936

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

[Br.I:

Cn.2

and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears t<r
be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences
1094b should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens shoulrl
learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even
the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e. g. strategy,
5 economicsr rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences,
and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are
to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the
others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end
is the sarne for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems
at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain
or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for
one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for
10 city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since

it is political

science,

in

one sense

of that term.

3 , Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now
15 fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of
, much'variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought
to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give
rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people;
for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and
others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speak20 ing of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth
roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for
the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each
type of statement be recei,aed; for it is the mark of an educated man
25 to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature
of the subject admits I it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable
reasoning from a mathematician and to deniand from a rhetorician
scientiflc proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is
a good judge. And so the man wfro has been educated in a subject is
1095" a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an allround education is a good judge in general. Hence a young. man is not
a proper hearer of lectures on political sciencel for he is inexperienced
in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these
and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions,

Br.I: Cn.3l

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

937

his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is
not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is
young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend
on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as
passion directs, For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge
brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with
a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great

5

10

beneflt.

These remarks about the student, the sort ,of tre4tment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

4 Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all
knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we
say political science'aims at and what is the highest of all goods
achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for
both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say
that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being

happy; but .with regard to what happiness is they differ, and
the many do not give the sarne account as the wise. For the former
think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or
honour; they differ, however, from one another-and often even the
same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is
ill, with wealth when he is poor; but,. censcioui of their ignorance,
they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their
comprehension. Now some 2 thought that apart from these many

15

z0

25

goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness
of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held
were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are
most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.
Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between 30
arguments from and those to the first principles. For plato, too, was
right in raising this question and asking, as he used to de, ,are rve on

the way from or to the first principles?,3 There is a difference, as
there is in a race"course between the course from the judges to the
turning-poipt and the way back. For, while we must begin with what
is known,_ things are objects of knowledge in two senses-some to us,
some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with
things known to zrs. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to
Iectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects
of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the
2The Platonic School; Cf, ch,6.
I Cf..Rey',5rr r.

1095b

5

as of God and of reason. e. e. The men'who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers). for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for. of opportunity. or with lifelong inactivity. if (as is the case) in 'man himself' and in a particular man the account of man 35 is one and the same. of the right locality ahd the like). rather than hbnour. although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friencls of our own.happy. or happiness. nor lays to heart Anothir's wisdom. so that there could tgood' not be a common Idea set over all these goods. and. with pleasure.rther. and in time. the end of the political life. at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured. they will in no 1096b respect cliffer. at any rate. for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. of that which is nioderate. But he who neither knows. since has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both i4 the category of substanie. But even this appears somewhat incomplete. while both are dear. for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely. then. e. which we shall consider later. but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. neither will 'good itself ' and particular goods. i. three prominent types of life-that just mentioned. preferring a life suitable to beasts. Good. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows Jhat people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour. and men of the most vulgar type. most men.that men lead. he that hearkens when men counsel right. Br. i. which is the reason why they Iove the life of enjoyment. But enough of this. is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an offshoot and accident of being) . especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom. And one might ask the question. But it is evident that not even these are ends. i. for this is. let hinl hear the words of fact is the starting-point. indeed to be our duty. roughly speaking. but as it is there are manv sciences even of the things that fall under one category. Further. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish 20 in their tastes. he will not at the start need the reason as well. what in the world Nhey mean by 'a thing itself'. Further. and if this is so. and thirdly the contemplative life.a 4 rt77e tz-tr188 8. further. in so far as they are good. and among those who know them. for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine. But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal. and that 20 which is Per se. Let us leave this subject. is a useless wight. e. unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. for they are loved for themselves. clearly. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be. according to them. 30 there would have been one science of all the goods. e' g. the end of the political life. however. and in relation. e. substance. but the term 'good' is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends. For in so far as they are man.I:Cn. of the right opportunity. but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. and in place. piety requires us to honour truth 5 10 1. for. and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better. since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science. Third comes the contemplative life. And as for him who neither has nor can get them. and\n-quality. of the useful. men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness. To judge 15 from the lives. seem (not without some ground) to identify the good. yet many arguments have been thrown arvay in support of them. Let us. and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. the political. we may say. of the'25 virtues. rr?88 zz-fi7ga 32. e. i.I: Cu. and Hesiod: 10 5 Far best is he who knows all things himself . clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single. i. For there are. for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. since that which lasts long is no whiter I L . Fu. and in quantity. 6 We had perhaps better consider the universal good and cliscuss thoroughly what is meant by it.5l NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 939 The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion. virtue 30 is better. but a man who was living so no one would call. i. since it is thought to depend on those who bestow 25 honour rather than on him who receives it. and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking. for" then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. and on the ground of their virtue.4 938 if this is sufifrciently plain to him. then. with the greatest 1096" sufferings and misfortunes.NICOMACHEAN'BTHICS [Bx.( above our friends. resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed.

