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Table of content
Metamorphosis
Truth
Purity and desire
Isolation
Ironic
Farewell
Wonder
Handmaiden
Philosophizing
Aporetic
Pitfalls
The desire for knowledge
Provisional
Exact
Doubt
Life's questions
Finitude
Infinitely finite
Logic of infinitude
"Il faut"
Philosophy as praxis

3
5
8
10
10
14
15
17
19
22
24
27
29
31
33
35
39
41
43
45
47

References

49

Metamorphosis
Philosophy is hip, this PXFK LV FHUWDLQ )URP +DUU\ 3RWWHUV 3KLORVRSKHUV
Stone to Plato for Managers to philosophy for children, philosophy matters.
The media and publishers are also happy to play along in this interest. All
sorts manner of introductions and manuals are making the rounds and,
judging by the figures, are not poorly received. This is offset by the fact that
sometimes philosophy must assume a certain guise in order to enjoy this
interest. Philosophy is often emEUDFHGDVLILWZHUHDERXWWKHDUWRIOLYLQJRU
JLYLQJPHDQLQJWROLIHDSHUVRQDOL]HGPHDQVWRDSSURDFKRXr complex lives
and the world from a different perspective, and from this perspective to assign
LW DQRWKHU PHDQLQJ 3KLORVRSKLFDO consultancies or therapies are also keen
to take advantage of this. Philosophy then seems to be equivalent to the
question of KRZWROLYH, and how to FKDQJHRQHVOLIHVW\OH$QGIRUWKRse who
RFFDVLRQDOO\YLVLWDERRNVWRUHWKHSKLORVRSK\VKHOI typically flows seamlessly
LQWRHVRWHULDRU VSLULWXDOLW\
Philosophy in this guise is the ideal method to find an answer to many
RIOLIHVTXHVWLRQVSUHIHUDEO\DVTXLFNO\DQGHDVLO\DVSRVsible, or to be able
to pose precisely orchestrated questions, but all the while standing on solid
ground. Of course we should all be critical and question ourselves this is
simply the motto of political correctness but the foundation of the question,
the place of doubt and critique in our culture, as well as their relationship to
truth, are thereby afforded less space.
This actually means that philosophy should not protest too much and
should certainly never be historical. And should a question be accidentally
posed, there is always the life-preserver of relativization. Fortunately we have
different opinions, as they say; otherwise it would be so boring. In this
context, philosophy should in particular propagate a number of modest,
humanist values: it should sharpen our democratic attitude, expand our moral
horizon and promote tolerance or respect for diversity. This type of
philosophy, which can be found on the marketplace of democracy, the agora,
VKRXOGGLVWLQJXLVKLWVHOIIURPWKHVWXII\LYRU\-tower SKLORVRSK\ZKLFKZRUULHV
DERXW REVROHWH TXHVWLRQV VXFK DV EHLQJ RU WUXWK 7KH PHWDPRUSKRVLV WKDW
the philosophy which is concerned about these questions has undergone is
certainly not just a consequence of evolutions taking place outside the
philosophical firmament. Even in philosophy itself there is the tendency to
WKURZ WKH ZKROH ORW RYHUERDUG DQG QR ORQJHU VSHQG HQHUJ\ RQ WKH SDLQ RI
EHLQJ7KLVHVVD\FLUFOHVDURXQGWKLVWHQGHQF\&DQWKHGHVLUHIRUZLVGRPRU
3

truth indeed be reduced to the art of living, and are a number of questions
that have indeed kindled philosophy definitively closed? Have we closed the
books on the problem of truth, and is the philosophy that is still occupied with
it indeed an ivory-tower affair? These are the questions with which I begin.
I am certainly not writing this text because I wish to personally and
incontrovertibly define philosophy, or because I would own some kind of
property rights to philosophy who am I to speak on behalf of philosophy? Its
desire for truth and wisdom, which is something other than truth and wisdom
itself, belongs to each of us. Rather, I would like to respond to the fact that
today, the rights to philosophy have indeed been claimed and people
frequently speak on its behalf. This is not to save philosophy or to write its
hagiography. But I do attribute great importance to the formulation of the
question which has been asked from time immemorial and the way in which
WKLV KDSSHQV ,I , WKHQ VSHDN RI SKLORVRSK\ LW RQO\ KDV WR GR ZLWK WKHVH
questions.1 Whether they are philosophical or not does not interest me as
such.

2IFRXUVHWKHUHDUHLQQXPHUDEOHSKLORVRSKLHVDQGWKHUHLVQRRQHSKLORVRSK\%XWE\
SKLORVRSK\,ZDQWWRGLVFXVVDILHOGDVSHFLILFSUD[LVRUGLVFLSOLQHWKHUHIRUHWKHXVHRI
SKLORVRSK\EHFDXVHQDWXUDOO\SKLORVRSK\LVQRWSV\FKRORJ\RUPHFKDQLFVHYHQWKRXJK
GLVFLSOLQHVFDQRIFRXUVHQHYHUEHVLPSO\GHOLPLWHGPDNHQRPLVWDNHDERXWWKDW
4

Truth
Our age circles around a philosophical impasse which demands clarification.
2QHRIWKHPRVWIUHTXHQWO\SURIHVVHGWKHPHVLQUHFHQW\HDUVLVWKDWHYHU\RQH
has his own trutK 2QH FDQ KDUGO\ HQJDJH LQ D FRQYHUVDWLRQ ZLWK KDYLQJ WR
KHDUWKDWHYHU\WKLQJLVUHODWLYHWKDWQRRQHKDVDOHDVHRQWKHWUXWKDQGWKDW
ZHGRQRWNQRZDQGWKDWLVHYHQDJRRGWKLQJ7KDWHYHU\WKLQJLVUHODWLYH
might be a widespread standpoint, but it quickly gets caught in its own web.
That everything is relative and thus nothing is absolutely true is and remains
an absolute truth claim. If I am positively convinced that nothing is true any
PRUHWKHQ,DGYDQFHWKLVQRWKLQJLVWUXHDQ\PRUHDV a new truth. On behalf
of the loss of all certainties, I thereby unwittingly give birth to a new certainty,
precisely at the moment that I have announced the bankruptcy of this
possibility. One could not imagine a better description of a paradox.
Naturally, assuming this standpoint eliminates the problem. The
question can of course be raised as to why you should still be interested in
the word of someone who says that everything is relative? Why would you
take his or her position seriously? If nothing is true, why be interested in
someone who says that nothing is true any more? These rhetorical questions
may counter the statement as such, but the underlying paradox exposes a
very interesting issue which we cannot just sweep under the carpet. It
primarily concerns whether and how we relate to the question of truth today.
This question is more pressing than it seems at first glance. If our age would
lack an overarching truth, then no one would be able to affirm or deny the
truth of this relativism, as our view of the world would no longer be supported
by truth and certainty. Supposing this hypothesis is correct, we would not
even be able to verify it.
Thus one can easily speak of an impasse: we get ourselves into a jam
while we are thinking about the problem. In the jargon of philosophers, we
find ourselves with an aporiaVRPHWKLQJWKDWODFNVD-DQH[LWSRURVDQG
thus hits a dead-end, or at least gives that impression. The aporia of
relativism not only assumes a prominent place in our society and culture in
general. We also encounter it in the specific field of philosophy itself, albeit
under the form of a specific demand. What demand is this, and precisely what
is desired of philosophy? This is the context at issue.
<RXUQHFNLVOLNHDQLYRU\WRZHU
7KH FXUUHQW GHPDQGV DQG UHSURDFKHV DGGUHVVHG WR LYRU\-WRZHU SKLORVRSK\
are the symptom of a persistent ambiguity and even a paradox: the tower in
5

which philosophy would dwell is a target of criticism as well as an object of

desire. On the one hand, philosophy is accused of staying in the tower and
thus of being elitist. On the other hand, there is a positive desire also to speak
on behalf of philosophy and to nestle down next to the philosopher in the
tower. This ambiguity not only characterizes the criticism addressed to
SKLORVRSK\ EXW DOVR WKH XVH RI WKH VD\LQJ LYRU\ WRZHU LQ RWKHU FRQWH[WV
Allow me to therefore indicate very briefly a few references in the evolution of
WKHXVHRIWKHH[SUHVVLRQLYRU\WRZHULQRUGHUWREHWWHUVLWXDWHWKHFRQWH[WRf
the current critique of the ivory tower.
The rather voluptuous description from the Song of Solomon from the
Old Testament<RXUQHFNLVOLNHDQLYRU\WRZHULVRQHRIWKHROGHVWWH[WXDO
references to a tower of ivory. The context of the passage is as follows:
How graceful are your feet in sandals, O queenly maiden! Your rounded
thighs are like jewels, the work of a master hand. Your navel is a
rounded bowl that never lacks mixed wine. Your belly is a heap of
wheat, encircled with lilies. Your two breasts are like two fawns, twins of
DJD]HOOH<RXUQHFNLVOLNHDQLYRU\WRZHUSong of Solomon, 7, 2-5).
7KH DXWKRU RI WKLV ERRN FOHDUO\ ZDQWHG WR FHOHEUDWH WKH TXHHQO\ PDLGHQ LQ
TXHVWLRQ DQG WKH H[SUHVVLRQ LYRU\ WRZHU ZDV DSSDUHQWO\ DQ DFFHSWHG
manner of doing so. Ivory tower signifies simultaneously purity, wisdom and
beauty on the one hand, and impregnability and inaccessibility on the other.
The neck of the maiden is so enchantingly beautiful that she, like a tower,
seems to be an impregnable fortress. Whether the expression refers to an
actual tower is uncertain. There is mention of a throne, an ivory palace or a
tower in various places in the Old Testament: there is the ivory tower of
Solomon and the ivory palace of Ahab in the first book of Kings (1 Kings,
10:18 and 22:39), the ivory palaces, houses and beds in the book of Amos
(Amos, 3:14 and 6:4) or the ivory palaces in Psalms (Psalms, 45:9). In each
case, ivory stands for magnificence and extravagance, for something
unbelievably beautiful, which is extremely attractive and therefore also carries
a certain risk. The ivory palaces are a thorn in the side of Yahweh and he
often threatens to destroy these displays of extravagance.
7KHDXWKRURIWKH6RQJRI6RQJVDQRWKHUWLWOHRIWKHSong of Solomon,
SULPDULO\ XVHG WKH LYRU\ WRZHU WR FHOHEUDWH WKH PDLGHQ LQ WKH VWRU\
:LOOLEURUGV &DWKROLF WUDQVODWLRQ RI WKLV SDVVDJH LV VRPHZKDW PLVOHDGLQJ
<RXU QHFN LV OLNHDQ LYRU\ WRZHU PLVVHV DQXPEHU RI OD\HUV RI VLJQLILFDQFH
and internal references present in the Song of Solomon. Various Hebrew
6

commentaries and comparative studies reveal that when the maiden in the
Song is asked how she distinguishes her lover from all the others, her answer
LV WKH IROORZLQJ +LV ERG\ LV LYRU\ ZRUN Song of Solomon, 5:15).2 The
+HEUHZZRUGMQXVHGLQWKHSDVVDJHIRULYRU\LVWKHVDPHDVWKHZRUG
XVHG LQ WKH H[SUHVVLRQ LYRU\ WRZHU ,Q DGGLWLRQ QHFN FRQFHUQV D
euphemistic use of language, and according to philological commentaries
symbolizes the female genitals.3 This seems like a rather plausible
interpretation, particularly when you consider how earlier in the text, one of
WKHPDLGHQVFDUHWDNHUVHXSKHPLVWLFDOO\WDONVDERXWWKHQHFNRIWKHZRPDQ
ZKLFK VKH GHVFULEHV DV D UHIXJH IRU WKH LYRU\ 7KH correct translation of
\RXUQHFNLVOLNHDQLYRU\WRZHULVWKXV<RXUQHFNLVOLNHDUHIXJHIRULYRU\

,UHIHULQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHWRWKHWUDQVODWLRQLQWKHSXEOLVKHGGLVVHUWDWLRQE\3:7K
6WRRS9DQ3DULGRQ+HWOLHGGHUOLHGHUHQ(HQILORORJLVFKHDQDO\VHYDQKHW+HEUHHXZVH
ERHN3HHWHUV/HXYHQ

6HH)R[097KH6RQJRI6RQJVDQGWKHDQFLHQW(J\SWLDQORYHVRQJV7KH8QLYHUVLW\RI
:LVFRQVLQ3UHVV:LVFRQVLQ+RULQH6&,QWHUSUHWDWLYHLPDJHVLQWKH6RQJRI
6RQJV)URPZHGGLQJFKDULRWVWREULGDOFKDPEHUV3HWHU/DQJ1HZ<RUN.HHO2
7KH6RQJRI6RQJV$FRQWLQHQWDOFRPPHQWDU\)RUWUHVV3UHVV0LQQHDSROLV
7

Purity and desire

:KDW,ZLVKWRNHHSLQPLQGIURPWKHDERYHLVWKDWLYRU\RULYRU\WRZHULQ
the context of the Old Testament, simultaneously serves as a symbol for
purity, wisdom and beauty, and for an inaccessible object of desire. In the
ODWHU&KULVWLDQWUDGLWLRQDVZHOOLYRU\WRZHUV\PEROL]HVSXULW\DQGVKHOWHULQJ
IRUFH0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\LWZDVXVHGDVDQRGHWRWKHXQWDLQWHGEHDXW\Rf the
Holy Virgin. Diverse references within the Judeo-Christian tradition reveal that
it concerns a symbolism which only has a positive association, especially that
of admiration. Nevertheless, the image of the ivory tower is never
unambiguously positive. Precisely because of its purity (white), but also its
inaccessible nature (tower), admiration often turns into envy and criticism.
The lap may be the refuge of ivory, but not every refuge can just be entered
by everyone.
A large number of related illustrations in the Old Testament also contain
WKHPRWLIRIWKHLYRU\WRZHU7KH7RZHURI%DEHOIURPWKHERRNRIGenesis is
probably the most well known in that list: people wanted to build a tower that
would reach to the heavens; Yahweh did not sympathize with so much
human ambition and brought about a confusion of tongues leading people to
spread across the face of the Earth with their many languages.
There is also mention of this ambiguous nature outside Judeo-Christian
UHIHUHQFHVRQWKHRQHKDQGWKHSXUHGHVHUYHVUHVSHFWDQGDGPLUDWLRQEXW
on the other hand its inaccessibility stirs up animosity and jealousy. The tower
is the forbidden object of desire for which mankind continues to strive. This is
UHIOHFWHGIRUH[DPSOHLQWKH3\JPDOLRQP\WKEHFDuse of the wanton way of
life of his contemporaries, Pygmalion, the famous sculptor from Greek
mythology, developed a profound aversion for marriage. In this context he
created a female sculpture in ivory. As we know, the sculptor then fell in love
with the sculpture and received from Aphrodite or Venus, goddess of love
WKH SRZHU WR DQLPDWH WKH VFXOSWXUH4 In this well-known myth, it is not so
much converging with the beloved that takes centre stage, but rather purity
and inaccessibility. Pygmalion wants nothing else than to establish a distance
between the ivory sculpture and himself. The sculpture must remain pure and
LQDFFHVVLEOH PD\ QRW EH FRQWDPLQDWHG DQG WKLV LV SUHFLVHO\ ZK\ KH FDQ
desire it.


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1HGHUODQGVFKH%RHNKDQGHO$QWZHUSHQ7RGD\ZHDUHIDPLOLDUPDLQO\ZLWKWKH
YHUVLRQE\2YLG%&LQZKLFKWKHVFXOSWRUGHSLFWVKLVLGHDORIIHPLQLQLW\DOVR
IDOOVLQORYHZLWKWKHVFXOSWXUHDQG9HQXVEULQJVWKHLPDJHWROLIHDIWHUOLVWHQLQJWRWKH
HQWUHDWLHVRI3\JPDOLRQ
8

The ambiguity of desire and longing is strongly present in the modern

XVH RI WKH H[SUHVVLRQ LYRU\ WRZHU )LUVW WKHUH DUH PDQ\ UHIHUHQFHV LQ
literature and the arts to a tower in which, typically, an inaccessible virgin
beloved is imprisoned. The tower embodies inaccessibility and the pain that
comes with not attaining the object of desire. In this extremely romantic
theme, happiness and misery are always intensely intertwined with one
another. The many stories about this theme often centre on a pure young girl
whose hand has been promised in marriage to a man she does not love. In
order to maintain her purity, the girl is hidden away from the world until she
gets married. In other words, she is locked up so that no one can enter her
UHIXJH 7KH HWHUQDO WKLUG SDUW\ LQ WKH VWRU\ LV DOZD\V WKH WUXH ORYH who
passionately desires the girl her lover. She is inaccessible to him, and this
is expressed symbolically when he comes to find her in the tower where she
is locked away, and which is intended to protect her from him (among others).
Then the story leads to a union of the two lovers, or more expressly in
accordance with the themes of romanticism to the ultimate convergence
which occurs in and by the death/suicide of both lovers.

Isolation
If the ivory tower here still symbolizes positive and negative feelings, in the
course of the nineteenth century the expression came to be used in a purely
negative sense, namely to indicate artists who are unworldly or remain aloof
from other people, who live in isolation and create works that the common
man cannot understand. In connection with this, it always concerns asocial
individuals who live in isolation, do not work and are only concerned about
art. The first reference in this sense comes from French literary critic SainteBeuve who, in one of the editions of the journal Revue des Deux Mondes,
reproached poet Alfred de Vigny for haughtily withdrawing from society.5
When he became older, De Vigny opted for the peacefulness of the
countryside over the bustle of Paris, and apparently Sainte-Beuve blamed
him for this. Since then, people have used the expression in a purely negative
sense, first as reproach to artists and later also to intellectuals in general.
Without going through the entire context of this shift of meaning, in this
context I would still like to indicate the importance of the rise of the romantic
QRWLRQRIWKHDUWLVWDVJHQLXV$VWKHDFFXVDWLRQJRHVWKHQRWLRQRIJHQLXV
arises from the artist as a person who towers above everything and everyone
to such an extent that he remains misunderstood or wants to remain
PLVXQGHUVWRRG 7KH IDFW WKDW LYRU\ WRZHU RQO\ ZHQW DURXQG WKH ZRUOG DV D
common reproach at the end of the nineteenth century also has to do with the
many emerging avant-garde movements at the time, as well as the definitive
loss of classical fine arts. Art had become something that was the concern of
D FHUWDLQ LQWHOOHFWXDO HOLWH DQG ZDV VDLG WR EH GLIILFXOW D UHSURDFK WKDW LV
equally attributed to it even today. In the twentieth century, the expression for
that matter is also quoted in the context of communist regimes, directed at
artists who did not lend themselves to making social-realist art as was
expected of them. In this context, ivory tower literally symbolizes irrealism, not
fitting in or adapting to social reality.
Finally, in a more vulgar sense, ivory tower also stands for irrationalism.
Because certain individuals want to isolate themselves in a particular place,
and do not just participate in every aspect of social life, they are a bit balmy.
They conceive bizarre things and one should particularly pay them no mind.
There must be something wrong with someone who isolates oneself from
VRFLHW\WKH\PXVWEHDUWLVWVRULQWHOOHFWXDOV6


)RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVVHH*DOODV.5$OIUHGGH9LJQ\HWVD7RXUG

,YRLUH
1HRSKLORORJXV

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'LRJHQHVRI6LQRSHFD%HIRUHWKH&RPPRQ(UDDFRQWHPSRUDU\RI3ODWRDQG
10

With this, being isolated from reality, being intellectually active came to
be seen in a bad light once and for all. To this very day, artists, philosophers,
scientists or intellectuals are time and again reproached for staying in their
LYRU\ WRZHU 7KH\ ZRXOG EH XQZRUOGO\ UHPDLQ D JUHDW GLVWDQFH IURP WUXH
reality because they remain tucked away somewhere high in their tower,
doing their thing without being aware of what is going on in the world. As a
result, reproaching someone for this amounts to saying: you have clearly
understood nothing! Or again: you urgently need to get out in the streets
where real life is happening.

$ULVWRWOHLVDW\SLFDOH[DPSOHRIDQXQZRUOGO\SKLORVRSKHUEHFDXVHKHLVRODWHVKLPVHOI
IURPQRUPDOVRFLHW\'LRJHQHVZDQWHGWROLYHOLNHDGRJDQDQLPDOZKLFKDFFRUGLQJWR
KLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQOLYHVDKDSS\OLIHDVRSSRVHGWRKXPDQEHLQJV+LVUHIXJHZDVPRUH
RIDFDYHWKDQDQLYRU\WRZHUEXWKLVFRQVFLRXVO\FKRVHQLVRODWLRQV\PEROL]HVIRUPDQ\
WKHXQZRUOGOLQHVVRISKLORVRSK\7KLVH[SODLQVP\SUHIHUHQFHIRUWKLVGHSLFWLRQ
11

Ironic
Cultural-historically then, on the one hand the ivory tower stands for that
which people desire and try to attain, but on the other hand for that which
generates jealousy and animosity, and should consequently disappear from
the field of view. This ambivalence is also at work in current debate about
truth and the place of knowing. Since every truth counts for the same, the
right of ownership of the truth is democratized. The ivory tower, so to speak,
belongs to everyone. We all want access to the truth which, until recently,
was reserved for a few, undemocratic people out of touch with the world. In
formal terms, everyone tries to assume the position of the intellectual. This is
expressed in the importance of SHUVRQDO H[SHULHQFH ZKLFK WKHVH GD\V
VHUYHVDVWKHXOWLPDWHWUXWKFULWHULRQ7KLVLVZKDW,H[SHULHQFHSHUVRQDOO\RU
WKLV LV P\ RSLQLRQ DUH WKH SUHYDLOLQJ H[SUHVVLRQV \RX HQFRXQWHU LQ LQIRUPDO
conversations as well as in many interviews in various media. With this, an
opinion comes to be on equal footing with a fact, and it becomes increasingly
difficult to distinguish them.7
At the same time, no one may assume this position because the one
who professes to claim the truth about a particular issue is taken for an
arrogant intellectual. A fellow philosopher and ex-communist remarked some
WLPHDJRGXULQJDGLVFXVVLRQ$OO,NQRZLVWKDWZKHQVRPHRQHSURIHVVHVWR
KDYHDOHDVHRQWKHWUXWK,VKRXOGEHVXVSLFLRXV,GRQRWEHOLHYHRQHFDQ
better illustrate the climate of our age. Precisely because someone thinks
they know what the real issue is, precisely when someone claims to
understand what is going on and can provide an explanation, he becomes
VXVSHFWDQGKHDUVWKHLYRU\WRZHUUHSURDFK+HPXVWEH wrong because he
knows it and that can never be good. To once again avail of the ivory tower
metaphor: everyone may visit the tower, but then only as an ironic or cynical
tourist who visits a historical location on one or another heritage day. Take a
quick peek and then get serious again.8
:KLOHZHLURQL]HWKHWUXWK only using truth between quotation marks
RUSHUVRQDOL]HLW the truth is my truth it of course is and remains active in
other areas. And how. There have probably never before been sRPDQ\WUXWK
H[SHUWV DV WKHUH DUH WRGD\ $Q LQFUHDVLQJ QXPEHU RI DUHDV RI RXU OLIH KDYH
been outsourced to technical and scientific specialists. We need an expert for


