IR/Scenario Planning

Case First
Case disproves the critique – the alts normative ethical vision for IR is
unattainable and gets coopted. Managing insecurity through the plan is
better than the alt – AND only evaluate link args if they win alt solvency
Chandler, IR Prof @ University of Westminster, 13
(David, “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies,” Critical Studies on
Security, 2013 Vol. 1, No. 1, 46–63)
We would argue that the removal of the prefix ‘critical’ would also be useful to distinguish security study based on critique
of the world as it exists from normative theorising based on the world as we would like it to be. As long as we keep the
‘critical’ nomenclature, we are affirming that government and international policy-making can be understood and
critiqued against the goal of emancipating the non-Western Other . Judging policy-making and policy
outcomes, on

the basis of this imputed goal, may provide ‘critical’ theorists with endless
possibilities to demonstrate their normative standpoints but it does little to develop
academic and political understandings of the world we live in. In fact, no greater straw
[person] man could have been imagined, than the ability to become ‘critical’ on the basis of
debates around the claim that the West was now capable of undertaking emancipatory
policy missions. Today, as we witness a narrowing of transformative aspirations on behalf
of Western policy elites, in a reaction against the ‘hubris’ of the claims of the 1990s (Mayall
and Soares de Oliveira 2012) and a slimmed down approach to sustainable, ‘hybrid’
peacebuilding, CSS has again renewed its relationship with the policy sphere . Some
academics and policy-makers now have a united front that rather than placing
emancipation at the heart of policy-making it should be ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local
demands’. The double irony of the birth and death of CSS is not only that CSS has come full circle –
from its liberal teleological universalist and emancipatory claims , in the 1990s, to its
discourses of limits and flatter ontologies, highlighting differences and pluralities in the 2010s – but that
this ‘critical’ approach to security has also mirrored and mimicked the policy discourses of
leading Western powers. As policy-makers now look for excuses to explain the failures of the promise of liberal
interventionism, critical security theorists are on hand to salve Western consciences with
analyses of non-linearity, complexity and human and non-human assemblages. It appears that the
world cannot be transformed after all. We cannot end conflict or insecurity, merely
attempt to manage them. Once critique becomes anti-critique (Noys 2011) and emancipatory alternatives
are seen to be merely expressions of liberal hubris, the appendage of ‘critical’ for arguments
that discount the possibility of transforming the world and stake no claims which are
unamenable to power or distinct from dominant philosophical understandings is highly
problematic. Let us study security, its discourses and its practices, by all means but please let
us not pretend that study is somehow the same as critique.

not really real. the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is. deconstruction from reconstruction. Blacks. appropriately: `[s]hould with itself. articulating. the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation. 2001 (LHM.Care Preventing violence good – turn its bad to make us justify why its bad Ling. we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time? ' (hooks. despite their avowals to the contrary. Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive. google books) Without concrete action for change. What hope do they have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action? After all. In maintaining `a critical distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change' (Shapiro. as a mute. 1990: 28) Without this recognition. bell hooks asked. instead. (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar. postmodernists ended up marginalizing. particulars from universals. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self ensured. Worse yet. `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld. starvation. silencing. 1994: 31). self-generative Other. civil war. Post-Colonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West. sexism. analysis from policy.especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions . women. added Roger Spegele. 1992: 174). . and so forth )' (Krishna. 1992: 49). 1993: 405). discourse divorced from practice. New School International Affairs professor. and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. and critical theory from problemsolving. asked Mark Neufeld. dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it' (Spegele. subordinate identity: that is. disconnected. racism. In not answering these questions. and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest victims of the West's essentialist conceits (the excolonials and neocolonials. passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction Critique became romanticized into a totalizing affair . postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed. postmodernists recycled.

China entered the WTO in December 2001. Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event. Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum. which critics see as neo-colonial.46 Lastly. India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China's protests of peace. trade. by refuting China threat in this bellicose way . Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute 'Chinese' threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat. a Japan threat. professor of international relations at the London School of Economics..at: china threat This is a link to people like the heritage foundation – the aff does not construct the threat of a rising China -.rather than in international politics. and general business journals . an India threat.45 Another way is for China to assert ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through participation in globalisation. some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: 'There is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. this process was painful for China as WTO membership subjects the PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture.it explicitly challenges the dominant narrative of how we understand China and military presence Policing China threats reproduces enmity – analysis of discrete military threats is key Callahan. The rationality of the rise of China . “How to understand China: the dangers and opportunities of being a rising power.48 This brings us back to Foucault's logic of 'rationality' being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as 'madness'. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from security issues to more economic and cultural issues suggests that China is estranged from the 'international standards' of the 'international community'. Refutations of 'China threat theory' do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of 'threat' as part of critical security studies. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China's national identity. ‘05 (William A. Since 2002.the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan. it was an issue of Chinese identity. After a long process of difficult negotiations. which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. Unfortunately. investment. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from these international standards. Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based on shared values and rules. the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. area studies and ideological journals as in the 1990s. the estrangement produced and circulated in China threat theory is not just among nation-states.44 As Breslin. a large proportion of the China threat theory articles have been published in economics.43 Moreover. 701-714) Although 'China threat theory' is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome.” Review of International Studies (2005). 31. It can only be summed up in a word: "Madness" 7 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a 'China threat theory syndrome'.that is by generating a new series of threats . and so on. China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world.