zs flutes. if we pursue these also for the sake of something else.. So the argument has by a different course reached the same point. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated fronr others. Bx. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way. Now such a thing happiness.6 And similarly with regard to the Idea.that only chance to have the same name. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the good. then. but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciencesl for all of these.)10 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS . g. sight. What then is ? 15 the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. 9868 zz-6. t3-togzr 17. leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Therefore. Now we call that which is in 30 itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sahe of scmething else. and that the goods that arc pursued and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form. in strategy victory. In medicine this is health. for perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of philoso- phy. when they place the one in the column of goods. however. and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed. just in respect of 25 their goodness. Clearly. rogrs 29-b3. in strategy.6l NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 941 having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that L097' are good for us. is held to be. to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by k-nowing this 'good itself'. Therefore.. [Bx. pleasure. yel one would place them among things good in themselves. But let us discuss these matters elsewheres. by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good. such as intelligence. so great an aid is not probable. though they aim at some good and seek to 5 supply the deficiency of it. the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Letus again return to the good we are seeking. for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else. then. and in every aqtion and pursuit the end. iv. as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. but we must try to state this even more clearly. and therefore we call final without qualification that which. but the chief good is evidently something final. some one might a Cf. may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists 10 have not been speaking about all. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves. and some must be good in themselves. 1097b but honour.6 5 than that which perishes in a day. things good in themselves from 15 things useful. Met. Let us separate. b a Cf. even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence. wealth. goods. but we are now seeking something attaineblc. and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. this will be the good achievable by action. for a5 Perhaps. wisdom. or perhaps rather the health of a particular man. if there is an end for all that we do. the account of the good will have to app€ar as something identical in them all. it is different in medicine. the others by reason of theSe. Or is nothing 20 other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will bc empty. 2o in any other sphere something else. think it worth while to recognizc this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable. The good. in architecture a house. this will be what we are seeking. But enough of these topics.I: Cn. and if we know them shall attain them. and if there are more than one. or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body.. and in general instruments) for the sake of something else. is not some common element answering to one Idea. however. But of honour. these will be the goods achievable by action. and so on in other cases' But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present. goods must be spoken of in two ways. too. it is indivjduals that he is healing. while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these. and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly. or how the man who has 10 viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby.is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. if there is only one final end. and ask what it can be. Are goods one. and if there are more than one. It is hard.1o72b 3o-ro13l 3. the accounts are distinct and diverse. Since there are evidently more than one end. and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose .I:Crr. But whit then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like thc things. and in a secondary sense. but the health of man. then. and should not even seek. reason. and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are de$rable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing. for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. This argument has some plausibility. Yet that all the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of. It seems different in different actions and arts. therefore. clearly not all ends are final ends. and pleasure. Met. rozSb zt-4. and we choose some of these (e. 30 so is reason in the soul. clearly it could not be achievetl or attained by man. and in the other arts likewise. z. an objection to what: we have said. above all else.

eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name 10 of the term. for one who lives a solitary life. therefore. ro. so would it seem to be for man. But we must add tin a complete life'' For one swallow does not make a summer. and if we say 'a so-and-so' and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind. that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions. for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. or a short time. and in general for his friends and fellow citizens. then. however. hand. and others too in other ways. may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to becommon ' even to plants. We must act in the same way. we must state that life in the sense of activity is vihat we mean. Next there would be a life of perception. and the tanner cdrtain 30 functions or activities. and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye. Now of fi1st principles we see some by induction. 'Let this serve as an outline of the good.. the good. anrl a clearer account of what it is is still desired. but . does not make a man blessed and happy. and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry.7l NICOMACHEANETHICS 943 if the function of manis an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle.? the self-sufficient we now define as 15 that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. if we could first ascertain the function of man. For a carpenter and a'geometer investigateitre right angle in different ways. and in general eaeh of the parts evidently has a function.. for all things that have a function or activity. and then later filI in the details. And we must also remember what 25 precision in all things alike.t also seems to be common even to the horse. since 5 they have a great influence on what follows. without being counted as one good thing among others-if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods.I:Cu. Let us examine this question. in general. Br. 5 judging that by means of them we shall be happy. This might . however. nor does one day. and if any action is well performed when it is 1'5 performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case. And. Now of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre. some by perception. and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle. but we choose them also for the sake of happiness. but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. and is the end of action. for this seems to be the more proper sense 7i. then. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player. Now by self-sufEcient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by ro himself. in general. From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow. the life of nutrition and growth. then. the other in the sense 5 of possessing one and exercising thought. or any artist. Happiness. and if there are more than one virtue. the former doet to in so far as the right angle is useful for his work. as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings. is something final and self-sufficient. For the beginning is a tog4b tt-27. and so without qualification in all cases. some by a certain habituation. and we must take pains to state them definitellr. in accordance with the best and most complete. for that which is added 20 becomes an excess of goods... ix. of this. and.but i. foot. z5 perhaps be given.and of goods the greater is always more desirable. rt. to which facts the advances of the arts are due. no one chooses for the sake of these. For just as for a flute-player? a sculptor. 30 while the latter inquires whatit is or what sort of thing it is. in all other matters as well. wife. on the other hand.r precision as accords with the subjectsuch in each class of things matter. but also for parents.and the'well' is thougfrt to reside in the function. the fact is the primary thing or first principle. to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude. Happiness. There remhins. for anything other than itself. and every animal. But some limit must be set to this.. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way. and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well) : if this is the case. as 1098b in the case of the first principles. # b*.i. Let us 1098' exclude.942 NICOMACHEAN ETHICF [Bx. for we must presumably 20 first sketch it roughly. an active life ofthe element that has a rational principle. children.] human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue. the ox. and such we think happiness to be. for he is a spectator of the truth. on another occasion."4 ""ii"8rl. then. Presumably. since man is born for citizenship.I. nor. it is enough in some cases that the lact be well established. to.". for any one can add what is lacking. and further we think it most desirable of all things. one parthas such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one.. [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life. and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these.7 each of them).. But it would seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been rvell outlined. and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work. e' g. and so too one day. Have the carpenter.. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike.' ]1 I I I .:Cn. if he hds a function. for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient.

and similarly in all other cases. e. therefore. fn many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instrumenti. of thise. as good birth. we identify with happiness' for goods well. and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as ii is the best. beauty. all of them.1099b ment. no small difference whether we place the chief . the man who does not rejoice in. or clmes in virtue oJ some divine proviclence or again by chance. or one30 the best. for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting. Laws. 8 trVe must consider it. but has its pleasure in itsell For. and rightly win. nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions. some with practical wisdom. the noble and good things in life. For some identify happiness with virtue. has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm. goodly children.ll it needs the external it is impossible.g and some are described as external. Br. so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. virtuous-actions must be in themselves pleasant. but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant. But pleasantest is it to win what we love' Iror qll these properties belong to the best activities. whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training. or one of these.r:Cx. though others identify it with virtue. If this is so. others as relating to soul or to Lody. For pleasure is a state of. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses. Now foi most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant. e. since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting jusily. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old.ty 6 be happy.lo Happiness then is the best. so tlose who act win.8l NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 945 to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. soul. and most pleasant thing in the world. as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive. 743 n. Therefore our account must be sound. in state of mind or in activity. It iJcorrect also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities.. for which reason some identify happiness with good-fortune. I. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most Ueiutitut and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is 5 some of these that are victorious). and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it. however. as Yet evidently. Their life. ind these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at 25 Delos- I\{ost noble is that which is justest. but also in the same way just acts are pleasant 10 s Pl. happiness seems. and a spectacle 10 to the lover of sights. -for-lhe man who is veiy ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless s is not very lik. others by a few eminent personsl and it is not. and perhaps'a man would be still less he had"thoroughly-bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. Their life is also in itself pleasant.to need this sort of prosperity in addition. others with a kind of philosophic wisdom. 48 a. and virtuous actions are such. As we said. for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness. Euthyd. and 15 physical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. at least according to this view. perhaps. 25 others with these. that virtuous actions are good and noble in the highest degree' 10 .l. since the good man judges well about these attributes. 30 With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony. but also of what is commonly said about it. which is an old oneand agreed onby philosophers. for with a true view all the data harmonize. good in possession or in use. but the activity cannot.noble actions is not even good. But this question would perhaps be more 1o i. but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects. likely if g For this reason also the question is asked. For the 1099" state of mind may exist without producing any good resuit. and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant. z7g tn. and best is health. NIw if there is any gif.Z thought to be more than half of the whole. noblest. or not easy. to do noble acts without the proper equip. besides what we have said. probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken. in the Iight not only of our conclusion and our premisses. and acting well. we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods. Another belief 20 which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well. his judgement is such as we 15 20 have desdribed.l1 then. it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given. Now goods have been divided into three classes.944 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [Br. for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure.I:Cn. as we said. he judges 11 1693b 26-r. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also. But they are also good and nobl'e. but with a false one the facts soon clash. while others include also external prosperity. But it makes. for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Phi. and have each of thesd attributes in the highest degree. to belong to what we have defined happiness as being.tof the gods to men. and these.