)DUKDG0DQMRRZURWHDERXWWKLVLQDYHU\LQWHUHVWLQJVWXG\7UXH(QRXJK/HDUQLQJWR
/LYHLQD3RVW)DFW6RFLHW\-RKQ:LOH\ 6RQV

7KLVPDNHVRQHWKLQNRIZKDWWKH$PHULFDQVDWLULVW6WHSKHQ&ROEHUWGHVFULEHGLQ
DVWUXWKLQHVVDWHUPWRVKRZKRZSHRSOHFODLPWRNQRZWKLQJVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHLU
LQWXLWLRQZLWKRXWEHLQJERWKHUHGE\HYLGHQFHORJLFRUIDFWXDOPDWHULDO
12

every device that we buy, someone to explain to us how something works

and especially how we should keep our hands off it when it no longer works;
there are also experts who tell us how we should adjust our eating habits,
how and how much we should exercise, how to properly raise our children
DQG SHWV DQG ZKDW LV WKH ULJKW ZD\ WR GUHVV +Rw do you mean, no more
truth?

13

Farewell
Truth continues to operate, whether we wish it to or not. Perhaps, this is now
the question, our relationship to the philosophical tradition, to the place that
brought about the confrontation with truth from time immemorial, is much
more profound than we recognize today? Allow me to summarize as follows:
can we announce that we are taking leave from the tradition of truth without
LQWURGXFLQJ WKH LGHD RI WKH WUXWK RI RXU OHDYH-WDNLQJ DQG ZLWK WKLV DJDLQ
postpone saying our farewell? Stated otherwise: can we indeed say farewell
to truth without turning ourselves into the very horizon of truth?
If we do not want to simply dismiss these difficult questions, it seems
we will have to resort to a renewed confrontation with a number of core
philosophical issues. Not to act as if there has been no history, as if nothing
has happened and even less to reinstate that history. On the contrary,
precisely by considering what has passed, we can (hopefully) better
understand the present. This specifically means that we must investigate
whether and how the question of truth and by extension, philosophy is
appealed to today and in the past. What is currently at stake in philosophy
and for what is it claimed?

14

Wonder
Philosophy is wonder. Being amazed by a number of matters means asking
questions about them, and this is philosophy. At least this is one of the most
well-known descriptions of doing philosophy. It is clear that wonder plays a
large role in philosophizing, but does not suffice as such. To formulate it
directly in philosophical language: wonder is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition. Philosophy asks questions about matters which are apparently
obvious. Are we able to know? What does it mean that there is time? Are we
certain of anything at all? Does what we see really exist? These questions
indeed arise from a form of wonder. I remember as a young boy asking
myself whether my grandmother, who was right there in front of me, was
actually alive. I never dared ask the question out loud, but I found it strange
that there was someone there before me, who spoke to me and is described
as a human being. Was I a philosopher back then? It is true that I was
thinking about a potentially philosophical question (does what I see really
exist?), but a philosopher? No, I was likely not that. Children ask many
interesting questions and have great wonder about man and world. It is
doubtful, however, that they would therefore be the true philosophers
EHFDXVH VRPHZKHUH DORQJ WKH ZD\ DGults would have lost their sense of
wonder. To philosophize does not necessarily mean retaining an innocent,
original vision, but often putting on another set of glasses to learn to see
something you did not see before. Sometimes you must indeed take off your
JODVVHVWRVHHEHWWHUEXW\RXUYLVLRQLVQRWWKHUHIRUHPRUHDXWKHQWLF
Not every question that arises from a certain sense of wonder is a
SKLORVRSKLFDOLVVXH4XHVWLRQVVXFKDVPRWKHUZK\DUHZHDOLYH"PD\DULVH
from wonder, but are not necessarily the most profound questions, even
though these are the clichs with which one is often addressed as a
philosopher. For that matter, even if a philosopher would want to think about
these questions DQGZK\ZRXOGQWKH" this does not mean that a definitive
DQVZHUFDQEHJLYHQ7KLVLVZKDWPDNHVWKHSKLORVRSK\RIRXUDJHXQLTXH
Philosophy can no longer rest on a comprehensive world view which explains
all phenomena in reality by the presence of a prime cause or creative agent.
Philosophical thought in the modern age is characterized by the radical
absence of something like a Creator or a first cause and thus also of an
ultimate aim toward which reality evolves. The world is what it is, period.
This is why philosophy can no longer provide a total explanation for the
fundamental questions WKHVHDUHRIWHQZK\TXHVWLRQV:K\GRHVWKHZRUOG
exist? Why are we alive? or subsume them into a large synthesis. Not that
15

we should no longer bother with these questions. On the contrary, we

struggle with them on a daily basis and many intellectual horse-traders try to
VHOO WKHLU UHDG\-made explanations. If we start from rational and plausible
arguments, however, we have less to say. A large number of classical
philosophical systems, called metaphysics, which previously provided
detailed answers to the most fundamental questions of our existence, are
H[KDXVWHG ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV ZH FDQ QR ORQJHU FRQVLGHU WKH ZRUOG OLNH 3ODWR
could. Certain theories for understanding reality are today no longer tenable;
their explanatory power has nothing to offer. Ancient Greek philosophers
could still assume a total explanation of reality. They sought and found the
point from which the world, or matter, originated: a first cause, a final ground,
and so on. Natural elements such as earth, water, fire and air played a
SURPLQHQWUROHLQWKLV3HRSOHWLPHDQGDJDLQDWWHPSWHGWRH[SODLQDOOWKDWLV
on the basis of a substrate or element underlying the world. Reality is a
cosmos literally: an order or ordering; not chaos.

16

Handmaiden
The prominent role that Greek philosophers played on this level changed
fundamentally once Christianity washed over the European landscape.
Philosophy gradually came to be marginalized and for a long time was even
the handmaiden of religion. Not one or another natural element but the
Creator was at the foundation of all that is, so went the dominant creed during
the Christian Middle Ages. We owe our lives and the entire world to its
Eternal Goodness.
Despite the fundamental differences between ancient Greek philosophy
and Christian theology, both share one primary element: they offer a definitive
total explanation for everything that happens in reality and are coalition
partners of being. With the rise of modernity and later the Enlightenment, this
apparently uncomfortable coalition between philosophy and theology had to
GHILQLWLYHO\ VWHS DVLGH 7KH VXPPD ZKLFK 7KRPDV $TXLQDV VR EHDXWLIXOO\
worked out in the thirteenth century paved the way for explanatory systems
based exclusively on human reason. In his summa, Aquinas still assumed
that philosophy, the path of reason, and theology, the path of faith, were like
two rivers from the same source, the First Truth. The two rivers flowed as it
were into the same source from which they originated God.
In the new construction plans for man and world which modern reason
draws up, there is no longer a place reserved for this divine Creator. With
this, philosophy, together with science this time, assumes the torch that it had
to relinquish upon the arrival of Christianity. From this point forward it also
LQWHQGVWRWKRURXJKO\IDWKRPWKHERRNRIQDWXUH5HDVRQLVLWVLQVWUXPHQWLQ
this; complete knowledge of the world its goal.
In what later came to be called the Enlightenment, this rational pursuit
for knowledge of man and world culminates in an encyclopaedic project which
literally attempts to pour nature into one and the same book form. But while
some henceforth postulated reason as the foundation of reality, criticism
about the ambitions of the same philosophical and scientific reason swelled
even more. In the meantime, the status of reason had ascended to a divine
place which had already been confiscated. Consequently, the ever self-critical
philosophical tradition has also knocked this statue from its pedestal, and little
by little came to question the pretensions of its own reason. This unabated
self-FULWLFLVPZLWKLQWKHSKLORVRSKLFDOHQWHUSULVHOHGWRWKHGHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI
17

the classic philosophical system at the end of the twentieth century, and a
FHUWDLQIRUPRISKLORVRSK\FDOOLWPHWDSK\VLFVZDVVLPSO\GHFODUHGGHDG

18

Philosophizing
Some people therefore placed, and place, their hope in science, and our
fascination for theories like the Big Bang attest to the attempt to still find an
e[SODQDWLRQ IRU WKH JUHDW TXHVWLRQV ZLWK ZKLFK ZH VWUXJJOH 1HYHUWKHOHVV
science in principle is occupied with examining what and how something is,
not how something should be. I will indeed return to this point later when I
explain the relationship between philosophy and science. Awaiting me first is
the perilous undertaking of further defining philosophizing so that we can
situate the claim currently made on philosophy in a broader context.
From time immemorial, philosophizing has meant confronting oneself with the
most fundamental questions about our existence. This is not something you
do in an unstructured manner. Knowledge is needed to take a streamlined
approach to questions and one never starts ex nihilo, from nothing, when
postulating a particular position. Philosophy stands for a number of textual
traditions in which a great many issues have already been discussed
exhaustively. If you want to simply throw these traditions overboard on behalf
of a certain scientific character because all philosophical texts older than a
KDOI FHQWXU\ ZRXOG EH RXWGDWHG WKHQ \RX KDYH QRW RQO\ IRXQGHG D QHZ
WUDGLWLRQ KHUH WKHUH ZLOO RQO\ EH PRGHUQLVP EXW \RX KDYH DOVR PDGH LW
unnecessarily difficult for yourself. Philosophy is almost inextricably linked
with sLIWLQJ WKURXJK VRPHWKLQJ LQ LWV KLVWRU\ VHL]LQJ D TXHVWLRQ RU SUREOHP
with a tweezers and unravelling it. The historical arsenal of philosophical
treatises and theories is therefore often of great help.
Knowledge and the handing down of traditions are, philosophically, not
objectives in themselves, but form a context from which we analyse issues
facing us today. For a great many issues and questions, a certain path of
thinking has already been travelled and it would be downright foolish not to
become acquainted with this path of thinking. Firstly, because it is an illusion
to believe that one can just start thinking out of nothing without passing
through the same questions and dilemmas. Secondly, because one is thereby
able to fall back on a system of thought which has been polished over the
course of hundreds of years of use. We are continually adjusting, correcting,
criticising that system though of course they are always various systems.
Consequently, a notable theme within the philosophical tradition is selfcriticism: time after time, philosophers criticize one another, attack one
DQRWKHUVWKHRULHVRUUHILQHWKHP7KLVLVZK\LWLVDOVRVRGLIILFXOWWRLQGLFDWH
ZKHWKHU SKLORVRSK\ DGYDQFHV VXFK DV LV PXFK PRUH FOHDUO\ WKH FDVH ZLWK

