand, the inhabitants of these communities are heroes
because they live there. The border communities mark the limits of identity70 and they defend
traditions. At the same time they assert the myths and traditions about the unity of the people as
well as the myths about the natural unity of the territory71. On the other hand, the border
communities can represent the other in the national imaginary72. According to T.M.Wilson
and H.Donnan, the border people are comfortable with the notion that they are tied culturally
to many other people in neighboring states73.
61

E. Banus, op. cit, p. 204


Fiona Gill, Public and private: national identities in a Scottish Borders community in Nation and
Nationalism (journal of Association for Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism), vol. 11/1, 2005, p.86
63
M. Anderson, op.cit, p. 189
64
E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalisme, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994, p. 4
65
F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organisation of Culture, London, George Allain
&Unwin, 1970
66
F. Gill, op.cit, p. 84
67
A. P. Cohen, Symbolising Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures, Manchester University
Press, 1986; L. ODowd, T.M.Wilson, Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New
Europe, Aldershot, Avebury, 1996; A. Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: the Changing
Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border, Chichester, John Wiley &Son, 1996; T.M.Wilson,
H.Donnan, Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University Press,
1998; H.Donnan, T.M.Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, New York, Berg, 1999
68
F. Gill, op.cit., p. 84
69
R. Shields, Places on the Margin : Alternative Geographies of Modernity, London, Routledge, 1992, p.
5
70
Seen the study about the impact of the cross-borders identity in the territorial marketing (Gbor Kozma,
The use of cross-border co-operation and border location in place marketing, in Eurolimes, vol. 2,
Oradea, 2006, pp. 74-80; Luminita Soproni, Cross-border Identity in Building a Regional Brand: The
Northern Transylvania Region, in Eurolimes, vol. 2, pp. 54-64
71
M. Anderson, op. cit., p. 2.
72
F. Gill, op.cit., p. 84
73
Ibidem, p. 84-85; T.M.Wilson, H.Donnan, op.cit, p. 4
62

37
3. The role of media in transforming the sense of borders
Globalization is best understood by its communicational dimension, which crosses all
borders, which makes the limits of state sovereignty to be futile and annuls the linguistic and
cultural differences.74 In spite of the globalization of communication, of the globalization of
media production, mass-media is dominated by frontiers. These frontiers are on the one hand
determined by the limits of communication, and on the other hand they also have a heavy
identity load.75 On the communicational limits, Joaquin Roy asserts that not on all continents
there is the same dynamics of communication and not everywhere the population has free and
cheap access to information76. About the identity weight of communication, Tzevetan Todorov
sees the TV programs as cultural models in miniature77, enabling the members of a nation to
orientate themselves. This fact is crucial in forming, maintaining and reflecting the national
identity, related to the national audience, the national experience and the collective memory 78.
3.1. Media faced with the frontier between manipulation and communication
The immense volume of communication coexist with an immense quantity of
stereotypes, manipulated data and facts manipulate, lack of mutual trust, hatred and suspicion,
social isolation and exclusion or simply ignorance. Many people consider that the media, in
general can be both the source and solution for setting up a real intercultural dialogue. But at a
closer look of things, the media is not only the solution of intercultural communication, but it is
part of the problem, by its effective absence from the dialogue79. It is not about a lack in the
sense of absence, but about the blocking of it in front of a frontier, on the one hand, of the lack
of experience in the practice of the intercultural dialogue, and on the other hand, because of the
discrepancy in the technological advancement between various countries and between various
social strata.
Natural questions are raised: what section of newspapers should be better targeted to
engage in this new mission of correcting a mistaken communication? How can the core of the
elite press correct these perceptions and endemic stereotypes? Is it possible nowadays, to rely
on the leadership role of old-fashioned intellectuals turned into media professionals to redress
the negative mutual lack of trust? 80. There are many answers here, but there are some without
which borders cannot be exceeded: cultural training and intellectual experience by which
todays media professionals must face the task; active role of governments in helping the
independent, but economically weak, media in reducing the communication gap between north
and south, manipulation of the press through political power must be avoided81.
The technological gap creates differences of access to communication. There is an
elitist minority, interested in the conventional press (newspapers and magazines) where there
appear opinions and critical analyses on the essence and mechanisms of intercultural dialogue.
This minority is placed more in the urban, academic and economic environment and especially
in the North. There is a mass which is interested in a consumption press, particularly audiovideo (films, TV, radio), where information is taken in pure, raw state and by which
74

Jan Aart Schlote, Globalization: a critical introduction, New York, Saint Martins Press, 2000
Tamar Ashuri, The nation remember: national identity and shared memory in television
documentaries, in Nation and Nationalism (Journal of Association for Study of Ethnicity and
Nationalism), vol. 11/3, 2005, pp. 423-442
76
Joaquin Roy, The role of media in the north-south intercultural dialogue, in Dialogue between peoples
and cultures: actors in the dialogue, Bruxelles, European Communities, 2005, p. 108
77
Tzvetar Todorov, The Coexistence of Cultures, in Oxford Literary Review, 1997, 19(3), pp. 3-17
78
T. Ashuri, op. cit., p. 423
79
J. Roy, op.cit, p. 111
80
Ibidem
81
Ibidem
75

38
manipulation is made most simply. This majority is present more in the social urban
environments with high rates of illiteracy in the rural area and particularly in the South.
Concentration of ownership in few hands in Europe, plus the heavy dependency on public
media with governments in key EU countries financing of huge deficits, and the political
control of the boards, appointed by government or parliamentary commissions), have raised
doubts about the neutrality of the solution and its effectiveness in carrying a positive message
for dialogue building with the south82.
Even if in Europe the journalists are not subject, in the name of the democratic system,
to pressures of violating the sources of information, this problem can become worrying in the
future, regarding what has happened in the USA after September 11, 2001. In these conditions
there shall be raised serious doubts not only from the point of view of professional capacity of
journalists, but also of credibility of the political system, meant to defend the inviolability of the
freedom of expression83.
3.2. Is Media the last bastion of the national identity?
The explosion of the digital and satellite media, which can no longer be controlled
but by imposing certain rules of programming and distributing the channels, makes that the
identity load to be still present. The television industry was assigned and assumed a dual role: to
serve a political public sphere of the nation-state and to act as a locus for national culture84.
In the era of globalization this apparent control is reduced, therefore, we could assert
that the national identity borders in communication disappear, but still, things are not like that.
Tamar Ashuri identifies a few elements which demonstrate that the ea national identity is audiovisual does not disappear, but is amplified:
- the actors: who are they and what is their relevance to the national experience?
- The roles: who are the heroes and who are the villains? Who are each nations friends
and enemies
- Place/location: which places are depicted and what is their relevance to the nations
history and rich legacy of memories?
- Plot/story (time/issues): At which historical moment does the story begin and end, and
how do such moments relate to the nations heritage? Which historical events will be
acknowledged and which will be consigned to oblivion?
- Language: What is the language in use and what is the relevance to the national
experience?85
These arguments brought by Tamar Ashuri are confirmed as well by P. Preston, A.
Kerr, who are of opinion that although the national borders have become more fluid in the last
decades, the mass communication did not make geopolitical borders obsolete or diminished
the regulatory control of nation-state86.
Some authors are of opinion that the new media is mobilized in order to forge the
national identity. Various movements occurred in the last ten years use symbolic violence as
a message, which further on mediatized is often exaggerated in lugubrious scenes 87. This thing

82
Ibidem, p. 114; Tony Barber, Controversial media reform bill heads for final approval, in Financial
Times, 29 April 2004
83
J. Roy, op.cit, p. 115
84
D. Morley and K. Robins, Space of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural
Boundaries, London-New York, Routledge, 1995; J. Harrison, L.M. Woods, Defining European Public
Service Broadcasting, in European Journal of Communication, 2001, 16 (4), pp. 477-504
85
T. Ashuri, op. cit, p. 431
86
P. Preston, A. Kerr, Digital media, nation-state and local culture: the case of multimedia content
production in Media, Culture & Society, 2001, 23 (1), pp. 109-131
87
Mary Kaldor, Nationalism and Globalization, in Nation and Nationalism (Journal of Association for
Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism), vol. 10/2, 2004, p.170

39
has been of avail to the ex-Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, Uganda, in Palestine, Israel. We also have to
deal with a crepuscular nationalism of certain ethnic communities (The Basks, the Catalans, etc)
Mary Kaldor asserts that one cannot reach a European identity since in a technologized
world and highly individualized it is hard to generate a passional loyalty towards a
cosmopolitan culture, open to various cultures and born out of various cultures88
Cosmopolitanism should involve the search for, and delight in, the contrast between societies
rather than a longing for superiority or for uniformity89.
Another sceptical person with regard to the forging of European identity, Anthony D.
Smith asserts that the European cosmopolitan culture has no memory. He suggests that all bad
things that happened in Europe be forgotten wars, imperialism, holocaust90. The European
Culture that shall stay at the grounds of the European identity must have in its core the culture
of human rights, and that of excluding war. Only two moments can be noted down in the
process of real Europeanization, says Mary Kaldor. The first one is after 1945, when the
European movement was founded in the Hague as a reaction to the atrocities of World War II
and the second one after 1989, when the Cold War ended and when the two parts of Europe met
again on the platform of peace movements and the respect of human rights.91.
These reflections are confirmed as well by other research92 that notice as efforts for
promoting the European issue are being made, at the same extent grows the level of ignorance
in this respect, due to the continual changes in the content of the messages, but also due to
disregarding the need for transparency. This fact contributes to appearance of a
communicational blockage, which leads to a rupture between the producers of European media
message and its consumers, with them taking refuge in a kind of regional or local media
message, with many sub-cultural accents. After 15 years of freedom of the press in Central and
Eastern Europe there is a deep rupture between the participation of media at local or regional
level an their participation at national level in the process of creating a European Media Area
(EMA), through the place it occupies in the formation of public democratic space in the
respective countries.
Analyzing things from another perspective, it is possible to have a more optimistic
view regarding this European ignorance of media consumers or of the journalists predilections
for the national viewpoints rather than for the European viewpoints. Regarding about how they
both react, we are in the presence of the same clich difference, opposition, resistance
propelled by various means by the media, up to the hate speech 93 induced by education, and
by national environment in which we perform. Can we build a European identity, a European
perception on this clich specific to the national identity? Yes and no. Even if theoretically it
would be possible by underlining the differences towards other spaces: the American one, the
Asian one, the African one, in reality it is no viable at last due to two reasons. On the one hand,
it would create a unity towards exterior, but the clich of the difference; of opposition and of the
resistance would be maintained inside. On other hand, Europe would become a closed space, in
a world in which identity is based on another set of values transparency, alterity and human
rights.
Attending this set of values that can contribute to the creation of an EPA is difficult
task, even from the most important moment of the media activities - selection of the news that
88

Ibidem, p. 173
John Urry, The global media and cosmopolitanism, in Department of Sociology, Lancaster,
http://www.comp.lances.ac.uk/sociology/soc056ju.htlm
90
Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity, 1995, p. 24
91
M. Kaldor, op. cit, pp. 174-175
92
Ioan Horga, Adrian Popoviciu, The National Media Impact on the European Security, in International
and European Security versus the Explosion of Global Media (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro,
Renaud de la Brosse, Ioan Horga), Bruxelles, 2004, pp. 25-40
93
Gordana Vilovic, Hate Speech vs standards of European Union, in The Contribution of Mass-Media
to the Enlargement of European Union (eds. Ariane Landuyt, Renaud de la Brosse, Ioan Horga),
Bruxelles, 2003, pp. 220-225
89

40
are to be broadcast. An analysis in this sense shows that it is a greater connotation of
independence in the European Union media institutions, but here too occur situations when
radical accents emerge, as it happened in the case of the dispute between the USA and the EU
on the issue of the International Court of War Crimes94. Many times the kind of information
that are broadcast do not help to the understanding of the integration effects, of the UE
enlargement, or of the functioning of European institutions and policies95. Also, the selection of
information and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe is made according to the editors
interest or by the interest of the political group he/she serves96, ignoring or disregarding the
news referring to European issues in the inside pages or in short messages, with no relevance to
the media consumers97.
These editorial motivations are still marked by the national identity border. Even if the
nation seems to be an obsolete entity, we notice that it continues to exist in reality, that it
represents the back bone of an indispensable cultural matrix. From this point of view, a
paradoxical aspect emerges as economic and political constraints develop around the nation,
the national identity models are in full process of recreation to end up in a new model of
transparency in global relations. At the origins of this renewal directly lay the media
technologies and the communicational practices available for that particular nation98.
The explosion of the media phenomenon in the last 10 years at all levels, local,
regional, national and international affect first and foremost the national identity border,
because of the free outspreading of information. This fact leads us to be optimistic with regard
to the coagulation of an EPA in the future. However, our optimism must be tempered since in
front of major international security crises 11 September 2001 and the Iraq crisis of 2003 or
of European blockings rejecting the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands the
importance of these extraordinary novelties and their emotional change have urged the media
to question even more its national identity. Likewise, an increase in the level of uncertainty in
the world, and an ardent need for information, make the media grow ever more dependent upon
sources they cannot easily reach. This fact engenders on obvious question, that Michel Mathien
also ask: must the evolution of security in Western democracies modify the role of the
Media?99.
Out of this brief analysis, it is obvious that by facing the common reflection of this
issue concerning the impact of border national identity on the media in relation with Europes
general interest, the space for differences is extremely large. Practically there is no reflection of
this issue in the European media to such an extent as to form in the European citizens a
consciousness of their identity in issues of defense that might support the creation of set of
values in this sphere, unanimously accepted. We are still far away from the appearance of
certain values such as European patriotism or solidarity. Should we accept the other European
values as being a common good, these are values that still await to be fulfilled. Also, media
could exert a powerful pressure, by means of the public opinion, upon the decision factors in the
European governance, in order to drop the divergence and to adopt a convergence in viewpoints
in this important issue on which the Europes future depend from now on.

94
Stjepan Malovic, News selecting: European Standards, local practice, in A. Landuyt, R. de la Brosse,
I. Horga, op.cit., pp. 69-77
95
Daniele Pasquinucci, LEurope Absente: lElargissement aux PECO et la Radiotlvision Italienne, in
A. Landuyt, R. de la Brosse, I. Horga, op.cit, pp. 86-95
96
St. Malovic, op.cit, p. 76
97
Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, From Helsinki to Nice, or seeing Europe through the eyes of the Romanian
written presse, in I. Horga & R. de la Brosse, op.cit., pp. 145-158
98
Allen W. Palmer, Transparency and Hidden Transcripts: The Global Media Dilemma of Emergent
Nations, in A. Landuyt, R. de la Brosse, I. Horga, op.cit, pp. 15-25
99
Michel Mathien, Les mdias face lvolution scuritaire occidentale, in Annuaire franais de
relations internationales, 2003, vol, IV, p. 804

41
3.3. The role of media in transforming the perception of the border from limit
into frontier as a difference
There are premises and conditions for the media to change the interpretations, interests
and options from the national perspective towards the European one, but this process is slow
and very closely linked to: the essence of the European mediatic reflection, represented by the
typology of the community we create; the objective of European mediatic reflection,
represented by the place of media in the European mechanism of governing; means of mediatic
reflection, represented by the de nature of techniques of information and communication.
Finally, the oscillation of the media between the national identity and the European one
is determined by the very success or insuccess of the process of integration and construction of
the belief among the European states and the European citizens. The construction of a European
identity, the belief of a community of fate separated can be achieved when at a mediatic level
there still are lots of defects? The increased interdependency between the member states does
not mean that we shall assist, mechanically, to the birth of the European identity. We must talk
more about a long term process, a dynamic one, the success of which shall depend to a great
extent on the existence of a European mediatic space, which remains and imperative to be
accomplished.100.
Media shall always be more sensible to the national emotional than to the European
pragmatism. Paradoxically, however, the notion of European mediatic space is not possible to
be seen other than adjacent to the phenomenon of economic integration and of formation of the
internal market. Little or even very little is to be anticipated that the European mediatic space to
appear in the context of the exclusive action of certain socio-cultural or democratic factors,
which are traditionally arguments of the mass-media101. Nevertheless, beyond the uncontested
economic successes of united Europe, which were very little exploited mediatically, (let us
think only at the effects of the Euro upon the European integration and conscience), the
differences of opinion between the European governance and the national one or between the
EU members, were very well exploited mediatically, but at times with a higher tolerance
towards the national actors, in comparison with the European ones.
The national media have got used most often to touch the European actuality from a
very frequent point of view, the institutional one, contributing in its own proper manner to the
feeding of a would-be European democratic deficit, which it repeatedly denounces in front of
the consumers of mediatic message. On the contrary, the role of mass-media, be it national,
regional or local, or even be it European is to fight the European democratic deficit treating
the information in such a manner as not to make Europe responsible of lack of action and
blocking when it does not have to do entirely with subjects such as unemployment or social
insecurity.
From this perspective, even if media still peddles the clichs of the culpability of
Europe for what does not go well internally, the constitutional blocking of 2005, by the
negative vote of France and Holland could represent a crucial point in the balance of the media
between the national identity border and the European communicational frontier, given the
necessity of a more profound implication of the European institutions in topics which are under
the imprint of intergovernmental negotiations: institutional changes, foreign policy, defence and
justice and home affairs102.
Getting out of the constitutional treaty blockage must be done as a compromise
between the interests of the state big and small. The most optimum variant must be found,
100

Renaud de la Brosse, Espace mdiatique europen et la communaut de destins , in Maria


Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, op.cit, p. 285
101
Ibidem, p. 287; see Jens Cavallin, European Policies and Regulations on Media Concentration, in
International Journal of Communications Law and Policy, February 11, 1998, p.23
(http://www.ijclp.org/1_1998/ijlp_webdoc_3_1_1998.htlm*top)
102
Jean-Claude Piris, The Constitution for Europe. A Legal Analysis, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2006, pp. 30-37, 145-178, 192-197; O. Rehn, op.cit., p. 114

42
which should enable the big states to play an acceptable role, while the small states not to feel
they are part of the EU only as a number. The solution with a President of the European Council
elected for two years and a half full-time, instead of the presidency rotation; introducing the
double majority in the voting system and choosing a foreign minister of the Union are
constitutional provisions which places the big states to an advantage and places the small ones
in a disadvantage. This system, combined with the provision that the number of commissars to
be reduced and to be used the rotation system, which apparently gives gains to the small
states103, overall introduces in the European public sphere a polemical problem, which the
media cannot but approach only from the perspective of the national identity.
Flexibility is the most important dimension of European governance since on the one
hand it can face the various challenges appearing in the process of economic modernizing, of
demographic changes and of the changes in the political agenda. On the other hand, flexibility
enables it to be transparent and to be open to diversity of opinions and solutions.
The research notices104 that the new attributes of the European governance such as
management through agencies and management through networks draw little attention to the
journalists as media facts, which would lead to the idea that we are in two parallel worlds
European governance cannot interfere whit the Public European Sphere, as each one is a
distinct entity. If we look into the facts, the media does not influence the appearance of the
Public European Sphere directly, although within the national bounds by its regulating and
formative function in society; it influences it indirectly by its impact on European governance.
As a regulator, the media has to reach certain parameters: to be pluralist in opinions,
transparent and free from all interferences, whether public or private; to serve the citizens by
providing information concerning political persons and events; to be vigilant to corruption
practices and tendencies; to keep the communication means open and to organize the dialogue
amongst different elements of the society respecting human rights no matter the topic.
The New Technologies of Information and Communication (NTIC), which was very
soon be implemented in Central and Eastern European countries are an alternative to media
suffocated by the nationalist discourse, by the tendencies of the parti pris. The impossibility of
the State to controlling communication through the NTIC develops in the area encouraging
forms for the much desired European Public Area (EPA)105. There are many examples where a
transnational media have been developed, especially in the economic field, causing a greater
transparency in all the fields106. At the same time by the NTIC, the national minorities,
especially those in Central and Eastern Europe actively take part not only to refreshing the
national public space with their contributions, but also to bringing in the European public
scenery items of culture, of unique experience, which are hidden otherwise, and would
disappear in time107.
4. Conclusion
Nevertheless although the media bears a deep national imprint, it still has a great power
of influence upon the European governance that will bear the European Public Sphere against
the background of the process of economic and monetary union. Consequently, the European
103

O. Rehn, op.cit, loc.cit.


Hans-Jorg Trenz, Media on European Gouvernance. Exploring the European Public Sphere in the
national Quality Newspapers, in European Journal of Communication, vol. 19, nr. 3, 2004, pp. 291-319
105
Jos Maria Cruz Rodriguez, The European Audiovisual Policy as Tool for Construction of the
Common Identity: the Fall of Socio-cultural Myth, in F. Maron, I. Horga, R. de la Brosse, op.cit., pp.
215-224
106
Dominique Augey, NTIC, mdias et conomies in transition , in The Role of Mass-Media and of the
New Information and Communication Technologies in the Democratization Process of Central and
Eastern Europe (eds. Ioan Horga & Renaud de la Brosse), Bruxelles, 2002, pp. 195-215
107
Luca Calvi, Minorities and the Net: Reflections on the Carpatho-Rusyn Case Study, in Ioan Horga &
Renaud de la Brosse, op.cit., pp. 283-292
104

43
Public Sphere will not be the direct result of the interaction of European public actors; it will be
an indirect result by the action of the local, regional and national media phenomenon mediated
by European governance and alternative media, which could ensure the transformation of the
perception of border from limit into frontier as a difference.
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47

Mdias europens et la non-mention des racines chrtiennes


dans la Constitution europenne
Thibault BAZIN
Abstract: On October 2004, the 25 EU member states chefs of State and Governments
have signed the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. The European Constitution
drafting process enabled to consider the common values of the EU. It transpires that a major
stake was the definition of the European identity.
How has the final text been adopted? What is the substance of the European link if it is
not the Christian one? What kind of idea for the XXIe centurys Europe has been outlined
through this debate?
So the European media had to cope with this challenge, in other words, to deepen the
debate by developing intercultural dialogue. The way they had been used is useful not only to
understand and characterize the current European crisis but also to emphasize their
responsibility to a certain extent.
Key words: Christian roots, European Constitution, identity
Au printemps 2004 sous la prsidence irlandaise de lUnion europenne, les chefs
dtat et de Gouvernement des vingt-cinq tats membres ont sign un trait tablissant une
Constitution pour lEurope. Ce trait est le fruit dun processus commenc au conseil de Laeken
en 2001 dont lobjet tait la rforme des institutions. Parsemes de compromis, les tapes
successives peuvent tre rsumes ainsi. Une Convention, runie de fvrier 2002 juin 2003, a
labor un projet de trait. Le 18 juillet 2003, le prsident de la Convention, M. Valry Giscard
dEstaing, a remis ce projet M. Silvio Berlusconi, alors prsident du Conseil europen. Ce
projet a t la base de travail dune confrence intergouvernementale dans la deuxime moiti
de 2003 sous la prsidence italienne1. lorigine, ce trait devait adapter le fonctionnement des
institutions lentre de dix nouveaux tats membres en mai 2004. Ce nest que le 18 juin
2004, sous la prsidence irlandaise, que les chefs dtat et de Gouvernement ont trouv un
accord. Le 29 octobre 2004, les chefs dtat et de Gouvernement des 25 tats membres de lUE
ont sign le trait tablissant une constitution pour lEurope. Cette signature solennelle marque
la fin de la confrence intergouvernementale (CIG). Tout au long de ce cheminement, un des
enjeux a t de dfinir des valeurs communes dans une optique constitutionnelle.
Naturellement, les Etats ont eu rflchir sur ce qui les unissait. Cela revient dfinir lidentit
europenne et, par l-mme, rsoudre la question des frontires. Lorsque les conventionnels
ont travaill sur le chapitre intitul Les valeurs de lUnion du prambule, la question de
mentionner les racines chrtiennes de lEurope a ainsi merg naturellement comme ce fut dj
le cas lors de la rdaction de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de lUnion europenne
lautomne 2000.
Le Conseil Europen avait mis le souhait dun dbat public. Un forum2 ouvert aux
organisations reprsentant la socit civile (partenaires sociaux, milieux conomiques,
organisations non Gouvernementales, milieux acadmiques) a donc t cr. Lors de la mise
en place de la Convention en fvrier 2002, les glises ont demand une audition spcifique dans
le cadre de la Convention sur lavenir de lEurope3 et lglise catholique a prcis son souhait

Le 4 octobre 2003, M. Berlusconi a inaugur la Confrence intergouvernementale.


Forum de la socit civile : http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_Convention
3
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 4-5/2/2002, n 8143.
2

48
dtre entendue comme les autres voix de la socit civile4. Le cadre indit de la Convention
impliquait dans le dbat toutes les parties prenantes qui pouvaient dialoguer dans le cadre dun
forum de la socit civile avec les conventionnels. Le cadre conventionnel permettait non
seulement aux forces politiques, mais surtout des intrts conomiques, sociaux,
environnementaux, culturels, philosophiques et religieux de sexprimer. Linvestissement
consenti par plusieurs milliers dorganisations tmoigne de leur intrt. Il suffit ainsi de
consulter le site Internet de la Convention pour sen assurer travers leurs lettres adresses au
Prsidium. Dans ce cadre, il est pertinent de sinterroger sur le rle jou par les mdias
europens. Cela revient se demander sils ont cherch relayer, susciter ce dbat ou le
masquer.
la lecture des grands mdias europens diffuss grande chelle et sous le prisme du
dbat sur la mention des racines chrtiennes dans la Constitution europenne, il convient de se
demander quelles leons peut-on tirer sur le dialogue multiculturel en Europe en terme de
dfinition de lidentit europenne. Le premier enseignement est le caractre personnel,
htrogne et nigmatique de lutilisation des mdias dans le dbat. Deuximement, la
recherche dun consensus par le camp en faveur de la mention a reflt de manire significative
la volont dun certain dialogue multiculturel. Ensuite, la dernire leon consiste analyser et
mesurer avec nuance la part de responsabilit des mdias dans la rdaction finale, rdaction
synonyme dun manque de dfinition de lidentit europenne. Enfin, nous tenterons de
dessiner les grands enjeux du dialogue multiculturel pour les mdias.
1. Les mdias: un vecteur de prise de position individuelle dans la socit civile
Dans cette premire partie, nous nous intressons la manire par laquelle les mdias
europens ont t mobiliss et se sont mobiliss pour reflter le dbat sur la mention des racines
chrtiennes. Nous allons montrer que les mdias se sont rvls un vecteur de prise de position
individuelle dans la socit civile. La socit civile a largement contribu au dbat sur la
mention des racines chrtiennes.
En son sein, lglise catholique sest largement engage notamment par son chef, le Pape JeanPaul II. Nous avons not dans les journaux nationaux un relai significatif de la part des glises
locales la position du Saint-Sige. Contrairement la France o on remarque une quasi
absence de lglise dans les mdias, on observe une forte prsence ailleurs. Les glises locales
ont relay pour la plupart la position du Saint-Sige. Certaines positions permettront dclairer
des partis politiques des mmes pays.
1.1. Les prises de positions dans les mdias des Eglises catholiques locales
En premier lieu, les vques polonais ont reproch la Convention de falsifier
l'Histoire 5. Le porte-parole de lpiscopat polonais, Adam Schulz, a demand aux
conventionnels une rfrence au Seigneur (invocatio dei) et a prcis que cest un point de
vue commun arrt par lglise6. Dans une interview accorde lagence catholique polonaise
KAI le 10 janvier 2003, le cardinal Jozef Glemp, chef de lglise polonaise, sest interrog
sur la nervosit avec laquelle [les membres de la Convention sur lavenir de lEurope] se
dfendent contre une invocation du nom de Dieu 7 dans la future Constitution de lUE. Et le
primat destimer quil apparat que la loi fondamentale est rdige par des gens dont les
opinions sont trs loin de celles des Europens moyens, majoritairement croyants. Nous avons
donc affaire une violation de la dmocratie par les lites . Le primat de Pologne a accus la
4

Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 09/03/2002, n 8167.


Le Monde, mardi 22 juin 2004, p. 6.
6
The church side considers that a common viewpoint was agreed so that the representatives to the
Convention promote in a final document to be worked out by the Convention, a reference to Lord,
invocatio dei, the spokesman of the Poland's episkopate Adam Schulz stated.
7
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 11/01/2003, n 8376.
5

49
Convention de violation de la dmocratie parce quelle refuse une rfrence Dieu dans la
future Constitution de lUE. Mgr Glemp, compatriote du pape et archevque, a lev le voile en
fvrier 2003 sur la signification que peut prendre cet appel aux racines. Il voudrait que la
Constitution mentionne la loi naturelle 8.
En Allemagne, le prsident de la Confrence piscopale de l'glise catholique
allemande, le cardinal Karl Lehmann dans un appel publi par le quotidien populaire allemand
Bild du 16 juin 2004 crit ceci : faire mention des racines judo-chrtiennes de l'Europe aussi
bien que de Dieu dans le prambule de la Constitution est bon pour l'Europe . Un prambule
relativement long est prvu dans la nouvelle Constitution. Si dj on rentre dans les dtails, on
ne peut pas ne pas faire rfrence aux fondements spirituels de l'Europe, auxquels appartient la
tradition judo-chrtienne , souligne-t-il dans cet appel intitul : reconnaissez-vous en Dieu !
Les valeurs qui nous unissent et l'hritage culturel commun de l'Europe sont tellement
imprgns par l'hritage durable de la Bible et du christianisme que cela devrait tre
mentionn 9.
La Lituanie met en vidence le singularisme de lpiscopat catholique franais. Dans
une interview accorde lExpress le 10 juillet 2003, le cardinal Audrys Backis, archevque de
Vilnius, estime que lidentit de ce petit pays balte catholique rside dans ses racines
chrtiennes . Pour lui, la Convention a commis un lapsus , un oubli historique . Il
sexclame ainsi : quels que soient ses dfauts, le christianisme a cr toute une culture
artistique qui fait partie de l'histoire de l'Europe. Enlever cette rfrence, c'est s'imposer un trou
de mmoire 10.
1.2. Les prises de positions dans les mdias des partis politiques nationaux
En tudiant les journaux nationaux, nous pouvons dcouvrir les prises de position des
responsables politiques dans le dbat. Le besoin de se situer dans ce dbat est vident pour
certains pays, notamment ceux issus de la fin du bloc sovitique.
Au sujet des responsables politiques polonais, Christophe Chtelot, journaliste au
Monde, parle dun quasi-consensus dans les partis polonais, des ultracatholiques aux anciens
communistes 11. Varsovie, on demande mme la mention de Dieu dans le prambule dune
future constitution europenne12. Les lus de la Plate-forme civique (PO, droite), laquelle M.
Saryusz-Wolski, chef de la dlgation polonaise au Parlement europen, demandent que le
prambule de la Constitution europenne mentionne les racines chrtiennes de l'Europe13.
Comment une composante aussi importante de lidentit europenne pourrait tre omise ? 14
se demandent en septembre 2003 Pawel Zalewski, ancien dput de la Rpublique polonaise,
membre du parti Droit et Justice (PiS: Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc ), et Wieslaw Tarka,
ancien diplomate. La socit civile polonaise travers ses docteurs, ses juristes et ses
journalistes 15 a appel lintroduction de la rfrence, nous rapporte la Polska agencja
prasowa . Nous ne devons pas avoir peur de faire rfrence Dieu dans la Constitution ,
sest exclam Aleksander Marek Szczyglo, membre polonais du groupe UEN (union pour

Grard Dupuy, Libration, vendredi 28 fvrier 2003, p. 3.


Le Monde, mardi 22 juin 2004, p. 6.
10
Jean-Michel Demetz et Pierre Ganz, L'Express, n 2714, jeudi 10 juillet 2003, p. 20.
11
Christophe Chtelot, Un quasi-consensus dans les partis polonais, des ultracatholiques aux anciens
communistes in Le Monde, 22 mai 2004.
12
G. Leclerc, Christianisme, Europe et Lact in Salamandra, op. cit., p. 12.
13
Rafale Rivais, Le Monde, lundi 5 septembre 2005, p. 5.
14
Polish News Bulletin, 4 septembre 2003.
15
PAP Polish Press Agency, 21 avril 2005: Over 30 strong group of Polish scholars, doctors, lawyers and
journalists appealed to heads of the EU governing bodies Thursday for inclusion of a reference to Europe's
Christian roots in the preamble to the EU constitution.
9

50
lEurope des Nations). Le membre polonais du groupe PPE-DE, Zbigniew Chrzanowski, sest
exprim lui aussi pour une rfrence aux racines chrtiennes de lEurope16.
En Allemagne, la CDU, parti dmocrate chrtien allemand a t un des partis en
Europe prendre parti le plus en faveur de la mention des racines chrtiennes. Sa sur CSU en
Bavire la t encore davantage. La CDU/CSU insiste sur une rfrence au christianisme
notamment en juin 200317. Jens Schneider et Nico Fried voquent dans le Sddeutsche
Zeitung18 de Munich les fortes rserves persistentes en mai 2005 sur le trait constitutionnel,
notamment labsence de rfrence religieuse pour la CSU. Annette Schavan, vice-prsidente de
la CDU et ministre des Cultes du Land de Bade-Wurtemberg, explique dans LExpress19 en juin
2004 qu il n'y a pas de culture sans racines religieuses . Selon elle, l'Europe n'est pas
simplement une communaut montaire ou une zone de libre-change conomique. Le
christianisme a puissamment contribu forger la perception que nous avons aujourd'hui de
l'homme dans nos socits : un individu part entire dont la dignit ne peut tre bafoue .
C'est notamment pour ces raisons qu'il est souhaitable, pour elle, que notre Constitution
europenne fasse rfrence ces racines chrtiennes. Pour Annette Schavan, il s'agit
simplement, indpendamment des convictions et des pratiques de chacun, de souligner notre
comprhension commune de l'homme .
En Italie, lAlliance Nationale et lUnion des Dmocrates Chrtiens, les deux autres
partis de la coalition Gouvernementale de Berlusconi, avec davantage de modration, regrette
labsence de mention aux racines chrtiennes dans le prambule. Dans le mme esprit, Antonio
Tajani (Forza Italia) a demand plusieurs reprises quune rfrence aux racines judochrtiennes de lUnion soit incluse dans le prambule de la Constitution. Pourquoi, suggre-t-il,
ne pas reprendre le texte de la Constitution polonaise, avec son allusion explicite Dieu20. Nous
avons ici lexemple dun dialogue culturel avanc se basant sur un partage des expriences des
autres, on peut traduire cela en une communaut dapprentissage.
En Hongrie, Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance), le principal parti dopposition, a
insist pour la rfrence aux racines chrtiennes, nous rapporte en dcembre 2003 Jozsef Szajer
dans une mission la radio hongroise21. Ce dernier a rencontr le prsident hongrois, Ferenc
Madl, qui soutient aussi cette rfrence. La position de Fidesz en faveur de la mention, nous
prcise Horcsik, aurait t important pour des considrations historiques plutt que
religieuses 22.
En Espagne, le Partido Popular espagnol, parti de droite au pouvoir jusquen mars
2004, sest positionn clairement en faveur de la mention des racines chrtiennes. La ncessit
de l'affirmation 23 des racines chrtiennes de l'Europe dans la future Constitution faisait partie
des thmes abords par le Partido Popular lors de la campagne lgislative de 2004. Le PP nest
pas le seul dans cette posture. Le groupe E-cristians rclame non seulement que la
constitution europenne assume le christianisme comme racine et base de la civilisation
europenne 24, mais aussi un document qui garantisse les valeurs chrtiennes comme la

16

Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 05/05/2004. n 8699.


Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 11/06/2003, n 8479.
18
Courrier International, n759, du 19 au 25 mai 2005, p. 39.
19
Demetz Jean-Michel & Milcent Blandine, Les racines chrtiennes dans la Constitution
europenne? in L'Express, n 2763, lundi 14 juin 2004, p. 118.
20
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 05/05/2004, n 8699.
21
Kossuth Radio, Budapest, 9 dcembre 2003.
22
Hungarian News Agency (MTI), 5 octobre 2004.
23
Le Monde, samedi 29 mai 2004, p. 6.
24
El Mundo, 10 dcembre 2002: esta convencion, que esta impulsada entre otros por el ex conseller de
Agricultura y ex concejal de CiU en Barcelona Josep Miro i Ardevol a traves de E-Cristians, reclamo que
la futura Constitucion europea asuma el cristianismo como raiz y base de la civilizacion europea, pero
tambien aprobo un documento en el que se rechaza el aborto y se ensalza la familia tradicional.
17

51
protection de la vie et la promotion de la famille. Le fondateur du PP, Manuel Fraga, considre
labsence de rfrence comme incomprhensible et scandaleuse 25.
En Slovnie, M. Peterle, membre du NSi (dmocrates-chrtiens), pense quil ny a pas
rougir en inscrivant les racines chrtiennes dans le prambule. Nanmoins, selon lui, cela ne
doit pas tre fait en vue de catgoriser les europens comme chrtiens ou non-chrtiens.
Dautres partis, tels que le LDS (les libraux dmocrates) et le ZLSD (la nouvelle liste unie)
reprsents respectivement par Messieurs Kacin et Juri, partagent lopinion favorable la
reconnaissance de la chrtient comme composante des racines chrtiennes26.
Lagence de presse tchque, CTK, nous rapporte que les chrtiens-dmocrates (KDUCSL) ne sont pas daccord avec la rdaction de la Convention. Pour Cyril Svoboda, le chef de
ce parti, elle devrait mentionner explicitement les racines judo-chrtiennes de la culture et
des traditions europennes . Cette mention, poursuit-il, aiderait vraiment lEurope se
rappeler ses frontires 27.
En Slovaquie, le prsident du KDH, Pavol Hrusovsky, estime que le document en
question traduit un manque de dmocratie, de chrtient et dhonntet 28. Le vice-prsident
du mme groupe, Pavol Miranik, va plus loin en disant que lEurope daujourdhui est
christophobe, intolrante et a oubli Dieu 29. Enfin, lors de la session plnire du Parlement
europen de mai 2004, le maltais Jason Azzopardi a dfendu avec vigueur le rappel des valeurs
chrtiennes dans la Constitution30.
De manire surprenante, les positions dun responsable politique dun tat sont
rarement rapportes dans les mdias dun autre Etat. Restreinte a aussi t la place laisse aux
intellectuels et aux historiens pour sexprimer dans les mdias sur lidentit europenne. Une
des explications possibles ce constat est la suivante : nous souffrons peut-tre de labsence de
mdias europens comme il existe des mdias locaux, rgionaux ou nationaux. Par mdias
europens , nous entendons dans cette tude essentiellement les grands mdias nationaux.
Etudier le dbat lchelon national ne signifie donc pas exactement tudier le dbat
lchelon europen. En outre, les journaux reproduits grande chelle, notamment en version
lectronique, sintressent des degrs varis la question religieuse pose par la Constitution.
Ainsi aucun journal europen na pens prsenter exhaustivement le rapport entre religion et
droit dans les Constitutions respectives des autres pays.
2. Les mdias: lieu dexposition des unions sur la question
Les mdias europens nont pas t seulement le moyen pour des prises de positions
individuelles, mais surtout le lieu dexposition dunions porteuses de sens. Nous navons pas
25

ANSA, 10 septembre 2004: only two days ago the PP founder, Manuel Fraga, defined as
incomprehensible and scandalous the fact that the European Constitution will not contain reference to
Christianity in its preamble.
26
STA news agency, Ljubljana, 21 mai 2004: Peterle of the NSi thought that there was no harm in writing
down Christian roots in the preamble, however this should not be done by categorizing people as
Christians or non-Christians. [...] Juri of the ZLSD (the junior coalition United List) and Kacin of the
LDS (the senior ruling coalition Liberal Democrats) were of the opinion that European roots went beyond
Christianity.
27
CTK news agency, Prague, 3 juillet 2003: the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) disagree with the
European Convent's proposed preamble to the European constitution, stating that it should explicitly refer
to the Judeo-Christian roots of European culture and traditions, the party's head Cyril Svoboda told
journalists today. A statement on the Judeo-Christian heritage, he said, would merely help the EU in
remembering its boundaries.
28
Marius Kopcsay, Narodna obroda, p. 8. in TASR web site BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Bratislava, 12
mai 2005: KDH Chairman Pavol Hrusovsky said that there is a lack of democracy, Christianity and
honesty in the document. KDH Deputy Chairman Pavol Minarik went even further by saying that today's
Europe is Christophobic, intolerant and has forgotten God.
29
Idem.
30
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 05/05/2004, n 8699.

52
observ de recherche dunion dans le non , alors que des synergies dans le oui la
mention ont t clairement visibles. En tmoignent tout dabord les rencontres bilatrales et
multilatrales au niveau politique comme le sommet entre la Pologne et la Lituanie. lissue
dune rencontre le 27 aot 2003 avec le prsident polonais Aleksander Kwasniewski Vilnius,
le prsident de la Lituanie, Rolandas Paksas, a affirm dans un communiqu quil soutenait,
avec son homologue polonais, chef dtat catholique , la demande du Pape Jean-Paul II de
citer les valeurs chrtiennes dans la future Constitution31. Le prsident du parlement de la
Lituanie, Arturas Paulauskas, parle dune part insparable de la tradition chrtienne 32
lorsquil argumente en faveur de la mention des racines chrtiennes de lEurope. Cette synergie
ne sopre pas que sur la scne politique. Plus intressant est lavnement dun consensus un
niveau religieux entre un cardinal catholique et le patriarche en Grce ou encore les
responsables ecclsiaux des glises allemandes catholique et protestante. On peut mme parler
dune tentative dafficher une position cumnique.
En effet, alors quun refus dune mention de la chrtient et ses valeurs comme source
du lien unissant les peuples europens se dessine, le Saint-Sige a tent une alliance de
circonstance avec les autres organisations chrtiennes en Europe. Cette stratgie applique la
thse dveloppe par M. Vallet selon laquelle lcumnisme est ce qui peut rendre une unit
lEurope chrtienne 33. Ainsi une position cumnique a t labore, mais na pas t
suffisante pour influencer les rdacteurs du trait.
2.1. La position des autres Eglises de confession monothiste
En prambule, tudions la position dautres glises pour connatre les bases dun
possible consensus. La Confrence des glises europennes (KEK), base Genve, qui
regroupe plus de 120 glises de tradition orthodoxe, protestante, anglicane et vieille catholique
insiste sur la communaut de valeurs et saluerait une reconnaissance des fondements religieux
et spirituels de lEurope dans le prambule dun texte constitutionnel communautaire34.
Ghislain Waterlot35 souligne les efforts rcurrents des fondamentalistes protestants pour
inscrire un christianisme confessionnel dans lexcutif et surtout dans le futur 36.
Lglise orthodoxe grecque revendique lidentit chrtienne comme nouveau moteur
commun dune action cumnique. Nous inaugurons une nouvelle priode de coopration
sincre centre surtout autour du thme de l'identit chrtienne de l'Europe laquelle la
Constitution devrait faire rfrence37, a comment le responsable de l'glise grecque, Mgr
Christodoulos. Cette glise, qui bnficie dune influence considrable, a demand plusieurs
reprises linscription des racines chrtiennes dans le prambule38. Larchevque Christodoulos a
remis le 21 fvrier 2003 au prsident de la Convention europenne Valry Giscard dEstaing
une lettre nonant les desiderata de lglise orthodoxe grecque au sujet de la place de la
religion dans le trait constitutionnel. Lors dun entretien avec le Prsident de la Convention
31

Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 29/08/2003, n 8530.


Baltic News Service, 10 octobre 2003: Lithuanian Parliamentary Chairman Arturas Paulauskas,
lithuania, Being an inseparable part of the Christian tradition, we say that the preamble of the EU
Constitutional Treaty should mention Christian roots of Europe, said the parliamentary chairman .
33
O. Vallet, Les racines de lEurope sont multiples in Salamandra, op. cit., 51 p.
34
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 20/06/2002, n 8236; United Press
International, 17 juin 2002: This followed similar demands by the Geneva-based Conference of European
Churches representing 127 Anglican, Eastern Orthodox, Protestant and Old Catholic denominations. This
body also stated that the religious and spiritual heritage of Europe and its contribution to the formation of
European values [be recognized] in any preamble to a constitutional text or a new treaty.
35
Ghislain Waterlot, Rousseau. Religion et politique, Philosophie PUF, n 172, 2004, p. 122.
36
Ibid.
37
Eric Jozsef, Le Vatican au front in Libration, vendredi 28 fvrier 2003, p. 4.
38
Agence France Presse English, 27 mai 2004: Greece's conservative Orthodox church, which carries
considerable influence, has repeatedly called for Europe's Christian roots to be included in the
constitution.
32

53
europenne, larchevque Christodoulos a soulign les racines chrtiennes des traditions
spirituelles et culturelles de lUE, indique lagence grecque ANA39.
Autre reprsentant orthodoxe, le patriarche russe estime que la Constitution
europenne doit prendre en compte ses traditions chrtiennes40. Il parle mme en juin 2005
dune position commune entre lglise Romaine Catholique et lglise Orthodoxe Russe :
nous croyons que la Constitution europenne doit mentionner les racines chrtiennes
communes comme base de la culture europenne 41.
2.2. Lcumnisme lchelon europen: entre la COMECE et la CEC
Lcumnisme est apparu tout dabord lchelon europen travers la COMECE
(Commission des piscopats de la communaut europenne) et la CEC (confrence des glises
europennes). Dans une lettre adresse au prsident de la Convention le 28 juin 2002, la CEC,
la COMECE et des organisations caractre chrtien telles que Caritas Europa, European
Federation for Diacona, Association of World Council of Churches related Development
Organisations in Europe et International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity ont
dclar que lhritage religieux et spirituel de lEurope doit tre reconnu dans nimporte quel
texte constitutionnel . Elles ont ajout que la contribution spcifique des glises et des
communauts religieuses la socit doivent [aussi] tre reconnue 42.
Athnes, le 5 mai 2003, les reprsentants des glises chrtiennes ont rclam dans
une dclaration commune une claire rfrence aux racines chrtiennes de l'Europe . Runis
pour dbattre des principes et valeurs pour la construction de l'Europe , ont particip le
patriarche oecumnique de Constantinople, Mgr Bartholome, le cardinal franais Roger
Etchegaray, missaire du Pape, l'vque anglican de Londres, Richard Chartres, ainsi que
plusieurs dlgus des glises de Grce, de Russie, de Roumanie et d'Albanie43.
Une alliance a t passe entre le Saint-Sige et les glises anglicane et grecque
orthodoxe pour rclamer une mention des valeurs ou des racines chrtiennes44. Dans un
communiqu, la COMECE et la CEC se flicitent nanmoins de lavant-projet de trait
constitutionnel prsent par le praesidium de la Convention europenne45. Le rvrend Rdiger
Noll, de la confrence des glises europennes (CEC) et Mgr Nol Tranor, secrtaire gnral de
la COMECE, ont not le 7 juin 2003 que le praesidium propose un prambule qui reconnat de
manire inclusive la contribution de lhritage religieux de lEurope dont le christianisme est
une partie majeure . Selon eux, une Europe qui dsavouerait son pass, qui nierait le fait
religieux et qui naurait aucune dimension spirituelle, serait bien dmunie face lambitieux
projet qui mobilise ses nergies 46.
2.3. Lexemple de lcumnisme allemand : un vritable dialogue multiculturel
Lcumnisme local le plus abouti sest esquiss en Allemagne. la fin du
Katholikentag d'Ulm, le 20 juin [2004], le cardinal Lehman, prsident de la Confrence des

39

Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 22/02/2003, n 8406.


RIA Novosti, 7 juin 2005: European Constitution should take into account Christian traditions - Russian
patriarch.
41
Al Nisr Publishing LLC, Gulf News, 2 juillet 2005: The Patriarch added, The Russian Orthodox
Church and the Roman Catholic Church have a common position. We believe that the European
constitution should mention common Christian roots as the basis of European culture.
42
Forum de la socit civile, http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_Convention: The religious and spiritual
heritage of Europe should be acknowledged in any constitutional text. The specific contribution of
Churches and religious communities to society should be acknowledged.
43
Philippe Gelie, Le Figaro, n 18270, Mardi 6 mai 2003, p. 4.
44
Philippe Gelie, Le Figaro, n 18298, Samedi 7 juin 2003, p. 2.
45
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 29/05/2003, n 8472.
46
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 04/06/2003, n 8475.
40

54
vques catholiques, et l'vque luthrien Wolfgang Huber, prsident du Conseil de l'glise
vanglique dAllemagne, ont publi une dclaration commune dplorant cette occultation de la
mmoire chrtienne de l'Europe : nous regrettons qu'il n'ait pas t possible de faire
comprendre, par une rfrence notre responsabilit devant Dieu, que tout ordre humain est
faillible et imparfait et que la politique n'est jamais absolue, eu gard aux expriences
douloureuses des guerres et des dictatures en Europe 47.
Malgr cette action cumnique indniable, les dcideurs ne donneront pas suite leur requte.
Selon Henri Tincq, le Vatican s'inquite de ne devenir qu'un groupe de pression parmi d'autres
en Europe 48.
3. Les mdias europens: une responsabilit dans la manque de dfinition de
lidentit europenne
Si lon compare les informations dlivres quotidiennement par lAgence Quotidien
Europe et celles des grands quotidiens nationaux en Europe, on saperoit que les contributions
et les dbats intenses ont t cloisonns la Convention et il en est fait trs peu cho dans mes
mdias europens. En effet, cette ralit des prmices dune rflexion profonde sur lide
europenne na pas t retranscrite sa juste place dans les mdias europens.
3.1 La distance mdias gouverns
Cette distance entre socit civile et mdias lchelon europen nous montre que ces
derniers nont pas rpondu, ou nont pas su rpondre linvitation au dbat. Autrement dit, et
en considrant le point de vue du lecteur-citoyen de lUnion europenne, les mdias nont pas
transmis cet appel la rflexion des peuples. Pourtant, la mise en place dun forum visait ne
pas restreindre la rdaction du projet tablissant une Constitution pour lEurope aux
contributions des lites, mais bien au contraire se rapprocher et susciter la curiosit des
nations europennes. De surcrot, ce sentiment a t renforc par un manque de clart des
positions dans les ngociations de la part des gouvernements. Certains donnaient limpression
de montrer un double visage : dune part, un discours devant leur opinion nationale, et dautre
part, leur position dans le cadre confidentiel du Conseil europen (Espagne, Italie, Portugal,
Pologne). Par ailleurs, les considrations des diffrents Etats sur le dbat des racines chrtiennes
de lEurope ne peuvent se comprendre parfaitement sans voquer dun ct les autres dbats,
notamment conomiques, qui ont pu amener certains arbitrages entre des intrts court terme
et des intrts long terme, et dun autre ct, les vnements politiques tels que les attentats de
Madrid en mars 2004. Ldition du 20 juin 2004 de The Observer nous rapporte que le Premier
Ministre de la Pologne, Marek Belka, a accept un compromis qui ne prend plus en compte la
demande polonaise dune rfrence aux racines chrtiennes49. Le prsident du parti social
dmocrate de Rpublique Tchque (CSSD), Vladimir Spidla, et de nombreux snateurs
estiment quune mention ntait pas essentielle mme si les ngociateurs du gouvernement lont
souhaite. Nanmoins, leur possible chec nest pas une raison pour rejeter la Constitution ,
soulignent-ils50.

47

Henri Tincq, Constitution europenne: la dfaite du parti chrtien in Le Monde, mardi 29 juin
2004, p. 1.
48
Henri Tincq, Le Monde, 21 Octobre 2004.
49
The Observer, 20 juin 2004: Rzeczpospolita Poland Poland's Prime Minister Marek Belka has agreed
on a compromise in agreeing to the European Constitution in particular for giving ground on Poland's
voting power and failing to secure a reference in the treaty to Europe's Christian roots .
50
Czech News Agency (CTK), Prague, 20 mai 2004: Premier and Social Democrat (CSSD) chairman
Vladimir Spidla failed [...] Spidla and many senators agreed that this mention was unnecessary even
though government negotiators should advocate it. However, their possible failure would not be a reason
to reject the constitution, they stressed .

55
tant donn un certain mpris des mdias pour le travail de la Convention qui na pas
fait les gros titres alors que les campagnes franaise et nerlandaise sur leur rfrendum
respectif ont montr par la suite un rel souci des lectorats sur la question , on a abouti une
mconnaissance surprenante des positions des autres pays sur la mention des racines
chrtiennes. En outre, les mdias nationaux voient et traitent de lEurope travers le prisme
national et non le prisme europen.
Les mdias europens seraient-ils responsables dun dbat interculturel insuffisant ?
Peut-tre en partie. La distance traditionnelle entre les gouvernants et les gouverns semble se
doubler dune distance mdias gouverns qui ne fait que renforcer le sentiment de la premire.
Enfin peut-on dceler travers ses ultimes observations une stratgie des mdias, consciente ou
inconsciente, face la Constitution europenne. Les mdias sintressent tout dabord aux
questions conomiques et ninvitent pas la rflexion. En choisissant une formule a minima qui
ne choisit pas de dfinir lidentit europenne, comment lEurope peut-elle discuter avec les
autres grandes civilisations qui se sont affirmes trs fortement ces dernires dcennies.
3.2. Prsentation brve du rapport la religion dans les Constitutions nationales
Pourtant, le dbat nest pas entr en profondeur. Ainsi le rapport la religion des autres
pays europens savre trs mconnu. On relve peu darticles prsentant cette question
religieuse et le rapport entre lglise et ltat. Qui sait pourtant que quatorze Etats sur quinze
mentionnent Dieu dans leur Constitution. Seul un pays na aucune rfrence religieuse dans sa
Constitution : le Portugal. Sa constitution a t adopte au lendemain de la rvolution des
illets. Cinq tats connaissent un rgime de "religion d'tat" : Danemark et Finlande
(Luthrianisme), Grce (Orthodoxie), Royaume-Uni (lglise anglicane pour lAngleterre et
lglise presbytrienne pour lcosse), Malte (Catholicisme). Seize pays ont sign des
Concordats ou accords bilatraux avec le Saint-Sige pour rgir les relations entre l'glise
catholique et l'tat : Autriche, Espagne, France (Alsace-Moselle, D.O.M.-T.O.M.), Italie,
Portugal, Luxembourg, Estonie, Hongrie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Malte, Pologne, Slovaquie,
Slovnie et la Rpublique tchque (encore non ratifi). En Allemagne, le Saint-Sige a sign un
accord avec 14 des 16 Lander51. Le principe de la coopration entre ltat et les religions est
mme proclam par neuf Constitutions sous diffrentes formes. Dix tats ont aussi inscrit dans
leur Constitution le droit linstruction religieuse ou lenseignement religieux52.
On peut estimer que labsence de dbat est due en partie cette mconnaissance de ses
voisins. De surcrot, ce dbat sur une reconnaissance historique cachait la question sous-jacente
des valeurs, et notamment des valeurs chrtiennes.
3.3. Labsence de dbat de fond
Des lecteurs de lExpress53 stonnent quen 5 ans (2000 2004) de dbat sur la
question religieuse en Europe, on n'ait consult qui que ce soit de la base au sujet des
racines chrtiennes mentionner ou omettre dans la Constitution europenne, alors que les
sondages fleurissent tout propos et sur des thmes beaucoup plus futiles. Si on tudie
quantitativement comment les grands quotidiens franais ont trait le sujet, on observe une
divergence dintrt pour la question. Le nombre darticles citant les racines chrtiennes est
dune vingtaine pour Libration, une cinquantaine pour Le Monde et plus de 150 pour Le
Figaro. Nous avons relev deux enqutes imparfaites : une de RTL et une de BVA opinion. Le
site Internet de RTL a ralis une consultation qui a recueilli le 31 mai 2004 81% davis
favorables la mention de lhritage chrtien sur 11000 rponses.

51
Europe infos, Mensuel de la Comece (Commission des Episcopats de la Communaut Europenne) et de
lOcipe (Office Catholique dInformation et dInitiative pour lEurope), n 64, Octobre 2004.
52
Jol-Benot dOnorio, Dieu , op. cit., pp. 171-173.
53
L'Express, n 2761, lundi 31 mai 2004, p. 138.

56
Le pouvoir de la presse est souvent voqu. La position de Grard Dupuy dans
Libration54 ne fait que reflter la position des mdias franais face la question :
On voit que le dbat n'est pas aussi anodin qu'il pourrait paratre. La campagne du
Vatican vise sortir de l'pure laque qui a jusqu'ici encadr de fait la construction
europenne au profit d'un nouvel empitement du religieux (et des religieux) sur le
temporel. La libert de tous est en cause dans cette rgression qui dfie la ncessaire
neutralit de l'tat et des lois.
Selon Georges Mantzaridis55, la crise actuelle du monde chrtien est, dans son essence,
une crise spirituelle. Et le plus important, cest quon na pas encore pris conscience de la nature
de cette crise, si bien quaucun effort nest fait pour lenrayer. Leuropen daujourdhui pense
et agit au niveau conomique et politique. La cause de ces problmes et de ces crises na pas
encore t recherche. Aujourdhui une Europe unie conomiquement et politiquement apparat
comme lobjectif idal. Le niveau spirituel, qui sexprime par la foi et la vie religieuse, est
nglig quand il nest pas totalement rejet. Et il ne peut en tre autrement, car la scularisation
dtruit la foi et la vie religieuse. Tout se limite au niveau conomique et politique. Est considr
comme rel ce qui reprsente ou sert les besoins qui se manifestent ce niveau.
3.4. Une opacit due un manque de dfinitions
Le dialogue multiculturel rencontre des difficults conceptuelles. Ainsi le terme lacit
renvoie selon les pays des dfinitions diffrentes. La lacit dfinie en France correspond un
lacisme pour les autres pays. Les pays europens peinent comprendre la position franaise,
car sa conception de la lacit est unique. Tous les pays respectent la sparation de lglise et de
ltat, dfinition premire de la lacit, cest pourquoi la lacit la franaise relverait
davantage du lacisme pour certains, cest--dire dune vision extrme de la sparation. En
Espagne, El Mundo a qualifi M. Chirac de lacard 56. Le journal italien L'Espresso parle de
la trs laque Constitution europenne 57.
Patrick de Laubier nous explique que le refus du christianisme fait aussi partie
intgrante de lEurope qui ne cesse de choisir, dune gnration lautre, de croire ou de ne pas
croire au message vanglique 58. L'ditorialiste de La Stampa de Turin insiste ainsi sur
l'importance de la lacit : L'Europe a indniablement des racines chrtiennes, mais elle a
aussi mri et dvelopp son identit au travers de comportements et de raisonnements
laques 59.
3.5. Des mdias qui ne se sont plus centrs sur la transmission dinformation
Les mdias europens traduisent un manque de connaissance des journalistes sur la
technicit des quilibres europens, qui sexplique juste titre par une complexification
croissante des mcanismes dcisionnels et institutionnels. Dans les journaux franais, y compris
dans Le Monde nous navons pas de rubrique Europe . Dans de grands journaux comme El
Pais en Espagne ou Le Monde en France, on ne traite pas quotidiennement de lUE alors que
80% des droits nationaux sont irrigus par du droit communautaire.
Un point commun est pourtant relever la lecture des mdias europens : une pense
unique du politiquement correct est de plus en plus en vigueur. Ce dfaut de dmocratie peut
expliquer la position de lUnion europenne qui ne peut plus dire non tout pays qui demandera
54

Grard Dupuy, Libration, vendredi 28 fvrier 2003, p. 3.