and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments. and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. for none of them is capable of sharing in such 1100" activity. of the remaining goods. then. and something godlike and blessed. again the same man happy and to be a .l0l NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 947 for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man. gercd and capable of noble acts.I:Cn. since many changes occur in life. on account of the 1100b changes that may befall them. even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training.ti.uch as 20 for one who is aliire but not aw-are of them. 20 i . while with othcrs the opposite zs iray be the case. honours and dishongeneral of and in of children ours and the good or bad fortunes descendants. ness while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel' For s clearly if wi were to keep pace with his fortunqs. The attribute in question. as we said. viz. see the end? Even il we are to lay down this doctrine. 12 ro98t 16. for always. For this reason also a boy is not hippy. for perhaps by a consideration of it our present problem might be solved. And this wilt be found to agree with what we said at the outset. while viituous activities or their opposites are what constitute happi10 ness or the reverse. then. at another wretched. and political science spends most of iis pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character. be called happy while he livesl must we.'some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness. and boys who are called happy are being'congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. llappiness . But if it is better to bi happy tlus 15 than by chance. not as being happy but as having 35 been so before. it is reasonable that the facts should be so.17 16 rogga 3r-b 7. as. owing to his age.la not only complete virtue but also a 5 complete life."u. will belong to the happy ma"n. surely this is a paradox. if the dead man were to share in these changes and become at one time happy. and all manner of chances. 10 10 Must no one at all. and similarly everything that depends on art or an! rationar cause. g. that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy. arrd he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether ddcorously. Now if we must see the end and onlv ihen cali a man happy. and clearly too the d9Sr9e9 of relationship between them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely.m.l' for we stated the end of political 30 science to be the best end. For there is required. for a[ who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a 20 certain kind of study and care. For definition.chameleon and insecurely based'. for it has been said rzto bi a virtuous activity of soul.u". if he is 'truly good' and'foursquare beyond reproach'. It is natural. for though a man has lived happily up to oltl agi and has had a death worthy of his life. our confirms The question we have now discussed no funciion of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be more durable even. *uny . as.than knowledge of the 15 sciences). 13 rog4e 27. for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. and oithese themselves the most valuable are more durable nrost and readily most life spend their happy because'ihose who are continuously in these.be the best Ihing in the world. that when he is happy the of him predicated be truly not to is him to belon[s that attribute because we do not wish to call living men happy.946 NrcoM.n|. but human life. and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy. rt will also on this view be very generalry shared. but that one can then safely cail a man blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes.(cHEANETHTCS [Bx. especially for us who say that happiness is an activity? t5 But if we do not call the deacl man happy. since everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be. as we said. this also affords matter for disiussion. 25 The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the definitionof happiness. or by preference to everything else. and he will be happy throughout his life. 16 Durability. e. for he is" not yet capable of such acts.9 appropriate to another inquiry. then. Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not depend on these. as-Solon says.lo then. 1? Simonides. to be among the most godJike tiringsl for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to. and because we have assumed happi-to be somelhing permanent and by no means easily changed.s may befali his descendants-some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve. no*"uer. is it also the case that a man is happy when he ii deadl or is not this quite absurd. Bx.r:cr. while it would also be odd if the fortunes ^ 'the 30 descendants did not for some time have some effect on the of happiness of their ancestors. of a certain kind. It would be odd. and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age. But we must return to our first difficulty. ana tUis also presents a problem. he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation. we should often call man out happy the making wretched. 14 ro98s 16-rg.15 needs these as mere additions. io entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement. and if Solon does not mean this. is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle.

.rrtures.I:Crr. Why then should we not say that he is happy who is active. from these considerations.t0 Now many events happen by chance.nlara Priam.y crush and maim happiness. but this is done 20 because praise i-nvolves a reference. but since the events that -. tt83b zo. so too there are differences among the misadventures of our friends taken 30 as a whole..happen z5 are numerous and admit of all sorts of difference. M . but rather calls it blessed. as it were. Brrt applies what clearly have described. perhaps. the fact that doubt is felt whether the dead share in any good or evil' For it seems. If. lighter. for what we do to the gods and the most godlike of men 25 is to call them Llessed and happy.o *iir. nor. and some lE l. 6ut tf. Eudoxus also seems to have been right in his method of advocating the supremacy of pleasure. and so on. or rather. as is indeed obvious. we shall call happy those among living men in whom these condition." way a man deals with them may be nobre and good).. an infinite-*task to discuss each in detail. that even if anything whether good or evii penetrates to them. while happiness. ti so. but a muliitude of 25 great events if they turn out well wil make life happier (for not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to life. For the man who is trury good and wise. for they both bring pain with them and 30 hinder many activities. And so too with good things.ls what gives life its chaiacter.Io.*ternal goods.itity shines through. This is clear also from the praises of the gods. will he recover his happiness in a short time. To0.i#. Br. then.I: Cn.. because he is of a 10 1101b ruitrln degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy nor to taki away their blessedness from those who are. the happy man can never become *ir.in 15 accordance with complete virtue and is sufficienily equipped *itr. then.. and events differing in importancel small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite creairy do not weigh down the scares of life one way or the othei.948 NICOMACHEANETHICS [Br. no happy man can become miserable. as some of a man's own misadventures have a certain weight and influence on life while others are. to something else. as being something more divine and better. is he many-coloured and changeable. let us consider whether happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among the things ihat are prized.. The good o-r 12 iertain kind and is related in a certain way to something good and 15 important. but effects of such a kind and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy nor to produce any other change of the kind. when a man bears with resignation many. So much for these questions. for he will never do the acts that are 35 hateful and mean. 9. ii he has had -many great misadventures.either in itself or for them. it must be something weak and iegligible. and one opposed to the opinions men hold. we as such if praise is for things to the best things iJnot praise. as a good general makes the besi military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out s oJthehides that are given hiil. for clearly it is not to be placed among potentiaii. the various sufferings befau the living or the dead (much more even than whether lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed in a tragedy or done on the stage). rf activities are. and that this is what God and the good are. at least it must be 35 bad fortunes of iriends. but'if at alf only in a long and complete one in which he has attained many . a general outline will perhaps suffice. yet even in these nof. the good runner. 11 reThat the fortunes of descendants and of ail a man. while if ihey turn ori itt trr. this difference also muit be iaken into account. for by reference 2o Cf. not for some chance period but ttrlrgirori a complete life? or must we add 'and who is destined to live thui and die as befits his-life'? Certainly the future is obscure to us. though a good. 10 he be moved splendid successes. for it seems abiurd that the gods should be referred to our standard. it seems a long-nay.r. we think.great misfortunes. 10 Aristotle now returns to the question stated in rroor rg_3o. . and it makes a difference whether. ir this is-the case. as 'we said. .2o Everything that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain kind and is re-lated somehow to something elsel for we praise the just or brave man and in general both the good man and virtue itself because of the actions and functions involved. or if not. and we praise the strong man. makes ihe best of circumstances. fulfilled-but happy ruen. if he meet with fortunes like those of uii. seem to have some effects on the dead. 5 These questions having been definitely answered. and greatness oi'soul.ties. 1101" bearsall the chances of life becomingty and u1*uy. una. rz6b 4.h*. we claim. but something greater and better.i"ui*-trr""gr. it is not praised indicated it to be better than the things that are 3o praised.11l NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 949 come more near to us and others less so. not through insensibility to pain but through nofifit). is an end and something in every way final. as wesaid. _- again. M . he thought that the fact that. he wiil not reach blessedness. but only by many great ones. no one praises happiness as he does justice.s friends should not affect his happiness at ail seems a very unfriendty doltiine.. for neither will from his happy state easily or by iny ordinary *israu. und ur" 20 to be.

The true student of politics.iii. for as a result of virtue men tend to do nobre deedi.. and vegetative in its nature. is.atts of the body or oi anything divisible are. For exactly as paralysed liirbs w[en we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left. a. l'ike convex and concave in the circumference of a circle.ry ii'thers of the kind thal ther. but there is found in them also anJther element naturally opposed to the rational principle.L Letter than those of ordinary people. we must none the less rrppos" that in the soul too there is something contraryto. shares in a rational principle.. for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to 1102b all nurslings and to embryos. but the shares it. as we said.irh.t. and in this respect the dreams of good .r. clearry the iursuit *irr.13l NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 951 tures. this is more reasonable than to assign some different power to them. The studefit of politics. the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. with the same voice as the rational principle' Therefore the irrational element also appears to be twofold. For the s0 vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle. we must consider the naturl of virtue. then. is thought to have studied viitue above ail things.whether of the body or of the soul. let us leave the nutritive faculty alone. that we all do alr that we do. And ii this inquily"nh belongs to poriticat science. for perhaps *. not that in *hi"t ru speak of 'accounting' for a mathematical property' That the irrational eiement is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhorta. on all matters.. however.tuayit with these objects in view. since a has such the part of their soul that arigf.. u"-l*"*pr" or" this we have the lawgivers of the cretans and rhe spr. to us it is crear from what has been said thai tuppin"r. resisting and opposing it.. for this part or faculty seems to function 5 most in sieep. sut ir this is so. But clearly the virtue we must study is human _ virtue. i. There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul-one which in a sense. adequately . unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements 10 ictually penetrate tothe soul. Now even this seems to have a share in a rational principle. Enough of this subject. must study thJsout."qrire. . But perhaps 35 nicety in these malle.. while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are no better off than the wretched for half their lives.. for further pr....tinct by definition but by nature inseparable.perhaps something more we are discussing.C*irZ to these all other things are judged. and a[ the more potiti. 5 19 since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue.u.muc! Iabour on acquiring knowredge"oi tiu toav.n in the discus_ sions outside our school. and it urges them principle. Some things are said about it. something prized and divine. ioo. as the man who is to hear the eyes or the body as-a" whole must know about the eyes or the body.ui oriil.o*"rrr* it iu.2l at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient. and this happens naturally enough.ai..uu. however. -clearly about soul. and happiness also we calr an activity oi sour.I:Cn.rs is more prop€r to those *rro r. one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in 21 l. "nJ."tt'*"t oi.-ilJiv rrt that of the sour.. . but enconcia arc bestowed on actl.nough. so is it with the soul. our original plan.friU tfru. il.1.t and towards the best objects. In what sensejt is distinct from the othei elements does not concern us. see better the nature of happiness. since it has by its nature no share in human excellence. of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distributed. doei not ailect the present . r mean that which causes nutrition and growth. 10 his fellow citizens good and obedient to the-raws. in the soul we do not. No doubt.u. since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad). that one erement in the soul is irrational and one has a rationat piincfite. and the first principre oigooo. the student of politics must know .. .it tr. however.._ for-in him it speaks. a. in^so far as it listens to and obeys it..i*rl .the 20 25 rational piincipte. for the good we-were seeking was human goocl and the happiness __ 15 haman happiness. for it is for the rrtu . By human virtui we *. in a sense in element desiring general the in and apletitive.uu" .ir* question. 20 is more prized and better than medicine. But while in the body we see that which moves astray. this is the sense in which we speak of 'taking account' of one's father or one's-friends.950 NTCOMACHEAN ETHTCS [Br. we clairn. which fights against and resists that principle. whether these 30 are separated as the p. and this same power to full-grown crea- Br.-ua"I'stuay encomia. Now the excellence of this seems to be common to all species and not specifically human. fo. r3.1103" tion.iSon i.uy hur" b". . . And if this element also must be said to have a rational principle. . and do so juit to the extent which is suffi_ cient for the_questions -.1r.*on! Jo"f* trr" best educated snel{. praise is appropriate to virtue.r tni. rt seems to 6Jso arso from the fact that it is a fiist principle.. or are dis. For we praise 1s the ratiohal principle of the continent man and of the incontinent. but even .. .n. 1102" among the things that are prized and perfect. 25 laborious tlan our purposes . that which has a rational principle (as well as that which has not) will be (wofold. and*uri-. and we must use ihese.