can be interpreted as a threat. but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat. and cyber operations along its maritime periphery. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-like). mutually beneficial .S. Beijing now has both the ability and the motivation to seek to diminish significantly if not eliminate the potential threat to its domestic and growing regional economic interests posed by America’s long-standing predominance in the Western Pacific. Conclusion The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. because depending on circumstances anything . Indeed. as well as its increasing economic and political-diplomatic initiatives across the Asian littoral and its call for a new. http://carnegieendowment. Indeed. Rather than adding to the debate.depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Beijing has an ongoing and likely long-term and deep incentive to work with the United States and the West to sustain continued.S. Like Joseph Nye's concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy. April 20.-China Balance of Power”. Not our argument – the aff is a nuanced depiction of Chinese motives backed up by empirics Swaine 15 Michael Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and has a PhD in Government from Harvard. from anemic economic growth and domestic political dysfunction to image concerns resulting from arguably unjust Middle East wars and apparent egregious human rights abuses.s. and allied air. 2015. Moreover. Rather. China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say. as do many in China and the West. naval. But that would be a mistake. space. it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia. Beijing must now defend against threats before they can reach the Chinese homeland and vital coastal economic centers. 'China threat' has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in debates among academics.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi This strategy can no longer provide adequate security for China. the desire to reduce America’s past maritime superiority and economic power has become more achievable and hence more compelling to many Chinese as a result not only of China’s continued economic success but also of the troubles now plaguing America and the West. it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic. its ongoing acquisition of military capabilities designed in large part to counter or complicate U. partly serve such ends. missile. post–Cold War cooperative security architecture for the Asia-Pacific.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-inwestern-pacific-need-for-stable-u. For the first time in its history. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce 'China threat theory' as the misguided product of the Blue Team.from rising powers to civilian aircraft . “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U. public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth. This should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great power transitions.

historical insecurity (and nationalist pride). As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues. To some degree. It will also likely become more fearful that a declining (in relative terms) Washington will regard an increasingly influential China as a threat to be countered through ever more forceful or deliberate measures. Krebs is Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. but also in part by the understandable desire to take advantage of China’s growing regional and global influence and America’s apparent relative decline in order to strengthen Chinese leverage in possible future disputes. . in particular policy domains. while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. a promise. something is done (as in betting. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms. its foreign interests expand. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. [T]he word ‘security’ is the act .” [emphasis added]. by using well-known tropes to . 2015. usually elites. actors. and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive. and most important. Why It Should. But its mechanisms remain obscure. put China at a strategic. and power structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers. it will naturally become less willing to accept or acquiesce in international political and economic relationships. As Beijing’s overseas power and influence grow. First. they also stem from a level of opportunism. Duck of Minerva. or generally fail to reflect movement toward a more multipolar global and regional power structure. . One does not need to cast Beijing as an evil or predatory entity to understand the forces driving such beliefs. .economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive. norms. Goddard is the Jane Bishop ’51 Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College.html * modified for ableist language But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. Indeed. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School. driven in part by fear. September 18. political. “By saying it [security]. http://duckofminerva. this view is already widespread among many Chinese observers. . Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR. Ronald R. as do the conditions under which it operates. securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. fear. and How It Can”. or economic disadvantage. suspicion. as a speech act. At the same time. and uncertainty. . naming a ship). it understandably wishes to reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States and other politically and militarily strong nations. Countless articles and books have traced this process. transform the social order from one of normal.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-whysecuritization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-itcan. Reps don’t shape reality in the China debate Goddard 9/18/15 Stacie E. everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They stem from national self-interest. from pandemics to climate change and terrorism. and its consequences.

Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed. many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts. speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. . even when the performance is competent. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers. to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social. the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Franklin Delano Roosevelt. To this end. securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate. Speaking security. who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others). You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). lies in securitization’s silence on [disregard of] the politics of security. and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. While George W. After thirty years as an active research program. we would urge securitization theorists.convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion. that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action. that legitimation is laced through with contestation. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values. Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. the balance has shifted. and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. In very recent years. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. while others fall on deaf ears [are ignored]. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media. The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. A large part of the problem. In its seminal formulation. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. a more gifted orator. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues. yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. as we recently have elsewhere. the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization. by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. we believe. where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. does not sweep this politics away.

is a reflection of a broader problem—an unwillingness to engage in political contestation. The focus on the shared interests with those ‘excluded’. If the only alternative to the political ‘game’ is to threaten to ‘take our ball home’—the anti-politics of rejectionism—the powers that be can sleep peacefully in their beds. 2004 (David. . neither does it assert that the key problem with radical global civil society approaches is their rejection of formal engagement in existing political institutions and practices. rather than engaging in a public debate. Advocates of global civil society ‘from below’ would rather hide behind the views of someone else. which force the individual to engage with and account for the views of other members of society. leaves political struggles isolated from any shared framework of meaning or from any formal processes of democratic accountability. is a way of legitimising the avoidance of any accountability to those still ‘trapped inside’—the electorate. Millennium . legitimising their views as the prior moral claims of others—the courtly advocates—or putting themselves in harm’s way and leading by inarticulate example. “Building Global Civil Society `From Below'?”. SAGE) The celebration of global civil society ‘from the bottom up’ would appear to be based less on any emergence of new political forces at the global level than the desire of Western activists and commentators to justify their avoidance of accountability to any collective source of political community or elected authority. this rejection of social engagement can only further legitimise the narrowing of the political sphere to a small circle of unaccountable elites .113 The struggle for individual ethical and political autonomy. The rejection of the formal political sphere.Journal of International Studies. demonstrates the limits of the radical claims for the normative project of global civil society ‘from below’ . March. Westminster IR senior lecturer.2. or the ‘imagined’ global community of radical activists. The unwillingness of radical activists to engage with their own society reflects the attenuation of political community rather than its expansion. Regardless of the effectiveness of radical lobbying and calls for recognition.Heuristic Good Saying we aren’t policy makers is self-fulfilling and a cop out---it is only true if you accept their totalizing critique that eschews pursuing concrete policies of accountability for individual thinking Chandler. the claim for the recognition of separate ‘political spaces’ and for the ‘incommunicability’ of political causes. This article should not be read as a defence of some nostalgic vision of the past. as a way of mediating between the individual and the social. 33. The point being made here is that the rejection of state-based processes.

