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JENSON V. EVELETH TACONITE CO.

This case, the first sexual harassment class action to reach federal court, determined whether the
person appointed to determine the damages owed to victims of workplace sexual harassment
committed legal errors in his discovery report.
Full Case Title: Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997)
Year: 1997
Legal Momentun's Role: Contributed Amicus Brief
Brief: This case was the first sexual harassment class action to reach federal court. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the Special Master appointed to determine the damages
owed to victims of workplace sexual harassment committed legal errors in his discovery report;
specifically, he claimed that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that sexual harassment
caused them mental harm, yet he refused to allow the plaintiffs any expert testimony to prove
their emotional harm. The Eighth Circuit remanded and required a new jury trial. The case was
eventually settled with $3.5 million awarded to the plaintiffs.

MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO V. ROGELIO I.


RAYALA
Rayala argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA7877. In particular, he assails the definition
of the forms of sexualharassment:
Forms of Sexual Harrasment:
Section 1.
Forms of Sexual Harassment. - Sexualharassment may be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but notlimited to going out on dates, outings or the like
for the samepurpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally
annoying,disgusting or offensive to the victim.
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand,request, or requirement do not constitute
sexual harassment ascontemplated by the law. He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the
employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only toprocedural matters. The law did not delegate to the
employer thepower to promulgate rules which would provide other or additionalforms of sexual
harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual harassment.

NARVASA V. SANCHEZ JR.


Facts:

-Three women employees of the Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya filed complaints for
sexualharassment against the municipal assessor Benjamin Sanchez Jr.
-These were the acts of harassment committed by respondent:
a. against Mary Gay dela Cruz- giving notes saying, I like you, and sending a text message
whichsays, Mary Gay.. ang tamis ng halik mo.
b. against Zenaida Gayaton- sending text messages such as: pauwi ka na ba sexy?, I like
you,have a date with me, I slept and dreamt nice things about you
c. against Teresa Narvasa- respondent pulled her towards him and attempted to kiss her
-Mayor Marvic Padilla found respondent guilty for the three complaints for sexual harassment.
Hewas meted out the penalties of reprimand for his 1stoffense and 30 days suspension for his
2ndoffense. However, as regards his third offense which is also against Narvasa, he was deemed
tohave committed grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed from government
service.
-Sanchez appealed to the CSC who only passed upon the decision on the case filed by
Narvasasince the penalty of reprimand and suspension for not more than 30 days cannot be
appealed.
TheCSC affirmed the penalty of dismissal. However, upon appeal to the CA, the same courtdow
ngraded the offense to simple misconduct and meted the appeal to suspension for one monthand
a day.
Issue: WON the sexual harassment committed by Sanchez against Narvasa constitutes grave
or simple misconduct.
Held and Ratio:
-It constitutes grave misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violationof a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct shouldrelate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
-Respondents acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt,
intentional.Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were much
more aggressive, itwas impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped
him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship
that might have justifiedhis attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their
companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons),
respondent not only took his marital statuslightly, he also ignored petitioners married state, and
good character and reputation.
-Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is
adouble-edged sword. In fact, respondents long years of government service should be seen as

afactor which aggravated the wrong that he committed. Having been in the government service
for so long, he, more than anyone else, should have known that public service is a public trust;
thatpublic service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline, and, as such, a public servant
mustexhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity.

BACSIN V. WAHIMAN
G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School. Respondent Eduardo
O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand.
Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and
place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then
touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that she felt
afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident,
testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was
handing AAA a lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three
seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.
CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed
him from the service. Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have committed an act
constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7877, the AntiSexual Harassment Act of 1995.
CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioners right to due process, and based on its
finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that
right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with disgraceful and immoral
conduct and misconduct, the CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved
petitioners guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.
Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as Grave
Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), different from that specified in the formal charge
which was Misconduct. He further argues that the offense of Misconduct does not include
the graver offense of Grave Misconduct.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Sexual Harassment

HELD: The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or
stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.
The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of
mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under
Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is
committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the
time petitioner touched her.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of fondling one of his
students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner
cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple misconduct.
He is dismissed from service
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge
against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he
defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with
precision is of no moment in this administrative case.

