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QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Quasi-Judicial Power
DEFINITION
Power of the Administrative Agency to determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself

Quasi-Judicial Function
Term applied to the action, discretion of the officers who are
required to investigate the facts or ascertain from the existence
of facts, hold hearings and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature

Quasi-Judicial Power
Power of Adjudication
An agency process for the formulation of a final order
Power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
the parties are and then undertakes to determine these
questions and to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties
Requires the investigation of facts or ascertaining the existence
of facts, holding hearings and drawing conclusions from them as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature

Quasi-Judicial Power
Nature of Proceedings
Administrative in nature
It performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature

Retrospective in nature
Requires that there be an actual controversy to be settled between
actual parties
Settles a controversy

Quasi-Judicial Power
Necessity of Jurisdiction
JURISDICTION
The competence of an office or body to act on a given matter or
decide a certain question
Conferred upon the administrative agency by the constitution
or by law or its charter

Jurisdiction gives competence to the decision rendered by


the body and prevents it from a collateral attack
No uniform rule concerning the jurisdiction of the
administrative bodies

Quasi-Judicial Power
Subpoena Power
Must be expressly conferred to the administrative body
Power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not inherent in
administrative bodies

Administrative body may summon witnesses and require the


production of evidence only when duly allowed by law and
always in connection with the matter they are authorized to
investigate
They have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or
the production of books, papers, documents and other
pertinent data, upon request of any of the parties before or
during any hearing upon showing of general relevance

Quasi-Judicial Power
Contempt Power
Must be expressly conferred upon the body and additionally,
must be used only in connection with its quasi-judicial power as
distinguished from its purely administrative or routinary
functions
It is not automatic
Administrative Bodies can rule one for contempt if it was done
in exercise of their quasi-judicial function

Administrative Bodies can seek the assistance of the


courts of justice for the enforcement of its order
(subpoena and contempt)

Quasi-Judicial Power
Robosa v. NLRC
Facts
CTMI Employees Union-DFA, led by the petitioners filed a
petition for certification election at CTMI to be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the company. It failed to garner
the votes required. Later on, respondent issued a memorandum
demobilizing its sales territories and abolishing its system of
truck-sales representatives while simultaneously informing the
sales group of a new system(Salon Business Groups). Petitioner
union asked for the withdrawal of respondents directives but
the latter ignored it. Instead it issued a notice of termination of
employment of sales drivers due to the abolition of their
position.

Quasi-Judicial Power

Robosa v. NLRC
Facts

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor


practices against CTMI, it also moved for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO. During the compulsory arbitration
proceedings, the union was prompted to file it to the NLRC which
then issued a TRO. It was upgraded to a writ of preliminary injunction
when the respondent refused to comply. Respondent moved for
consideration but was denied by the NLRC who then directed Labor
Arbiter Cristeta Tamayo to hear the motion for contempt as urged by
the union.
The NLRC heard the contempt charge but issued its dismissal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and subsequently sought relief
from the CA. However, the CA opined that the dismissal is not subject
to review by an appellate court. Hence this petition raising the issues.

Quasi-Judicial Power
Robosa v. NLRC
Issues
Whether the NLRC has contempt powers;
Whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable; and
Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the contempt charge against the respondents

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Robosa v. NLRC
Held
Yes, NLRC is vested with contempt powers
Article 218[22] of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor
arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or
indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with
law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either
imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on
whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor
arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or
the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court

11

Quasi-Judicial Power
Robosa v. NLRC
Held
Not all contempt charges are appealable
Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court states that the
judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt
may be appealed to the proper court as in a criminal case.
In the case at bar, the contempt charge is not appealable to the
CA but the Supreme Court looked into the contempt charges
because of the allegation of grave abuse of discretion
In view of the grave abuse of discretion allegation in this case,
we (Supreme Court) deem it necessary to look into the NLRCs
dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Robosa v. NLRC
Held
There was no grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed NLRC
ruling. It rightly avoided delving into issues which would clearly
be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are issues involving the
merits of the case which are by law within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter

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Quasi-Judicial Power
NOTICE AND HEARING
General Rule: The right to notice and hearing is essential to
due process and its non-observance will as a rule invalidate
the administrative proceedings.
Rationale
Essence of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
The opportunity to explain ones side or a chance to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Notice and Hearing
Exceptions:
the urgency of immediate action
the right had previously been offered but not claimed
summary abatement of a nuisance per se
cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution
padlocking of filthy restaurants or theatres showing
obscene movies

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Administrative Due Process
There is no requirement for strict adherence to technical
rules as are observed in truly judicial proceedings.
Nevertheless, it is essential that due process must be
observed, for the requirements of fair play are not applicable
to judicial proceedings only.
Not a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary
rules
Evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum
of admissibility for it to be given some probative value

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Ang Tibay vs. CIR
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
shoe company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a
number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union,
Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off averring that
the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Ang Tibay vs. CIR
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the
Supreme Court praying for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The
Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled
to a new trial.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Ang Tibay vs. CIR
Held:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached
to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further,
the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
(said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).

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Quasi-Judicial Power

Ang Tibay vs. CIR


Held:

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although
not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that
they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1) The right to a hearing;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The tribunal must have something to support its decision;
(4) The evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion;

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Quasi-Judicial Power

Ang Tibay vs. CIR


Held:

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at


the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

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Quasi-Judicial Power

Universal Robina Corp. vs. Laguna Lake Development


Authority
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) found that
Universal Robina Corporation (URC), in discharging pollutive
wastewater, failed to comply with government standards
provided under DENR Administrative Order (DAO) Nos. 34 and
35, series of 1990.
URC moved to reconsider, however, LLDA denied URCs
motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order for URC to
pay the penalties. URC challenged by certiorari the orders
before the Court of Appeals.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Universal Robina Corp. vs. Laguna Lake Development
Authority
Facts:
The appellate court affirmed the LLDAs ruling and
went on to chide URCs petition for certiorari as premature
since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders
of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the
President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted
before invoking judicial intervention.

Issue:
W/N Universal Robina Corp. was denied due process.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Universal Robina Corp. vs. Laguna Lake Development
Authority
Held:
No, URC was not denied due process.
URCs invocation of due process fails. The appellate court
thus aptly brushed aside this claim, in this wise:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in
all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Universal Robina Corp. vs. Laguna Lake Development
Authority
Held:
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. The essence of due process is
simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
A persons right against self-incrimination is enshrined in
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

What is the basis of said right?


Grounds of public policy and humanity-of policy, because if the
party were required to testify, it would place the witness under
the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury; and of
humanity, because it would prevent the extortion of
confessions by address.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
What is the Constitutional Foundation of said right?
It is the respect the government must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizen. In our government our system of criminal
justice requires that evidences to be used must be obtained
through independent labors rather than his own mouth through
cruel, simple and compelling means.

What is the purpose of said right?


To positively avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and
recurrence of the inhumane procedure of compelling a person,
in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction before or upon trial.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
What is the scope of the right against self-incrimination?
-The right against self-incrimination covers testimonial compulsion
only and the compulsion to produce real or physical evidence using
the body of the accused.
-Physical or moral compulsion to extort communication

What is the meaning of the phrase to be exempt from being


a witness against himself?
It means that the accused cannot be compelled to testify or produce
evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused or one of the
co-accused for either the prosecution, a co-accused or himself. He
cannot be compelled by the Court through a subpoena, order or
process of the Court.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
On what kind of proceedings can the right against selfincrimination be invoked?
The right against self-incrimination can be invoked in all proceedings
instituted by the government

With what kind of testimony or instances can the right be


invoked?
It applies to commutative testimony and not mechanical testimony
Commutative testimony involves the use of intelligence on the part of
the accused or witness. Corrorarily, on cases on self-incrimination, the
following are permissible- substance from the body, morphine from
the mouth, put on pants, physical exam, wallet, picture taking, etc.
the following on the other hand are not permissible- handwriting,
signature, and similar incidents which involve the use of intelligence.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Is there an exception to the right against selfincrimination?
The right cannot be invoked when the State has the rights to
inspect documents under its police power, such as documents
of corporations.