and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005. and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric. and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures. JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke. which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_poli tical_science_isp_2015. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning. Eric Lorber.” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2). little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas. Butcher 2012. Van Evera 2010.edu/publications/how_globalization_went_bad) b) most recent published scenario is entitled “World Without the West. and concludes that “This argument made a lot of people uncomfortable. made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking.pdf) **FYI if anyone is skeptical of Barma’s affiliation with the Naval Postgraduate School. Professor of Government at Smith College.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills. Rachel Whitlark. What went wrong? The world became dependent on a single superpower. “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science. Barma et al. PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley. Dunn & Crutcher. a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates. preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from . Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking. Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Mead 2010. Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003. Gallucci 2012. Walt 2009).2011. Glasgow 2012. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis.IR Method Justifications Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and selfreflexivity.stanford.org/feature/welcome-theworld-without-the-west-11651) Over the past decade. methodological training. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. mostly because of an endemic and gross overestimation of the reach.naazneenbarma. http://www. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. pp. PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC). which is deeply opposed to US hegemony and the existing liberal world order: a) co-authored an article entitled “How Globalization Went Bad” that has this byline: “From terrorism to global warming. Building on these insights. Gibson. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection. Naazneen Barma. strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community. Avey and Desch 2014). A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.3 In the introductory section. Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. the evils of globalization are more dangerous than ever before. This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. PhD in Political Science from GWU. Rothman 2012.fsi. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends . especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009. 1-19. platforms. What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. depth and attractiveness of the existing liberal order” (http://nationalinterest. several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap. DiCicco 2014). 16 – (May 2016. Nye 2009. Brent Durbin. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy.” (http://cisac. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students.” supports the a Non-Western reinvention of the liberal order. Jentleson and Ratner 2011. [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15]. Only by correcting this imbalance can the world become a safer place. it’s worth looking at her publication history. deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions.

lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases. some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e. For example. Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports. the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. Yet independent driving forces. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. 2005). For example. of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social. focused comparison.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns. often referred to as “alternative worlds. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985. economic. Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight. issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways. an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. in principle. a resurgence of the nation-state vs. the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking . are plausible—yet. carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends. achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach . scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. indeed probable. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War.4 As with corporate scenario analysis. The global petroleum company Shell. and opportunities. and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. then exaggerate” them. intended The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered. suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. independent of one another. which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures. A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit. Schwartz 1991). plausible.7 Thus. discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. Janis 1982. to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. as described below. which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine. the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario. with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second.. Scenarios are essentially textured. scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. structured. characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project. on the contrary. Scenarios thus offer. 4). is that the scenario discussions themselves. The specific scenario scholarship—applies to models of reality. Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history. border-evading globalizing forces). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965. before fleshing out the emerging story with more details. terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community. Using scenario thinking. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science Very simply. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention. In practice. that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible. Tetlock 2005). By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats. and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya. Building on its corporate roots. In particular.g. For example. our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). let alone prepare for. they are depictions of possible future states of the world. technological. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that. a pioneer of the technique. risks. It is entirely possible. ingrained in most corporate planning. however. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future. scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. Instead. The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. not to reality itself. China’s slowing economic growth. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976. environmental. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures. which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Consensus was not the goal.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs.adverse exogenous shocks. and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects. when combined. yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance. . such as the shale gas revolution in the United States. Nor should they be equated with simulations.

Because ideas inform social action they are casually efficacious either in securing the reproduction of existing social relations (usually as an unintended consequence of social In societies which are constituted by unequal structures of social relations giving rise to unequal power and conflicting interests. these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King. knowledge and objectivity in International Relations. for example. or other methodological tools. rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis.csog.pdf) The ‘common-sense’ view pervading recent discussions of epistemology. in various senses. and Verba 1994). 30 In other words critical social inquiry does not (or not only) manifest its ‘criticalness’ through self-claimed labels of being critical or siding with the oppressed. acting as cases for analytical comparison. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. their own previous policy exposure. “From Eurocentrism to Epistemological Internationalism: power. Keohane. focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). As such. University of Cambridge. http://www. but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction . three distinct scenarios are employed.cam. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to. understandably.” Paper presented at Theorising Ontology.to explore potential futures that could unfold. or the topics studied by their advisors. counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005. thus exposing the necessary and causal relation between particular social relations and particular ideological conceptions. This may also entail revealing the social conditions which give rise to ideologies. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997. objective social inquiry has an inherent tendency to be critical. ontology and methodology in IR asserts that objectivity implies value-free neutrality. 68–69). whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework. participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs. Finally. Each scenario. while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs. often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Objective social knowledge constitutes a specific form of criticism: explanatory critique. even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured. focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. Branwen Gruffydd. To the extent that objective knowledge provides a better and more adequate account of reality than other ideas. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC.group. as detailed below. whereas transformation of existing structured relations is in the interests of the weak . Rothman 2008). and in so doing exposing what is wrong with the dominant ideology. includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. However. Jones 04 – (August 2004. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). .uk/iacr/papers/Jones. intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. descriptive theories of the world are an essential prerequisite to emancipatory critique – epistemic decolonization is impossible without reclaiming the concept of objectivity. Valid. PhD in Development Studies from the University of Sussex. The critique of dominant ideas or ideologies is elaborated through providing a more adequate explanation of aspects of the world. such knowledge is inherently critical (implicitly or explicitly) of those ideas. In essence. but through the substantive critique of prevailing ideas . historical case studies. Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy at Goldsmiths University of London. the reproduction of those structured relations is in the interests of the powerful. Doctoral students also. Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism.ac. the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. this structured.