19

DQ HYLGHQFH EDVHG VFLHQFH9 Thirdly, and following on this, it may also be
WKDWWKHV\VWHPRIWKRXJKWLVZRUQRXWWKDWDFHUWDLQTXHVWLRQLVDWDQHQG,
indicted earlier that, for instance, classical metaphysics, which consistently
started from a first cause in order from there to explain the whole of reality, for
PDQ\LVH[KDXVWHGQRORQJHUDFWLYHDWWKLVMXQFWXUHZKHUHZHDUHQRZ)RU
LQVWDQFH LW ZRXOG EH UHPDUNDEOH WR PRUH RU OHVV FRQVLGHU (PSHGRFOHV
doctrine of the elements as a theory which just like that would be valid today.
This brings up a specific characteristic of our age. People suddenly
discover a certain figure or movement from the past, or from a distant land, in
order to rediscover therein all manner of (life-) wisdom. One time it is the
ancient Greeks, then it the Stoics again or perhaps Zen Buddhism. The claim
which invariably follows is that one could already find the source of all wisdom
therein, or that a certain figure back then already had insight into the issues
with which we are now struggling. This is to act as if the current age or
contemporary questions were already anticipated millennia ago. This reminds
PHRI8PEHUWR(FRVMRNHWKDWZHVKRXOGWDNHFDUHQRWKDYHSRVWPRGHUQLVP
begin with the pre-Socratics.
The above does not at all mean that we, for instance, should no longer
UHDG 3ODWR DQG WKDW QRWRQH RI3ODWRV WKRXJKWV LV ZRUWKFRQVLGHULQJ RUFDQ
only survive as a sort of folklore. On the contrary, we should read Plato today,
for instance to know where his thought led to, what influence he still has on
us, where his insights still have much to contribute. Many of the issues that
3ODWR UDLVHG LQ IDFW FRQWLQXH WR VWXEERUQO\ KDXQW RXU WKLQNLQJ 7KLV ODWWHU
question is a matter that is hard to defend. Criticism of the idea that we
should still read Plato is that in this way, philosophy is either defined as a
IL[HG FDQRQ RI VDFUHG WH[WV RU LV UHGXFHG WR OLWHUDWXUH ,I DOO SKLORVRSKLFDO
WH[WV DUH DOZD\V YDOLGWKHQ ZH DUHIDFHG ZLWKVWRULHV DQG QRW ZLWKVFLHQFH
No science that takes itself seriously still invokes insights from more than two
millennia ago, as they say. From this critique follows that if philosophy still
means something, then it is as the precursor of science, but is itself not
VFLHQFH (W WRXW OH UHVWH HVW OLWHUDWXUH LV KRZ WKH VWDWXV RI SKLORVRSK\ LV
described in this context. Yet it is not a matter of defending a certain canon or
preserving some texts like a relic. Reading or rereading texts is not in function
of celebrating the brilliance of an author, but rather about what reading it can
contribute to the analysis of problems we face today. Philosophy is therefore

(YLGHQFHEDVHGDVVXPHVWKDWDVFLHQWLILFSUDFWLFHPXVWEHEDVHGRQIDFWVSURYHQ
WKURXJKUHVHDUFKDQGQRWMXVWZLWKRXWIRXQGDWLRQ$SK\VLRWKHUDSLVWIRUH[DPSOHZLOO
EDVHKLVWKHUDSHXWLFLQWHUYHQWLRQVRQDOUHDG\FRPSOHWHGUHVHDUFK
20

not literature in the sense of a fictional story, but even less is it an empirically
verifiable science in the strict sense of the word.10
Philosophers are often occupied with questions and problems which
transcend a purely empirical or numerical discourse. Certain questions allow
no quantifiable demonstrability and this has nothing to do with an
unwillingness to be clear or with obscure forces which we would not be able
to explain. You could conduct a hundred empirical studies about
fundamentalism but these will in no way clear up fundamentalism as a social
issue. Or, in the context of this essay, I could take a survey as to whether
people still believe in truth. Even if that would no longer be the case for a
FHUWDLQSHUFHQWDJH,ZRXOGVWLOOQRWKDYHVROYHGRXUUHODWLRQVKLSWRWUXWK7KH
logic of these kinds of problems is too cunning, too sly for that.



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GHOLQHDWLQJWKHERUGHUEHWZHHQOLWHUDWXUHDQGSKLORVRSK\UHVSHFWLYHO\)RUHPRVW
KRZHYHU,GRQRWZLVKWRUDLVHWKHTXHVWLRQRIGHOLPLWLQJDQLQVLGHRXWVLGH$V
PHQWLRQHGDERYH,GRQRWZLVKWRVWULFWO\GHOLPLWSKLORVRSK\EXWUDWKHURQWKHRQH
KDQGWRUHFDOOZKDWKDVEHHQH[SHOOHGIURPSKLORVRSK\DQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGWR
LQGLFDWHWKRVHTXHVWLRQVIRUZKLFKSKLORVRSK\FDQJLYHQRGHILQLWLYHPHWDSK\VLFDO
DQVZHU
21

Aporetic
Traditionally, philosophy is inWHUHVWHG LQ WUXWK DQG VKDUHV WKLV GHVLUH
ZLWKVFLHQFH:KDWLVJHQHUDOO\FDOOHGHVRWHULDRUSVHXGR-science is in stark
FRQWUDVW WR WKLV ,Q WKLV ILHOG PDWWHUV DUH RIWHQ H[SODLQHG E\ IDFLOH
associations of human character traits with the phase of the moon or other
SULQFLSOHV RU RQH FXUHV SHRSOH E\ SUHVFULELQJ RQH RU DQRWKHUFHQWXULHV-old
wonder therapy. And good old-fashioned deceit is always a possibility as well.
Philosophers have in common with scientists that they want to distance
themselves from precisely such completely unverifiable principles or theories.
Philosophy is therefore not just literature, or its history a story, because it
DOZD\V DLPV DWWUXWK )URPWLPH LPPHPRULDO LW KDVVWULYHQ WR DUWLFXODWH WUXH
VWDWHPHQWV DQG LI SRVVLEOH Dlso to coincide with this truth. What could this
praxis mean in the twenty-ILUVW FHQWXU\" &DQ ZH MXVW WUDQVODWH SKLORVRSK\V
traditional search into a contemporary context?
Traditionally, the philosopher may have wisdom or truth in mind, but he
or she seems to miss it every time again. The realization that the pursuit of
truth is borne by a desire which in principle cannot be satisfied is an issue
extremely characteristic of twentieth-century philosophy. Therefore,
philosophy is also and above all doubt concerning the possibility of realizing
the truth. This makes it a special case. Philosophy is often no more than that:
articulating a radical question and then critically and patiently unravelling
overhasty answers to the question until little is left of it.
People therefore also describe philosophy as a form of aporetic
thought. The Greek term a-poros stands for a lack of access, for a timidity or
desperation of thought. Rather than searching for a definitive answer,
aporetic thought means looking for a particular problem in the existing
answers, following its logic and pushing it so far that it is literally runs into
trouble and apparently cannot get out. An aporia indicates that what we
thought was correct or obvious is, upon further investigation, much less so.
Philosophy as aporetic thought is consequently more or less about this:
philosophizing until we can go no further, only to then look further in different
directions. At that moment, one could say, philosophy happens. Philosophers
often seek out problems where others do not see them; they stop to consider
already existing solutions, suspiciously and patiently ask questions about it,
twist and turn it until they have found a weakness; in scientific circles this is
called falsifying, whereas here it does not just have to do with an empirical,
GRXEOH EOLQG WHVW 1RW WKDW SKLORVRSKLFDO WKHRULHV FDQQRW RU GR QRW ZDQW WR
advance any solutions. They more or less always do this because clarifying
22

problems is part of the work of philosophy. However, a philosophical theory is

not necessarily less successful in its enterprise if it cannot present a solution
to a problem, unless of course this is the express intent.
As I wrote above: demonstrating where thought goes wrong or stumbles
over itself is often the only thing philosophers do, but the social relevance of
this can be substantial. If, for example, Claude Lefort attempted to wake up
the entire Left in France with his analyses of the totalitarian Soviet Union
during the 1960s and thereafter, then this turned out to be extremely relevant
for our concept of democracy.
Philosophy in this sense is the only discipline where you can end up
with less than you started. Was it not Socrates, the philosophical archetype,
who said that the longer he thought about a certain matter, the less he knew
about it? Knowing that you do not know something can also be very
LPSRUWDQW DOWKRXJK WKLV GRHV QRW LQGLFDWH D IRUP RI UHODWLYLVP 6RFUDWHV
statement is in fact less gratuitous than it seems at first sight: the more you
study an issue, the more you discover its complexity or bring existing
knowledge of it into doubt, the less you consequently know and thus the
harder you have to search for the truth.
Today we can even go a step further by not even being certain of the
latter SULQFLSOH2QHZKRVWRSVWRFRQVLGHU6RFUDWHVVWDWHPHQWVKRXOGLQGHHG
conclude that not only do we not have a solid view of what we do know, but
that we even cannot be sure of what we do not know. If this were not the
case, not-knowing would in turn become absolutely certain knowledge, once
again landing us in the paradox of relativism mentioned above: if am
absolutely sure that nothing can be known, how can I simultaneously be sure
of my position itself? Or to put it another way: the truth of uncertainty PXVWOHW
JRRIWKLVXQFHUWDLQW\RILWVRZQWUXWKDERXWLWRULWXQGHUPLQHVLWVHOIDVDWWKH
moment it is pronounced.