GERONIMO ORDINARIO V. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES AND COURTOF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 155415, May 20, 2004)
FACTS:
The case before this Court relates to an affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the joint
decision, dated 20 October 1999, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
138, in Criminal Cases No. 99-299 to No. 99-310, inclusive, convicting petitioner Geronimo
Ordinario, on twelve (12) counts, of having committed punishable acts under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code. The indictments, under twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the
City Prosecutor of Makati City on 26 February 1999, were uniformly worded, except with regard
to the date of commission of the offenses.

Complainant Jayson Ramos and accused-appellant were student and teacher, respectively,
at Nicanor Garcia Elementary School during the time the alleged crime was perpetrated. Jayson
was then a fourth-grader and accused-appellant was his teacher in Boy Scout. In the same
manner, Accused-appellant ordered Jayson to strip off. Bare to the skin, accused-appellant
approached Jayson and started kissing him all over his body including his male organ.
Thereafter, accused-appellant inserted his private part into the mouth of Jayson.
The counsel of the accused interposed the defense of alibi on the part of the Jayson,
presenting several witnesses particularly on the account of the time of commission and the place
of the commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinario is liable for the crime of rape under 266-A of the Revised Penal code?
RULINGS:
The defense of alibi might prosper if it is at least shown (1) that the accused is in another
place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (2) that it would have been physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime sceneor within its immediate vicinity.Alibi cannot
be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but it also does not on its face
demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accuseds presence at the place and time of the
commission of the offense.Appellant himself has admitted that while his class would end at one
oclock in the afternoon, he occasionally would still go back to school late in the afternoon to
oversee the schools poultry project.
The definition of the crime of rape has been expanded with the enactment of Republic
Act No. 8353, otherwise also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, to include not only "rape by
sexual intercourse" but now likewise "rape by sexual assault." Section 2 of the law provides:
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified
as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title
Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as
follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. Rape Is Committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise


unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
"(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shallcommit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, convicting petitioner Geronimo Ordinario
of rape by sexual assault on twelve (12) counts, and sentencing him therefor, is affirmed with
modification in that petitioner Geronimo Ordinario is ordered to pay private
complainant P25,000.00 civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages for each count of rape
by sexual assault. The award of exemplary damages is deleted. Costs against petitioner.

PEOPLE V. QUINTOS
The intellectual disability of the witness does not make her testimony incredible, especially when
corroborated by other evidence
When a victim's testimony is credible and sufficiently establishes the elements of the crime, it
may be enough basis to convict an accused of rape.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice,

or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person (Republic Act No.
8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997).
Thus, to be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs to be
shown that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another,
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) The victim is deprived of reason;
c) The victim is unconscious;
d) By means of fraudulent machination;
e) By means of grave abuse of authority;
f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or
g) When the victim is demented.
In this case, AAA made a spontaneous and unadorned testimony in court about the fact, the
manner, and the circumstances of the male accused's sexualintercourse with her over a period of
days. She was also able to positively identify the accused, when asked. (People v. Quintos y
Badilla, G.R. No. 199402, [November 12, 2014])

PEOPLE V. JAMANDRON
The assertion of appellants that it was the stepfather of Rowena who abused her impresses the court as a
desperate but lame attempt to divert the attention of the court to another person who, because of his
relationship and proximity to the rape victim, could be suspected of getting sexually attracted to her.
Rowena herself vehemently denies any sexual harrassment by her stepfather whom she considers as a
kind and good parent. Nonetheless, if the above-mentioned imputation of appellants were true, the Court
finds no reason why Rowena would vent her anger at two innocent persons, and for no reason whatsoever,
to the extent of filing charges against them and exposing herself to the rigours and disgraceful
consequences of a public trial.||| (People v. Jamandron, G.R. Nos. 80226-27, [October 13, 1989], 258-A
PHIL 250-259)