the causes of unequal social conditions. Robert Vitalis. Objective social knowledge which accurately depicts and explains social reality has these qualities by virtue of its relation to its object.or in transforming social relations ideas cannot be ‘neutral’ practice). The criticism here arises not. in serving to promote the reproduction of the status quo and avoid attempts at radical change. Ideas which provide a misrepresentation of the nature of society. and how such themes are glaring in their absence from histories and theories of international relations and international history. not its subject. which have been glaring in their absence from the discipline of International Relations. This will inherently provide a critique of the ideologies which. They expose the ideological and racialised nature of central aspects of IR through a critical examination of both the long historical trajectory of imperial ideologies regarding colonized peoples. but on the greater adequacy of their accounts with respect to the actual historical and contemporary production of conditions and change in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. In this sense. serve the interests of the powerful. the general perspective and knowledge of conditions in and the history of Africa might be due largely to the African social origins of the authors. A fundamental problem which underlies the origin and reproduction of IR’s eurocentricity is the overwhelming dominance of ideas produced in and by the west. So. Anthony Anghie. Gathii and Depelchin. the best way to declare solidarity with the oppressed is to declare one’s commitment to objective inquiry 32 . global governance. and the wilful and determined silencing of the voices and histories of the colonised. In other words. colonialism and neo-colonialism have been central to the making of contemporary international order and contemporary doctrines of international law. to decolonise IR. exploitation and dispossession. sovereignty and rights. not whose ideas they are. A normative commitment to the oppressed must entail a commitment to truth and objectivity. James Gathii. nor from a prior normative stance of solidarity with the oppressed. theories and discourses in the theory and practice of IR and narratives of world history. both past and present – during both colonial and neo-colonial periods of the imperial world order. not a social one. by virtue of their flawed account of the social world. just as much as non-American or non-European scholars. who have nothing to lose from truthful analyses of their predicament. who have a vested interest in mystifying the way society works. A vitally important implication of objectivity is that it is the responsibility of European and American. Hilbourne Watson. in the work of Grovogui. An account which is objective will contradict ideological ideas. It is vital to retain explicitly some commitment to objectivity in social inquiry. Ideas which provide a more adequate account of the way society is structured and how structured social relations produce concrete conditions of inequality and ideas which are false are ideological and. the nature of the state. but also commitment to correcting the flaws in prevailing knowledge – and it is not only ‘the Other’ who can and should elaborate this critique. international law. and the conflicting interests of the weak and powerful. objectivity and explanatory critique thus provides an alternative response to the relationship between knowledge and power. are in the interests of the powerful. violence. Bhupinder Chimni. informing social action aimed at . but the histories of colonialism. However the judgement that their accounts are superior to those of mainstream IR rests not on the fact that the authors are African. The criteria for choosing their accounts over others derives from the relation between the ideas and their objects (what they are about). implicitly or explicitly criticising them for their false or flawed accounts of reality. Exemplars of explanatory critique in International Relations are provided in the work of scholars such as Siba Grovogui. to the notion that the proper criterion for judging ideas about the world lies in what they say about the world. or from the standpoint of ordinary people. from pointing out the coincidence between ideologies and the interests of the powerful. The philosophical realist theory of science. we should choose between contending ideas on the basis of which provides a better account of objective social reality . Their work provides critiques of central categories. or not only. The importance of objectivity in social inquiry defended here can perhaps be seen as a form of epistemological internationalism. Their work reveals how racism. exploitation can potentially inform efforts to change those social relations. but from exposing the flaws in dominant ideologies through a more adequate account of the nature and causes of social conditions 31 . Eurocentricity is therefore a dual problem concerning both the authors and the content of knowledge. Overcoming eurocentricity therefore requires not only concerted effort from the centre to create space and listen to hitherto marginalised voices. It is not necessary to be African to attempt to tell a more accurate account of the history of Europe’s role in the making of the contemporary . will tend to help secure the reproduction of prevailing social relations. false ideas are in the interest of the oppressors. and the actual practices of colonialism and decolonisation in the constitution of international orders and local social conditions.” (Collier 1979: 60). As Collier argues. international society. the Caribbean and other regions of the Third World. But the result of this fundamental problem is flawed knowledge about the world. for example. Sankaran Krishna. including assumptions about sovereignty. not from the relation between the ideas and their subjects (who produced them). Their work identifies the flaws in current ideas by revealing how they systematically misrepresent or ignore the actual history of social change in Africa. and cannot be resolved through normative commitments alone. Jacques Depelchin. Michel-Rolph Trouillot 33 . because true ideas are in the interest of the oppressed. Instead of choosing perspectives on the basis of our ethical commitment to the cause of the oppressed and to emancipatory social change. It is not only the voices of the colonised. This is why . “The science/ideology distinction is an epistemological one. As Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986: 10) has put it: It is a question of whether one analyses society from the standpoint of the dominant groups.

outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Roland. for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E. Levine stresses. pages 325–327) This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations. outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one.” International Studies Review. a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms. recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 15). His ultimate goal is to overcome reification. then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second. trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. 101–102). Root cause explanations of International Relations don’t exist – methodological pluralism is necessary to reclaim IR as emancipatory praxis and avoid endless political violence. Issue 2. while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship. A superb scholarly achievement. The dangers are real. It is also inward-oriented. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged. Here. rather than integrate. Two stand out: First. is not just something that is directed outwards. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose. In this model. The second stage of Levine's inquiry speed at which academics are meant to publish. or Graham Allison). racism. or to write counter-histories of ‘the expansion of international society’ which detail the systematic barbarity of so-called Western civilisation. because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues. 102). this is how reification may be “checked at The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are. different perspectives. Critique. Bleiker 14 – (6/17. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique . the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned. Hans Morgenthau. such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). 68). and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p.Africa and the rest of the world. 63. even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. see also pp. Here. As a result. . he outlines the path toward what he calls “ sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. It is not necessary to have been colonised to recognise and document the violence. if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are. Carr. In practical terms. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. but as an a priori condition for scholarship. Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. ongoing. showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate. to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. if one constantly questions one's own perspective. Volume 16. while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has. against particular theories or theorists. in a way. rather.H. But each should. often lacked critical selfawareness. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique. for example. precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. or. Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking —including itself” (p. in my view. this means combining a range of methods even when—or. been critiqued as relentlessly negative. from peer review processes to the And here too. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship. to be more precise. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. and convincing. for him. from genocides to war. For Levine. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative. he points to a range of factors and phenomena. of course. both convincing and useful at a practical level. 12). he eschews conventional wisdom. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known For Levine. sophisticated. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. genocide and dispossession which have characterised European expansion over five hundred years.