23

Pitfalls
I will continue to circle around the status of philosophy. One can and should
expect from a philosopher that he thoroughly, critically and lucidly thinks
about a number of questions and issues we are dealing with in our times; that
he has verifiable or well-founded arguments and/or possibly demonstrable
evidence for his arguments or theories; or that he can demonstrate clearly
how a certain theory goes wrong and can expose the aporia therein.
That everything should be immediately perceptible and univocally
demonstrable, however, is a philosophical project that failed in its intention,
but perhaps was interesting precisely for this reason. Some matters are not
VHQVXDOO\ GHPRQVWUDEOH QRW OHDVW WKH GHPRQVWUDELOLW\ LWVHOI &HUWDLQ
problems seem insoluble, o be poorly described or explained, time and again.
This has nothing to do with a lack of scientific method, but with the
complexity of the phrasing of the question. In this sense, certain philosophical
theories, even if they are centuries old, are still useful for answering
contemporary problems, or even just for clarifying the issue in question.
Not that it is necessary to RPLW SURRI IRU FRPSOH[ SUREOHPV 2Q WKH
contrary, there should always be rational and verifiable answers available in
RQHZD\RUDQRWKHURUHYHU\GLVFXVVLRQLVVXSHUIOXRXVDQGQRQVHQVLFDODV
Ludwig Wittgenstein describes it a nonsensical proposition is neither
demonstrable nor refutable, neither meaningful nor meaningless, but simply
ZLWKRXWVHQVH3XUHVSHFXODWLRQLQDYDFXXPLVQRWDQRSWLRQIRUSKLORVRSK\
In one way or another, there must be an exchange of arguments or an
explanation of a proposition must be achieved in order to do philosophy.
Depending on the issue, argumentation may sometimes be immediately
demonstrable empirically, and sometimes not, but every proposition must at
least be able to be examined as to its attainability or validity. If I claim that it is
not raining and everyone sees or feels that it is raining, then I can pack it in. If
, DVVHUW WKDW ZRUOGZLGH FDSLWDOLVP LV GLUHFWO\ UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH LQFUHDVH RI
REHVLW\LQRXUVRFLHW\WKLVUHTXLUHVDJRRGGHDOPRUHDUJXPHQWDtion which is
QRWXQHTXLYRFDOO\GHPRQVWUDEOH$QGILQDOO\LI,ZRQGHUZKDWOLYLQJZHOOLVLW
is clear that demonstrability here obtains a very different status than what
SHRSOHLQVFLHQFHJHQHUDOO\GHVFULEHDVHYLGHQFHEDVHG
Perhaps drawing a distLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ REMHFWLYH VXEMHFWLYH DQG
VXEMHFWLYLVWZLOOKDYHDFODULI\LQJHIIHFWZKHQVSHDNLQJDERXWWUXWK7KHODWWHU
means: having an unsupported and purely personal opinion which can never
lay claim to universal or even particular validity, suFK DV WKH VWDWHPHQW DOO
*HUPDQVDUHOD]\$OO,DPVD\LQJLVWKDWZKDW,VWDWHLVWUXHMXVWEHFDXVHLW
24

is my opinion. It is not my ambition to provide arguments for it; I just have an

RSLQLRQ2EMHFWLYHRQWKHFRQWUDU\LVZKDWLVXQLYHUVDOO\YDOLG, independent
RIDQ\SDUWLFXODUFRQGLWLRQ:KHWKHU,EHOLHYHLQJUDYLW\ RU QRWPDWWHUVOLWWOH
because if I jump I will always fall, regardless from which culture I originate.
)LQDOO\ VXEMHFWLYH VWDQGV IRU DOPRVW HYHU\ VFLHQWLILF LQVLJKW ZKLFK KDV
arisen from a human perspective VXEMHFW PHDQV KXPDQ %HFDXVH PXFK
science is bound to a subject, the truth which emerges from it cannot be other
WKDQVXEMHFWLYH2XUVXEMHFWLYLW\LVWKHUHIRUHFRQVWLWXWLYHRIWKHWUXWK read:
there is truth because of rather than despite subjectivity and thus in this
sense it is not a negative category. If objectivity is unobtainable and
sometimes even undesirable imagine an objective form of politics one can
still try to approach the general validity or truth of a particular problem as
much as possible.
If philosophy, like so many other sciences, does not satisfy the demand
for objectivity, this does not at all imply that it lands directly in subjectivism. A
philosopher is not only supposed to know what he or she is talking about. She
must know the issues through and through and have sound insights about
WKHP 3KLORVRSK\ LV WKHUHIRUH QRW D PHWD LQTXLU\ DQ LQTXLU\ IURP RXWVLGH
about one or another field, but rather sharpening an inquiry or issue which is
already present in nuce in that particular field. A philosopher does not
comment on something from outside, but crawls inside the issue as much as
SRVVLEOHDQGLQWKLVVHQVHLWLVDQLQWUDLQTXLU\,IQRWSKLORVRSKLFDOLQTXLU\
would be reduced to a purely methodological affair which, in effect, often
occurs: the reflective survey question of an external commentator. Philosophy
can only be fully effective if it can analyse a problem from the inside,
whatever its nature. Philosophy is therefore not limited to a specifically
delimited field or sector of reality. For instance, if today you ask the question
about human nature, a traditional philosophical question, you can also seek
advice from biological, psychological and disciplines other than philosophy in
order to analyse this question in a current fashion. Strictly speaking, there are
thus no philosophical issues. There are only issues and we must think about
them. This is why I suggested at the start of the text that philosophy as such
does not interest me, but rather the way it addresses certain issues.
Philosophy often concerns matters which for most of us seem
unproblematic, but may equally concern questions whose problematic nature
is apparent to everyone, but for which no one has found the answer.
Philosophy cannot present itself here as some kind of oracle, a search engine
for issues people are struggling with. It would sooner delve deeper into these
problems, situate them more broadly or articulate them more radically. It does
25

not do so out of masochLVP EXW IURP D FHUWDLQ QHFHVVLW\ EHFDXVH LVVXHV

simply arise. One can defend this necessity by what a philosopher does but
also from anthropological considerations. In the first case, one assumes that
WKH SKLORVRSKHU PXVW WKLQN KLV WLPH WKDW KH FDQQRt do otherwise than be
concerned with the issues of his time. The philosopher dances on the skin of
his time.

26

The desire for knowledge

The relationship of man to philosophy is an old issue. Aristotle argued that
man is inevitably a rational animal (animal rationale) which cannot do
otherwise than wonder about the place he lives, about himself, about his
surroundings. To formulate this another way: our reason, as Immanuel Kant
described it, never stops asking questions for which we often have no
answer, and yet we continue to ask questions. Reason seems to be
supported by something that gets it into difficulties. Before you realize it, you
are involved in a series of questions which make the ground under your feet
disappear entirely and you no longer know what to think. This moment of
radical doubt is the pre-eminent philosophical moment. This doubt and these
often abysmal questions assume a central place in philosophical praxis,
which attempts to systemize them in rational way, however difficult and
complex they may be. Philosophizing, the desire for knowledge, is in this
sense the relentless confrontation with these and other questions. This has
been the case since its very origins.
:KLOHWKH\KDYHDQDPELJXRXVUHODWLRQVKLSWRGD\SKLORVRSK\VRULJLQDO
context and its historical course inevitably goes together with that of science,
more specifically that of mathematics. The need for systematic empirical
verification or scientific experimentation was foreign to Greek philosophers.
The demand for knowledge and how the world is arranged is a philosophical
question and no one even thinks about calling them scientists. There are
SHRSOH ZKR NQRZ DQG FDQ GR FHUWDLQ WKLQJV EXW WKRVH DUH VSHFLDOLVWV RU
WHFKQLFLDQV7KHSKLORVRSKHURQWKHFRQWUDU\LVQRWVSHFialized in a certain
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QRVWHZDUGRUFDSWDLQRIDVKLS$SKLORVRSKHUGRHVQRWERWKHUZLWKQRUPDO
affairs. He is interested in profound questions which determine the
foundations of existence.
In this sense, philosophy in modern times is a very different story.
When modern science slowly but surely emerged, only since the fourteenth
century, a large share of broad philosophical inquiry was increasingly
RXWVRXUFHG WR D VFLHQFH based on experiments and demonstrable
empiricism. While philosophy took part in forcing this breakthrough, over the
course of centuries it has consequently lost a good deal of ground. An
increasing number of issues for which speculative answers were previously
given were quickly and effectively solved by a scientific approach.
3KLORVRSK\VWHUULWRU\VLQFHWKHQVHHPVWRKDYHVKUXQNLQFRPSDULVRQWR
when it originated. Aristotle, for example, wrote treatises on animals, plants,
27

stars and human beings as well as politics and ethics, metaphysics and
economics. That feat is not to be repeated today without making oneself
ridiculous. Various sciences are independent and always demand very
specialized knowledge, so that those involved know a great deal about
something, but very little about the rest. No one today is capable of
synthesizing all knowledge in an all-encompassing worldview. The classical,
metaphysical project of philosophy, the attempt to know the world as a whole
and furthermore to serve as the place where that knowledge is gathered, has
thus failed. Precisely this failure characterizes contemporary philosophy
through and through.

28

Provisional
That metaphysics has failed has led some to describe philosophy as the
discipline which searches for a provisional answer to issues for which science
does not yet have an answer; philosophy as the handmaiden of science,
secretly desiring to be science itself. Or again: if science is Don Giovanni,
then philosophy in this guise is a sort of Leporello, the shifty servant from
0R]DUWVIDPRXVRSHUD
Should philosophy limit its role to speculative theories about questions
which scientists have not yet reached a conclusion, then today it would
indeed have become the handmaiden of science. Yet that is not its role
because it is occupied with another line of inquiry. If I limit myself to the
aspect of knowledge, then a scientist primarily asks the question of what we
know, while the philosopher asks how we arrive at knowledge. Even if this
distinction is rather artificial, there is indeed a difference. For the most part it
FRPHV GRZQ WR WKH IDFW WKDW LQ WKH ILHOG RI KDUG VFLHQFH UHVHDUFKHUV
SULPDULO\ REWDLQ IDFWV XQWLO WKH WKHVLV FRUUHVSRQGV ZKLOH SKLORVRSK\ VR WR
VD\LVRFFXSLHGZLWKWKHFRUUHVSRQGHQFHLWVHOI%y this I mean, in short, they
are concerned with the question of how truth is either established or not by
the logic with which and the ground from which we obtain these facts. This
leads to questions such as: is the knowledge we obtain reliable knowledge,
and why? What is the relationship between the knowing subject and the
object to be known? What is the distinction between science and myth and
can it be precisely delineated, or is this distinction not itself a mythical
distinction? Naturally this also provides new facts, but not like in another
science. Science wants to gather facts and produce experimentally acquired
evidence for formulated hypotheses. This is not necessarily the case with
philosophy. The labour of philosophy now and again consists precisely of
bringing the acquired solutions or answers into doubt, of making them
problematic. The whole difficulty again lies in describing how philosophical
scepticism and doubt work.
7KHSKLORVRSKHUVREMHFWVRILQYHVWLJDWLRQGRQRWDOZD\VGLIIHUDVVXFK
from that of certain sciences, though he does approach them in a different
way and his relationship to them is different, or less obvious. A philosopher
will naturally not apply himself to empirical research into the ecological
processing of synthetic materials. That is scientific or technical labour, and if
a philosopher gets involved with this he becomes more of a scientist than a
philosopher. A philosopher, for example, asks the question whether what we
29

observe scientifically through a space telescope provides reliable knowledge.

The scientist as well is concerned with the reliability of his scientific results
and indeed, at times the border between science and philosophy of science is
very narrow, but there is something to be said that when a scientist questions
the status of his knowledge, he is thinking philosophically. The difference
between philosophy and science only becomes clear when you do not speak
about the object of knowledge but about the subject of knowledge.
Philosophy is not about gathering speculative knowledge about objects in the
expectation that this knowledge will be perfected by exact scientific research.
The entire issue of modern philosophy, say since Descartes, is how one
UHODWHVDVWKLQNLQJVXEMHFWWRWKHREMHFWFDOOHGZRUOG&RQsequently, what this
comes down to is that a philosopher is not so much concerned with the
question about the object of knowledge, as also and above all with the
subject of that knowledge, with the place from which knowledge is
established and the doubt as to whether one can still speak from the place of
truth at all.
7KLVSODFHLVILQLWHEHFDXVHPDQLVDOZD\VWKURZQLQWRWKHZRUOGIURP
a certain time-and-space perspective I cannot be here and there at the
same time; in short, I am not infinite but finite. Philosophical inquiry into the
subject in-the-world as it were precedes scientific inquiry into the knowledge
of facts. It concerns the question whether there is something, rather than the
technical question as to how exactly things are formed in their materiality.

30

Exact
7KLVEULQJVPHDJDLQWRWKHH[DFWQHVVRISKLORVRSK\7KHDQFLHQWGLVWLQFWLRQ
between objective and subjective sciences or exact and human sciences also
characterizes the philosophical establishment. A philosophical discussion has
long been raging with regard to those who specialize in science and want to
be as empirical as possible and accuse those who do not evince this
WHQGHQF\RIZULWLQJOLWHUDWXUH%\WKLVWKH\PHDQRISUDFWLFLQJDGHVFULSWLYH
narrative form of philosophy in which verifiable arguments and proofs play too
minor a role to call it science. On the other hand is the position which is
convinced that philosophy assumes a descriptive position because not all
problems can or should be approached quantitatively, as such an approach
describes an artificial reality which hopelessly overshoots the complex world
in which we live.
This distinction between objective (exact) and subjective (human)
sciences, but also the discussion between descriptive or empirical, seems to
me to start from a false premise. While nearly every science is subjective or
subject-related in the sense that there is always a subject involved, the same
science always strives to be as exact as possible, whether this is from a
human perspective or not. I have yet to come across the first scientist who
GRHVQRWZDQWWRNQRZZKDWKHVWXGLHVYHU\ZHOO(YHU\DQDO\VLVLVDVH[DFW
DV SRVVLEOH RU LW LV QRW WR IRUPXODWH LW DV D VRUW RI PRWWR 7KH UHOHYDQW
question is not whether the analysis is exact, but rather which phenomena
lend themselves to which approach. When calculating an integral in
mathematics, there will probably be little discussion about the result
(although). Empirically, one can also quickly settle a discussion about gravity:
JRDKHDGDQGMXPS,DPWHOOLQJ\RXWKDWJUDYLW\H[LVWV:LWKDQDQDO\VLVRI
more complex and multifaceted issues such as whether or not violence is
increasing in contemporary society and its causes, the situation is different.
The chance that there will primarily be disagreement about its analysis is
quite large. One can assess violence, conduct surveys among youth or any
other target group, but even these surveys cannot escape interpretation and
demand well-founded and fundamental reflection about the problem of
violence in society. This reflection should obviously be provided with clear
arguments and should also be conducted as exactly as possible, at least
insofar as the issue allows.
In this sense, philosophy is never a provisional and modest response to
an issue which humbly waits for the improved and definitive version from a
UHDO VFLHQFH 3KLORVRSK\ PXVW DSSHDO WR PHWKRGLFDO GRXEW WR VWULFW DQG
31

patient debate and reasoning, to always again considering and refining the
same idea and taking into account that the place from which doubt arises also
JLYHVVKDSHWRWKHGRXEW)RULQVWDQFHLI,SRVLWWKHWKHVLVSHRSOHWKHVHGD\V
DUHVWXSLGWKHQ,DVVXPHWKDW,FDQWDNHDSHUVSHFWLYHIURPZKLFK,FDQYLHZ
all people and that I as I am passing judgment on everyone else am
immune from that judgment. I thereby position myself outside or above the
rest of the world and find myself in a situation that is unbelievably self-certain:
as I am questioning the intelligence of all of mankind, I am the clever one who
is left unscathed by this criticism. Doubt and certainty make for dubious
bedfellows here. This is also why philosophy attempts to not only sow doubt
on the object of knowledge but also on the subject of the one who articulates
this knowledge. If I doubt everything, I cannot do otherwise than apply this
doubt to my position, at least if I want to reason consistently.

32

Doubt
Philosophical modernity was born from the issue I just outlined. French
SKLORVRSKHU5HQp'HVFDUWHVZDVWKHRQHZKRVHPHWKRGLFDOGRXEWDUUived at
the bare fact that, while he doubted everything, it could not be otherwise than
that he doubted at that very moment. This led him to the certainty that he
H[LVWHG ZKLOH KH GRXEWHG -H SHQVH GRQF MH VXLV KDV EHFRPH RQH RI WKH
most well-known philosophical one-liners, but as facilely as we pronounce
that sentence, so complex is its line of reasoning. Cartesian doubt not only
concerns the object of knowledge, but also and above all the finite subject
that doubts.
When push comes to shove, you are nowhere in philosophy, so it
seems. In contrast to science, which constantly builds up its knowledge,
philosophy seem to opt for the opposite by always having to, and wanting to,
begin again: doubt, scepticism, uncertainty, problematizing, questioning, and
so on. Philosophy is an exercise in doubting everything as forcefully and as
hyperbolically as possible: what is knowledge, how should society be
organized, what is art, and so on. What philosophy doubts most, however, is
itself. It is never assured of its own question, let alone that it has a readymade answer to offer to the question. Philosophy asks impossible questions
DQG SUHIHUV WR DVN WKHP LQ D ZD\ DV LPSRVVLEOH DV SRVVLEOH ,Q KLV WH[W
Violence and Metaphysics, French philosopher Jacques Derrida described
WKLV LQWHOOHFWXDO IRUP RI PDVRFKLVP DV SRVLQJ WKH TXHVWLRQ WR WKH TXHVWLRQ
(in: Derrida, 2001). With this he means that philosophizing is also and above
all thinking about itself. Doubt about the certainty of doubt thereby became a
hyperbole which ensures that we always seem to come away with less than
we originally thought.
As mentioned, philosophizing involves taking the premise from which
questions are formulated into account in the questions themselves. For
instance, if I start from the idHD , GRXEW HYHU\WKLQJ WKHQ P\ EDVLF SUHPLVH
REYLRXVO\ DOVR DSSOLHV WR WKH , WKDW SURQRXQFHV WKLV :KHQ , DP QRW
conscious of the position from which I think, I threaten to immediately head
every question off at the pass. Certain questions imply their answer in
DGYDQFH,I,DVNZK\LVWKHZRUOGOLNHWKLVRUWKDW,FDQQRWGRRWKHUZLVHWKDQ
JLYH D WKDWV ZK\ DQVZHU , REOLJH P\VHOI WR VHDUFK IRU D ILUVW FDXVH D
principle from which everything would flow, while it still must be asked if this
must be the correct answer.
33

.HHSLQJWKHTXHVWLRQWRWKHTXHVWLRQRSHQLVH[WUHPHO\LPSRUWDQWIRU
society and specifically presents itself as a form of resistance and
philosophical engagement. While it is often expected that philosophers
provide answers to every possible and impossible question, their work can
sometimes better consist in continuing to stubbornly confront us with the
LPSRVVLELOLW\ RI DUULYLQJ DW D GHILQLWLYH DQVZHU WR FHUWDLQ TXHVWLRQV ([DFW
scientists occasionally pity this philosophical doubt of everything because it
seems to cultivate uncertainty and doubt without providing a solution. Even
though there are of course many poor examples of this, I am always delighted
with a philosophy which voices its uncertainty, which does not really know if it
is right and which is in permanent crisis. This testifies more to thorough
reflection about the difficulty of speaking about certain affairs than to the fact
that it would not be an exact science though this is not to say that I am
endorsing uncertainty as an end in itself.

34

/LIHVTXHVWLRQV
A wisdom that does not know where it begins, where it ends, even whom or
what it is; a wisdom which seems to undermine itself, which continually
applies self-criticism to tear down the foundations which have been built up; it
is hard to find much of this in the new role that philosophy seems to have
assumed in recent years philosophy as a form of finding meaning and the
LGHDO PHWKRG WR ORRN IRU DQ DQVZHU WR DOO PDQQHU RI OLIHV TXHVWLRQV 7KH
argument for philosophy as a way of giving meaning to life starts from specific
way of relating to its history and textual traditions. At most, the history of
philosophy is a museological archive from which people pluck ideas to their
KHDUWVFRQWHQWDQGPDWFKWKHPWR a contemporary format. Philosophy then
EHFRPHV WKLQNLQJ DERXW OLIHV TXHVWLRQV RU PRUDO LVVXHV IDFLQJ XV QRZ DQG
together, democratically and dialogically, finding an answer to them. The
entire body of historical texts, the written report of what philosophy has been
up to until now, however, does not fit with this or has even become
superfluous. The history of philosophy is thereby seen from an exclusively
moral perspective. In short, philosophy not only has meaning, it provides
meaning. Or again: philosophy encourages wisdom, or it is not.
The question of course is not which issues or authors may or may not
be addressed. Questions of meaning obviously matter, so why not consider
them as well? An entirely different story is why reading Plato would indeed
lHDGRQHWRDFWPRUDOO\:K\UHGXFHSKLORVRSK\WRDPRQJHURIOLIHVOHVVRQV"
The discussion about this is rather fundamental in nature: is philosophy
something of which I can avail as a person to make me wiser or live better, or
is philosophy a question whLFKFRPHVIURPHOVHZKHUHDQGZLWKZKLFK,DQG
my knowledge do not know what to do? Not that the one necessarily excludes
the other, but it seems difficult to avoid a choice. Allow me to broach the
dilemma with a question: if philosophy must limit itself to the role of trailblazer
for moral affairs, have we then not left the inquisitive and problematizing
nature of philosophy behind in exchange for a self-assured platform from
which we only ensure our life needs? Or again, if you use philosophy as a
toolbox for moral issues, has it then shrunk to a sort of methodology, a form
of philosophical process management which either arouses the suggestion of
a time when one can arrive at oneself in total peace and wisdom, or which
sends the equally self-assured message that this day will never come and
that we will have to learn to live with (the certainty of) uncertainty, and once
we can do that, will be wise?

35

Allow me to tackle the reasoning of my answer formally and return to

what I wrote above concerning doubt. Methodical doubt sits atop the
philosophical agenda, as I suggested earlier, even if it is only because certain
questions imply their own answer ahead of time. Philosophical questioning
therefore entails including the basic premises from which people ask
questions when considering those questions themselves.
If philosophy now should merely encourage one to act morally, this
doubt is nowhere to be found. Doubt is at best a methodically employed
toolbox with which to consider oneself, but is not to be applied to the question
of why philosophy should lead to moral action. The presupposition that I as a
person can use my moral preference as a criterion in the choice of theories is
nevertheless embedded in a certain social context. This context is clearly
liberDO GHPRFUDF\ ZKHUH DQ LQGLYLGXDO FKRRVHV KLV RU KHU YDOXHV LQ DOO
freedom and such that philosophy, together with other instances, must play a
supporting and clarifying role in the difficulty of fulfilling this task day in day
out.
If this context, if the framework from which we think and act is not
addressed, unless seemingly, then philosophical inquiry as a whole is
washed away and can only still present itself as a moral dashboard.
Furthermore, philosophy is then already handed over to the platitudes of soft
values WROHUDQFHUHVSHFWIRURWKHUV- which are never up for discussion.
After that, all you can do is announce your moral indignation about, for
instance, the lack of tolerance in our society or about other moral questions,
but this is where it stops. This while philosophical reflection about, for
example, tolerance at the very least begins with the fundamental question of
what tolerance is, why we can or should be tolerant and what it means when
we say that we are tolerant. In which case it also concerns discussions about
the social and political framework in which the issue of tolerance is asked.
None of this is addressed when you limit yourself to pointing out moral issues
or announcing your moral indignation. Proclaiming the morally scandalous
character of something is one thing moral indignation; thinking through the
issues involved, however philosophical reflection is something else.
Whether an issue is moral, or leads to certain values or not, does not
have to be the primary concern of philosophy. Its perspective is to fathom and
unravel questions and issues irrespective of moral connotations or political
correctness. Therefore, philosophy may, but does not have to lead to moral
action. My defence of tenacious philosophy is expressly motivated by this: it
resists the tendency to yield too quickly to the pressure of assuming that
36