Georges Mantzaridis, La fonction cumnique de la tradition orthodoxe in Gilbert Vincent et JeanPaul Willaime (dir.), Religions..., op. cit.
56
Courrier international, n 712, jeudi 24 juin 2004, p. 9.
57
Courrier international, n 730, jeudi 28 octobre 2004, p. 16.
58
Patrick de Laubier, La loi naturelle: la politique et la religion, Parole et silence, Paris, 2004, p. 70.
59
Le Monde, samedi 5 octobre 2002, p. 15.
55

57
son adhsion. Ceci sexplique aussi par des conditions dentre sont trs vagues et souples, qui
se basent essentiellement sur des questions techniques. En effet, la question des frontires de
lUnion europenne, cest--dire sur le lien entre les peuples europens, sur ce qui les unit, sur
lidentit europenne, na pas t rsolue.
Dautre part, les mdias europens paraissent de plus en plus lis de grandes
entreprises. Sils sont de plus en plus pauvres intellectuellement, cest peut-tre que les
journaux ne sont plus dirigs par des rdacteurs en chef, mais par des managers - pouvant tre
directeur gnral dune entreprise de savon juste avant - qui cherchent avant tout faire du
profit. Lcole de journalisme de Paris nenseigne ainsi plus la philosophie, mais le marketing.
De surcrot, on observe par cette mondialisation des groupes de presse un certain manque
dindpendance. Une autre confusion fut celle entretenue par les mdias entre la constitution et
le grand largissement qui ont eu lieu au printemps 2004 pour les deux.
4. Les grands enjeux du dialogue multiculturel pour les mdias
4.1. Le manque de dimension spirituelle
Si nous rflchissons davantage en profondeur, il existe certes des cultures nationales
diffrentes, mais une civilisation europenne. Selon le quotidien espagnol ABC60, beaucoup de
croyants peuvent estimer quils ne reconnaissent plus dans la dfinition de lEurope que la
Constitution propose ou quils la considrent au moins biaise. Labsence de rfrence la
chrtient montre une dvalorisation dune vidence historique et de lidentit chrtienne des
peuples europens, estime le Bristol Evening Post61. En revanche, Henri Tincq, chroniqueur
religieux du Monde, indique que l hritage chrtien n'est pas le seul repre pour le progrs
de la socit 62. Pour tenter de se construire, lEurope naurait, selon Stphane Madaule63
(crivain et essayiste), en quelque sorte quun cheminement possible : se couper, sextraire de
ses origines, se faire un corps jeune, sans histoire, presque vide, lui qui souffrait jusqu prsent
dune sorte de trop plein dhistoire 64. De mme, lditorialiste du Bulletin Quotidien Europe65,
Ferdinado Riccardi, se positionne ainsi :
Je suis contre la rfrence en question si elle assume une valeur idologique [] La
Constitution ne doit comporter aucune indication de prfrence. Je suis pour la
rfrence sil apparat clairement sans quivoque possible, quelle se rfre lhistoire
de lEurope, et si elle cite en mme temps, sous une forme ou lautre, les racines,
grecques, romaines et des Lumires. [] Il est indniable, et vident pour quiconque,
que le christianisme a en grande partie faonn lEurope: ses villes (avec les glises
romanes, gothiques et ensuite baroques et noclasiques, et les centres historiques), ses
paysages (avec les monastres et abbayes), ses routes (en fonction des itinraires
religieux).
Reste savoir si l'offensive du Saint-Sige consiste juste obtenir une rfrence
symbolique dans la Constitution, ou si la hirarchie catholique cherche d'une certaine faon

60

ABC web site, Madrid, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 24 juin 2004: lastly, the stubborn
refusal of a relative majority of states to include an explicit reference to Europe's Christian roots in the
preamble may make many believers feel that they are not reflected in the definition of Europe which the
constitution offers or that they consider it biased.
61
Bristol Evening Post, 31 mai 2005: the constitution's missing reference to Christianity shows an
undervaluing of historical evidence and of the Christian identity of European peoples.
62
Le Monde, mardi 29 juin 2004, p. 1.
63
Stphane Madaule est le fils de Jacques Madaule, chrtien de gauche, ex-compagnon de route du parti.
Cf. C. Amalvi Dictionnaire biographique des historiens franais.
64
Stphane Madaule, La Croix, mercredi 12 novembre 2003.
65
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Bruxelles, Agence Europe, dition du 11/11/2003. n 8561.

58
modeler la future lgislation europenne66. Pourtant, la religion constitue frquemment un
lment fdrateur et fondateur dune identit collective67 alors quon cherche dfinir
lEurope. De surcrot, invoquer Dieu, cest donner une garantie supplmentaire la libert et
aux droits des citoyens en ce sens quune prsence divine signifie que le droit humain nest pas
la norme suprme et finale de la socit humaine68. Dune part, cela rappelle aux gouvernants
quils sont eux-mmes soumis des rgles morales suprieures sur lobservation desquelles ils
seront eux-mmes jugs et, dautre part, que les droits de lhomme sont antrieurs et suprieurs
ltat. Le XXme sicle europen avait prtendu vouloir difier les socits nouvelles la
destine tragique le marxisme-lninisme et le national-socialisme , sans Dieu, cest--dire
contre lui.
La signification des valeurs religieuses ou morales dans la socit pluraliste est
fortement lie la dfinition de la vrit. Une socit peut-elle se passer dun noyau non
relativiste ? Aujourdhui on prfre parler de valeurs (plutt que dun fondement de vrit et
de vrit morale) plutt que de vrit pour ne pas entrer en conflit avec la pense tolrante et le
relativisme dmocratique. Mais on ne peut pas laide dun subterfuge terminologique ,
chapper la question pose. Comment justifier ces valeurs collectives ? Comment justifier
des valeurs fondamentales non soumises au jeu de la majorit et de la minorit ? 69
4.2. Quelle lgitimit pour la religion dans un dialogue multiculturel ?
LEurope a-t-elle besoin dune lgitimation religieuse ? Selon Olivier Duhamel, la
dfinition philosophique de notre continent rside ailleurs quen Dieu, dans les valeurs qui
fondent lhumanisme 70. Pour Pierre Pfimlin71, ministre de la quatrime Rpublique, la seule
source authentique et profonde de lunit est dordre spirituel. Ce nest pas un hasard si les
hommes dtat reconnus commes les Pres fondateurs de lEurope Robert Schuman,
Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi appartenaient la mme famille politique, la
dmocratie-chrtienne. Selon lui, il faut sans tarder que lEurope approfondisse son identit
culturelle , quelle fonde son unit sur la dfense des valeurs constituant son patrimoine
spirituel, dont le christianisme est la source essentielle. Bronislaw Geremek72, historien et
ancien ministre polonais des Affaires trangres, peine comprendre que la rfrence au
christianisme, dans le rappel de ce qui a constitu lEurope, ne soit pas clairement explicite:
Cest un viol de la vrit. Tout historien sait quil y a eu trois grandes tapes dans
lunification de lEurope: lunification autour dune communaut de foi chrtienne, qui
tait aussi une communaut de langue, de liturgie, de production artistique. Puis, plus
litiste, lunification de la Renaissance et des Lumires, linitiative dhommes qui
avaient foi dans un progrs scientifique qui a pris la place de Dieu. La troisime
grande priode est celle que nous vivons prsent.
Alain de Libra note aussi labsence de philosophie dans le Prambule, ce qui
correspond llimination de la part smite de lhritage dit grec 73. Cela confirme aussi un
dclin de rflexion sur la civilisation europenne. Contrairement aux opposants la mention, les

66

Libration, vnement, vendredi 28 fvrier 2003, p. 4


B. Basdevant-Gaudemet & F. Messner (direc.), Les origines historiques, op. cit., p. 25.
68
Jol-Benot dOnorio, Dieu dans les Constitutions europennes : pour un compromis communautaire
in Elizabeth Montfort (dir.), Libert politique, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
69
Joseph Ratzinger, Valeur pour un temps en crise, Parole et silence, 2005, p. 25-49.
70
Olivier Duhamel, La fin de la querelle sur Dieu in Pour lEurope, Paris, Seuil, 2003, p. 118-119.
71
Jean et Blandine Chelini, Lglise, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
72
Bronislaw Geremek, une nouvelle donne religieuse , entretien avec Henri Tincq, Le Monde des
religions, mai-juin 2004, p. 20-21 in Dominique Borne (dir.), La lacit. Mmoire et exigence du prsent,
Paris, problmes politiques et sociaux la documentation franaise, n 917, octobre 2005, 118 p.
73
Alain de Libra, La philosophie, op. cit., pp. 161-186.
67

59
prises de positions des partisans sont nombreuses mais le texte final ne refltera pas la majorit
apparente.
Cela peut sexpliquer par une distance croissante des peuples europens avec la sphre
de leurs lites dcisionnels sans oublier des lobbys silencieux comme la franc-maonnerie dont
laction semble avoir jouer un rle non ngligeable. Alain Bauer, Grand-matre du Grand-Orient
de France dans Le Nouvel Observateur du 12 dcembre 2002, revendique lorigine de la posture
actuelle dominante: si, dans les textes sur lEurope, il nest plus question dintroduire la
notion dhritage culturel chrtien, ce nest pas par hasard. Les francs-maons font ce quils ont
faire 74.
4.3. Lintroduction de la question turque: dans la logique de lviction ?
La question de la mention des racines chrtiennes de lEurope tait susceptible de
captiver lattention, en particulier avec lintroduction de la question turque. Dautant plus que la
question turque sest immisce. La question turque sest introduite dans le dbat sur la mention
des racines chrtiennes, la rendu encore plus biais. Cette introduction de la question turque
invite pourtant tout citoyen europen un dialogue multiculturel accru quelque soit leur
position. Lavance des ngociations de lUnion europenne avec la Turquie a conduit certains
prparer cette adhsion. On comprendrait ainsi lviction de la mention dans la logique de
llargissement futur la Turquie.
A. Les adversaires de la Turquie: larme des racines chrtiennes. Certains
souhaitent ainsi linscription des racines chrtiennes pour contrer lentre de la Turquie75. La
presse tchque explique ainsi que ceux qui sactivent pour que les racines chrtiennes soient
mentionnes, notamment le gouvernement de la Rpublique Tchque, cherchent lever des
obstacles lentre de la Turquie dans lUE76. Hormis le prsident de la Rpublique Franaise
qui y est favorable, il apparat une certaine contradiction de la rponse franaise ngative
lentre de la Turquie dans lUE. En effet, la France opposerait les racines chrtiennes de la
construction europenne pour empcher lentre de la Turquie dans lUE, mais ses
reprsentants ont refus une mention de ces racines dans la Constitution. M. Lequiller,
parlementaire franais (UMP), dit un journal turc que labsence de rfrence aux racines
chrtiennes dans la Constitution renforce les craintes des Franais lgard de la Turquie77.
Claude Allgre, dans sa chronique hebdomadaire dans LExpress du 13 octobre 2005,
argumente son opposition implicite lentre turque :
Contrairement mon ami Michel Rocard, je ne crois pas que lEurope soit simplement
une ide. Elle est dfinie par un territoire, une gographie et une histoire. []
LEurope, de tradition judo-chrtienne, a dbouch sur la lacit. [] Cest lEurope
onusienne [avec la Turquie] ! Sans frontires, sans entit, sans idal.
Le non franais la Turquie, justifi parfois par lnonciation explicite de la tradition
judo-chrtienne de lEurope, semble contredire le non franais la mention des racines
chrtiennes dans le trait constitutionnel tablissant une Constitution pour lEurope.

74

Alain Bauer, Le Nouvel Observateur, n 1988 du 12 dcembre 2002.


Le Figaro, 9-10 novembre 2002: Des dirigeants [lexpriment] pour peu quils se sentent couverts par
lanonymat. Nous sommes un continent chrtien, cela nous permet dtre hypocrites, ironise un ancien
chef de gouvernement .
76
Peth Uhl, CTK news agency, Prague, 4 juin 2004: Those who are pushing for Christian roots to be
embedded in the European Constitution, including the Czech government, are putting up obstacles on the
path of Turkey into the EU .
77
Turkish Daily News, 21 mars 2005: One French parliamentarian Lequiller told the daily that the
absence of a reference to Christian roots in the Constitution reinforces these fears over Turkey about
which French .
75

60
B. Les partisans de la Turquie: contre un club chrtien. Dautres veulent souvrir
la Turquie, car ils ne souhaitent pas rduire lUnion europenne un club chrtien . M.
Barnier avait affirm lui-mme dans un discours Lyon du 25 mai 2004, que lUnion
europenne nest pas un club judo-chrtien et quelle devrait rester une construction
laque . Pour certains78, la formule affirmant que lEurope ntait pas un club chrtien et ne
devait pas faire obstacle lentre dun pays dirig par des musulmans semble avoir t
lance par le ministre des Affaires trangres de lEspagne, Ana Palacio, le 4 novembre 2002.
Dautres citent Helmut Kohl79.
La chrtient ne serait pas un lment de dfinition de lidentit europenne. Cette
dfinition se voudrait ainsi pragmatique, puisquelle opterait pour une dmarche dynamique
prenant en compte limmigration et la dmographie musulmanes80. De surcrot, les rdacteurs
du trait Constitutionnel anticipent lentre potentielle de la Turquie. Il s'agit, selon Philippe de
Villiers, de faciliter l'entre de la Turquie dans l'Union, comme l'a aussitt relev le ministre
turc des affaires trangres, pour qui le trait tablit une bonne Constitution, qui remplit les
attentes de la Turquie 81. Incidemment, une rfrence explicite des racines chrtiennes
aurait pos un obstacle l'adhsion turque 82, confirme Alain Barluet, journaliste au Figaro.
Au Conseil Europen dHelsinki des 11 et 12 dcembre 1999, M. Chirac lavait expliqu de la
manire suivante :
[la dcision de la Turquie lui accordant le statut de candidat] correspond une vision
stratgique qui permet dancrer la Turquie lEurope. La Turquie, par son histoire et
par ses ambitions est europenne. La question des limites de lEurope est un peu
abstraite. Nous verrons petit petit dans quelles conditions les pays qui ne sont pas
encore candidats pourront ltre.
La dialectique est confirme du ct turc. Le Premier Ministre turc, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, a somm lUE le 2 octobre 2005 de choisir: soit elle adopte une position dacteur
mondial en intgrant la Turquie, soit elle la rejette et reste confine dans un club chrtien .
Pour Henri Tincq, certains ont craint de fermer la porte la Turquie musulmane par une
insistance trop grande sur la dimension chrtienne de l'Europe83 linstar de M. Barroso. Ce
dernier a reconnu qu'il serait dangereux de fermer l'Europe comme un club de chrtiens .
Lintroduction de la question turque a non seulement illustr linquitude des
Occidentaux face la monte de lIslam, mais aussi soulev lternel dbat sur les frontires de
lUE. Hubert Haenel sinterroge ainsi : ny a-t-il, en ralit, derrire le dbat sur l Europe
chrtienne , un dbat inavou sur les frontires de lEurope ? 84. Alain Lamassoure affirme
que le problme pour le citoyen de base est labsence de frontires 85. Selon lui,
laspiration un rappel de la tradition chrtienne aurait t moins forte ou naurait pas exist
si lUnion europenne avait des frontires . La question turque et la question des frontires de
lUE semblent lies. En effet, les lments dmocratique et culturel ne sont pas suffisants. Se
repose alors la dfinition de lidentit europenne. Or, M. Lamassoure estime que ce serait
offensant de refuser la Turquie pour des raisons culturelles ou religieuses. Lidentit ne peut se
dfinir que par des frontires gographiques . Cela signifie que llment de dfinition devait
renvoyer la nature des choses qui exclut la mtaphysique. LUE continue se chercher et le
dbat sur la mention des racines chrtiennes na pas permis lUnion europenne dapprofondir
78
Alain de Libra, La philosophie dans lisoloir , in inactualit du politique , Critique, ditions de
Minuit, juin-juillet 2005, n 697-698, pp. 496-503 in Dominique Borne (dir.), La lacit, op. cit., 118 p.
79
F. Kuntz, Dieu ternel candidat lUnion europenne ? in Salamandra, op. cit., 51 p.
80
Patrick de Laubier, La loi naturelle : la politique et la religion. Parole et silence, Paris. 2004. 130 p. :
On a critiqu lide dun club chrtien propos de la candidature turque, tandis que le courant
migratoire, dorigine musulmane, est important et le sera de plus en plus dans lavenir
81
Henri Tincq, Le Monde, vendredi 29 avril 2005, p. 9.
82
Alain Barluet, Le Figaro, n 18577, mercredi 28 avril 2004, p. 6.
83
Henri Tincq, La dfaite du parti chrtien in Le Monde A la Une, mardi 29 juin 2004, p. 1.
84
Hubert Haenel, LEurope : chrtienne ou non ? in La Croix, 29 septembre 2003.
85
Lentretien de lauteur avec Alain Lamassoure ralis le 15 novembre 2005 Strasbourg.

61
son identit. Elle semble refuser dutiliser un critre culturel afin de se dfinir, et ainsi dlimiter
ses frontires.
4.4. La question sous-jacente de la monte de lIslam
Le juge belge de la Cour de justice de l'Union, Koen Lenaerts, estime que l'inclusion
dans la future Constitution d'une rfrence aux racines chrtiennes du Vieux Continent serait
incompatible avec le ncessaire respect des autres religions86. La principale religion sousentendue ici serait lIslam comme lexplique Grard Dupuy, dans son ditorial87 de Libration:
Une telle mention exclusive serait aussi une preuve d'intolrance l'gard des millions
de musulmans qui vivent dsormais dans les pays europens ou pour les croyants de
toute autre obdience. En outre, en guise de racines , il conviendrait aussi de
mentionner la libre pense et son enracinement dans la culture grecque. Aprs tout, une
tradition presque trimillnaire d'athisme est une particularit europenne qu'aucune
autre culture ou civilisation ne partage.
Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont modifi structurellement la position des
gouvernements europens envers les minorits musulmanes prsentes en Europe. Beaucoup de
pays europens craignent laffrontement religieux88. 3,4% de la population totale de lUE est
musulmane, soit 15,5 millions. Le pays de lUE le plus peupl de musulmans, la fois en valeur
absolue et en valeur relative, est la France avec 8,3% de musulmans vivant en France, soit 5
millions. Ainsi prs dun tiers des musulmans vivant en Europe rsiderait ainsi en France. La
question de lIslam dans lHexagone est centrale pour dautres raisons. En 2004, a eu lieu le
dbat portant sur linterdiction du port des insignes religieux dans les lieux publics. Le voile
musulman tait implicitement vis. De surcrot, la guerre en Irak commence en mars 2003 a
rveill les populations musulmanes en Europe. Les attentats de Madrid en 2004 et de Londres
en 2005 nont fait que renforcer la crainte de la monte de lIslam. Cest dans ce contexte que
les gouvernements rflchissent au projet final de constitution pour lEurope, et notamment
une mention de la chrtient comme lment de dfinition de son identit.
De manire plus ambigu, la monte de lIslam a pos des questions notamment aprs
les attentats du 11 septembre. On a souhait ne pas mentionner Dieu pour viter le dbat sur
lIslam. Cela pourrait se traduire par une fausse rponse son gard. Peut-on rpondre
lintgrisme par le lacisme ? Ou doit-on rflchir une forme dintgration du religieux dans la
socit ? Ainsi daprs un journal iranien, M. Boubakeur, le recteur de la mosque de Paris,
proposa en novembre 2003 une simple rfrence la spiritualit du monothisme dAbraham
puisque les trois grandes religions drivent toutes du prophte Abraham89. Ainsi une rfrence
Dieu pourrait mme tre facteur dunit et de cohsion sur une base religieuse en Europe.
4.5. Un besoin de dialogue multiculturel
En 1992, le prsident de la commission, Jacques Delors estime qu il faut donner une
me lEurope . Si dans les dix ans qui viennent, nous navons pas russi donner une me,
une spiritualit, une signification lEurope, nous aurons perdu la partie , explique-t-il aussi.
Or, Malraux assure quune crise des valeurs est une crise de civilisation 90. Selon P. Kahn,
86

Le Figaro, n 18441, vendredi 21 novembre 2003, p. 5.


Grard Dupuy, Libration, vendredi 28 fvrier 2003, p. 3.
88
United Press International, 28 mai 2003: Sources said several European countries were nervous about
creating resentment among their large Islamic immigrant populations .
89
Nawab Khan, Iranian newspaper Iran Daily web site in English, 2 novembre 2003: Boubakeur
proposed a simple reference to the spirituality of Abrahamic monotheism since the three great
monotheistic faiths all derive from the prophet Abraham.
90
Jean-Paul II, Lglise en Europe, Exhortation apostolique, Bayard Fleurs-Mame Cerf, 2003, page de
couverture.
87

62
ltat obit toujours des fins et suspend ainsi de lui-mme son existence un ordre des
valeurs, ordre lie la question de la valeur des fins quil se propose91. Atila zer, professeur
dans une universit en Turquie, souligne la ralit effective de lide morale chez Hegel. Pour
ce dernier, Ltat moderne repose non seulement sur le principe antique de lunit politique,
mais aussi sur le principe chrtien de la valeur infinie de la personnalit92. la base de toute
ide europenne, il y a une conception de ltat, cest--dire des fondements philosophiques et
mtaphysiques de ltat. Quelle est cette conception de ltat pour lUnion europenne ? SaintSimon veut fonder la nouvelle Europe sur une nouvelle religion. Cette religion renvoie lesprit
des Lumires, la foi dans le progrs et la science, explique Marie-Thrse Bitsch93. Sur quoi
veulent fonder lEurope les rdacteurs du trait Constitutionnel ? Ivan Rioufol assure que le
besoin d'identification collectif passe dsormais par une reconnaissance culturelle et religieuse.
Elles sont l'unique dnominateur commun pour les pays du Vieux Continent. Leur air de
famille s'explique par cette mme origine94. Mme Voltaire voyait lEurope comme une
espce de grande rpublique partage en plusieurs tats mais tous correspondant les uns avec
les autres, tous ayant un mme fond de religion 95. Paul Valry sexprime aussi sur le sujet
en novembre 1922 :
Je considrerai comme europens tous les peuples qui ont subi au cours de lHistoire
les trois influences que je vais dire. [] La seconde est celle du christianisme qui vise
et atteint progressivement le profond de la conscience. [] Toute race et toute terre
qui a t successivement romanise, christianise et soumise quant lesprit la
discipline des Grecs est absolument europenne96.
Ce traitement des questions europennes contribue faire vivre lEurope comme une
donne concrte dans les faits matrialistes et non dans une prise de conscience des changes
culturels depuis un millnaire. Ainsi les largissements se poursuivent sans rflexion
approfondie des lites sur lidentit europenne des lites. LEurope a cruellement besoin dune
me, de revenir ses valeurs dont une des sources communes est le christianisme, telle que le
respect de la dignit humaine, de la famille comme cellule fondamentale de la socit se basant
sur lunion complmentaire entre un homme et une femme.
4.6. La crise spirituelle europenne rendant difficile un dialogue multiculturel
Le dernier essai de Georges Weigel97, amricain, sur lEurope, lAmrique et la
politique avec ou sans Dieu illustre notre propos. Parmi les consquences de cette
dchristianisation, figure, selon lui, le refus de faire rfrence aux racines chrtiennes dans
la constitution europenne. Georges Weigel sinterroge sur la christophobie de tant
dintellectuels et de dirigeants europens. Il nhsite pas faire remonter au XIIIme sicle
lorigine de lactuel dbat entre partisans et adversaires de linvocation de Dieu dans la
Constitution europenne. Plus prcisment, il remonterait au conflit qui opposa le dominicain
Thomas dAquin, tenant de la libert pour lexcellence (conception spirituelle), au
franciscain Guillaume dOckham, tenant de la libert dindiffrence (conception nominaliste
non spirituelle). Pour Weigel, le chemin ouvert par Ockham mne Nietzsche et aussi un
trait constitutionnel europen qui vite les problmes dthique et de finalit.

91

Kahn Pierre, Ltat, Paris, Editions Quintette, Collection Philosopher, 2003, p. 6.


Atila zer, Ltat, Paris, Flammarion, 1998, p. 125.
93
Marie-Thrse Bitsch, Histoire de la construction europenne, Bruxelles, ditions Complexe, 2001, p.
16.
94
Ivan Rioufol, Le Figaro, n 18220, Vendredi 7 mars 2003, p. 14.
95
F. de Teyssier & G. Baudier, La construction de lEurope, Que sais-je ? PUF, 2003, p. 34.
96
Paul Valry (novembre 1922), Varits IV in uvres compltes, Paris, Gallimard, collection La Pliade,
1957 in Elisabeth du Rau, Lide dEurope au XXme sicle, Paris, ditions complexe, 1995, p. 20.
97
Claire Lesegretain, La Croix, 21 juillet 2005.
92

63
Pour illustrer ce penchant pour ce qui relve de lordre du faire, Alain Lamassoure dfinit
lidentit europenne teinte de saint-simonisme de la manire suivante:
Ce qui rassemble les Europens, cest le rejet de leur pass. On construit lEurope pour
enterrer ce pass commun. Ce qui va faire lidentit de lEurope, ce nest pas le pass.
[] Ce qui va dfinir lidentit europenne est ce que nous ferons ensemble98.
On peut penser que les mdias europens donnent trop dimportance, trop dintrt aux
enjeux matrialistes, conomiques dans la vie quotidienne de lUE. On peut aussi qualifier cette
approche de proudhonienne car en ne dfinissant pas une sve commune et en choisissant une
formule vague et elliptique hritages culturels, spirituels et humanistes . Pourquoi les
mdias dlaissent-ils les aspects historiques et culturels lorsquils voquent lEurope ?
Pourtant, lconomie, de par ses flux financiers, reste trs abstraite, alors que la culture
sintresse lhomme. Or, la dimension culturelle est largement absente des mdias europens.
Il sagit, en fait, dune concertation positiviste, de raisonnements par rapport des
statistiques.
Fait-on lEurope car on y a des gains conomiques ? Le Royaume-Uni est la caricature
de cette approche saint-simonienne qui donne la primaut aux questions conomiques. Un tat
illustre parfaitement cette ide europenne. Il sagit du Royaume-Uni qui na montr aucun
intrt pour le sujet des racines chrtiennes. Londres se moque du dbat sur les racines
chrtiennes de la vieille Europe, souligne Alexandrine Bouilhet99. En effet, aucune mention du
dbat apparat dans les rapports du Gouvernement au Parlement britannique: The British
Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 2003 prsente au Parlement
par le secrtaire dtat aux Affaires trangres en septembre 2003, et le White Paper on the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe prsente au Parlement par le secrtaire dtat
aux Affaires trangres en septembre 2004. Le concept anglo-saxon dEurope correspond un
grand march libre un peu organis. Dans un discours la Commission europenne100, le 28
novembre 2002, Tony Blair, Premier ministre britannique, souligne l'importance des travaux de
la Convention europenne sur l'avenir de l'Europe et expose son point de vue en ce qui concerne
le rle de la Grande-Bretagne dans une Europe plus forte et dmocratique.
L'Europe est vitale pour le Royaume-Uni. 60 % de nos changes se font avec l'UE; 3
millions d'emplois en dpendent dans notre pays. L'adhsion l'UE nous donne accs
au march unique, avec ses 380 millions de consommateurs, ds avant l'largissement.
Il nous donne davantage de poids pour relever les nombreux dfis que nous partageons
avec nos voisins. [] Prenez le dossier de la rforme conomique pour lequel le
Royaume-Uni se passionne.
Ainsi les mdias ont une responsabilit dans le manque de rflexion, dans le manque
dinvitation au dbat sur lidentit europenne, sur la dimension culturelle et spirituelle des
changes depuis longtemps.
5. Conclusions
Le dbat sur la mention des racines chrtiennes a mis en vidence le rle jou par les
mdias europens aujourdhui. Il a rvl sa responsabilit dans le manque de rflexion sur
lidentit europenne, rflexion qui aurait comme sous-jacent la dfinition des frontires
europennes. La mconnaissance des autres cultures europennes qui forment la civilisation
europenne empche un dialogue multiculturel ncessaire afin de rapprocher les gouvernants
des gouverns. Concernant la ngation des racines, soulignons seulement que ce choix pour
lEurope ne reflte pas les constitutions nationales o les formules consacres Dieu sont
pourtant courantes comme la formule allemande qui introduit la Loi Fondamentale de 1949:
98

Lentretien de lauteur avec Alain Lamassoure ralis le 15 novembre 2005 Strasbourg.


Alexandrine Bouilhet, Le Figaro, n 18599, mardi 25 mai 2004, p. 5.
100
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/speech/sp281102_fr.pdf, mis jour le 26 juillet
2005.
99

64
Conscients de nos responsabilits devant Dieu ou encore les Constitutions irlandaise et
grecque qui font rfrence la trs sainte Trinit .
La Convention a finalement opt pour le consensus par recoupement , formule du
philosophe John Rawls. La formulation hritages culturels, spirituels et humanistes renvoie
une vocation plurielle et implicite pour tous. Il ny a pas de consensus. La Convention a alors
cherch dtourner le problme en faisant une description qui pourrait fdrer lensemble. La
solution minimaliste, ambigu et elliptique, vague et imprcise, ne dfinit pas une sve
commune unificatrice. On laisse les valeurs opposes saffronter dans une approche fdraliste
au sens de la dialectique proudhonienne.
Comment sest ralise ladoption du texte final ? Un bilan au cours du dbat met en
balance sept pays opposs (France, Danemark, Belgique, Sude, Finlande, Estonie, Espagne),
cinq plutt neutres (Autriche, Luxembourg, Royaume-Uni, Slovnie et Lettonie) et 13 pour
(Portugal, Slovaquie, Lituanie, Rpublique Tchque, Italie, Pologne, Pays-Bas, Grce,
Allemagne, Hongrie, Malte, Chypre et Irlande). Le choix final ne reflterait pas celui de la
majorit. Les arguments des opposants la mention des racines chrtiennes dans le prambule
renvoient non seulement la dfense de la lacit mais aussi au refus de la chrtient comme
lment de dfinition de lUE. Des opposants la mention lont t pour des motifs diffrents,
au mme titre que les partisans. La question turque a compliqu le dbat, voire la aliment.
En effet, lUE doit faire face un problme de dfinition de ses frontires. Or, les
critres retenus ne sont ni culturels ni spirituels. Est-ce que le critre unique est conomique,
voire gostratgique ? Le christianisme, utilis pour sa symbolique par des proudhoniens de
droite lecteurs de Georges Sorel lorigine de la construction europenne, nest plus
considr par leurs hritiers comme un mythe ncessaire pour faire avancer les peuples
europens dans son dveloppement actuel. La recherche de la puissance conomique
correspond la finalit du projet europen, avouent les principaux penseurs du trait
constitutionnel. On ne souhaite pas fonder la paix sur lunit religieuse mais bien sur le
commerce. Quelle est alors la nature du lien europen ? Le trait dunion entre les pays
europens est ainsi une rationalit conomique, gage de paix dans lesprit du socialisme de
Saint-Simon, et non sur des fondements spirituels.
Or, nous constatons une crise de civilisation chez les Europens, et les mdias ont leur
part de responsabilit selon moi. Les mdias se doivent dtre un vecteur de dmocratie, de
rapprochement entre les peuples europens en relayant un vritable dialogue multiculturel. Cela
commence par lintrt quils consacrent aux autres pays europens et aux opinions
dveloppes par leurs reprsentants. La devise de lEurope pourrait alors redonner un vritable
sens leur vocation : unis dans la diversit .
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67

Mdias et minorits en Slovaquie


Mria FOLLRICHOVA
Gilles ROUET
Abstract: In the world there are 2,6 - 2,8 million persons of Slovak root. They issue
mostly monthly and quarterly papers, but no daily papers and only four weekly newspapers. In
Czech Republic they issue nine Slovak papers and journals.
Slovak state declared twelve ethnic minorities (14.2% of the inhabitants of Slovakia).
Constitution of Slovak Republic regulates their rights in articles 12, 26 and 34, in laws of
Slovak Republic and treaties. Ministry of Cultural Slovak Republic and regional offices finance
their culture. Department of culture of minorities and Council of government for minorities and
ethnic groups help them.
Ministry of Culture finances 40 papers and journals. They contribute to identity
process in a new European Union context.
Key words: minorities, Slovakia, media, Diaspora, cultural politic
LEtat slovaque est dhistoire rcente et, aprs quelques annes de diffusion massive
des produits culturels doutre-Atlantique, beaucoup de Slovaques, hommes politiques,
producteurs, crivains, intellectuels, universitaires, artistes ou journalistes, revendiquent des
conditions dexpression des diversits culturelles. Le dbat social et juridique autour des
minorits en Slovaquie, leur place et leur statut, qui sest traduit, par exemple, par un dispositif
lgislatif reconnaissant notamment le droit lusage local de la langue, est li cette prise de
conscience et cette nouvelle tendance: la Slovaquie, pays de 5,4 millions dhabitants, de 12
minorits reconnues et de 16 religions enregistres, tente de dfendre et parfois de soutenir
aussi ses cultures en tentant dviter tout imprialisme culturel.
1. Les minorits en Slovaquie: langues, religions et histoire constitutionnelle
Les droits des citoyens des minorits en Slovaquie sont dfinis par la Constitution de la
Rpublique slovaque mais aussi par dautres textes comme, par exemple, partir de 1994, la loi
sur les langues des minorits au sein des communes, les lois concernant la culture, lducation,
les missions de tlvision ou de radio, ou, enfin, les conventions internationales sur les droits
des hommes et les liberts principales comme la Dclaration de lONU sur les personnes
morales appartenant aux natioanlits ou aux minorits ethniques, religieuses ou linguistiques ou
bien la Charte europenne des langues rgionales ou minoritaires.
Mais lhistoire est plus ancienne. En effet, depuis la constitution de 1920, les habitants
appartenant une minorit peuvent utiliser leur langue localement partir du seuil de 20 %. La
constitution de 1992 confirme la langue slovaque comme la langue officielle de la Rpublique
slovaque : dans larticle 12, les droits gnraux fondamentaux sont reconnus tous les citoyens
et larticle 34 contient des dispositions spcifiques relatives aux minorits nationales: le droit
la diffusion et la rception des informations dans la langue minoritaire, le droit lducation
dans la langue minoritaire et le droit dutiliser cette langue dans les contacts avec les autorits.
En 1995, une loi trs critique a relativis les possibilits ouvertes par larticle 34 de la
Constitution en rappelant fermement le caractre officiel de la seule langue slovaque. En 1999,
une nouvelle loi abroge une partie de la loi de 1995 et tente de mieux correspondre aux besoins
des minorits. Mais la mise en pratique de cette loi est difficile puisquil ne sagit que de
reconnatre la possibilit dutiliser la langue minoritaire dans les contacts avec les autorits
rgionales, sans exiger pour autant que les agents des rgions ne connaissent cette langue.

68
Autre lment identitaire des minorits: les religions. Il nexiste pas de religion dEtat
en Slovaquie mais la religion Catholique est considre comme religion dominante.
Lenregistrement dune religion nest pas obligatoire toutefois seules les religions enregistres
peuvent avoir des droits: par exemple de proposer des services, de recevoir des subsides, de
visiter prisons et hpitaux, davoir accs aux tlvisions, etc. Les religions enregistres peuvent
galement tre exemptes de certaines taxes. Quatorze religions ont t enregistres avant 1991,
Depuis cette date, lenregistrement est soumis la prsentation dune liste de 20 000 rsidents
permanents dclarant adhrer la religion ; les Tmoins de Jhovah et la nouvelle glise
apostolique ont t ainsi enregistrs. Depuis septembre 2006, les Mormons tentent recueillir par
ptition dans les rues de Slovaquie les 20 000 signatures ncessaires leur reconnaissance. Une
trentaine dautres cultes dont certains sont lorigine, en France, de drives sectaires, sont
prsents en Slovaquie, notamment la Scientologie ou encore les Raliens. La religion
musulmane nest pas enregistre et regrouperait entre 300 et 3 000 immigrs du Proche-Orient
ou dAlbanais, ou encore des tudiants.
La construction identitaire du jeune Etat slovaque a donc pour cadre cette pluralit
culturelle et linguistique. En effet, si dans sa Constitution la Rpublique slovaque se dfinit
comme un Etat de droit souverain, dmocratique, li aucune idologie ni religion dont le
territoire est un et indivisible 1, larticle 12 de ce texte garantit la libert et lgalit de tous
dans leur dignit et leurs droits inalinables , sans gard au sexe, la race, la couleur de
la peau, la langue, aux croyances ou la religion, lorientation politique ou autre,
lorigine nationale ou sociale, lappartenance une nationalit ou un groupe ethnique, la
fortune, la descendance ou une autre position . Le troisime alina de cet article est
intressant : il sagit de garantir tout citoyen de pouvoir dcider librement concernant sa
nationalit, ce qui, lvidence, interdit toute opration dintgration ou dassimilation
nationale. Lhritage multiethnique de lancien Empire austro-hongrois est assum et,
en consquence, tout citoyen de la Rpublique slovaque a parfaitement le droit dafficher son
origine nationale ou ethnique. La diffrenciation entre citoyennet et nationalit est
ainsi constitutionnellement fonde et la langue, en Slovaquie, rvle bien souvent cette
nationalit.
Ce choix constitutionnel sappuie sur une ralit sociale car, dans plus de 22 % des
communes slovaques, la proportion dhabitants issus dune minorit linguistique est gale ou
suprieure 20 %. Ainsi, dans 512 communes la langue hongroise peut tre utilise localement;
dans 68 communes, cest le cas pour le ruthne ou encore pour lukrainien dans 18
municipalits. Un seul village satisfait les critres officiels pour le respect des droits de la
minorit allemande et dans 57 communes les Roms se sont dclars plus de 20 %.
Lors du recensement de 2001, 4 614 854 personnes (85,8 %) se sont dclares
slovaques, 520 528 personnes (9,7 %) hongroises, et 89 920 (1,7 %) roms, mais ces derniers
reprsenteraient en fait une communaut de prs de 420 000 personnes, car la majorit des
Roms se dclarent soit en tant que Slovaques, soit en tant quHongrois, selon le lieu dhabitat en
Slovaquie. Ainsi, la Slovaquie est le premier pays pour le nombre de Roms par rapport la
population totale. En ce qui concerne les autres minorits, le recensement fournit les effectifs de
44 620 tchques (0,8 %), 24 201 ruthnes (0,4 %), 10 814 ukrainiens (0,2%), 5 405 allemands,
2 602 polonais, 2 348 moraves, 1 590 russes, 1 179 bulgares, 890 croates, 434 serbes, 218 juifs
(chiffres trs certainement sous-estim). 5 350 personnes ont dclar une autre nationalit et
54 502 personnes nen ont dclar aucune.
Avant 1989, quatre minorits taient reconnues : hongroise, ukrainienne, allemande et
polonaise, tandis qu partir du recensement de la population en 1991, ce sont onze minorits
qui ont t admises: bulgare, tchque, croate, hongroise, morave, allemande (des Carpates),
polonaise, rom, ruthne, ukrainienne, juive. En 2003, la minorit russe a t ajoute cette liste.

Constitution du 1er septembre 1992, entre en vigueur le 1er janvier 1993, articles 1 et 3 alina 1.

69
Un dbat sensible en Slovaquie concerne justement le seuil historique de 20 % et la
dfinition de nouveaux critres est souvent revendique, qui sappuierait par exemple sur
lhistoire mme du peuplement des communes.
La ratification en 2001 de la Charte europenne des langues rgionales ou minoritaires
permet de considrer dsormais les neuf langues suivantes: allemand, bulgare, croate, hongrois,
polonais, romani, ruthne, tchque, ukrainien. Cette ratification et les amendements successifs
de la loi sur la langue dEtat, notamment en 2005, afin de permettre lexpression culturelle en
langue minoritaire, nont pas encore permis de remettre jour la liste officielle des
municipalits intgrant des usages linguistiques minoritaires.
Cette pluralit culturelle, linguistique et religieuse, installe depuis plusieurs sicles,
pourrait ainsi protger les citoyens slovaques contre certaines drives de repli national et
engager dpasser la simple curiosit de lautre et envisager tout change dexpriences
comme source de richesse et de progrs. Mais cette situation peut galement, linverse, offrir
un terrain un nationalisme extrmiste susceptible de une expression nouvelle dans le cadre de
lUnion Europenne.
2. Medias et minorits: un sujet dtudes pour une identit plurielle
Depuis 1973, le journalisme des minorits en Tchcoslovaquie puis en Slovaquie,
comme celui des minorits slovaques dans le monde sont particulirement tudis au sein du
dpartement du Journalisme de la Facult des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de lUniversit
Comenius Bratislava. Ce dpartement propose mme depuis 30 ans un cours sur le
Journalisme nationaliste et extrme2. Lintgration de cette thmatique dans la formation des
futurs journalistes est fondamentale car les tudiants de journalisme appartiennent la nation
slovaque, aux minorits en Slovaquie, aux minorits slovaques sur le territoire de lancienne
Autriche-Hongrie et aux minorits slovaques dans le monde.
Mais cette formation devrait pouvoir tre galement dispense tout citoyen slovaque.
En effet, en premier lieu, chacun des membres dune quelconque communaut, doit se rendre
compte que, parfois il appartient une majorit et parfois une minorit. Rappelons que sur le
territoire europen, il existe environ 80 populations particulires dont le pays dorigine pour 25
dentre elles est situe sur le territoire de lancienne Russie. Certaines populations sont
installes sur des territoires qui dpassent les frontires des Etats. Les habitants dune dizaine
dethnies immigres dautres continents vivent galement en Europe (Notamment immigrants
des territoires doutre-mer de certains pays ou danciennes colonies, etc.). La situation des
nationalits en Europe est donc complexe.
3. Mdias et migrations slovaques
Pour mieux comprendre la situation slovaque, il convient de rappeler les cinq vagues
de migrations passes:
1) Une migration interne dans le cadre de la Hongrie (dans les annes 1685-1867);
2) Une migration massive (1867-1921), notamment aux USA;
3) Une migration interne dans le cadre de la Tchcoslovaquie (1918-1993);
4) Une migration saisonnire, particulirement une migration sociale (1921-1939);
5) Une migration politique (1938-1939, 1945, 1948, 1968-1969);
6) Une nouvelle migration (surtout aprs lanne 1989).
Selon les estimations, de 2,6 2,8 millions de personnes dorigine slovaque vivent
dans le monde entier dont 1,9 millions aux USA, prs de 350 000 habitent en Tchquie. Environ
110 000 rsidents dorigine slovaque sont recenss en Hongrie, 90 000 au Canada et 70 000 en
ex-Yougoslavie.
2
Depuis 1960, 43 mmoires sur le journalisme nationaliste ont t soutenus au sein du dpartement ainsi
que, depuis 1967, 19 memoires sur le journalisme extrme.

70
Un rle important pour la conservation et le dveloppement de lidentit des Slovaques
du monde est jou par une presse priodique. Du point de vue de la priodicit, ce sont
essentiellement des magazines mensuels et trimestriels. Aucun quotidien nest publi hors de la
Slovaquie et quatre maisons dditions publient des hebdomadaires: en Serbie, la Voix du
peuple (Hlas udu), en Hongrie, le Journal populaire (udov noviny), au Canada, le
Slovaque canadien (Kanadsk Slovk) et au USA, l Aigle slovaque catholique
(Slovensk katolcky Sokol). Citons galement les magazines trimestriels Pont (Most) aux
USA, Miroirs parallles (Rovnobezne zrkadl, Oglinzi paralele), en Roumanie, Nouvelle
vie (Nov ivot), en ex-Yougoslavie et Vues slovaques (Slovensk rozhady) en
Tchquie.
En Tchquie, neuf magazines nationalistes sont publis et trois mensuels ont une
diffusion importante (Korene, Slovensk dotyky, Slovensk listy). Le magazine Slovensk
dotyky (tirage denviron 10 000 exemplaires) est le plus diffus des magazines slovaques
actuels dans le monde entier.
Toutes les communauts slovaques dans le monde ont manifest un besoin
dassimilation au pays daccueil, mais bien videmment pas toutes aux mmes poques ni dans
des circonstances identiques. Les mdias, et principalement les magazines des minorits
slovaques ont contribu au ralentissement de ce processus.
En Slovaquie, la loi sur les Slovaques trangers stipule que les minorits (enklvy)
nationales slovaques sont une partie insparable de la nation slovaque et quils forment un pont
entre la Slovaque et le pays o ils vivent. Mme si la conscience de lappartenance une nation
a t considre comme tant le signe le plus important de la nationalit de lindividu, la
matrise de la langue est apparu comme une base de cette conscience.
Aprs 1993, la presse nationaliste dans les pays de louest a t rduite en partie
(beaucoup ont considr la cration de la Rpublique Slovaque indpendante comme le but
ralis et ils ont arrt de publier ces journaux), alors quen Europe de lEst, cette presse
a augment (Tchquie, Roumanie, Hongrie, Ukraine, etc.). Il est trs intressant de comparer la
qualit, le nombre et le tirage des journaux et magazines publis dans chaque pays o vivent des
communauts issues de limmigration slovaque car toutes ces communauts ont bien entendu
intgr ses caractristiques spcifiques dans son pays dimplantation.
4. Politique pour les cultures minoritaires en Slovaquie
A partir de la mise en place du gouvernement de la Rpublique Slovaque en novembre
1998, une nouvelle section des cultures des minorits a t cre au sein du ministre de la
Culture afin de concrtiser par certaines activits et ralisations les intentions politiques du
gouvernement par rapport aux minorits.
Le 14 avril 1999, le gouvernement a cr le Conseil du gouvernement pour les
minorits et pour les groupes ethniques. Les membres de ce Conseil sont des reprsentants des
minorits. Il sagit dun organe consultatif qui remplit galement des fonctions de coordination.
Son secrtariat est assur par la Section des droits des hommes et des minorits du Bureau du
gouvernement.
Comme on la rappel prcdemment, la Constitution et divers textes lgislatifs
fournissent le cadre constitutionnel de la place des minorits en Slovaquie. Mais il existe
galement un cadre qui dpasse la Rpublique slovaque puisque la Convention du Conseil de
lEurope sur la protection des minorits a t accepte par le Conseil du gouvernement de la
Rpublique slovaque le 21 juin 1995, puis est entre en vigueur le 1er janvier 1998 aprs
ratification par plus de 12 Etats europens. Cette Convention oblige notamment la Rpublique
slovaque fournir au Secrtaire gnral du Conseil de lEurope un Rapport complet sur
lapplication de cette Convention.
A lvidence, cette reconnaissance des minorits ne pouvait pas rester au niveau des
seuls principes et des modalits de financement de lexpression culturelle des minorits ont
donc t mises en place, avec trois modes de financement.

71
En premier lieu, le ministre de la Culture contribue au dveloppement de la culture
des minorits et finance des vnements culturels, la publication de la presse priodique et non
priodique. Le fonctionnement des organisations des minorits but culturel et des institutions
culturelles dEtat au niveau central comme au niveau des rgions (notamment les thtres) fait
galement lobjet dun financement particulier comme les activits culturelles des minorits
organises dans le cadre des institutions dEtat ou des rgions (au sein des muses, galeries,
bibliothques, centres culturels, etc.). Enfin, le ministre de la Culture propose des
financements pour les projets soutenus par des personnes physiques ou morales dans le cadre de
lexpression culturelle des minorits.
Une commission professionnelle, forme auprs de la Section des cultures minoritaires
au sein du ministre de la Culture avec des reprsentants de chacune des 12 minorits en
Slovaquie, tudie chaque projet et propose au ministre une distribution des financements.
Tableau 1. Financements accordes par le Ministre de la Culture en 2000
pour lexpression culturelle des minorits en Slovaquie
Total des financements
Activits culturelles
Presse priodique
Presse non priodique

En millions de couronnes
50
20
16,3
9,5

En millions deuros
1,351
0,540
0,440
0,262

La rpartition de ces budgets par minorit est la suivante:


1) Pour la minorit bulgare, 500 000 couronnes pour les activits culturelles et
400 000 couronnes pour 1 priodique (1,8 % du budget total);
2) Pour la minorit tchque, 81 projets culturels ont t financs avec plus de 980 000
couronnes ainsi que 5 priodiques: 1,1 millions de couronnes (4,2%);
3) Pour la minorit croate, plus de 1,1 millions de couronnes pour les vnements et
plus de 350 000 pour la cration de recueils ethnographiques et ethnologiques (2,9 %);
4) Pour la minorit hongroise, 315 projets culturels ont reu plus de 9,5 millions de
couronnes, 19 titres de la presse priodique plus que 6,5 millions de couronnes et la presse non
priodique plus de 6,800 millions de couronnes (prs de 50 %);
5) Pour la minorit morave, 8 projets ont reu 560 000 couronnes et 1 priodique
400 000 couronnes (2,2 %);
6) Pour la minorit allemande, 45 projets ont reu 1,3 millions de couronnes et 1 titre
de la presse priodique, 800 000 couronnes (4,5 %);
7) Pour la minorit polonaise, 5 projets ont reu 610 000 couronnes et 1 priodique
220 000 couronnes (1,8 %);
8) La minorit rom est reprsente par plus de 60 associations civiles, 2,7 millions de
couronnes ont t attribus pour les vnements culturels, 2,8 millions pour ldition de 5
priodiques et 483 000 couronnes pour 5 titres de la presse non priodique (13, 2 %);
9) Pour la minorit ruthne, 30 projets ont t financs hauteur de 6,5 millions de
couronnes, 2 priodiques pour plus de 1,5 millions de couronnes et 2 titres de la presse non
priodique pour 170 000 couronnes (5, 2 %);
10) Pour la minorit russe, 5 projets ont reu 180 000 couronnes et 1 priodique
400 000 couronnes (1,3 %);
11) Pour la minorit ukrainienne, 8 projets ont reu 715 000 couronnes, 3 priodiques
plus de 1,5 millions de couronnes et 4 titres de la presse non priodique prs de 0,5 million de
couronnes (5,4 %);
12) Enfin, la minorit juive a reu 210 000 couronnes pour 4 projets, 70 000 pour
ldition de la presse priodique et 1,5 millions de couronnes pour ldition de la presse non
priodique (3,9 %).

72
Bien videmment, la comparaison des poids respectifs des populations de ces
minorits avec la rpartition des crdits affects leur expression culturelle ne correspond pas
exactement: la minorit hongroise, la plus importante (entre 60 et 70 % de la population non
slovaque), a obtenu la moiti des crdits tandis que les roms (plus de 20 % des populations
minoritaires) ont utilis un peu plus de 13 % des crdits. Les distorsions sont videmment bien
plus importantes pour les minorits les moins nombreuses: les propositions de financement de
la commission ont videmment t dtermines par les projets eux-mmes, et sans tenter
dtablir une liaison rigoureuse entre rpartitions des populations et des crdits. Les Tchques,
6,33 % des populations minoritaires, ont utilis 4,2 % des crdits tandis que les Bulgares ont
obtenu 1,8 % du financement alors quils reprsentent 0,17 %, soit moins de 1200 personnes. Il
ne sagit en effet pas seulement de permettre aux communauts de conserver leurs cultures mais
aussi den faire la promotion, au niveau de lEtat slovaque tout entier. Il est donc intressant
pour tout citoyen slovaque de pouvoir mieux connatre, par exemple, les traditions croates
mme si moins de 900 personnes de cette nationalit vivent en Slovaquie.
Pour lanne 2005, prs de 80 millions de couronnes (soit 2,2 millions deuros) ont t
consacrs par le ministre de la Culture ce programme, dont 52 % pour les vnements
culturels, 25 % pour les priodiques et 23 % pour la presse non priodique des minorits. Au
total, 570 vnements culturels ont ainsi t financs, 37 priodiques et 144 non priodiques.
Les acteurs principaux du dveloppement des cultures en Rpublique slovaque sont:
1) Les associations civiles qui soutiennent les 12 cultures minoritaires ( Union des
Bulgares et de leurs amis en Slovaquie , Socit tchque en Slovaquie , Union culturelle
croate , Csemadok Union culturelle et sociale hongroise en Rpublique slovaque ,
Socit des Moraves en Rpublique slovaque , Socit carpate-allemande en Rpublique
slovaque , Socit des Polonais et de leurs amis en Rpublique slovaque , Initiative civile
des Roms de la Rpublique slovaque , Renaissance ruthne , Union des Russes en
Rpublique slovaque , Union des Ruthnes Ukrainiens et Centre culturel des citoyens
juifs en Rpublique slovaque );
2) Les diteurs de la presse priodique et non priodique;
3) Les thtres dEtat et leurs programmes en langues des minorits nationales : 4
thtres (pour la minorit hongroise, Thtre Thalia Kosice et Thtre Jokai
Komarno, pour la minorit rom, Thtre Romathan Kosice et pour la minorit ruthne et
ukrainienne le Thtre A. Duchnovi de Preov);
4) Les muses dEtat orients vers les problmatiques des minorits: Dpartement pour
la culture hongroise au Muse du Danube Podunajsk muzeum Komarno, Dpartement de
la culture rom du Muse de Gemer-Malohont Rimavsk Sobota. Au sein du Muse national
slovaque, sont galement organiss, Bratislava, le Muse de la culture des Allemands des
Carpates, le Muse de la culture juive ainsi que les Centres de documentation de la culture
croate et de la culture hongroise dans le Muse historique. Le Muse ethnographique de Martin
intgre un Centre de documentation de la culture tchque. Deux dpartements pour la culture
minoritaire rom sont accueillis au sein du Muse de Vihorlat Humenn et du Muse de
Gemer-Malohont Rimavsk Sobota.
5) Les ensembles folkloriques professionnel (citons, par exemple, lensemble hongrois
de danse Coeurs jeunes (Ifj Szvek) de Bratislava et lensemble folklorique des Ruthnes
Ukrainiens PUS actif du Thtre de A. Duchnovi Preov);
6) Lactivit des centres culturels rgionaux, des bibliothques des rgions et des
districts, des observatoires ou plantariums, etc.;
7) Les missions du programme en langue des minorits nationales dans les mdias
publics (Radio slovaque et Tlvision slovaque).
5. Les mdias pour les minorits en Slovaquie
Le ministre slovaque de la Culture soutient financirement, on la vu, une quarantaine
de titres de la presse priodique (en 2004: 1 bulgare, 5 tchques, 19 hongroises, 1 morave, 1
allemand, 1 polonais, 5 roms, 1 ruthnes, 1 russe, 3 ukrainiens, 1 juive).

73
Mais, bien videmment, le journalisme des nationalits nest pas limit aux titres
subventionns. La minorit hongroise nationaliste, en particulier, publie dautres titres de la
presse priodique. Un quotidien existe depuis 1948 j Sz (Nov Slovo Nouveau Mot) et,
jusqu aujourdhui, quelques journaux dentreprise et rgionaux hongro-slovaques sont
publis.
Malgr le soutien de lEtat, la presse priodique des minorits nationales connat de
srieuses difficults financires, lies videmment leur faible diffusion. Ainsi, dans les
rdactions de ces priodiques, un seul rdacteur est souvent salari, les correspondants ne sont
pas pays et les publications font appel trs rgulirement la gnrosit des lecteurs.
La Radio slovaque propose des missions nationales. Ainsi, pour la minorit
hongroise, Radio Patria emploie 45 employs dont 35 rdacteurs qui prparent 45 heures de
programme par semaine. Tous les styles dmissions sont produites: musique, information,
culture, etc.
Pour les autres minorits, la Radio Slovaque propose des missions rgulires. En
effet, en fonction des rsultats du recensement, des programmes particuliers ont t crs pour
les minorits tchque, allemande, polonaise, rom, ruthne et ukrainienne (environ 815 heures
dmissions par an). Cependant, les rythmes de diffusion reste rduits : pour les minorits
tchque, allemande ou rom, 30 minutes par semaine; pour la minorit polonaise, 30 minutes par
mois. Les minorits ruthnes et ukrainiennes peuvent cependant couter 13,5 heures dmission
par semaine, depuis 20023.
La Tlvision Slovaque met galement pour les minorits. Les enqutes montrent
cependant que les membres des minorits regardent trs majoritairement les chanes en
slovaques, mme si cette tendance est plus relative pour la communaut hongroise (6,1 % des
habitants ne suivent pas les programmes de la Tlvision slovaque, STV, et 9,7 % des habitants
de nationalit hongroise).
Les missions destines aux minorits sont de frquence variable: une fois par mois,
30 minutes, pour les minorits polonaise et tchque, 20 minutes par semaine pour la minorit
allemande, 30 minute par semaine pour la minorit rom. Les hongrois peuvent suivre plus de
200 heures de programmes par an tandis que les ruthnes et les ukrainiens sont destinataires de
14 heures par semaine dmissions.
La situation des mdias en Slovaquie, par rapport aux minorits, est donc trs
intressantes : la reconnaissance des minorits, notamment culturelles et linguistiques, a t
accompagne par une politique assez volontariste de maintien des expressions culturelles dans
un contexte de dfense dune langue unique pour lEtat. La presse des minorits est encourage,
de nombreux vnements culturels soutenus financirement installent lide dune socit
plurielle alors mme quune monte de lintolrance et dun nationalisme extrmiste sont
dsormais perceptibles. Lidentit du pays est difficile dfinir, travers cette mosaque
culturelle et mme si les minorits ne composent que 15 20 % de la population totale. Il sagit
de multiples identits: ruthnes de Slovaquie, slovaques de Slovaquie, comme, de plus en plus,
hongrois de Slovaquie construisent, leur faon, leur pays, au sein dune Union Europenne qui
est elle-mme en crise identitaire.
Les futurs journalistes de Slovaquie reoivent des enseignements qui tentent de leur
faire prendre conscience de limportance des minorits ethniques ou culturelles, sans
marginalisation ou diabolisation. Le soutien aux mdias des nationalits (ou nationalistes) est-il
un pige ? Mme si les mdias ne crent videmment pas le racisme ou la xnophobie, en
ignorant les ralits, ils peuvent contribuer au dveloppement de ces thses.
Les mdias ont donc un rle fondamental jouer dans ces problmatiques: expressions
attendues des minorits, instruments identitaires dans une conjoncture volution trs rapide,

Pour les ukrainiens, presque 80% de lmission est en langue ruthne, en effet, la langue utilise au sein
du studio nest pas lukrainien littraire, mais la langue de lauditeur, cest--dire lukrainien ruthne
enrichi par les dialectes qui sont connus pour tous les auditeurs.