and consider whether different worlds are possible and desirable. an early doyen of IR.W. Such a view is sometimes also described as being ‘statist’. as to engage with ‘who gets what. but it would be foolish to underestimate the stubborn continuities of state interactions. Ken.” google books) Scholars love to debate the definition of their discipline. it only means that the atheist is aware of the significance of God when talking about religion. not against. Including the state in analysis is necessary for effective scholarship – the historical dominance of “state-centrism” is an argument for. An atheist cannot for long discuss religion without talking about God. this does not make the atheist ‘God-centric’. This is the idea already mentioned. “International Relations: All That Matters. Later chapters will underline that states are not the only actors at the international . its relevance. “The mother of all isms: Causal mechanisms and structured pluralism in International Relations theory. Recognizing these empirical realities is perfectly consistent with accepting that one of the aims of studying IR is to challenge what is done. when and how across the world’ without a coherent focus such as ‘the international level’ is to invite bewilderment in the face of information overload. that states are the fundamental reality of world politics. There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail. First. dilemmas and crises faced by leaders and peoples in other places in other eras. level: some multinational corporations have more clout than some states. By ‘international level’ I mean the interactions largely (but not exclusively) of sovereign states. and why. the international is a level with enormous ‘causal weight’. a distinct ‘texture’ (a persisting set of characteristics) over the centuries. for example. Second. By focusing on the international. This continuity allows us to have a timetranscending understanding of the situations. by ‘world politics’ I mean ‘who gets what. Professor of Government at Georgetown University. Booth 14 – (7/25.the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. Nonetheless Middle Range theorizing is good – proceding from the particular to the universal avoids the dangers of reification inherent in top down theory formation. it would be foolish to play down the continuing significance of especially the most powerful states in determining ‘who gets what’ across the world. In this book. It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but . but have relations between political units fundamentally changed? We cannot. and should not. but should be the highest level of both political decision-making and loyalty. This problem is evident in many of the doorstep-sized textbooks about ‘world’ or ‘global’ politics: what in the world is not a matter of ‘world politics’? The formulation proposed offers a distinct focus (‘the international’). 103). ‘ the world’. PhD in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This is hardly surprising. 14). The book will argue that the international level of world politics is state-dominated in an empirical sense (some states are the most powerful ‘actors’ in the world) without succumbing to state-centrism in a normative sense (believing that the contemporary states-system represents the best of all possible worlds). scholars can use the taxonomy to develop middle-range or typological theories about how A typological theory is a theory that not only defines individual independent combinations of mechanisms interact in shaping outcomes for specified cases or populations. assume that everything will always be the same. This is mistaken. Critics of this view .those dazzled by what’s new . Bennett 13 – (2013. who described academic international relations as having ‘a focus but not a periphery’. critics will say that I have succumbed to a ‘ state-centric’ view of the world. again in Waltz’s term. as there is always a great deal riding on where one draws the line between what is international relations’ is defined simply as the international level of world politics. The reason for accentuating the international level of world politics is twofold. Carr Professor of the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University. Manning. to stretch Harold Lasswell’s classical definition of ‘politics’. an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. There can be no doubt that we live in a new era when it comes to technology and its potential. Andrew. the international level or system has had.tend to argue that talk of ‘texture’ exaggerates continuity. According to the ‘realist’ tradition (explained later). meaning endorsing the idea that the state is and My position is more complicated: I want to recognize the empirical significance of states and their relations without being statist politically or ethically. when and how across in or out. former E. or the continuing ‘causal weight’ of state interactions in shaping the ‘when and how’ of things happening.. while being empirically open (‘the world’). Matters of continuity and change are always present in international relations. rather.A. .” European Journal of International Relations 19(3) 459 –481) Finally. This is like an atheist arguing about ‘religion’. I owe this way of thinking largely to C. H.

2012. An additional advantage of shifting rooting the IR field more clearly in theories about causal mechanisms is that this can re-energize interchanges among the IR subfield. in different ways. and processes involving many variables. see Bennett. which is not widely used in comparative politics. and research methods back into alignment. for analysis of some of these examples and a long list of typologies in IR and comparative politics. The taxonomy thus encompasses the building blocks of theorized mechanisms that can be brought together in different conjunctions to develop typological theories on how combinations of variables behave. grievance. 2011). In the end. which still cling to the vestiges of forms of positivism that lost favor among philosophers decades ago. socialization. 2012). These dialogues should be a two-way street. liberalism.opment of variants of scientific realism in the philosophy of science. Yet political scientists have been explanations built upon earlier philosophies of science. principal–agent relations.cepts on causal mechanisms translate far more readily between IR and economics. sociology.ables and exploring only subsets of the full typological space in any one study.cept of theories about discrete causal mechanisms allows for middle-range typological theories that are more localized. which increasingly embrace complexity. cross-pollination and collaboration have flourished. but researchers can pare back this complexity by controlling for some of the vari . The present article has argued that although mechanism-ori . 2005). the taxonomy of causal extant paradigms and research programs have implicitly relied on causal mechanisms all along and can be mapped onto an approach that focuses on explanatory mechanisms without reifying them into grand schools of thought. Typological theories allow for cumulative theorizing as scholars can add variables or re-conceptualize them to higher or lower levels of abstraction (Elman. including non-linear relations. mobilization. have outrun our epistemological notions of how to study politics. 2003.fied dependent variables’ (George and Bennett. and it is possible to do so while maintaining a structured discourse and cumulating research findings.. researchers using this approach to theory-building can choose different trade-offs along the spectrum between parsimony and complexity. if also more complex. and comparativists and IR scholars have collaborated and drawn readily on each other in their research (Checkel.ented explanations are not without their own drawbacks. Mechanism-oriented theorizing poses important costs. rational choice. Still. . particularly a loss of parsi . the con . persuasion. there is a strong philosophical basis for rooting the study of politics in theories about causal mechanisms .tions costs. IR scholars also need assurance that explanation via mechanisms does not entirely lack the key attraction of paradigms or research programs: a structured discourse that provides a framework around which we can organize cumulative research findings. and rebel–home state–host state relations (Bennett. 2012. 2005: 235).tive politics can also benefit by moving away from the tribal language of the isms.cussion of the example of the evolution of typological theorizing on alliance burden. Similarly.nisms and as improvements in typological theories on how combinations of mechanisms interact to shape outcomes in problem-based research programs. This shift is related to the devel . the other subfields of political science. Where the two subfields have intersected in ways that focus on causal mechanisms rather than paradigmatic isms. and many other factors. and other ‘isms’ in the study of American and comparative politics — and toward causal mechanisms if the latter contribute only to a hodgepodge of discrete explanations of individual cases? Here. The IR field has already shared with the American politics subfield many theories about mechanisms of power and institutions. 2003. 2006).ences. theoretical con . see Collier et al. King. Lichbach. A focus on explanation via reference to causal mechanisms offers one way of bringing our ontological assumptions.sharing. but they [these variables] behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on speci . 2001). explanations have focused on mechanisms involving greed. from the isms and with borrowing and learning in both directions. norms. and such theories can be fruitfully and cumulatively modified as they encounter anomalous cases or expand to encompass new types of cases variables and the hypothesized causal mechanisms that shape their effects. Collier and Hoeffler. informational asymmetries and credible commitments problems. Adding variables of course adds to the complexity of the theory. In this research program. political science has moved increasingly over the last toward mechanism-based explanations of complex phenomena and history than does the ingrown and esoteric language of the isms Conclusions The field of two decades . they are an improvement over Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigms’ and Lakatos’s notion of ‘research programs. ethnic security dilemmas.chology. welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen. on the difficulties of justifying large sets of partially testable inter related ideas. epistemological approaches. transac . and identity that have been developed more fully in IR. Salehyan. As Peter Hall has persuasively argued (2003). Fearon and Laitin. national political economies (Hall and Soskice.mony compared to extant paradigms and research programs. 2004.nism-based explanations. national unification (Ziblatt. and the other social sci . This is particularly true in the study of civil and ethnic conflicts and their interaction with foreign states and transnational actors. 2004.. Kalyvas. Examples from comparative politics as well as IR include theories on alliance burden-sharing (Bennett et al. and constructivism in the IR subfield. hesitant to commit fully to this move because they have lacked a clear sense of the philosophical costs and benefits of mecha . (for dis . Why should we move away from the ‘isms’ — realism. framing. 1998.provides ‘contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions Typological theories can model complex causal relations. 2009). Cross-field discourse with compara . but the taxonomy of mechanisms serves as a reminder that the study of American politics could benefit by paying closer attention to theories on legitimacy. 1994). Cumulation and mechanisms introduced above shows how progress enter in as increasingly refined theories on individual mecha . historical institutionalism. but it has been hampered by limited understanding among political scientists of how mechanism-based explanations differ from our ontological theories of how politics works. high-order interaction effects. 1990).’ Whereas Kuhnian paradigms and Lakatosian research programs both foundered. for example. psy .

