Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Smith
Keith Dickson
Cemre /or Business and Management
Stephen
Uxbridge,
LIB8 3PH,
UK
Lloyd Smith
Polytechnic,
Kingston
Upon Thames,
Inter-firm collaboration
for innovation increasingly appears
as a industrial response to changing economic and technological conditions both in the UK and internationally.
This paper
examines
such responses,
particularly
at an informal
level
between small and large firms, in the light of recent arguments
about economic
and technological
imperatives,
disorganised
capitalism, control versus cooperation
and the growing debate
over the significance of networks. Using a case study approach,
the motives and problems of firms in such relationships
are
explored, with special reference to the UK context.
KTI 2EE, UK
458
Inter-firm collaboration for innovation is a common strategy adopted by firms to develop new
products and/or processes. This involves the interchange of technology developed jointly, and
hence the use of complementary assets [30, p.
2881. To take this point further, Camagni [3,p.17]
argues that the objective of technological alliances,
is not just the control over a given technology or
a given stock of complementary assets, but rather
the control over the optimal development trajectory of these assets or technologies. Hence cooperation is both market and technology driven.
However, additional considerations need to be
taken into account. As Cooke [4,p.10] suggests,
where firms are engaged in recurrent exchanges of
knowledge or where transaction costs make collaborative agreements cheaper than in-house research, firms form contracts which are not necessarily of a strictly market character. Our research
supports Cookes view, especially in the light of
the informal nature of many of the firms links.
Research collaboration is an applied activity,
usually directed at advancing technology, which
translates the combined research output into
marketable products. The essence of this kind of
collaboration between firms is that a symbiotic
relationship exists in which technology is developed that could not have been created independently because of resource constraints. The recognition that even large firms cannot go it alone,
as the pace of technological change increases and
as product life cycles shorten, provides in incentive to obtain economies of scope through the
sharing of technical know-how and working skills
[25]. In this way the specialised resources of other
firms are made accessible. Small specialised firms
fulfil a variety of functions, but in the context of
innovation, act as an extension of the first firms
resources as it external&es its technological and
production requirements
through collaborative
ventures. This is an important method of reducing
the risk of a single firms competitive edge being
blunted by increasing global competition.
Changes in both national and international
market structures have given rise to disorganised
capitalism according to Lash and Urry [17]. Such
macro-economic
changes contrast sharply with
observed changes at the micro level in the form of
increasing cooperation. We have argued elsewhere
[9,10] that increasing disorganisation at national
and international levels, characterised by loss of
Diversity in collaboration
Collaboration can be seen as a form of horizontal integration where companies operating in similar or related activities establish joint agreements
for technology and information exchange. Such
inter-firm collaboration may involve joint work at
one site or parallel research and development efforts, with ongoing transfer of results. In this way,
ideas generated outside an organization are incorporated into in-house effort. An important effect
of collaboration is increasing firm inter-dependency.
The spectrum of inter-firm research collaboration ranges from pre-competitive research collaboration through to competitive R&D cooperation and includes activities which are coordinated
by formal structures and informal projects which
have not reached the stage of any legal or formal
agreement. We identify four types of cooperative
venture on the basis of the degree of planning
involved.
The first is long-term strategic alliances [14],
which are essentially a large firm phenomenon
involving a companys long-term strategic plan to
improve its competitive position or, in mature
industries, to challenge traditional monopolies.
Devlin and Bleakley [7] argue that, probably the
greatest stimulus to alliance formation has been
the emergence of global competitors and those
corporations wishing to become global. Strategic
alliances also incorporate a strong innovation dimension especially in technologically advanced
sectors. In biotechnology, for example, Strategic
alliances have become a crucial step in corporate
growth..... Enormous capital requirements, prolonged R&D cycles, conflicting regulatory issues,
developing scale up production processes and international marketing and distribution systems
make it impossible for most biotech firms to go it
alone. [18].
The second type of cooperative venture occurs
where there are short-term strategic reasons for
particular collaborations, which may only cover a
specific project. Nevertheless, a certain amount of
foresight, planning and commitment is deemed
necessary in order that the collaboration take place
at all. Such firms are likely to willingly accept
cooperative games rules for they have discerned
the advantages of collaboration.
The third type of venture is where collaboration
is largely unplanned, but occurs as a result of
opportunity presenting itself. The firms, or rather
individuals within firms, are sufficiently enterprising to take advantage of the opportunity. The
phenomenon of skunk work (individuals performing undeclared work, on company time) fits
nicely into this category, especially when it is
performed in collaboration with outsiders (only at
such time as its potential use to the company is
established is the effort declared). The opportunistic nature of the collaboration suggests that the
firms may suspend normal competitive rules only
for the duration.
459
460
in the UK
Several studies suggest that large UK companies are not as good at building relationships
with
smaller companies
as those in other countries,
notably Japan 1241 but increasingly
those in continental
Europe 1191. Thirty years ago, Kindleberger [16] identified
why this was so. He suggested that British industry
was organised
into
separate firms dealing with each other at arms
length. We found instances where this legacy still
pervades British industry and constituted
a major
factor in inhibiting
successful
collaboration.
It
461
Advantages
of collaboration
We summarise
our research findings
on the
motives for small/large
firm collaboration
in table
1. We found that the initiative to collaborate
had
been shared almost equally between the large and
the small firms. In both the biotechnology
collaborations,
however, the larger firms approached
the smaller firms. This suggests that large firms
are aware of the opportunities
presented by smaller
firms, and that technologically
active small firms
recognise the need for external inputs. Many collaborations
are short or medium term, lasting the
462
Table 1
Advantages
of inter-firm
collaboration
Small firms
Large firms
Large-small
Electronics
resources
firm collaboration:
Access to people
new products
with right
Increase
range, provide
Potential
Strategic decision
needed specialised
Electronics
combination
of skills to develop
Access
sales to partner
Gains
to EC funding
Management
strategy,
leaders in technology
company
Approached
by larger
DTI recommendation
company
evolving
Extend
followers
to develop
prototype
customers
in a key technology.
of smaller company
Exploitation
and equipment
to
to smaller
firms
expertise
for product
development
after
Provided
customers
joint
to invest
resources
Access
needed
from
company
solution to technical
- hence an improved
problem
- better service
competitive position
for
development
Entry
to UK market
Access to expertise
New products
at pre-competitive
research
stage
principal
range of company
and increase
distribution
network
Access to technology
development
which
would
facilitate
in-house
project
develop
products
in order
to
463
Hazards of collaboration
Where we found projects had been delayed, it
was due to resistance of management for operat-
464
ing counter
to prevailing
management
style or
because of the not invented here syndrome.
In
the latter case, collaboration
(and its success)
meant
that other technical
people within
the
principal company,
who had not achieved effective results (hence the collaboration),
were not
willing to accept an imposed innovation.
For example, a small software company had been called
into a major telecommunications
company to help
develop a product which would integrate a computer graphics package and database
capability
into the existing in-house system. The collaboration included a few senior technical people in the
large company,
but excluded
the development
team who had spent two years on the project. The
outcome was that successful technical collaboration was throttled
because of major problems
within the host organisation.
The software company gained little in financial
reward, and the
project
was eventually
dropped.
Collaboration
therefore needs careful internal management
and
good relations within the company.
Some small companies
have had experiences
which make them reluctant
to enter into further
cooperative
arrangements.
Such reluctance
was
based on a number of circumstances,
such as loss
of control over the direction of a project. We were
told on a number of occasions that certain large
firms have a reputation
of behaving in a predatory
manner towards small firms. In one case, a small
leading
edge electronics
company,
employing
about 90 people, had committed
resources to a
collaboration
with a research centre of a UKowned multinational.
The smaller company deals
with most electronics companies in the world, and
has a feel for the direction in which technology is
developing.
The company
sees collaboration
as
part of its competitive
strategy. Six months down
the line, the larger company pulled the plug on
the operation, refusing to supply the promised test
wafers and generally behaving in a high-handed
manner. For small companies,
therefore, risk and
uncertainty
are increased by poor corporate
behaviour. This would appear to be the legacy of
behaviour
patterns in UK industry,
as identified
by Kindleberger
(1964).
Differing
priorities
are a problem
in formal
relationships
between small and large firms. In
one example, the large company did not deploy
sufficient resources to develop the new product,
which the smaller company
regarded as poten-
tially important.
The product was to be developed
to solve an internal problem for the biotechnology
research unit of a multinational
chemical company. The smaller company
was invited to help
develop the product,
an automatic
blotting
machine, on the basis of previous interaction.
Problems arose when a short-term
solution was found
which did not involve the full development
of the
new instrument,
and for which the smaller needed
the larger companys
knowledge of the processes
involved.
Eventually
the project was completed,
but the smaller company had lost time in getting
the instrument
to market.
We found instances where a collaboration
failed
because the products were not developed as both
sides anticipated,
with the result that they did not
fulfil their commercial
function. This could be put
down to a failure of management
to agree on goals
at the outset, a lack of monitoring,
or as result of
size disparity.
In this case the larger company
imposed standards
on the instrument
which the
technical staff in the smaller company knew would
make it too complex to operate. Those involved in
the technical collaboration
were unable to withstand the pressure to make the instrument
overly
sophisticated
and the market
for the product
turned out to be smaller than expected. Indeed,
the amount of time and money invested by both
sides has not been rewarded by adequate financial
return.
Although
collaboration
can bring major rewards, initiating
ventures can be dangerous,
particularly for small firms. For example, companies
have lost valuable technical advantages to competitors through intentional
and unintentional
revelation of commercial
secrets. A common problem
small companies face is that they do not have the
experience
or resources to safeguard
their intellectual property.
Failure to establish intellectual
property rights at the outset has meant that companies have lost out on a share of ownership, and
have devoted resources
to project only to find
themselves in dispute later.
The process of developing
the right basis for a
collaborative
relationship
can also mean that developments
are delayed, manpower
and resources
have been tied up, and a technical lead is lost.
This is a particularly
critical problem for a small
company. In one example, it took two years for a
formal agreement to be drawn up, far longer than
was anticipated.
465
disadvantage
unless the challenges
offered outweight the benefits of working for a large firm.
Nonetheless,
the UK experience in this respect
has not always been happy. A small electronics
company
built a prototype
production
machine
for a UK aerospace company. It worked well, and
a preferred
contractor
order was placed, worth
&300,000.
466
The importance
laboration
of personal
relationships
in col-
Relationships
are one of the most valuable
resources
that
a company
possesses,
notes
Hakansson
[13,p.10]. He argues that relationships
fulfil three main functions:
to increase productivity or technical efficiency, to serve as information
channels, and to increase control (power). These
comments echo earlier work of de Solla Price [6]
on invisible colleges and Allen and Cohen [l] on
technological
gatekeepers,
all of whom emphasize
the roles played by information
exchange
and
dissemination
by key people. Personal
relationships are not only an outcome of collaboration,
but also a key element in its success. Collaboration
creates
indebtedness
and
reciprocity
whereby a relationship
is established
which may
be called upon when the need arises in the future.
Collaboration
itself may he an outcome of the
personal
and professional
trust which exists at
many layers within companies.
Collaboration
may arise where a supplier relationship has existed and personal respect has developed. For example in the case of a small scientific instruments
company (Browns)
and a research institute. The director of the institute had
for some time bought equipment
from Browns
and had been impressed by the quality of their
back-up service; he was able to go into a partnership with Browns to develop a novel piece of
equipment
which had considerable
market potential, but which needed the technical expertise on
both sides. However, the opportunity
for Browns
only came after larger firms which had been approached by the director had rejected the project
as having insufficient
potential. The smaller company in this case has committed
itself to a longterm development
project requiring
considerable
investment
of resources, and will be operating in a
small way for some time to come. It was not worth
larger companies while to be involved in a market
of this nature.
In this relationship
the risk is
shared by the institute; if the company is sold on,
the research institute could lose control over the
project they currently enjoy on the basis of existing personal relationships.
Personal commitment
can be the critical determinant
in whether a collaboration
between a
small, relatively unknown
firm and a more tested
company
can proceed.
Individuals
who act as
product
champions,
are faced with overcoming
problems associated with corporate cultures even
more so when they are working within the UK
company
of a foreign-owned
multinational.
The
Not Invented Here syndrome seems to be particularly rife in American companies,
and restricts
the development
and absorption
of technologies
from offshore,
particularly
when they involve
long-term
commitment
and substantial
investment. In general, the people in the UK understand
the US better than those in the US understand
the
UK. As one the product champion
said, In the
US there are two kinds of people, internationalists
and domestics - 99% are domestics - for them the
world ends at the coast. Eventually the collaboration took place and the small UK biotechnology
firm has benefitted
substantially
from the collaboration
with the US pharmaceutical
company.
The large firm, although it has not yet achieved a
positive bank balance on the deal, has secured
new products which it could not have developed
independently.
The person who was the driving
force behind the collaboration
has developed intrapreneurial
skills, as well as political
skills
which can be described positively as the ability to
negotiate and use contacts, or less complementarily as deviousness.
The downside of the key role which personal
relationships
play in collaborative
ventures
is
over-dependence
on certain individuals.
This can
arise when the collaborative
venture is not sufficiently key to the companys operations that it can
withstand
the removal of the key individual.
The
down side of professional
trust, therefore, is the
reliance on the product
champion
remaining
in
position. In our example, in spite of the technical
success of the prototype x-ray machine,
Conclusions
Inter-firm collaborative networks serve to externalise the innovation function through the
transfer of technology between firms and this is
always a two-way process. Collaboration also extends firm networks through linkages into those of
the partner, linking individuals, firms and sectors.
Although it is possible to identify particular
rewards and hazards resulting from inter-firm collaboration, what is clear is that each collaborator
was confronted by a more or less novel set of
circumstances in terms of size, product markets
and organisational idiosyncrasies, of which size
disparity between large and small firms was only
one dimension.
Changing technological and commercial imperatives mean that new rules have to be learnt. The
very newness of this active form of inter-dependence conflicts with traditional ingrained attitudes
towards smaller companies. When collaborative
projects occur between firms where one has not
learned co-operative game rules, it leads to precarious relationships. Corporate cultures within
large firms, especially with those where control is
located outside the UK, create operational problems for individuals who recognise the opportunities arising from accessing complementary assets.
In our study we found that the existence of
informal, personal networks among the scientific
and engineering elite was the key factor in the
establishment of collaborative links. In many cases,
these links were based on professional, scientific
trust at the early research stages, which was later
formalised when commercial/production
possibilities arose. Pre-existing networks are often the
basis of collaboration, as personal contacts are
used to target key people in potential partner
firms, and provide the basis of professional trust
on which successful technical collaboration depends.
Formalisation legitimises what has occurred informally. However, formalisation can also be a
significant barrier to successful collaboration, with
small firms particularly vulnerable to adverse decisions made by people in authority above the level
of the technical collaborators.
The coming of the single European market in
1992, undoubtedly presents export opportunities
for UK firms. Indeed there is some evidence that
the number of partnerships between UK and con-
461
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