z i' e' both what the right rule is.A.." character we do not siy that he is wise or has understanding but that he_is good-tempered or temperate. The general 5 account being of this nature.'For being intellectual. r. that it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess.exists by nature can form a habit contrary to iis nature. then. but in order to become good. and are made perfect by habit.13 itself. It makes no small ditference.-. and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one. But this must be agreed 1104' upon beforehand. and those who do not *i*iiJr"rr... and being habituated to feel fear or confidence.^^. 13. for they do not fall under any art or preceptbut the agints themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to thJoccasion. we get by first exercising them.I legislator. in one word.. -20 for nothing that.. 15 . or rather al. and did not come to have them-by using them) but tt. and this ls the wish of -t::. virtue too is distinguished into kinds in acco.e . 2 vi. for these determine also the nature 30 of the states of character that are produced.y uit.or" to us by nature we first _ acquire thepotentiality and later exhibit the activity (this ispiain in-t[. and similarly .tr.u got these senses. lhen. namely how we ought to do them. that we must act according to the right rule is a common principle and must be assumed-it wiil 6e discussed later.by building una iy. Again. is the case with the virtues also. and 2 Since.. temperate by doing temperate acts.ur" -eo of th9 senses. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind: it is because the states of character correspond to the differences betwlen these. e. then. . . for it was not by often seeing oi. For the things we have to learn'before we cun Jo-th.s father. so too we become lusi by Aoirr! iuri . nor can fire be habituated to mtve downwards.the acts that we do in our transactions with other men rve become just or unjust. . philosophic wisdom and understanding and prulti. then.gain. it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produ-ced and destroyed. for we say that some of the virtuesare intellectual and others 5 moral. *"n become temperate and good-tempered. being of tw-o kindg intelectual and moral.. 15 by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger. nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in anofher. often hearing if. 10 . noi even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times. uttr.ad them before we used them. matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us irave no fixity. as also irappens in the case of the arts as well. by doing. 1103b players by playing the lyre. the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness. of all the things that .l lhe difterence. for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them. we become brave or cowardlyl The same is true of appetitics and feelings of anger."_ Bx.II: Cn.ll NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 953 duced.i. Neither by nature.i.n by doing them-. and of staies of 10 mind we call those which merit praise virtues. othqrs self-indulgent 20 and irascible. we must examine the nature of actions.r. then. since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use). let us consider this. yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind. that the whole account of matters of conduct must be 3 given in outline and not precisely. io. then. but on the iontrary we f. as we have said'I Now. but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. 3 ro94b r r-z 7.u. g.i. -moral. This is confirmed by rvhat happens in states. as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.. liberality and temperance in speaking about a man. .dance-witrr trri.o*.it'ii from a bad one. This. while moral irirtue comes about as a resurt of habit. any more than matters of health. the present inquiry does not aim at theorctical knorvledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to knorv what virlue is. by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. air_ ference. and how it is related to the other virtues. there would have been no need of a teacher. men become builders. *" Igr. First. as 'lve said at the ver5r beginning subjectthe with must be in accordance that the accounts we dernand matter.ui *irao.rt . it makes avery great difference.'ura it is in this that a good constitution differs "tt. For if this were not so. it is from playing the lyre that both good and nua fy. brave by doing U. nor contiary to nature do the virtues arise in us. as we see in the case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible ve must-use the evidence of sensible things) . states of character arise out of liire activities..*.'rr. BOOK 15 II virtue. But though our present account is of this nature we must give what 1o help we can.I:Cn. .952 NICOMACHEANETHICS [Br. For instance the storie which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards. whether we form 25 habits of one kind or of another from our very youth. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the restl men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly.'inteilectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teachint (for which reason it requires experience and time)._pfuyir. thrls. both excessive and defective I r 31-b zg.tu. rathei we are adapted by nature to 25 receive them.rom this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature. whence atso its name ethike is one thatis formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habitj.