Hence. reduce political contest to the "micro" politics of everyday life. knowledge must be shared by and with others if it is to count as knowledge. "If it is not organized. This is not a plea to let a hundred. There is no monopoly on knowledge. if it is not distinction between speech and work.” European Journal of International Relations 19(3) 567–587. Poli Sci Prof @ University of California San Diego. might ultimately deliver free and equal democratic deliberation. he clarifies. Positivists and post-positivists are each working hard to improve and clarify the . which is only possible upon winning a measure of institutional authority.edu/lake/files/2014/02/Lake-EJIR. may be either more or less than meets the eye. within the network of national forces in order to effec'ively change a system. Certeau rejects the "jubilation" of intellectuals "who wish to collapse a system of authority without preparing for its replacement. long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations. That is. the necessity of a sustained capture of speech. meaningful change requires forms of symbolic resistance that plan an eventual campaign for and a reintegration with state authority.Institutional analysis good Their framework/alternative arguments distract from institutional analysis – that undermines their sustainability and effectiveness – that’s net offence Welsh. or ten thousand intellectual flowers bloom. “Theory is dead. Jodi Dean finds a naive faith of this kind in those who imagine that accelerated and broadly dispersed conversations. we must not. however."83 Instead. (al demand Of conscience Will be neither reformist nor revolutionary. While Certeau is partly responsible for drawing recent scholarly attention to the politics of everyday life. however.' Evaluate the benefits of the plan before our epistemology – knowledge is always contextual and fractured which means specificity is the only way to verify the 1AC’s truth claims – focusing debate on our assumptions in the abstract is intellectual hubris and makes managing violence and environmental destruction impossible – turns the k Lake. especially as the latter would be inconclusive. I prefer progress within paradigms rather than war between paradigms. ewen as a strategy.theless deliberately avoids falling into the trap Dean identifies. 81) Certeau does not. win elections. rather.” pg. she argues that such efforts "to displace polities onto the activities of everyday or ordinary people" draw attention away from the still very real need for political challengers to build support. production chains are disaggregated and wrapped around the globe. Under these circumstances.ucsd. 14 (David. The human condition is precarious. Just because he recognizes that the power of the weak resides in the effective authority of the strong does not mean that we can rest assured that everything will simply work out in the end. is not an adequate "substitute" for "work. as important as the daily "capture of speech" is to democratic politics. To assert otherwise is an act of supreme intellectual hubris. inscribed. Instead. Globalization continues to disrupt lives as countries realign their economies on the basis of comparative advantage. So in response. Ceneau argues. a thousand. Speech. especially when the social problems besetting us today are of such magnitude. “The Rhetorical Surface of Democracy: How Deliberative Ideals Undermine Democratic Politics. made possible by the Internet and social media. he never. This is still the age of thermonuclear weapons. He writes. https://quote. Transnational terrorism threatens to turn otherwise local disputes into global conflicts. And there is no guarantee that any one kind of knowledge generated and understood within any one epistemology or ontology is always and everywhere more useful than another. and ultimately exercise authority themselves. All knowledge must be disciplined. anthropomorphic change transforms the global climate with potentially catastrophic consequences.pdf) *ableism corrected In the end. and leave everyone everywhere feeling unsafe."S2 Certeau's It signals. Comm Prof @ Appalachia State University." but Will be ' 'extinguished. 13 (Scott. we as a society need all the help we can get. and financial crises in one country reverberate around the planet in minutes. attribute a magical democratic power to vernacular voices. Scholars working in cloistered isolation are not likely to produce great insights. And all the while.

as it will facilitate progress within each even as it raises barriers to exchange across approaches. not conclusions that followed from a falsifiable theory with stronger empirical support. the Great Debates and especially the paradigm wars became contests over the truth status of assumptions. Mid-level theory flourished in the interstices of these debates for decades and now. Declarations that ‘I am a realist’ or pronouncements that ‘As a liberal. This is an important turn for both. The Great Debates were too often academic in the worst sense of that term. the broader societies of which they are part. but theory — in the plural — lives. . if not a thousand flowers. I predict …’ were statements of a near quasi-religious faith. especially. with the waning of the paradigm wars. So. Long may they reign. grow what they can best. Likewise. and share when possible with the others and. it is perhaps better for teams of scholars to tend a small number of separate gardens. assertions that positivism or post-positivism is a better approach to understanding world politics are similarly [misleading] blinding. We may be witnessing the demise of a particular kind of grand theory. if by theory we mean the Great Debates in International Relations. Do not mourn the end of theory.standards of knowledge within their respective paradigms. is coming into its own within the field. I regard this as an entirely positive development. Too often.