74
les mdias peuvent apporter des informations critiques, contribuant ainsi former les citoyens
europens dans un contexte multiculturel.
Bibliographie
1. Follrichov, M., Tla nrodnostnch menn, in Mal encyklopdia urnalistiky,
Bratislava, Obzor, 1982, pp. 488-493
2. Follrichov, M., Vyuovanie urnalistiky nrodnostnch menn v esko-Slovensku in
urnalistika a vuba urnalistiky v demokratickej spolonosti, Bratislava: CGS MIXET,
1993, pp. 74-75
3. Follrichov, M., Education of Journalism of Minorities in Czecho-Slovakia in Journalism
and Journalism Education in a Free Society, Bratislava, CGS MIXET, 1993, pp. 80-81
4. Follrichov, M., Nrodnostn a krajansk urnalistika, in Otzky urnalistiky, 44, 2001, .
3-4, pp. 349-351
5. Rouet, G., Serafinova, D., Vatral, J., Les mdias en Slovaquie de 1993 nos jours, in
Annuaire Franais des Relations Internationales, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007

75

3. Media, Borders and New EU Borders


Luminia OPRONI (Oradea) The RomanianHungarian Crossborder
Cooperation in the Regional Press of Bihor County
Bela BARANYI (Debrecen) The Hungarian-Romanian Border Region in
the Hungarian National and Local Press (19902005)
Alla ROCA (Chiinu) Mass Media Impact on the Democratization
Processes in Society: Case of the Republic of Moldova

76

The Romanian Hungarian Crossborder Cooperation


in the Regional Press of Bihor County
Luminia OPRONI
Abstract: The cross-border cooperation is a basic part of the European integration
process; it is considerably present in the regional newspapers, although there is neither a
constant reference to the European context nor a strategy for peoples information which
should translate the substance of cooperation in a language as simple as possible.
The actions of cooperation between Romania and Hungary are widely reflected in the
regional press of Bihor County, and the articles cover subjects like: the agreements concerning
the activity of the frontier area between Romania and Hungary, as new internal border of the
European Union, financing programs for the cross-border cooperation and regional
development, cooperation between the local authorities of the counties adjacent to the two
countries All these subjects are reflecting the cross-border values of the neighbouring regions
from Romania and Hungary.
Key words: cross-border, regional, press, European, cooperation
1. A new European Union, with new frontiers
The local and regional authorities are responsible for the implementation of the most
laws of the European Union. They are also able to make European Union membership a reality,
bringing Europe closer to citizens. The regions had a major role in the expansion process and
now they are the main factors which make sure that the new members regards their accession to
the European Union as a succes.
The expansion of the European Union brought about the building up of new internal
and external borders that means new opportunities but also new challenges. In order to struggle
against the danger of a new separarating line inside Europe, the European Commission has
developed a new Neighbourhood Policy which wants to assure a stable and secure area on
this continent. Thus, the European Commission acknowledges the important role of the regions
for the implementation of this policy.
The Institutional Affairs Commission has also founded a new Working Group which
has in view the consolidation of the cooperation between the regional authorities in order to
promote the real, efficient and democratic regional self-administration.
2. Cooperation fields as shown in the newspapers
When I prepared this paper I analyzed the main newspapers from Bihor County in
2006, the last year when this border still represents the external limit of the European Union. I
have analyzed the following newspapers:
Criana (audience: 50.000 readers / each issue the leader of the written press in
Bihor county and in the North-West Transylvania and, in the same time, being among
the first six local newspapers from Romania according to the Focus National Study
of Audience, imposed by the Romanian Bureau of Audit of Circulation (BRAT) for the
member publications)
Realitatea Bihorean
Jurnalul Bihorean (audience: 43.000 readers / each issue)

77
As a result of this analysis I have noticed that the press has focused on the following
fields:
the cross-border values of the neighbouring regions from Romania and Hungary;
the settlements and the agreements concerning the activity of the frontier area
between Romania and Hungary, as new internal border of the European Union;
financing programs for the cross-border cooperation and regional development;
the agreements and the partnerships from the education and research field;
cultural cooperation;
cooperation between the local authorities of the counties adjacent to the two
countries;
projects from the cross-border tourism field;
projects for the rural development in the Romanian Hungarian frontier area;
cooperation in the business field, cross-border acquisitions and fusions;
common projects for the evaluation of the quality of environment;
Romanian-Hungarian cooperation for the consumers protection.

2.1. Cross-border values manifestation of the common European spirit


The Bihor Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion has been created in 2002 by the County Council
and Self-governing Hajdu-Bihar; the city of Oradea and Self-Administration Debrecen also
adhered to the Foundation Agreement.
The general objectives of the Euroregion are to maintain and develop the relations of
good neighbourhood; to identify the possible fields for cross-border cooperation; to organize
and coordinate those activities that promote members socially, economically, culturally,
educationally cooperation, to preserve their health, environment and tourism; to implement
some precise programmes in the fields of common interest; to promote cooperation relations
between the inhabitants and the specialists who work in different activity fields of common
interest; to promote the cooperation of the Euroregion with other international organizations; to
prepare together some projects in order to obtain financial funds from the European Union.
The cooperation inside the euroregions represents the creation of some direct
connections between the regions and communities from the both sides of the state frontiers on
the strength of the local authorities jurisdiction.
The local cultural institutions and the business environment from both sides of the
Romanian Hungarian border must be prepared for the European integration, as they have a
decisive role in the formation and the development of the common European identity. The
regional press periodically shows the preoccupation of the cultural institutes and centers from
both countries in training the officials and the managers of different institutions important for
the cultural and economical life of the two counties. Among these actions we mention the
seminar entitled Cross-border values in Bihor Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion", which took place
simultaneously in Romania (Oradea) and Hungary (Hajduszoboszlo), and which brought about
an exchange of opinions and recommendations for a more efficient communication in order to
better inform the professional society and to form the new relational manager1.
2.2. The regulations and the agreements that aim at the functioning of the frontier
area between Romania and Hungary as a new internal border of the European Union
The new internal border of the European Union, starting with 2007, implies the
modification of some regulations and procedures used until now in the border crossing points.
The customs on the west border of our country, between Romania and Hungary might
provisionally function until the half of 2007. Until now, the Romanian Government made no
1
Loredana Nicoar, Valori transfrontaliere n Euroregiunea Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar, in Criana, 12
September 2006

78
decision regarding the customs reorganization from 1 January 2007, when Romania will
become member of the European Union.
The flow chart was not finished, and the suggestion of the National Customs Authority
is based on the model of the ten countries that recently accessed to the European Union. The
reorganization of the customs is imposed by the new rules for the Romanian borders after
integration, when the volume of the goods that must pass the customs formalities clearance will
be reduced with 70%. Consequently, the Romanian customs will be the first institution which
becomes European institution on 1 January 2007.
After the accession the customs will work more for the European Commission than for
the Romanian country. About 75% of the customs duties will go to the EU budget and 25% will
be used for the management expenses2. In present, 43% of the state budget incomes are cashed
by the custom-agents; the most significant are the incomes from the value added tax (VAT). By
the information exchange the states from the European Union may supervise the circulation
inside the common territory of the goods that will be not checked anymore when passing
through the customs.
The local press of Bihor County also treats in detail the settlements regarding the
duty-free shops which must align the Romanian legislation with the legislation of the
European Union. Consequently, starting with 2007, when Romania becomes member of the
EU, the duty-free shops from the terrestrial and naval customs will disappear as well as those
from the Romanian-Hungarian customs.
The duty-free system implies the exemption from customs duties or any other taxes, its
effect being equivalent with the customs duties for import, as well as with any other amount
that reverts to the state from the import of goods that are to be sold under these conditions. The
sale of goods in duty-free conditions is made with passport, where the customs police put the
visa for passing out from the country, and with the shipping note, for the shops from the
international airports and from the airplanes. Starting from the publication date of the law in the
Official Journal until the day when Romania becomes member of EU no license for
commercializing goods in duty-free conditions will be issued.
According to the newspaper Criana, the prefect of Bihor announced that he was
taking the necessary steps for closing the duty-free shops from the regional customs earlier than
scheduled. He affirmed that these shops should be closed earlier than the end of 2006 in order
to make efficient the fight against illegal trade with cigarettes, coffee and alcohol; he also said
that, for now, the only way of reducing the sale of contraband goods would be the
intensification of customs checks3. The newspaper Realitatea Bihorean also publishes an
interview with the executive manager of Oradea Regional Customs who declared that the dutyfree shops at the Hungarian border are watched and in three months they will finish their goods
in stock and will be closed. The activity of checking these shops is also the task of the
inspectors from the Finance Department of Bihor4.
In what regards the movement of persons, there will be, at the internal borders of the
Union, check points common with the neighbor countries; customs police will use the principle
of "One Stop Control", that is Romanians will be checked only once, when entering the
neighbor country5. The so-called border disappearace will not bring about reorganization or
personnel restriction; the customs police will also have well-established tasks from 1 January
2007. European Union and Schengen countries are two different entities; thus, the fact that
Romania will become member of the EU does not mean that it will automatically become a
Schengen country. That is why, from 1 January 2007, only the goods will be allowed to pass
from one country to another without documents and not the persons. The citizens will not need
2
Florin Alexandru, Vameii vor lucra mai mult pentru Comisia European, in Realitatea Bihorean, 5
October 2006
3
Ioana Matea, Demersuri pentru nchiderea duty-free-urilor, in Criana, 28 March 2006
4
Florin Alexandru, Duty-free-urile, verificate la snge, in Realitatea Bihorean, 12 July 2006
5
Alina Ungur, Controlul la frontier: portbagajul nu, paaportul, da! Romnii mai au de ateptat pn vor
cltori n UE doar cu... buletinul, in Criana, 19 October 2006

79
the medical assurance, the book at the hotel and they will neither have to justify the purpose of
their visit and nor show money. That is because Romanians will pay for medical assurance in a
European country and all documents issued by the Romanian authorities will be valid in the
European Union.
The Romanian customs police officers will have the duty to watch the internal border
of the European Union, for instance the borders between Romania and Hungary as well as the
external border of the Union, like the border between Romania and The Republic of Moldova,
which is not a member of the European Union. The Romanian customs police officers will
work together with the Hungarian customs police officers, both in Bors (Romania) and in
Artand (Hungary).
In order to struggle against cross-border criminality the Romanian and Hungarian
customs police officers have been working together, in the Common Contact Point between
Romanian and Hungarian borders (Bors-Artand area); their mission is to exchange information
about the cross-border criminality in the benefit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the two
countries6.
2.3. Cross-border cooperation and regional development
 PHARE CBC Projects
The cooperation inside the Bihor Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion allows gaining access of
Phare funds by organisms and institutions from Bihor County together with their Hungarian
partners, by using PHARE CBC cross-border cooperation programmes.
With the help of the PHARE CBC programmes they promote the cooperation between
the regions, communities and the authorities from Romania and Hungary in order to work out
some common problems, to develop the local communities, to promote a good neighborhood
and social stability.
On the 1st of January 2005 the Programme PHARE CBC Romania-Hungary has been
launched; it brought about new financing possibilities for the Romanian border counties Arad,
Bihor, Satu-Mare, Timi, with European and governmental funds. Within the PHARE CBC
programmes Romania gets a total amount of 34 millions of Euro, out of which 5 millions are for
the Hungarian border7. In this field of the cross-border cooperation and regional development
the financing through the PHARE CBC Romania-Hungary Programm is focused mainly on
projects about the infrastructure in the road-transport field, about the environment protection,
including here the floods, the promotion of initiatives that facilitates the integration of the
private economical field, and the cooperation and research.
The press mirrors the cross-border cooperation programmes and thus we can see that
these programmes are a guarantor and an important pillar of the regional development inside the
new European Unoin, which assures the competitiveness and the force of a region the BihorHajdu Bihar region in this paper. In front of great regions from the powerful countries of EU,
the unique affirmation chance is represented by cooperation and creation of the team-spirit
between the regions with similar potentialities from the two neighbour countries, Romania and
Hungary. In 2006 the economics page of the local press of Bihor county was more than 50%
about the cross-border cooperation programmes, gaining access to European funds, conditions
of eligibility, terms and places for the projects, statistics of the projects, interviews with the
officials of The Regional Bureau of Cross-border Cooperation of Oradea and with the local
authorities.
Although the programme has been launched in 2005, the funds assigned for the year
2004 were of 6,333,000 Euro, to which the beneficiaries contribute with their own financing of
minimum 10%. The usage of funds is possible only if projects are presented to The Regional
Bureau of Cross-border Cooperation from Oradea; four counties belong to this bureau. At the
6
7

Sebastian Kovacs, Acoperi comun cu maghiarii, in Jurnal Bihorean, 14 October 2005


Criana, 7 January 2006

80
end of November 2005 there were 112 financing requests accompanied by projects: 25 were
from Timis county, 26 from Arad county, 26 from Satu-Mare County and the most financing
requests were from Bihor County 35. These financing requests accompanied by the necessary
documents are also for small projects (of values between 10,000 and 50,000 euro) as well as for
great projects (of values between 50,000 and 600,000 euro) 8.
The foundation Bihor Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion and the City Hall of Oradea also
had some funds available for the financing of the projects that stimulate the cooperation and the
multiple cooperation relationships in the economical, social, cultural, educational field, in arts,
tourism, sports, environment protection between the two counties, Bihor (Romania) and HajduBihar (Hungary) 9.
There may be financed cross-border events (meetings, exhibitions) which refer to the
preservation of traditions and the presentation of the specific features of the Euroregion,
focusing on events that stimulate and develop the relations between the two counties.
Among the activities which may be financed are the elaboration of some informative
(brochures, catalogues) and marketing materials, as well as multimedia products (CDs,
websites, broadcastings) that should promote the economical, touristical objectives and the
cultural values of the Euroregion and or of the county. The organization of seminars, training
sessions, specialized conferences, aiming to elaborate common projects and programmes for the
Euroregion, also belong to those projects that may be financed.
The applicants eligible for financing are the local councils, the associations of the local
councils, the institutions subordinated to the local or district council, the non-gouvernamental
organizations and the educational institutions.
 Project for the development of the Romanian Hungarian border area
The cross-border projects are also undertaken by smaller cities inside the Bihor
Hajdu Bihar region, and the local press greets and presents these initiatives as examples to other
local authorities from the area. Thus, Realitatea Bihorean presents the project of the city hall
of Marghita (Bihor County) which aims to develop the border area from the north of Bihor
County, which is the area between Marghita and Berettyujfalu10, in Hungary. They hope to
obtain financing from the European Union for this project, through the PHARE CBC system.
With this money they will found the Chamber of Romanian-Hungarian institutional cooperation
and of cross-border duties.
The objective of the project of the administration of Marghita is to intensify and
perpetuate the contacts between the citizens, administration, communities and economical
agents from the border area in order to create a solid base for the balanced economical and
social development of the whole area, bringing benefits for the people from Marghita and
Berettyujfalu. Creating a permanent structure of institutional cooperation and services inside
the local organisms from the cross-border area, especially in the administration, economical,
social and cultural field, would lead to the development and the intensification of the
organizational abilities of the organizational structures of the local administration, in order to
encourage the cooperation between institutions and communities.
The project aims at the cooperation of institutions by stimulating and supporting the
foundation of some permanent structures for information-cooperation and by supporting the
common activities and the institutions implied in the local, regional and cross-border
development.
 AWARE interregional project
A common border supposes to take into account all the problems, good or bad, that
might appear in the neighbour regions. The project Interreg III C AWARE (Attention to

Gabriel Georgescu, Programul PHARE CBC Romnia-Ungaria, in Criana, 6 January 2006


Mihaela Alexandru, Proiecte pentru Euroregiune, in Realitatea Bihorean, 30 July 2006
10
Dan Ile, Proiect de dezvoltare a zonei de frontier, in Realitatea Bihorean, 16 February 2006
9

81
Warning and Readiness in Emergencies) has been developed in this purpose; its objective is the
acknowledgement, the communication and the transnational cooperation in the cross-border
regions, in case of flood disasters, petrol pollution after a shipwreck, criminality or acts of
terrorism.
AWARE, as interregional project, consists in the participation of ten partners from
seven different countries, as it is cooperation about dealing with situations of crisis between
countries that are members of the European Unoin and countries that dont belong yet to the
EU. The budget of this project is of 1 million euro, 50% of the capital coming from the
European Union and the other 50% comes from the partners from the seven countries. Two
counties on the Romanian border, Arad and Bihor11, are implied in the AWARE project. The
Euroregion Bihor Hajdu-Bihar is represented by the county councils of the two counties.
According to Viek Verdult, the president of the AWARE committee,
communication is an essential factor before, during and after any disaster. The authorities
must be conscious that their decisions have effect over the borders, and that is why they must
provide competent information to their neighbours 12.
The fourth meeting of the A.W.A.R.E. project partners took place in Arad and Oradea,
in October 2006, where the partners and many specialists have discussed the results of an
exercise of virtual management of the cross-border emergency situations, having as example a
flood on the Romanian Hungarian border13.
 Future plans
The Regional Bureau of Cross-border Cooperation of Oradea (BRECO) is already
working at the elaboration of the territorial cooperation programme Hungary Romania 2007
2013, to be able to present it to the European Union, just after the accession, in order to be
approved and to start financing the projects. In October 2006 the representatives of BRECO and
VATI (Hungarian partner) met at Oradea the target-public of Bihor County in order to include
all the interest fields and to find out which are the priorities of the eligible beneficiaries.
After Romanias accession into EU only integrated common projects will be financed.
Both elaboration and implementation of the projects will be made in common. There will be
only one financing and one working team. As novelty, there will be financed through this
program activities related to the cross-border public means of transport and to the improvement
of the cross-border communications. Also as novelty, some common activities for answering to
emergencies, as transport accidents or fires, are introduced in the programme14.
Hungary is also thinking at the future of the cross-border relationships, as it results
from the information from Criana. The article specifies that the Romanian-Hungarian
department of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Hungary, together with the Chamber
of Commerce and Industry of Bks have organized in November 2006 at Bkscsaba The
Conference of Foreign Economics and Hungarian Partnership entitled Common Europe
Euroregions Developments Cross-border Cooperation.15 Besides the presentations of
different participating institutions, the Programme included open meetings with Hungarian
companies.
2.4. Economical cooperation
The regional newspapers dont offer too much information about the business meetings
from the border area, although they are an important factor that assures the regional dynamics;
11

Ovidiu Morcan, nva s comunice la dezastre, in Jurnal Bihorean, 27 October 2006


Speech on the Occasion of Opening the Proceedings of the Interreg III C AWARE Project, Internet
Site Local Council of Arad: http://www.cjarad.ro
13
Mlina Pop, "Avertizare i pregtire n caz de urgene" Partenerii proiectului AWARE se reunesc n
aceste zile, 24 October 2006
14
Claudia Curta, Plan pentru proiecte comune, in Jurnal Bihorean, 3 October 2006
15
Criana, 2 November 2006
12

82
they are interested only in the great meetings, where the central authorities take part and which
take place in their protection area. Maybe this is due to the fact that there are few initiatives in
this field compared to the opportunities offered by the Euroregion they belong to. Thus,
Criana was the only written support which has informed its readers about the organization in
Oradea of the Conference of Economical Cooperation Romania-Hungary 2006. The forum
has been organized by the Employers Federation of Bihor County, the County Council of
Bihor and BTL Design Bucharest, together with Transilvania Business Associations
Confederation16.
The forum from Oradea represented a communication interface between the Hungarian
and the Romanian economical environment and the political factors, in order to discuss aspects
and problems that influence the economical relations between the two countries at the crossborder and regional level. The Romanian businessmen had the oportunity to find out, with the
help of a Hungarian businessmen delegation, the consequences of the integration into European
Union and how they were experienced by the Hungarian business environment. At the same
time, the government representatives from the two countries analized what it should be done for
a more efficient cooperation between the Romanian and the Hungarian business environment
after Romanias accession to European Union.
Besides the economical environment there were also representatives of the political
administrative environment. There have been discussed the following issues: the importance of
the bilateral economical relations between Romania Hungary in the framework of the
European integration; cross-border cooperation in the economical and administrative field, as
premise of the regional development; strategical projects for the infrastructure and the
environment; solutions for a better cooperation between the local authorities and the investors;
financing programmes for the infrastructure projects; identification of cross-border projects;
projects with a major impact on the environment; the development of projects in the private
public partnership system.
The newspapers also reports the meeting from Budapest another central event
between the management of the National Agency for Consumers Protection and the general
manager of the General Inspectorate for Consumers Protection from Hungary, in order to sign
the cooperation protocol between the two institutions17. The protocol signed by the two parties
concerns the good cooperation in order to supervise as efficient as possible the market, the
products, the services and the consumers safety. In the same time, the Romanian delegation has
benefited by specialized consultance regarding the integration into European Union.
Many of the news about the cross-border cooperation actions from the economical
field are offered by the Chamber of Industry and Commerce Bihor directly implied in order to
support the regional business society. Thus, Criana announces that Chamber of Industry and
Commerce Bihor and Chamber of Industry and Commerce Hajdu-Bihar have organized at
Debrecen a trilateral business meeting between Hungary-Ukraine-Romania for the companies
from the food and agriculture industry field from the three countries. This event, organized on
the occasion of the exhibition of agriculture and food industry FARMER EXPO (one of the
most significant exhibitions in Hungary, with 300 companies from different countries; the area
dedicated to this exhibition was over 15000 sqm18) shows that there are many business
opportunities for the economical agents from the Bihor Hajdu-Bihar Region.
On this occasion, there have been different discussions between the management of the
Chamber of Industry and Commerce Bihor and the representatives of some companies from
Hungary and Ukraine, who were presented the economical potential of the Bihor County,
aspects regarding the Romanian legislation, and also the present possibilities regarding the
market, the investment and business opportunities in Bihor County. Especially the Hungarian
companies, but also the Ukrainian ones, have called on the Chamber of Industry and Commerce
16

Criana, 18 22 September 2006


Florin Alexandru, Colaborare romno-ungar pentru protecia consumatorilor, in Realitatea
Bihorean, 19 March 2006
18
Criana, 7 September 2006
17

83
Bihor to find business partners in the region, in order to advertise their products and services,
being interested in partnerships and cooperations with the businessmen from Bihor County.
All this shows one more time what we have stated: the dynamism of the cross-border
regions is provided by the cooperation in different fields.
The regional press also watches the evolution of the cross-border acquisitions after
Romanias integration into European Union, taking over the statements of the representatives of
the Romanian Agency for Foreign Investments. As a normal tendancy of all developed
countries, starting from the first years after their accession to the European Union, in Romania
will significantly increase, as importance and value, the cross-border and the international
fusions and acquisitions. The accession to the European Union is associated with the most
direct foreign investments by the increase of the level of predictability, legislative stability and
not in the last place, by the continuous reduction of the financing cost. As the buy-out process is
almost at its end, this kind of entrance of the direct foreign investments inside the country will
diminish and eventually finish, and the only possibilities of Romania after the accession are
Greenfield investments, as well as brownfield investments, in which case the investor buys the
enterprise but replaces almost the entire factory, equipments, workers and production line.
2.5. Cooperation in the education and research field
The Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) was founded in Oradea, as a result of the
resolution of the European Commission, as European Excellency Center Jean Monnet. This
project has been realized by the University of Oradea in collaboration with the University of
Debrecen (Hungary). IERS proposes to represent an interface for the dissemination of the
European information in the neighbourhood, that is the new eastern borders of the European
Union, after 2007, and a decisive factor of Romanian research and knowledge in the crossborder field at the Romanian west border.
The local newspapers offered detailed information about the beginning of this Institute.
Criana quotes the president of The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Bihor, who stated
that he appreciated that cooperation initiative in the university field that would bring the
European values closer to the region. It is important for the businessmen to have the necessary
specialists here in Romania; these specialists should be ready to revaluate all the opportunities
and to apply efficiently working systems, to use improved and validated proceedings, they
should be able to get through the rivalry from the common market19. Jurnal Bihorean defines
the two elements of this structure: formation represented by the Euroregional Studies School
and research, represented by the International Centre of Euroregional Research and explains the
way of financing the IERS activities which will be carried out during three years by the
European Commission, through the Action Jean Monnet and University of Oradea20.
Twice a year, under the aegis of the Institute for Euroregional Studies, they organize
scientific papers session alternatively in Oradea and Debrecen, the two poles of the institution.
The press relates about the semestrial scientific session from Debrecen in June 2006, about
The regional development in the Romanian-Hungarian cross-border area from the regional
perspective towards the European one 21. At the conference took part professors and
personalities from the two neighbour countries, Romania and Hungary, as well as professors
from other member states of the European Union, and the discussions were about the crossborder cooperation, the euroregions and their role regarding the European projects, historical
realities at the Romanian- Hungarian border.
The euroregional cooperation is not only at the level of the university education. Thus,
in February 2006 the press relates that Arts Gala is being organized at Oradea; this event
implied schools from Bihor county and Hajdu-Bihar and consisted in the organization of some
19

Lavinia Hebritean, Deschiderea oficial a Institutului de Studii Euroregionale, in Criana, 20 January


2006
20
Jurnal Bihorean, 2 February 2006
21
Alina Ungur, Sesiune de comunicri tiinifice la Debrein, in Criana, 9 June 2006

84
exhibitions, theater plays and other artistic moments presented by the pupils from the Hungarian
and Romanian schools. The main organizer was the School Union from Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar
Euroregion22.
2.6. Cooperation in the tourism field
Tourism is an essential field in the sustainable development of a Euroregion; it entails
the development of infrastructure and of the related services. Cooperation in this field aims to
promote and develop the cross-border tourism, to promote the investments in tourism, to train
specialists in this field.
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Bihor and its partner The Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Hajdu-Bihar (Hungary) has finished in February 2006 the Project
The centre for promotion and professional training in the field of cross-border tourism Bihor
Hajdu-Bihar" as part of the PHARE CBC Program Romania-Hungary23. The general
objective of the project was to intensify the relationships of regional cross-border cooperation
between Romania and Hungary, between the two counties adjacent to the border, in order to
sustain and develop the touristic activities and the activities related to tourism, of the
economical and social activities at the local and regional level
Precisely, the financing was used in order to promote the Bihor Hajdu-Bihar
Euroregion in the whole world. The results of the project consist in the achievement of
informative materials (in English, Romanian, German and Hungarian) issued in 10000 copies,
of 5 folders structured on the habitat of Bihor county, the printing of a presentation brochure of
Bihor County and a CD, in 1000 copies, the foundation of a Center for the promovation and
professional preparation in tourism, as well as the achievement of a website of the Center.
The direct beneficiaries of this project are the local public authorities, the economical
agents from the tourism field and the related activities, the local employers associations, the
educational institutions, the representatives of the civil society, all those interested in the
development of the regional touristical field.
This is not the only project that promotes the cross-border cooperation in the touristical
field. During the last years, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Bihor has realized other
European financed projects, which means that there is continuity in this field. For instance, the
project Frontier Touristic Development in Bihor Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion was realized in
2003, and one year later the project Promotion of Investments in Bihor Hajdu-Bihar
Euroregion, the new frontier of the European Union"24. The materials resulted from these
projects were given to the economical agents from Bihor county, to the Romanian Embassies, to
the Chambers of Commerce and Industry from all over the country and abroad, thus promoting
tourism and economical field from the two counties of the Euroregion, as well as the crossborder tourism.
The idea of continuity does not disappear, as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
of Bihor presented to the Regional Bureau of Cross-border Cooperation for the Romanian
Hungarian Border from Oradea a new project PHARE CBC 2004 / INTERREG IIIA Unity
and diversity in the Tourism of Bihor Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion (74200 Euro).
2.7. Cooperation in the environment field
Romanias cooperation with Hungary in the environment field is the best cooperation
and in the same time an exercise which must be used for the cooperation with other states too
states the Romanian Ministry of Environment and Waters Management on the occasion of the
22

Loredana Nicoar, coli din Euroregiunea Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar, la "Gala Artelor", in Criana, 27
February 2006
23
Claudia Curta, Turismul transfrontalier, promovat, in Jurnal Bihorean, 2 February 2006
24
Gabriel Georgescu, Susinere i dezvoltare durabil n domeniul turismului transfrontalier, in Criana,
9 February 2006

85
session of the Mixt Committee for the achievement of the provisions of the Agreement between
Romanian Government and the Hungarian Government regarding the cooperation in the
environment field, which took place in October 2006 in Oradea (Romania)25.
The cooperation between the two countries in the environment field includes aspects of
environment, nature protection and the identification and the analysis of the problems related to
the foundation, exploitation and the examination of the objectives and activities with possible
cross-border effect. In the inter-governmental agreement they stipulate the foundation of a
permanent group of specialists for international programs and projects.
A healthy environment means clean waters. That is why they made the Agreement
between Romanian Government and the Hungarian Government regarding the cooperation for
the protection and the sustainable use of frontier waters. On the basis of this agreement the
Romanian-Hungarian Hydrotechnical Committee was founded, which is going to realize a
common data basis for the quality of waters. When this databasis is actualized, the parties will
send their own databases to eachother in order to bring them into accord.
The XVIIth session of the Romanian-Hungarian Hydrotechnical Committee took place
in Bile Felix, in February 2006, and in the end the Protocol of the Romanian-Hungarian
Hydrotechnical Committee has been signed26. In the specialists opinion this document of
hydrotechnical cooperation is the most modern protocol that Romania has ever signed with a
neighbour country.
All these events testify the importance given by Romania and Hungary to the waters
which cross the Romanian-Hungarian border.
The European financing programs are also in this field. The projects which aim to
strengthen the infrastructure in the transport, environment and floods prevention field, to
promote the initiatives that make easier the integration of the economical field for Bihor, Arad,
Satu-Mare and Timi County, are financed through the PHARE CBC Romania Hungary
programme, which was launched in August 2006. This programme is echeloned over many
years and it will function even after 2007 when Romania will become member of the European
Union.
2.8. Romanian Hungarian cross-border cooperation in the struggle against
drugs traffic
The Romanian-Hungarian cross-border cooperation is achieved also in the struggle
against drugs traffic and consumption. The press periodically brings into its readers attention
information about this subject and presents the results of the Romanian Hungarian working
meetings which take place inside the two countries. At the end of 2005 they have signed at
Budapest the Romanian-Hungarian reciprocal protocol for cooperation in order to prevent the
drugs abuse and to treat the drug addicted. As a result of this protocol, the anti-drugs specialists
from the two countries met in 2006 in Bile Felix (Oradea) in order to debate the cross-border
cooperation and the underregional partnerships for the diminution of the drugs request27.
After the meeting the parties have agreed to elaborate a common study regarding the
drug consumption in the cross-border areas of the both countries and they have laid the bases
for the elaboration of a cooperation strategy with the non-governmental organizations in order
to make common projects to obtain EU funds. The bilateral Romanian Hungarian meeting
took place in October 2006 in Nyregyhza (Hungary)28. The main objective of the meeting was
the exchange of experience and good methods for the implementation of the anti-drugs local
strategy and the institution of a national system of service provider regarding the consultance
and treatment of drugs-addicted, as well as a specialized examination of their development.
25

Doina Aronescu-Neagoe, A patra sesiune de lucru a Comisiei mixte romno-maghiare n domeniul


proteciei mediului, in Criana, 7 October 2006
26
Criana, 3 February 2006
27
Dana Iova, Soluii antidrog romno-ungare, in Realitatea Bihorean, 25 March 2006
28
Alina Ungur, Reuniune bilateral romno-maghiar, in Criana, 11 October 2006

86
During the meeting the participants have analyzed the practical ways for the reduction of the
drugs request by cross-border cooperation in the context of governmental and nongovernmental inter-institutional cooperation.
3. Cooperation, a chance for development
Cross-border cooperation represents a chance for development, a possibility for the
new members of the Union to distinguish themselves, to show that there are entities which have
something important to say in their competition with the old powerful states of Europe. It
assures tight relations between the neighbor countries, it reduces the differences of economical
and social development between the states, and it ensures peoples security, stability and the
sustainable development of the regions they live in.
References
1. Alexandru, Florin, Vameii vor lucra mai mult pentru Comisia European, in Realitatea
Bihorean, 5 October 2006
2. Alexandru, Florin, Duty-free-urile, verificate la snge, in Realitatea Bihorean, 12 July
2006
3. Alexandru, Florin, Colaborare romno-ungar pentru protecia consumatorilor, in
Realitatea Bihorean, 19 March 2006
4. Alexandru, Mihaela, Proiecte pentru Euroregiune, in Realitatea Bihorean, 30 July 2006
5. Aronescu-Neagoe, Doina, A patra sesiune de lucru a Comisiei mixte romno-maghiare n
domeniul proteciei mediului, in Criana, 7 October 2006
6. Curta, Claudia, Turismul transfrontalier, promovat, in Jurnal Bihorean, 2 February 2006
7. Curta, Claudia, Plan pentru proiecte comune, in Jurnal Bihorean, 3 October 2006
8. Georgescu, Gabriel, Susinere i dezvoltare durabil n domeniul turismului
transfrontalier, in Criana, 9 February 2006
9. Georgescu, Gabriel, Programul PHARE CBC Romnia-Ungaria, in Criana, 6 January
2006
10. Hebritean, Lavinia, Deschiderea oficial a Institutului de Studii Euroregionale, in
Criana, 20 January 2006
11. Ile, Dan, Proiect de dezvoltare a zonei de frontier, in Realitatea Bihorean, 16 February
2006
12.Internet Site of Local Council Arad: http://www.cjarad.ro
13.Internet Site of Local Council Bihor: http://www.cjbihor.ro
14.Internet Site of Romania Euractiv: http://www.euractiv.ro
15.Internet Site of Ministry of European Integration: http://www.mie.ro/
16.Iova, Dana, Soluii antidrog romno-ungare, in Realitatea Bihorean, 25 March 2006
17.Kovacs, Sebastian, Acoperi comun cu maghiarii, in Jurnal Bihorean, 14 October 2005
18.Matea, Ioana, Demersuri pentru nchiderea duty-free-urilor, in Criana, 28 March 2006
19.Morcan, Ovidiu, nva s comunice la dezastre, in Jurnal Bihorean, 27 October 2006
20.Nicoar, Loredana, coli din Euroregiunea Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar, la "Gala Artelor", in
Criana, 27 February 2006
21.Nicoar, Loredana, Valori transfrontaliere n Euroregiunea Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar, in
Criana, 12 September 2006
22.oproni, Luminia, Le reflet du procs dintgration europenne de la Roumanie dans le
mass-mdia roumain, in Media and the Good Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU
Enlargement, Bruxelles, 2005, pp. 238-246
23.Ungur, Alina, Sesiune de comunicri tiinifice la Debrein, in Criana, 9 June 2006
24.Ungur, Alina, Reuniune bilateral romno-maghiar, in Criana, 11 October 2006

87

The Hungarian-Romanian border region in the Hungarian


national and local press (19902005)
Bla BARANYI
Abstract: The goal of the analysis of several leading Hungarian national and county
level newspapers from the years between 1990 and 2005 is to amplify the results of the
empirical research and to create a thorough understanding of the appearance of the most
important topics concerning the Hungarian-Romanian border regions in these newspapers,
which have a significant effect on the general public. The immediate object of this analysis is
the overview of all articles concerning the Hungarian and Romanian state borders (because of
the size of the paper without concrete reference to the articles). During the research we focused
on the following concrete issues:
various cross-border economic connections (e.g. Hungarian-Romanian trade,
investments in the regions, settlement of enterprises),
frameworks, forms and content of institutional cross-border cooperation
(cooperation of euroregions, local governments, chambers, various professional
organizations etc.),
social and cultural connections (concrete CBC projects), interethnic connections,
identity (regionalism, the idea of a common region),
civil society (NGOs, etc.),
legal conditions and characteristics of border traffic institutions
political dimensions of cross-border cooperation (e.g. issues of security policy),
other important issues concerning CBC.
Key words: press, border region, cooperation, Europe

1. Newspapers and years that have been analyzed


On the Hungarian side of the Hungarian-Romanian border the volumes between 1990
and 2005 of the newspapers of Szabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg, Hajd-Bihar, Bks s Csongrd
Counties (Kelet-Magyarorszg, Hajd-Bihari Napl, Bks Megyei Hrlap, Bks Megyei Nap,
Dlmagyaroszg, Dlvilg) were involved in the analysis in comparison with four leading
national newspapers (Magyar Hrlap, Magyar Nemzet, Npszabadsg, Npszava) in the same
period of time. In both Bks and Csongrd Counties we chose two newspapers (Bks Megyei
Hrlap, Bks Megyei Nap, Dlmagyarorszg and Dlvilg) because they are twin papers, the
articles of which complete or substitute each other.
2. The beginning: connections on a new basis
It is well known that a new concept of cross-border cooperation evolved after the
political changes at the turn of the 80s and 90s. After the collapse of the iron curtain the
western borders of Hungary became open, which had a determinant effect on the economic
development of the western Hungarian region. The alteration of the economic structure, the
changes in the everyday life caused although not overnight significant metamorphosis in the
peoples minds, the concept of borders changed radically. The significance of the new
opportunities provided by this new situation was transmitted to the general public by the local
newspapers, which should present the new situation correctly if they do their job properly.
The analysis of the articles in the local newspapers in the western border regions of Hungary

88
indicated an eventful decade (Izsk, . 1999). The result of a similar research project in the
eastern border regions of Hungary wouldnt be so clearly positive, since the economic
differences between the eastern and western border regions have not decreased, or even
increased, the peripheral characteristic of the eastern border regions strengthened (Ruttkay, .
1995, Baranyi, B. 2004).
The immediate object of this analysis is the review of the articles on the HungarianRomanian connections after the democratic transition, especially because before 1989 articles
of this kind were very rare. Articles on border incidents or on illegal trade activity in the border
region belong to the few exceptions, what is not surprising as the rather chilly political
atmosphere between Hungary and Romania encumbered the development of other forms of
cooperation as well, like cultural connections or connections between ethnic minorities on both
sides of the border (Gmes, T. 2002, Rechnitzer. J. 1999).
The Romanian revolution in December 1989 was eagerly welcomed in the Hungarian
side of the border. The renownedly strict Hungarian-Romanian border control changed rapidly,
the easing of the political tension between the two countries started earlier among the border
guards. Because of the revolution the newspapers paid special attention to border guarding, but
the border region was peaceful in this period.1
As a result of the political changes in both countries cross-border activities became
more intensive, although the changes were neither immediate nor enormous in the first years.
As a part of the program Eurpa Nap (European Day), a so called Pan European Picnic was
organized (on the model of the similar program at the Hungarian-Austrian border) at the border
crossing point of high capacity near rtnd, a small settlement in Hajd-Bihar County, where
the cultural programs meant to decrease the tension between the two sides, starting from the fact
that not only Hungary, but also Romania is interested in the construction of a new Europe.
According to the media coverage one of the main function of the meetings is to emphasize that
the border do not separate but connect people. This international meeting for youth was
organized year by year with the participation of a number of Romanian citizens.
3. At the eastern ends2
At the western borders of Hungary the growth in the number of border crossing points
was observable in the beginning of the 1990s. A similar process took place along the eastern
borders as well, with the difference that it lasted a bit longer, but the development of these
border stations was an important task for the whole decade. Romania will join the EU in the
near future and the Hungarian-Romanian border will not be the external border of the EU, it is
questionable if the opening of new border crossing points is worth while to invest money into
these projects, as this kind of infrastructure (mainly the buildings and roads) will lose its current
function.
In the reports the demand for the increase in the number of border crossing points and
the rational development of the already existing check-points was formulated as a general wish,
as their existence can significantly contribute to the development of the local economy and the
moderation of peripheral disadvantages. At the same time any development projects which aim
the strengthening of economic cooperation or the better permeability of the border requires the
approval of the government, elaboration of bilateral international agreements and financial
resources.
A portion of the articles dealing with the border crossing points along the HungarianRomanian informed the readers about violations of the law, crimes (e.g. violation of frontier,
smuggling of goods and people), others dealt with border-control activities, which can be
interesting, but from the point of view of border research those reports are more important
which discuss the situation at the border crossing points. For example at Nagylak, at the
1
2

The articles in this paper are examples only.


Magyar Hrlap, February 2, 1998, p. 6

89
Hungarian-Romanian border the technical infrastructure was modernized step by step, the new
terminals greatly eased the truck traffic between the Balkan and Western Europe. The
cooperation agreement signed by the leaders of Csongrd and Timis Counties in 1992 has
already emphasized the significance of the opening of a check point between the two counties.
Because of the Yugoslavian war the role of the border crossing point at Gyula became
more important and it appeared that it was unable to fulfill the requirements of the continuously
increasing border traffic. The renovation and the enlargement of the terminals started at the end
of the 1990s, and finished in 2001-2002 with the reconstruction of the passenger traffic
terminals. Although the importance of the establishment of further border crossing points was
emphasized by the national and local press in the first years of the 90s already, but the first
new border stations were opened at Mhkerk and Battonya in 1995-1996 only.
The plans to develop the border station at Nyrbrny (in the Eastern section of the
Hungarian-Romanian border) into an international border crossing point which met the
requirements of the Romanian partners too was on the tapis for more then a decade. The
necessary modifications were accomplished by 2002 (by the help of PHARE resources) and the
hopes proved true as the traffic increased tenfold, which had vitalizing effect on the economy of
the area. The unemployment rate, which was over 20% decreased to 7,5% and the small and
medium-size enterprises are flourishing.
The opening of a border station between KrsnagyharsnyCheresig was an initiative
of the villages near the river Sebes-Krs and they intended to realize this plan by the help of
Ispa and Sapard resources. Earlier the border was opened only twice a year and these events
provided opportunity to cross the border either on foot or by car and bus. Inhabitants of the
border region on both sides were keen on the accomplishment of these plans, but the final
decision as the local press emphasized had to be made by the politicians.
Also an old wish of the local inhabitants was the establishment of a border crossing
point between Ltavrtes and Sacueni. In this case the building-up of a new border station was
in close connection with the building of the new North-Transylvanian motorway, and was on
the agenda of several meetings of the two prime ministers. The demand for the opportunity of
permanent border crossing at Vllaj was formulated by the local inhabitants as well. In the
1990s this border crossing point was opened temporarily only, on the occasion of religious and
public holidays.
4. Cooperation has no barriers any more3
After democratic transition in 1989 the number of reports on the connections at the
settlement and county level increased spectacularly in the newspapers. Mak for example had
excellent connections to the other side, the town strengthened these connections with Timisoara
in the first place. But other cross-border connections were deliberately built up too, inside the
DunaKrsMarosTisza Euroregion a small model region was established together with the
Sinnicolau Mare micro region on the Romanian side. As the newspapers reported the two
regions intended to enter in European competitions together.
The twin settlement of Hdmezvsrhely is Arad, Mrahalom built up new
connections with Sanmartin. Sarkad and Salonta signed an agreement in 1997, Debrecen
retrieved the traditional connections with Oradea, and a number of further examples could be
enumerated
Csongrd and Timis Counties signed an agreement in September 1992, in which
cooperation in the field of economy, science, culture, education, regional development and
tourism were indicated as main goals of collaboration. Another important goal of the
cooperation was the fulfillment of the demands of the ethnic minorities in both countries. Since
the agreement has taken effect connections between the two counties are intensive. One of the
unsolved problems which require common action is the establishment of the SzegedKikinda
3

Hajd-Bihari Napl, 2000 December 30, 2000, p. 5

90
JimboliaTimisoara railway connection. The realization of this project was not simply
economic, but also national interest, but for lack of financial resources the construction of the
railway line seemed to be improbable. But the wide-ranging lobbying succeeded and the
realization of the direct connection between the two cities seems to be an attainable goal. A
Euroregional application was also prepared in the framework of the cooperation of Csongrd s
Timis Counties and the application earned the assent of the South-East European Stability
Foundation. The two counties also coordinated their efforts aiming the establishment of the
KiszomborCenad border crossing point, the development of shipping on the river Tisza and the
reconstruction of the Bega channel on the Romanian side. The newspapers also reported that
Timis County was about to join the Tisza Water-Catchment Program region too.
The chairmen of the Csongrd County Council and the Arad County Council signed a
cooperation treaty in 1999, which concerned the preparation and possibly the realization of
various projects. Another agreement dealt with the permanent exchange of experiences and
information, with special consideration to the ethnic minorities. The cooperation of Bks
County with Romanian counties includes the utilization of the economic potential of regional
connections, the collective actions of the settlement in the border region, and the promotion of
the traditions, culture and language of the Hungarian ethnic minority. The most arborescent and
active connections were formed with Covasna County, one third of the settlements in Bks
County have twin settlements in Covasna, and encourage the protection of traditions among
ethnic Hungarians who live far from the border. The 15th meeting of the mayors of the twin
settlements in Arad and Bks counties was held in 2002 in Mezkovcshza. The participants
discussed the results of the county-level cooperation, like the reconstruction of the border
station at Gyula, or the construction of the road between Battonya and Kaszaper by the help of a
collective project.
The first call for the Phare CBC programs were published in 1995; the main goal was
the encouragement of the close up of the border regions before the expected EU accession. The
regional Phare coordination bureau was created in Bkscsaba. Local authorities, chambers,
foundations, local and regional development agencies, associations and schools in Csongrd,
Bks, Hajd-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg counties could apply for financial resources
of the program.
The common history and traditional connections between Hajd-Bihar and Bihor
Counties provided a good starting point for the cross-border cooperation. Cultural connections
have been flourishing for a long time, these connections transformed into an active form of
cooperation. New connections were built up with Caras-Severin County and an agreement was
signed in 1998 which had cultural and economic goals first and foremost. Quite a number of
settlements in Hajd-Bihar County established successful connections with Romanian
settlements. Among others Debrecen and Berettyjfalu have close connections to Oradea,
Hajdbszrmny to Salonta, Pspkladny to Ghindari. These connections were mentioned in
the local newspapers regularly, although in comparison with other twin settlement connections
(especially with Western European cities) the appearance of these articles was rare. In general
we can say that the importance of the local level cooperation was realized by the press too. For
example the authorities of Berettyjfalu keep the example of the Hungarian-Austrian border
region in mind and have concrete plans to copy the development strategies of Vas County and
Burgenland, to utilize the potential advantages of the peripheral situation and to elaborate the
common strategies of economic development together with the Romanian partners. To decrease
the negative effects of the peripheral situation the settlement associations (Regional
Development Association of Settlements in the Borderland in Bihar, Association Local
Authorities in Bihar) plan collective applications and projects.
It is a promising result that the formation of settlement association has already begun
on the Romanian side on the analogy of the Hungarian attempts. After the synchronization of
the legislative, tax, and financial systems the cross-border village tourism could be a success
story in this region. After an agreement of the above mentioned associations in Hajd-Bihar
County and on the Romanian side they took part in several competitions together successfully.

91
The associations had the opportunity to organize cross-border programs in order to propagate
village tourism in Romania and to prepare all interested parties for the reception of tourists. The
experts agreed that meetings would be held regularly to localize tour routs for cyclists and
horsemen as well.
The coordination of the tasks in the border region is imperative from the point of view
of the environmental condition of the borderland and the utilization of the natural resources.
The various forms of the environmental problems do not depend on the positions of the borders,
and they can be solved with international cooperation only. In comparison with the possible
consequences of these challenges there were only a few articles which tried to attract the
attention of the readers on the necessity of the collective environmental protection policies. One
of the few exceptions was the report on the cooperation of the Environmental Protectorate of
Trans-Tiszanian Region and the Environmental Protection Agency in Oradea. The main aim of
this agreement was the exploration and coordination of tasks in the field of environmental
protection, and the realization of these goals were supported by the Hajd-Bihar County
Council, which applied successfully for financial aid from the Common Small Project Fund of
the Hungarian-Romanian Phare CBC. This project also provided an opportunity to compare the
environmental protection policies of the two countries and to elaborate a common evaluation
system.
There are not many good practices in the field of institutional connections, one of the
few examples is the agreement between the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in HajdBihar County and the Chamber of Commerce in Bihor County, Romania. The main goal of this
agreement was to encourage cooperation between the entrepreneurs of the two counties. The
partners expected considerable results from the exchange of information of the two chambers; it
can provide useful information for the enterprises on both sides about the economics and the
privatization. In the field of cultural cooperation beside the traditional forms and institutional
connections the strengthening of the cooperation of universities and research institutes would be
suitable as the newspapers wrote.
Most of the articles in the local newspaper in Szabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg County, just like
in Hajd-Bihar dealt with the connections with Western Europe instead of the neighboring
countries. Local inhabitants had less chance to read an article on the cross-border connections
of the county than about the connections with France. It is characteristic for the connections
with Romania as well that the twin settlement connections were especially effective in the field
of the cultural cooperation in the first half of the 1990s. The twin city agreement of
Nyregyhza and Satu Mare declared three areas of cooperation: common preparation of
regional applications related to the EU accession, cooperation of local authorities and
professional organizations, and mutual appearance of ensembles, theatrical companies. The
county has the most effective agreement with Harghita County in the field of education; this
agreement gave Romanian pupils the chance to attend schools in Hungary.
Most articles in the local newspapers set the examples of educational or cultural
cooperation when they dealt with the institutional connections of Szabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg
County with the neighboring countries. The local newspaper Kelet-Magyarorszg regularly
reported on the programs organized for the Hungarian ethnic minority in the neighboring
countries in the 1990s, and collaterally with this, national newspapers took over some of these
articles. The performances at the Festival of Hungarian Theaters Beyond the Frontier in
Kisvrda can be followed in the newspaper. The continuative education of Hungarian speaking
foreign teachers, the organization of various camps for Hungarian pupils and conferences on
public education were among the most popular topics as well.

92
5. The Euroregion is like St. Stephans crown on a small scale4
The development of cross-border connections made way for various forms of
interregional cooperation, in the first place the organizations at the highest level, the
euroregions. The functionality of the regional organizations is ensured by the fact that the
borders are not real barriers between the neighboring countries any more (Rechnitzer, J. 1996,
1997, ger, Gy. 2000, Baranyi, B. 2002a, 2002b). In Eastern Hungary both types of the crossborder cooperation organizations, the large scale and the small scale model can be found. The
two large interregional organization of this area are the Carpathian Euroregion and the DunaKrs-Maros-Tisza Euroregion (Sli-Zakar I. 1996).
The Carpathian Euroregions deed of foundation was signed on February 14, 1993 in
Debrecen. In the beginning among the member states we find four, and from 1997 five former
socialist countries (Sli-Zakar, I. Ludvig, Zs. 2001). It is remarkable that the national
newspapers report on the formation of this organization, but in local newspapers except the
newspaper of Debrecen and Hajd-Bihar County, the location of the ceremony we can hardly
find any sign of this event, as if the foundation of the euroregion had not been considered as a
significant achievement.
A major share of the analyzed articles emphasize the supposed or really existing
chance of economic cooperation and state at the same time the prevailing opinion that this large
multiregional organization could not achieve its goals in this field either. Instead of the really
important business relations nowadays series of informal meetings are typical for the economic
cooperation of the euroregion, which has only secondary significance. These programs are
e.g. the meetings organized during the international exhibitions, fairs, which serve the
establishment of commercial and economic connections.
Most of the articles published in 1997-1998 celebrate the fifth anniversary of the
foundation. At this time the readers could obtain relevant and authentic information about the
circumstances of the foundation of the Carpathian Euroregion, the successes and difficulties of
its activity from the articles of experts and studies. With the professional help and cooperation
of the MaasRhein Euroregion the Carpathian Euroregion Regional Development Conception
was prepared in 1999. After the presentation and analysis of the actual situation the strategic
plan emphasized three main tasks: beside the development of the cohesion of the member
regions the coordination of the economic activity and the external affairs would be the most
important objectives.
Nowadays the Carpathian Euroregion has new perspectives. According to the
standpoint of the 31th meeting of the council in Eger the role of the regional activity which
embrace the Polish, Romanian, Slovakian, Ukrainian and Hungarian regions would be more
important after the accession to the European Union than ever before. As a significant
institution of the Hungarian stability the euroregion may contribute to the strengthening of the
democratic values and the market economy after the necessary internal reforms.
6. Operating region or administration only5
The lack of efficiency in the oversized Carpathian Euroregion lead to the formation of
new interregional organizations at the millennium. The first example of the smaller-scale region
model was the trilateral cooperation of Interregio, which was established by Szabolcs-SzatmrBereg County from Hungary, Satu Mare County from Romania and Transcarpathia from
Ukraine in the autumn of the year 2000. The goal of the new organization was similar to the
goals of the Carpathian Euroregion: the development of cross-border cooperation on the basis
of bi-and trilateral cooperation. The agreement serves the realization of the goals defined in the
bilateral (Hungarian-Ukrainian, Hungarian-Romanian and Romanian-Ukrainian) contracts.
4
5

Magyar Nemzet, April 29, 1993, p. 2


Hajd-Bihari Napl, January 31, 2002, p. 4

93
Parallel to the formation of the Interregio two further smaller-case interregional
organizations were established in 2002, the goals of which were presented in the local
newspapers. The BiharBihor Euroregion Cross-border Cooperation (in short: Bihar-Bihor
Euroregion) and the Hajd-Bihar-Bihor Euroregion have very similar goals: the intensification
of the cross-border economic, cultural and tourism connections in the Hungarian borderland.
The question related to the future of Bihar was not answered at the conference
entitled The future of Bihar on Friday in Berettyjfalu. The roads are not built here and
investors do not wish to come here. Probably only the Bihar-Bihor Euroregion can effect a
change.6 reported one of the newspapers. The author of the article can only hope that the
establishment of the new euroregion could be the turning point for the whole region. A
fundamental condition of the formation of the euroregion on the part of the Romanian partners
was the reception of a general agreement, which should be accepted by both Parliaments.
Finally the agreement which made the formation of the BiharBihor Euroregion possible was
signed on April 12, 2002, on the opening day of the fifth Bihar-Bihor Expo in Biharkeresztes.
Among the goals of the new organization the newspapers enumerated the provision of all
necessary conditions of the sustainable development and the preparation for the European
integration process.
The deed of foundation of the Hajd-Bihar-Bihor Euroregion, an organization formed
on the basis of voluntary cooperation was signed only a few months later on the other side of
the border, in Oradea. The new interregional organization was a descendant of the settlement
level agreement between Debrecen and Oradea, which was established ten years earlier.
According to the deed of foundation the accentuated area of its activity are among others the
development of cross-border cooperation in the field of environmental protection, protection
against flood and internal water, economy, agriculture, education, science and public health.
The reports on the formation of the euroregion amended this list with some new items, they
mentioned among the terms of a problem the various tasks in reference to the water
management, the air pollution of the Romanian factories near the border. The treatment of the
patients, who arrive to Hungary from Romania and on semi-official ways also caused trouble
for the Hungarian social insurance, most officials hoped that the new form of cooperation
would find a solution for this problem.
7. With European measure in Europe7
The economic and political unit of the areas at the lower section of the river Tisza was
broke up by the new Hungarian-Romanian-Yugoslavian border called into existence by the
Trianon Treaty in 1920. Several decades later discussions were started with the participation of
the leaders of the Hungarian counties Bcs-Kiskun, Bks, Csongrd, Jsz-Nagykun-Szolnok,
the Romanian counties Arad and Timis and the Autonomous Territory of Vojvodina in
Yugoslavia to establish a euroregion, which could encourage cross-border connections in the
border region. Two Romanian counties, Hunedoara and Caras-Severin joined the organization
later. The deed of foundation of the DunaKrsMarosTisza Euroregion (DKMT) was signed
in November 21, 1997 in Szeged, Hungary. A goal of the DKMTs regional cooperation was
the development of connections between local communities and local authorities in the field of
economy, education, culture, public health, science and sport and the promotion of those forms
of cooperation, which can lead to the integration inside a modern European framework. The
Euroregion intends to assert European norms, the assurance of minority rights in the framework
of broad cross-border co-operation. According to the deed of foundation the organization has no
political goals, it focuses on the development of regional connections. Its economic objectives
harmonize with the EU expectations, the free flow of labour force, capital, goods and services.
In this region, where the ethnic composition of local inhabitants is rather diverse, the conflict
6
7

Hajd-Bihari Napl, April 2, 2002, p. 7


Dlmagyarorszg, November 8, 1997, p. 1

94
prevention and trust building role of the Euroregion is not negligible either (Pszti Tth, Gy.
1996).
A number of articles were published about the formation of the organization, and the
publication of articles related to the DKMT is permanent since then, that is the press shows
interest in the activity of this euroregional organization and journalists still attach importance to
it. Since 1997 the so called DKMT Euroregion Day is organized in Kbekhza every year, to
emphasize and symbolize the seriousness of the Romanian-Serbian-Hungarian cooperation. An
official paper called Euro-regio is published by the partners, which have naturally three editions
in three languages. The newspaper mostly contains a number of repots and actual news in
reference to the most important events of the border region.
According to the press reports the demand and compulsion of cooperation determined
the behavior of the economic actors in the DKMT Euroregion. The example of the European
integration proves that the economy of a region can be competitive only if it cooperates with its
environment. A series of conferences and businessman-meetings were organized to familiarize
these people with the investment and privatization opportunities. One of the common goals is
the strengthening of the economic cohesion. On the other hand in the Hungarian counties beside
the attraction of the foreign direct investments the integration of the native enterprises is an
inevitable task, because without this the sustainable development is inconceivable.
8. After the EU accession in the shadow of Schengen
After Hungarys EU accession (May 1, 2004) and in period before this event crossborder connections came into the limelight, and this change was reflected in the growth of the
number of articles concerning border issues. These articles dealt with the results of the already
functioning cooperation forms on the one hand, and with those changes of the regulations which
essentially influence these results and with the new opportunities and barriers created by them
on the other hand.
Practically all professional fields have already formed their connection on the other
side of the border, especially along the Hungarian-Romanian border. The number of the reports
on conferences, discussions and trainings was the highest in this period, among others the
following issues were the most popular: traffic connections, regional development, various
sectors of economic development, flood protection, environmental protection, crime prevention,
public health, education, culture, science, employment, and civil society. For example the
cooperation with universities in the neighboring countries is not a new result. Besides an
international border guard action was organized in the area of the Border Guard Directorate in
Nyrbtor and the peace keeping battalion established in 1998 by Hungary and Romania
organized a common tactical exercise near Hdmezvsrhely.
A positive change could be observed in the field of connection at the national level too.
The first official journey of the newly elected Romanian prime minister lead to Budapest in
January 2005, where an important decision was made: to coordinate the cooperation plans of
the Hungarian and Romanian governments more effectively, a common cabinet meeting will be
held every year, which was held in Bucharest in October 21, 2005 for the first time. Most of the
newspapers on both side of the border reported on this agreement in detail.
The euroregions which are active along the eastern borders of Hungary were presented
by the analyzed newspapers thoroughly. The most popular of these interregional organizations
was clearly the DunaKrsMarosTisza Euroregion. The newspapers reported on the
opening of the border that was an initiative of the euroregion, on the elaboration of a new
development strategy, the creation of a new information portal which can accelerate the
formation of new connections and on the support of the development of twin-settlement
connections. A bit less articles were published in the printed press about a smaller interregional
organization, the Hajd-BiharBihor Euroregion, these articles report on the common trainings
and tourism programs. In order to work more effectively and to be able to focus on projects,
these two counties left the Carpathian Euroregion, too. Inside the Carpathian Euroregion a new

95
euroregional organization, the Interregio was established by the leaders of three neighbouring
counties (Szabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg, Satu Mare s Transcarpathai) in 2000. In the local
newspapers mostly in the Kelet-Magyarorszg at least one article was published about the
three most significant euroregional organizations in this border region in every month. But not
only the more and more intensive activity of these interregional organizations aroused the
journalists interest, a number of reports can be found in the national and local newspapers on
the establishment of new cross-border organization as well.
Within the cross-border cooperation Hungarian-Hungarian connections still have a
decisive role. Hungary supported Hungarian education (especially higher education) and other
forms of the protection of Hungarian identity in the neighboring countries with large sum of
money. The newspapers reported on the programs organized on the occasion of various national
holidays almost every time. According to the articles Hungary intended to achieve that the
Hungarian ethnic minority obtain cultural autonomy through the support of Democratic
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.
The new external borders of the European Union create new barriers but also open new
opportunities for the economic development of this area, especially in the western regions of
Romania. Several articles reported on the expressive development of Western-Romania, while
in the neighboring Eastern-Hungary unemployment is still a significant problem. Hungarian
firms are among the largest investors in Romania, Hungary had the seventh position on the list
of foreign investors.8
Naturally the information on concrete economic cooperation is usually not published in
the local newspapers, the reports mostly dealt with the resources, applications which made the
realization of the plans possible. With the help of the Phare CBC program several projects were
launched which aimed to help the establishment of new enterprises and several other projects
were prolonged. The main goal of these projects was the training of the owners of small- and
medium-size enterprises. But the resources of the Phare CBC program also provided the
opportunity to establish the Mak Business- and Service Center, and the building of an
incubator house started in Pspkladny in the same period. At least a few exhibitors from the
neighboring countries participated in every exhibition and fair of the largest cities in the border
region. Several NGOs applied for financial support successfully in order to promote the
development of tourism in the border region. A special form of the economic cooperation is the
usage of the public health service in Hungary by foreign citizens. The hospitals of Szeged and
Mak received a number of Romanian citizens, and they intended to build up an international
health center.
The condition of the road network has an essential effect on the development of the
border regions, which is why a plenty of articles dealt with the possible connection of the main
roads of Hungary (e.g. the roads M3, M49, M35, M43 in Hungary) with the main roads of the
neighboring countries. In several settlements the unbearably enormous transit traffic is the most
serious problem. On the other hand the meeting of the main roads and the border open the door
to accomplish logistic projects, which opportunity was mentioned in the newspapers very often.
The most important achievement from this aspect after Hungarys EU accession was the
inauguration of the border crossing point between Ltavrtes and Sacueni.
In the watershed area of the Tisza much more intensive forms of cooperation evolved
in the field of flood- and environmental protection. A number of articles reported on the
technical development of the technical devices which are responsible for these tasks in the
border region, this is a one of the most important goals of the Hungarian government. For
example one of the races of the world speed boat championship could not have been held near
Szeged because of the communal waste arrived from Romania on the river. In April 2005 a
disastrous flood destroyed Banat, the Romanian territory along the southeastern borders of
Hungary. In this case Hungarian authorities lent the victims a helping hand and transported
pumps, generators and other necessary goods to the Banat faster than the Romanian
8

Hajd-Bihari Napl, April 16, 2005, p. 6

96
government. However in this case anti-Hungarian emotions have showed up when Romanian
nationalist groups were indignant that the Romanian government accepted this kind of help
from Hungary.
Again the cultural and sport events are mentioned in the newspapers most frequently,
but the establishment of a workshop of folk art, a common exhibition of artist and guest
performances of acting companies were popular topics in this period too.
Several NGOs organized trainings in the framework of various projects in order to
encourage cross-border cooperation. Although the greater part of these trainings were held in
Hungary, along the Hungarian-Romanian border most of these projects are managed in parallel.
Ceremonial openings of the border were organized in a few sections of the HungarianRomanian border, when provisional border crossing points were established (Kbekhza,
Bagamr). Another group of articles dealt with the possible ways of the transmission of
experiences of the Hungarian authorities in reference to the EU accession. The printed press
showed a special interest in Interreg, the new European resource for the realization of such
projects.
In parallel with the accession process the Hungarian border guards must prepare for the
new expectations of the Schengen border regime, which include a number of technical
requirements as well. The newspapers continuously reported on the development and the
development plans of the infrastructural conditions of the border stations (reconstruction of the
barracks, establishment of refugee camps, enhancement of the electronic database), on the
enlargement of the border stations (e.g. new terminals for the freight traffic at Nyrbrny and
Kiszombor), and on the modernization of the structure of border defense. Reports on the illegal
immigrants who tried to cross the green border or tried to cross the border at the border
station but with false passport can be found in the Hungarian printed press every week. The
motivation of this people is very simple in most of the cases: they try to find a better job in
Hungary or in Western Europe. Most of the illegal migrants are Romanian, Ukrainian or
Moldavian citizens, but many of them arrived from Asia.9
The smuggling of various products has always been in the forefront of the reports
regarding to cross-border cooperation. Most newspapers reported regularly on the successes of
the border guards and customs officers in the Romanian border region, and presented the new
equipments which help them (e.g. mobile laboratory, mobile X-ray etc.). The number of the
short articles of this kind is especially high in the leading local newspaper of Szabolcs-SzatmrBereg County, as in this border region the smuggling of tobacco and fuel is part of vital part of
the subsistence of the local people. Sometimes local officials, border guards and customs
officers are involved in the smuggling operations. Beside cigarette, alcoholic drinks and fuel
other goods, like drugs, DVDs, fireworks, protected animals are found in the smugglers
vehicles. A new phenomenon is that Hungarian shopping tourists pour into the cities of the
border regions in Romania, and buy up cheap foods and fuel. Shopping tourism was encouraged
by launching new scheduled bus routes. Especially the personal import of granulated sugar
caused perceptible inconvenience in the Hungarian market, and set up confrontation between
the beneficiaries of shopping tourism and Hungarian officials. The conflict was terminated only
when the rules of import from Romania for individuals were changed and the control was
tightened.
After Hungarys EU accession small border traffic ceased to exist, and this measure
had negative effect especially on the ethnic Hungarians living near the border. The only hope
for them is that the working out of a new border regime is in progress in the EU. Besides
hundreds of Romanian citizens were retained at the border because they had spent more than 3
months in the EU presumably because of illegal employment.

Hajd-Bihari Napl, May 26, 2004, p.1

97
9. Consideration of one and a half decades
Sometimes articles become historical documents after years, which become useful
resources for the researchers of the specific period. In our case during the analysis of newspaper
articles of the past 15 years no internal periods can be determined concerning border issues. The
press dealt with this topic regularly, although usually only limited amount of information
reached the readers. Detailed information was published only in reference to important or
unusual events.
One of the typical topics, which were sometimes discussed in detail, is the description
of the life at the border crossing points and the possible ways of development. Almost one
third of all collected articles (the whole amount of them is approx. 600) dealt with this topic.
39% of these articles dealt with the development of already existing or planned border stations
at the Hungarian-Romanian border, 33% were conversation pieces, and 28% informed about
various illegal activities, crimes. The high number of articles, which dealt with the border
crossing points cannot be surprising as the EU accession, which is on the agenda and the
demand on more active cross-border cooperation required the optimization of the permeability
of the borders, and have news value at he local level only, but in the national press as well.
Another large group of topics is connected to the euroregions and various interregional
organizations. These articles informed the readers more or less objectively, although the reports
were very formal in most of the cases and presented the activities of these organizations as
abstract and distant in comparison with the everyday life of the local inhabitants. Whereas the
articles are mostly professional, sometimes the typical problems of publicism, the using of
stereotypes and generalities can be observed too. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is
that the journalist had to make the non-professional readers familiar with a large number of
new information and expressions.
The articles which discussed the connections of settlements near the border, the
establishment of concrete cooperation between counties and twin settlements, or reported on
cultural, educational, sport and religious events were more understandable and unambiguous.
On the other hand these articles usually did not emphasize that these forms of cooperation are
formal and have protocol character in most of the cases and did not try to reveal the general
effects of these initiatives, which could have long lasting influence on the future of cross-border
cooperation. It is understandable on the one hand that there are a number of articles concerning
the situation of the Hungarian ethnic minority in the neighboring countries and the HungarianHungarian connections, on the other hand these articles can have negative effect on the official
connections with these countries. The reports on the economic, commercial and agricultural
connections are surely not so powerful, and the same can be told about the appearance of
topics related to environmental protection, except cyanide pollution in January 2000, when the
contamination arrived from Romania to Hungary in the rivers Szamos and Tisza. The reactions
on this event were vehement in Hungary and all over the world and these opinions were
represented in the newspapers as well.
The analysis of the documents of one and a half decades has strengthened that
estimation that the traditional backwardness and peripheral situation of the border regions in
Eastern Hungary have not changed since the democratic transformation in 1989. In spite of the
positive changes the separating and connecting role of the state borders are perceivable in an
antinomic way, and connecting function is still interlinked with the separating role. However it
is a noteworthy fact that articles in the analyzed newspapers did not emphasized this
disadvantageous situation (which is evident for those who live in this region), but dealt with the
possible solutions and the chances of the border region.

98
References
1. Baranyi, B., Euroregionlis szervezetek s j interregionlis szervezdsek Magyarorszg
keleti llamhatrai mentn (Euroregional organizations and new interregional organizations
along the Eastern state borders of Hungary), Magyar Tudomny, 2002, pp. 15051518
2. Baranyi, B., Before Schengen Ready for Schengen. Euroregional Organisations and New
Interregional Formations at the Eastern Borders of Hungary, Pcs, Centre for Regional
Studies. (Discussion Papers, 38.), 2002
3. Baranyi, B., A hatrmentisg dimenzii. Magyarorszg keleti llamhatrai (The dimensions
of the border regional location. Hungary and its eastern state borders), BudapestPcs,
Dialg Campus K, 2004, (Dialg Campus Szakknyvek, Terleti s Teleplsi Kutatsok,
22.)
4. ger, Gy., Regionalizmus, hatrok s kisebbsgek Kelet-Kzp-Eurpban (Regionalism,
borders and minorities in Eastern Central Europe), Budapest, Osiris, (Pro Minoritate
Knyvek), 2000
5. Gmes, T., Adalkok a keleti llamhatrok sajtvisszhangjhoz (Contributions to the media
coverage of the Eastern state borders). Kecskemt, MTA Regionlis Kutatsok Kzpontja
Alfldi Tudomnyos Intzet. Kzirat, 2002
6. Izsk, ., A hatrmentisg s a hatr menti regionlis egyttmkds a sajt tkrben 1989tl napjainkig. (Border situation and regional cross-border cooperation in the press from
1989 up to now) Elvlaszt s sszekt - a hatr, Trsadalmi-gazdasgi vltozsok az
osztrkmagyar hatr menti trsgekben, Szerk. Nrai M., Rechnitzer J. PcsGyr, MTA
Regionlis Kutatsok Kzpontja, 1999, pp. 191208
7. Pszti Tth, Gy., A formld Duna-Tisza-Maros Eurorgi (The forming Danube-TiszaMaros Euroregion), Hatron innen - hatron tl. Szerk.: Pl ., Sznokyn Ancsin G.
Szeged, JATE Gazdasgi Fldrajzi Tanszk, JGYFT Fldrajzi Tanszk, 1996, pp. 1621
8. Rechnitzer, J., Az osztrkmagyar hatr menti trsgek egyttmkdsnek j dimenzii,
egy potencilis eurorgi krvonalai (The new dimensions of co-operation in the AustrianHungarian border regions, the profile of a potential euroregion), Gyr, MTA Regionlis
Kutatsok Kzpontja Nyugat-magyarorszgi Tudomnyos Intzet. (Nyugat-magyarorszgi
Tudomnyos Intzet Kzlemnyei, 33.), 1996
9. Rechnitzer, J., Eurorgi vzlatok a magyarosztrkszlovk hatr menti trsgekben
(Euroregional drafts in the Hungarian-Austrian-Slovakian border regions), Tr s
Trsadalom, 1997, pp. 2958
10. Rechnitzer, J., Orszghatr menti egyttmkdsek, mint a terletfejleszts j stratgiai
irnyai (Co-operations along the state borders as new strategic course of regional
development). Nemzetkzi Fldrajzi Tudomnyos Konferencia, Szeged, 1999, november
2930, Szerk.: Sznokyn Ancsin G. Szeged, SZTE Termszettudomnyi Kar Gazdasg s
Trsadalomfldrajz Tanszk. pp. 723
11. Ruttkay, ., Hatrok, hatrmentisg, regionlis politika (Borders, border situation, regional
policy). Comitatus, 1995, pp. 2335
12. Sli-Zakar, I., A hatron tnyl kapcsolatok erstsnek lehetsgei a Krptok-Eurorgi
terletn (Possibilities of the strengthening of cross-border connections in the territory of the
Carpathian Euroregion). Hatron innen - hatron tl. Szerk.: Pl ., Sznokyn Ancsin G.
Szeged, 1996, JATE Gazdasgi Fldrajzi Tanszk, JGYFT Fldrajzi Tanszk, pp. 4651
13. Sli-Zakar, I.Ludvig, Zs., A Krptok Eurorgi. (Egy hatrokon tnyl egyttmkds
eredmnyei) (The Carpathian Euroregion Results of a cross-border cooperation), Terleti
Statisztika, 2001, pp. 372386

99

Mass Media Impact on the Democratization Processes in Society:


Case of the Republic of Moldova
Alla ROCA
Abstract: Reorganization of mass media activity for the Republic of Moldova became
an imperative dictated both by democratization necessities of the whole society and by the
obligations that Moldova took in view of the implementation of Action Plan European Union
Republic of Moldova. In this articles is analyzed the efforts to bring the norms and conditions
of mass media functioning in Moldova to European standards, that impose the necessity of
supporting the tendency to treat the press as a business institution and not as an instrument of
political influence. Other challenges are the promotion of western investments in media
industry and using economic support to promote the development of independent press. The
author came to the conclusion, that the joint efforts of the government, mass media and civil
society will determinate the success in societys democratization.
Key words: democratization, freedom of press, access to information, legal frame

1. Introduction
An ardent interest to the development of mass communication persisting in all
countries is primarily accounted for by the fact that the evolution of mass media is a central,
relevant and visible aspect of transition to democratic society. Besides, the functions of mass
media system are modified and there are steady socio-political transformations taking place.
Mass media are a mirror of society reflecting both the transformation processes and the
conditions in which this renovation is being implemented.
The interpretation of mass media functions in society leads to recognition of the
fundamental role of the audiences socialization in the public opinion formation and in society
democratization. Mass media development was always an indispensable indicator of the
evolution of democratic processes: when media reveal vulnerability, but fail to train the
teaching about participatory and civil society, democracy lingers to distinguish itself. It is mass
media whose task is to atomize and spread the deep significance of democracy.1
Being an inseparable part of democratization process, mass media of the Republic of
Moldova are distinguished by the same features as democratic processes in the country with
developing ethnic identity, consolidation of the state, its recognition on the international level as
well as determination of state foreign policy and creation of the image of the Republic of
Moldova. Mass media follow the itinerary of perestroyka and glasnosti going back to the
period of national awakening (1988-1991), of the processes of destatalization and pluralism of
opinion, of active participation in the society reorganization processes. 2
The dominant of present-day mass media is passing to the conditions of establishing
economic and editorial freedom and trying to combine two aspects of difficult-to-reach
compatibility in current and long-term activity that of editorial independence and that of
economic and financial autonomy. Therefore, the local informational and communicational
sector is characterized by a definite uncertainty and provokes justified worries.
The media sector in the Republic of Moldova is marked by diversity printed press,
radio, television, on-line journalism; the statistical data about the information offer testify to the
1
2

John Keane, The Media and Democracy, Polity Press, 1991


Alla Roca, Political Communication and Societys Democratization, Chisinau, 2003

100
domains sophistication. In 1995, there were 245 titles of periodicals officially registered in the
country3; in 2000, the number of paper-based newspapers constituted 176 titles (with a total
circulation of about 30 million copies)4, and in 2001, there were printed 233 newspapers (with
45 million copies annually) and 80 magazines (with an annual circulation of circa 2 million
copies.)5. There were no significant changes in this dynamics in the recent years. In proportion
to the total population of the country, these figures testify to an insufficient information
provision (10 newspaper copies and 0.5 magazines per inhabitant per year6).
Nevertheless, the impact of media factor as the basis for the support of democratic
development of the Moldovan society cannot be contested because of the trust the population
has in mass media. The results of public opinion poll carried out by the Institute of Public
Politics in April 2006 show that 63.5% of the respondents stated some and high trust in mass
media7. This result is much more impressive compared to the trust in state authorities
(Parliament 38,5%, Government 39,6%). The explanation lies in both a perpetual mistrust of
the population towards its authorities and in the tradition of people appealing to the press as
representing power for fixing wrongs. However, this fact also highlights the potential of mass
media to serve the societys interests.
2. The Normative and Legal Frame of Mass Media Activities in Moldova
There are multiple and diverse reasons behind the reformation of Moldavian media and
of the normative and legal frame of mass media activities. The reform is performed with the
following constituents in view the realization of necessary alignment to international legal
standards in the information sector introduced by representatives of the national government
bodies, understanding of the mass media role in modern society by the local political class and
external requirements. The latter are either imposed by international bodies or initiated by some
non-governmental associations in mass media field. The freedom of press, access to information
and conditions of broadcasting media functioning in the country have been proclaimed and
sanctioned through a series of laws including the following: Constitution of the Republic of
Moldova, adopted on July 29, 1994; Press Law, nr. 243-XIII of Oct. 26, 1994; Audio-Visual
Law, nr. 603-XIII of Oct. 3, 1995; Law on Access to Information, nr. 982-XIV of May 11,
2000; The Decision about the Concept of State Support and Promotion of Mass Media in 19992003, nr. 277-XIV of Feb. 2, 1999; The Law on Copyright and Related Rights nr. 293-XIII of
November 23, 1994; The Law on Editorial Activity nr. 939-XIV of April 20, 2000.
The Republic of Moldova assumed the attitude of respecting rights and liberties of
press also through adherence to some important international acts, such as: Universal
Declaration of Human Rights - adopted in New York on Dec. 10, 1948 (Ratified by the
Decision of Parliament nr. 217-XII of July 28, 1990); International Pact on Civil and Political
Rights - adopted in New York, on Dec. 16 1966 (Ratified by the Decision of Parliament nr.
217-XII of July 28, 1990); The International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(Ratified by the Decision of Parliament nr. 217-XII of July 28, 1990); The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties / The European
Convention on Human Rights ECHR, adopted in Rome on Nov. 4, 1950, in force since Sep.
3, 1953 (Ratified by the Decision of Parliament nr. 1298-XIII of July 24, 1997); International
Agreement on Civil and Political Laws (1993).
The legal frame of mass media activity in the Republic of Moldova is determined by
other laws and normative acts directly or indirectly related to media functioning: The Law on
3

Mass media guide 2000, Independent Journalism Center, Chisinau, 2000


Source: National Office of Statistics
5
Victor Moraru, Mass Media between Uncertainties and Aspirations. Republic of Moldova, 2001,
Chisinau: MSU, 2002, p. 59
6
Civil Society and Mass Media, Responsible government for human development / National Report of
Human Development, Republic of Moldova. 2003, Chisinau: PNUD, 2004, p. 54.
7
Barometer of public opinion, April 2006, Chisinau: Institute of Public Politics, 2006, p. 30
4

101
State Secret nr. 106-XIII of May 17, 1994; The Law on Commercial Secret nr. 171-XIII of July
6, 1994; The Law on Informatics nr. 1069-XIV of June22, 2000; The Law on Information and
State Information Resources nr. 467-XV of Nov. 21, 2003; The Law on Anti-Extremist
Measures nr. 54-XV of Feb. 21, 2003; The Law on Copying and Phonogram Replicating nr.
1459-XV of Nov. 14, 2002; The Law on Telecommunications nr. 520-XIII of July 7, 1995; The
Law on Publication nr. 1227-XIII of June 27, 1997; The Electoral Code nr. 1381-XIII of Nov.
21 1997; The Civil Code of the Republic of Moldova adopted by Law nr. 1107-XV of June 6,
2002; The Penal Code of the Republic of Moldova, adopted by Law nr. 985-XV of April 18,
2002; The Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Moldova nr. 225-XV of May 30, 2003; The
Penal Procedure Code of the Republic of Moldova nr. 122-XV of March 14, 2003; The Code on
Administrative Contraventions, approved by Law of March 29, 1985 (Art. 51/2 in the reduction
of Law nr. 63-XV of Feb. 27, 2003); The Law on Administrative Legal Department nr. 793XIV of Feb. 10, 2000; The Law on Terrorism Combat nr. 539-XV of Oct. 12, 2001, etc.
We can confidently ascertain that the laws and normative acts of Moldova, so far
adopted in the field, may be treated as a ground zero for further development of the legislation
designated for insuring the freedom of press. The legal frame in force containing a basic set of
normative regulations in the sphere shapes a relatively acceptable context for the functioning of
media institutions on the condition of consolidating the existent normative acts and their
continuous adjustment to European standards. Another factor is an active implication of the
governmental structures, their awareness and support of favorable policy towards mass media
development and resolving the burning problems of media sector.
However, creating the environment favorable from the legislative point of view and the
adoption of some normative acts, whose objective is the press functioning in conformity with
the principles of democratic society, do not breed a complete consolidation of medias activity
and establishment of free press in Moldova. The two can be reached only through real
capitalization of the existent legal basis as well as its sagacious application. . In the context of
resolving the problem concerning the European integration task, we can speak about the
promotion of governmental politics related to the stipulations of the European Union Action
Plan for the Republic of Moldova (APEUM) in the respective field.
The government has renounced being the founder of the official national publications
Moldova Suveran and Nezavisimaia Moldova, which was probably its most
publicized action in terms of press (meeting the requirements of Action Plan, leave alone
triggering response on the part of writing brethren that addressed these publications staff and
reporters on the occasion of a formal divorce). Nevertheless, it produced practically no other
actions of resonance with positive impact on the mass communications.
In this sense, the governments actions give no cause for asserting the existence of any
efficient collaboration between the authorities and institutions of media sector. Actually, the
few events that are supposed to reflect the government activity in terms of disciplinary order in
the information sphere can hardly be defined as an integral program of actions with a coherent
strategy. They rather demonstrate a lack of systemic vision of the mass media development and
promotion of press freedom on the part of power holders. De facto, they prove that non-existent
is a clear and elaborated concept of the governments involvement in resolving the problems
accompanying the press meandrous navigation in society in transition.
In this case, the relation between the authorities and mass media can be qualified as
ambiguous. On the one hand, press represents the force that permits the power to fortify its
legitimacy obtained in the election, create a favorable image during its functioning period and
contribute to strengthening the public opinion. On the other hand, obviously, some journalists
neglect and criticize certain political leaders from the power structures. Therefore, according to
experts, the authorities tend to make a differentiation in treatment of the loyal and critical
press regulating access to information, orientation of advertisement flows, etc.
Another characteristic of the powermass media relation may be initiated by the latter
in the form of minimization of the authorities public communication, which, by definition,
insures the transparence of government action. The frequency of public appearances of power

102
representatives in mass media may become insignificant, reduced to a limited circle of the same
persons. The spokespersons of the higher structures become practically unknown. A negative
communication model adopted by the power towards press may breed desperate actions of
improvisational character, which are hardly very efficient.
In the conditions of developing market economy and austerity of the national budget,
the state support provided to media sector is an inopportune stake on some facilities for mass
media institutions and small subsidies for their staff. The government manages to offer only
partial budgetary cover to some national publications for children, local budgets financing, in
their turn, certain local publications (circa 30). The media institutions are handled
preponderantly as commercial enterprises and suffer all the tortures of market economy in
development together with the entire society.
3. Guarantee of Freedom of Press, Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information
3.1. Freedom of press and freedom of expression
Moldovas taking the way of European integration means stepping on a marathon
track with obstacles, a most difficult of which is evaluating the degree to which the Moldovan
political-media realities meet the EU requirements in the Chapter on freedom of mass media. In
this context, of major importance are the conditions in which the press functions, the
fundamental condition being the existence of real and sound freedom of press. The concept of
freedom of press is universally recognized as a corner stone necessary for the edifice of free
and democratic society, 8 representing a fundamental precept included in the most relevant
international documents, such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 19),
European Convention on Human Rights (art. 10), etc. Respecting and promoting mass media
freedom in conformity with the standards for democratic countries is a major political criterion
for the admission of new states in European Union.9
The Action Plan UE-MOLDOVA that was adopted at 22 February, 2005 indicates as
priorities the following:
the assurance of freedom of speech and freedom of expression;
continuing consolidation of stability and efficiency of the institutions that guarantee
democracy.
This illustrates the necessity of the governments awareness as to the importance of
adequate development of media sector in the Republic of Moldova, of the necessity to pay
primary attention to the problem of establishing in the country a socio-political climate
beneficial for the plenary affirmation of the criteria adopted in the respective sector in the EU
countries.10
However, the evaluation of mass media freedom carried out by the international
organizations place the Republic of Moldova in the category of the countries where press has
no liberty. Thus, The freedom of press in 2006 investigation undertaken by Freedom
House ranks Moldova as the 146th out of 194 countries giving it 65 points, which places
Moldova on the same level with Angola, Cameroon, Malaysia and United Arab Emirates11. The
.position of Moldova aggravated in comparison with the results of the studies made in 2005
(137th position) and 2004 (127th position). This fact yields such a pessimistic statement as: The

Koishiro Matsuura, General Director of UNESCO. Speech on May 3, 2005, Dakar,


www2.unesco.org/wef/fr-conf/ fr_coverage_speech_koichiro.shtm
9
Cf.: www.mie.ro/_documente/dialog_Ro_UE/ documente_raportare_CE.htm;
libserver.cedefop.europa.eu/ vetelib/eu/leg/ETVNL/L055_2006_0030_fr.pdf
10
Action Plan UE-MOLDOVA
11
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6792&year=2005&view=mof;
http://azi.md/news?ID=39090;

103
freedom of press in the Republic of Moldova degrades12. Discouraging are the results of
another study made by the organization Reporters sans frontires: according to them, the
Republic of Moldova occupies the 74th position out of 167 (next to Guinea-Bissau and
Tanzania)13.
The problem of freedom of press in the Republic of Moldova generates various
reactions reflected in multiple attitudes of the press representatives and of NGOs in the sphere
of mass media. The Memorandum of media NGOs on the occasion of World Press Freedom
Day expresses the worry that the application of the freedom of press and freedom of
expression and pluralism according to the objectives of European integration is compromised
by the authoritarian reflexes, by the tendency of the governance to take mass media under
control, to use them as an instrument in political fight against the opposition14.
Nowadays there exists a phenomenon of self-censorship, shaped by specific working
conditions of the journalists. There is a pressure of hidden censorship resulting not from power
institutions, but directly from the chiefs or patrons of media institutions. There are cases of
attempts to subordinate written press, especially local, to the public administration interests15, to
endanger - by some indirect methods - the activity of dissident media institutions and of
undesirable journalists16, as well as cases of differential attitude of the power institutions
toward the journalists of loyal and less loyal periodicals.
It is notable that the same worry is stated in the Declaration of some diplomatic
missions accredited in Moldova. The signers of this Declaration expressed regret that, in spite
of repeated statements of the authorities of Moldova about respecting the values inspired by the
freedom of press, there was observed an insufficient progress in the press reformation during
the last year17.
3.2. Guarantee of access to information
According to local and foreign experts18, not only the problem of freedom of press, but
also the problem of access to information in the Republic of Moldova keeps breeding worries.
Regarded as the most important public or civil law, the law of free access to information
(stipulated by article 10 of European Convention on Human Rights and article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) is a fundamental reference point in a democratic
society determining the validity degree of other citizens rights. There are multiple aspects that
are tackled in connection with the access to information (citizens right to possess any
information of public interest, transparence of the activity of public administration institutions,
degree of secretization of official information, etc.). As a mater of fact, this right is derived
from the combination of the right to be informed and the right to inform, fused into the right to
information, which means the right of access to information.
Stating the right to information determines - as task of public authorities - active policy
of promoting awareness of acts and documents, as well as the data in their possession, by the
citizens. In other words, it is the obligation to take all the adequate measures for the citizens and
public organizations to be informed and to have a possibility to conscientiously exercise the
right-duty to participate in political and social life. For the mass media field this means the
guarantee of access to information on the problems of relevant social significance, such as

12

http://www.investigatii.md/index.php?newsID=33#.
http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=549.
14
In the Memorandum of media NGOs on the occasion World Press Freedom Day,
http://www.impact.md/ro/documente/memoriu.html#memoriu
15
Cf.: http://www.acces-info.org.md/upload/RAPORT_ANUAL_2005.doc.
16
Cf.: http://www.api.org.md/presasubpresa3.html.
17
Common Declaration on the occasion of Liberty Day 2006,
http://www.api.org.md/declaratierom.html
18
Cf.: http://www.azi.md/news?ID=38312
13

104
administration of public money, human resource policy, the phenomenon of corruption,
challenges of public health system reorganization, etc.
The press repeatedly pointed out cases of violation of the current legislation about free
access to information on the part of structures of the public administration. It found out, by
revealing the tricks to which civil servants resort when information is requested, that
bureaucratic intuition helped our officials to avoid the spirit of Law on the access to
information.19
As to guaranteeing free access to information in Moldova, foreign experts pronounced
the diagnosis: Raising institution transparence was not achieved.20There were registered
frequent attempts of the representatives of public administration to hinder exercising the right to
information on the part of journalists either by refusing to provide the information, or by
denying the access to the organizations meeting room, or by non-acceptance or cancellation of
accreditation. Thus, mass media organizations, monitoring the situation in the access of
journalists to information, qualified as worrying the declarations of the temporary mayor of
Chisinau, Mr. Vasile Ursu. Limiting access of journalists to the meeting room of the Mayors
office in the Chisinau municipality was an answer to the critical material regarding the public
administrative activity of the capital that appeared in mass media21.
The relations of journalists with the local authorities prove to be difficult. The
evidence of the journalists from the Nord-Info Edinet newspaper illustrates a typical situation
with no dialogue with local authorities. The journalists declared that for some years any
attempt to obtain information from the district administration is equal to zero. We dont
understand, on what basis we were refused the information solicitation22.
It is natural that such circumstances inspire journalists to make appeal to legal
authorities. In September 2005, the number of legal cases based on violating the Law of access
to information reached 3023. It is not a significant number, if we take into account that in the last
decade over 800 files were examined in the courts of law where mass media were involved.
The majority was about impairment of human dignity and brought no profit for the journalists24.
According to experts from the Acces-Info center, down went the number of cases resulting
from refusal to present some information of public interest.
It is significant, however, that there are cases when legal authorities satisfy the
solicitation coming from media institutions. In this sense, notable is the example of the
Independent Journalism Center (CIN), which on March 23, 2006 won the case against the
General Prosecutors Office (GPO) that had denied accreditation to a reporter. It was the first
time when a state institution lost to a media institution the case of refusal to accredit a
journalist25. On June 7, 2005, CIN solicited GPO for a reporters accreditation presenting all the
documents required by the Press Service of this institution. In its reply of June 24, GPO repelled
19

David Deleanu, Access to information a subject we need to come back to,


http://www.investigatii.md/index.php?art=83
20
Cf.: http://www.acces-info.org.md/art19_1.htm
21
Cf.: http://www.investigatii.md/index.php?art=83
22
, ? // , 2006, 28
23
http://europa.timpul.md/Article.asp?idIssue=150&idRubric=1942&idArticle=5100 P>
24
The journalists were protagonists of some legal litigations, gain in ECHR case Giulieta Savitchi
(decision of 01.02.2005 violation of art. 10 of Convention, freedom of speech); case Busuioc (decision
of 27.04.2004 violation of art. 10 from Convention, freedom of speech). Cf.: Government and
democracy in Moldova. E-journal, an IV, nr. 70, March 14-28, 2006
25
In December 2004, the periodical Moldavskie Vedomosti lost the case against the Presidency of the
Republic of Moldova concerning the accreditation of its editor-in-chief, the corresponding file being now
at ECHR. Similar was the decision of the Supreme Court, when the "TIMPUL" newspaper lost the case to
the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. The newspaper accused the legislation of non-observance of
the Law on Access to Information. In May 2004, the "TIMPUL" newspaper solicited from the legislation
the minutes of the parliamentary autumn-winter 2002 session. The Parliament administration refused to
satisfy the demand of the journalists on the ground that it was not allowed according to the regulation
(Cf.: http://www.acces-info.org.md/upload/RAPORT_ANUAL_2005.doc.)

105
the application for accreditation on the ground that CIN was a public association, while GP0
accredited only journalists from periodicals and press agencies. The Supreme Court of Justice
cancelled the November decision of the Court of Appeal, which had rejected the demand of
CIN to the GPO court, and obligated the GPO to accredit the CIN reporter26. Therefore, here we
are dealing with sanctioning of arbitrary attitude of an administrative structure, on the one hand,
and, on the other, with the existence of some lacunas in the legislation that do not stipulate
exactly the conditions of journalists accreditation. It should be indicated there that the activity
of Inter-Ministry Commission facilitates the optimization of legislation function in the field of
access to information, including accreditation of mass media representatives.
4. Creation of Public Television
According to mass media experts, creation of public television is a major condition of
society democratization; the conditions of its functioning are one of the basic indices of
democratic principles realization. Vladimir Filippov, special representative of the European
Council General Secretary in Chisinau, emphasized the necessity of public mass media creation
in the Republic of Moldova and of guaranteeing mass media freedom as essential conditions
that of democratization: "Freedom of press is not a detail, but a key element of the engagements
that the Republic of Moldova must accomplish. It can seem hard, but with such laws as are in
force at present, especially in terms of public mass media, with an existing functioning system,
it is unlikely that somebody will consider seriously the possibility of European integration of
the Republic of Moldova"27.
The process of democratization of Moldovan audiovisual mass media is determined by
the way of implementation of the Law on Broadcasting (1995), which legalized public and
private institutions, introduced licensing in the field, stipulated the creation of the Broadcasting
Coordinating Council as public authority. Therefore, the Law became a catalyst for the
process of diversification of the resources and operators in the field. From then on, we are
witnessing a boom in the electronic press field. If in 1997 the Coordinating Council issued 28
licenses to TV studios with wave emission, MMDS and cable and 7 to radio broadcasting
stations, including those established earlier, in 2004, respectively they are 167 and 4028.
The monopoly of state television was over when 2002 witnessed the adoption of the
Law on Teleradio-Moldova a national public broadcasting company. Though formally there
existed another State Company Teleradio-Gagauzia, the municipal channels Euro TVChisinau, Antena C and Teleradio-Balti, the transformation of the state broadcasting into
public was launched, breaking the monotony of broadcasting landscape. Now we can already
speak about diversity of broadcasting in Moldova: four TV channels on the national Hertz
waves network and 36 - local, 2 Hertz radio networks with national coverage, 11 - with wide
coverage and 32 - local, 157 cable operators, 81 of them being placed in villages of Moldova29.
However, the authorities tend to keep their influence on the most prestigious media;
this and the impossibility to eliminate certain deficiencies in the legislation and apply some
other provisions resulted in the faulty evolutions in this field. As a result, the broadcasting of
the Republic of Moldova, in the opinion some researches, represents an eclectic set of radio and
TV services, but not a structured, complete and diversified system.
It is also worth mentioning that a big mistake was placing of the broadcasting
development process in the frame of retransmission. In 2001, this brought about the situation
when the share of Moldovan radio and television producers was only 9% of the total
broadcasting offer. In the next five years, the situation remained the same, which also affected
the range of TV programs, most of them being copied from the neighboring countries: The
26

Cf.: The GPO lost the case against the press // www.investigatii.md
Andrei Stratan, Moldova has accomplished the EU plan for the first year,
http://www.conflict.md/comentarii.php?ID=445, after: www.bbc.co.uk/romanian, February 24, 2006
28
Annual BCC (CCA) report, 2004, www.cca.telemedia.md
29
Mass media in Moldova, 2006, www.cij.md
27

106
share of retransmitted production compared to that of programs produced in the Republic of
Moldova is much bigger. Moreover, most of local channel production and retransmissions look
as if created by the same hand news, movie, music, sports, weather forecast, which makes our
broadcasting market limited. TV spectators, evidently, find themselves in a difficult position they have to choose where there is nothing to choose. The retransmitted programs (we speak
about the retransmission on land Hertzien frequencies, not by cable) are produced in two
countries - Russia and Romania - basing their broadcasting on the same hybrids shows (How
to Become a Millionaire, Surprises, Surprises, Wheel of Fortune, etc.), Latin-American
soap operas and action films, full of aggression and violence.30
The regulatory deficiencies in the placement of advertising and broadcasting of
commercials through the broadcasts that are under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova
both undermine the media market and hamper the advertising industry in the state language. On
the one hand, the laws of the Republic of Moldova do not forbid placing commercials in
retransmitted radio and TV programs, and foreign companies do not need to make investments
in promotional activities in the country. On the other hand, local broadcasts, including cable
networks, are entitled to injecting local commercials in the retransmitted programs, thus
inhibiting the development of native capacity in the field. An eloquent example is a
retransmitted Russian TV channel, called Pervyi kanal v Moldove (First Channel in
Moldova), which produces nothing of its own but weather forecast; nevertheless, it gains more
profit than the national channel Moldova -1.
Unlike in international practice, in Moldova there is no regulation of the language
aspect in broadcasting commercials, which leads to destroying linguistic and cultural heritage.
Even in the last draft of the Broadcasting Code this problem did not find a proper handling.
Neither the activity of cable networks was regulated in terms of including in the service
package national, regional and local channels. However, there is placement of commercials in
the retransmitted programs. In this case, we can propose the solution that these channels should
produce their own programs where commercials will be placed thus stimulating the
broadcasting development.
Analysis of the activity of electronic media in Moldova and of new broadcasting draft
showed the necessity of elaborating the National Strategy of Broadcasting Development, which
should guide the development of native e-press and should bring into being authentic and
coherent broadcasting. The analysis results stress the possibility and advisability of creating
program diversity, stimulating native production, discouraging the practice of legal
retransmission, a better regulating and developing public service and adequate financing. 31
Therefore, one of the obligations of the Republic of Moldova before the Council of
Europe was the adoption of a new Broadcasting Code. After being exposed to criticism of the
civil society and experts in the field32, the new Code was brought before the Parliament, put on
vote and took force on August 18, 2006. The document contains legal provisions for the activity
of the Broadcasting Coordinating Council (BCC) that will comprise nine members proposed by
NGOs, trade unions, patronages and religious cults and nominated for the Parliaments approval
by the Parliamentary Commission on Education, Culture and Mass Media. At the same time,
the Council of Observers also made up of nine members, selected by BCC and approved by the
Parliament, will administrate the Companys activity.
On the recommendations of European experts, in the new Code there was reintroduced
the notion of local public broadcasting institution; in this context, "Teleradio-Moldova" has the
right to establish territorial offices. Therefore, the existing municipal radio and TV channels

30

Annual report on the activity of BCC in the Republic of Moldova in 2005, www.cca.telemedia.md
From the APEUM implementation to the policy elaboration. Program of European Initiatives of the
Soros Foundation Moldova, Chisinau, Cartier, 2006, p.95
32
According to experts and politicians, the Broadcasting Code does not meet international standards and
national requirements. April 14, 2006, www.azi.md
31

107
will have two options - either accepting the variant of territorial offices or going through the
privatization procedure33.
5. Some conclusions
Democratization processes in any society inevitably imply the guarantee of
transformation conditions for media system and involvement of mass media in the transitory
processes at different levels. For the Republic of Moldova reorganization of mass media
activity became an imperative dictated both by democratization necessities of the whole society
and by the obligations that Moldova took in view of the implementation of Action Plan
European UnionRepublic of Moldova.
In the opinion of local and international experts, the legal frame of mass media activity
in the country contains a basic set of normative regulations in the field and models an
acceptable context for the functioning of media institutions. The challenge to face is creating
conditions for rational evaluation of the existent normative acts and continuing their adjustment
to European standards. A major priority in actual mass media situation is the necessity to most
actively involve the governmental structures in the creation and support of favorable policy
towards mass media development and in resolving burning problems of the media sector. Being
a major political criterion of societys democratization, the issue of guaranteeing mass media
freedom and access to information remains one of the sore spots in the implementation of
Action Plan provisions on the part of Chisinau authorities. In this context, important is the
revision of legislative aspects concerning the limitations of freedom of speech, the problem of
slander, the issue of state secret, private life protection, etc. The efforts to bring the norms and
conditions of mass media functioning to European standards impose the necessity of supporting
the tendency to treat the press as a business institution and not as an instrument of political
influence. Other challenges are the promotion of western investments in media industry and
using economic support to promote the development of independent press.
Concerning broadcasting and the obligations assumed before the Council of Europe,
Action Plan EURepublic of Moldova stipulates revision of the policy in the field of e-press,
one of essential conditions being the perfection of the legislative frame. Thus, excluded should
be the promotion of governmental or group interests in the process of licensing in the field as
well as interference in editorial activity of broadcasts. In the Republic of Moldova there is a
notable discrepancy between the quality of legislative acts and quality of their application. The
explanation lies in a low degree of legal culture in society as well as in the absence of law of
administrative responsibility and lack of synchronization of legal provisions with more than one
law referring to the same problem.
The processes of transformation to perform in the sphere of broadcasting can also be
inspired by the ratification of the European Convention on international television, which opens
up a possibility of cooperation at regional level. Among the measures to be taken in order to
invigorate broadcasting, there is a proper regulation of the public service in the countryside,
guarantee of adequate financing, creation of a Support Fund for broadcasting development.
Hence, on completing the stage of reaching awareness of the methods to reform the mass media
system in the country and of the necessity to guarantee freedom of press and freedom of
expression, Moldovan society should pass to the stage of mastering and creating conditions for
the implementation of these requirements in practical activity. The joint efforts of the
government, mass media and civil society will determinate the success in societys
democratization.

33

Broadcasting Code took force, August 18, 2006, www.azi.md.

108
References
1. Action Plan UE-MOLDOVA
http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/index.php/Proposed_EU/Moldova_Action_Plan
2. Barometer of Public Opinion. April 2006, Chisinau: Institute of Public Politics, 2006
3. Blumer, Jay G., Gurevitch, Michael, The Crisis of Public Communication, London,
Routledge, 1995
4. Civil Society and Mass Media, Responsible government for human development, National
Report of Human Development, Republic of Moldova 2003, Chisinau, PNUD, 2004
5. From the APEUM implementation to the policy elaboration. Program of European
Initiatives of the Soros Foundation Moldova, Chisinau, Cartier, 2006
6. Keane, John, The Media and Democracy, Polity Press, 1991
7. Mass media guide 2000, Chisinau, Independent Journalism Center, 2000
8. Moraru, Victor, Mass Media between Uncertainties and Aspirations. Republic of Moldova,
2001, Chisinau, MSU, 2002
9. Rosca, Alla, Political Communication and Society Democratization, Chisinau, 2003
10. Schopflin, G., Post-Communism: A Profile in Javnost, 1995. Vol.II (I), pp. 63-74
11. Schumpeter, J.A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London, Allen and Unwin, 1952
12. Splichal S., Civil Society and Media Democratization in East-Central Europe: Dilemmas in
the Evolution of the New Model in A.Bibie, G.Grayiano (Eds.), Civil Society, Political
Society, Democracy, Ljubljana, The Slovenian Political Science Association, 1994, pp. 305325

109

4. Identity, Alterity and Imaginary of Borders


Bohdana DIMITROVOVA (Belfast) Towards a Controversial Border
Strategy? The Case of Transcarpathia
Jos Luis VILLANOVA (Girona) Municipal Administration of Spanish
Protectorate Cities in Morocco (1912-1956): A Model Subordinated to the
Interests of Colonialist Policy
Frank PFETSCH (Heidelberg) Why was the 20th century warlike?
Michel MAFFESOLI (Paris) Jeunes et nomadisme tribal

110

Towards a Controversial Border Strategy? The Case of Transcarpathia


Bohdana DIMITROVOVA
Abstract: This paper seeks to unpack the contradictions surrounding the border
processes at the external EU border in the context of Wider Europe strategy. I will primarily
refer to the borderland of Transcarpathia, which provides an interesting opportunity to
demonstrate these contradictions and to shed some light on the development of cross-border
relationships.
I make an analytical distinction between two sub-discourses: (1) a security discourse
and (2) a cross-border co-operation discourse. In practice, these two discourses are
interrelated and interwoven in complex and contradictory ways within the ENP. The former,
however, gives priority to confirming borders as barriers or buffer zones against perceived
external threats. The latter emphasises the need to transcend borders by building networks of
co-operation across them. In practice it may also be aimed at building security, however, its
main thrust is to project political and economic influence across borders, even to the extent of
advancing a transnational civilising mission.
Key words: cross-border cooperation, bordering processes, Transcarpathia,
territoriality
1. Introduction
The geopolitical transformations facing the European continent and the present
development of boundaries have substantially contributed to a renaissance in the study of
borders, which is reflected in an impressive list of conferences, workshops and scholarly
publications. The idea of a border or boundary has become a major theme across the social
sciences and different schools of thoughts. Yet despite a significant proliferation of border
research, little theoretical consensus has been established in the social sciences concerning the
interpretation of the rudimentary elements of the bordering process, and its socio-political
implications. Greater synthesis of the concepts of boundaries may facilitate new theoretical
insights about a whole range of general social processes present across a wide variety of
apparently unrelated phenomena-processes (Lamont and Molnar, 2002).
The enlargement of the European Union has heralded a need to reorganize its policy
towards providing a new impetus for the study of the external borders of the European Union
(EU), which seem to be an extremely diverse and fragmented conceptual category. Within the
concept generally known as Wider Europe, the EU has mapped out an ambitious vision of a
regional Neighbourhood that involves a ring of countries, sharing the EUs fundamental
values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond cooperation
to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration.1
The EU has designed a proposal for developing a European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP)2, which seeks to promote regional or cross-border cooperation (CBC) and partnerships
on the external borders of the EU to compensate for the potentially damaging effects of longterm or permanent exclusion from the EU.

Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
the Council Laying Down General Provisions Establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument COM 2004/628, Brussels, 2004, p.5
2
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission, European
Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy paper, COM, 2004, 373 final.

111
Central to the ENP is the so-called carrot and stick approach of the EU, which has
sought to promote cross-border and regional co-operation while holding out the promise of full
or associate membership of the EU to the neighbouring countries. In other words, well-behaved
countries, which meet European standards, will receive better market opportunities. The
package being promulgated by the EU includes the establishment of a market economy and a
legal and political system analogous to that of existing EU Member States, as well as the
promotion of cross-border economic co-operation. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if the principle
of conditionality will be effective in new Neighbourhood countries in the absence of prospect
for full EU membership.
This paper seeks to unpack the contradictions surrounding the border processes at the
external EU border in the context of Wider Europe strategy. I will primarily refer to the
borderland of Transcarpathia, which provides an interesting opportunity to demonstrate these
contradictions and to shed some light on the development of cross-border relationships.
I will make an analytical distinction between two sub-discourses: (1) a security
discourse and (2) a cross-border co-operation discourse. In practice, these two discourses are
interrelated and interwoven in complex and contradictory ways within the ENP. The former,
however, gives priority to confirming borders as barriers or buffer zones against perceived
external threats. The latter emphasises the need to transcend borders by building networks of
co-operation across them. In practice it may also be aimed at building security, however, its
main thrust is to project political and economic influence across borders, even to the extent of
advancing a transnational civilising mission.
It seems that the New Neighbourhood space is the scene of a struggle over security and
cooperation, which are being contested or balanced amongst different political or social actors
and their respective roles, responsibilities and problematic power relationships and ideological
struggles. Border confirming and border transcending ideas are simultaneously competing
concepts that define and organise this political and economic space where the cross-border
processes are fragmented, reflecting different interests, perceptions, structures and procedures
at various spatial levels (supranational, national and local). The EU external borders remain
highly contested in terms of the modes of governance, the degree of openness and the functions
(i.e. barriers or opportunities) attached to the borders by different actors.
2. Confirming the Borders
Security discourse is without doubt a central rationale for the Wider Europe policy,
which seeks to secure the external borders of the EU and to create a buffer zone against security
threats. In official EU discourse the politics of securitisation has complex understandings and
lumps together very different things. Security is to be achieved through cooperation in many
different policy areas and formed in the context of the different positions, practices and
relations of the various social actors.
In practice, the politics of securitisation produces rather rigid and hard external
borders, which are often perceived as artificial constructs and barriers by the borderland
communities. In this sense, borders can be conceptualised as barriers and clear lines of
exclusion, which for example, is demonstrated by the introduction of visa regimes to the
countries identified as security threats, particularly in the field of illegal migration.
The mobility of people and the regulation of their movement across the state borders is
regulated by governments and the EU under the auspices of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Title of the EC Treaty. Borders are confirmed via inter-governmental agreements under close
supervision by and guidance from the EU. The core of Europe has imposed a variety of security
regulations on the external borders regardless of the socio-economic or cultural contexts of the
new Member States and their direct neighbours.
In relation to these securitisation debates, the state borders are understood as the agents
of national security and sovereignty, and a physical record of a states past and present relations
with its neighbours (Wilson and Donnan, 1998:9).

112
State-centric scholarly approaches perceive borders as essential attributes of states,
which exercise sovereign control over clearly defined territories. According to this state-centric
epistemology of the borders, there is a mutual dependence between states and territory, which
legitimates modern states use of force and to exercise military power over the territory. Statecentric understandings of the European project builds on the Weberian definition of the modern
state, which has following characteristics:
It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to
which the organized corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also
regulated by legislation, is orientedIt is thus a compulsory association with a
territorial basis (Weber, 1948:156).
Central to this modernist understanding of the borders is the notion of clearly
demarcated territorial spaces. Agnew (1999) puts forward three assumptions typical to this
thinking: 1) states have exclusive power within their territories, 2) domestic and foreign affairs
are separate realms, and 3) the boundaries of a state define the boundaries of its society.
In line with this modernist thinking, the functions attached to borders are to control,
regulate and unify social relations within territorial, defined and fixed spaces, and which
operate under a nation-state arrangement. Sovereignty is defined as the exclusive right for the
exercise of legitimate violence within the limits of territory, which is then mutually recognised
by states. This is a conception of borders that reflect what John Agnew calls field of forces: a
geopolitical model of states as rigidly define territorial units in which each state can gain power
at the expenses of others and each has total control over its own territory (Agnew, 1999:504).
The main purpose of borders is hence to establish absolute physical control over a
territorial area and to exercise exclusive legal, administrative and social controls over its
inhabitants (Fischer, 1948; Kristoff, 1943; Jones, 1959). Kratochvil in his inquiry into the
formation of the state system considers this simplicity and the clear boundaries to what he calls
the advantage of the all-or- nothing principle of sovereignty of international life where only
territorial units have the right to regulate and control (Kratochvil, 1986: 50).
Thus, borders are about concentration of power, hierarchy, sovereignty and
homogeneity. This traditional framework of power politics is partially reflected in the EUs
approach towards the Neighbourhood.
Against these modernist understandings of borders, absolute control over the borders
has been undermined in the current geopolitical constellation. New geopolitical changes in
Europe pose severe challenges to above-discussed traditional state-centric territorialities, which
has been a founding concept of modern states. The so-called Westhpalian interstate system,
which among other things is presumed to have fixed borders delimiting its territory and a
singular state sovereignty, has been challenged to think beyond what Agnew calls the territorial
trap (Agnew, 1994). Here modernist understandings of borders shade into post-modern
approaches.
Even by 1993, John Ruggie had suggested that the unbundling of territoriality is a
productive concept for the exploration of contemporary transnational processes, particularly the
emergence of European Community as the first post-modern community in Europe (Ruggie,
1993:172). The rise of new multiperspectival polities appears to signal the era of the postmodern space of flow which effectively means the end of the modern interstate system
(Ruggie, 1993: 620).
At first glance, the state-centric approaches seem to be inappropriate for interpreting
the contemporary geopolitical constellation of enhanced transnational or cross-border
cooperative networks. Yet, there is evidence that suggests that it is wrong to dismiss the statecentric practices entirely in my research area, where the state borders are still of great
importance.
I shall attempt to discuss how the key attributes attached to these state-centric practices
such as territoriality, national sovereignty or state power have been transformed in relation to
the re-bordering processes which have occurred in Transcarpathia when Hungary joined the

113
EU. In order to demonstrate this, I will present some key arguments and research findings
concerning the visa regulations and the local border traffic, which have had a significant impact
on the cross-border movement of local inhabitants in Transcarpathia.
As part of the implementation of the JHA acquis, Hungary was obliged to introduce
visas for its neighbouring country Ukraine where approximately 150,000 Hungarians live in the
Transcarpathia region. The Hungarian strategy was built on one of the key pillars of national
foreign policy: protecting the interests of ethnic compatriots living across the state borders. The
national interest of the Hungarian state was to postpone the visa policies and to keep the local
border traffics until the last possible moment, which however did not comply with the EU
directives in the JHA area.3
Hungary together with Poland announced during accession negotiations that they
would not complete the process until six months before the expected data of EU entry. The
Hungarian approach consisted of gradual harmonisation based on pre-announced schedules and
taking national interests (Hungarian minorities) into account.
The arguments were rooted in specific domestic policy priorities such as the negative
socio-economic impact on the bordering communities, which was assessed prior to the
introduction of new regulatory frameworks.
The asymmetric policy introduced by Hungary included several preferential conditions
such as simplification of the visa application forms or offering multiple-entry visas valid for
five years to a broad range of categories of travellers, as defined in bilateral agreements with
Ukraine.4 These categories included people with family ties, those regularly crossing the
borders for family purposes, or those involved in enhancing economic, cultural, scientific,
educational, etc. relations between two countries.
Despite above-mentioned gradual harmonisation, including extensive consular
preparations for a smooth and effective visa system, the statistics point to sharp decline in legal
entries of citizens of Ukraine to Hungary. Hungarys preparations focused on the
Transcarpathian region, from where the overwhelming majority of visa applications were
expected, given the concentration of the Hungarian minority. The objective was to prevent the
necessity of travelling long distances to the consulate to obtain a visa and to simplify the visa
procedures; this was reflected in the above-mentioned preferential conditions.
New consular and customer service offices were opened in Hungarian populated areas
(Berehovo and Uzhhorod) to limit waiting time. Hungarys liberal approach to visa policy is
also reflected in the extremely low rate of refusal to Ukrainian applicants standing around 0,2
percent.
In this respect, Hungarian policy was driven by the interests of the Hungarian minority
in Transcarpathia. Furthermore, the ethnic Hungarians turned to be a minority among the visa
applicants.5
In the first month that visa requirements were in force, November 2003, the number of
Ukrainians entering Hungary declined by 54 percent relative to the month before (down from
255,000 to nearly 117,000).6
The power struggles between different social and political actors have been clearly
demonstrated in the case of local border traffic, which allowed residents of border regions to
cross the border with a travel voucher without passport or visa for a maximum stay of 10 days.
The EU required candidate countries to terminate those local border policies with its neighbours
as they violated the Schengen acquis. Pointing at the existing local border traffic within the EU
and in some cases on the external EU border, candidate countries argued that double standards
are applied by the EU member states. Nevertheless, after serious negotiations and the original
3
Directive No. 574/99 of the Council of the European Communities requires the introduction of visas for
the citizens of the 15 former communist countries by the time of accession.
4
The Hungarian practice also allowed for visas for 15 days to be exceptionally obtained at the border.
5
The attempt of populist Hungarian government in 2001 to introduce dual citizenships for ethnic
Hungarians outside of Hungary was unitarily rejected by respective governments and the EU.
6
Hungarian Central Statistical Office

114
Hungarian intention to keep local border traffic, Hungary was forced to terminate the agreement
with Ukraine in 2003.
The introduction of visas and the abolishment of local border traffic were based on the
EUs rationale of securing the external borders against illegal migration and illegal cross-border
traffic, which has been frequently questioned by many experts and NGOs. Similarly to other
countries, the experience of Hungary does not indicate a clear relationship between the
introduction of visa for Ukrainian citizens and combating the illegal migration and other forms
of cross-borer criminality. According to the estimations by the Hungarian Border Guards and
several NGO activists human trafficking, forgery of official documents (visas and residence
permits), illegal entry and residence, and other offenses increased significantly. The number of
Ukrainian citizens committing the crime of human trafficking increased fourfold, while the
number of Ukrainian citizens illegally trafficked into Hungary increased more than tenfold.7
Hungarian position8 during this period of time confirms that territory and control over
the movement of people and goods remained important attributes of the state policy. In case of
Transcarpathia, territorial power exercised by the state was traded for more favorable position
to the EU, which resulted in Hungarians accession to the European club.
These re-bordering processes can be described in terms of a gradual shift from the
territorial power, which has been a basic attribute exercised by modern states to control and
dominate the flow of capital and information. As highlighted above, the criteria, which
determine the lines of separation and re-construct the borders, are based on power struggles
among different actors.
In the next section, I present an alternative view is that current developments can be as
well described by the metaphor of an emerging EU empire, which builds upon the state-centric
border epistemology. An increasing number of scholars are looking to models and metaphors of
empire to analyse and to unpack the complexity of current EU bordering practices. Empire is
a useful tool to conceptualise the external bordering processes of the EU (Weaver, 1997; Holm,
2006; Anderson, 2006; Christiansen, 2000; Zielonka, 2001; Browning, 2005).
Imperial borders did not operate to demonstrate areas of exclusive jurisdiction on the
basis of shared practices and mutual recognition on rights, but to keep the environment
safe through the establishment of clients and the control of trade. (Kratochvil,
1986:35).
The EUs desire for eastwards expansion under the ENP framework can be labelled as
soft imperialism. This use of the notion of empire detaches it from its traditional military
associations. It is not problems of military nature or territorial conquest that dominate bordering
discourse around New Neighbourhood. Rather, the question of soft security concerns such as
drugs smuggling, terrorism, people trafficking, arms dealing and asylum seeking are connected
to the EUs external bordering discourse. This new policy does not appear to be connected with
a politics of war, of geographical territory understood as a power resource.
According to Browning (2005:94), central to the notion of the metaphor are two
important points. First, Empire maintains the preservation of borders between self and other to
be crucial in constructing and protecting subjectivity. Second, the Empire notion illustrates how
the borders are not clearly defined and the centres control of the periphery has been
undermined, resulting in a certain de-centralisation of power and governance.
The ENP inevitably brings about asymmetric neighbourhood relations, which is a
strong source of European power politics allowing the EU to establish its rule through the
ordering policies in its zones of influence or interest (Emerson, 2003). In essence, The Union
uses conditionality as a strategic tool to impose the modes of governance and European Law,
which are often missing from the local or regional context (Joenniemi, 2006).

7
8

Based on anonymous interviews with different stakeholders.


It needs to be stressed out that Poland persuaded similar policy to its Eastern neighbour Ukraine.

115
Unbalanced and asymmetric power therefore enables the EU- Empire to impose its
understanding of borders and to re-define the lines of inclusion and exclusion, which often cut
across existing functional cross-border networks. This is the case in Transcarpathia where
borderland communities have traditional socio-economic and historical ties.
As Newman observes the criteria of exclusion and inclusion are determined by the
same power elites who usually act in their own political, economical and institutional interests
(Newman, 2006). Those who determine the lines of exclusion and inclusion are the same
colonial and imperial powers in Europe responsible in the past for many inter-ethnic wars and
conflicts (Newman, 2006). The recent consequences of European borders policies are obviously
not so dramatic. Still several studies point at negative socio-economic and political implications
for the new EUs borders to new neighbours.
An example of the asymmetric dependency is the regulation of cross-border mobility
on the external border of the EU. As already discussed-above in spite of critical voices from
new member states (Poland and Hungary) regarding the introduction of visas and the restriction
of local traffic with its Eastern neighbours, both countries had to comply with prescribed norms
by the EU. Their arguments for a flexible approach in cross-border regulations was rooted in
specific domestic policy priorities such as the negative socio-economic impacts on border
communities, which was evaluated prior to the introduction of new regulatory frameworks and
that proved to be the case. This top-down approach of border management has created rather
rigid structures with little room for discussions and manoeuvring for new member states, which
advocated for more flexibility, and permeability of the eastern borders.9 In this sense, borders
can be conceptualised as barriers and lines of exclusion, as demonstrated by the introduction of
visa regimes to the countries identified as security threats, particularly in the field of illegal
migration (black list). This raises ethical questions concerning a top-down management of
borders where interests and needs of those who are excluded are not taken into considerations.
According to Josef Borosz (2002), the power imbalance and desire of new member
states to join a prosperous and powerful core meant that the asymmetric relationship was
sustained. This asymmetric structure allowed the EU to govern in new applicants states
without economic punishment and or the use of military power. However, it needs to be
stressed that negative conditionality or disincentives are not ruled out by the EU.
The above-described asymmetric relationship operates within a core-periphery
framework, which has been criticised or even dismissed by several authors (Zielonka, 2001;
Scholte, 1996). Christiansen et al. (2000) argue that what emerges is an EU Empire where
power and subjectivity are focused on the centre, but the borders of which are becoming
increasingly fuzzy as the EU seeks to assert its presence in the near abroad. It is evident that the
EU has become focused on the concerns of the centre.
Some authors conceptualise the current constellation as a series of concentric circles
developing formally or informally around the power centre located in Brussels and being
dispersed outwards to varying and declining degrees (Zielonka, 2001; Weaver, 1997). Some
member states havent yet joined common policies such as monetary union, security policy or
the Social Charter (i.e. new member states). This concept of concentric circles is about degrees
of proximity as it is about participation in policy-making processes and regulatory spaces. The
ENP reconfigures these concentric circles, which depend on variety of factors prescribed by the
EU but also by the willingness of neighbourhood countries to cooperate in order to get closer to
the core. According to Christiansen and Joenniemi (1999:112) this conception of concentric
circles is in tension with the regionalist policies of the EU. As they argue attention to the
various dimensions of regionality could diminish as actors jostle for the attention of the centre.
The ENP itself emphasises inequalities between the established, democratic,
prosperous, stable Union and undemocratic, economically and socially underdeveloped

The same strategy was applied in new member states. Both Hungary and Poland argued during the
accession talks for gradual harmonisation and preferential conditions for their neighbours, particularly
Ukraine.