philosophy is one or another politically correct guise which offers expertise in

exchange for its servitude.
This tenacity is not a quality of a morally sound person called
SKLORVRSKHUEXWKDVHYHU\WKLQJWRGRZLWKWKHWHQDFLW\RIWKRXJKWLWVHOI6LQFH
every pursuit of truth never knows for sure if it will arrive at the truth, one
cannot do otherwise than not dismiss the question too easily. Consequently,
in philosophy, it does not matter if my question is answered quickly, and
whether I can use that answer to discover meaning in my life. Philosophical
inquiry in effect places me outside the framework of my personal meaning
and I am not talking about learning to put your own convictions in perspective
by confronting them with others, as is propagated in many courses.
By qualifying your position as just another position, the content of the
inquiry no longer matters, but only the psychology or methodology of daring
WRDVN\RXUVHOITXHVWLRQV)RULQVWDQFHWKHTXHVWLRQZK\LVWKHUHVRPHWKLQJ
UDWKHUWKDQQRWKLQJGRHVQRWFHQWUHRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZI can live with this
something or nothing or on what it would have to do with me. This question
concerns tKH IDFW WKDW WKLV , DOUHDG\ is before it asks itself the question; it
concerns the being of that something. The absolute nature of the question
escapes the content of my life, placing me outside myself rather than bringing
me closer to myself.
If a moral task would be assigned to contemporary philosophy, it seems
to me to be this: it should not have to answer to the previously mentioned
reduction to giving meaning and acting morally, even if only to be able to
subject the sharp rise in this demand and the presupposition that mankind is
an autonomous provider of meaning to thorough reflection. This issue can be
summarized under the broad category of the demand for meaning or for
purpose: the demand for the foundation by which or from which something
existV)RXQGDWLRQLQWXUQPHDQVWKDWwhereby something exists and not why
something exists. This difference is crucial. Determining what makes existing
possible is something other than looking for an answer to the why of all this.
The latter would not only concern investigation into a first cause from which
everything arises, but would likewise imply the search for a reason for the
H[LVWHQFHRIWKDWVULJKWWKHPHDQLQJRIHYHU\WKLQJ:HJLYHPHDQLQJWRRXU
existence. Nobody seems to contest that. Finding meaning forms a large
share of each of our lives and one would be inclined to say: increasingly so.
More than in the past, our society provides the opportunity to give meaning to
our own lives, our existence. A very different question is whether the task of
philosophy is to take part in giving meaning to my existence. The
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI TXHVWLRQV VXFK DV GRHV OLIH KDYH PHDQLQJ PD\ in se be
37

philosophical questions, but the way one answers these questions is not
necessarily philosophical. Should philosophy assign itself the exclusive task
of looking for or providing meaning, then it answers in advance every
question of meaning. Then the question of meaning already closes its own
DQVZHUZLWKLQLWVHOIDQGOLNHDQLQILQLWHVXEMHFWJLYHVLWVZRUOGPHDQLQJIrom
outside. And the next section treats of this (in-)finitude.

38

Finitude
7KH ZRUG ILQLWXGH KDV DOUHDG\ EHHQ PHQWLRQHG D QXPEHU RI WLPHV ZLWKRXW
really explaining what this issue means for contemporary philosophy and for
our age. In a discussion among philosophers, it is more often remarked that
ZH KDYH WR WKLQN DERXW ILQLWXGH %XW ZKDW GRHV WKLV PHDQ WKLQNLQJ DERXW
ILQLWXGH" $QG ZK\ ILQLWXGH UDWKHU WKDQ LQILQLWXGH" $QG LI ZH WKLQN DERXW
finitude, must not our discussion of finitude moreover be finite?
Finitude is of course one of the central issues of the twentieth century, a
century which nevertheless started off very ambitiously. A great many
projects were started with the intention of organizing the various building
blocks of knowledge from ground zero and to bring them to a large synthesis
in the hope of, in this way, arriving at a comprehensive and coherent image of
reality. This ambition continued to exist until late in the twentieth century. The
DWWHPSW WR DFKLHYH LQVLJKW LQWR DOO WKDW LV Dnd to describe it, call it the preeminent philosophical project, also ended up in failure time after time in the
prior century. Either it turned out that the language in which we had to say it
was not univocal enough to reduce it to elementary statements and in this
way to construct knowledge atomically and layer by layer. Or it became clear
that reality was much more complex than anticipated, despite how many
disciplines were brought together to arrive at a synthesis. Even the preeminent science, mathemaWLFVWXUQHGRXWWREHXQGHFLGHG7KHWKHRUHPVRI
logician and mathematician Gdel (1906-1978), to wit, have demonstrated
that mathematics is incomplete.11 This means that in every collection of
mathematical statements, in every formal system, there is always a
mathematical theorem which cannot be proven or be deduced thus an
undecided statement.
At the same time, with and perhaps because of the (failed) ambition to
synthesize knowledge, the twentieth century is characterized by a dismantling
and even a demolition of old, philosophical or metaphysical systems. This
demolition did not so much come from outside; rather it was a movement
internal to philosophy itself. Earlier in the text, I claimed that the history of
philosophy is characterized by relentless self-criticism. Our age is a good
example of this and is known as the age in which philosophy definitively
collided with its finitude, even with its end. Terms such as temporariness,
boundedness or incompleteness take centre stage in the philosophical corpus
of the last half century.


6HH'HVWHOOLQJYDQ*|GHOE\-HDQ3DXO9DQ%HQGHJHPLQ:LMVJHULJSHUVSHFWLHI

39

Nevertheless, finitude is not a characteristic of our age alone.

Christianity never did otherwise than stress the finitude or mortality of the
human being, in contrast to the infinitude of the divine Lawmaker. Human
finitude in this context is a lack, non-infinitude and is always a watered-down
version of the infinitude of the Creator to which humanity turns its focus.
Christianity describes man as a finite and insignificant being by referring to
the omnipotence and infinitude of the divine being from which it is created
and with which it ultimately desires to coincide. Stated otherwise, finitude is
here thought from infinitude.

40

Infinitely finite
Finitude is thus not a specific characteristic of our age. The difference today
is primarily the position from which finitude is discussed, namely, no longer as
a shortcoming which makes mankind relate to a transcendent authority from
which he would obtain his meaning or lack thereof. Finitude means precisely
that the human being considers its limitedness, its inevitably partial
perspective on the world as a positive fact. Consequently, finitude is not a
shortcoming to be lifted or something that is announced as a prior incarnation
of a stage that will ultimately be reached, but is the constitutive basis from
which people exist. We are only capable of living from the perspective of finite
space and time.
The philosopher who thoroughly described constitutive finitude is
Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, human knowledge comes about through
the fact that sensible perceptions are ordered by our reason and, by
synthesizing these impressions, can lead to understanding and judgment.
7KH D SULRUL IRUPV RI UHDVRQ DV KH VR EHDXWLIXOO\ GHVFULEHV LW IRUP DV LV
were screen through which the world is accessible to us. The most wellNQRZQRIWKHVHFDWHJRULHVDUHVSDFHDQGWLPHZHDUHDOZD\VLQDFHUWDLQ
place (space) and a certain moment (time) and precisely this allows the
ordering of sensible intuitions. We can only arrive at knowledge and we can
only be because we are finite, because we are not always and everywhere at
the same time. Finitude constitutes us.
In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger emphasized the worldliness
RIWKHKXPDQVXEMHFWHYHQPRUHVWURQJO\WKDQ.DQW+HLGHJJHr did not like to
use the term subject, but opts for the word there-being (Dasein). According to
Heidegger, Dasein is not a subject over against objects; it does not situate
itself in the world, but is always already there, exposed in and to a world.
Dasein is always thrown into a world, a throw of which it is itself not the
foundation, and which constitutes the finitude of man. Paradoxically enough,
this implies that man is infinitely finite, that he does not have complete control
of his own existence. Consequently, thinking finitude presupposes an
essential and actual boundedness of the human being, and that one cannot
FRQVLGHU RQHV ILQLWXGH DV D VRUW RI UHWXUQ RQHVHOI DIWHU D ORQJ MRXUQH\ RI
alienation in the other, the infinite, or whatever. Finitude means that the
human being does not arrive at itself, does not coincide with itself, has no
GHILQLWLYHJULSRQLWVRZQH[LVWHQFHDQGLVLQILQLWHO\ILQLWH
In other words, finitude as such does not have to do with a particular
PRGHVWRUUHODWLYL]LQJDWWitude toward existence. This again brings me to the
41

question of relativism, one of the greatest misunderstandings in the context of

the issue of finitude. According to some, finitude would mean that everything
is relative, is seen from an always limited perspective and thus is equivalent
to moral modesty. Philosophy, is that not a question of learning to relativize?
/HDUQLQJ WR SKLORVRSKL]H GRHV WKDW QRW PHDQ WKDW \RX SODFH WKLQJV LQ WKH
ULJKWFRQWH[WDQGUHFRJQL]HWKHUHODWLYLW\RIWKLVFRQWH[W"$QGILQally, is all of
WKLVQRWDQH[HUFLVHLQOLVWHQLQJWRRQHDQRWKHUDQGOHDUQLQJWRSXWRQHVRZQ
convictions in perspective; in short, a perfect lubricant for our democracy?
The real villains would then be those who still dare to speak about truth:
pretentious philosophers and metaphysicians who have understood nothing
of this. Those who adopt an attitude of caution, moderation and modesty will
realize what finitude is about. Finitude would be a question of moral attitude.
Not only is the above position problHPDWLFEHFDXVHLWFRPSOHWHO\PRUDOL]HV
the philosophical scene, the pretensions of modesty are furthermore as
absolute as can be. Like someone professing to pronounce the truth about a
SDUWLFXODU SUREOHP WKH PRGHVWRU PRGHUDWH SKLORVRSKHU NQRZV MXVW Ds well
and just as absolutely that the truth about an issue cannot be pronounced by
anyone, or that every truth is relative. There is nothing finite about this
NQRZLQJ EHFDXVH WKH VXEMHFW IURP ZKLFK ILQLWXGH LV DUWLFXODWHG LV LWVHOI QRW
taken into account when speaking about it. It professes something about
finitude from a position that transcends finitude. The status of the knowledge
RI WKLV LQILQLWH VXEMHFW LV QRW LQ WKH OHDVW DIIHFWHG E\ VRPHWKLQJ OLNH WKH
finitude of knowledge.
$ILQLWHSKLORVRphy is not so much characterized by stripping itself of its
position, but by thinking a question through to the end with a tenacious,
almost hyperbolic logic. Only with this tenacity is it possible to penetrate and
analyse an issue, or sharpen the existing analysis of it. Relativizing is just
about the last thing that comes to mind here, as one can obstinately defend
WKHXOWLPDWHSRVLWLRQRQHGUDZVIURPRQHVTXHVWDVORQJDVYDOLGDUJXPHQWV
are available. Tenaciously defending something does not mean holding fast
to an opinion at all costs when it turns out to be wrong or inconsistent.
Precisely the search for arguments and pointed debate about a question
make an issue interesting, and revising a position possible. Conversely,
immediately invoking the relativity of all opinions quashes all debate a priori.
When everything is easily interchangeable or disposable, there is little to
exchange.

42

Logic of infinitude
We cannot be anything but finite. At the same time, and just as often, we
observe that we seldom provide this finitude a central place in our thought
and action: when we aspire to knowledge, we want to know as much and as
objectively as possible; when we establish a society, we do so in function a of
particular, established goal which we pursue at any cost; we want a rationally
designed and simultaneously free society with as much happiness as
possible for the greatest number of people possible, and so on. In this pursuit
of a particular destination, finitude is always under pressure, as the twentieth
century has made so abundantly clear.
When you select one field, namely the field of politics, then it is
immediately clear that we cannot just brush aside the inheritance of the
SXUVXLW RI LQILQLWXGH LQ DQ LQVWDQW 7ZHQWLHWK-century politics was primarily
characterized by the rise and fall of three great totalitarian systems:
communism, fascism and Nazism. The three systems were totalitarian
because at a certain stage they compulsorily and violently mobilized entire
societies in function of a particular objective, without taking into account the
rights and freedoms of the individuals of those societies. They did this in
sometimes very divergent ways, and it is therefore impossible to simply
equate them. What these systems do share with one another is the logic by
which they operated. This logic of infinitude starts out from a particular, fixed
WUXWK DERXW VRFLHW\ SHRSOH NQRZ ZKDW D VRFLHW\ LV DQG ZKDW LW VKRXOG ORRN
like. This knowledge is absolute, eternal and thus infinite. It is not concerned
with the finite, temporary or changing nature of society. Once this infinite truth
has been established as a presupposed objective, nothing will obstruct
realization of the truth. People must and will see the truth and at that moment
the happiness of society will be definitively achieved: a free and communist
society, a Thousand Year Reich, and so on. A univocal and delineable path
thus runs from the idea of how a society should be to the final realization of
this idea. Once we know how society should look, we must adapt our
activities entirely to its realization and eliminate everything which could
obstruct this realization.
A totalitarian society is conceived as a definitive and defined whole. No
foreign element disturbs its self-presence. In order to be certain that it only
contains itself, it must install infinite control to monitor whether indeed nothing
escapes or transcends society. It must be able to monitor at every moment if
this is the case, right down to the very smallest particles of society. Every
element which disturbs the course of development of the ideal society must
43

be cleared away, such that every time again it takes another step closer to its
objective. This ultimately ends up in a paranoid logic, in which everyone
becomes a potential enemy of the regime. Even the perfect servants of the
UHJLPH PXVW EH VXVSHFWHG IRU SHUKDSV WKH\ DUH RQO\ IDNLQJ WKHLU OR\DOW\
while they are actually pursuing their own or other interests.

44

,OIDXW
Why finitude takes centre stage on the philosophical boards today thus in part
KDV WR GR ZLWK SROLWLFDO WHUURU DV RXWOLQHG DERYH 3KLORVRSKLFDO HQJDJHPHQW
may then lie primarily in continuing to confront us with other questions, rather
than just reconfirming the existing consensus. One can describe this
engagement aVDSDUWLFXODUGXW\DQRXJKW,I,DPWDONLQJDERXWSKLORVRSK\
as praxis, this has everything to do with it: acquiring the knowledge required
to address a wide range of social, political, theoretical and other questions
which appeal to us and which we cannot avoid, unless we look the other way.
3KLORVRSK\V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ PD\ FRQVLVW LQ QRW DYRLGLQJ WKHVH LVVXHV EXW LQ
actually studying and analysing them, and so forth. This ought or this duty
does not at all mean philosophy would only be concerned with ethical
questions. If that were the case, philosophy would be nothing more than a
place of consensus and political correctness. For example, it would defend
positions about democracy, multiculturalism or about tolerance for otherness.
Or it would confine itself to expressing personal moral indignation concerning
the functioning of democracy, such that the framework of liberal democracy
as such is never open for discussion.
Rather than just switching to a defence of a particular form of society,
the engagement of a philosopher thus lies in his philosophical labour.
Fathoming an issue is completely independent of its ethical connotations.
7KXV WKLQNLQJ DERXW IDVFLVP LV DQ HQJDJHPHQW LUUHVSHFWLYH RI KRZ
reprehensible fascism was. The easiest intellectual option with the problem of
fascism is to repudiate it on moral grounds. The starting point of philosophical
praxis is that we switch to an analysis of the issues which manifest
themselves (in our time). Perhaps it is therefore appropriate to speak of a
philosophical duty, a must. This must, this il faut as it is concisely formulated
in French, confronts philosophy with a problem. This duty is not an ethics
which thought can appropriate and in itself does not constitute an ethics, but
on the contrary precedes every ethics and places the philosopher before his
responsibility. This corresponds to what I described earlier with Derrida as the
question to the question: the obligation to ask questions, to preserve,
continue and keep the question open. This obligation as it were drives the
philosopher forward in his labour. Thinking about an issue therefore is
equivalent to the relentless and critical analysis of a fundamental issue,
irrespective of its moral connotations.
This is less sombre than it seems at first glance. Philosophy is the place
or the event by which a number of issues are not closed off in advance and
45

provided with an answer, but on the contrary, where they are posed as radical
questions. Even if they thereby wish to avoid every a priori answer to a
SDUWLFXODU TXHVWLRQ TXHVWLRQLQJ LV QRW DQ REMHFWLYH LQ LWVHOI ,Q WKDW FDVH
philosophy would be confined to the hysterical development of an endless
succession of questions, in order to then be assured that it knows their nonanswer. Even the certainty of this non-NQRZOHGJH FDQQRW VHUYH D ILQLWH
philosophy.

46

Philosophy as praxis
Generally speaking, one would expect that greater insight would lead to
better or more refined action. Not that more knowledge automatically leads to
better action, but would less knowledge do so? Thinking about fundamental
or everyday problems is just as necessary as specific policy. In this sense,
philosophy is indeed praxis, a manner of acting and getting along in and with
the world. The demand that all thought must be replaced by action fails to
take this into account. By assuming that thought does not lead to decisions
and is therefore wrong in principle closes off many options. Karl Marx, for
example, demanded a stop to the interpretation of texts, because ultimately
we must change the world.12 The political history of the twentieth century
unambiguously shows that we should think more than ever about this
obligation, and that back then, they perhaps should have given it more
thorough and longer consideration.
In this sense I indeed argue for a tenacious, non-compliant philosophy,
a philosophical praxis which does not simply allow it to be seduced into
immediate action or ad hoc acts of service. A tenacious philosophy cannot
just speak on behalf the only really true philosophy. I may, for instance, make
a statement about philosophy in these pages and argue for tenacious
philosophy, but this essay is not written for or on the behalf of philosophy; it
intends rather to not exclude a certain form of philosophy ahead of time or to
not too quickly consider a certain discourse of truth as behind us. Truth is and
remains an issue. Philosophy might pursue it, but never possesses it. Like
HYHU\RQHLWGHVLUHVWRNQRZWKHWUXWKRUWRDSSURSULDWHLWEXWLVQHYHUDVLQ
HIIHFWQRRQHLVLQWKHSODFHRIWUXWKLWVHOI
This is why nobody resides in the ivory tower today. Truth has been, so
to say, democratized: it belongs to everyone and therefore no one, and this is
precisely why it is interesting to discuss it. We can strive to attain it only
EHFDXVHWKHWUXWKLVQRWHVWDEOLVKHGEXWLVRSHQWRGLVFXVVLRQ7KHIDLOXUHRI
metaphysics discussed above and the issue of finitude which animates
contemporary philosophy can therefore be a weapon to time and again
frustrate every hope for a definitive arrival at the truth. This has nothing to do
with the certainty that only philosophy would know that truth cannot exist
that would be extremely pretentious but with the perspective from which it


7KLVLVDWOHDVWZKDWKHVD\VLQWKHWK7KHVLVRQ)HXHUEDFK3KLORVRSKHUVKDYHRQO\
LQWHUSUHWHGWKH:RUOGLQYDULRXVZD\VWKHSRLQWLVWRFKDQJHLWLQ.DUO0DU[ 
)ULHGULFK(QJHOV:HUNH%DQG%HUOLQ'LHW]9HUODJS

47

attempts to understand humankind. Even if our desire for the truth is infinite,
we who desire it are irrevocably finite.
What does all of this impart to us about the ivory tower, the metaphor
around which this essay is woven? Just as Kant was of the opinion that
finitude is constitutive for human thought, action and judgment, in a certain
sense the ivory tower, the UHIXJH RI WKH QHFN RI WKH PDLGHQ is also
constitutive for desire for the truth. It therefore serves us well to remember the
ambivalent context of meaning of the ivory tower: we desire to enter the ivory
tower of truth, but are denied access to it. And while desire for truth is
stubborn, the gates of the tower in which the question of truth lives is equally
so.
Truth and reason are extremely difficult. Before you even realize it, your
own words have turned against you. Any talk of truth, for example, threatens
to speak in the name of truth. That is no different for my utterances in this
essay: the remark about not speaking on behalf of philosophy was in this
sense also a warning to myself and demands very deliberate navigation
between many pitfalls. It is certainly possible that, while I attempted to avoid a
number of pitfalls, I did not notice some others. Thus the use of the word
HVVD\LQWKHVXEWLWOHWUDQVODWHGOLWHUDOO\IURP)UHQch: an attempt, an initiative
to clarify that truth is still active. Today, truth seems embedded in a culture
which apparently does not know what to do with its abandonment of a pure,
objective truth, and then threatens to pass off all truths as subjectivist and
thus relative. One can therefore understand relativism as a form of nostalgia:
the relativist is so disappointed that there is no pure and univocal truth that,
by abstaining from it, immediately declares everything relative. By relativizing
it, however, you let go of the problem of truth before you have thoroughly
studied it.
If philosophy, on the contrary, is characterized by a tenacious,
hyperbolic logic to think a question through to the end, then this is primarily
because tenaciousness can create the conditions for fathoming an issue or
refining the existing analysis of it. Relativizing or giving meaning is therefore
the last thing you can bear in mind, as the eventual position that you derive
IURPDQDQDO\VLVGHVHUYHVWREHGHIHQGHGDVORQJDs more valid arguments
are not available. Tenaciously defending something does not mean holding to
an opinion at any cost. Precisely the search for arguments and pointed
debates about them makes an issue interesting. In other words, only that
which can be discussed leads to discussion. And despite the so-called
complex and obscure times in which we live, thought has not become an
impossible affair, even if truth is likely never just there for the taking.
48

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De Nederlandsche Boekhandel: Antwerpen
Derrida, J. (2001). Writing and difference. London and New York, Routledge
Fox, M.V. (1985) The Song of Songs and the ancient Egyptian love songs.
The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin
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Horine S.C. (2001), Interpretative images in the Song of Songs: From
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Stoop-Van Paridon, P.W. Th. (2003), Het lied der liederen. Een filologische
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