How should the right be construed?


It must be liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
person invoking it to be a real protection

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Quasi-Judicial Power
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Examples where privilege is inapplicable
Requiring a person to exhibit himself before the court, putting in
evidence, papers, and other articles taken from the room of the room
of the accused in his absence;
Forcing a prohibited drug from the person of the accused;
Taking a substance from the body of the accused;
Placing the foot of the accused, over his objection, over the footprint
found on the crime scene;
Measuring or photographing the party;
Removal or replacement of his garment, or his shoes; nor is the
requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing
things be done.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Examples where privilege is applicable
Compelling the accused to produce a document;
Compelling the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.

Waiver
How: By failure to invoke the privilege at the proper time; By obeying
an order without protest; By taking the stand and testifying as a
witness; By freely answering the incriminatory questions put to him;
When: After the incriminatory question is asked and before his
answer
Who: Accused/Defendant

32

Quasi-Judicial Power
Cabal vs. Kapunan [G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962]
FACTS

Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a


letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff
of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and
other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines
created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth.
The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in
the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for
Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained
wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee
insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to,
subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be
incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to
be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Cabal vs. Kapunan [G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962]
FACTS
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for
such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for
failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness
stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent
judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion
to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition.

34

Quasi-Judicial Power
Cabal vs. Kapunan [G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962]
ISSUE
Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to
take the witness stand violates his constitutional right against
self-incrimination.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Cabal vs. Kapunan [G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962]
HELD
Yes.
Although the said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the
purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of
the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of
property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. However, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the
nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of
property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable thereto.

36

Quasi-Judicial Power
Cabal vs. Kapunan [G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962]
HELD
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a
person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to
criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a
proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of
the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which
the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Cabal vs. Kapunan [G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962]
HELD

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed


by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer.
The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of
inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may
tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional
right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason
for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate
the witness is improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to
the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to
answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is
virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may
invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and
all questions.

38

Quasi-Judicial Power
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26
May 1969]
FACTS
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an
administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged
immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbontons counsel
announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness.
Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners, took
note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would be
called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime
he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.

39

Quasi-Judicial Power
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May
1969]
FACTS

Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9
February 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary
injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from
hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to
await the judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a
bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention
by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be
allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted
and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March
1965 sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited to
compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished from the
power to compel a witness to incriminate himself.

40

Quasi-Judicial Power
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26
May 1969]
FACTS
A decision was rendered by the lower court on 2 August 1965,
finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting
the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his
consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and the
Gatbontons appealed.

41

Quasi-Judicial Power
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26
May 1969]
ISSUE
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in
administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not
to be a witness against himself.

42

Quasi-Judicial Power
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26
May 1969]
HELD
The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not
limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers
to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently
incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the
language of another American decision, is the protection
against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably
apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that
were all there is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional
guarantee protects as well the right to silence.

43

Quasi-Judicial Power
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May
1969]
HELD
As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused
has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the
Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant
"to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights
granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human
personality.

44

Quasi-Judicial Power
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26
May 1969]
HELD
More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the
most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief
Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an administrative hearing
against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board
of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to
take the witness stand without his consent.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Administrative Appeals and Review
Executive Order 292, Book VII, Chapter 4
Appeal

Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from


a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Department head.
Appeals shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a
copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected, by
filing with the agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal,
serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate
agency, and paying the required fees.
The appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and
may, on its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional
evidence.
In any contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall
become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the
parties of a copy thereof.

46

Quasi-Judicial Power
Administrative Appeals and Review
Judicial Review
Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision
may seek judicial review.
Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with
the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a
petition for review of the order. The petition shall be under oath
and shall show, by stating the specific material dates, that it was
filed within the period fixed in this chapter.
The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by
statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court.