116
Neighbourhood. In other words, in contrast to EU rationality, order and cosmos, the
Neighbourhood is presented as a potential site of disorder, chaos and contamination. To
overcome these deficits and to keep the attractiveness of the core, the Union supports different
cooperative practices. The attractiveness of the EU Empire has tied new member states into a
system of concentric circles (Weaver, 1997), which however excludes New Neighbourhood
countries with very little, or zero, prospect of full membership.
It seems that new buffer zones are emerging through this policy of a ring of friends
(Prodi, 2002). It insulates the EU from what many describe as turbulent, chaotic spaces. The
ENP seeks to encourage neighbours to secure its borders and to govern according to the EUs
established practices (i.e. Schengen criteria).
Empires have their ideologies. In this sense, the ENP can be understood as a peace
project with the mission to increasingly expend peace beyond its borders. The ENP formulates
the aspirations of the EU as being to try to order economic and political space of neighbouring
countries According to Ole Weavers argument, empires seek to establish and maintain a zone
of peace to enhance trade opportunities and generate wealth (Weaver, 1997:63). These empires
sustain a range of relationships and levels of influence with surrounding states and populations.
Using Weavers terminology they influence outwards in space in terms of concentric circles of
influence and power.
There is important dimension to civilising the periphery and the impoverished
Neighbourhood countries. The enlargement and shift of the borders towards the East brings the
anxieties about the backward and barbarian East closer to the civilised EU. Boroszs (2002)
textual analysis of the accession documents for Hungary pointed out the presence of the
colonial topos of discovery in the exchange of information between the EU and accession
countries. He compares the EUs learning about the candidate countries to colonial discoveries
in uncivilised parts of world.10 Yet, Anderson and Bort reject this civilisation discourse arguing
that the EU involves the enlargement of a union of states, rather than an empire, but also it is
not the spread of a people or a civilisation across a continent. Additionally, EU enlargement
does not involve the spread of a people or a civilisation across a continent. The EU expansion
might diffuse certain norms, values and practices, but it leaves many others in place (Anderson
and Bort, 1998:143). In a similar way, Walters argues that the norms are no longer associated
with notions of civilisation but they are more neutral, technical and universal norms of political
and economic governance- form practices of financial regulation to standards of border control
(Walters, 2003: 688).
As highlighted above, the ENP provides a variable permeability of borders depending
if new incomers are considered to be threats to stability and prosperity of Empire. Several
authors use the notion of Roman limes to characterize the current construction of the EU
external borders (Holm, 2005; King, 1998; Walters, 2004).
The Romans did not consider limes as fixed in the landscape. They constituted rather
fluid zones- sphere of influence where both the Romans and the outsiders
intermingled in a kind creolisation/hybridization of culture. The outsiders could
therefore come and go if they did not contest the Roman political and military
dominance of the core (Holm, 2006).
The limes are more like an edge, fringe or limit (Walters, 2003). They materialise on
the edges of the EU as gated community. The idea behind the limes is to create around the
Empire zones of stability and peace. They are conceived not as a boundary but as a temporary
stopping place (Kratochvil, 1987). It is essentially the way to organise and sustain peaceful
relationships with Neighbourhood countries without their eventual subsumption. In this sense,
the task of the ENP is to draw these countries into a zone of stability and prosperity.

10

He refers to work of Anne McClintock on colonial discovery which she argues is a journey to a farflung region, asking the local inhabitants if they know of a nearby river, lake or waterfall, paying them to
take one there, then discovering the site., Borozs, 2000, p.870.

117
Nevertheless, there is a great source of tension among different actors. According to this
definition, the logic of limes can be also found in the ENP document: Securing borders and
effective border management is essential for joint prosperity and security. Facilitating trade and
passage, while securing European Union borders against smuggling, trafficking, organized
crime (including terrorist threats) and illegal immigration (including transit migration), will be
of crucial importance. (COM, 2003, 393 final). I see this attempt to conceptualize the external
EU borders in terms of Roman limes relevant to Wider Europe where securitization and
cooperation discourse meet in rather uneasy ways.
To conclude, the borders are confirmed and preserved via inter-governmental
agreements under close supervision and guidelines of the EU. At the same time, the borders are
continuously being transcended by those who are invited or by those who manage to find the
way. The balance of cross-border mobility and security becomes pressing within the framework
of New Neighbourhood Policy. I expect that my empirical research will show how far the
external bordering processes resemble to imperial borders.
3. Transcending the Borders
The second discourse of cross-border cooperation underlines the opportunities and
benefits deriving from new incentives for cross-border and regional cooperation Programmes.
This paradigm of regional cooperation is based on the assumption that economic and social
development of these disadvantaged border regions will spill over to other sectors and will
reduce the significance of the existing borders. Nevertheless, these funds devoted for crossborder cooperation are primarily channelled via the state institutions leaving very little room for
other agents. In other words, the borders or boundaries have different meanings and create
different opportunities or threats for various social actors, which in practice create series of
obstacles for the implementation of the regional policies and financial instruments.
There are at least two elements to cross-border cooperation discourse. First, it is crossborder or transnational flow, which goes beyond the control of the states or other international
institutions, no matter how much they try to do (informal cross-border cooperation).
Second, there are cross-border processes that are regulated, facilitated or supported by
state institutions or by different EU financial and legal instruments. The EU has been actively
engaged in stimulating cross-border and regional cooperation through different Programmes
and supportive mechanisms (DG Regional Policy), which further problematise the notions of
borders as barriers and hard border regimes. This promotion of cross-border economic
cooperation on the sub-state scales has been materialised in concrete strategies, frameworks and
financial instruments (i.e. INTERREG, PHARE, TACIS and CARDS) which aim to stimulate
development of cooperative networks across internal and external borders and to link these
networks to larger community networks.11 This approach to borders resonates with the NeoLiberal project of market building and regionalisation.
The debates on de/re-territorialisation have also challenged the modernist concept of
the state-borders as static and territorially bounded units. This cross-border cooperation
discourse is often framed in terms of a regionalisation/globalisation which however I find more
appropriate for the EU itself where the obstacles for mobility of people and goods were
removed (i.e. Schengen) than to those living on the edges. Hirst and Thompson (1995) point out
that, despite the rhetoric of globalisation, most of worlds people live in closed worlds, trapped
by the lottery of their birth. The impoverished and underdeveloped neighbourhood countries
seem to be still outsiders of the world of globalisation.
The major factor influencing this school of thought is the impact of globalisation and
the rise of the space of flows instead of the space of places to bordering processes.
Increasing cross-border interaction and cooperation is leading in many places to more porous or
11
The general aim of the regional policy of the European Commission (EC) is based on the premises that
border areas have been often neglected under national policies which resulted in their underdevelopment.

118
looser boundaries. The literature under the rubric of border transcending discusses changing
meanings of borders using the rhetoric flow or networks.
Some scholars participating in this discourse argue that the role of the sovereignty of
states has been undermined under the pressures of globalisation, deregulation or and
internationalisation of different policies and that states lost their absolute control over the
borders (Sassen, 1998). At the heart of these discussions is the question whether these crossborder processes are happening outside or through the state systems and what are their
consequences to the current state restructuring through the problems of territoriality and
sovereignty.
More recently, scholars have started to conceptualise the complexity of government
activities in terms of multi-level governance and policy networks implying that it is governance
rather than government which becomes the definitive feature of new polity (Perkmann, 1999;
Marks et al. 1996; Sparke, 2002). The cross-border governance approach resonates with space
of flows and with no clear hierarchy of power and competences. is relevant to my research them
while looking at the EUs cross-border and regional cooperation policies. The governance
approach can be described as situation whereby key regulatory capacities once of exclusive
domain of nation-states are pushed upwards (EU) and downwards to variety of local and
regional state and non-state actors (cities; regions; NGOs). This view is relevant to my research
them while looking at the EUs cross-border and regional cooperation policies and help to grasp
some mechanisms of border transcending.
First, let me briefly discuss the notion of multi-level governance, which is an entirely
new concept for highly centralized and bureaucratic states in the new Neighbourhood where
borders still represent the distinctive domestic and foreign realms of governance. According to
Marks and Hooghe, multilevel governance is defined by decentralized forms of interaction
between variety of actors; the EU, national governments, local and regional authorities and
variety of non-governmental organisations (Marks and Hooghe, 2001). The state power
therefore upwards to supranational agencies such as the EU or downwards towards the states
regional and local levels transcending traditional national problem-solving capacities.
According to this interpretation states still continue to operate as essential sites of
territorialisation of social, political and economic relations.
Marks and Hooghe argue that regional development and social policy funds are
depending on lower-level governments and the constellations of connections and interactions of
elected public officials (Marks and Hooghe, ibid). Furthermore, they distinguish between two
types of multi-level governance: 1) general-purpose governance and 2) task-specific
governance. The first one refers to the interactions of agencies with general-purpose jurisdiction
on local, county, regional, state or international levels. The second type is understood in terms
of cooperation in specific policy areas between different social or political groups.
It is expected that several contradictions and variations surrounding multi-level
governance (or rescaling) theories will emerge during the course of empirical research. On the
one hand, the national states still remain politically important and retain much of their national
sovereignty. On the other hand transnationalism and Europeanisation processes have decisively
weakened their power. This concept probably applies more to internal EU structures then to
Neighbourhood countries with heavily centralised institutions.
As defined here, reterritorialised state power can mobilise new forms of local or
regional regulation to promote cross-border cooperation and to provide a strategic space for
the emergence of new actors. This development gives the borders a new meaning of meeting
place, bridges or a resource as non-state actors enter the borders process. In relation to my
research, cross-border cooperation is a policy area that lies at the heart of the rescaling
processes or the shifting the scales of governance within the official EU discourse. According to
this logic, it is expected that new forms of sub- or supra-national forms of governance or
territorial organisations are being constructed.
The practices of establishing cross-border institutions such as Euroregions provide
examples of re-territorialisation, re-scaling governance or multi-level governance. There is a

119
vast literature, which discusses the problems and ambiguities surrounding Euroregions (Bort,
1998; Christiansen and Joenniemi, 1999; Scott, 1999; 2000; 2002; ODowd et al. 1995;
Perkmann, 1999).
In brief, the principle goals of the Euroregions are to gain acceptance as a focal point
for binational initiatives that address specific economic, environmental, sustainable tourism and
social and culture issues affecting respective cross-border regions (Bort, 1998; Scott, 1999). In
general, Euroregions can be described as voluntary associations without independent legal
identity, made up by municipalities or local governments independently from the national
governments. Their main goal is to act as a focal point for the solution of difficult
transboundary problems and to stimulate initiatives in a range of areas. Partners have equal
voting rights and the secretariat usually rotate across the border. This description the
Euroregions often evokes sense of transnational or multilevel community or cross-border
identity formation, particularly for those who argue that state borders do not matter anymore.
Undoubtedly, the Euroregions or other new cross-border institutions present a window of
opportunity to look at problems from local or regional perspectives and to use innovative
solutions or mechanisms, which were not there before.
This formulation is however problematic in centralised countries where local or
regional authorities lack the basic competences to form Euroregions and to carry out crossborder activities. James Scott (1999) calls this the evolution of a semi-administrative
European space, with new problem-solving capacities, albeit very limited decision-making
powers. In his comparison with North America he observes that European cross-border
cooperation has been characterised by administrative complexity, public sector dominance and
local dependence on cooperation incentives. Undoubtedly, the EUs funds help to stimulate
regional cross-border cooperation and networking but with serious limits. The administrative
complexity, length and complicated procedures and their centralised character are often
incompatible with local realities, particularly in Neighbourhood countries.
Summarizing research on Euroregions within the EU, Kramsch (2001) has suggested
that while specific projects have succeed, programmes of economic, political and cultural crossborder cooperation have fallen bellow expectations. Indeed, close empirical investigations12
have revealed that a vast number of Euroregions have limited decision-makers power, with a
highly bureaucratic and politicised character and high dependency on the EU or governmental
funds.
According to ODowd et al., the vast majority of border region initiatives came into
existence because of EU and intergovernmental funding but were hampered by the very
political and administrative system which encouraged them in the first place (1995: 278-279).
Only a small number of the Projects have been carried out on cooperative basis or partnerships,
which would continue after the ending of funding. Furthermore, states are in general unwilling
to hand over portions of their sovereignty and authority to local and regional actors, particularly
to institutionalised cross-border bodies. This raises question to what extent these practices of
cross-border cooperation challenge the existing power relations.
Preliminary research data collected in Transcarpathia supports the idea of similar
difficulties, resulting in a low trust of local communities for the Euroregion. It might be the case
that local communities have different or weaker interests in cross-border cooperation than their
political representatives.
At first glance, the cooperative networks increasingly operating at different scales and
across borders drive re-bordering and de-bordering processes within European space. As argued
by Walters, far from being transcended, physical space is reorganised and redeployed within
new control strategies (Walters, 2002). Under conditions of regional and cross-border
integration new forms of cross-border governance are created which turn state borders from
dividing lines between states into spaces of governance (Christiansen and Jorgensen, 2000). In
12
Based on my previous field research which was conducted in 2004 and 2005 with different stakeholders
in Nisa, Viadriana, Carpathian, Bug, Pomerania Euroregions in the border regions.

120
this context, we can conclude that the rationale of European Neighbourhood Policy is therefore
to facilitate cross-border cooperation and to generate new economic opportunities for the border
regions, which experience disadvantages being situated at the socio-economic peripheries. This,
in turn, opens space for more active and cooperative relations through promoting increasing
levels of cross-border cooperation. Borders can be conceptualised as the meeting points or lines
of interactions among different social groups. Despite these efforts to also accommodate the
views of outsiders such as Ukraine there have been already critical voices of being excluded
from decision-making.
This re (de)-territorialised discourse on borders seems to have limited implications in
the Neighbourhood. As argued by several scholars (Weaver, 1996; Browning, 2005) from the
perspective of the centre the EUs external borders should not be blurred or the authority of the
core challenged. Indeed, Weaver (1996:121) argues that any move towards decentralisation or
fragmentation is easily presented as an existential threat to the EU. This argumentation can
explain why most cross-border and regional initiatives are guarded and often top-down initiated
either from state or EU levels. Similarly, the ENP, which seeks to enhance inter-regional
cooperation, is paradoxically designed in bilateral way.
As already discussed the ENP emphasises on bilateralism and coherence. It takes a
guarded approach towards transcending borders. The EUs rhetoric on inclusiveness,
regionalism and openness clashes with its priority to secure the external borders from potential
threats to the Unions stability and prosperity. Walters refers to this situation as double
movement whereby the liberalisation of trade and finance is being accompanied by new
security threats and anxieties about borders, along with political demands and initiatives to
assert the power of the border (Walters, 2002). Browning (2005) labels this situation as
internal/external security paradox where the modernist understanding of borders clashes with
bolstering cross-border and regional networks. I suggest that the ENP is an example of this
security paradox or double movement, which creates, contested space among different actors
and their responsibilities and ideologies.
In spite of the accelerating tendencies towards transnationalism or economic
interdependency, the states remain the major actors in the Neighbourhood even if the meanings
of sovereignty are continually changing. Yet despite prevailing top-down domination in
decision-making local or regional actors situated at the frontiers are already empowered for
certain level of which often goes beyond the state control or institutions.
When two discourses clash with each other, it is generally the securitisation discourse,
which predominates. Additionally, securitisation often triggers informal cross-border networks
rather than the institutionalized forms of cross-border cooperation envisioned by the EU. This
raises questions as to whether the kind of cooperation created by the New Neighbourhood
Instrument can indeed be considered transnational.
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123

Municipal Administration of Spanish Protectorate Cities in Morocco


(1912-1956): A Model Subordinated to the Interests of Colonialist Policy1
Jos Luis VILLANOVA
Abstract: The colonial authorities of the Protectorate of Spain in Morocco organised
the administration of the cities under a model that took back precedents of the local
administration of the Empire that were characteristic of the municipal organisation of the
French area and also of the local Spanish legislation. Nevertheless, the different responsible
organisms of the municipal management had few attributions, they had not enough economical
resources and autonomy to exercise functions, and the colonial authorities controlled their
activity and the election of the citizenry representatives whom had excessive representation of
Spanish and Jewish people in front of the Muslim ones. In all, the municipal administration was
a simply extension of the government power and another instrument that served to the colonial
Spanish politics.
Key words: colonialism, geopolitics, Municipal Administration, Spanish Protectorate
in Morocco
1. Introduction
The establishment of the French and Spanish Protectorate in Morocco in 1912 was the
culmination of the hounding that the European powers had been refer to the Moroccan Empire
from the middle of the XIX Century2. This hounding was developed in a process characterized
by the application of new ways to dominate that conduced to the triumph of the European
Imperialism. In this context, the colonial power hoped to won their objective: the dominance of
the Maghreb and the Middle East countries in order to control their markets and also to get short
and sure routes of the Euroasiatic trade (Martn Corrales, 1996).
In the partition of the Empire, Spain obtained an area of 20.000 km in the North of
Morocco from outlet of Muluya River in the Mediterranean Sea till the Atlantic Ocean with the
exception of Tangier Region that was submitted to international administration of different
powers.
This work analyzes the evolution of the model of municipal government that Spanish
authorities organized to manage the operating and developing of the urban life in their
Protectorate, a municipal organization that also was one of the important elements to assure the
Spanish political control of the area.
In precolonial Morocco, the main cities were part of bled el-Majzen, a territory
controlled and managed by Majzen, i.e. subject to the direct and effective authority of the Sultan.
The administration of urban cores was characterized by a principle of strong centralization
(Basri, 1994, p. 13) and encompassed only basic functions: a governor basha assisted by
several officers who managed public services of a most elementary type. Over the territory
which
would
match
the
Spanish
protectorate
zone,
basha-s had been appointed in Tetun Tetouan-, Larache, Alcazarquivir Ksar-el-Kebir and
Arcila Asilah (Ghirelli, 1926).

Translation from Spanish: Isolda Rodrguez Villegas [isolda@epigramma.com.ar]


On this matter, see, for example Ayache (1956), Morales Lezcano (1976 and 1984), Julien (1978),
Ayache (1979, 1981 and 1996), Benjelloun (1988), Madariaga (1999), Nogu & Villanova (1999),
Rodrguez Mediano & Felipe (2002) o Villanova (2004 and 2006)

124
The basha, an officer designated and empowered by the Sultan, was responsible for the
citys administrative management and had to ensure compliance with dahr-s (Executive
Orders), enforce instructions and directives by Majzen, keep social order and collect taxes. A
basha was also invested with regulatory powers to organize the city and acted as a judge in
criminal and commercial matters. The remaining structure of this rudimentary and schematic
local administrative arrangement included a group of mostly technical officers: muh,tasib
(responsible for the urban police and the control of markets, prices, weights and measures, and
the enforcement of fines for infringements related to these matters), nadr administrator of
Habs property, amn (responsible for tax matters), qd and muqaddam (a representative of
basha in neighborhoods) (Cordero Torres, 1942-1943, vol. 1; Ben Mlih, 1990).
The basha was a governing authority; hence, it can be asserted that municipal functions
were not performed by local and specific agencies with their own personality and resources.
Therefore, there was no differentiation between local public services and central Majzen services
(Cordero Torres, 1942-1943, vol. 1).
2. The First Municipal Administrative Agencies
Just a few months after the Spanish Protectorate had been established, and based on the
foreseeable development of urban life, Protectorate authorities decided to organize a municipal
administrative scheme which would reflect the scarce available data from the former local
administrative structure and some characteristics of the organization established by the French
on their own Protectorate zone.3 Spanish municipal regulations completed this picture (Garca
Figueras, 1949).
In June, 1913, the State Minister4 suggested to the Spanish High Commissioner in
Morocco the creation of Juntas de Servicios Locales (Local Services Boards) in the cities on a
test basis and while the establishment of city councils was resolved. Bearing in mind the
Ministers suggestion, Juntas de Servicios Locales were set up in Tetun the Protectorates
capital city , Larache, Alcazarquivir and Arcila pursuant to a Dahr dated June 16, 1913. These
juntas were responsible for sanitation, hygiene, cleaning and urbanization matters, and were
composed of a President (who was a Khalfa5 delegate) and an indefinite number of members:
technical Spanish members and representatives of the three communities in the city (Muslims,
Jews and Spaniards).6
The fact that the majority of junta members were Spanish was seen with mistrust by
the local population. Existing protests gave rise, three years later, to a proposal by the High
Commissioner to the State Minister that population representatives at the juntas be three
Muslims, one Jew and one Spaniard, according to the ratio of city inhabitants (62%, 22% and
16%). The High Commissioner would not be disquieted by an increase in the number of
Moroccan junta members because the Spanish community was broadly represented by its
officers. Furthermore, he considered that most Muslims would easily accept Spanish authorities
as these were proposed by the basha, whose decisions were overseen by the Indigenous Affairs
Delegate.7 The Minister accepted the proposal that the Muslims should occupy most of the seats
based on their high number of inhabitants, but he considered it essential that the Spanish
3
On this matter, see, for example, Cassinire (1924), Colliez (1930), Ben Bachir (1969) and Ojeda Garca
(2000, pp. 256-333)
4
The State Ministry was a metropolitan agency conducting the Spanish colonialist policy over the
Protectorate until 1924; this function was later performed by the Governments Presidency
5
The Khalfa was the top political and religious authority over the Protectorate, representing the Sultan
6
A High Commissioners Order dated June 16, 1913 and the Junta By-laws completed the composition of
these Junta (Boletn Oficial de la Zona de Protectorado de Espaa en Marruecos [The Spanish
Protectorate Zone in Morocco Official Gazette], 1913, pp. 478-482). The other three juntas were formed
in a much similar way to that in Tetun
7
In the other cities, actions by the basha were supervised by the Spanish consul (Royal Order dated
January 24, 1916)

125
community be advocated as it represented a higher social value (Archivo General de la
Administracin del Estado [General State Administration Archive], M. case file IX-A-1).
Under a Dahr dated August 17, 1916, the composition of juntas was reorganized so
that the population should be represented by three Muslim, two Jewish and two Spanish
members.8 Although Moroccan representatives outweighed the Spanish ones, the above stated
opinions of the High Commissioner should not be forgotten, as well as the fact that designations
were strictly controlled by Spanish authorities and that the Jewish population might not share the
same interests as the Muslims.
A Vizierial Order dated that same day established an election system for such junta
members as would represent their respective communities: Muslim principal citizens before the
presence of basha had to choose three clusters of three candidates each and the High Vizier
whose decisions had to be ratified by the High Commissioner9 would appoint one member per
neighborhood; Jew heads of the family selected two three-candidate clusters under the direction
of the Israeli Community President and before the presence of the Spanish consul so that the
High Vizier could appoint the two relevant junta members; additionally, the High Commissioner
appointed the two Spanish junta members from the three-candidate clusters prepared by the
Spanish local citizens directed by the consul and the representative of the Trade Chamber
selected from the three candidates proposed by this Chamber.
Dahr-s dated December 11, 1917 reorganized the other three juntas, the composition of
which was quite similar to that in Tetun, although the number of members was fewer on
account of the smaller number of inhabitants in these cities (Vizierial Orders dated December
11, 1917).10
This led to the result that the Spanish and Israeli communities were over represented in
these four cities. The Israeli community was fostered by the High Commissioners Office as the
High Commissioner wished to strengthen a bond with a segment of the Moroccan population
which kept the remembrance of their origin alive after their expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula
in 1492 in order to take advantage of that segment to facilitate colonialist penetration.
The system to elect peoples representatives allowed for a limited popular participation.
The people could only propose candidates, and the High Vizier whose decisions were overseen
by Spanish authorities jointly with the High Commissioner appointed junta members. Results
were not always as expected, however, and sometimes Spaniards who were critical of the policy
developed in the zone were designated. The High Commissioners Office did not want juntas to
become political forums and, in May 1926, this Office declared the elections that had been
carried out in Larache to form the three-candidate cluster for the Spanish community null and
void because freemason and anti-monarchiqual representatives had been elected. As similar
developments had taken place in Tetun, the High Commissioner recommended that consuls use
indirect means [] to destroy any malicious attempt to perform crafty tricks and conspiracies
and adopt timely measures discreetly so that a certain number of Spaniards could vote for
previously selected candidates. This did not seem to be a difficult mission as it was not essential
that shortlisted candidates should gain the highest number of votes. It was only necessary for

The population in Tetun was composed by 11263 Muslims, 4250 Jews and 3006 Spaniards. The Junta
additionally included the basha (President), the muh,tasib, the amn el Mustafad, a Khalfa Muslim
representative, the President of the Israeli Community, the Spanish consul (Vice-President), one architect,
the local Sanitation Chief, a High Commissioners delegate, a representative of the Indigenous Affairs
Delegate, and a representative of the Spanish Trade Chamber
9
The High Vizier was the Chief Administrative Officer of Majzen, invested with regulatory powers and
entitled to perform such functions as were delegated to him by the Khalfa, who appointed him at the
proposal of the High Commissioner
10
In Larache, two junta members represented the 6848 Muslim citizens, one represented the 2199 local
Jews and another one represented the 3608 Spanish local inhabitants. In Alcazarquivir, two representatives
were elected among the 8492 Muslims, one among the 1623 Jews and an additional one among the 591
Spaniards. In Arcila, one junta member was appointed to represent each community: 1382 Muslims, 442
Jews and 525 Spaniards

126
them to be included in the relevant three-candidate clusters (Archivo General, boxes M-1437
and 1459, and M. case file IX-A-2).
In connection with junta functions and their internal organization, the By-laws
governing the Tetun Junta (Boletn Oficial de la Zona [The Spanish Protectorate Zone in
Morocco Official Gazette], 1913, pp. 478-484) empowered this body with the implementation
and performance of sanitation, hygiene, cleaning, urbanization and all other services typical of
any City Council (section 1). The Junta President convened and presided over meetings; signed
agreements, ordinances, proclamations and all other executive provisions (section 5). The High
Commissioners Office, however, enjoyed the power of accepting Junta budgets, by-laws, and
ordinances (section 2).11 Therefore, the Juntas autonomy was a fully restricted one.
Juntas quickly started to issue ordinances and proclamations.12 Owing to inexperience,
though, many provisions were passed which were highly dissimilar from a formal point of view.
In February 1915, the Indigenous Affairs Delegate, who was responsible for inspecting the
juntas, ordered consuls that they forward a copy of passed proclamations and adopted
agreements to their colleagues in other cities as it was advisable that all provisions should be
consistent with each other, at least to a certain extent. A final solution could not be found,
however, until a Vizierial Order dated October 19, 1935 set forth the publication of a Local
Gazette containing all provisions applicable to the juntas issued both by the High
Commissioner's Office and the juntas themselves.
The Disaster of Annual in 1921, the war devastating the zone until 1927 and the
inefficiency most junta members did show resulted in a stagnant municipal life. In 1923, the
Indigenous Affairs Delegate requested consuls to conduct a complete survey with the purpose to
reactivate municipal action. In 1925, the Civil Contrle Director13 proposed to enhance the
juntas autonomy by updating their internal By-laws (Archivo General ..., box M-1454 and M.
case file IX-A-1), but the High Commissioners Office did not adopt the required measures and
would not publish the first Municipal By-laws until 1931. During the war, only one additional
urban junta was established in Nador (Dahr dated December 23, 1922).14
In 1927 an increase in the number of Spanish immigrants, who settled mostly in the
main population cores, was favored by the full domination of this zone.15 The growth of these
towns gave rise to the establishment of new juntas in Chauen Chaouen- (Dahr dated February
1, 1928) and Villa Sanjurjo16 Al-Hoceima (Dahr dated April 14, 1928).17 They were qualified
as autonomous bodies by both dahr-s, but all agreements reached by these juntas had to be
previously accepted by the High Commissioner. Additionally, although junta Presidents were

11

The rules governing the other juntas were very similar and were passed on close dates.
For example, see the Ordinance on cattle slaughtering in Tetun, the Ordinances on constructions in
Larache and Arcila, or the rules governing urban constructions in both cities (Boletn Oficial de la Zona
, 1913, p. 443 and 1914, pp. 10-11, 264-266 and 572-578).
13
A Royal Order dated July 12, 1924 entrusted the inspection of municipal bodies to a new Civil Contrle
Directorate.
14
Nador had grown thanks to the strengthening and diversification of economic activities and the
existence of military barracks. As from 1931, it was elected capital city of the Eastern Region, which
meant a new leap forward for this city, but its evolution did remain conditioned by its proximity to Melilla,
the actual capital city of this area (Bravo Nieto, 2000).
15
For more information on Spanish immigration in this zone, which was never profuse, see, for example,
Bonmat Antn (1992, pp. 245 and 250-251) and Aziza (2003, pp. 151-156 and 200-209).
16
This city was named Villa Alhucemas between 1932 and 1936.
17
The High Commissioners Office also organized juntas in other towns. We have only focused on such
urban cores as were considered cities before the establishment of the Protectorate (Tetun, Alcazarquivir,
Larache, Arcila and Chauen), and on Nador and Villa Sanjurjo. These two towns were created during the
Spanish occupation, and the High Commissioners Office elected them as capital cities of the Region. For
more information on the territorial organization of the Protectorate, see Villanova (2004, pp. 247-287).
12

127
officially invested with executive powers, their actions had to be supervised by local
contrleurs,18 who had to issue a first instance approval of proclamations, edicts and provisions.
The composition of these new juntas and the system to elect junta members
representing the population were quite similar to those used by preexisting juntas but, as no
basha-s had been appointed in these towns, Villa Sanjurjo and Chauen junta Presidents were
Muslims appointed by Majzen and, in Nador, this office was performed by the q'id from the
qbila in Mazuza, where the city was located.19
Until the Municipal By-laws were passed (1931), provisions applicable to local public
assets were not sufficiently explicit or organized. The High Commissioners Office had
established the economic autonomy of juntas (Dahr dated January 1, 1916), but this aim could
not be attained because the income of juntas had not been clearly identified and because of the
difficulty to collect taxes, municipal duties and levies. These circumstances forced Majzen to
grant subsidies and assign fees to juntas so that they could face their daily obligations20 and
perform works and jobs that could not be covered by their ordinary budgets.21 However, these
budget line items were only good as a temporary solution to a problem which had not been
approached with the required decisive attitude.
Most budgetary difficulties arose by the reluctance of neighbors to pay taxes. In July
1917, the Indigenous Affairs Delegate claimed that many affluent residents did not pay the
Urban Municipal Duties in Tetun, especially the Europeans and protected22 Moroccans.
Effective relevant measures were not adopted and this Delegate reported again on this case five
years later (Archivo General ..., box M-1454).
3. The First Municipal By-laws and their consequences
The first Municipal By-laws were adopted in May, 1931 (Dahr dated May 6, 1931), in
the month following that when the II Spanish Republic was founded; however, a draft had
already been drawn up by the authorities of the former rgime (Archivo General..., box M-1222).
These By-laws which meant a leap forward if we consider the former fragmentary provisions,

18
Section 21 of the Internal Rules of Procedure governing the Protectorates administration (Royal Order
dated January 24, 1916) had set forth that the contrleur should be appointed by the Spanish government
at the suggestion of the High Commissioner in cities without a consul.
19
In Nador, two junta members from each community were elected to represent the 1551 Muslims, 321
Jews and 2810 Spaniards who lived there. In Chauen, two junta members were also elected to represent
each community. The Muslim population was composed of 5411 citizens, the Jewish population
comprised 113 citizens, and the Spanish population, 536. In Villa Sanjurjo, only four Spanish junta
members were elected to represent the 4458 inhabitants of this community. No Jews lived in this city and
Muslims were just 289.
20
For example, under a Dahr dated May 16, 1916 a subsidy was adopted for the Larache Junta because
its budget was insufficient to cover city needs.
21
That is how the slaughterhouse was built, the stronghold was cleaned up or other municipal works were
performed in Arcila (Dahr-s dated December 5, 1917; November 5, 1919, and March 29, 1922);
embellishment, sanitation or urban improvement works were performed in Alcazarquivir (Dahr-s dated
January 26, 1918; December 14, 1918; and March 29, 1922); a dispensary was set up, water was provided
to the Supply Market and urban improvements were carried out in Tetun (Dahr-s dated March 18, 1918;
May 22, 1918; and March 20, 1919); or urban works were performed in Larache (Dahr dated September
23, 1922).
22
The right of protection was established in the 19th century under some treaties signed between
Morocco and foreign powers and was regulated by the Madrid Conference (1880). Exercising this right
entailed immunity of jurisdiction: inapplicability of Moroccan laws and placement under the protection of
foreign representatives and their respective national laws. This right applied not only to the citizens of
these countries, but it was abusively extended to several sectors of the Moroccan population serving
diplomatic and consular agents as well as European merchants (Berramdane, 1987). After the Protectorate
was established, the creation of French and Spanish courts entailed a progressive disappearance of this
right (LLord OLawlor, 1952). For more information about protection in Morocco, see Kenbib (1996).

128
although they did not include the whole local administrative matter23 were largely inspired by
the Spanish model. Nonetheless, they were intended to reflect the peculiar characteristics of this
zone (Cordero Torres, 1942-1943, vol. 1, p. 217). In general terms, they maintained the
structure of the 1929 project. Reinforcing the control on the juntas exercised by the Civil
Contrle Directorate and contrleurs was one of the main changes introduced by these By-laws.
This restriction granted a more democratic character to the election of local representatives: in
order to become a junta member, an individual included in a three-candidate cluster needed to
win the highest number of votes in an election. The introduction of a direct election system was
the result of the democratic principles prevailing in Spain during the Republic and the demands
from Moroccan nationalists.24 However, the absolute lack of democratic tradition in Majzen and
the erratic, contradictory and short-sighted policy of Republican authorities would give rise to
numerous problems, election suspensions, and dissolution of juntas.
The main urban cores were described as city councils by these By-laws, under which
their management was entrusted to Juntas Municipales (Municipal Boards) (section 1). These
Juntas Municipales would be established or dissolved under Vizierial Orders (section 3) and
were composed of a President -the basha or the q'id-, two Vice-Presidents a Spanish one and a
Muslim one, a certain number of members elected as local people representatives, and a series
of members with a technical character (a municipal engineer or architect and the Local
Sanitation Inspector) who occupied these positions on account of the office they held in town
(section 4). The President was appointed under a dahr; Vice-Presidents were selected by and
among such junta members as had been elected by the population and were confirmed by a
Vizierial Order. Junta members elected by the population were nominated from as many threecandidate clusters as representatives of each community should be and headquarter authorities
had to appoint the person who had won the highest number of votes (section 7). The
constituency had to be composed of Spanish or Moroccan legally adult subjects having lived at
least for one year in the electing town. Candidates nominated for election were required to be
literate and should not have any direct interest in the junta or owe any municipal funds (section
9). These last conditions were intended to prevent reportedly corrupt junta practices, but this
goal was not successfully attained. Three-candidate clusters were formed under the surveillance
of the President, the contrleur and the Israeli Communitys President, depending on the
community in question: Spanish junta members were selected by secret vote and the Moroccan
ones, pursuant to local habits or the provisions established by the High Vizier (section 10). Thus,
it was possible to use more than one system to elect Moroccan members.
These By-laws established clear-cut presidential powers in addition to those which had
already been vested upon the President, who now had to: preside over the tenders for the award
of municipal services and works; grant or deny building permits; inspect municipal services and
administer municipal services assets; account for budget administration; take care of all urban
police matters and enforce laws and resolutions issued by higher authorities (section 12). The
President, however, would not have full autonomy to perform these functions since he was
strictly supervised by the contrleur, who would control sessions, inspect municipal services, act
as a link with other administrative agencies, ensure strict compliance with laws and by-laws,
suspend municipal agreements when he deemed it appropriate; supervise administrative
management matters; issue approvals on accounting matters and payment orders; grant licenses
to open commercial stores, and make juntas abide by provisions in force (section 13).
Juntas had exclusive competence on the governance of the peculiar interests of
populations (section 16), but on a very restricted basis. These By-laws specifically entrusted
juntas with responsibility for the registration of individuals on the municipal population register,
23
For example, the Inspeccin de Entidades Municipales (Inspection of Municipal Bodies) was established
in 1934 (Dahr dated October 25, 1934) and the General Rules of Procedure for Municipal Officers and
Civil Servants was adopted in 1937 (Dahr dated September 14, 1937).
24
A few weeks after the inauguration of the Republic, eight hundred nationalists addressed a letter to the
President of the Republic claiming for reforms, among which the organization of free municipal elections
was included (Ibn Azzuz Hakim, 1980, cited in Benjelloun, 1988).

129
community services (public road maintenance, urban and rural police, hygiene, fires), sanitation
and charity work, and the draw-up of an urban enlargement plan, all of which had to be
completed not later than a two-year term (sections 29 to 36). The High Vizier, however, after
hearing a Civil Contrle Directorate report, was to adopt the rules of procedure and budgets to
be used by the juntas; authorize sales, exchanges, and assignments of property; property
purchase transactions; and the award of works in excess of certain quantities (section 17).
Agreements were adopted by juntas under a majority of votes (section 24).
In order to meet their obligations, juntas were authorized by the Municipal By-laws to
collect such taxes as would be accepted under a Vizierial Order. A Vizierial Order dated October
22, 1931 set forth a large series of taxes, fees, municipal duties and levies that could be collected
by juntas. If additional items were to be added or monetary amounts were to be changed, these
should be approved by the higher officers after receiving a report from the Public Assets and
Civil Contrle Directorates (sections 2 and 71 of the Municipal By-laws). The evident
decisiveness to deal with economic issues was favorable for the juntas to reach a budgetary
balance -although sometimes this balance was the result of the little activity performed by some
juntas- and even to have a surplus result in certain years. Existing surpluses were allocated to
extraordinary budgets and credit supplements to complete projects for which budgets had already
been used up.
In terms of economic standing, it can be highlighted that the juntas could be under the
protection of the High Commissioners Office when, for instance, they had had a deficit
budgetary condition for three consecutive years or a 33% budgetary deficit in any one year and
could not guarantee payment for three years (section 56). In these cases, the contrleur prepared
a dossier and the High Vizier would resolve the matter after hearing the reports from the Public
Assets and Civil Contrle Directorates (section 57). Under the protective rgime, any junta in
this situation was dissolved, and the contrleur and a municipal officer would draw up a
rehabilitation budget (section 57). After the problem had been solved, a new junta was set up
(section 58).
One of the issues with which these By-laws did not deal was the number of junta
members who would represent the three communities. In August, 1931, the High Commissioner
noticed that this number could not be established on a proportional basis owing to a remarkable
imbalance favoring the Muslims;25 therefore, he proposed that Spanish junta members equal in
number the representatives of the two Moroccan communities. The High Commissioner believed
that Spanish members would represent Spanish interests and that they were better prepared for
"election and municipal administrative matters"; thus, they could act as guides for Moroccan
members (Archivo General..., box M-1986).26 Under a Vizierial Order dated September 23,
1931, the number of junta members elected by the population was established in line with the
High Commissioners proposal.27 This distribution acted as a positive discrimination for the
Spanish community in Tetun, Alcazarquivir, Larache, Chauen and Arcila, whereas the Muslim
community was favored in Villa Sanjurjo. The Jewish community was favored in all juntas to
the detriment of the Muslims.
After deciding upon a suitable number of junta members, the High Commissioners
Office called municipal elections in September, 1931. The electoral campaign and elections
25
By mid 1930s, there was a majority of Muslim population in Chauen (89%), Alcazarquivir (82%),
Arcila (65%), Tetun (60%) and Larache (58%). Conversely, the Spanish population was larger in
Alhucemas (93%) and Nador (60%) (Direccin General de Estadstica [General Statistics Directorate],
1942, p. 28).
26
Not all Spanish officers shared this opinion. The Chauen local contrleur proposed that the participation
of Muslim members in the junta be two thirds as an exceptional condition owing to the small number of
Spanish residents in the city; the High Commissioners Office rejected this suggestion on the grounds of
insufficient cause (Archivo General ..., box M-1458).
27
Junta members who represented the three communities (Muslims, Jews, and Spaniards) were: 8, 2 and
10 in Tetun; 7, 2, and 9 in Alcazarquivir; 5, 1 and 6 in Larache; 6, 1 and 7 in Chauen; 3, 1 and 4 in
Arcila; 2, 1 and 3 in Al-Hocema; and 2, 2 and 4 in Nador.

130
turned out to be very confusing and agitated in some cities on account of the efforts by
Moroccan nationalists and different Spanish ideological groups to win the highest number of
public offices. A poorly defined election system only made matters worse. In order to avoid
public political struggles, the Civil Contrle Director had recommended contrleurs that public
rallies should not be authorized since elections had a purely administrative and not a political
character. Political meetings were held, however, and tension grew rapidly. In Larache,
arguments broke out between two Muslim groups: the majority, affluent and prestigious senior
families and a very small but vociferous minority under nationalistic influence, the contrleur
claimed. The election of Spanish junta members was also uneasy (Archivo General ..., boxes M1217 and 1458).
Additionally, these By-laws had not established a system to elect Moroccan junta
members; they had only stated that they should be elected pursuant to local habits or as provided
for by the High Vizier. Thus, elections were performed in a traditional way in Larache and
Arcila: by acclamation of those present and the approval of native authorities; in
Alcazarquivir, conversely, this election was carried out by secret vote to choose between two
Muslim candidates. The contrleur claimed that the latter was a truly disastrous system because
Majzen officers had prevented such individuals as were inclined to support the alternative list
from placing their ballot papers in the ballot box. This serious irregularity originated much
tension and the contrleur criticized the implementation of such radical reforms because he
considered it dangerous to grant certain concessions to the natives as, if the Europeans find it
difficult to grasp the concept of FREEDOM, we can not know where we would end up if
doctrines and liberties should reach the natives which cant be assimilated by their primitive
intelligence. The contrleur ended his report saying that the High Commissioners Office had
lost the concept of where we are and what the Protectorate is (Archivo General ..., box M1217). This attitude reflected the frame of mind of colonialist supporters, who showed little
respect for the Protectorates principles and who, furthermore, used to reject the existence of a
democratic system in Spain.
Election results were also contested in other towns. Tetun workers claimed that the
contrleur had granted permission for votes to be casted beyond the established voting hours and
had allowed individuals who were not included in the municipal population register to
participate in the election. Several members of the Federation of Industrials and Merchants of
Villa Alhucemas filed complaints with the High Commissioners Office stating that they lacked
representation in the Junta as the three Spanish candidates elected as junta members were from
two left-wing lists. In their opinion, this result caused a social imbalance in administrative
matters which might have far-reaching consequences in future commercial and economic
developments, even entailing capital flight. The contrleur supported this group and proposed
the inclusion of an additional Spanish member so that the Junta should be representative of all
sectors and ideologies, without any decisive majority, which would guarantee an excellent and
smooth administrative management (Archivo General ..., boxes M-1454 and 1986). The unease
of all complaining parties reflected the political tension created by these elections and revealed
that the High Commissioners Office had failed to avoid the voicing of disagreements with the
colonialist policy as well as the transfer to the Protectorate of ideological disputes developing in
Spain so as not to create a suitable climate for the success of nationalistic demands.
After the elections, juntas performed quite poorly due to administrative mismanagement
and the corruption of some junta members. Nonetheless, the model established by the Municipal
By-laws is not to blame. This situation had also occurred before the By-laws were passed.28 The
28

In 1923, the Nador Junta President was forced to resign from office on account of his excesses and
abuses. The local contrleur had reported that he claimed to have governing and legal powers, spoke
directly with Melilla authorities without resorting to the required link represented by the Contrle Office,
ordered unauthorized expenditures and did not take care of municipal issues. In 1925, the Civil Contrle
Director reported that most junta members were only a nuisance, that they just defended friends and
relatives, and took advantage of their public office. In 1926, the Director reported that the Alcazarquivir
Junta showed bureaucratic flaws, that its account keeping was completely untidy, and that it depended

131
Civil Contrle and Indigenous Affairs Directorates29 accused many juntas of not holding
ordinary meetings within the required timeframe, submitting minutes which had not been signed,
abandoning responsibilities, granting concessions in an irregular manner, changing the budget in
an anomalous way, approving works without any previous project or budget, appointing staff
irregularly, etc. These bodies also complained against numerous junta members for not attending
meetings, taking advantage of their public office to award concessions under very beneficial
conditions either to themselves or family or friends, defaulting on payments owed to the junta or
reducing the amount of their municipal contribution.
Administrative irregularities sometimes resulting from imprudent behaviour30 and
corruption were the arguments used to dissolve the Juntas in Alcazarquivir, Tetun, Nador, or
Villa Alhucemas (Vizierial Orders dated March 16, 1932; October 11, 1932; June 18, 1934; and
October 10, 1934). These were replaced by interim juntas or management commissions, the
members of which were appointed at the suggestion of contrleurs. On many occasions,
however, these bodies did not succeed in redressing the activity of the municipal administration
either.31
The reasons explained by the High Commissioners Office to dissolve juntas used to be
pretexts hiding the true: political unease and the disagreement of many junta members with the
municipal policy (Benjelloun, 1988).32 Inadequate actions by contrleurs, whose major mission
was to monitor performance by the juntas, added to this situation.
Implementing an election system for junta members let citizens who disagreed with the
Spanish colonialist policy participate in these bodies. Juntas became real political fora where the
High Commissioner's Office could be criticized and increased municipal autonomy was sought
for. Some junta members even resigned because they disagreed with the policy implemented in
the zone and other members left their seats due to the chaotic character of junta meetings
(Archivo General ..., M. case file IX-A-1). Resignations paralized the action of juntas as the
number of junta members left was insufficient to adopt agreements and take care of obligations.
These circumstances led to the replacements of the Arcila and Larache Juntas by interim
management commissions (Vizierial Orders dated October 10, 1932, and August 29, 1933).
Facing a highly confusing municipal situation, the Indigenous Affairs Delegate
proposed reforming the Municipal By-laws based on the fact that results had been little
promising mostly due to an inborn desire of the Spaniards who live in this Protectorate Zone to
do politics and establishing an agency which would exercise direct control over the
management and performance of local bodies (Archivo General ..., M. case file IX-A-1 and box
M-1461). Under a Dahr dated October 25, 1934, the Inspeccin de Entidades Municipales
(Inspection of Municipal Bodies) was set up, reporting to the Indigenous Affairs Delegation
(section 1), the specific missions of which were to monitor compliance with the Municipal Bylaws and all provisions and rules applicable to the juntas; review, approve or annul the minutes
of meetings and agreements; and report on budgetary matters (section 2).
Nationalists were concerned about the reinforcement of junta monitoring by the High
Commissioners Office. Therefore, at the beginning of July, 1936, they collected signatures as
they wanted Moroccan junta members to become a majority, elections to be performed by secret

heavily on its personnel. For example, the municipal veterinary acted as a collector and did not make any
inspections at all (Archivo General ..., boxes M-1336, 1454, 1469 and 1472).
29
The Indigenous Affairs Directorate -later to become the Indigenous Affairs Delegation- replaced the
Civil Contrle Directorate in junta monitoring functions during the Republican period.
30
The judge who was in charge of putting together the file case to identify individuals accountable for the
actions by some Tetun Junta members considered that irregularities were rather due to imprudent
behavior than to bad faith (Archivo General ..., case file IX-A-1).
31
For example, the Indigenous Affairs Delegation complained that members of the Tetun Management
Commission did not take care of their responsibilities. This was due to weariness, since members thought
they had been elected for a short term and some of them had been forced to accept office (Archivo General
..., box M-1445 and M. case file IX-A-1).
32
These seem to be the reasons why the Chauen Junta was dissolved in 1935 (Salas Larrazabal, 1992).

132
vote, Presidents to be elected by junta members and the High Commissioners Office not to
prevent the implementation of adopted agreements (Archivo General ..., box M-2444).
4. The Municipal Policy of Franquists Authorities
Power takeover in the zone in July, 1936 by the military forces supporting the coup
dtat entailed fast consequences on municipal life. Shortly afterwards, the Tetun, Arcila and
Alcazarquivir Juntas (Vizierial Orders dated July 29, 1936; September 24, 1936; and November
10, 1936) were replaced by management commissions formed by supporting rgime members. It
was a typical characteristic of these commissions to have a higher number of Moroccan
community representatives and to elect these members under a traditional election system. For
example, the Tetun Commission was formed by four Moroccan members appointed by Majzen
from the three-candidate clusters created by the principal citizens of the different neighborhoods
before the presence of basha; two Jewish members elected by the High Commissioners Office
from two three-candidate clusters presented by the Jewish community; and four Spanish
members appointed by the High Commissioners Office from a three-candidate cluster prepared
by the Trade Chamber, another one formed by the Owners Association and two other clusters
submitted by the local contrleur (Vizierial Order dated July 29, 1936). Franquists authorities
granted a more numerous representation to the Moroccan community with the aim of winning
over this population;33 it should not be forgotten, however, that Majzen suitably monitored
continued designating the winning candidates and that the Inspeccin de Entidades Municipales
had to approve any agreements adopted by the juntas. Furthermore, the democratic traces in this
provision were quickly swept away. Under a Vizierial Order dated December 28, 1936, the
Tetun Commission was reorganized and the Indigenous Affairs Delegation was instructed to
present the members to be appointed by Majzen and the High Commissioners Office after
receiving a list of Muslim candidates proposed by the basha and a list of Jewish and Spanish
members proposed by the contrleur (section 4). In order to compensate the Muslim community
for this, this Order determined that the number of Muslim members should now be increased to
ten and that Spanish members should be decreased to three (section 3).
These changes made it apparent that Franquists authorities used to legislate on an
improvised basis during these years. The need to establish a local legal framework in accordance
with their political line required drawing up new Municipal By-laws, but the complexity of this
task made the adoption of these By-laws very difficult. The need to implement at least minimum
local life regulations was urgent, though, so such sections of the current By-laws as were more
inconsistent with the new rgimes ideology were modified under a Dahr dated May 8, 1941.
This Dahr established that juntas would now include the muh,tasib (President), the local
contrleur (Vice-President), a certain number of representatives of the existing communities and
several technical advisory members, without a right to vote. The reason why the muh,tasib
instead of the basha would hold the Presidents office was that the municipal and government
functions were intended to be separated. Then, the purely administrative character of the juntas
would be reinforced. In addition, the election of population representatives as junta members
would be made by Majzen and the High Commissioners Office pursuant to the following rules:
Muslim owners would present three-candidate clusters for half of the offices before the presence
of basha, while candidates for the other half would be proposed by the trade unions uman',
also under the form of three-candidate clusters before the presence of the muh,tasib; the threecandidate clusters for Jewish members would be presented by the community Council; and
three-candidate clusters for Spanish members would be presented by the Local Headquarters of
Falange Espaola Tradicionalista (Traditionalist Spanish Falange) and J.O.N.S. and the

33

The Protectorate was the true rear guard of Franquists during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).
Therefore, the new authorities wished to guarantee peace at all expenses and win over the support of the
native population.

133
delegations of Central Nacional Sindicalista (National Trade Union Bureau) or, failing that, by
the contrleur.
This Dahr did not place any restrictions on the juntas powers; it even expanded their
authority to approve expenses up to 25,000 pts. and relieved them from making any consultation
on legal actions for evictions and monetary complaints arising from rental agreements applicable
to estates owned by the juntas (section 4).34 This improvement was more illusory than real,
however, since the contrleur powers were highly reinforced. The contrleur, to the Presidents
expense, assumed the capacity to preside over sale auctions and all municipal service and works
award procedures, as well as the urban police management. In addition to these powers and those
vested upon him by the 1931 By-laws, the contrleur would also inspect municipal services and
works, adopt applicable measures in extremely serious cases (epidemics, floods, public order
disturbances, etc.), penalize municipal employees, enforce fines for non-compliance with
municipal ordinances, and penalize disobedience and disrespect to his investiture and that of
junta members or public officers (section 3).
Last, this Dahr dealt with matters relative to local public assets, which had caused
enough problems: a Municipal Funds Supervisor public office was created (section 5) and an
Accounting Administrative Department was organized to examine budgets, incomes, and
payments; issue reports arising from budget modification requests; and provide advice to the
Inspector de Entidades Municipales on these matters (section 6). This helped strengthen
surveillance on the juntas economy.
Before the new Municipal By-laws were published, the High Commissioners Office
and Majzen set forth some other provisions concerning local life. Among these, it is worth
highlighting that the operation of Health-Sanitation Services in the main cities was handed over
to Majzen (Dahr-s dated January 19, 1939; March 31, 1939; May 25, 1939; and November 2,
1939) and Supply Services were awarded to the juntas (High Commissioners Ordinance dated
March 17, 1942). The transfer of Health-Sanitation Services was due to a political interest in
fostering a sanitary action based on Tetun. On the other hand, concessioning Supply Services
was more of an effective than an efficient measure as, in fact, the Inspeccin de Entidades
Municipales assumed control of these services and the juntas just followed the instructions
issued by that body.
Finally, new detailed and extensive Municipal By-laws were adopted under High
Commissioners Ordinance dated August 19, 1942, showing the influence of the Spanish
Municipal Rules of Procedure and Municipal Law (Cordero Torres, 1942-1943, vol. 1). These
By-laws described as major city councils all urban cores having more than 2000 inhabitants
(section 1) among which all cities were naturally included and set forth that they would be
managed by Juntas de Servicios Municipales (Municipal Service Boards) (section 2) which
would be established, changed or dissolved under Vizierial Orders (section 4).
These By-laws did not change the juntas composition or the system to elect Moroccan
junta members, although they did establish that the contrleur should personally create the
Spanish three-candidate clusters (section 24). Conversely, they updated some conditions to be
met by junta members: they should be males and older than 25 years of age (1931 By-laws had
established 23 years old as the required minimum age and did not mention anything concerning
the male condition of candidates, although we do not think female members were ever elected)
(section 28). The new By-laws also set forth that individuals involved in legal or administrative
conflicts with the juntas could not be elected to hold office, as well as relatives of the Auditor of
Municipal Funds and of the Service Chief (section 29).
After these By-laws were adopted, most juntas continued to be composed of an
imbalanced number of members representing the three communities, generally in favor of the
Spanish and Israeli citizens.35 Later, this imbalance became even stronger in favor of the Spanish
34
The 1931 Municipal By-laws restricted the juntas authority to approve expenses up to 10,000 pts. and
required consultation by the juntas on every legal action.
35
For example, in Larache, in 1942-1943, four Muslims represented the 28211 members of this
community, one Jew represented the 2228 Jewish community inhabitants and two Spanish junta members

134
community when the number of Spanish junta members was increased by the addition of one
representative for the Trade and Industry Chamber and another representative for the Urban
Property Chamber, as was the case in Arcila, Larache or Tetun (Vizierial Orders dated January
30, 1945; February 16, 1945; and February 27, 1945). This decision must have been influenced
by pressures from Spanish merchants and owners at a time when the High Commissioners
Office fostered several urbanization plans. Protests by nationalistic groups, however, forced a
reorganization of these juntas. The increase in the number of Spanish junta members in Tetun
was offset by the appointment of two additional Muslim members (Vizierial Order dated June 2,
1953).
These new By-laws restricted the Presidents powers even more for the benefit of the
contrleur. This officer, in addition to the powers he already enjoyed, would now be the Chief of
the Municipal Administrative Office and Manager of Local Interests, and, additionally, would
supervise administrative management issues handled by the President and could authorize all
matters under the Presidents competence; he could order payments; disapprove of, review, and
approve budgets; solve any complaint concerning the municipal population register; convene
extraordinary meetings; grant a secret character to these meetings when dealing with public
order matters, the honorable reputation of the junta or any of its members or employees; grant
licences to junta members to leave town for more than twenty days; and forward the meeting
minutes to the Inspeccin de Entidades Municipales (sections 20, 35, 36, 39, 44, 52 and 53).
These By-laws established that the juntas would be the sole body in charge of the
governance, development, management and administration of the material and moral interests
of towns (section 54), but previous approval from the Inspeccin de Entidades Municipales had
to be secured in all matters regulated in 1931 and 1941, as well as to perform forceful
expropriations and transfer services to municipal control and operation (section 55). They also
described in detail the minimum obligations these juntas were to fulfill which, in addition to
those established in 1931, included: supply and inspection of water services; vaccines;
cemeteries; foodstuff analysis in cities having more than 10,000 inhabitants; public lighting
system; fostering the construction of economic houses; vehicle traffic; enlargement of towns;
making of monthly statistics (marital status, markets, prices, slaughterhouses, works) and of an
annual report (sections 59 to 63). The Inspeccin de Entidades Municipales could meet these
obligations if not discharged by the juntas (section 57). The protective scheme in force was
barely changed by these new By-laws.
Most By-law sections (102-322) dealt with local public assets, which were fueled by
revenues arising from municipal equity or the sale thereof, subsidies and donations from Majzen
or individuals; municipal levies; assignments authorized by Majzen, and the income from the
services now under municipal operation and control (sections 129, 148-170, and 172). The
largest portion of this income originated from indirect taxes, municipal duties and a share of
Majzen taxes. The small income from direct taxes was due to the reluctance of citizens to pay
these taxes and an obscure payment enforcement procedure.36
After these By-laws were published, the Administrative Headquarters adopted multiple
provisions of a smaller scope slight changes to the number of junta members, establishment of
new by-laws (slaughterhouses, location of industries, etc.) and new taxes or tax adjustments,
modification of municipal boundaries or service regulations and some other provisions dealing
with more significant matters. In general, the latter were intended to increase the restrictions
represented the 10847 local Spaniards. In Arcila, the ratio was the following: two Muslims for 8757
Muslim citizens, one Jewish junta member for 677 Jewish citizens and two Spanish members for 1335
Spanish citizens. This was not the case in Villa Sanjurjo, where three Muslim junta members were elected
on behalf of 5086 Muslims, one Jewish representative on behalf of 147 Jewish citizens and two Spanish
members on behalf of 5517 Spaniards.
36
Subjects from Spain or from such countries as had withdrawn from the capitulation rgime were applied
a procedure similar to that enforced in Spain: native authorities exerted pressure on Moroccan individuals
pursuant to traditional rules and methods, and foreigners from countries which had not withdrawn from
capitulations were pressed by their respective consular courts (Garca Camacho, 1952).