Vol. and wars of the WW2 type. 2. No. In considering whether acts which harm others are a consequence¶ of the aggressive motivation of individuals. . PAS) http://www. A subsidiary aim of this paper is to¶ identify the factors that make aggressive tendencies predominate over the cooperative and compassionate ones. violence¶ between groups. Although research on human violence has focussed too often on the importance of one factor or another. And¶ people also have the capacity to care for the needs of others. individual aggressiveness becomes progressively less important. Some degree of conflict of interest is often present in relationships between individuals. and the interactions between the causal factors remain largely unexplored. and they differ yet again from¶ the factors influencing the bomb-aimer pressing the button in a large scale international war. Peace Structural violence doesn’t escalate – they essentialize degrees of violence. Pg. But that does¶ not mean that aggression is inevitable: temporary anger need not give rise to¶ persistent hostility. While there¶ may be some factors in common. systems of violence are not causal to international war Hinde and Pulkkinnen 1 Cambridge Psychology Professor and University of Jyväskylä Psychology Professor. the bases of individual aggressiveness are very¶ different from those involved in mob violence. and violence¶ is potentially present in every society. and hostility need not give rise to acts of aggression. with increasing social complexity. 3. 2001.pugwash. it is essential to recognize the diversity of such acts. but other aspects of human nature come to contribute to group phenomena. There is no escaping the fact that the capacity to develop a propensity for violence is part of human nature. From before recorded history humans have killed humans. and are capable¶ of acts of great altruism and selfsacrifice.AT: Pos. We shall see that.¶ The answer to that question depends critically on the context. “Human Aggressiveness and War”. Pugwash. and in the relations between states: we are concerned with¶ the factors that make such conflicts escalate into violence. ¶ (Robert and Lea. it is essential to remember that violence always¶ has multiple causes. in the relations between groups of individuals within states.org/reports/rc/Papers_2-3. 5-6.pdf 1-17-13 People are capable of perpetrating the most terrible acts of violence on their¶ fellows. September. which include interactions between individuals.

This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility. this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns. response/responsibility contained in words like justice. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction. In the case of the current European configuration. and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946. there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics.. banal conflicts and controversies. To take a position. Therefore. Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed'. Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts Often. Rorty 1996).even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. IR—University of Copenhagen. Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand However. etc. Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. p. the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e. only with the large one (cf. I know that it is to the detriment of an other. after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation). As a security/securitization analyst. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. security is not that kind of call. (ibid. to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence .and the question of how to handle them. the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations. violence and mutual vilification . 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). In line with the classical revolutionary tradition. If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone. but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. and risks . 284-285 The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. particular. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends. in what terms)? . It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Ole Wæver. infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946. politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small. The 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Should we treat security in this manner? No. we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event.g. our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics. take part.Scenario Planning Good Even if their links are right our specific scenario planning is key combating international violence and inaugurating an ethical response to IR conflicts— they can’t win a case turn and voting aff is the best way to solve their impact arguments. Europe and emancipation. 2000 International relations theory and the politics of European integration. Should developments be securitized (and if so.

which is to reject the idea of theory building entirely. coun¬terproductive debates over meaning in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself. Finally. In any case. never changing) against which to com¬pare a universe of discourse . nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify . George and Campbell 1990). but not entirely. given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others. Building on the work of Wittgenstein (1968). Although definitions may vary — possibly partly. the underlying philosophical argument. or symbol cannot correspond "to some . it is contingent upon the theorist to specify the precise meaning of any variable or symbol that is central to a theory . our understanding of the causes of international conflict — and most notably war — has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations (Vasquez 1987. is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism. The alternative approach. One approach of postmodernists is to point to the complex nature of language and meaning as a critique of positiv¬ism. that are commonly understood. term. Similarly. it is not entirely clear how this "multiplicity of meaning" is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality. it is possible to address the linguistic variant of the criticism contends that any attempt to reduce everyday terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning to be found in social activity" (George and Campbell 1990.AT: Serial policy Failure No serial policy failure Harvey. throw one's hands up in failure... in turn. but precision is a practical research problem . relevant to the overwhelming amount of work in IR (Phillips 1977. By implication. externally derived foundation or object" and ulti¬mately is context-dependent. The point is that theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend. Although a comprehensive assessment of the linguistic relativism debate is beyond the scope of this project. 273). 273). and Crisis Stability after the Cold War. that is. most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. a concept. a statement's truth or falsity" (1977. criticising from within. this critique is. Clearly. 138-139. does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. the lack of purity and precision. An important distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect. and ideas. given the complexity of the subject.” p. at least temporarily. regardless of other linguistic variations. Of course . In most cases. concepts. Deterrence Theory. a more important issue that has nothing to do with language. errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and ultimately have very little impact on the generalizability of social theories. . not an insurmountable barrier to progress. which is fairly straightforward. Dalhousie Political Science Prof. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy. implicit in much of the postmodern literature. The study of international relations may not be exact. symbols.. is likely to be more conducive to theoretical progress than the alternative. 97 (Frank. another consequence of linguistic relativism. for example. “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry. Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality (always fixed. word... symbols and phrases. Giddens 1979. as a conse¬quence of language — scholars nevertheless are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words. 1993). There are numerous words. and repudiate the entire enterprise. but the implications of this standardized concep¬tual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique. In fact.. Evaluating the internal consistency of the central assumptions and propositions of a theory. hec) Linguistic Relativism.