47

Quasi-Judicial Power
SGMC Realty Corporation vs. Office of the President G.R. No.
126999, August 30, 2000
Facts
On March 29, 1994, petitioner filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for breach of contract,
violation of property rights and damages against private respondents.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Board of
Commissioners of the HLURB which, however, dismissed said petition.
On October 23, 1995, petitioner received a copy of said decision of
the Board of Commissioners. On November 20, 1995, petitioner filed
an appeal with public respondent. On June 18, 1996, public
respondent, without delving into the merits of the case, rendered the
assailed decision which dismissed the case for being filed out of time.
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition.

48

Quasi-Judicial Power
SGMC Realty Corporation vs. Office of the President G.R.
No. 126999, August 30, 2000
Issue
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the reglementary period within which
to appeal the decision of HLURB to public respondent is fifteen
days.

49

Quasi-Judicial Power
SGMC Realty Corporation vs. Office of the President G.R. No. 126999,
August 30, 2000
Held:

No. Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides that Any party
may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal the decision of the
Board of Commissioners or its division to the Office of the President within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative
Order No. 18, of the Office of the President On the other hand,
Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by OP states that Unless
otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President
shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from. As pointed out by
public respondent, the aforecited administrative order allows aggrieved party to
file its appeal with the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to
the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If
there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or
longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period
provided for in the administrative order.

50

Quasi-Judicial Power
SGMC Realty Corporation vs. Office of the President G.R. No.
126999, August 30, 2000
Held:

This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative


rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to
the provisions of the enabling law. We note that indeed there are special
laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen (15) days within which to
appeal a case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 provides that the decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA)
shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the
date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1344 states that decisions of the National Housing Authority shall become
final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its
receipt. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in
Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being
in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees. For it is
axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that
they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with
statute itself is null and void.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Res Judicata
The Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and may
refer to two things: in both civil law and common
law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final
judgment and is no longer subject to appeal.[1]; and the
term is also used to refer to the legal doctrine meant to
bar (or preclude) continued litigation of such cases
between the same parties, which is different between the
two legal systems. In this latter usage, the term is
synonymous with "preclusion".

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Quasi-Judicial Power
Elements of Res Judicata
Former judgment must be final.
The court which rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties.
The judgment must be on the merits.
There must be between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action.
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53

Quasi-Judicial Power
Res Judicata
The general rule is that an administrative decision is not considered res judicata
so as to preclude its subsequent reconsideration or revocation.
Decisions of the previous incumbents of the administrative body may be
modified or reversed by their successors in the exercise of their own powers of
adjudication.
However, a modification of a previous order granting a substantial right to a party
cannot be made without giving such party notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
It is now well settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi judicial authority, have
upon finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview
of the doctrine of res judicata.
The principle of res judicata applies as well to the judicial and quasi judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative offices and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
MOTEMAYOR V. BUNDALIAN
FACTS
Petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Office of the
President in Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioners
dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth, in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was
the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He
attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation
Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for
insufficiency of evidence.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
MOTEMAYOR V. BUNDALIAN
ISSUE
Whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the
PCAGC moot and academic.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
MOTEMAYOR V. BUNDALIAN
HELD
We cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of
similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered
the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and
academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not
operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review.
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated
by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control
of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of
petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application in the case at bar.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION
FACTS

Petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the
President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the
reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in
August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of
TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws,
rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing
petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area.

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Quasi-Judicial Power
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION
ISSUE
W/N the refusal of public respondents to reverse the final and
executory administrative orders constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

59

Quasi-Judicial Power
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION
RULING:
NO. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions
and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive
upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been
rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata
thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

60

Quasi-Judicial Power
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION
RULING:
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the
MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the
reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well
as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to
private respondents in 1984. But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did
not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as
amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after
1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly
appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above
Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was
concerned.

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Sources
Administrative Law by Carlo C. Cruz, 2016 Edition, Central
Bookstore

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