135
imposed on the autonomy of juntas, speed up their operation and provide them with additional
economic resources so that they could afford the increasing expenses arising from urban
development.
City growth was quite chaotic37 although the 1931 Municipal By-laws had required that
juntas should adopt a city enlargement plan and several measures regulating the expansion of
some cities had been approved. The High Commissioners Office stated that these issues could
not be entrusted to the free competence of juntas not only because of the mistakes they had
already made, but also because cities should meet certain standardised esthetic criteria. With
these arguments in hand and the aim of fostering and regulating urban development, the High
Commissioners Ordinance dated September 2, 1942 organized a Junta General de
Urbanizacin (General Urbanization Board) and Juntas Locales de Urbanizacin (Local
Urbanization Boards) in such towns as had more than 5000 inhabitants. This Junta General was
composed of the High Commissioners Office General Secretary (President) and several Spanish
technical members (section 2), and centralized all matters relative to the draw-up of urbanization
plans in those towns (section 1). Studies developed by this Junta were required to be approved in
person by the High Commissioner (section 8). Parallel to this, juntas locales de urbanizacin
reporting to the Junta General were set up composed of Spanish technical members, the basha
and the muh,tasib (section 3). These juntas had only an advisory character: they could state their
opinion on projects having a direct impact on their affairs, but these opinions could be
disregarded by the Junta General (section 7). Furthermore, they actually lasted for a short time
as a High Commissioners Ordinance dated May 18, 1952 dissolved them upon considering that
their mission overlapped that of the Juntas de Servicios Municipales. This decision may have
been driven by the aim to exercise more centralizing and controlling powers as all Moroccan
authorities were separated from urban layout functions.38
Furthermore, the growing economic needs to be met by the juntas made them publish
several measures intended to increase their income. With the aim of making collections easier, a
Vizierial Order dated December 13, 1947 authorized juntas to appoint executive agents who
would be responsible for the follow-up of payment enforcement procedures against debtors. This
measure, however, proved to be insufficient and the passing of a Dahr dated October 4, 1952
was necessary to set up the Fondo de Corporaciones Locales (Local Corporations Fund) for the
juntas to be able to establish, enlarge and improve public services (section 1). The advance
payments granted by this Fund had to be reimbursed by the juntas (section 4). In that same year,
a Dahr dated December 15, 1952 authorized that the portion payable to Majzen of some taxes
be granted to the juntas, as well as some tax rises and the establishment of new taxes intended to
supplement their income. This Dahr required the suppression of some levies or the lowering of
some rates (section 5) in order to lighten this growing tax pressure on city inhabitants. Thanks to
these measures, almost all junta budgets could show a surplus result as from 1953.39
Last, the need to speed up the activity of juntas in main cities made it advisable to
provide them with a less numerous body than its full body, which should be available to hold
meetings more frequently in order to solve urgent matters and take care of economic issues.
Under a High Commissioners Ordinance dated January 19, 1953 a Permanent Commission was
set up for the juntas in Tetun, Larache, Alcazarquivir and Nador, consisting of the muh,tasib,
37
Tetun's deficient development may be a good example to illustrate this situation. The Report
accompanying Tetuns Urban Layout Plan (High Commissioners Ordinance dated May 20, 1944)
acknowledged that this creation had not been brilliant for lack of ability to think of an all-embracing
perspective and of suitable urbanization projects: access points from Ceuta and Ro Martn were
deficient, the rail access was unsuitable, the barracks site was inappropriate, free spaces were
sparse, an architectural criterion was absent and the urban layout, non-existent.
38
The control exercised by the High Commissioners Office on urban matters had already been enhanced
some years before. Under a Dahr dated May 19, 1944 the powers of the Junta General were extended to
include the plan performance period, over which the Junta General could authorize partial projects and
carry out urban layout inspections (section 1).
39
See Instituto Nacional de Estadstica (National Statistics Institute) (1955, 1956 and 1957).

136
the contrleur and three elected members who should attempt to represent the existing
communities (section 1). This Commission was responsible for the organization of the
Collection and Treasurers Office Services, works and services contracts not exceeding one year,
the designation of officers and employees, the licences granted to transfer and open industrial
and merchant establishments, the development of economic management according to available
budgets and the exercise of legal actions (section 3). It is true that the establishment of this
Commission turned management more agile, but it also reduced the powers of the full junta body
where a larger number of members representing city inhabitants was present as their
agreements were actually effective (section 4).
In spite of all this effort, these provisions failed to invigorate the juntas activity. In their
defense, however, we should point out the difficulties to collect taxes, the small size of
municipal boundaries,40 the money owed to Majzen, price rises, an increase in the number of
officers and their salaries, the rapid growth of cities where almost everything was still to be
done, and the distance existing between many elected junta members and most of the population,
which considered these juntas as a mere extension of the governing power (Trujillo Machacn,
1948; Garca Figueras, date uncertain and 1953). Furthermore, as in other politicaladministrative spheres of the Protectorate, permanent doing and undoing actions which
werent always adjusted to actual needs affected local legislation. This showed the influence of
political motives alien to the local sphere and a little realistic administrative conception by the
High Commissioners Office (Cordero Torres, 1942-1943, vol. 1, p. 211). Other important
elements were that contrleurs could not fully understand the actual purpose of juntas -they
prevented juntas from using the minimum autonomy granted to them by law-41 the carelessness
shown by some contrleurs and the corruption of certain junta members and officers (Archivo
General ..., boxes M-344, 2377 and 2379 and Garca Figueras, date uncertain).
References
1. Anuario Estadstico, 1954. Zona del Protectorado y de los territorios de soberana en el
Norte de frica, Madrid, Mara Gmez, 1956
2. Ayache, Albert, Le Maroc. Bilan d'une colonisation, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1956
3. Ayache, Germain, tudes d'histoire marocaine, Rabat, Socit Marocaine des diteurs
Reuns, 1979
4. Aziza, Mimoun, La sociedad rifea frente al Protectorado espaol de Marruecos (19121956), Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2003
5. Basri, Driss, La dcentralisation au Maroc. De la commune la Rgion, Paris, Nathan, 1994
6. Ben Bachir, Said, L'administration locale au Maroc, Casablanca, Universit Mohammed V,
1969
7. Ben Mlih, Abdellah, Structures politiques du Maroc colonial, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1990
8. Benjelloun, Abdelmajid, Approches du colonialisme espagnol et du mouvement nationaliste
marocain dans l'ex-Maroc khalifien, Rabat, Okad, 1988
9. Berramdane, Abdelkhalek, Le Maroc et l'occident, Paris, Khartala, 1987
10. Bonmati Anton, Jos Fermn, Espaoles en el Magreb, Madrid, Editorial Mapfre, 1992
11. Bravo Nieto, Antonio, Arquitectura y urbanismo espaol en el Norte de Marruecos, Sevilla,
Junta de Andaluca. Consejera de Obras Pblicas y Transportes, 2000
12. Cassini Assinire, H., Les Municipalits Marocaines. Leur dveloppement. Leur lgislation,
Casablanca, Imprimerie de la Vigie Marocaine, 1924
13. Colliez, Andr, Notre Protectorat Marocain. La premire tape, 1912-1930, Paris, Librairie
des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1930

40
For example, in 1954, Villa Sanjurjo municipal boundaries were 8.5 km2, those of Chauen were 7.50
km2 and Nadors, less than 7 km2 (Instituto Nacional de Estadstica, 1956, p. 28).
41
In their defense, we should point out that the education received by contrleurs was inadequate and
belated. See Villanova (2002 and 2006) for more information on the training and education of contrleurs.

137
14. Cordero Torres, Jos Mara, Organizacin del Protectorado espaol en Marruecos, 2 vols.,
Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1942-1943
15. Direccin General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadstico. 1941. Zona del Protectorado y de los
territorios de soberana en el Norte de frica, Madrid, Grficas Snchez, 1942
16. Garca Camacho, Santiago, Los Municipios marroques, frica, n. 129-130 (1952), pp. 2022
17. Garca Figueras, Toms, Los Municipios en nuestra Zona de Protectorado, 1949, texto
mecanografiado
18. Ghirelli, Angelo, El Norte de Marruecos. Contribucin al estudio de la zona de protectorado
en Marruecos septentrional, Melilla, Artes Grficas Postal-Exprs, 1926
19. Ibn Azzuz Hakim, Mamad, Ouatk tach-had, Rabat, Imprimrie de la Cte, 1980
20. Instituto Nacional De Estadstica. Anuario Estadstico. 1952-53. Zona del Protectorado y de
los territorios de soberana en el Norte de frica, Madrid, Mara Gmez, 1955
21. Julien, Charles-Andr, Le Maroc face aux imprialismes, 1415-1956, Paris, Editions Jeune
Afrique, 1978
22. Kenbib, Mohammed, Les Protgs: contribution l'histoire du Maroc, Rabat, Facult des
Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1996
23. Llord OLawlor, Manuel. Apuntes de Derecho Administrativo del Protectorado de Espaa en
Marruecos, Tetun, Editora Marroqu, 1952
24. Madariaga, Mara Rosa de, Espaa y el Rif. Crnica de una historia casi olvidada, Melilla,
Ciudad Autnoma de Melilla & U.N.E.D., 1999
25. Martn Corrales, Eloy, Al Bei i la poltica espanyola davant la Mediterrnea musulmana.
In Museu Etnologic (ed.). Al Bei. Un pelegr catal per terres de l'Islam, Barcelona, Proa,
1996, pp. 61-76
26. Morales Lezcano, Vctor, El colonialismo hispano-francs en Marruecos (1898-1927),
Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1976
27. *** Espaa y el Norte de frica: el Protectorado en Marruecos (1912-1956), Madrid,
U.N.E.D., 1984
28. Nogu, Joan; Villanova, Jos Luis (eds.), Espaa en Marruecos (1912-1956). Discursos
Geogrficos e intervencin territorial, Lleida, Milenio, 1999.
29. Ojeda Garcia, Raquel, La distribucin territorial del poder en el proceso de
descentralizacin en Marruecos: nuevos equilibrios y viejas tensiones, Doctoral Thesis,
Granada, Universidad de Granada, 2000
30. Rodrguez Mediano, Fernando; Felipe, Helena de (eds.), El Protectorado espaol en
Marruecos. Gestin colonial e identidades, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientficas, 2002
31. Salas Larrazbal, Ramn, El Protectorado de Espaa en Marruecos, Madrid, Editorial
MAPFRE, 1992
32. Trujillo Machacn, Francisco. Entidades municipales, in Delegacion de asuntos indgenas,
Conferencias desarrolladas en la Academia de Interventores durante el curso de 1947,
Tetun, Imprenta del Majzen, 1948, pp. 107-128

33. Villanova, Jos Luis, La formacin de los interventores en el Protectorado espaol en


Marruecos (1912-1956), in Fernando Rodrguez Mediano and Helena de Felipe (eds.), El
Protectorado espaol en Marruecos. Gestin colonial e identidades, Madrid, Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas, 2002, pp. 247-280
34. *** Les origines de la guerre du Rif, Rabat & Paris, Socit Marocaine des diteurs Reuns
& Publications de la Sorbonne, 1981
35. *** La guerre du Rif, Paris, LHarmattan, 1986
36. ***. Cartas a los Interventores, d. u. [1952-1956], texto mecanografiado
37. *** Miscelnea de estudios varios sobre Marruecos, Tetun, Editora Marroqu, 1953

138
38. *** Ultimo Anuario Estadstico. 1955 Zona del Protectorado y de los territorios de
soberana en el Norte de Africa, Madrid, Mara Gmez, 1957
39. *** El Protectorado de Espaa en Marruecos. Organizacin poltica y territorial, Barcelona,
Bellaterra, 2004
40. *** Los interventores: la piedra angular de la poltica colonial espaola en Marruecos,
Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2006

139

Why was the 20th century warlike?


Frank R. PFETSCH
Abstract: The article describes the occurrence of wars during the centuries of modern
times, especially of the 19th and 20th century. Three main findings can be mentioned: first, as to
the high numbers of wars, the first half of the 20th century is a continuation of the second half of
the 19th century where national power politics dominated government actions of the leading
powers. Second, as a result, the numerous so-called peace treaties were concluded in the spirit
of forced upon arrangements. Especially the Parisian peace treaties after World War I were
means of revenge and not at all pacifying measures. Such unfinished peace agreements led
the ground for most of the wars thereafter. Not only can World War II be seen as a result of
such a diktat but also the warlike rearrangements in the second half of the 20th century. Third,
by considering some of Kants reflections on peace, the article gives an explanation by way of
non-compliance to six conditions which must be fulfilled in order to achieve durable peaceful
situations.
Key words: centuries of war, diktat, negotiation, conditions of peace
1. What images shape the 20th century?
The image imposes itself: The devastating two World Wars of the past century, the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Kosovo make the last
century appear warlike. If one calculates that there were about 100 million dead (WW I 7.9m,
WW II 37m), 20 million refugees and exiles and figures the costs of wars to about 7, 74 trillion
US dollars (exchange rate Aug. 30th 2000) the century takes on almost dreadful proportions. Is
this image of massacres of nations and exodus the label of the last century or can other names
be applied to the century?
The outstanding events in Europe naturally are the two World Wars, the proclamation
of the Soviet Union following the Bolshevik revolution, the world economic crisis, the seizure
of power of Mussolini and Hitler, the Iron Curtain, the foundation of two German states, the
building of the Wall and the fall of the Wall followed by German unification. The years of the
student revolt are still present in memory as well as the murder of presidents and religious
leaders. Natural and human catastrophes are present on TV-screens and shape our memories of
the century.
The 20th century has received two contrasting designations: On the one hand, it has
been called the most dreadful century in the history of the West (Isaiah Berlin), the century
of massacres and wars (Ren Dumont), the most violent century (Ploetz) or the century of
disasters. The century of extremes has brought the most terrible increase in world
population (Ernst Gombrich) and has destroyed all illusions and ideals (Yehudi Menuhin).
On the other hand, it has also been the century of revolutions to the better, with the
advancement of the fourth estate and the appearance of women after centuries of suppression
(Rita Levi Montalcini), and the century of technical progress (Severo Ochoa) and electrical
technology (Raymond Firth) and it is connected with the victory of the ideals of justice and
equality (LeoValiani); finally, the century left behind a legacy of speechlessness and the
always new attempt to understand (Franco Venturi) (quotes from Hobsbawm 1998: 15/16).
No wonder that the past century has received quite different designations and
classifications. Following periods can be identified: The Thirty Years War, meant as the
period from the beginning of World War I to the end of World War II 1914 to 1945; the
Golden Age (Hobsbawm) of economic prosperity in Western democracies as well as in

140
Eastern planned economies, lasting from the years of the economic miracle starting in the
1940s up to 1973 (collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the first OPEC crises in
1973). Reinhart Koseleck (1999) identifies the East-West confrontation as the most dominant
constallation of the century. This worldwide civil war seized most parts of the globe. The
period of contrasting ideologies, also known as ideological civil war of the 20th century, starts
with the foundation of the Soviet Union in 1917 and ends in 1989/1990 with the implosion of
the Soviet system. Hans Ulrich Wehler identifies the century in the trade off between
democracy and market economy and suggests an epoch designation era of social democracy.
The American historian Charles S. Maier talks about the long 19th century from 1789 until
1914 and the short 20th century from 1914 to 1989. Here, nation state, democracy and
industrialisation become important criteria for the modern age. Maier also suggests using the
development of geopolitical and politico-economical spheres as criteria. According to this, the
epoch of global territorial development came to an end in the 1980s (FAZ 20.01.2000). The
fascist and communist regimes of the century allow us to designate the century as Century of
Totalitarianism or Ideologies of Totalitarianism. Dan Diner (1996: 3-10) identifies the time
before and after totalitarianism as a continuation of traditional national power politics as
practiced in the 19th century. The 20th century has also been called the German century that
begins with German aspirations for world power in the post-Bismarck era and ends with the
defeat of Nazi Germany.
Such divisions in periods describe the century from very different points of view,
coined by economical, social, ideological or power conflicts. This enumeration shows that a
calendar is a questionable measure for a historical chronology. Historical events and processes
are not conforming to the Julian calendar.
The point of view in my analysis of the 20th century focuses on conflict and cooperation in their extreme characteristics of war and peace. In doing so, states and their
understanding of politics are crucial. Additionally, international organisations and nongovernmental actors came along to influence conflicts.
2. Empirical evidence of wars
How does the 20th century appear in the light of warlike conflicts, keeping in mind that
the century has been characterised by wars and massacres, violence and world civil wars? What
theoretically founded and empirically assured statements can be made?
First of all, a definition of war should help. According to Niccolo Machiavellis
History of Florence war is related to violence and destruction: one cannot speak of wars,
if no men are killed, no cities are raided, no states are destroyed (Machiavelli: History of
Florence V, 1). The Heidelberg project of conflict research, KOSIMO, uses the following
description to collect its data: Wars are conflicts with fighting of at least two opponents with
organized, regular military forces that last for a considerable period of time and leads to victims
and destruction, and in which the number of victims and the scope of destruction is high
(Pfetsch/Rohloff 2000:32). Using this definition for empirical inquiry it can be shown in a first
overview that a global analysis of conflicts leads to more differentiated view than is the case
from an European or Western outlook. During the 20th century there have been changes at least
in parts of the world regarding the perception of war and peace. Also the handling of warlike
conflicts has changed accordingly.
According to the Western perspective1 the observable conflicts suggest that we divide
the century into two halves. Until the end of World War II the style of political action was
1

In modern times, at least ten major wars have been taken place: the Italian Wars 1494-1516, the
Netherlands Independent War 1572-1578, the Thirty Years War 1618-1648, the wars of Luis XIV. 16671714, the wars of the Augsburger Alliance 1688-1697, the Spanish War of Succession 1701-1714, the
Austrian War of Succession 1740-1748, the Seven Years War 1756-1763, the Napoleonic Wars 17921812, World War I 1914-1918 and World War II 1939-1945 (Levi: 1985). The decade following the end
of the East-West-Conflict with 15 new wars, most of them in Europe, can be regarded as relatively violent.

141
dominated by politics of national power and prestige, i.e. countries believed that political
controversies had to be dealt with pressure or military means. According to this so-called
Realpoltik war was considered to be a tolerable means of politics, even though the BriandKellog-Pact proscribed war. The myth of indivisible national sovereignty did not allow for
those involved abandoning this myth in favour of peaceful solutions. The last major war in
Western Europe after 1945, the Greek civil war, was still dominated by these thoughts. Since
then, a new pattern of conflict coverage has won recognition in this part of the world. The
integration of states and their involvement in a new mutual system of politics have led to a
peaceful solution to centuries-old conflicts. Hand in hand with the establishment of
intergovernmental patterns of politics came the establishment of democracy in Western states.
No more wars between democratic states have been fought since. The change of paradigms
from confrontational national power politics to co-operative regional politics and politics of
integration has been brought on by the failure of the zero-sum politics of two World Wars and
has led to the success of positive-sum politics with gains through co-operation instead of losses
through confrontation.
Regarding conflicts on a global scale, the 19th century and the first half of the 20th
century seems to be dominated by the imperial politics of the European colonial powers and
these politics were in deed global. The world empires of Great Britain and France as well as the
colonies of the Dutch, the Belgians, the Spanish and the Portuguese included almost all
countries of the later so-called Third World. Until the end of World War II imperialism and
rivalry between Western-European great powers has been the dominant formation in these
countries. Thereafter, the United States took over the dominant role from Western-European
countries. The Soviet Union came along after gaining influence beyond the Euro-Asian
continent. This formation, however, has been less extensive than that of the Western imperial
powers. Numerous former colonies, which became independent, have not been directly
influenced by the East-West conflict. The Organisation of Non-Aligned Nations (even though
they were closer to the Eastern superpower) aimed to be independent from any bloc. Whether
this has been successful or not is another question. The Non-Aligned movement, less important
today, found its organisational form in the Group of 77, which to date has more than 130
members. These nations have not been a direct part of bloc-building between East and West,
and explicitly did not want to. Only sporadic interventions by proxies took place. This means
that a great number of states has not been involved in the northern hemispheres conflict
between East and West.
The confrontations of the superpowers provide additional information about the range
of the East-West conflict. During the Cold War they faced each other in 49 conflicts; most of
them international and violent disputes (cf. Pfetsch/Rohloff 2000:160). If these conflicts are
restricted to the same territory, the superpowers only 33 times confronted each other in
conflicts among third countries or in their territories. Five times, they have been directly
confronted in air and see clashes. Compared to the total number of nearly 700 conflicts in the
post-war period, superpower conflicts have been limited. The superpowers even stood on the
same side in five conflicts: in the conflict of Indonesian independence, in the conflict between
Saudi-Arabia and Abu Dhabi, in the conflict between Sri Lanka and Rhodesia as well as in the
war between Kuwait and Iraq. The direct confrontation as well as the indirect support of
opposing parties through superpowers do not establish the only determining conflict pattern.
Even if counting the so-called wars by proxy the picture does not change that much. In such
wars the superpower itself stays in the background. Most familiar examples are the eleven
interventions of the Soviet ally Cuba in Africa (i.e. Ethiopia, Angola, etc.) or the US-allied
groups of the Contras in Nicaragua. The behaviour of the superpowers in the Security Council
of the United Nations proves that the antagonistic rivalry has diminished since the 1970s, at a
point of time where spheres of influence have been almost settled and respected.
How limited the European perception is can be seen by the warlike involvements
during times that the Europeans generally consider peaceful. The era between 1815 and 1914,
which Henry Kissinger has praised as the era of European equilibrium, saw 420 wars. That

142
means more than four wars per year. In the short time span of 18 years between the two World
Wars (1920 to 1938) 145 wars have been counted. That is twice as much as in the era of
European equilibrium. These periods were not as warlike for Europe, but were for the rest of the
world. This statement does not at all contradict the calculations of Pitirim Sorokin, who labelled
the 19th century, compared with preceding and succeeding centuries, as being very peaceful (cf.
Graph 1). His index, describing the extent and importance of wars and based on 100 of them for
the 15th century, amounts to 370 for the 18th century, 120 for the 19th century and for the first
half of the 20th century to even 3080 (Sorokin 1937, in Wright 1937: 237). Quincy Wright,
another important American war researcher, confirms that according to his calculations the 19th
century was not the most warlike with 215 wars compared to the 17th (239 wars) and 18th
century (149 wars). The inter-European wars declined during the last centuries but the imperial
wars increased (Wright 1937: 640-654). The 19th century shows clearly its imperial character
with 60 wars outside and 29 inside Europe (Wright 1937: 651). This data proves that the
European view and the here perceived violence are highly selective and do not represent the
wide spectrum of violence in the world. The same holds for the East-West conflict, which, as a
big social and ideological formation, surely has included Europe and many other parts of the
world; but there have been many countries outside the spheres of influence of the superpowers.
Table 1: Sorokin (violence index, basis 15th century = 100)
century

18th

19th

20th

index

370

120

3080

Graph 1: Distribution of wars according to centuries


century
wars

16th

17th

18th

19th

20th

60

100

67

394

460

132 (19th/I)

362 (20th/I)

262 (19th/II)

98 (20th/II)

500
450

2 0 th /II

400
350

wars

300

1 9 th /II

250
200

2 0 th / I
150
100

1 9 th / I

50
0
1 6 th

1 7 th

1 8 th

1 9 th

2 0 th

ce n tu ry

Calculations per century shows that the first three centuries of modern times there was
a total of 227 wars (1500-1599 = 60, 1600-1699 = 100, 1700-1799 = 67). This lies below the
two subsequent centuries with a total of 862 wars (1800-1899 = 394, 1900-1999 = 460). The

143
distribution over the two halves of the 20th century is admittedly uneven: while counting 362
wars in the first half only 98 wars have occurred in the second half (Graph 1).
The 20th century saw more wars than the preceding centuries, but the first half was
much more violent than the second. This is even more astonishing, if one considers that the
number of countries more than quadrupled after 1945 and that this means more possible
attackers and defenders.
The 19th century shows an unequal distribution as well, but in inverted order: in the
second half twice as many wars took place than in the first half. According to this statistic the
20th century is linked to the 19th century. The violent second half of the 19th century is followed
by the even more violent first half of the 20th century. During the second half of the 20th century
even fewer wars took place than during the first half of the 19th century. A decrease in the
number of wars can be clearly identified since the mid-20th century. The conflicts suggest that
the first half of the 20th century is to be seen as a continuation of the 19th century and the
preceding centuries. National power politics dominated the thoughts of politicians until the end
of World War II. The conflict calendar should span from the middle of the 19th century to the
middle of the 20th century and not from century to century. It can be said that the span of time
between the Crimean war of the 19th century and World War II in the 20th century was the most
warlike hundred years of the last millennium and, therefore, this period can be labelled as the
era of European wars or era of wars fought by European states. Subsequently, the Western
hemisphere was dominated by the so-called democracy or OECD peace. The periphery of
Europe, Africa, Asia and the Islamic world is still dominated by traditional national power
politics.
Some striking empirical results characterise the second half of the 20th century:
The number of conflicts has increased, but not at such a rate as the number of states
increased. Secondly, the number of new conflicts is declining and thirdly, violence tends to be
receding.
Most frequently involved in conflicts have been Great Britain, the USSR, the USA,
France and China; most frequently involved in wars have been Great Britain, India, China,
France, and Iraq. Intervening external powers have most frequently been the USA, the USSR,
France, Great Britain and China.
Most conflicts have been counted in the Middle East, followed by sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia. Wars have been noticed most frequently in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and
the Maghreb. More than half of the conflicts with highly violent potential occurred between
countries in the southern hemisphere.
The type of war has altered: Until the end of the 1960s international conflicts have
predominated (cf.graph 2).
Graph 2. Violent Domestic and Interstate Conflicts

144
Since the 1970s, domestic conflicts have replaced the international conflicts. For this
reason classic border and territorial conflicts have lost importance. Minority conflicts and
demands for religious and cultural self-determination have characterised the modern type of
conflict. Non-governmental actors have taken over government positions. In general, violent
conflicts declined and non-violent conflicts increased.
The number of casualties is substantial: About 30 million (highest estimate) lost
their lives including ever-higher numbers of civilians. Their share of war victims increased from
the end of the 1970s from about 53 percent to about 74 percent in the 1980s and finally to about
90 per cent in the 1990s; during the Kosovo war hardly any soldier died, only civilians.
Militarily, wars have most frequently ended indecisively; a victory of the aggressor
occurred only in 18 percent of the cases, whereas 28 percent of the wars ended with defeat.
Thus, 20th century can be seen as having two faces: The first half of the century was
dominated by national power and control politics based on the dogma that power interests of
each country are the highest of all goals and that this can only be reached through confrontation
(Morgenthau 1933:4-16). The desolate results of this behaviour led to a rethinking at least in
Western Europe for primarily three reasons: First, the understanding has grown that national
welfare cannot be increased through confrontation but through co-operation. Not confrontation
but co-operation has brought welfare gains. Second, European integration as a new order is a
result of the understanding that no European state involved in the World War - neither winner
nor loser - could have played a dominant role. Third, the readiness to give countries their
sovereignty resulted in the exertion of influence by an external actor: The economic reconstruction of Europe and the inclusion in the liberal free-trade system has foremost and above
all a result of American aid. The Europeans followed by founding the European organisations.
3. What can explain the violent behaviour in the 20th century?
Numerous theories explain the violent behaviour of the last century, which is not
surprising in such complex field. I will now differentiate the causes of war following the
Aristotles scheme of accountability of causes. Besides general explanations such as human
aggression or foolishness of statesmen one can identify four categories of causes:
Firstly, there are the causa materialis. These theories focus on structures of the
international and national political systems and they point to the absence of a dominant
international power (break-up of bi-polarity) or national power (weak state). Non-consolidated
regimes and non-successful nation-building could lead to crises of identity, participation,
distribution of horizontal (ethnics, minorities) and vertical legitimacy (acceptance of political
lead) and thereby to conflicts or wars. Historically, this situation occurred after the collapse of
the Habsburg Dual-Monarchy, the Ottoman and tsarist empires, the colonial empires of the
British, the French or the Dutch as well as the Soviet empire. The collapse of empires leaves a
vacuum that can be filled by competing states. In addition to political structures numerous
theories of war are based on economical or ecological structural realities such as deprivation
due to poverty (war arises out of pots), the difference in the North-South divide both inside
states (endeavours for autonomy in developed regions within a national polity of, i.e., Spain,
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union) and between states of the North and states of the South.
Environmental disasters like drought or shortage of water could provoke conflicts such as the
one in Ogaden between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Secondly, the causa formalis or the putative existing or subsequently rationalised
realities with numerous theories of miss-perception and theories of threat. Huntingtons Clash
of Civilisations and ideological rivalries belong here as well.
Thirdly, the causa efficiens or instrumentalis identifies the cause of wars in the actually
existing or putatively given existence of armament and military technology. The means of
destruction become independent and their momentum disregards any political goal. The
estimation or false estimation of the capacity of mass destruction opens up successful

145
calculations that points to a victory. The arms race is based upon the perception of a threat
posed by armaments on the other side. The implication to the militarisation of whole societies
(i.e. the German Empire) belongs in this category as well as the claims to political leadership
resulting from economical strength.
Fourthly, the causa finalis identifies the causation of wars in the objectives of national
behaviour. The classical pattern of power politics with the absolute dominance of power as the
highest gaol in national politics is deeply linked to the thinking of leading politicians and
determined the system of states since the era of absolutism. The 20th century experienced such
claims of power (expressed in the foreign policy doctrines of the great powers) and the quest for
power of states that have lost their position. These kinds of deprivation theories can be applied
to Germany (place in the sun, grasp for global power), Italy or Japan at the end of the 19th
century. The great ideologies of the century, nationalism, socialism and racism, made for such
expansive claims and had the potential for aggression. Those and more theories certainly
provide important explanations and can be put in concrete forms for any individual war.
However, the theories included in these explanations of the causes of wars have only
limited validity: the theory of weak states or absence of an international power affects only a
small number of states. The theory of the Cold War, whereby international turbulences can be
controlled, can refer to the non-warlike status between the superpowers, but it can be challenged
with the great number of wars in the Third World. The theory of wars of civilisation, identifying
the new division in the clash of civilisations, neglects the state as still the most important actor.
The theory of liberal institutionalism whereby war could be controlled by international
organisations has contributed to the fact that barely any war have occurred between countries.
However, the international community of states was not able to cope with ethno-political wars.
The theory of democratic peace which states that democracies do not fight wars with each other
has high empirical evidence in the OECD-world. But on the one hand, the road to democracy
can lead to conflicts. On the other hand, democracies do not behave differently from any other
authoritarian regime regarding their external affairs: The position of power inside the
international system is the determining factor.
4. The theory of unfinished peace agreements
To explain the violent behaviour in the 20th century I would like to offer a theory of
undone peace agreements following Kants theory of peace and to extend his considerations
regarding the transition from peace to war or war to peace. According to the Knigsberg
philosopher peace is not necessarily a preferential situation in the developmental history of
mankind, and it only becomes possible and needed at a certain stage of human development,
which remains yet unspecified. The development of mankind tends to a status of peace that
results from mainly three reasons: the obligation to the rule of law, the principal of publicity and
the personal concernment in wars.
In his work Eternal Peace (1795) Kant set up conditions beneficial for peace. Wilful
deception while concluding a contract, annexation of someones territory, purchase of
mercenaries, indebtedness of a state for martial purposes, intervention and interference in other
states and finally the impossibility of mutual confidence in a future peace have to be forbidden.
A status of peace could only be brought about by republican states commonly forming a peace
league or league of nations and allowing free right to travel.
About 200 years after Kants work was published the question is whether or not
mankind has reached a level of civilisation in which it does not need wars for higher evolution
and in which it can savour eternal peace. What empirical findings are available to verify
Kants conditions? The recent research in conflicts has extensively used Kants conditions and
made further differentiations. Particularly Kants republicanism (theory of democratic peace)
and his idea of the federation of states (international institutionalism) stimulated the discussion
of international relations.

146
Todays perspective shows that sporadic or permanent offences against these
conditions have taken place: peace agreements or ceasefires have been concluded with the
purpose of non-compliance (Mr. Milosevic has agreed to at least 30 ceasefires and broke them
all), states still, but less frequently, try to annex other states; the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq
has probably been the last attempt at doing so. Mercenaries can still be hired and military
expansion is especially high in threatened states (i.e. Pakistan, India, Israel, etc.). The principal
of non-interference in domestic matters is actually established in the UN-charter but has been
broken in many cases, sometimes using a proxy. During the 50-year-old history of conflicts in
the post-war period, altogether 206 governments intervened in neighbouring countries in a
political or military way (Pfetsch/Rohloff 2000: 182), whereby intervention was often requested
by domestic elites. Finally, peace agreements are seldom concluded to prevent future conflicts.
The consecutive conflicts in one and the same country show that previous peace agreements are
not concluded in the spirit of mutual confidence.
To prove the thesis of arbitrary peace that leads to war, Kants first and sixth condition
of his so-called preliminary articles play a role and show that all controversial subjects have to
be solved amicably and that peace agreements have to secure confidence in the future. It is my
central thesis that non-compliance of these conditions explains the majority of wars in the 20th
century. Here, Kants conditions should at first be interpreted from todays point of view.
Kants wording in the first preliminary article: "No peace treaty [as condition of eternal peace]
shall be held to be such, which is made with the secret intention of a future war. And the sixth
preliminary article formulates: "No state at war with another shall permit such acts of warfare
that make mutual confidence in future peace impossible. Kant emphasises this demand by
claiming that this conditions together with the prohibition of annexations should be complied
with promptly. In addition he appends in his Reflexions: Thus, every peace presumes that all
claims raised by one state against another at a certain point of time that could provoke any
hostility should be dismissed and nullified. Therefore, peace starts a new episode between two
states beyond which nothing shall be taken out that has been agreed upon. (Reflexion Nr.
7837). Kant says no more than that the actions of war and peace agreements have to be shaped
in a way that they eliminate the causes of war and permit a peaceful co-existence with the
former enemy. Peace agreements must not be the means of revenge or pay back and they have
to be brought about by negotiations and not by war. As Jean Monnet, the co-founder of the
counter model of classical power politics, namely the European Union, said: The spirit of
discrimination has been the reason of the biggest misfortunes in the world (Monnet 1976:
413). As it is generally known, President Wilson, acting in the Kantian sense, after World War I
could not win recognition with his postulation of a peace of justice and of the right of selfdetermination of peoples.
What are the conditions for a permanent peace? Mutual confidence has to be based on
fair treaties and they, so my extending conclusions, are possible in an ideal case subjected to
five conditions. Firstly, peace negotiations have to include all concerned parties (Kant speaks of
states as the then only actors); secondly, they have to be negotiated freely and in mutual
understanding (claims should be nullified); thirdly, negotiations have to be conducted
regarding all relevant conflict issues (all claims), fourthly, consensus has to be brought about
without any secret proviso (reservatio mentalis) and fifthly, agreements apply to the
conditions of the prevailing historical circumstances.
4.1. Consequences of non-compliance to these conditions
Since these conditions are rarely fulfilled or can hardly be fulfilled - peace not war is
the case of emergency - it has neither come to peace agreements in the above-stated sense or
such peace agreements did not hold, or have been revised or caused other conflicts. Our
statistics show: of the 104 wars between 1945 and 1995 led to other 79 conflicts and 65 of them
wars as well. In many cases a war of independence was followed by fights for nation-building
or state-building. Likewise, ethnic wars have been followed by other wars. The unfinished and

147
unaccepted agreement of Alger in 1975 between Iran and Iraq did not detain Saddam Hussein
from his aggression against Kuwait. Also, the agreements of Dayton and Paris did not detain
Mr. Milosevic from executing ethnic cleansings in Kosovo. The bottom line could be: War is
over, but conflicts are sill going on. Neither the five Parisian peace agreements that ended
World War I nor the Potsdam agreement after World War II or the Dayton agreement for
Bosnia or the military agreement for Kosovo fulfilled the conditions of a permanent peace and,
in the aftermath, they did not bring peace. The West did win the Kosovo war militarily but so
far they lost the peace. With the creation of two protectorates (Bosnia, Kosovo) and two semiprotectorates (Montenegro, Macedonia) one cannot speak of peace. Rather, war has been
transformed into new conflicts. The long-term effects of the Parisian peace agreements support
the thesis that peace agreements dictated by power politics in 1919/22 explain or at least
influenced the subsequent wars in Europe. In the aftermath of World War I the victorious
powers signed six peace agreements. They were subjected to the defeated states of Germany
(Versailles, 28.6.1919), Austria/Hungary (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 10.9.1919), Bulgaria
(Neuilly-sur-Seine, 27.11.1919), Hungary (Trianon, 2.6.1920), Turkey (Svres, 10.8.1920) and
again Turkey (Lausanne, 23.4.1922). These contracts and their secret protocols, concluded
without participation of the affected states, have to be seen as dictating and forcing an
agreement, the more so because they violated an important, even though not the most important
principal of the 20th century, namely the right of self-determination of peoples (it even has been
spurned after the referendum in Upper-Silesia). The revision of these contracts often led to
violent conflicts. The milestones on the way from the arbitrary peace of Versailles (also termed
final crime, Economist 31.12.1999) to the next World War were the Rhineland occupation,
the Italian invasion in Ethiopia in 1935, the German and Italian intervention in the Spanish civil
war in 1936/39, the annexation of Austria in 1938 and the partition and later occupation of
Czechoslovakia (again a result of force) as well as the German territorial claims against Poland
that led to World War II. This leads Eric Hobsbawm to talk of the thirty-one-years war from
1914 to 1945 (Hobsbawm 1998:75).
The Parisian peace agreements founded former non-existing states as separate states on
a relatively arbitrary basis2. Most of the sold-off territories are today independent. Thus, the
territorial changes agreed upon in the peace agreements have been revised in the process of
history. In some of the transferred territories, i.e. the Burgenland or Fiume, rebellions took
place. Referenda have been held in some territories like Krnten or Silesia; the latter in favour
of Germany not being accepted by the allied states and turned in favour of Poland. The treaty of
Svres was replaced by the treaty of Lausanne and reversed the Kurdish self-determination.
Above all, the dictate of the Versailles treaty significantly strengthened the NS-movement and
provoked World War II. The agreement of Munich is another example of a forced arrangement
that could not be maintained in time. Finally, in the 1990s, there were wars flaring in the
aftermath of the Cold War: The Bosnian wars, the Kosovo war or the Kurdish conflict in
Turkey, Iran and Iraq are all rooted in the arbitrary Parisian peace agreements.
The territorial successes of Hitler-Germany against former Czechoslovakia were all
revised after the war, not to speak of the conquests during the war. In 1945, the Potsdam
agreement revised the annexations and the treaties between Germany and the Czechoslovakian
2
Hungary (with numerous Hungarian minorities in other countries), Czechoslovakia (recently
disintegrated), Yugoslavia (today dispelled) and Poland (today in different borders) have been founded
within new borders. Territorial adjustments from one country to another have been made: Alsace-Loraine
from Germany to France (remained with France after the annexation in World War II) and Posen and
West Prussia to Poland (were they still remain). South Tyrol, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia and parts of Krnten
and the Krajina moved from Austria to Italy (apart from South Tyrol today in other countries). Macedonia
moved from Bulgaria to Yugoslavia (today independent). Hungary gave Slovakia to Czechoslovakia
(today independent) and the Burgenland to Austria. Croatia, Slovenia and the Banat were unified with
Yugoslavia (today again separated) and Siebenbrgen came to Romania. Turkey lost great parts of its
territory to Greece (Thrakien, Aegean islands, Smyrna), to France (Syria and Klikien) to Great Britain
(Iraq and Palestine) and to Italy (Rhodos and Dodekanes).

148
Socialist Republic (CSSR) in 1974 and the Czech-Slovakian Federal Republic (CSFR) in 1991
regarding the dictate of 1938 as Nil ex tunc; these treaties agreed upon the former borderlines
on an international basis. These examples show that a forced peace agreement will either be
revised or violently changed as soon as the circumstances permit so or it is believed that they do
so.
Numerous cases provide evidence for the thesis that amicable agreements fulfilling the
five criteria for a stable peace mentioned above can be permanent. Some examples should prove
the thesis, even though a systematic analysis of the cases is still lacking. The Camp David
Accords of March 26th, 1979 between Israel and Egypt mediated by the US agreed upon the
return of conquered territories. It has been fulfilled and is being upheld today. The same is true
for the 13 decisions reached by the International Court until 1995 (i.e. the affiliation of islands
[Minquirs and Ecrehos], borders [Honduras vs. Nicaragua] or fishing rights [Great Britain vs.
Norway]) that are accepted by the involved parties and are still being upheld. Even the revision
of unfair peace agreements could be consensual and non-violent if circumstances change
adequately. Examples are the border adjustment between the Netherlands and Germany dated
April 8th, 1960, the solution of the Saar question by integrating the Saar area in the Federal
Republic of Germany on January 1st, 1957 following a referendum or the German reunification
on October 3rd, 1990 following the conclusion of the 2+4 negotiations. These agreements show
that forced variations can be revised by consensus.
However, there are also examples of permanent losses by war like the territorial losses
of Germany in both World Wars as the price for military aggression or the loss of the Karelyens
by Finland in the Finish-Russian war in 1940. Such results caused by war can be permanent if
either the defeated population is expelled, eliminated or unable to retaliate; or if national and/or
international actors keep up the status quo; finally, the defeat can be accepted by involved
parties over the years and/or recognised as justified.
With regard to Kants conditions of government it can be said that republicanism has
won recognition in certain parts of the world - even though only in small parts covering about
70 states. After 1945, no more wars between democracies have occurred. The United Nations,
the European Union and other regional organisations can be regarded as peace leagues in the
sense of Kant. Inter alia, they contributed to the fact that there are barely any wars between
states. The recent cross-national conflicts, i.e., between India and Pakistan or between Ethiopia
and Eritrea result from incomplete wars of former independence. The Besuchsrecht in the
form of the right to travel is widely realised in the era of globalisation. The politics of the
states is being transformed to a world domestic policy.
5. Kants peace in the Western world
The government action of west European politicians has realised Kants six conditions,
admittedly in a painful learning process. The Potsdam treaty and its realisation differ
substantially form the Versailles treaty of the victorious powers. Support for reconstruction and
integration in the world economic system have been offered. Barely any mercenary armies
exist, but some militias and professional armies do. Military expanses have been gradually
reduced by a substantial amount, especially after the Cold War, and military intervention did
not take place in the Western part of Europe (not so in the Eastern part). Finally, the union of
Western European states is characterised by the spirit of trust and co-ordination of interests and
not based on veiled purposes. Confidence-building measures have been advanced to create a
principle of collective security since the Helsinki Conference (1975). The project of European
integration can be regarded as the plain model of peace in the spirit of Kant. Since the
declaration by the former French foreign minister Robert Schuman more than 50 years ago
(May 9th, 1950) no more wars occurred between member states and other democratic states. The
authors have been absolutely aware of the revolutionary character of this model. Schuman
spoke about a brave act, about a founding act and the spiritus rector, Jean Monnet,
explained: We are here to achieve a common plan, not to negotiate advantage but to search our

149
advantage in the common advantage (Monnet 1976: 378). The overcoming of confrontational
diplomacy of the old style led by national egoism and the thoughts of international equilibrium
should be brought about by a transfer of sovereignty in limited but important domains and by
creation of common institutions to effectuate peace among and prosperity within the European
states. This successfully continuing project had an extremely beneficial impact, but only on the
Western part of the world. As stated earlier, the above-mentioned peace conditions are barely or
inadequately fulfilled in the remaining parts of the world. The Konfliktbarometer 2006 shows
that beyond the regions of democratic peace numerous violent conflicts have been counted, but
not in the scale of the pre-war era.
6. Conclusion: Forced peace agreements cause more wars, sustained peace
agreements cause peace
In particular Kants first and last preliminary article together with additional conditions
offer an explanation for the repeated occurrence of wars following wars. Peace agreements,
which lay the foundation of future confidence, were not taken into account in the electrified
nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century and it provoked most of the wars in the 20th
century. The numerous wars caused by arbitrary territorial divisions implemented by the
colonial and imperial powers fit in this image. Borderlines have been arbitrarily divided peoples
and tribes and led to wars after independence, partly because these treaties often did not include
any provisions for political reconstruction. Primarily, the Agenda for Peace of the former UN
secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali formulated an extensive notion of peace, regarding the
consolidation of political order as the most important task after wars. This is particularly
important because at the end of the territorial development of the world future wars will occur
inside states.
In particular, the political change from traditional national power politics to cooperative negotiations and politics of integration in Western Europe can be reconciled with
Kants idea of political order. National power politics and violence still dominate the handling
of conflicts in south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Russia.
The answer to the question posed at the beginning, that is why the 20th century was so
warlike, is as follows: Because the treaties concluded at the beginning of and during the 20th
century were forced by the power politics of the victorious powers and, thus, been as unjustified
and did not allow confidence in the future, new wars emerged and lasted until the end of the 20th
century. The lesson left behind by the 20th century is that not war but peace is the case of
emergency. The transition period from war to the post-war era is crucial for the question of war
and peace. Consequently, the task of politics and science is organising peace in a way so that
confidence into the future is possible by including all concerned states or people in the
negotiations and by establishing amicable agreements covering all relevant controversial issues.
These negotiations are actually posed and await settling in the Balkans, in Chechnya and in the
African regions of the Great Lake and the horn of Africa.
References
1. Diner, Dan, An der Jahrhundertwende, in Internationale Politik 12, 1996, pp.3-10
2. Hobsbawm, Eric, Das Zeitalter der Extreme. Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mnchen:
dtv, 1998
3. Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996
4. Kant, Immanuel, Zum ewigen Frieden, Stuttgart, Reclam, 1979
5. Kant, Immanuel, Reflexion in Kants ges. Schriften. Hrsg. v. der Preuischen Akademie der
Wissenshaften, 1971, Bd.XIX, 3.Abt: Handschriftlicher Nachlass. Berlin/Leipzig 1934 (ND,
Berlin 1971)

150
6. Kant, Immanuel, Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und
Pdagogik, 1998, Bd.VI Werke in sechs Bnden. Mutmalicher Anfang der
Menschengeschichte (1786). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft
7. Konfliktbarometer, Yearly Collection of World Conflicts. Heidelberg: Institut fr Politische
Wissenschaft der Universitt Heidelberg, 2006
8. Koseleck, Reinhart, Das Jahrtausend. In: FAZ v.27. November 1999
9. Levy, Jack S., Theory of General War in World Politics, Vol. XXXVII, Nr.3, 1985, pp. 344374
10. Monnet, Jean, Mmoires, Paris, Fayard, 1976
11. Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations,1948, N.Y. et al : McGraw-Hill, 1993
12. Pfetsch, Frank R. and Rohloff, Christoph, National and International Conflicts. New
theoretical and Empirical, London: Routhledge, 2000
13. Sorokin, Pitrim A., Social and Cultural Dynamics, N.Y., American Book Co., 1937
14. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, 2 Vols., Chicago: Chicago Press, 1942

151

Jeunes et nomadisme tribal


Michel MAFFESOLI
Abstract: In several surveys, Karl Jaspers makes reference to the existential
communication as a foundation of any culture. I would add that, right from its foundation, this
is anomic. It contradicts the pre-established norms, it often relates to ancient values. It is
shocking, even provocative, as it does not obey the unanimously admitted injunctions of social
life. However, without intending to canonise it a priori, such an anomie does not cease to be
instructive to those considering lucidity the mark of a noble spirit.
Keywords : communication, culture, civilization, imaginary
La socialit, celle du monde de la vie (Lebenswelt) ne se rduit pas un social se
dduisant par simple raisonnement. Elle repose sur le partage des images. Pour reprendre ce
terme qui, selon M. Weber, caractrisait la communaut, ce qui est en jeu est de lordre de
lmotionnel.
Lmotionnalit chappe linjonction morale. Elle repose sur un socle antprdicatif, pr-catgoriel 1. Les thtralits corporelles se vivant au jour le jour dans les rituels
vestimentaires, ou sexprimant dune manire paroxystique dans les nombreuses parades
urbaines soulignent un ordo amoris (M. Scheler) o prdomine un fort sentiment
dappartenance. Lidal communautaire a besoin de symboles extrieurs, dimages partages
pour traduire la force qui, intrieurement, le structure. Mais la vitalit de ces archtypes, pulsion
inconsciente sil en est, sexprime trs souvent dune manire anomique. Les mythes, contes et
lgendes sont traverss par lombre. Cette part obscure se retrouve dans le travail sur le
corps contemporain. Et le succs du tatouage, du piercing , tout comme celui de Harry Potter
ou du Seigneur des Anneaux ne manque pas dinvalider le jugement de valeur et lanalyse
moralisatrice.
Il y a, en effet, quelques difficults, pour lintelligentsia moderne se contenter dun
jugement de fait : dire ce qui est, ce qui se voit, ce qui simagine . Habitue quelle est
apprcier le bien et le mal partir de ce que lon peut appeler le fantasme de lUn : Dieu
Un, la Vrit Une, la Finalit, le Sens de lHistoire, et autres majuscules ignorant la pluralit de
la chose humaine et le polythisme des valeurs. Difficult saisir les consquences dun ordo
amoris renaissant, limpact dune atmosphre dionysiaque dont lorbe tend stendre de plus
en plus.
Reconnatre quil y a dans le corporisme et limaginaire ambiants une impulsion
vitaliste alliant le matriel et le spirituel. Lintellectualisme ou le rationalisme, encore,
dominant, du moins institutionnellement, sest toujours employ sparer les diffrentes
sphres de lhumaine nature. Fidle linjonction biblique (Dieu spara la Lumire des
Tnbres), la raison a peur de ce holisme o lenvers et lavers se conjuguent harmonieusement.
Or, le propre de la vie organique repose sur la richesse dune telle conjugaison. Ainsi
tout comme lesprit du vin est en constante relation avec la matire (terroir, cpage), il
existe une subtile alchimie entre le travail sur le corps : habillement, phnomnes de mode,
exacerbation des diffrences, et la constitution dun esprit commun, dune reliance imaginale.
On peut mme dire que dans les interstices du paratre sopre une exprience de ltre
collectif. Ce qui affleure la surface, tel un idogramme, est un inconscient archtypal auquel
1
Cf. sur ce point G. Durand, Les Structures anthropologiques de limaginaire (1960), Bordas, 1969, ou
encore in LHumanisme plantaire. E. Morin en ses 80 ans, dir. Nelson Vallejo-Gomez, UNESCO, 2004,
p. 112. Sur lordo amoris , cf. M. Scheler, Six essais de philosophie et de religion, d. Universitaires de
Fribourg, 1996, p. 63 sq.

152
tout un chacun communie. Le signe devient symbole, et fait surgir lautre ct, immatriel, des
choses.
Cest bien cette alchimie on ne peut plus subtile, et combien mystrieuse qui chappe
ce que Paul Valry nommait la brutalit du concept. Tout sa recherche deprofundiste ,
recherche dune soi-disant profondeur, dune essence de la ralit, dun noumne au-del du
phnomne, il ne voit pas dans lefflorescence de ce qui est la marque dun plaisir et dun dsir
dtre-ensemble au travers de ce qui se donne voir et, donc, se donne tre.
Karl Jaspers fait rfrence, dans nombres de ses analyses, la communication
existentielle comme fondement de toute culture. Jajouterai que celle-ci est toujours, en son
moment fondateur, anomique. Elle contrevient aux normes tablies, elle renoue souvent avec
des valeurs anciennes. Elle est choquante, voire provocatrice en ce quelle nobit plus aux
injonctions, communment admises, de la vie sociale. Mais sans vouloir la canoniser a priori,
une telle anomie ne laisse pas dtre instructive pour ceux qui font de la lucidit une marque de
la noblesse desprit.
Le retour de lorganique dans la vie de nos socits, cest--dire cette conjonction de
ces choses opposes que sont lme et la matire, en appelle une pense organique. Je veux
dire par l une attitude phnomnologique qui sache, en prenant en compte les images,
qualifier avant de lgifrer. Le souci des dnominations exactes tant, on le sait de longue
mmoire, le fondement mme de la ncessaire organisation sociale. Mais celle-ci ne peut pas se
faire contresens.
Ainsi que le rapporte la sagesse chinoise, Tseu-lou dit Confucius le seigneur de Wei
se propose de vous confier le gouvernement. Quelle est votre avis la premire chose faire ?
Lessentiel est de rendre correctes les dsignations 2. Voil bien ce qui souligne limportance
du bon usage des mots. Trs prcisment pour ce qui concerne le gouvernement des esprits,
cest--dire cette capacit sajuster ltat des murs. Celle-ci est, toujours, quelque peu
magique. Mais elle seule donne sa vritable lgitimit, sa valeur spirituelle quelque pouvoir
que ce soit : politique, conomique ou symbolique.
Pour le dire familirement, coller lesprit du temps ncessite, ds lors, de prendre
ses distances vis--vis de la doxa dominante, cette opinion plus ou moins docte dont la
frilosit ou la lchet est le moteur essentiel. Retourner la coquille conseillait Platon
(Rpublique, 521c), rvolution du regard qui soit mme de comprendre, sans prjugs,
limportance des effervescences contemporaines, et den mesurer les effets.
Ce qui implique que lon sache rompre avec ce que lon pourrait appeler le
plagianisme moderne. Le moine Plage dniant la tache originelle peut-tre considr,
quon le sache ou non, comme le fondateur de la pdagogie rationaliste qui sest
progressivement impose dans lorganisation sociale du monde occidental. Fondateur, ds lors,
du moralisme et du conformisme social. Pour lesquels la part dombre de lhumaine nature,
celle qui fait appel au sensible, va tre, inluctablement, dpasse3. Moralisme pdagogique
faisant de la socit, puis de toutes ses instances spirituelles : universit, presse, dition, une
immense manufacture demploys au service dune idologie entreprenariale domine par un
utilitarisme/rationalisme omniprsent.
Et cest bien celui-ci qui ne semble plus tre une chose admise sans discussions.
Lexprience du vivant outrepasse la simple logique marchande et quantitative. Au
plagianisme officiel rpond, souterrainement mais dune manire ttue, une sorte de
quitisme insolent. Cest cela mme qui sexprime dans le port du voile ou dans lexhibition des
nombrils et autres hauts de fesses. Il y a dans ces provocations, apparemment contrastes, en
fait trs semblables, lexpression du refus dun monde uniquement marchand et rationnel.
Lexpression dun non-conformisme, parfois inconscient, parfois, au contraire, bien matris. Le

M. Granet, La Pense chinoise, Albin Michel, 1968, p. 362 et les rfrences Karl Jaspers in J.C. Gens,
Karl Jaspers, Bayard 2003, p. 380
3
Sur un tel plagianisme , cf. L. Moulin, La Gauche, la Droite et le pch originel, Lib. Des
Mridiens, Paris, 1984

153
dsir de ne plus se plier une logique de la sparation, mais au contraire de comprendre la
ralit comme un tout o limage a sa place.
Les thiques particulires induites par un tel non-conformisme relient matrialisme et
spiritualisme. Et, comme en dautres tapes deffervescence culturelle cela cre une sorte de
ralisme magique laissant pantois lensemble des observateurs sociaux. Hommes thoriques
(Nietzsche), ceux-ci ont bien du mal saisir la fringale de vie en ses aspects incarns.
Incarnation que lon retrouve dans les fanatismes religieux, mais aussi dans le
dbridement des sens de toutes les occasions festives chres aux diverses tribus postmodernes.
Dans chacun de ces cas se trouve en prsence de vritables parades amoureuses , forte
composante amicale, o la sduction a une large part. Cest presque en termes olfactifs quil
faudrait poser le problme social, tant la scrtion est importante. Au travers du voilement du
corps ou de son dvoilement on assiste des danses, plus ou moins frntiques, par lesquelles
tout un chacun semploie communier dans une exprience de ltre-collectif.
Il faut bien le dire, grce limage partage, de telles copulations mystiques chappent,
largement, au jugement moral. Elles mettent mal une vision du monde dessence
contractuelle, puisque aussi bien lindividu rationnel et matre de lui, protagoniste du contrat
social moderne, tend se perdre, on pourrait dire se consumer, dans la communaut dont il
est, en tous points, tributaire. Lidal moral est bien outill pour grer lindividu rationnel. Il est
impuissant devant le (re)surgissement des imaginaires tribaux.
Cest bien un tel glissement auquel il convient dtre attentif : lme collective tend prvaloir
contre lesprit individuel. De diverses manires on a pu montrer ltroite relation existant entre
le rationalisme cartsien et le logocentrisme qui en tait la consquence4. Ce je pense
souverain constitutif de soi et du monde et manufacturant la socit semble submerg par un
surcrot de jouissance.
Lexacerbation du corps individuel dans le cadre dun corps collectif renvoie une
autre forme du lien social forte composante lococentrique. Cest, en effet, lespace qui
prvaut. Espace du corps propre que lon travaille loisir, que lon habille pour la prire, que
lon pare pour le plaisir, que lon mutile pour une jouissance douloureuse. Territoire du corps
tribal que lon semploie conqurir et que lon dfend contre toutes formes dintrusion. Dans
tous les cas, espaces symboliques gnrant et confortant le lien. Cest cela que lon peut appeler
la reliance imaginale .
Jai, souvent, signal ce glissement du logocentrisme vers le lococentrisme en
rappelant quil est des poques o le lieu fait lien. Glissement qui en appelle une attitude non
judicative. dpasser notre habituelle tendance analyser en termes de bien ou de mal .
Qui devrait nous inciter constater en quoi les phnomnes qui peuvent paratre anomiques, et
qui certainement le sont par rapport aux normes tablies, peuvent tre considrs comme les
indices (index) les plus srs pointant une nouvelle socialit en gestation.
Ce nest pas la premire fois que de tels indices font signifiance. Parmi la multiplicit
des exemples historiques, on peut rappeler lorsque les historiens de lart ou les philosophes de
la vie religieuse analysent la rbellion des moines de Cteaux contre ce que ceux-ci
considraient tre lattidissement des rgles par labbaye de Cluny, ils relvent que lordre
des formes correspond lordre de lesprit . Et quen appelant une nouvelle thique
communautaire, les cisterciens vont crer des formes nouvelles, o celle-ci puisse
spanouir5.
thique plus proche de la nature, de la simplicit des relations, Reliance renouvele et
pure par un dpassement des lois artificielles issues de la sclrose et des pesanteurs
institutionnelles. thique qui avait pour ambition de restaurer la ferveur originelle et
ldification du corps monacal afin de mieux raliser la vocation monastique. Et, symbole

Cf. par exemple D. Janicaud, Heidegger en France, tome II, Entretien avec J.P. Faye, Albin Michel,
2003, p. 150. Cf. aussi M. Maffesoli, Le Rythme de la vie, La Table Ronde, 2004
5
M.M. Davy, Saint Bernard (1945), rd. Flin, 1990, p. 71 et H. Focillon, Art dOccident, le Moyen-ge
roman et gothique, Paris, 1938, p. 159

154
important cela va se faire en portant une vture nouvelle signifiant, ainsi, lunion mystique
projete.
En son sens strict lart cistercien est une culture nouvelle sopposant une civilisation
appauvrie. Larchitecture, la dcoration, lapparence sont, ds lors, comme autant dexpressions
dun esprit commun et dun tre-ensemble toujours et nouveau vivant.
On peut extrapoler les leons de cet exemple, en montrant que toute instauration
nouvelle est une transfiguration. Elle en appelle dautres figures en lesquelles lidal
communautaire se reconnat et se complait. Il est ais de voir en quoi les pratiques
contemporaines obissent une logique semblable. Les formes quelles emploient peuvent
tre, certes, transgressives, elles nen sont pas moins fondatrices si on sait les apprcier pour ce
quelles sont et non pas pour ce que lon aimerait quelles soient.
Si je fais, ici, rfrence un exemple religieux cest quil est, en effet, frappant de voir
que ces nouvelles formes de socialit sont dune part traverses par lintensit propre la
religiosit, et dautre part expriment une dbordante intensit dans le rapport lautre, et ce
grce aux images partages. Intensit et densit qui, prsentisme oblige, tout en tant
phmres nen sont pas moins relles.
Lattitude contemplative qui prvaut sur la pulsion politique, propre aux
gnrations prcdentes, le fait que lintuition dans les rapports sociaux prend le pas sur les
associations rflchies (parti, syndicats), le fait de privilgier toutes les occasions de
transport (transports festifs, effervescences diverses), tout cela cre une atmosphre
spcifique o le sujet substantiel qui, dans la tradition occidentale, nous tait familire, na plus
grande importance. Le subjectif tend cder la place au trajectif (G; Durand). Cest--dire
la connaissance directe de lintime liaison de toutes choses.
Correspondance holistique, intuitive reliance aux autres et la nature environnante,
tout cela se traduit, trivialement parlant, dans le fait dtre transport , de sclater ou
davoir le feeling . La liste est longue de ces expressions exprimant le dpassement dune
logique discursive, et soulignent la calme violence du flux vital. On peut, certes, sen offusquer.
Il nen reste pas moins que limpratif catgorique de la morale tablie laisse, de plus en plus,
la place la mise en pratique de petites liberts interstitielles o domine une forme de joyeux
immoralisme. Cest bien cela lordo amoris (M. Scheler) cause et effet des multiples extases
socitales.
On peut rapprocher cela des intuitions de Bergson : le passage du statique au
dynamique, du clos louvert, dune vie routinire la vie mystique6. Cela claire bien,
thoriquement, toutes ces situations empiriques o la formule conceptuelle (politique, sociale)
cde la place une forme opratoire. Une forme communautaire o tout un chacun ne cherche
plus sa singularit, naffirme plus sa spcificit, mais semploie, concrtement, ne plus faire
quun avec lobjet qui lui ou auquel il appartient. Une forme reposant, essentiellement, sur
limage.
Voile islamique, kipa juive, foulard Herms, dessous Calvin Klein, on pourrait loisir
multiplier les signes et les marques, qui peuvent tre considrs comme autant de
manifestations du sentiment dappartenance. Stricto sensu, on en est de cela mme que lon
affiche comme un emblme de reconnaissance. Mme, et surtout, si une telle affirmation
provoque ou choque ceux qui nen sont pas . Le nombril mis nu dune manire sexy , la
circoncision religieuse, tout comme le piercing intime favorisent les extases communielles.
Ils sont comme autant de rituels anodins ou exacerbs par lesquels les micros tribus
contemporaines expriment leurs affinits lectives. Par lesquels elles transfigurent un quotidien
domin par une logique marchande, en une ralit spirituelle qui sabritant, parfois, derrire le
masque de la transcendance nest pas moins, toujours, profondment, humaine : ce que je vis,
avec dautres ici et maintenant.

H. Bergson, Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion, Paris, 1932, p. 445. Cf. aussi M.Maffesoli,
Eloge de la raison sensible (1996) red en poche, La table Ronde, 2005. Sur la reliance , cf. M. Bolle de
Bal, Reliance et thories, d. LHarmattan, 1996

155
Pratiques incarnes, Incarnation quil faut comprendre en son sens prcis : plaisirs de la
chair, mortification de la chair, la diffrence est de peu dimportance, comme moyens de redire
limportance du corps individuel dans le cadre du corps collectif. Corps mystique, corps
imaginal, en tout cas qui ne se reconnat plus par les mcanismes de labstraction rationnelle,
mais qui tend saffirmer dans lorganicit des groupes motionnels.
En inversant ladage populaire, lhabit fait le moine. La vture , quelle soit sur ou
dans le corps, devient ainsi hiroglyphe. Signe sacr faisant participer une sorte de
transcendance immanente. Pierres vivantes dun temple immatriel o lon se sent bien.
Construction symbolique o tout en semble fait corps. Demeure relle ou virtuelle assurant
protection et rconfort. Les passionns des jeux informatiques le savent bien qui recherchent,
perdument, dans les rseaux dinternet une forme de communion et qui, ainsi, crent des
communauts non moins relles que les regroupements sociaux, donc rationnels, proposs
par la socit. En ce sens, les pseudos utiliss sont comme autant de marques sur le corps propre
permettant dintgrer un corps collectif. Il y a l, souvent, une addiction indniable. Mais
celle-ci ne fait que signifier une ivresse collective: laisser sa trace dans la tragique
impermanence du donn mondain.
Cela nous invite suivre le signe de piste du nomadisme tribal contemporain fait
paradoxalement denracinement et dexil. Du dsir dtre et vivre ici, tout en ayant la nostalgie
de lailleurs. Ne faut-il pas voir dans ce paradoxe la faillite dune morale rationnelle de
lassignation rsidence, dune existence close sur elle-mme et, dans le mme temps,
lmergence dune thique dynamique alliant les contraires ? Le corps et lesprit, la raison et le
sensible, lintellect et limaginaire. Cest bien cela qui donne penser.
Bibliographie
1. Bergson, H., Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion, Paris, 1932
2. Bolle de Bal, M., Reliance et thories, d. LHarmattan, 1996
3. Davy, M.M., Saint Bernard (1945), rd. Flin, 1990
4. Durand, G., Les Structures anthropologiques de limaginaire, Bordas, 1969
5. Focillon, H., Art dOccident, le Moyen-ge roman et gothique, Paris, 1938
6. Gens, J.C., Karl Jaspers, Bayard 2003
7. Granet, M., La Pense chinoise, Albin Michel, 1968
8. Janicaud, D., Heidegger en France, tome II, Entretien avec J.P. Faye, Albin Michel, 2003
9. Maffesoli, M., Le Rythme de la vie, La Table Ronde, 2004
10. Maffesoli, M., Eloge de la raison sensible (1996) red en poche, La table Ronde, 2005
11. Moulin, L., La Gauche, la Droite et le pch originel, Lib. Des Mridiens, Paris, 1984
12. Scheler, M., Six essais de philosophie et de religion, d. Universitaires de Fribourg, 1996
13. Vallejo-Gomez, Nelson (dir.), LHumanisme plantaire. E. Morin en ses 80 ans, UNESCO,
2004

157

5. Focus
Stjepan MALOVIC (Zagreb) Media and Interculturalism

158

Media and Interculturalism


Stjepan MALOVI
Abstract: Media are globalized and whole world is under the influence of
multinational media corporations, but in the same time we are witnessing strong role of the
local media. Developed information technology enables us to consume local media even far
away of home.
This paradox can be overcome by multiculturalism and diversity reporting. Media are
not better than society in general. What is characteristic for society it is visible in mass media.
So, the question is not When will media improve their attitude toward diversities, but When
we shall, as individuals and as representatives of public, change the understanding of
diversities and develop interculturalism?
Key words: media, interculturalism, global or local journalism, diversity reporting
Koloep is a very small and very beautiful island 3 miles southeast from Dubrovnik
and belongs to the archipelago of Elaphity. All the beauties of Mediterranean are concentrated
in this small piece of land: rich vegetation, cliffs, sandy beach, rich history, nice summer
houses, and friendly people. Only 25 minutes takes to old ship to sail from Dubrovnik. So close
and so far from the civilization, five stars hotels, restaurants, nigh-clubs, big cruiser and
thousand of tourists.
Group of young businessmen have an extraordinary project: Isle of Knowledge! Such
island is inspiring to knowledge, seminars and similar educational activities. First step in the
project was to bring in information technology. Wireless area network is covering the island!
One could walk with laptop and surf not on waves but on Internet! In each hotel room they are
screen which are providing all services: TV, Internet, cable...
Suddenly, this jewel, where time was frozen and you could see Mediterranean as it
was once, like the tourist slogan is saying, was turned to high tech center where all world in on
your lap! Contrast of nature and high tech!
One can drink local herb brandy with fisherman and receiving latest Reuters news
covering Baghdad bombing. What is influencing to whom? Local, traditional culture to the
world wide information society or vice versa?
Another, similar example: Media hotel in Ljubljana, Slovenia, is also providing to their
guests high tech possibilities. Hotel guest can ask hotel services to provide to the screen in the
room his local TV show from back home, his local radio and he can check his favorite local
web site. Coming to Ljubljana does not change anything in his usual media consumption. He
will not watch Lubljana TV, not listening to Slovenian folk music on local radio, not looking if
not reading local newspapers. Or, he will consume only international and globalize media.
Today we can travel around the world not having any real touch with local culture.
Hotels are all looking alike, depend which chain you are in favor, food is the same in
international restaurants, we are drinking in Irish pubs Irish beer, watching CNN in hotel room
and checking Internet in some business center.
Members of big international organizations are joking about international officials who
are traveling around world from one task to another, often not knowing in which country they
landed, but capable to immediately act as experienced experts and telling to local official what
should do. And, 24 hours later they are landing in other country on the opposite side of the
world having same role: to spread global understanding of the world.

159
No any interculturalism, no any input by local heritage, history, knowledge... No any
curiosity in Koloep island fishermans opinion on change of climate.
What is happening to us? Should we turn the world to globalize village but Western
like, or shall we enjoy in diversity of culture and people? And, what is the role of the media in
interculturalism?
1. Sentimental journey to my media experience
People born in Communism developed very sensitive understanding for media and
news system. It was well known to everybody how role of the media in Communism was to
spread Party propaganda, but in the same time it was the window to the free world. Sometimes
it was a very small window, more like hole, but at the end of the tunnel was light. Former
Yugoslavian media, in Titos regime, enabled to us even more than a hole. We could watch RAI
Uno transmitted by local TV. San Remo song contest was great event in Croatia just like in
Italy. Youngsters were listening on old radio receivers supplied by improvised antennas Radio
Luxemburg enjoying in rock and roll what was impossible on local radio station. Hollywood
movies came to our cinema theatres 5 to ten year later, but it was much better than Soviet
propaganda movies. Journalists informed what was happening in the West, so near, only 200
kilometers away and in the same time so far away, because we have no possibilities to travel.
All these media influences were for us very clear signs that something is wrong with the
Communism.
Local media spread local politics, local folk music, and local art and in the same time
we were desperately looking for international media, rock and pop art.
Next generation have had completely different experience. My daughter was
surrounded by color TV and satellite dish, audio stereo systems, having records and cassettes
from all over the world, VHS and lot of pirate cassettes smuggled from Middle East sources.
Young people from all oveer the world are MTV generation, listening to the same
music, watching same movies, enjoying in same soap operas! Youngs from countries in
transition were not forced to listen local folk, to watch local TV, and they were not interested in
reading local newspapers.
In one generation such great change. For us, in countries in transition, it is bigger than
in the West. Quick Western media development is not easy to be understood for the EU citizen,
but it is a complete shock for the citizen in countries in transition.
2. Media village
Now, they are all global media present on the same global market. We can watch
movie in the same day when is the opening night in Hollywood or London, we are enjoying in 3
tenors concert in Rome like everybody else in the world. McLuhann vision of global village
was correct. But, his message how media is massage was correct also.
Global media are ruling the information and entertainment business. Like octopussy,
global media corporations are taking over the media business in countries in transition.
Mark Crispin Miller, a professor of culture and communications at New York
University, is saying:
The ten great multinationals AOL Time Warner, Disney, General Electric, News
Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi, Sony, Bertelsmann, AT&T and Liberty Media rule the cosmos
only at the moment. The media cartel that keeps us fully entertained and permanently halfinformed is always growing here and shriveling there, with certain of its members bulking up
while others slowly fall apart or get digested whole. But while the players tend to come and go-always with a few exceptions--the overall Leviathan itself keeps getting bigger, louder, brighter,
forever taking up more time and space, in every street, in countless homes, in every other head.1
1

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020107/miller

160
European media landscape is also in hands of only few media corporations:
Westdeutsche Algemeine Zeitung has a European empire of more than 130 newspapers. CME
operate nine TV networks in six countries; SBS S.A. owns interests in 10 TV stations in 7
countries; Axel Springer Verlag published 120 newspapers and magazines worldwide...2
What does it mean? Global media corporations are spreading global, unified image of
the world today. They are not interested in developing local images. It is much more efficient to
have same style, same stories, and same photos and, the most important, same adds. Advertising
is the key word. Corporations are interested mostly in advertising income. Having a great media
market share means having a possibility to sell it to the advertisement companies, which are
global also.
Other aspects of media concentration are in not a phenomenon exclusive to
contemporary societies, but one of its new features is an almost incestuous relationship between
politics and the media. Politicians use (and abuse) media for their own political purposes. Today
it seems impossible to remain in power without the support of the media.3
Thats why media village exists. We are only naive consumers, but much more
important interests are behind the scene which are influencing to our lives.
3. Global vs Local
Giant global media corporations are present all over the world. Nobody can hide
himself. Global media are reaching each isolated island, each desert; each mountain...Same
news value criteria is a standard in each global company. Reuters, CNN or BBC have the same
criteria in selecting news. Thousands of reporters all over the world are trained on the same
way, having the same standard in researching, writing lead on the same principle.
Final result is obvious: thousands of TV networks, newspapers, web sites or radio
stations are informing us on the same way, selecting same events, and presenting news on the
same way. Instead of pluralism we are facing with unified image of the world. Nothing is
happening beside global media corporations. If CNN camera is not present, nothing happened.
If Reuters is not reporting, nothing happened.
Media public all over the world is sitting in front of their TV, radio or computers
consuming same news. It is global village. Media are creating such news environment based on
their understanding of business. There is no place for local news in such criteria of news
selection. The only chance is to become news if you are doing something extraordinary: sex
scandal, top sport result or big sensation. Tipical 3S formula of tabloids (sex, sport and
sensations).
Local news is not present on global media. Global media are creating the world made
on their own image. Unified image of the world is much stronger than the local culture. Final
result is that we are all singing same songs, enjoying in the same football match, and eating
same food, having same fashion style...
4. Local vs Global
When fisherman from Koloep island is buying newspapers on the news stand, he is
asking: Newspapers, please! There is no doubt that he was asking to buy Slobodna
Dalmacija, local daily newspaper, published in Split. This newspaper is so popular in Dalmatia,
Croatian region on the Adriatic cost, that one should not say I would like to buy Slobodna
Dalmacija. Newspaper is enough. Slobodna Dalmacija is not any more the best selling daily
newspaper in Dalmatia, it is not any more the best quality daily newspaper as it was back in 90ties, but it is still a synonym for daily newspapers. Local habits are extremely strong.

2
3

Media Power in Europe: The Big Picture on Ownership, EFJ, Brussels, 2005, pp. 10 - 11
Media Ownership and its Imapct on MEdia Indepedence and Pluralism, SEENPM, Ljubljana, 2004, p. 10

161
All over the region such examples exists. Local products are having long tradition.
They are also very close to the readers, informing them about local events. Localize news are
having strong news values, as we know from media theory. Similar is the local radio situation.
In globalize word people are listening to the community radio, buying local newspapers, which
are covering the small and limited area and which are not informing what is happening globally,
but what happened behind the corner. Usually such local media are owned by local people,
having not many employed journalists. Very often we are talking about one-man show business,
where one person is the owner, editor in chief, correspondent and salesman. Sometimes it is
successful project, but very often they are fighting for survival. In countries in transition small
local media are very often easy plundered by local politician and other centers of power.
Nevertheless, local media are having unique charm. Public like them and need them.
The most important value is that they are independent. Pluralism of media is not possible
without such voices.
Web gave a new opportunity to the individuals: new challenge is called blog. Blogers
are all around us. Democratic institutions such as Hyde Park corner are not needed any more.
Blogers are having opportunity to publish what ever they want: opinion, news, and critic you
name it. Some of them are very good and valuable, most of them have no any value, but they
are practicing democratic right to freedom of expression.
5. Interculturalism: the missing link
Local media and independent journalists are counterpoints to the global media
corporations. Realistically, we need them both. World cannot exists without strong, influential
global media corporations and in the same time they need local media and independent
journalists.
Interculturalism is the key word in establishing the modern media environment. A
mono-cultural word would be a status of total captivity and hopelessness4. Thomas Bauer is
explaining:
In order to survive these dynamics of mutual perception between human beings,
groups, cultures and societies as (political and/or cultural) diversely designed community, it
needs order on both sides, minorities and majorities, which is characterized by communicative
competence.5
How media are reporting on racism, xenophobia and interculuralism? Research done
by European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, based in Vienna, and analyzed the
media good practice in the EU Member State in period 1995-2000. One of the conclusions was
that:
Furthermore, media practices and representations vary according to the management
of anti-racism norms, which differs from one situation to the other. That is, norms about what
can and cannot be said about migrants without being accused of racism affect the ways in
which media report and people talk about migrants and ethnic minorities. This is likely to vary
not only over time but also per country. Similarly, different conceptualizations of
multiculturalism and integration in the different Member States are likely to affect the (modes
of) representation of cultural diversity in the media6
So much about EU Members States. What is the South East European situation?
Ursula Plassnik, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote:
Since the downfall of communism, South East Europe has come a long way in the
acceptance of ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity and of the positive role minorities can
play in their societies. Great challenges lie ahead. The media have a key role to play further

Media and Minorities in South East Europe, SEEMO, Vienna, 2006, p. 5


Ibid, p. 6
6
Racism and cultural diversity in the mass media,EUMC, Vienna, 2002, p. 24
5

162
developing pluralism and promoting European values, among which minority rights figure
prominently.7
Obviously, there is no recipe how media should report on interculturalism. Each
country and each media are developing their own approach, depends on the situation. Diversity
is not determined by any act. Minority in one moment can become majority and vice versa.
Diversities are our reality and we have to open our minds, society and media to them. Miklos
Haraszti, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media is saying:
Recently, there has been increasing recognition of the crucial importance of the role
of the minority media within multilingual democracies...The essence of the democracy assumes
the full inclusion and integration of all people into the life of the nation, no matter what
language they speak.8
OSCE project on minority media resulted with the following conclusions:
1. The role of public service broadcasters is still vitally important. The private sector
alone cannot guarantee per se a pluralistic media landscape.
2. Support from the government is of crucial importance for the survival of minority
media. The practice of direct state funding always leaves room for state control over media and
should be avoided. Following the examples of some multilingual democracies, mechanisms of
indirect support, such as tax benefits, reduced postage costs or cross-subsidies, should be
considered in order tto enable minority media to operate independently.
3. The media, both mainstream and minority should promote mutual understanding in
multilingual societies by reflecting the multi-ethnic and multilingual society instead of focusing
only on their own community.
OSCE is supporting minority media in South East European countries, but their role in
the society is not very important. Most of these media are not professionally on high level, they
are under influence of the local ethnic minority politicians, who prefer old stylish role of media
as promoters of their image and not serving the audience. Financial support to minority media is
not sufficient and therefore good journalists are looking for better paid job and career in
mainstream media.
Interculturalism is not only task of the minority media. The main task is assigned to the
mainstream media. OSCE is pointing out these element as it was mentioned in research on
Racism and cultural diversity in mass media done by European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia.
6. How global media are reporting on interculturalism
Global media corporations are interested in news which will be of the interest of the
majority of the public. News should be interesting, actual, having well known actors, informing
about well known or exotic places. Blood, sex, sensations they are most important news
ingredients. It means that ethnic minority has no real chance to become breaking news. If does,
it is usually crime, scandal or something similar. It does not represent minorities in good image
and it is not interculturalism.
Ferdinand Christian Wehrschutz, correspondent for SEE of Austriana public TV
(ORF), based in Belgrade, commented the quality of the EU media correspondents from SEE:
Only few of them are speaking the language of the country where from are reporting.
In the contrary, most of the journalists from Eastern countries do know the local
language. Who is the better correspondent? And, what is the, so called, European
model of reporting?9
Andreas Rudasz, WAZ manager for SEE has a different opinion:

Media and Minorities in South East Europe, SEEMO, Vienna, 2006, p. x


Ibid. p. xii
9
Stated on Central European Initiative Journalists' forum, Tirana, 2006
8

163
Only economically successful media are free and only free media are successful.
Freedom of media is not enough. Management knowledge and market capability are
needed. WAZ model have these characteristics and thats why we are successful. 10
It is the model of all global companies. They are sending reporters without knowledge
of the country, they are not interested in diversities or interculturalism, they are looking only for
profit making news.
Model, offered by media experts and scientists is different. Thomas Bauer is
explaining:
We need media culture which is taking care about contribution of all participants:
individually, ethnicities and institutions, where media owner, editors, journalists and
public all in accordance of their own abilities - share the responsibility of the public
conscious. 11
Such media model has to be developed if we want to develop multicultural society.
7. How local media are reporting on diversity
Local media are under the influence of the global media. As we know, big global
media corporations are, like octopuses, spread all around South East European media market.
Their influence is huge and local media are competing with them for market success. Editorial
policy, based on diversity respect, interculturalism and media ethics is not achieving any market
result. And, only what counts is the profit making success.
In South East European countries the awareness of interculturalism is raising. Sinisa
Tatalovic, university professor and politician in Croatia, is saying:
It is of crucial importance to discuss all sensitive issues in multiethnic and
multicultural society without any national emotions and euphoria. 12
Public debate is impossible without mass media. How mass media, especially owned
by global media corporations, are covering this issue?
Igor Kaniaj, Croatian media researcher, analyzed daily newspapers reporting on
ethnic minorities in period 2001-2005. Results are not positive:
Minority coverage is based on news reporting, very informative, but without
analyses. Media logic is focused on partial reporting, not covering the whole story,
especially in countries in transition where tabloid newspapers are not creating even the
minimal conditions for serious reporting, characteristic to fair, balanced and impartial
journalism.13
Kanizajs conclusion is:
Editors, journalists and all other media experts should make an additional effort to
respect codes of ethics, but to show also sensitivity, responsibility and humanity in
diversity reporting, having in mind how their work is contributing to crating conditions
for tolerance in society.
Diversity reporting still is not in the focus of interest of Croatian journalists and it is
questionable when it will be, especially having in mind strong trend of tabloidization and
infotainement.
8. Conclusion
Similar research results are in the other South East European countries. Media are not
better than society in general. What is characteristic for society it is visible in mass media. So,

10
11

Ibid.
Bogatstvo razliitosti, ed. Malovic, Stjepan, Sveucilisna knjizara, Zagreb, 2004, p. 66

12

Ibid, p. 22

13

Kanizaj, Igor, Manjine izmeu javnosti i stvarnosti, JETiC, Zagreb, 2006, p. 124

164
the question is not When will media improve their attitude toward diversities, but When we
shall, as individuals and as representatives of public, change the understanding of diversities
and develop interculturalism?
References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Bogatstvo razliitosti, ed. Malovic, Stjepan, Sveucilisna knjizara, Zagreb, 2004


http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020107/miller
Kanizaj, Igor, Manjine izmeu javnosti i stvarnosti, JETiC, Zagreb, 2006
Malovi, Stjepan, Medijski prijepori, Izvori, Zagreb, 2004
Media and Minorities in South East Europe, SEEMO, Vienna, 2006
Media Ownership and its Impact on Media Indepedence and Pluralism, SEENPM,
Ljubljana, 2004
Media Power in Europe: The Big Picture on Ownership, EFJ, Brussels, 2005
Racism and cultural diversity in the mass media, EUMC, Vienna, 2002

165

Reviews and References

166
Olli Rehn, Europes Next Frontiers, 2006, Nomos Publishing House C.A.P.,
ISBN: 3-8329-2417-5
Olli Rehns [The Commissioner for Enlargement] recent book, Europes Next
Frontiers (August 2006, Brussels) falls within the long and rich tradition of the EU series,
established in 1997 by the reputed Director of the Center for Applied Policy Research at
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Prof. Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Dr.h.c. The present
book, based on the solid experience of the European political scene and views acquired over
two summers as the author himself acknowledges, came out of his active and genuine
participation in the making of Europe, at a time of the present challenges. For the past 60 years
mankind has witnessed the unifying of Europe. Contemporary European discourse is dominated
the limits and borders of Europe. The book is an attempt, as its author states, at making the
European Union more understandable for citizens, not only for experts; the author being of
opinion that in order to meet the future frontiers successfully, the civil society needs to be able
to sustain a well informed debate on this topic.
The envisaged, as well as the making of the European integration remains one of the
most grandiose and challenging strategic projects European Union is confronted with in the
forthcoming years. The success of European integration, the challenges and perspectives of
future EU enlargement is, nevertheless, something Olli Rehn goes far beyond in his approach.
Given the current crisis acknowledged by experts of the European project (rendered by the
failed referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, the current way the European Union is being
developed, the somewhat fading of the European idea within the political and intellectual
elite, even the lack of leadership that seems to endanger the success acquired so far), Olli Rehn
shares a passionate view of a convinced European, in spite of the defensive debate that goes on
in present Europe.
The pertinent solution offered by Olli Rehn in order for Europe to continue to evolve
and function better is grounded on three main arguments: I. The economic and social revival
of Europe described under the title of The First Frontier: Rebuilding Economic Confidence; II.
The strengthening of its capacity of horizontal and vertical enlargement, [which refers to the
political revival of Europe and the concepts of deepening vs. widening of Europe] presented
under the Second Frontier: Making Europe Function Well and III. Directing European Unions
soft power to South-East Europe - whereto accession of the countries in the area had been
carefully managed, discussed under the Third Frontier: Building a New Consensus on
Enlargement.
Starting from the idea that the current perception of the Europeans is that EU today has
turned to a different evolution than the one envisaged from the beginning, the author urges us,
Europeans, to think in terms of next frontiers as being ones that promote a new institutional
framework and a more democratic Europe this being perceived as being the challenge of our
time.
The author then refers in his approach, to the unfinished transformation of Europe;
focusing on the 1989 moment [the fall of the Berlin Wall] being the second great
transformation of post-war Europe, marked particularly by three main world resounding
issues: the end of communism, economic globalization and the digital revolution, preceded by
the one that took place in the 1950s.
The flow of events, succeeding each other in the EUs process of political integration
is then brought to the moment of May 29, 2005 and the overall feeling of crisis created
thereafter by the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. While
the second founding moment of Europe associated with implementing the constitutional
reform was blocked, the other parallel structure the economic and political transformation
keeps on its impetus.
In order to be able to continue its evolution, Olli Rehn argues, first the economic and
social revival of Europe must be pursued task which translates by strengthening European

167
economy, improving competitiveness, creating new jobs and raising unemployment rates.
Tracing the evolution of the EU since the beginnings of European integration, with its first
decades until the late 1990s of great success , which in spite of the internal market and the
liberalization of the great economies, has lead to the creation of the biggest economic area in
the world, with the single currency providing the monetary and economic stability. Europe is
confronted with the economic globalization and an aging population, facing fierce competition
from two poles East Asia and the US. However, stronger economic growth is what
tomorrows Europe needs.
Economic performance has obvious political consequences, is what Olli Rehn
asserts in the next analysis, thus leading the reader towards the Political Revival of Europe,
perceived as the second frontier. In reality, we need both an economic Europe and a political
Europe. Economic reforms are needed in order to enhance competitiveness and political
reforms to make the Union more effective and democratic, the two of them complementing
each other. Olli Rehn further on brings into discussion the enhanced cooperation as a method
to develop the EU by the member states who are both able and willing to enhance integration.
The most relevant areas where enhanced cooperation is poignant, are: the major and recent
integration initiatives [the single currency, the free movement of persons, the common foreign
and security policy] have started this way. The next ones would involve joint efforts in the fight
against terrorism, cross-border crime, and illegal immigration - all endeavours that require clear
principles that should be implemented via the EU institutions. Reference is being made in the
context to the new European order, which must be inclusive of both old and new member
states.
In this chain of frontiers, contributing to the consolidation of the EU, the next link is
represented by enlargement, seen as the third frontier, entitled in Olli Rehns book Building a
new consensus on enlargement. This can be made possible only by the above-mentioned
second factor a deeper political union. The third frontier thus refers according to the author
to extending the European zone of peace, liberty and prosperity, by better projecting the EU
soft power especially through a gradual, rigorous and carefully managed accession process.
Olli Rehn uses Joseph Nyes definition of soft power, according to whom soft power is defined
as: the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion. The EU
has at its disposal a series of means and ways of ensuring the rule of law and civilian crisis
management, money, trade diplomacy, peace keepers as well as civilian missions.
In the author view, enlargement reflects the deepest essence of the EU as a civilian
power. Building consensus is needed on enlargement, at the same time ensuring the Unions
capacity to function. We have all witnessed calls to slow down or even stop future rounds of EU
enlargement, particularly in what Romania and Bulgaria were concerned the eastwards
enlargement based on the idea that taking on more commitments than the EU can handle should
be avoided. But at the same time, it would make no sense to stop suddenly a process that helps
to bring stability to the unstable areas of Europe.
The challenge the European Union is faced with at its present state is improving its
functioning capacity. The EU enlargement process of today is headed towards the EU accession
process meant to continue promoting transformations in a democratic way in the West Balkans
and confer Turkey the status of a bridge between civilizations. The consolidated enlargement
agenda currently covers South East Europe, including Bulgaria and Romania (2007), the West
Balkans, and Turkey. Olli Rehn is of opinion that the West Balkans represent a particularly
important testing ground for the EU soft power and that the region needs a credible European
perspective to drive reforms forward. EU negotiations with Turkey have been the subject of
much and prolonged debate among EU member states. The answer to why does the EU
negotiate with such a country as Turkey resides in the fact that this is in the Unions own
strategic interests, the greatest challenge of our time being Europes relationship with Islam.
Another strong motivation would be undoubtedly the issue of stability in the rather unstable
MiddleEast.
The great problem of terrorism, civilisational and geostrategic conflicts and wars

168
occurred in the post- Cold War world has forced Europe to reconsider its relationships with
Islam. The best response to this, in the authors view, is a policy of containment and
cooperation, i.e. an attempt at containing the Islamic fundamentalism while cooperating with
moderate strands of Islam in the context of the XXI-st century, seen as a century of dialogue
and interaction among member states.
From the Introduction to his book and all to its Final goals, Olli Rehn pleads for an
urge addressed to Europeans to think in terms of next frontiers as innovative, stimulative of
action and increasing our influence, rather than of limits and borders that seem to have
dominated the contemporary European discourse, to which he attaches negative connotations,
i.e. of being restrictive, limitative and reducing influence.
His urge is an appeal to learn something from the American mentality and view new
frontiers as opportunities not as threats. European Unions 2007 Eastern enlargement is a
proof of a successful view on an innovative approach of the next frontiers. This but echoes
the dream of the founding fathers, despite the existence of the then Iron Curtain: Over 50 years
ago Robert Schumann called for the European Union to be ready, in time, to welcome the
sisters and brothers of Central and Eastern Europe to our common European family. So we did,
and we can be proud of it.
Thus approaching these frontiers can be done with a confident state of mind, as Europe
does have strengths to build on, is Olli Rehns certitude. Europes next frontier is very
pragmatic and tangible, like a piece of functionalist architecture. By proving that it is up to its
task, the European Union can regain the support of its citizens. Its policies must be geared to
deliver results for citizens more jobs, better education, greater security and more solid social
welfare. Thats the terrain where Europes next frontiers lie [Olli Rehn, p.22].
Ioana Albu, ialbu@uoradea.ro

Jean Tardif, Joelle Farchy, Les enjeux de la mondialisation culturelle, Hors


Commerce, 2006, Paris, 365 p, ISBN 10: 2-915286-62-0,
ISBN 13: 978-2-915286-62-5
Les enjeux de la mondialisation culturelle is a very interesting study of the present
day world with problems arised by the continuous changes in the economic, political and
cultural life of humanity.
Jean Tardif, one of the authors, taught anthropology at Kinshasa, Lumbashi and
Montreal, worked in the Foreign Office in Quebec and founded PlanetAgora International
Association. The other one, Joelle Farchy, is an economist and teacher of Information and
Communication Science at the University of Paris 1.
According to the two authors the problems of cultural identity become stronger every
year and in connection with these they put the question of how people can live together having
so many different cultures. They make a survey of the last years crises and point out the rising
in the outskirts of Paris, the problems caused by the caricatures of Mohamed, the refusal of the
European Union constitution by the French and Dutch. Pierre Manent is quoted with his
suggestion to deal with these problems using the means of modern and classic political science
beginning with the notion of culture defined by Montesquieu.
The two authors analyze the notion of culture, its evolution and its importance in the
history of mankind. They observe that the interest for cultural problems appears only when
different cultures bring about the subject of political demands. The evolution of economy and
politics which went global gave birth to a new cultural system, a global one too, which includes
all the cultures in the world, one by one. They go on observing all the implications
mondialization has upon cultures and how they influence each other.
They consider that the most important problem of cultural mondialization is how
people should live together at a global level with all the cultural differences which keep

169
changing all the time. From now on the book analyzes the present-day situation at different
levels and ends with a suggestion for a project that gives culture a great role.
Thus the reader finds out about the importance of mass media for the cultural
activities, the problems of national identity which are strongly related to culture and its
symbols, the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall upon the globalization of media, the empire of
the internet, the commercial media that bring profits of millions of dollars.
The dramatic events of September 11 and the Tzunami of December 26, 2004 are
presented to exemplify the existence of a global public opinion that manifested itself on these
occasions. Thus the authors conclude that media has the most important role in the cultural
mondialization. They also deal with culture seen from the economists point of view, the
evolution of the concept itself, cultural diversity, culture seen as merchandise, the American
hegemony over mass media, and the domination of the American films over the world screen.
After asserting and proving the existence of the process of mondialization, Tardif and
Farchy raise the question of mastering this process. They underline the difficulty of such a thing
when taking into account the interests of mankind which are not at all the same as those of the
national state. As a solution they suggest global governance that has as main objective to settle
the means by which it can manage the interdependences between societies and between
humanity and biosphere.
In this governance culture has a political dimension, there are certain cultural factors
which determine the structure and interaction between societies, they deal with the problems of
cultural politics at national and international level, and also they recognize the importance of
culture in the strategies of present-day political powers and suggest a solution: global cultural
pluralism.
Their conclusion is that mondialization is not a myth, but a reality that leaves its mark
on the beginning of the 21st century, giving the individual the opportunity to change his relation
to himself and also with the Other who is more and more present in his life. Tardif and Farchy
consider global political pluralism as a workable political project and compare it with the
European Union project construction and its present-day achievements.
The book gives us an image of the world we are living in, a deep analysis of the
problems of this world and also suggests solutions, gives us reasons to think and act so that we
may make ourselves a better place to live in.
Dana Pantea, pantea.dana@rdsor.ro

Thomas Lundn (editor), Crossing the Border. Boundary Relations in a Changing


Europe, Sdertrn University College, Stockholm, 2006, 199 p, ISSN: 1651-7849
Published under the patronage of the Centre for Baltic and Eastern European Studies,
this volume is made up of an interesting group of surveys concerning different topics relating to
the border. From a theoretic approach to different case studies referring to certain cross-border
models and behaviours, the analysis is carried out either through a historical approach, or
through a parallel and comparative approach of different systems of cross-border relations.
The volume begins with an introductory study of Mr. Thomas Lundn in which the
author makes a brief presentation of the papers in the volume paralleled by the definition of
general concepts, such as: border boundary, nation- state, nationality, political geography, or
geopolitics.
The first survey in the volume, Theoretical Limology: New Analytical Approaches,
signed by Prof. Vladimir Kolossov, intends to be a theoretic approach of the border from both
the cultural, political, administrative, economic, and social points of view, and the introduction
of certain concepts, such as security in such an analysis. The Moscow professor tries to define
the new trends of the closeness between people, cultures, and peoples in the context of the
wealth of their old historical traditions. The identity of the border in the context of a strong

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globalisation phenomenon and of the integration to the European structures becomes an
important axis on which the theoretical and conceptual analysis has been built. The author also
makes an interesting approach of topics, such as: The approach to border from the perspective
of security, Border as social representations or The eco-political approach.
Linas Eriksonas proposes the study of the Historic Border and Ethnic Arguments in
Eastern Europe after 1918. Through the examples it provides, the paper sheds light on the
effects of different after-war decisions; these decisions were based on the ethnic argument in
assessing the borders. As shown in the paper, millions of people had to suffer because of such
argued decisions invented to protect the population. The ethnic and linguistic arguments
lying at the basis of the territorial disputes are analysed from the historical-geographical
perspective and in tight relation with the principle of nationalities. For instance, the author
proposes a historical analysis of the Polish border and the Polish-Lithuanian disputes.
Crossing the Boundaries of Positionality: Some Methodological Remarks on the
Flexible Fieldwork, as proposed by Jaanus Veemaa, is the following paper in the volume. The
survey intends to be an investigation of the geopolitical practices in the context of the crossborder regionalisation through the approach of different positions of the research.
Nicole Ehlers proposes the paper entitled The Legitimacy of Europe. Through a case
study on a Euroregion lying at the border between Germany and the Netherlands, the author
tries to seize different mechanisms of the European integration. The process, which is deeply
stimulated through cross-border cooperation, has contributed to setting up regional models of
political and academic interest. The paper makes a presentation of the context, legitimacy and
issues (strong migration, new barriers between people, and so on) that Europe has to face.
Ingmar Oldberg proposes the paper Russian-Baltic Border Problems in a Comparative
Perspective. The paper sheds light on different issues in the Baltic area. The analysis is a
comparative presentation of the border relations Estonia-Latvia and Lithuania-Kaliningrad
against the background of the international context after 1990.
The paper From Wall to Window: Russian-Estonian Cross-border Environmental
Cooperation, signed by Anastasia Lundqvist, shows different cross-border issues between
Estonia and the Russia. By analysing their contexts, the author shows a history of the tensions
and contacts between the two countries after Estonia has become independent and the Soviet
Union has disintegrated.
In the paper On the Margin: Youth in Narva and Valga on the Estonian Border Denis
Zelamans tries to show the image of two Estonian cities at the border: Narva i Valga.
Katarzyna Stokosa proposes the paper Two Sides of the Border and One Regional
Identity: the Identity Problem in the German-Polish and the Ukrainian-Slovak Border Regions.
Regional identity is the main focus of the paper. Right from the beginning, we may notice the
differences between regional and national identity. In order to prove her theories, the author
makes a diachronic approach of the comparative analysis of the two models shown in the case
study: the Polish-German and the Slovak-Ukrainian ones.
In his paper, Slovakia and Its Border after the EU Enlargement, Ivo Samson focuses
on the Slovak border in the context of the European integration. The brief historical
introduction in which Slovakias identity within Czechoslovakia is identified; the author tries to
show the main stages and issues Slovakia has to face on its way to adopting the Community
acquis, the visa policy, migration control, and so on.
One City with Two Images and Two Communities: the Case of the Romanian
Hungarian City of Satu Mare/Szatmrnmeti (Anders Blomqvist) presents diversity and
multiculturalism through the dialogue between the population and the political elites of the city
of Satu Mare. Lying near the Romanian- Hungarian border, the city exceeds itself through the
cooperation needed in the context of the new regional and Euroregional development
policies.
Andrei S. Makarychev proposes the paper From Margin to Margin: Baltic and Black
Seas Regionalisms in a Comparative Perspective. The author tries to make a terminological
analysis to outline the core of the notion of margin as compared to the frontier. The concept

171
of periphery (as related to the margin) is also shown against the background of the strategic
argument between Russia, the USA, and the European Union to control the area between the
Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.
The last paper in the volume, Cross-border Cooperation, the Upper Rhine Euroregion:
a Model for the Tumen Projenct in Northeast Asia?, is proposed by Eckart Dege and Gequn
Feng. The topic is bold. The project of the comparative study of a European Euroregion and an
Asian one has proved to be very interesting in the context of a visible globalisation in both the
Euro-Atlantic area and the Asian one. The differences and resemblances between the two
regions are shown on the political, economic, administrative, cultural levels and from the point
of view of the ecological situation.
Mircea Brie, briedri@hotmail.com

Klara Czimre, Cross-border Co-operation Theory and Practice,


Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, Debrecen, 2006, 146 p,
ISBN 963 472 978 9
Klara Czimre, author of the book on Cross-border Co-operation Theory and
Practice, divides the topics into four great topics: comparative analysis of the literature in the
field, interpretation of the current frontier and border regions policy, means for cross-border
cooperation in the EU and Central Europe, and cross-border policy case study.
The first topic compares the European geographic research and the study focused on
the borders and border regions from the point of view of four subject divisions: political
geography, economic geography, cultural geography, and regional geography. Three means of
cooperation are shown: cross-border, interregional, and transnational; they are analysed on the
level of cooperation, organisations, cooperation structures, and networks.
The geographical interpretation is considered from the point of view of the four subject
divisions mentioned above, each comprising specific elements:
a) political geography: states, nations, sovereignty, nationalism, economic policies,
critical geopolitics, cross-border regionalisation;
b) economic geography: flows, border dissolution, cross-border interaction, spatial
annihilation;
c) cultural geography: identity policies, national culture, ethnie, race, environment,
peace, feminist movements, migration, and refugees;
d) regional geography: region democracy, regions and social structures, regions as a
result of the historical process, and regional identity.
Geographical politics and cultural geography are reflected in knowledge and power
using three aspects of the border: role of defining border lines, functions of the border, closed
border regions, and mutual relations. The study of the borders and border regions is focused on
the following areas: North America, Africa, Asia, as well as Hungary in its relations with
Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine. A series of specialists in the field of the
research of the border and border areas analyse the borders from different points of view as
resulted from a series of classifications.
Peter Haggett comparatively analyses the models of border and border regions, out of
which we may notice: subsequent limits, previous limits, and superposed limits.
Remigio Roti finds the borders as: closed, filtered, and open.
Oscar Martinez speaks about borders: alienated, co-existent, independent, and
integrated.
The interpretation of the competences of theories and models in the 21st century
Europe envisages the following aspects:
a) multidimensional border character;
b) spatial dimension of the borders;

172
c) multicultural aspect;
d) border dynamics.
All through the interpretation of the current policy of borders and border regions, the
changes that have taken place on the level of the European Union concerning the full Member
States throughout time are shown, from 1957 to 1995. In order to have an efficient regional
development, the following aspects have been considered: a better coordination of regional
policies, SME promotion, stabilisation of socio-economic situations, reduction of the migration
phenomenon, and organisation of the transport infrastructure.
Amongst the legal foundations of cross-border cooperation, the following official
documents are mentioned: Resolution on Cooperation between Local Communities in Frontier
Areas (Resolution 74), (1974), European Outline Convention on Cross-border Cooperation
between Territorial Communities or Authorities (1980), European Regional / Spatial Planning
Charter (1983), European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985), Legal Declaration on
Cross-border Cooperations (1987), Community Charter for Regionalisation (1988), European
Convention on Cross-border Television (1995), Additional Protocol to the European Outline
Convention on Cross-border Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities
(1998), Strategies for Promoting Cross-border and Interregional Cooperation in Enlarged EU
(2002), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
European grouping of cross-border cooperation (EGCC), (2004). On the level of community
initiatives in the service of cross-border cooperation in Europe, European projects and policies
have developed, as follows: Interreg I (1990- 19993), Interreg II A (1994 - 1999), Interreg III
(2000 - 2006), Phare CBC, Phare CREDO, LACE, TACIS CBC, CARDS, MEDA and the
European Neighbourhood Policy.
The European Association of the Border Regions (EABR) plays a vital role in the life
of cross-border cooperation. The organisation is analysed, as well as its cooperation with the
European Union, Euroregions, and EABR objectives and responsibilities.
Another interesting point is the Schengen convention and the development of the
Schengen area, its connections with the European Union, the members of the Schengen group
that have signed the agreement starting with 1990 and the date when the agreement came into
force for each signatory. The Schengen informational system is backed up by data provided by
the Member States via national sections (N-SIS) and the central technical function (C-SIS). The
relations between the aspects of enlargement and cross-border cooperation are presented; the
steps for integration to the European Union taken by the European countries, the types of
borders after integration, the joint borders, and other relevant indicators are shown.
After the forms of cross-border cooperation in the European Union and Central
Europe, Euroregions, chronological development of interregional cooperation, and the types of
cross-border cooperation are defined. A successful Euroregion has to meet certain prerequisites,
such as: the interest of the inhabitants has a vital role and has to be considered, institutions and
organisations to be involved on both sides of the border, the representatives of political life have
to be involved at all levels, the creation of bodies to efficiently carry out their tasks. On the
level of a Euroregion, there are two types of factors able to generate cooperation or not. They
are as follows:
a) unification factors: geographical location, climate, common history, common
culture, economic development, commerce, linguistic competences, common strategies;
b) inhibitory factors: differences aiming at the administrative system and
responsibilities, tax system, territorial planning and regional development, legal and executive
methods, linguistic measures, and measures for protection and territorial planning.
Euroregions are classified into two great categories, A and B, each having
subcategories:
a) A category cooperation along the internal borders with other three subcategories:
A1, A2, and A3;
b) B category cooperation along the external borders, involving three subcategories,
too: B1, B2, and B3.

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In the last part, cross-border practice is shown with direct reference to case studies of
different categories of Euroregions, either A or B level.
The case studies present regions with diversified participation, where certain important
indicators are shown, such as: participant countries, regions members, size of the region,
population, density, financial support from the European Union, position of the border, type of
border, access to internet and information in general. Amongst the regions subject to the first
case, we mention the following: A category - Irish Central Border Area Network (ICBAN),
Meuse Rhine Euroregion, West/Nyugat Pannonia Euroregion, Glacensis Euroregion; B
category: cooperation amongst border regions of the EFTA countries, Nordkalotten
Pohjoiskalotti, Adriatic Euroregion, BUG Euroregion.
Constantin oca, ctoca@uoradea.ro

Gbor Kozma, Place Marketing, Debrecen, 2006, 166 p, ISBN: 963 472 975 4
Place Marketing is a new field of marketing that is very little studied in Romania,
where the use of its instruments for the territorial analysis happens only in isolated cases.
Although its role is unquestionable in the actual context, characterized by the strong
competition between places, as he analyzes the territorial factors that can attract industrial
investments, tourists, qualified workers, commercial implantations, specialized services, public
agencies, technical examinations
According to the author of this book, the development of place marketing was
supported by the following elements: the economic structural change of the 1970s and 1980s,
the new trends in urbanization, the budgetary problems of the countries, the change in the
attitude towards central planning, the prosperity of tourism and the globalization of the world
economy.
The author of this book, Gabor Kozma, is a specialist in this field; his book is a
rigorous analysis of all elements of place marketing.
The study begins by describing the evolution of the term place marketing and the
relationships between place marketing and the marketing of traditional goods. From the place
marketings point of view the place is regarded as a product, and the target-group is divided
into three categories: economic participants, tourists and inhabitants.
The parallel made by the author between business marketing and place marketing is
very interesting as it emphasizes the idea that the biggest differences between business
marketing and place marketing occur in relation to the product to be sold: the place as a product
has different characteristics from those goods and services which have been in the focus of
marketing sciences since its beginning. In place marketing, the same physical space has to be
sold to various consumers who want to use it for different purposes.
The author emphasizes the stages of the place marketing.
The first stage of this process is represented by the analysis of the means used for this
place marketing strategy: SWOT analysis, selection of marketing policy, definition of target
groups (segmentation), definition of the development priorities.
The second stage of place marketing refers to the product development. They are
interested in the product development in order to satisfy the demand, as much as possible,
through the:
providing the necessary human and physical infrastructure;
creating the proper institutional background through the actions accomplished by
the local authority and through the cooperation between the public, private and non-profit
organizations.
participation of local authorities and of other organizations in programmes and
events related to the product development: cultural, commercial, sports and religious events at
local, national, regional and global level.

174
It should be remembered the fact that, from all cultural events mentioned in the book,
the author insists on the programme European Capital of Culture; he considers this
programme a means of promoting the cooperation among peoples and the improvement of
cooperation in the field of culture.
The author emphasizes the need for watching the impact of these programmes, of the
negative and positive effects of them upon the analyzed place. Thus he states that: the analysis
must extend to the changes in economic and political life, tourism and commerce, the physical
and built environment, as well as the fields of society and culture.
In the field of economic life, the effects are in terms of direct income generated by the
purchases and expenditures of participants and visitors; taxes to local and central government
budget; invisible and special export revenue; increase in the number of job opportunities. The
political life is affected by the perspectives of national and local policies. In the field of tourism
and commerce, the media exposure accompanying the events could raise international attention.
The built environment refers to the development of local infrastructure, which could improve
the accessibility. Finally, the socio-cultural impacts refer to the preservation and reinforcement
of regional values and traditions.
use of architecture (modern architecture and/or relics of the historical past) in order
to create an attractive built environment.
In the last part of the book the author analyzes the third stage of place marketing
strategy, the communication activity. It is a very important part of this process; thus the author
states that communication represents one of the most spectacular and most striking elements
from the outside world, for which important amounts of money are allocated from the budgets
dedicated to marketing.
The communication activity implies two stages:
creating the place image so that this image or its message should convince the
target groups about the opportunities and advantages of the envisaged place.
spreading the message towards different categories of target-groups thus using the
most efficient methods.
In the process of message elaboration we should distinguish between the actual public
and the potential public and different elaborated communication strategies. In the case of
potential users of the place, we should also differentiate the message in accordance with the
identified target-groups. For instance, for the economic participants, the communication activity
must focus on the economic advantages of the given territory (offered by the firms settled down
in the area): good geographical location, rapid accessibility, qualification of the labour force,
the quickness of administration, the applicability of the results of the scientific sphere in
economic life.
In order to transmit a message, different instruments can be used: advertisements,
direct marketing, Internet, publications, brochures and public relations. According to the author,
in the field of advertisement the newspapers and magazines are the most popular [] because
the target groups may be easily reached through them [] and certain target groups may be
reached at the best time. As for public relations, they have advantages like cheapness,
credibility, efficiency and extensiveness.
This study required a huge research work represented by the references and
footnotes from the best studies and works in this field from all over the world and it also
contains examples and practical cases where place marketing is used on different continents.
Its scientific content and relevant practical approaches recommend this book as a
reference study in the place marketing field.
Luminia oproni, lsoproni@uoradea.ro

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Henry Comte, Nicolas Levrat, Aux Coutures de LEurope. Dfis et enjeux
juridiques de la coopration transfrontalire, LHarmattan, Paris, 2006, 365 p,
ISBN 2-296-00845-3
The book Aux Coutures de LEurope. Defis et enjeux juridiques de la cooperation
transfrontaliere is made up of two parts: the first part focuses on the research of cooperation
areas at the borders of France, while the second one is focused on the idea of cross-border
governance, the enlargement and rethinking of the issue.
Cross-border cooperation in the Upper Rhine area and the particular case of the trinational agglomeration in Bale: in the first case, cross-border cooperation is the result of the
endeavours started forty years ago, a process considered from a historical perspective at the
beginning. The progressive formation of the border in the Upper Rhine area led to a separation
of the region, particularly the traditional influence area. This gives rise to three different
political and institutional theories: the Upper Rhine Euroregion, Regio Tri Rhena, and the trinational agglomeration of the city of Bale. Cooperation between these national territories is
subscribed to the intergovernmental framework and to a framework directly connecting
territorial communities.
A strategy to make the French-Belgian metropolitan area a cross-border metropolis: the
Grootstad project is a cross-border design and development scheme that started in 1998 and
ended in 2000. It set up a strategy process, objectives, concrete actions, in order to establish
the French-Belgian cross-border metropolis and it was funded by the European Commission.
The agglomeration is made up by the Flemish region, the Wallonia Region, the Western
Flanders Province and the six partner institutions directly involved in the project, out of which
five are inter-communal and one is an agency. Cross-border cooperation on the level of the
French-Spanish border is full of paradoxes. The mountainous character of the border (the
Pyrenees Mountains) and the low density makes this region less favourable to communication
and cooperation than other borders. Nevertheless, throughout time, many important crossPyrenees relations have been established; nowadays, the French-Spanish border is familiar with
several experiences of cross-border cooperation that are mainly focused at the two extremes of
the massif, that is, the Catalan Community and the Basque Country.
Maritime border cooperation between Corsica and Italy is a great example of
attenuation of the isolation effects, although there are boundaries, such as: culture, research,
marine environment protection, maritime security, energetic exchanges. The INTERREG
programme that facilitates exchange development in border area and financially supports
different project developed by local authorities is applied to maritime borders and implicitly to
this border. Through cooperation with Italy along the Livorno Bastia Cagliari axis, the two
islands will be able to elaborate a strategy for economic development and practise together
competences for the management of the shared area. The cross-border area is also favourable,
as it brings together local communities to manage the joint territory in narrow and hostile fields,
as the geographical area prevents a strict application of the cross-border principles and
regulations.
The French-Wallonia-Geneva agglomeration makes up a cross-border area requiring
solutions to overcome the limits of the border. Amongst the current cooperation projects are the
following: TGV, modernising the railways, international NGO development strategies, ant the
hydrographical field. The agglomeration is a major human, political, and economic objective
and is a privileged observation point for the evolution of law in point of cross-border
cooperation.
Although one may notice a great evolution of the legal framework in the field of crossborder cooperation through the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe, the additional
Protocol to the Framework Convention, the bilateral agreements, as well as the evolution of the
national legislations, the actors of this cooperation do not always find the efficient instruments
to overcome the numerous international frontiers in the developed rules. This does not prevent
them from continuing and increasing cross-border cooperation through agreements,

176
conferences, and enlargement of cooperation amongst countries with other actors. The ideas
carried in this direction open some new pathways leading to ways of cross-border governance.
Considering the fact that the association of cross-border cooperation with the treatment
of issues relating to simple neighbourhood is outdated, the quasi-universal trend leading public
actors and the diversity of relationship networks is a natural work in the border area. The
application of a great strategic project has led to the formulation of theses concerning both the
project codes of conduct and the need for a strong implication of the states.
Cross-border strategies are established by putting together competences belonging to
several actors on both sides of the border and the states central administration. Cross-border
strategies may and have to be acts of international public law. The international public law rules
are applied in cooperation and solve certain controversies related to their validity or
interpretation. The rules of internal law however will determine the statute in each of the
international legal courts of the international strategies.
The areas of cross-border cooperation analysed in the first part shows a high diversity
concerning the amplitude and degree of maturity. Nevertheless, they all share the ambition to
subscribe to the perspective of a continuous and long-term development. Surveys establish that
the core of cross-border cooperation nowadays is merely a sum of dispersed operations, each
pursuing its own finality, but integrating them in a global long-term project, in a joint strategy
for territorial development. The strategic imperative on the level of the European Union makes
the ambitious project put into practice a Plan for the Development of the Community Area.
The operational level of cross-border projects often needs a high integration. For the
political and administrative authorities concerned, the creation of a cross-border body acquires a
symbolic value, as it is about showing a joint will to be part of a single legislation and structural
framework. This institutional daring bears risks, too: the cross-border bodies are still a
prototype; they are not yet well known and managed. The European and international law
acknowledge a certain ability to set up cooperation bodies of the territorial communities. Thus,
the author pursues the creation of the cross-border bodies in France and abroad, as well as the
issues that have appeared since their creation.
The legal status and regime of the cross-border cooperation bodies in the French law
bring together the remarks of different borders in the same country France as, in the authors
opinion, it is the only European country trying to systematically develop a national law
appropriate to cross-border cooperation. In the French law, the general code of territorial
communities provides several possibilities to set up cooperation bodies divided into three main
categories: the first is backed up by a joint traditional solution resorting to the private law; the
second envisages the adaptation of the French law to cross-border cooperation bodies whose
form is determined by the international instruments related to France, and the third group
comprises the most interesting solutions that the French lawyers develop by their own initiative
with the aim to provide a specific framework to French and foreign border territorial
communities in the French legal system, in order to join their actions for cooperation.
On the level of any cross-border cooperation, there are two levels of the project: the
strategic level that is related to designing the general plan as decided for the territory in point,
and the operational level that is related to the concrete completion of different operations
comprised in the plan. The two types of projects have different features: the strategic projects
have a strong decision-making aspect stimulating the intellectual and political resources that
define the general ways of action, while the operational projects stimulate considerable
technical and financial means.
The decision-making focused on issues such as: border territories management, crossborder projects decision-making, neighbourhood management in cross-border territorial
development, cross-border frontier management, as well as cross-border governance. The work
of the authors leads to the successive study of the funding and cross-border cooperation sources.
Here, elements relating to the general issues and European funding of cooperation projects are
debated, as well as the use of resources in cross-border cooperation, laying stress on national
management under community control, after the general elements.

177
The great number of controls to which the actors of cross-border cooperation are
subject is applied depending on several variables, such as the border concerned, the type of
cross-border activity, the holder of the control power being a source for unbalance. In this
context, we have to consider improving these controls on the level of the civil society and the
state, if real cross-border governance is desired.
The responsibility of local actors in cross-border cooperation is shown in the case of
France, as the first part shows the denial, or limitation, of their responsibilities specific to the
first actions for the development of cross-border relations, while the second is focused on
defining the elements that facilitate the continuation of a range of responsibilities of local actors
in cooperation.
Comte and Nicolas Leuvrat suggest a strict methodology concerning cross-border
projects and four main pathways for work and debate amongst researchers (four axes):
rethinking the role of the state, finding new joint regulations entailing steady effects, resizing
the commitment of local actors, and increasing the legitimacy of the projects.
Alina Praja, alina_praja@yahoo.com

Philippe Hamman, Les travailleurs frontaliers en Europe. Mobilits et mobilisations


transnationales, LHarmattan, Paris, 2006, 263 p, ISBN 2-296-00431-8
Philippe Hamman divides his work entitled Les travailleurs frontaliers en Europe.
Mobilites et mobilisations transnationales (Border Workers in Europe. Transnational Mobility
and Mobilisation) into three parts, each comprising specific chapters supported by graphic
representations, tables, and maps facilitating the understanding of the presented data. The three
parts on which the author is focused are the following:
a) defending border workers, an a priori illegitimate cause: defending border workers
appears to be an illegitimate cause as confronted with a twofold negative image profiteers and
cooperate demands;
b) a way to avoid the appearance of a militant expertise: making a militant expertise
for community law as a means to avoid the obstacles through valued competences in the new
European area;
c) objectives of making professional border association: making professional practices
through associations representing the interests of the field actors.
Through the action of the border workers, two unfavourable images of their actions
develop and evolve: the privileged border inhabitant, the object where the evolution of the
border workers employed in Switzerland is analysed by nationality in 1969 1989, and the
corporatist pressure group.
Hence there is the need to define and disseminate in legitimate terms the interests of the
cross-border workers. At the same time, when seizing the primary legitimacy of the group, there
is a better understanding of the mobilisation channels as retained by communities differing from
national unions.
As a first definition, the expertise sends us to an issue claiming a specialist science
translated into a notice within the decision-making process. It is about understanding what
border associations expertise consist of as far as the equipments stimulating them are
concerned.
On a national level, border representatives have to face a random, or unfavourable,
identification of the interest they intend to promote.
At the same time, social actors are involved within a limited rational framework; they
are caught in a web of interactions and institutions and are determined by structural dynamics
out of their control.
Facing these boundaries, they resort to legal lobby: the way of making up a group is
moulded by the available actions and by the envisaged action framework. When interfering on a

178
European level, they provide the opportunity to choose between direct representation,
consultants, or participation to an already existing network.
When analysing militant relationships, opposition and institutionalism suppose the
reconstruction of the dispositions allowing the materialisation of the commitment. Indeed,
expert knowledge is in turn a savoir-faire (a range of action keys allowing the passage from one
situation to another), a savoir-comprendre (allowing the finishing of the information reliability
by resorting to previous knowledge), and a savoir-combiner (ranging, ordering).
Thus, border representatives allot uncanny qualities to law and community law in
particular. These uses are not only informative, they are also militant and challenged, they
correspond to what these people are: often former members of trade unions that have faced
national lack of opportunity to settle cross-border conflicts.
Organisations are attached to an institutional chain through their contacts with social
and fiscal policies that always suggest inspired actions. Bearer of contradictory injunctions, the
figure of the militant expert is not implicit; it is the progressive acquisition through border
workers of an inescapable part of social and legal issues that have to be debated.
Pertinent areas and networking imply multilayered cross-border objectives for public
action. Different aspects of the expertise as applied by associations are underlined. The last
chapter describes and analyses the movement toward professionalism that involve these actors
in a necessary education in point of legal and European issues.
This debate allows a break from the classical lecture of the associative commitment as
shown in Friedmanns works as an un-work activity, revealing active lobbies, returning justice
to an increasing diversity of statutes amongst the members of border communities.
The study of cross-border organisations is even more important as they bring together
three elements: militant, technical, and assistance; they are often shown separately in producing
a cause and then associated. The evolution within communities shows that the militant aspect is
always present beyond the legal treatment of individual situations. The origin of border
associations is a local one; it is a reaction to the feeling of misunderstanding from the public
power. We have to notice the original connection between the European growth of border issues
and the decrease of the single use of community law. Hence, there are two main consequences:
on the one hand, there is the advanced opposition amongst politicised militants bonded by an
ideology strengthening and driving the group towards the future and volunteers envisaging
immediate objectives and the new governing relations taking part in the community integration
that underline the changes of public action and require readjustments.
There is also a cross-border aspect of the collective action. One may distinguish
between three possible degrees of evolution of the Europeanization process. The most basic one
is the awareness of the existence on a supranational level of decisions stimulating professional
organisations to make up European interest groups or join one of them and establish periodical
contacts with community public actors. The advanced form of Europeanization involves the
transfer of national routine to the new political area. Last but not least, the most advanced form
of Europeanization involved the enlargement of the area for political action and the horizon of
perception of the European dimension. The benefits entailing from here do not seem to be more
exclusive nowadays, the relations between border, central, union, national and cross-border
EURES associations confirm the parallel evolutions regarding the strength relations between
organisations aiming at legitimately representing a border cause. The existence of different
levels of public action in Europe is characterised by a dynamic redefinition of the relationships
between actors. Through the relations between border representatives and the elected and the
representatives of the Government, local and national administrations, European institutions, or
other trade unions, there is a plurality of social transactions. The range of actors involved in
public policies has expanded to local authorities, private enterprises, representatives of different
services and territorial communities, consultants, and associations. Border associations, which
are influenced by the militant profile of their leaders and the specific bilateral issues relating to
their territories of implementation, are well adapted to the European logic, the importance of
involved legal expertise, interventions in the field of normalisation and parallel recourse to

179
national and European authorities that correspond to network governance oriented towards
functionality in a multilayered system. Thus, we may draw the conclusion that there is an
expertise carried out by experts that requires deep investigation, particularly in terms of
education.
The author approached social inequalities starting with the subjective experienced of
the border workers and their representatives. As well, the current internationalization
movements in which cross-border connections are present may be analysed as a questioning of
the French exception, the strong presence of the State. Nowadays, enterprises and especially
multinational companies tend to impose their own geography.
Consequently, the text of the European Commissioner may be reduced to one central
sentence: the favorisation of the regulations of the country of origin as compared to those in the
country of action. But cross-border work is organised through bilateral conventions (fiscal field)
and European coordination regulations (social protection) within the national frameworks.
Constantin oca, ctoca@uoradea.ro

Fabienne Maron, Ioan Horga, Renaud de La Brosse, Media and the Good
Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement, Brussels, 2005, 316 p,
ISBN 973-613-852-6
The volume Media and the Good Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU
Enlargement is the fruit of the international seminar bearing the same name. The Seminar was
held in Oradea on June 30th July 4th, 2004. The seminar is the result of the cooperation
between the University of Oradea, the University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, the
University of Debrecen, the Paul Negulescu Institute of Administrative Sciences, the Siena
Network for European Studies, the University of Bourgogne, and the University of Bucharest.
The volume is structured in several sections having the same core, the role of the
media within the context of the enlargement of the EU, the educative role of the media in the
European society, the need for good governance in the Candidate and Member States of the EU:
(1) Media, Good Governance and European Education, (2) the Gradual Substitution of the
Global Governance and of the Traditional Governance as Reflected in Contemporary Media
through the Evolution of the Concept of State, (3) the Components of the European Integration
System as Media Subject, (4) Media and Good Governance, (5) Media and Good Governance
Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement.
As Mercedes Samaniego Boneu puts it, mass media play nowadays a major role in
bringing Europe closer to its citizens. Media also brings its contribution to the process of good
governance and to the process of building and developing democratic societies.
Analysing the evolution of the media aspect in Central and Eastern Europe after the
fall of Berlin Wall, Renaud de La Brosse notices that the press is subject to the market law; that
in these countries were enacted broadcasting acts; that the broadcasting is no more a monopoly
of political power and it tends to have a commercial character. It is necessary to establish a
broadcasting authority in these states independent from any other power that has to protect the
public interest and the independence of the sector.
Having an informative role, the media also influence the educational process because
of the information it provides through modern technologies thus facilitating the readers easier
access to information. It is necessary to create profound bounds between education and media,
although media also have to develop, to increase their quality, because, as Boneu remarks, most
of the journals contain general information. This fact causes sometimes a refusal of media in
schools.
When referring to the Romanian society in particular, there are authors who do not
hide their scepticism. In the view of Luigi Dumitrescu and Liana Brezai, in television we see a
mixture of a glorious government along with a miserable country with rapes, crimes and roads

180
filled with holes and blood. Continuing the negative conclusions, Anca Dodescu and Adrian
Hatos underline that most of the Romanian citizens were not yet prepared to face, and adapt to,
the deep and difficult mentality and behaviour changes requested by the reconstruction of their
society, they do not know the rules of civic involvement and prefer passivity. At the same
time, inefficient public institutions still show uncivil attitudes. Although having a positive
approach when describing the NGOs landscape in Romania and at local level, Mioara Pitu and
Domnica aito quote the Statistics of the Foundation for the Development of the Civil Society
(FDSC), according to which more than 25,000 NGOs have been created during the transition
process, but only 10% of them are effectively active.
The authors are offering solutions to the improvement of the functioning of public
institutions, in order to be closer to the citizens needs. The nongovernmental organisations play
an important role in this process, because they have as purpose to promote the interest of the
citizen. That is why Mioara Pitut underlines the need for a long-term partnership between the
public and the civil sectors. Anca Dodescu and Adrian Hatos recommend as a necessity the
reform of public institutions, such as the school, the administration, or the politics, which are,
if not changed, places where attitudes and practices contrary to citizenship are learned and
promoted. This fact implies also legislative changes. It is necessary to create a new education
to lead to more tolerance and to the acceptance of diversity, in order to determine the citizens to
be more active and involved effectively in society, as the authors suggest.
Romanias integration to the EU will undoubtedly take place in 2007. As a solution to
the problems that Romania still has to deal with, the theory of good governance appears as a
necessity not only for this country, but also for the Member States of EU. The concept of good
governance is mentioned in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Good
Governance brings into the spotlight a greater role for civil society, the citizens being invited
to play an active role in society and not a passive one. In the opinion of Georges Contogeorgis,
in the good governance system the state does not more have the monopoly of political
authority. From the monopolist political sovereignty, the system changes to a new type of
sovereignty, the shared sovereignty of politics. Contogeorgis sees the system of good
governance as opposed to the modern epoch system, which bounds its system to property. The
author emphasised that the question is to bring together the politics (state), the economy (the
market) and the civil society actors. The good governance changes the relationship between
the social and the political, hence the necessity to build a strong civil society to exercise a
positive pressure on political power. Fabienne Maron brings into discussion these other forces,
such as civil society, NGOs, media. They have to cooperate in the management of public affairs
within the new system of good governance.
Good governance is a solution for present-day Europe is also the opinion of
professor Ioan Horga, who underlines the new challenge imposed by the process of enlargement
of the European Union towards 10 new states (event that occurred in 2004) for the European
leaders and the national ones. Moreover, in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria are expected to join
the EU. In the opinion of the author, the enlargement process implies the idea that the state is
no longer the sole guarantee of civil society and the defendant of public interest. Thus, as the
author underlines, there is the necessity to increase the number of alternative structures: NGOs,
universities, local and regional communities. However, Ioan Horga remarks that the evolution
of the European media phenomenon before the EU enlargement to 25 member states has shown
us that we are far from the objective of a European Public Sphere.
The media and the good governance are invited to cooperate, in order to achieve a
peaceful and more stable Europe: the journalist, by means of media, must begin to develop a
European consciousness and lay the basis for future European journalism (Dana Pantea). At
the same time, we are aware of our European roots, our common European history, the
existence of a European sensibility, a sort of spiritual bond that can be sensed and can result
into audiovisual artistic creations (idea that lead to the creation of JANO and ZEUROPA
projects as emphasised by Roberto Sobrino). The media should bring to the foreground these

181
European feelings and common roots and contribute to bringing the European Union issues to
our homes.
The enlargement of the EU and the deepening of European integration process require
a new type of government on a supranational level, but also on the national level. The press
should bring more transparency and provide an environment where ideas can be freely
discussed and asserted. The media and the good governance must work together to create the
21st century Europe.
This book is the framework where authors coming from all Europe express their views
on how good governance should be implemented in the new European environment and what
is the role of the press within this process. The present book is worth reading for various points
of view presented in its framework and for its interdisciplinary character.
Anca Oltean, olteananca@hotmail.com

Ioan Horga et Sorin Sipo, De la Petite la Grande Europe . Tmoignages


franais de la fin du XVIII et du dbut du XIX sicle sur la frontire orientale de
lEurope. tudes et documents , Editions de lUniversit dOradea, 2006,
ISBN (10) 973-759-052-X ; ISBN (13) 978-973-759-052-7
Louvrage De la Petite la Grande Europe Tmoignages franais de la fin du
XVIII et du dbut du XIX sicle sur la frontire orientale de lEurope. tudes et documents
de Mrs. Ioan Horga et Sorin Sipo paru Oradea en 2006, traite de la frontire orientale de
lEurope travers des manuscrits indits franais de la fin XVIII dbut XIX. La structure de
louvrage repose sur trois parties qui nous conduisent la dcouverte des Pays Roumains en
suivant les rflexions personnelles des voyageurs franais sur la frontire orientale de lEurope.
Dans un premier temps les auteurs analysent les tmoignages franais: celui de
lofficier Joseph Flix Lazowski, Mmoires sur les forteresses dIsmail, Bender, Akerman et
Kilia et ses Observations sur ltat prsent de la Turquie et sur les rapports politiques de cette
Puissance avec la Rpublique Franaise; les Notes statistiques sur la Pologne russe, la
Moldavie et la Valachie du capitaine Aubert; et Le mmoire de ladjudant commandant
Armand -Charles Guilleminot et ses observations quil a faites et les renseignements quil a
recueillis pendant son voyage en Turquie. Pour mieux comprendre la nature des informations
noncs par les voyageurs franais sur les Pays roumains, les auteurs ont bien considr de
nous prsenter la biographie des auteurs des manuscrits franais, une bonne initiative
dailleurs, pour comprendre la formation de ces personnes et qui se reflte dans leurs
tmoignages (par exemple, les rapports rdigs par lofficier Lazowski sur le systme de
fortifications sur Dniestr et sur le Danube, la description dans les moindres dtails des
fortifications est due sa formation dingnieur militaire franais).
Les tmoignages des voyageurs franais sont inclus dans le cadre gnral europen de
la priode de la fin XVIII et du dbut XIX, qui est ncessaire pour comprendre le contenu de
ces tmoignages et loption pour leurs penses. Lintrt des grands pouvoirs europennes pour
les Pays Roumains se manifeste dans le contexte de la reprise de loffensive contre lEmpire
Ottoman de la fin du XVIII sicle, les grands pouvoirs essayant de sapproprier des
possessions ottomanes en se prsentant comme des librateurs.
Les informations sur les Pays roumains tels comme ils ressortent de ces tmoignages
ne manquent pas dapprciations ni de critique. Les voyageurs franais reconnaissent le
potentiel naturel des Pays Roumains mais qui nest pas mis en valeur cause du systme
politique corupt et inefficient ; et le coupable pour la mauvaise administration des Pays serait
lEmpire Ottoman. Ils remarquent la crise de lautorit de linstitution centrale, le prince ne
rgnait que pour ramasser le plus de richesses. Ce qui est apprciable de la part des voyageurs
franais cest quils ne se contentent pas offrir limage des Pays Roumains, souvent assez
dsolante, mais ils cherchent trouver la cause, comprendre pourquoi ils taient dans un tel

182
tat ( cause des guerres des ottomans, indiscipline des troupes, la dcadence des institutions
des Pays) et ce geste est remarquable, on dcouvre ainsi des vrais penseurs.
Aprs avoir fait la critique des manuscrits, les auteurs ont fait inclure dans louvrage la
traduction en roumain des manuscrits franais pour rendre accessible la comprhension de ces
documents indits. On ne peut pas dire que louvrage est ddi un public acadmique, il peut
trs bien servir pour un milieu universitaire comme exemple de mthode de recherche
(publication des documents indits et critique de ces documents qui concernent les Pays
Roumains de la priode moderne).
Un air dpoque de la fin du XVIII et du dbut du XIX sicles nous est donn par la
reproduction des manuscrits originaux quon retrouve la fin de cet ouvrage cot des
estampes dpoque. Il faut remarquer la qualit du papier utilis pour ldition de cet ouvrage
qui invite, semblait-il, le lecteur vers un voyage dpoque.
Il ne peut tre que salutaire la parution de cet dition surtout dans un moment-cl de
lhistoire de la Roumanie, son adhsion lUnion Europenne qui sest accomplie le 1er janvier
2007. Tout en considrant que les tmoignages des voyageurs franais ont contribu la
formation du sentiment de croissance de lespace de lEurope orientale, louvrage sinscrit
magnifiquement dans le contexte gopolitique du moment de llargissement de lUnion
Europenne. Et ce nest pas pour rien si le Ministre des Affaires Etrangres roumain a nomm
le livre du mois de septembre 2006, De la Petite la Grande Europe . Tmoignages
franais de la fin XVIII et du dbut XIX sur la frontire orientale de lEurope.
Georgeta Giurgiu, candva20@gmail.com

Lucian Boia, Romnia, ar de frontier a Europei,


Humanitas Press, Bucharest, 2005, 337 pages, ISBN 973-50-0392-9
Right from the preface to the book, the author reveals the aim lying at the origin of the
work, that is, What is Romania?. The book firstly addresses a foreign public. Thus, Lucian
Boia admits that he shows to the reader what he himself bears in mind concerning the
Romanian phenomenon, his own Romania.
Born in Bucharest on February 1st, 1944, Lucian Boia is a professor at the Faculty of
History at the University of Bucharest. His broad and varied work comprises several titles
published in Romania and France, as well as translations into English, German, and other
languages. Mainly concerned with the history of ideas and the imaginary, he has become known
through his theoretic work concerning history (Jocul cu trecutul. Istoria ntre adevr i
ficiune Game with the Past. The History between Truth and Fiction), and the imaginary
(Pentru o istorie a imaginarului To a History of the Imaginary), as well as through his
steady investigation of a wide range of mythologies (from alien life and the end of the world to
communism, nationalism, and democracy). In 1997, his paper on Istorie i mit n contiina
romneasc (History and Myth in the Romanian Conscience) has aroused great interest and has
become a landmark in redefining national history.
His book Romnia, ar de frontier a Europei (Romania, A Border Country of
Europe) tries to show a multilayered and inexhaustible reality; he tries to reflect an overview on
Romania, a subjective one, as the author admits.
If the Europeans simplify and multiply Romania to all sorts of images and symbols
whose sole constant is its exotism, as it lies somewhere on the edge of Europe, to Lucian Boia,
Romania is not atemporal; its distinctive features are explained by history and the current state
of the Romanian society: Todays Romania does not really resemble yesterdays Romania.
Nor will tomorrows Romania resemble todays Romania.
From a structural point of view, the book is made up of eight chapters (Privire pe hart
A Look at the Map, O insul latin A Latin Island, Cum s-a fcut Romnia How Romania
Came Into Being, Comunismul romnesc The Romanian Communism, ntre trecut i viitor

183
Between Past and Future, Romnii i strinii Romanians and Foreigners, Incursiune n
Panteon Pantheon Survey, O plimbare prin Bucureti A Walk in Bucharest) to which a
preface to the second edition is added, as well as an Introduction and a Closure.
Lucian Boia thinks that everything may be explained through history. To the
Romanians, it is, to a great extent, a shortcoming. They are drawn back by the accumulated
delays and dysfunctionalities.
If the guilt is partly assumed by history, we should not exclude peoples character and
behaviour, as they have adapted to a prolonged state of uncertainty, considering that Romania
has been considered by Europe to be an unpredictable country.
Though tough, the conclusion of the renowned historian is very realistic: Nowadays,
Romania is unarticulated; it is made up of segments that do not mingle, of traditional life, of
inter-war memories, of communist structures and attitudes and of post-communist evolutions. It
is a system that barely works while waiting for quite a long time for a new beginning able to
lead to a new synthesis.
Despite all these shortcomings, we cannot speak of a break between Romania and
Europe, as they are both tightly related through thousands of threads of different origins. Lucian
Boias Romania is the best surveillance place over the Balkans and the last rampart in front of
the huge, uncertain and unstructured space after the disintegration of the Soviet empire.
Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu, apopoviciu@uoradea.ro

Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Europa em Mutao. Cidadania. Identidades.


Diversidade cultural, Editura Quarteto, Coimbra, 2003, 212 p,
ISBN 972-8717-99-7
There have been few topics to have such a great importance and to have aroused so
many debates and power games starting with the latter half of the 20th century to these days,
such as the case of the mutations that have come up on the level of the United Europe. Started
on an economic level by setting up the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
(1948), with a view to manage the funds granted by the USA through the Marshall Plan, the
European unity has undergone several changes of the political, economic and cultural aspect
throughout the decades.
Europa em Mutao. Cidadania. Identidades. Diversidade cultural is a collective
work. In the pages of the book one may find out how European mutations may acquire different
outlines and approaches. The book is the result of the debates and analyses that took place in
February March 2003 within the framework of the Socrates Intensive Programme developed
throughout four years (2001 2004) at the University of Coimbra under the coordination of
Prof. Dr. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro. The meeting brought together university professors
from Coimbra, Siena, Salamanca, Granada, Strasbourg, Krakow, Athens, Oradea, and Acores.
There were also professors from other walks of life, such as researchers, librarians and students,
who as usual, have made their contribution (Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Europa em
Mutao).
The articles and conferences included in the volume reflect three great European
issues: European citizenship, European identity, and cultural diversity. The concept of
citizenship has a rich history, as it is one of the basic principles of modern epoch and
democratic regime. Citizenship is tightly related to nationality and the State, so that European
citizenship is a new concept, a special notion, due to its supranational character. On an ideal
level, it stands for the community of goals and means existing amongst peoples of the Member
States of the European Union and comes from the founding idea of the European construction:
ensuring peace in Europe, so that nations may live together by virtue of certain joint rules and
institutions to which they have voluntarily agreed. European citizenship aims at strengthening
the image of the EU identity, as well as the deep involvement of the citizens in the process of

184
European integration. However, more important than the theoretic aspect is the final aim of this
body of judicial regulations: setting up a European identity more profound than the one granted
by geographic and historical belonging, making reference to a genuine European civic culture.
Besides the rights, concern and active involvement in events concerning political, social,
economic and cultural life of the European Union are needed.
Jean Monnet, the creative soul of Europe, used to say: If I were to restart it, I would
start with culture. Why? Because culture is the European link and may preserve an enduring
unity in such a vast diversity. If a great mutation on a cultural level is needed, in order to go on
in the process of unification, the community of civilisation as provided by the joint spiritual
values has adapted European identity to national identities, thus giving justification and power
to the process of integration. European culture is its own diversity. Europe meets its identity
in the <genius of diversity> (Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Europa en Mutao).
Europa em Mutao. Cidadania. Identidades. Diversidade cultural is a work of
reference for those who study, or are only interested in, the topic. At the same time, this could
be guidelines for those interested in getting a better knowledge of the European realities that are
ceaselessly changing.
Alina Stoica, stoicaalina79@yahoo.com

Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (ed.), Identidade Europeia e Multiculturalismo,


Coimbra: Quarteto Editora, 2002, 417 p., ISBN: 972-8717-53-9
In 2002, the CEIS20 (20th Century Centre of Interdisciplinary Studies) of the
University of Coimbra (Portugal) organized an international and multidisciplinary course of
lectures concerning the European Identity and Multiculturalism. In the meantime, the minutes
were published in this book, also entitled European Identity and Multiculturalism - the 2nd
volume of the European Studies collection, coordinated by Professor Maria Manuela Tavares
Ribeiro (University of Coimbra) which has come to public as a multilingual and
multidisciplinary set of scientific papers, frankly well sequenced and interrelated, fundamental
to understand the complexity of European civilisation and its cultural diversity. Furthermore,
the context in which the book was published after the 11th of September 2001 and on the eve
of the European Union (EU) first eastern enlargement was quite opportune to debate these
subjects, that is, setting up the EU characterisation, functioning and international position.
The authors wrote about a selected assortment of questions, like the European identity
and citizenship configuration, the EU participation in this process, as well in the intercultural
dialogue, the European multiculturalism basis and limitations, interculturality and education on
difference, or even about political and cultural boundaries. However, despite of the articles
thematic specificity, they are and can be correlated, since all of them converge to the books
main purpose: to render problematic the multiculturalism and European identity issues. Thus, it
is possible to establish a basic set of questions:
- What is the idea of Europe?
- What translates best the Europeans identity real meaning?
- How to protect the European multiculturalism and how to endorse intercultural
dialogue?
- What is the EU role in the configuration of a European identity?
- Would it be possible, on the communitarian level, a political and economic
integration with no cultural integration?
Given the articles analytical and theoretical complexity, it is only possible for us to
present synthetically the conclusions that we consider the most significant. For that very reason,
this is merely one of many possibilities of the critical interpretation of the book.
Considering that Europe is simultaneously unitary (in sharing the axiological,
epistemological, conceptual, intellectual, social, economic and political regulative principles on

185
which Europe has been constructed) and plural (there are three major transnational cultures non
interchangeable (the Latin, the Slavic and the Germanic) as well as very large linguistic
diversity and national particularities), as well as that a shared axiological patrimony based on
the democratic principles (pluralism, fundamental liberties, pre-eminence of the State of right,
human rights inviolability) subsists, it is considered that the EU, and the quality of the
European engine, has a vital role in the promotion and protection of a European identity. This
last one is characterized by the plurality, because it is in the non-identical that Europe can be
uncovered. Assuming that UE competence is to preserve this common axiological and cultural
patrimony, the UE institutions an internal and external valuable self-image upon the
presupposition that the Member States are joined together not only by common projects
(political, economic, security, defence and geo-strategy), but likewise through the adhesion to a
communitarian set of norms, rules and principles that have been established, in order to
reinforce Europes integration under a cultural, humanistic and less functionalist perspective.
However, and as the authors point out, there is yet a lot to be done. In fact, it is
necessary to enhance the convergence between the communitarian cultural policies and those
established by the members States (for example, creating a cultural European information
system and systematic long-term cooperation strategies). It is also essential to provide to the
intercultural dialogue with a civic and social dimension by the means of multicultural and
cosmopolitan educative politics, which, by restricting fanaticisms, racisms, xenophobia and
other discriminations, would convert Europe into a space increasingly united and open to the
pacifist confrontation.
Therefore, if multiculturalism is simultaneously a triumph and a major difficulty of the
European project, the intercultural communication will allow mitigate the multiculturalism
contingencies. Yet, we should note that only an intercultural and decentred communication will
be valid. In other words, Euroculture cannot impose itself as a centralizing calibration pattern
in relation to the dissimilar culture.
In this way, we conclude that, as the authors did, the expression cultural cohabitation
translates European reality more accurately than the expression multiculturalism, for the
reason that while cohabitation calls for permanent and dynamic adjustments between
particularities, the multicultural idea basically expresses intercultural relations management,
which can predispose to cultural segregation because of indifference.
The authors left many questions unanswered; they only emphasize the articles quality,
as if Europe is a very changeable reality, in reason of the evolution of the European historical
reality, the debate about European identity and multiculturalism, as being conditioned by the
transformations of the continent, keeps being controversial. Nonetheless, one thing is clear: this
book is an excellent bibliographical reference to understand and to follow consciously, critically
and analytically the quest to discover the European essence.
Vera de Matos, veradematos@mail.pt

International Journal on Minority and Group Rights,


vol. 13, no. 2-3, 2006, ISSN-1385-4879
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights is a prestigious review published
four times a year by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, which focuses on the juridical, social and
political problems of minorities and religious groups, as well as on the cultural, linguistic ones
in the society. The review has become an important scientific tribune in which there are debated
important topics for the contemporary society.
The volume we present refers to Minority and Group Rights to Accommodate
Difference: Approaches and Applications. It comprises research of the participants to the
interdisciplinary project entitled Accommodating Difference. Human Rights, Citizenship and
Identity in Diverse Societies and which was developed by the Norwegian Centre for Human
Rights from the University of Oslo.

186
In the study entitled Do Minority and Group Rights Promote Just Stability in NonUnitary Political Orders?, Andreas Fllesdal and Nils Butenschn pose several paradigmatic
problems: how can human rights affect the stability of the society; how can human rights
maintain the social order; with a system of institutional power-sharing between sub-units of a
society likely to produce long-term stability if not grounded on a wider democratic system
guaranteeing the fundamental rights of individual members of the society (p. 141-152). Asbjrn
Eide, in the study International Cooperation for Group Accommodation through Minority
Protection: A Review of Standard Setting and Institution Building at Regional and Global
Levels presents the development of international norms of protection of the minorities at the
global and regional level. They focus further on the methodologies of managing conflicts,
particularly the prevention and mediation of conflicts, measures of implementing the minorities'
rights by means of the representatives of minorities, of NGO-s (pp. 153-170).
The study Accessioning Liberal Compliance? Baltic Elites and Ethnic Politics under
New International Conditions, enables Anton Steen to present the experience of the Baltic
states of creating an ethno-liberal democracy, in which, the basis on the balance between the
political national identity and the numerous communal identities. They adapted citizenship laws
that satisfied the minimum standards of international organizations. They acknowledged
popular negative attitudes toward full inclusion of minorities, international pressures
notwithstanding. They accepted and urged assimilation of those who chose naturalization (pp.
187-207).
Andreas Fllesdal, in The Constitutional Treaty: the Answer to the European Unions
Quest for a Consistent Human Right Policy? notices that various types of politics in the field
of human rights can serve various functions and can resolve various actions. Each of these
various functions can offer various standards of action, by intervention, support, etc. He
exemplifies that in the federal states, the component units are independent to develop various
forms of intervention fort the protection of the rights of minorities and the minority groups (pp.
209-222).
In the study entitled Human Rights as a Mechanism for Integration in BosniaHerzegovina, Hugo Stokke notes that the deeper conditions for integration are missing, in
particular protection against discrimination, and tensions between the guarantees of individual
rights and nationalists claims to maintain their collective rights in cleansed enclaves. He
motivates this idea by the fact that the central institutions must be strong to defend human
rights, much stronger than the decentralized system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the absence of
such local institutions, the international community was compelled to assume the defence of
human rights in this country. This role opens for paternalistic imperialism by the West (pp. 263284).
Ioan Horga, ihorga@uoradea.ro

Dialogue des peuples et des cultures: les acteurs du dialogue, Bruxelles, 2004, 226
p, Communauts Europennes, ISBN 92-894-7825-X
Luvre Dialogue des peuples et des cultures: les acteurs du dialogue, parue grce
la contribution de la Direction gnrale ducation et culture Action Jean Monnet de la
Commission Europenne, vient complter les contributions importantes de la recherche sur le
phnomne de linterculturalit europenne faites par quipe de coordination du projet lors des
annes prcdentes.
Les tudes comprises dans ce volume appartiennent aux prsentations faites
Bruxelles lors du colloque avec le mme titre qui a eu lieu du 24 au 25 mai 2004. Le
dveloppement de lvnement, tout comme la prsentation des articles du volume, a t
structur en six ateliers : Les rseaux de la Mditerrane (Fondation Euro-mditerranenne
pour la culture); Lapport de la femme et la socit civile (Le rle de la femme dans le
dialogue); La citoyennet et les changements sociaux en Europe (Limmigration et

187
lintgration); Le rle des mdias dans le dialogue (Limpact des mdias dans limaginaire
crois); La ncessit du dialogue euro-mditerranen et les enjeux internationaux (Le dialogue
dans le contexte international); La jeunesse face au fait religieux, la tolrance et la lacit
(Alternatives la crise des idologies). Les six ateliers ont t harmonieusement encadrs par
deux prsentations introductives de Viviane Reding et Mervat Tallawy. Le volume est conclu
par les discours prononcs loccasion de la fin des articles par Fetema Mernissi et Romano
Prodi.
Les tudes introductives mettent en relief la thmatique du dialogue parmi les diverses
cultures et peuples. On met laccent sur les acteurs de ce dialogue, sur les valeurs culturelles et
mme sur la ncessit de la coopration et de la collaboration en vue de solutionner les
problmes interculturaux. La diversit et la multiculturalit imposent lacceptation dun
dialogue honnte, complt par la construction dune socit quidistante o les liberts
individuelles et collectives doivent tre non seulement respectes, mais transformes en
vecteurs du rapprochement des gens.
Le premier atelier, Les rseaux de la Mditerrane (Fondation Euro-mditerranenne
pour la culture), qui a eu Prof. Malek Chebel en tant que prsident et Peter G. Xuereb en tant
que modrateur, nous transpose une image des ralits du monde euro-mditerranen. Lide
des partenariats des peuples, ne de la solidarit des Etats membres de lUnion Europenne,
mutuellement reconnue par toutes les parties, est invoque comme repre afin de prserver un
dialogue efficace entre les peuples et les cultures de lEurope du sud.
Le deuxime atelier, Lapport de la femme et la socit civile (Le rle de la femme
dans le dialogue), prsid par Simone Susskind et modr par Teresa Freixas, met en discussion
le rle et la contribution de la femme dans la socit civile de la rgion mditerranenne. On
met laccent sur les diffrences majeures entre les diverses cultures concernant le rle et la
prsence de la femme en socit. Les auteurs mettent en vidence les clivages existantes dans le
monde islamique sud-mditerranen concernant la position de la femme dans la vie publique et
prive. Laccs limit de la femme la prise des dcisions, tout comme sa modeste
reprsentation dans la vie politique sont mises en vidence en dpit des progrs enregistrs.
Le troisime atelier, La citoyennet et les changements sociaux en Europe
(Limmigration et lintgration), prsid par Prof. Bichara Khader et modr par Prof. Espeth
Guild, dbat sur les changements sociaux des Etats europens dans le contexte de lintgration
lUnion Europenne. On met laccent sur limmigration et lintgration . La reprsentation
collective, y inclus les immigrants, le dialogue interreligieux, la migration et le dialogue
culturel, les transformations envisages dans la constitution europenne, le march du
travail, les droits des citoyens et autres sujets y sont analyss avec pertinence par les deux
professeurs pendant les dbats.
Latelier suivant, Le rle des mdias dans le dialogue (Limpact des mdias dans
limaginaire crois), prsid par Charles-Fernand Nothomb et modr par Joaquin Roy, fait une
analyse du rle des mdia dans le dialogue interculturel entre le nord et le sud. Les deux
protagonistes de ltude met en question le phnomne de la globalisation qui est toujours plus
prsent dans le contexte dune socit de plus en plus informatise. Les mdia et la
communication en gnral jouent un rle dcisif dans louverture et la prservation des moyens
du dialogue entre les divers points de vue.
Le cinquime atelier, La ncessit du dialogue euro-mditerranen et les enjeux
internationaux (Le dialogue dans le contexte international), modr par Prof. Chibli Mallat, fait
une analyse des diffrentes conclusions de plusieurs colloques et rencontres au sommet. Le
thme principal semble tre la dmocratisation et le dialogue des socits en crise. Lespace
mditerranen souffre dans ses efforts collectifs dassurer la stabilit dans plusieurs rgions en
crise, tel que le Proche Orient et les Balkans.
La tolrance et la lacit, corrobores avec les nouvelles tendances de la globalisation
ont t dbattues lors du sixime atelier prsid par Prof. Pedrag Matvejevic et modr par Prof.
Enrique Bans. Latelier La jeunesse face au fait religieux, la tolrance et la lacit
(Alternatives la crise des idologies) fait une analyse loquente de la ralit et des tendances

188
religieuses des diverses socits europennes. On met souvent laccent sur lespace balkanique,
qui est caractris par lexistence dune importante communaut islamique. Le dialogue
interreligieux, si ncessaire pour la convivialit des divers groupes religieux (spars trs
souvent par des barrires ethniques), est fort impratif dans le contexte de lintgration
europenne. La tolrance religieuse dont les auteurs de ce volume parlent et dautant plus
possible quon constate une lacisation de plus en plus visible parmi les jeunes, surtout dans les
grandes agglomrations urbaines. Mais ce phnomne peut tre constat dans le contexte dune
profonde crise idologique, qui favorise lorientation vers la sacralit dans certains
environnements.
Le volume finit par une rcapitulation des divers obstacles qui empchent la rsolution
de certaines tensions. Les solutions sont capables assurer le dbut dun dialogue interculturel.
Les impratifs de ces dialogues naissent juste de la construction de ldifice europen fond sur
la reconnaissance et lacceptation, sur le dialogue et la coopration entre les cultures et les
peuples.
Cest par les messages profonds dencouragement et par les impratifs mis en question
pour les gouvernants que le volume est un vritable ambassadeur des nations, des nations qui se
respectent, communiquent et veillent au respect des droits et liberts personnels.
Mircea Brie, briedri@hotmail.com

Questions internationales,
n 21, septembre-octombre 2006, Islam, Islams, 127 p, ISSN: 1761-7146
Il y a quelque temps, jai parcouru avec un rel intrt un numro de la revue Question
internationales tratant sur lIslam, les Islams. La revue parat sous les auspices du Scrtariat
gnral du gouvernement, Direction de la Documentation franaise, ayant pour rdacteur en
chef Serge Sur et rdacteur en chef adjoint Jrme Gallois. Pour le dbut, je dois faire quelques
prcisions dordre thoriques. Pour simposer sur le march ditorial, une revue doit avoir
quelques qualits, cest- dire, les articles doivent tre rdigs dune manire professionnelle,
les rdacteurs doivent offrir au public des numros thmatiques auxquels ils ont invit publier
des spcialistes reconnus, leur contenu doit tre diversifi, comprennant part les articles et
tudes consacrs, des nouvelles rubriques, des interviews, des comptes-rendus et des notes
bibliographiques, des glossaires de termes sur le sujet soumis au dbat. La revue doit aussi avoir
une forme graphique lgante, les textes doivent tres accompagns par des matriaux
auxiliaires, tels que matriaux cartographiques, des graphiques, des tableaux chronologiques,
des annexes documentaires, des photos, etc.
Ces minimes exigences sont respectes dans le numro 21 de la revue Questions
internationales, dont le thme, lIslam, les Islams, est trs actuel. Les rdacteurs font une bonne
prcision, car dans une bonne partie du monde chrtien lon peroit lIslam comme unitaire, les
raisonnements de certains analystes tant donc souvent errons. Les auteurs attirent lattention
aux multitudes de variantes existentes dans le monde islamique, commenant mme par les
diffrences majeures entre les Sunnites et les Chiites, diffrences dont lEurope et lAmrique
ont pris connaissance sur le fond des problmes que les Amricains et leurs allis ont dans
lIrak. Nous remarquons, dans ce sens, lexcellent article Les Islams, de Marc Gaboireau,
directeur de recherche au Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) et directeur
dtudes en sciences sociales (EHESS). Pour mieux comprendre les ralits contemporaines, il
est ncessaire de faire une analyse sur le moment de lapparition et sur lvolution du
phnomne respectif, dautant plus quon a affaire au monde musulman. Lappel lhistoire est
obligatoire, mais cela ne rsout pas aussi les problmes contemporains. La connaissance du
pass peut offrir aux responsables politiques des modles dont ils pourraient tenir compte
lorsquils prendront des dcisions importantes sur le futur dune communit.

189
ct de lanalyse srieuse du professeur Gaboireau, lon remarque aussi deux
articles sur lpoque contemporaine, lIslam europen, Islam en Europe, par Jocelyne Cesari,
spcialiste des minorits musulmanes en Europe et aux tats-Unis, ainsi quAux origines de
lIslam politique par Daniel Rivert, professeur de lhistoire contemporaine lUniversit
Panthon-Sorbonne et directeur de lInstitut dtudes de lIslam et des socites du monde
musulman. Autrement dit, au-del dun regard sur lvolution de lIslam, il y a aussi des
analyses pertinentes sur les problmes que confrontent la socit contemporaine. Peut-tre
quune analyse des ralits de la Bosnie et lHerzgovine, ainsi que celle de Kossovo, ne
devraient pas manquer du matriel publiqu par Jocelyne Cesari. Les discussions au sujet de
lindpendence de Kossovo, menes au niveau de la comunit europenne, prouvent que la
solution de tous les problmes se laisse encore attendre et que la solution de lintervention
militaire a failli dapporter la tranquillit si souvent clame par les politiciens europens il y a
quelques annes. Une heureuse ide est celle dillustrer les articles par des cartes et des
graphiques (au nombre de 18), et, lorque ncessaire, de mettre la disposition du lecteur des
glossaires avec termes de spcialit, ainsi quavec des documents importants concernant le
monde islamique (au nombre de 13), pour comprendre le texte plus facilement. En outre, cest
mritoire linitiative doffrir au lecteur, la rigueur, une bibliographie plus ample du thme
recherch.
Non pas en dernier lieu, lon remarque larticle de Frdric Charillon, professeur de
sciences politiques lUniversit de Clermont I et lInstitut dtudes politiques de Paris, Le
choc des civilisations, un compte-rendu critique ldition en franais du livre de luniversitaire
amricain Samuel Huntington. Lauteur de ce compte-rendu attire lattention sur la mthode de
travail rrone utilise par Samuel Huntington lorsquil divide le monde sur de critres religieux
et confessionnels. Si cette thorie se confirmait, remarque Frdric Charillon, dans le conflit de
Kossovo la communaut internationale aurait d soutenir les Serbes chrtiens et non pas les
Albanais musulmans. Or, dans Kossovo, les forces chrtiennes amricaines et europennes sont
intervenues contre les Serbes chrtiens pour protger la population musulmane.
Sorin ipo, s.sipos@uoradea.ro

191

About the Authors

192
Bla Baranyi (1946) leader of the Debrecen Department of the Centre for Regional Studies,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, habilitated professor and lecturer at the University of
Debrecen, a founding member of the Interdisciplinary Doctoral School of Agricultural and
Natural Sciences at the Centre of Agricultural Sciences of the University of Debrecen, a
consultant of Ph.D. students. Presently he holds presentations on different European and
Hungarian regional policy, rural and settlement development issues. His field of study is
contemporary economic and social history, regional (territorial) science, regional and rural
development and the research of border issues. He is member in the Committee of Regional
Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and in the Hungarian Regional Science
Society. His main works are as follows: A Tiszntl talakul trsadalma (The transforming
society of the Trans-Tisza Region) 19451978. (1985); A hatrmentisg dimenzii.
Magyarorszg s keleti llamhatrai (The Dimensions of the Border Regional Location.
Hungary and Its Eastern State Borders) (2004); HungarianRomanian and HungarianUkrainian
Border Regions as Areas of Co-operation Along the External Borders of Europe. Ed.: B. Baranyi.
(2005); A hatrmentisg dimenzii Magyarorszgon (Dimensions of the Border Regional
Location in Hungary) (2007). E-mail: baranyib@rkk.hu
Thibault Bazin is currently studying at ESSEC (Paris). During his previous scholarship at
Sciences Po Strasbourg (2002-2006), he had spent an exchange year in Royal Holloway,
University of London (2004-2005). He also wrote his big essay whose title is LUnion
europenne: de la ngation des racines la question des valeurs about the issue of the
definition of the European identity through the draft of the Constitution drafting process.
Email: thibault.bazin@wanadoo.fr
Renaud de la Brosse is Senior Lecturer in Communication and Information Sciences at the
University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne (France). He is the Director of the Master II
Specialists for Central and Eastern Europe. His researches are focusing on how the media can
be key actors within democratization processes; Communication Regulatory Bodies in SubSaharan Africa; Digital Divide: challenges and stakes for the less advanced countries; Media
contribution to the understanding and popularization of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
He worked as Witness Expert on propaganda issues for the Prosecution Office of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia from June 2002 to May 2003. He is
author of several books and articles, more recently among others: Media and the Good
Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement, edited by Fabienne Maron, Ioan
Horga and Renaud de La Brosse, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Jean
Monnet Action, Bruxelles, 2005, Les trois gnrations de la justice pnale internationale:
Tribunaux pnaux internationaux, Cour pnale internationale et tribunaux mixtes, in Annuaire
Franais des Relations Internationales, AFRI 2005, Volume VI, Bruylant, La Documentation
Franaise, Bruxelles, Dmocratisation dInternet : quelles perceptions des enjeux et des
risques associs au foss numrique mondial ? in La Socit de lInformation. Entre mythes
et ralits, sous la direction de Michel Mathien, prface de Michle Gendreau-Massaloux,
Mdias, Socits et Relations Internationales, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, International and
European Security versus the Explosion of Global Media, edited by Maria Manuela Tavares
Ribeiro, Renaud de La Brosse and Ioan Horga, International Institute of Administrative
Sciences, Jean Monnet Project, Bruxelles, 2004, Les nouvelles technologies de linformation
et de la communication au cur de la stratgie de Lisbonne, in Quel avenir pour lUnion
Europenne ? La stratgie de Lisbonne dfinie par le Conseil europen en 2000, coordonn par
Olivier Debarge, Pierre-Yves Laurent et Olivier Rabaey, G.I.E.P.I., octobre 2004, Bruylant,
Bruxelles.
E-mail: renaud.de-la-brosse@univ-reims.fr

193
Bohdana Dimitrovova, BA (International Relations, Charles University, Prague) MA
(Nationalism Studies, Central European University, Budapest) PhD candidate (School of
Sociology, Queens University Belfast). In April 2006 she joined Center for International
Borders Research at QUB as Research Associate for the EU supported EUDIMENSIONS
Project. Prior joining QUB Bohdana worked for four years for an international, non-profit civil
society organisation the EastWest Institute in Prague and Brussels. At EWI, she was responsible
for the research project Lessons Learned and Best Practices of Cross-border Cooperation,
which analysed experiences and models from Central Europe and Eastern European countries.
One her field of expertise in is in the area civil society and its role in regional conflict
resolution. E-mail: b.dimitrovova@Queens-Belfast.AC.UK
lk Doanay is assistant professor at the Faculty of Communication of Ankara University.
She is the author of a book (Rethinking Democratic Procedures, Imge Kitabevi Yaynlar,
2003) published in Turkish and articles on democracy and political communication.
Email: doganay@media.ankara.edu.tr
Maria Follrichova, PhDr., CSc., has studied Journalism at the Faculty of Letters at the
Comenius University, then she became a teacher-researcher at the Chair of Journalism in
Bratislava. She is a candidate in Philological Sciences at the Faculty of Journalism at the
University of Kiev, CSc (PhD, 2000) and chief of the periodical press section since 2000. She is
interested in internal politics, state of right, minorities and countrymen. Author of 15 scientific
surveys, two textbooks for students and several scientific papers, she is also an
interpreter/translator (Ukrainian, Slovakian). E-mail: maria.follrichova@fphil.uniba.sk
Ioan Horga (1956) is a History and International Relations Professor at the University of
Oradea. He is currently concerned with European integration issues, laying stress on the issue of
the borders, of crossborder cooperation, of the media and religion contribution to shaping a
European awareness. He is the holder of the Chair Jean Monnet in Euroregional Studies and a
Co-Director of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Jean Monnet European Centre of
Excellence Oradea Debrecen. He is author or co-author of the following works: Constuctie
Europeana. Traditie, Relaitate si Perspectiva, Oradea, 1998; The Role of Mass Media and of
the New Information and Communication Technologies in the Democratisation Process of
Central and Eastern European Societies (in collaboration with Renaud de la Brosse), Brussels,
2002; The Contribution of Mass Media to the Enlargement of the European Union (in
collaboration with Ariane Landuyt and Renaud de la Brosse), Brussels, 2003; International and
European Security versus the Explosion of Global Media (in collaboration with Maria Manuela
Tavares Ribeiro and Renaud de la Brosse), Brussels, 2004; Mass-Media and the Good
Gouvernance after the Enlargement of EU, (in collaboration with Fabien Maron and Renaud de
la Brosse), Bruxelles, 2005; Teoria Relatiilor Internationale, Oradea, 2006. E-mail:
ihorga@uoradea.ro
Eser Kker is Professor at the Faculty of Communication of Ankara University. She is the
author of two books (Rethinking on Oral Culture, Dipnot Yaynlar, 2005; and Communication
of Politics, Politics of Communication, Vadi Yaynlar, 1999) published in Turkish and several
articles on political communication, women studies and the media. E-mail:
koker@media.ankara.edu.tr
Michel Maffesoli (1944) is Professor of Sociology at the University Sorbonne Paris V. He is
director of CEAQ (Centre d'Etude sur l'Actuel et le Quotidien) (Paris V) and director of the
Center of Research on Imaginary. He is vice-president of International Institute of Sociology,
Member of the Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea, Member of the European Prize of

194
Social Sciences. He is member in scientific committees of many prestigious international
publications (Commucaao Midia e Consumo, Escola Suprior de Propaganda e Marketing
ESPM, Sao Pulo; Sociologia de la cultura, Universidad Autonoma Metroplitana, Edition Casa
abierta al tiempo, Mexico; Journal of Consumer Culture, SAGE Publications, London;
Sociologia Internationalis, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin; Space and Culture, SAGE
Publications, London; Social Movement Studies, Taylor & Francis, USA). He was invited to
give lectures and conferences in universities of all over the world. He is author of: Logique de
la domination, PUF, Paris, 1976 ; Essais sur la violence banale et fondatrice, Mridiens
Klincksieck, Paris, 1984, La Transfiguration du politique, La Table Ronde, Paris, 2002, Le
Renchantement du Monde, La Table Ronde, Paris, 2007, The Sociology of Everyday Live
(Epistemological Elements), in Current Sociology, ISA, The Sociology of Everyday Life,
Vol.37, N 1, London, Sage Publications, Editor M. Maffesoli, Spring 1989; The Social
Imaginary, in Current Sociology, Vol. 41, No. 2, London, Sage Publications, 1993.
E-mail: maffesoli@ceaq-sorbonne.org
Stjepan Malovi, Doctor of communication science, Associate Professor teaching journalism
on Dubrovnik University and Director of the International Center for Education of Journalists
(ICEJ). Malovi is an experienced journalist veteran who is oriented to media research and
teaching today. Until now he was the author, coauthor or editor of 12 books on media issues. He
was visiting professor on Vienna University teaching "Media in transition in Post-Socialists
Countries", and professor on the following universities: Faculty of Political Sciences of Zagreb
University, PR master program of Tuzla University in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Podgorica
University in Monte Negro and lecturing "News writing" on High School of Journalism "Media
Plan" in Sarajevo. He is experienced media trainer, participating in various workshops. He
actively participated to over 50 international and 30 national media workshops, seminars,
roundtables or conferences. He is coordinating Tempus project JETIC in cooperation with
Vienna University, and High School for Journalism in Lille. He is founder of SEEMO (South
East Media Organization), initiated by the International Press Institute (IPI), Vienna, as
organization of eminent journalists trying to improve the media environment on the region. He
is member of the Council for Media, a collective media ombudsman in Croatia. He was Vice
Dean of Faculty of Political Science in period 2000-2002. He was the President of the Trainers
Committee of the South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM)
and consulter of The Thomson Foundation, Cardiff. Most recent publications: The People,
Press and Politics of Croatia (Stjepan Malovi and Gary Selnow, Praeger Publishers, Westport,
Connecticut, London, 2001, Training for Better Journalism (Stjepan Malovi and Gordana
Vilovi), Izvori, Zagreb 1999. E-mail: stjepan.malovic@icej.hr
Fabienne Maron was born in 1966 and is a Belgian citizen. She holds a Masters and a PhD in
Political Sciences from the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL). She is currently Scientific
Administrator at the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS). Previously, she
was a Research Assistant at UCL in the Avenir Group and Associate Researcher for the
European Thematic Network of Political Science (epsNet). She also worked for a research
centre: Observatoire de la Francophonie and for the Agence intergouvernementale de la
Francophonie. At the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), she is at this
time in charge of the preparation of scientific activities, including those of the Scientific and
Programs Committee. She is also the European Affairs Manager for the European Group of
Public Administration (EGPA). Her research and study are focused on the European dynamic
(European integration, governance, and enlargement: political, institutional and administrative
aspects). Her research is mainly related to the role of political actors in the process of change
and the concept of project. She is also guest Professor at Reims University (France) and Oradea
University (Romania). E-mail: maron@iiasiisa.be

195
Frank R. Pfetsch is Professor of Political Science at the Ruprecht-Karls University of
Heidelberg and Jean Monnet-Professor of European Political Science. He studied economics and
political science at the universities of Karlsruhe, Paris, Turin, Heidelberg, and Harvard University.
In 1964 he received his Ph.D. from Heidelberg University. From 1964 to 1976 he worked in
research institutes and was a consultant to the West German Ministry for Scientific Affairs, to
UNESCO for various science policy administrations in South America, Africa, and Asia as well
as to the Commission of the European Union. He is member of academies in Greece and China
and of the Advisory Board of the University of Westminster/England. Member of the Executive
Council of the European Consortium for Political Research, 1998-2004. His main research
interests are in the field of International Relations and, more particularly, in conflict analysis,
negotiation theory and European Integration. He has widely published on Science Policy,
Foreign and Constitutional Policy, International Relations, Political Theory, especially
Negotiation Theory and is author of several books and articles on these subjects, more recently
among others: National and International Conflicts. New Theoretical and Empirical
Approaches (with Christoph Rohloff (2000), London: Routledge; Die Europische Union
(2005), Mnchen: UTB/Fink; La politique internationale (2000). Bruxelles: Bruylant; Theoretiker
der Politik. Von Platon bis Habermas, Paderborn 2000: UTB; Verhandlung in Konflikten.
Wiesbaden 2006. E-mail: Frank.Pfetsch@urz.uni-heidelberg.de
Alla Roca (1962) is Professor in Political Sciences and International Relations. She teaches at
the Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences within the State
University of Moldova, as well as at the Centre of American Studies in Moldova, at the
Invisible College (a Soros project). She is a member of the commission of experts of the
Institute of Public Politics of Moldova (the project The Barometer of Public Opinion and
The Ethnobarometer). She is a member of the editorial staff of Eurolimes, and
Moldoscopie, Moldavian Society of Political Sciences and American Political Science
Association. Her political interests are in the compared politics, in the study of
democratization processes, in the impact of different institutions, mass-media upon the
transition processes, the problems of European Integration and NATO. She has taken part in
investigations during the elections in Moldova, in the accomplishment of sociological tests and
target-groups. She is also interested in the essence of causes and methods of solving conflicts,
in the international conflicts and in the impact of the international authorities upon the solving
of conflicts. Publications: Political Communications and Society Democratization, Chisinau,
2003; Democratic consolidation and inter-ethnic relations: case-studies of Republic of
Moldova, in Etnobarometer in Republic of Moldova, Chisinau, 2006; The foreign policy of
the USA and international security, in International Relations in the New Era, Chisinau, 2005;
The transformation of Broadcasting in public institution (Case Studies of Republic of
Moldova), in Jurnalism & Comunicare, nr.3, 2003, Bucharest; The mass media and the
migration problems (on the example of Moldova), in Moldova, Romania, Ukraine: European
integration and the migration of the work force, Chisinau, 2000; Some methodical aspects of
using focus groups in the political marketing (in the electoral campaigns and in the learning
process), in Moldoscopie. Problems of Political Analysis, Chisinau, P.XIII, 2000; The
integration of the Republic of Moldova in the European structures: problems, advantages and
perspectives, in Moldova, Romania, Ukraine: integration in the European structures,
Chisinau, 2000; New dimensions of the contemporary social conflicts, in Moldoscopie, VXI,
Chisinau, 1999. E-mail: alla_rosca@usm.md
Gilles Rouet is a PhD in History (1990 and 1997), associated professor of Economics and
Management (1993), and professor of Educational Sciences at the University of Reims
Champagne-Ardenne (2000); he used to be lecturer in Management Studies (1993-2000). He is
the initiator and coordinator of the MA in Management Studies in Reims (1992-1999) and has
held several administrative positions (Vice-Dean, head of international relations, deputy director
of the Institute of MA Education). Author or editor of 12 papers and 35 published articles and

196
contributions. He is the initiator and coordinator of the research team on History and Studies of
Students Mobility (2003-2004) and is particularly interested in university governance. He has
been a coordinator of Erasmus, Leonardo, Tempus and Interreg programmes (1993-2004) and an
associate in these programmes as an expert (2002-2004). He is currently an attach for scientific,
technical and academic cooperation at the Embassy of France in Slovakia (2004-2008). E-mail:
gilles.rouet@wanadoo.fr
Luminia oproni (1974) is Lecturer at the Department of International Relations and
European Studies, Faculty of History-Geography at University of Oradea. She has a DESS
diploma in Administration and Management of Communication at the University of Social
Sciences, Toulouse I (France). She is one of the editors of the 3rd volume of Eurolimes. She is a
member of the Working Group on the Regional Brand of North-West Region Development
Agency (Cluj-Napoca), created in order to establish the Northern Transylvania Region identity.
Her scientific interests are focused on intercultural communication, regional marketing,
globalization and EU policies. She published as author the following works and articles:
Comunicare i negociere n afaceri (Business Communication and Negotiation), Oradea, 2002,
Relaii Economice Internaionale (International Economics), Oradea, 2004, Les effets
conomiques et sociaux de nouvelles technologies de linformation et de la communication
dans le monde globalize, in International and European Security versus the Explosion of
Global Media (Edited by Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Renaud de la Brosse, Ioan Horga),
Bruxelles, 2004, Le reflet du procs dintgration europenne de la Roumanie dans le mass
media roumain, in Media and Global Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU
Enlargement (Edited by Fabienne Maron, Ioan Horga, Renaud de la Brosse), Bruxelles, 2005,
National Identity and Globalization, in Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and
Euroregional Issues in the New Europe (Edited by Ioan Horga, Suli-Zakar Istvan), Oradea
University Press, Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen, 2006. E-mail:
lsoproni@uoradea.ro
Jos Luis Villanova is Assistant Lecturer of Geography in University of Girona. He has a
Master in Human Geography in University of Barcelona and a Ph. D. in Geography:
Geography in Town and Country Planning and Environmental Management in University of
Girona. His main articles and books are: La geopoltica de lOrient Mitj, Geografia
Universal. ExURSS. Orient Mitj, vol. 5, Barcelona, 1994, Apunts sobre geopoltica
internacional, Geografa Universal. Oceania. El futur. Indexs, vol. 9, Barcelona, 1995, La
Sociedad Geogrfica de Madrid y el colonialismo espaol en Marruecos, Documents dAnlisi
Geogrfica, n 34, 1999, La produccin geogrfica sobre el Protectorado de Espaa en
Marruecos, in Ramirez, ngeles; Lpez Garcia, Bernab (eds.), Antropologa y antroplogos
en Marruecos, Barcelona, 2002, El Protectorado de Espaa en Marruecos. Organizacin
poltica y territorial, Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2004, Las polticas de desarrollo rural en la Zona
de protectorado de Espaa en Marruecos (1912-1956), in Groupe de Recherches
Gographiques sur le RIF (ed.), Mutations des milieux ruraux dans les montagnes rifaines
(Maroc), Ttouan (Maroc), 2005, Los interventores del Protectorado espaol en Marruecos
(1912-1956) como agentes geopolticos, in Era. Revista cuatrimestral de Geografa, n 66,
2005. E-mail: josel.villanova@udg.es

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The Activity of the Institute of Euroregional Studies Debrecen-Oradea


2006
At the foundation of IERS stands the Convention 2005-2126/001-001 (no. ref.
C05/2005) concluded between the European Comission, the Jean Monnet Action and the
University of Oradea, concerning the establishment of the Institute of Euroregional Studies
(IERS) The European Center of Excelence Jean Monnet. It was a decision taken by the
Senat of the University of Oradea in 14th November 2005. The bilateral agreement of
cooperation was settled between the University of Oradea and the University of Debrecen in
2nd July 2000, renewed in 6th July 2005.
Having this juridical basis, the activity of the Institute of Euroregional Studies in 2006
focused on three directions: the institutional construction, the settlement of solid partnerships
and the opening of research sites.
The institutional construction has begun in 19th-20th January 2006 in Oradea, when
the official launch of IERS has taken place and the first reunion of 44 members of the institute,
who prepared the main working directions of this structure. With that occasion, the first IERS
seminar took place, having the theme: Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and
Euroregional Issues in the New Europe.
In 7th and 8th June 2006 the second IERS seminar has taken place in Debrecen. Its
theme was: Regional Development in the Romanian-Hungarian Cross-Border Space from
National to European Perspective. It has reunited 56 participants, their papers being focused on
the following directions: cross-border cooperation; regionalism; human resources; migration;
transport and infrastructure; interethnic relations; regional differences; development of
settlements. In 7th and 8th December 2006 the third IERS seminar has taken place in Oradea.
This seminar has launched the research project concerning the future Cross-border
Agglomeration Debrecen-Oradea (Eurodistrict Debrecen-Oradea).
By means of monthly reunions organised either in Debrecen or Oradea between the
two co-directors of the institute, (Ioan Horga/Oradea and Istvan Suli-Zakar/Debrecen) have
been settled either functioning elements of IERS, either research directions which are to be
followed. If you visit the page www.iser.rdsor.ro/events&news for the year 2006 you will be
able to see the calendar of activities which complete the frame of the institutional construction.
The establishment of partnerships has been accomplished in two directions:
1. IERS has settled cooperation relations with the Institute of Administrative Sciences
in Bruxelles, the Research Center of European Integration within the University of Siena, The
Center of International Relations of the University of Reims, with the Association of the
Universities in the Carpatica Euroregion, The Center of Interdisciplinary Studies of the 20th
century, The University of Coimbra, The Institute of Regional Studies The University of
Cracow, The Institute of International Social Studies in Gorizia, The Institute of Administrative
Sciences in Romania, The Institute of European Studies Universite Chatolique de Louvain.
The IERS members have participated in seminaries and international conferences
organised in Woclaw (Polland), Siena (Italy), Sofia (Bulgaria), Stockholm (Sweden), Iasi
(Romania), Budapest (Hungary).
2. IERS has settled partnerships with public authorities and Non-Governmental
Associations in Bihor-Hajdu Bihor Euroregion and Carpatica Euroregion. In 8th December 2006
in Oradea has been signed a Joint Support Statement of the public authorities in Bihor County
for the support of the research project concerning the future Cross-border Agglomeration
Debrecen-Oradea (Eurodistrict Debrecen-Oradea), initiated by IERS.
The opening of research sites has been carried out in three directions:
1. The cross-border cooperation at the Romanian-Hungarian frontier has been given the
greatest attention. The volumes of the IERS seminars have been subordinated to this direction:

198
a.
b.

Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and Euroregional Issues in the New
Europe (edited by Ioan Horga & Istvan Suli-Zakar), Oradea, 2006, 192 p.
Regional Development in the Romanian-Hungarian Cross-Border Space from
National to European Perspective (edited by Istvan Suli-Zakar & Ioan Horga),
Debrecen, 2006, 420 p.

The research studies published in the following volumes have been subordinated to the
same direction:
a. Klara Czimre, Cross-border Co-operation Theory and Practice, Debreceni
Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, Debrecen, 2006, 146 p.
b. Gbor Kozma, Place Marketing, Debrecen, 2006, 166 p.
2. The cross-border cooperation at the Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian frontier and
also at the Romanian-Moldavian frontier has been carried out in the seminar and the summer
school with the theme Regional and euroregional structures in the area of new border, which
has taken place in the 6th-18th July and also in the book written by Ioan Horga and Sorin Sipos
De la Petite la Grande Europe . Tmoignages franais de la fin du XVIII et du dbut
du XIX sicle sur la frontire orientale de lEurope. tudes et documents , Oradea, 2006.
3. The impact of the IERS research on the possible Urban Agglomeration DebrecenOradea (Eurodistrict Debrecen-Oradea). It has been carried out within the project with the
theme: Thinking the Future Together: The Debrecen-Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration
(2020). In October-December 2006 a questionnaire for public opinion has been applied in the
Oradea Metropolitan Area (1,000 subjects) on the opportunities of such an initiative. The
project has been financed by the Oradea City Hall. A wide press campaign has accompanied
this project, which has been put in a concrete form with the support of over 2/3 of the people
who have been questioned about the idea of a project dealing with a cross-border agglomeration
between Oradea and Debrecen.
The questioning of the public opinion in Debrecen has been accomplished in MarchApril 2007 and the results are now being processed. In the fourth number of Eurolimes
magazine will be published a comparative synthesis of the results in the two cities.
A part of the same programme, Phare CBC-Interreg 2005, is also the project intitled
Management Center for the Strategical Elaboration of the Cross-border Agglomeration
Debrecen-Oradea, which is now being evaluated.

Ioan HORGA
Istvan SULI-ZAKAR
Co-directors of the Institute of Euroregional Studies Oradea - Debrecen