Violence’ is the idea that the study of war should be subsumed under the category of ‘violence’. what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. Vol 41 No 1. my reference to partygoers from Copenhagen and Aberystwyth dancing on graves.24 But does anyone seriously doubt that ‘wider agenda’ scholars are less familiar with histories and sociologies of wars and militaries than were the traditional predecessors. Because of this. with a more holistic vision of the community of relevant scholars. riots and uprisings’. conceived another way. or about where and when it starts and ends. my article was already an engagement with critical inquiry into security relations. In this. for example. an important area of inquiry now dominated by the mostly self-serving nostrums of the liberal peace debates. I make no claims that the study of war should be privileged over that of other forms of violence. A broader focus on violence in general risks losing this central. disobediences. revolutions. Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings. she suggests that we attend to a continuum of violence in which war is considered alongside ‘insurrections. “Of Camps and Critiques: A Reply to 'Security. not proffering definitive answers about what war is and what it is not. both biological and cultural. and to open up the reader to the possibility that. a focus on violence encourages us to see war in relational terms and makes visible other kinds of violence besides that of war . It seems then. War. for it is amidst the clash of arms that the truths which define social and political orders are brought into question." That is. 1978) and Moore (Moore. our method has been inductive rather than deductive. War. a critique Aradau has overlooked. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume.AT: State Conflict Link Discussion of war does not displace focus on structural violence – it allows an injection of complexity that is not hierarchical Barkawi 12 – Professor Politics at the New School for Social Research (Tarak. or massacre. distinctive character of the violence of war. while I am all for the analysis of liberal violence. As for relationality. one does not need the concept What precisely distinguishes war from many other kinds of violence. Instead. another broad category which would we have far from exhausted the subject of liberalism and war. Violence'” Millennium Journal of International Studies.cuhk. which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces. insurgencies. I also think interesting about Aradau’s remarks on violence is that she assumes we know what war is. even though most of them typically involve reciprocal.23 Apparently. attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is. referring to reciprocal organised violence between political entities. I was posing new questions and possibilities for the study of war. to denaturalise our images of the new and old security studies. as Hume and Moore anticipated.edu. referring to the Second World War as an instance of ‘violence’? Equally. Aradau who is most concerned about hierarchy and privilege. and that of.pdf What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise. topics requiring different forms of theorisation and inquiry. Moreover.the only coherent rubric is to maximize lives Greene 10 Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University. organised violence. rebellions. particularly in respect of perceived slights to Critical Security Studies and her demand that any study of war be in dialogue with Critical Security Studies. Both the violence of war. that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. or my suggestion that contemporary ‘wider agenda’ security scholars know rather less about the composition of carrier battle groups than did their traditional predecessors. Perhaps it was the opening rhetoric of my article that inspired Aradau’s ire. such as genocide is that war is a relational form of violence in which the other side shoots back. Ethical obligations are tautological. This is the definition of war that I sought to critique in ‘From War to Security’. and I certainly However. Given the significance of war in the human past and present. Joshua. on her understanding. 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not. So. and that the analysis of violence somehow enables the disentangling of politics from war and a proper critique of liberal violence. who even so still managed to overlook their significance? These passages were meant to serve a very specific purpose. say. Is it really more theoretically or politically adequate to start of violence in general to see this. The reasons offered for this are: violence does not entail a hierarchy in which war is privileged. these other things are not war. the category of war is already inherently relational.22 I have no particular objection to the study of violence. seditions. demand scholarly attention. these fields of study share more in common than is conceivable within the current terms of debate. What perhaps is most include issues of ‘structural violence’. with respect to the study of war.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/GreeneKantSoul. This is precisely to take as given the IR disciplinary view of ‘real interstate war’ that underlies Correlates of War and other mainstream work. Is war not historically significant enough to justify inquiry into it? War is a more specific category relative to violence in general . www. p 124-130. revolts. I would suggest. almost certainly doesn't. why and how this obviates or subsumes the study of war is obscure to me. “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”.fed. This is ultimately the source of war’s generative social powers. Neither traditional nor ‘wider agenda’ security studies are centrally interested in war. It is. and the dire state of the study of war in the Anglo-American academy. she overlooks the fact that. this seems to me a serious problem for critical thought. or even part of one. We have inferred on the basis of . anyone who claims to have such a theory. SagePub) A final totalising move in ‘Security. it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions. but they are also distinct if related think there should be more of it in the social sciences. patriarchy.

They do. But this insider's view . i. more specifically. It's just that the real differences may not be same way. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete. secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. looking beyond oneself.) on the difficulty of defining deontology. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means. by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. how many deontologists see deontology. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion. though they may appear to be from the inside. But.e. may be misleading. as we know. isn't about this intuition or that intuition. 70-78." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion. Likewise. 1997. in "cognitive" terms. and be connected to things larger than themselves. a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests. A consequentialist respects other persons. what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases. and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain. they will say. have respect for persons. This is If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others. no doubt. Instead. are against treating people as mere objects. one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love . if not most. 1996a.the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman. Rather. but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. What. avoid self-absorption. I believe that most of what deontologists often take them to be. This is. for other people. that are impartial. you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. deontology is about taking humanity seriously. respect for persons. really. And so on (Korsgaard. In other words. This is because many. they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question. have a sense of a community. and refrains from treating them as mere objects. there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions.) It seems to me that consequentialists. And they're right. in contrast. what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. as I've suggested. In the the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. about acting for reasons rational beings can share. distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. From a secular humanist's point of view. Talk about rights. Deontology. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. non-religious people aspire to love deeply. look out 1977). because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above). they'll make the opposite judgment. they will insist that I have simply misunderstood whatKant and like-minded deontologists are all about. 1996b). then." But. Above all else. as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion. Korsgaard. The problem. I suspect. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices. being part of something larger than oneself. pp. etc. (See also Kagan (Kagan. It's about community." "You have to respect people's rights. wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share. is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological. as much as anyone else. it's about respect for persons. these answers don't really explain anything. Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. . Consider the following analogy with religion. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects. It's about looking out for other people. what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism .