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Mendoza, Glenn S.

PERSONS case digests: Mallion vs. Alcantara to Garcia vs. Sangil;
Psychological Incapacity to Donation by Reason of Marriage
Cases on Psychological Incapacity:
1. Mallion vs. Alcantara. G. R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006. 506
SCRA 336.
Facts: On October 24, 1995, Oscar P. Mallion (petitioner) filed a
petition with the RTC, Br. 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Editha Alcantara (respondent) under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After
trial, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11, 1997, for
failure to adduce preponderance of evidence. Appeal was also dismissed by
the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated June 11, 1998 for failure of
petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 became final, petitioner
filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of San Pablo City, but this time, based on a different ground, to
wit: their marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license, and
therefore such marriage is null and void. Respondent, on the other hand,
filed an answer dated August 13, 1999, with a prayer for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of res jusdicata and forum shopping. The RTC ruled in
favor of respondent. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an
order dated January 21, 2000.
Issue: Whether or not a previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a
subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the
rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit."
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
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namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 49 of the Rules of Court outlines the dual
aspect of res judicata. Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as bar by
prior judgment or estoppels by verdict, which is the effect of a judgment
as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand
or cause of action. On the other hand, section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata
in its concept as conclusiveness of judgment or otherwise known as the
rule of auter auction pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different cause of action. Res judicata in its
concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an orderon the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and
the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites.
What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test
to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an
identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the
same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered
the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the
application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case.
2. Santos vs. CA. G. R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995. 58 SCAD 17.
Facts: Leouel Santos (petitioner) first met Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
(private respondent) in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married
before the MTC Judge Cornelion G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
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thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with private respondents
parents. Private respondent gave birth to a son in 1987 named Leouel
Santos, Jr. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference
of private respondents parents as averred by petitioner. The couple also
occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when and wherre
should they start living independently from private respondents parents. In
1988, private respondent went to the US to work as a nurse despite
petitioners opposition. 7 months later, the couples got to talk and she
promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990,
petitioner got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his
stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Petitioner, in an
effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due
to private respondents psychological incapacity. Petitioner asserted that due
to private respondents failure to return home or at least communicate with
him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Private
respondent attacked the complaint and she said that it is petitioner who is
incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between
the two. Petitioners petition is however denied by the lower and appellate
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the
case at bar.
HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code
did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the
Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than
expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The
FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term
psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological
causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
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incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave
or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although petitioner stands aggrieved, his petition
must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by
the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to the
standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
3. Yambao vs. Republic. G. R. No. 184063. January 24, 2011. 640
SCRA 355.
Facts: Cynthia and Patricio were married. After 35 years of marriage,
Cynthia filed a petition before the RTC of Makati, praying that their marriage
be declared void by reason of Patricios psychological incapacity. Cynthia
averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one
who earned a living and took care of the children. Patricio, she alleged, did
nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends. She also
claimed that, Patricio became insecure and jealous and would get mad every
time he would see her talking to other people, even to her relatives. When
Patricio started threatening to kill her, she decided to leave the conjugal
abode and live separately from him.
She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. In his answer, Patricio denied all the allegations of Cythia. The
RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The RTC
held that Cynthia's evidence failed to support her argument that Patricio was
totally unaware of and incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such
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that the marriage was void from the beginning. The trial court also rejected
the supposed negative effect of respondent's Dependent Personality
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Petitioner argues that
respondent's Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently established by
her testimony and that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible
considering that they have personal knowledge of the circumstances prior to
and during the parties' marriage. On the other hand, respondent's evidence
consisted merely of his sole testimony, which was self-serving and full of
Issue: Does the totality of Cythias evidence establish Patricios
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage?
Held: The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled
under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse
must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a
psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to
his wife and family. On the contrary, respondent's efforts, though few and far
between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for
his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was
brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some
other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in
showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings,
does not suffer from psychological incapacity. Article 36 contemplates
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a)
a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
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It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. That respondent,
according to petitioner, "lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility" does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations.
His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures,
and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or
mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological
abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent's faults amount to
psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In his psychological report, Dr.
Tolentino merely said, "[b]ecause one's personality or character is formed
early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern
of inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individual's
culture," without explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her
allegations, never explained how the alleged psychological incapacity
manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
4. Halili vs. Santos-Halili. G. R. No. 165424. June 9, 2009. 589 SCRA
Facts: Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his
marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of
his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke.
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but
maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year
later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and
started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls
telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It
was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was
not fake. Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed
personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality
disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court
a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable.
CA reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or Not he is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: The testimony of petitioners expert witness revealed that
petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. In her
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psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent
personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much
attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioners
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt
confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to
respondent was for real. Dr. Dayan further observed that petitioner typically
acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude.
This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him.
This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated,
first, by his father who treated his family like robots and, later, by respondent
who was as domineering as his father. When petitioner could no longer take
respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than
confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage. It has
been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition
that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause.
5. Marcos vs. Marcos. G. R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000. 343 SCRA
Facts: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and
they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material
support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological
incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which
Issues: Whether or not personal medical or psychological
examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show
Held: Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of
a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There
is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although
this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
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defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in
Republic v. CA and Molina.
6. Republic vs. Dagdag. G. R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001. 351
SCRA 425.
FACTS: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married
Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent
Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20,
1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino
started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear
again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking
sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they
heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,
and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990,
Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo
News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of
evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and
presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.

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The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until
January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said
manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The
Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there
was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of

evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation,
the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article
36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the
ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until
January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting
evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the
duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally
immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
ISSUE: Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers
from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?
HELD: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field
of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
In Republic vs. Molina (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
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Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda
failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda
failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause
of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts,
since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the
husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the
crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting
evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

7. Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua. G. R. No. 166738. August 14,

2009. 596 SCRA 157.
Facts: Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in
June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of
courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having
been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn
and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3,
1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived
with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most
of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels
often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found
another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed
with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship,
she alleged in her complaint: (1) That from the time of their marriage up to
their separation in July 1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter
quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part
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of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every
time they had a troublesome encounter; (2) That the main reason for their
quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and
his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable
to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987; (3) That such
psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their
marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be
continuous, permanent and incurable;
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit
himself to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who
was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found
that no collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane
Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her
petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from
Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but
significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they
were married. Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared.
The RTC annulled the marriage. While the CA reversed the RTC
8. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA. G. R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997. 78 SCAD
Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the
celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants
mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first
night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have
their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives
went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant
avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at
the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the
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same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of
this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in
Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of
Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the
medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming
Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina
does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage
declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves
her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can
still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency
and he is capable of erection.
Issue: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi s refusal to have sexual intercourse with
his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
Held: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus
constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and
wholeness of the marriage.
9. Antonio vs. Reyes. G. R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006. 484 SCRA
Facts: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36
years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did
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not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her
husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August
1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family
Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
Held: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with
them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist
and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological
incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and
letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe
that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was
sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be
difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore,
Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her
but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
10. Te vs. Te. G. R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009. 579 SCRA 193.
Facts: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.
Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already
had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened
in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward
refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,

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made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to
her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got
married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting
out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her
uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his
parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena
refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Held: The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows
in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder,
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly
shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the
persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on
account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment
and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others.
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering;
she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail
and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on
April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
11. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes. G. R. No. 185286. August 18, 2010.
628 SCRA 461.
Facts: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent
Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in 1972 when they were both 19 years old.
Petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out,
unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students
budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not
diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery
that respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976, petitioner and
respondent got married. They lived with Ramons parents and they were
supported by them. They had a child which made their financial difficulties
worse. All the business ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro
became the breadwinner of the family. To make things worse, despite the
fact that Socorro would undergo an operation for removal of a cyst,
respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the
newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany
her as she was wheeled into the operating room. They tried to attend
counseling sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner

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confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. RTC granted
the petition. CA reversed. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or Not Ramon is psychologically incapacitated
Held: Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of personal examination
and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would
result in their exclusion as evidence. In the instant case, respondents
pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job
that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of
12. Choa vs. Choa. G. R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002. 392 SCRA
Facts: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2
children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an
annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further
held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert
for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and
deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according
to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but
also to banish outside the country.
Issue: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Held: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the
trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity
of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of
discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about
three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children,
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of
these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal
or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to
identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just
established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could
possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of
evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination.

13. Dedel vs. Court of Appeals. G. R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004.
421 SCRA 461.
Facts: In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had
four children since then. David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as
a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extramarital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim,
a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David
averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the
findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from AntiSocial Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that
she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-SocialPersonality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Issue: Whether or not PI has been proven.
Held: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not
sufficient. PI is intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital obligations.
Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the
other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in
law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or
established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.
14. Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco. G. R. No. 158896. October 27,
2004. 441 SCRA 422.
15. Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano. G. R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004.
428 SCRA 735.
Facts: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987.
Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a
month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for
two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote
him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her
friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons
issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The
motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days
from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation.
Issue: Whether or not Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligation.
Held: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have
greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital
obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was
not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
16. Republic vs. CA and Molina. G. R. No. 108763. February 13,
1997. 268 SCRA 198.
Facts: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the
marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the
ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a
year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the
couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since
then he abandoned them.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Held: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and
remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such
characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological
incapacity laid set forth in this case:

Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
Such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in
complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code
Decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic
Church must be respected
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it
to act on behalf of the state.

17. Ting vs. Velez-Ting. G. R. No. 166562. March 31, 2009. 582 SCRA
18. Paz vs. Paz. G. R. No. 166579. February 18, 2010. 613 SCRA 195.
Facts: They were married in Civil and Church on July 3, 1997 and
September 21, 1997 respectively. The petitioner alleged that he was
psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage
that was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied
and self indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and
abusive. He had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit
of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. He has not
provided any financial support or visited their son since she left their
conjugal home. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration while he admits
that he failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's 13 May
2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
should not have been strictly applied against him because it took effect only
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
on 15 March 2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the trial
court's 13 May 2003 Decision.
Issue: Whether or not Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations?
Held: No. The totality of the evidence presented by Respondent failed
to show that Petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations and that such incapacity was grave, incurable,
and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage. Petitioners
alleged psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so
permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond.
19. Lim vs. Lim. G. R. No. 176464. February 24, 2010.
20. Ligeralde vs. Patalinghug. G. R. No. 168796. April 15, 2010. 618
SCRA 315.
Facts: During the marriage of Silvino observed that May was
acting immature, irresponsible and carefree. The latter admitted to the
former to having lived an adulterous life. Petitioner came to believe that
private respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner approached Dr. Tina NicdaoBasilio who performed a psychological evaluation which certified that private
essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still
young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious
and incurable.
Issue: Is Sexual Infidelity of the private respondent Tantamount to
Psychological Incapacity?
Held: May s act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
Neither Silvino s testimony nor the psychologist findings failed to
establish the root cause of private respondent s incapacity to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state. The Court stressed that the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of the evidence presented during trial.
21. Toring vs. Toring. G. R. No. 165321. August 3, 2010. 626 SCRA
Facts: Teresita and Ricardo were husband and wife. The latter filed a
petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that her wife was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their
Ricardo offered the psychological evaluation of his expert witness
psychiatrist. Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that private respondent
had Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations based on the
information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and
the couples son, Richardson. The doctor did not personally examine Teresita.
Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer.
The RTC annulled the marriage. The CA reversed the decision saying
that RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused
As psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity
already existed at the time of celebration of marriage. The CA found that the
conclusions from Dr. Albaran s psychological evaluation do not appear
to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on
hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos
allegations on Teresita s overspending and infidelity do not constitute
adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in declaring the nullity of
the marriage.
Held: No, the RTC was wrong. CA decision affirmed.
According to the Molina case, the definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of this article are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
The intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the
Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party
to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality
of the petitioners evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife.
Though the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated
spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36. However, it is still essential although from sources other than the
respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to
appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity,
permanence and incurability of the condition.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who
was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita s psychological
evaluation was Richardson, the spouses eldest son who would not have
been very reliable as a witness because he could not have been there when
the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what
was happening between his parents until long after his birth.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of
Dr. Albaran s psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the
what, how, when, where and since when of Teresita s alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating
nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the
essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good
doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and
incurable was Teresita s psychological disorder. Ricardo failed to discharge
the burden of proof to show that her wife suffered from psychological
incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail.
We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may
only be due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the
obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.
Ricardo also failed to show the adverse integral element and link
to Teresita s allegedly disordered personality. Moreover, Ricardo failed to
prove that Teresita s alleged character traits already existed at the inception
of their marriage.
Finally, the root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be
alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code. What
is not required is the expert opinion to prove the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. CA decision affirmed.
22. Marable vs. Marable. G. R. No. 178741. January 17, 2011. 639
SCRA 557.

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Mendoza, Glenn S.
Facts: Rosalino L. Marable and Myrna F. Marable were sweethearts
since they were still students at Arellano University. Later on in their
relationship, they eloped from their homes and married through civil rites
of Tanay, Rizal. Within
the same
the civil wedding, a church wedding was celebrated. They had five children.
However, after years of being together, they started to fight verbally and
aggravated when they encountered problems with their daughter who was
transferred from one school to another because of misbehavior and then
later on became pregnant untimely. Rosalino s way of spoiling their children
also was a cause of quarrels between him and his spouse, Myrna. Rosalino,
who is beginning to get worn out by their unhealthy relationship, had an
affair with another woman. When Myrna discovered it, Rosalino immediately
relationship with his mistress. The quarrels between them unfortunately
worsened and this led to Rosalino s departure from their home, leaving his
wife and children. After some time, he converted to Islam after going out
with many women. Rosalino decided to legally end his marriage with Myrna
apetition for absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of his psychologicalin
capacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He went to a
clinical psychologist to be examined for the purpose of presenting evidence
in court. Dr. Tayag, the clinical psychologist who examined him, concluded
that Rosalino is suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder which
pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness,
deceitfulness, and lack of remorse. It was said to be rooted from Rosalino s
childhood hardships due to a dysfunctional family, deep feelings of rejection,
and constant need for attention. Because of this finding, Dr. Tayag
concludedthat Rosalino was psychologically incapacitated to perform his mar
italobligations. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo rendered judgment annulli
ng themarriage of the Marable spouses. However, the Court of Appeals
thedecision of the RTC upon granting the appeal of the Office of the Solicitor
General which declared the marriage as still valid and subsisting. The Court
of Appeals held that the evidence submitted was insufficient to provepsychol
ogical incapacity. Hence this appeal.

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Mendoza, Glenn S.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
decision of the RTC which granted the annulment of marriage of the Marable
spouses based on the evidence of Rosalino s psychological incapacity.
Held: Appeal denied for lack of merit. CA decision affirmed.
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be
proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court
correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of
Rosalino s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag
merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorderbut there was no factual basis stated for the
finding that Rosalino is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, selfcentered and deceitful. For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles
and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs, as
well as their conflict son how to raise their children, are not manifestations of
incapacitywhich may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Rosalino
admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments
together. Also, the records would show that the Rosalino acted responsibly
during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his
family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect
Rosalino tried to make it appear that his family history of having awomanizer
for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital
affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became
unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather
than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to
assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of apsyc
hological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records
show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated
it. In short, Rosalino s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic
of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that
sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering
incapacity. It
mustbe shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disorder
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
ed personality which make Rosalino completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage. That not being the case with Rosalino,
his claim of psychological incapacity must fail.
It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
performance of some marital obligations.
Rather, it is essential that the
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court
of Appeals the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
psychologicalincapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
23. Ochosa vs. Alano. G. R. No. 167459. January 26, 2011. 640 SCRA
Facts: Bonas illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their
marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of
the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when
they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985,
whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the
alleged participation of the failed coup detat. He heard circulation of rumors
of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.
He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about
the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were
separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan
until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one
submitted a psychological evaluation report
interviews she had with Jose and two of his
conclusion that respondent was suffering from
and it was traceable to her family history.

of the witnesses, testified and

on Bonas mental state. The
witnesses brought her to the
histrionic personality disorder,

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Mendoza, Glenn S.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared
the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court
finds that Bonas illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently
granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.
Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Held: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were
already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Bonas alleged
psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of
juridical antecedence. Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment
are not badges of psychological incapacity nor cant it be traced to the
inception of their marriage.
The psychiatrists conclusion about Bonas HPD which made her prone
to promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose,
cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which
such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of
meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological
Dr. Rondains conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful
knowledge of Jose. No other witness testified to Bonas family history or her
behavior prior to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses
only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition directly
from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. These
factual circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to the
psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family

Cases on Void Subsequent Marriage:

1. Odayat vs. Amante. A. M. No.-58. June 2, 1977. 77 SCRA 338.
2. Yap vs. Court of Appeals. No. L-40003. October 28, 1986. 145
SCRA 229.
3. Carino vs. Carino. G. R. No. 132529. Fenruary 2, 2001. 351 SCRA
Facts: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He
had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this
time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is
already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13
days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim
the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while
Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the
P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the
subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a
valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed
that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
Issue: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked
to claim presumptive legitimes.
Held: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the
absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is
likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
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marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to
properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall
belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full
benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This
is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no
impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of
the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation
is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes
salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the
other may not have contributed at all.
4. Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis. G. R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000. 336
SCRA 747.
Facts: On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a
first marriage with Ma. Dulce B. Javier. With said marriage not yet annulled,
nullified nor terminated, he contracted a second marriage with herein
petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with
certain Julia Hernandez, thereafter. Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy
against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon City. Thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal
proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage

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as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC granted the motion,
while petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question
to a criminal case for bigamy.
Held: Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent cannot be
permitted to use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the
civil case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its
two essential elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the respondents
clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and the subsequent marriage is
equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite
usually the marriage licenseand thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
the first
on the
assumption that the
first marriage is
void. Such scenario
render nugatory
the provisions on bigamy. As
succinctly held in
Landicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA731 (1968): Parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, [as]only competent courts
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
have such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. A prejudicial question does not
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests
the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented single
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge
of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is
in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a noncriminal suit. Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code
cannot be successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage
knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or
that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by
the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and
every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain
the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage,
why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in
order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own
disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence
during the trial proper in the criminal case. The elements of bigamy are (1)
the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not
been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he
contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The exceptions
to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code
and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
5. Antone vs. Beronilla. G. R. No. 183824. February 6, 2004.
Facts: Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint, filed in March
2007, that she and Leo were married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a
second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the
Information in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
offense because his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as of
April 2007 and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that
since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning,
there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first
marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of
bigamy. The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna and Leo on 1978
was not severed prior to his second marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has
already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null
and void on 2007.The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo
v. People.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
not a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after contrac
tingthe subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of
People v. Mendoza (under the Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for
bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is
no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is
invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect
such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which
renders the elements of bigamy complete. In fact, this was exhaustively
discussed in Mercado v. Tan.
It stated that, under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration
of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by
then the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person
who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy. While Morigo v. People was
promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado, the first
marriage was actually solemnized, although later declared void ab initio.
While in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred was a mere signing of
a marriage contract through a private act. Thus, there is no need to secure a
judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent
marriage. The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case.

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Mendoza, Glenn S.
6. Morigo vs. People. G. R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004. 422 SCRA
Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol.
They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and
various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in
1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition
for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity
on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then
charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the
civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
Issue: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from
the bigamy case.
Held: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that
there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The
petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when
he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Cases on Declaration of Presumptive Death
1. Republic vs. Nolasco. G. R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993. 220 SCRA
Facts: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in
bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six
months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her
to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to
another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a
letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days
after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets
whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans contract going to
London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was
all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive
death of Janet.
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife,
Janet, is already dead?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet
were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife
was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities
and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while
he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find
his wife.
2. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Alegro. G. R. No. 159614.
December 9, 2005. 477 SCRA 277.
Facts: Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January
1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she
enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her
parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents
house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to
the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but
left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For
sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free
time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas
disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He
also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in
March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
Issue: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already
Held: The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a wellfounded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was
dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He
even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate
his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law
regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could
have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law
about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of
Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and
NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss
his petition in RTC.

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Mendoza, Glenn S.
3. Valdez vs. Republic. G. R. No. 180863. September 8, 2009. 598
SCRA 646.
Facts: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She
gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because
Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972,
the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972,
they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without
any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they
agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last
time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that
Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985.
Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners
marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a
petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid
despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
Held: The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios
death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family
Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus,
petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and
4. Republic vs. Bermudez-Lorino. G. R. No. 160258. January 19,
2005. 449 SCRA 57.
Facts: Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June
1987. The wife was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker with
violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his
friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and
returned to her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to
work for her support her children. From the time she left him, she had no
communication with him or his relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition
in a newspaper of general circulation.

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Mendoza, Glenn S.
In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although
the judgment was final and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the
Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of
Issue: Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family Code were duly
Held: Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial
Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor for cases scoured by these
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary
court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditions manner
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by
expeditiously rending judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer
of evidence by the petitioner.

5. Republic vs. Tango. G. R. No. 161062. July 31, 2009. 594 SCRA
Facts: In 1987, Ferventino Tango, respondent, and Maria Jose Villarba
rites. Tango and Villarba had only spent a night together and had been intima
te once when Villarba toldFerventino that she and her family will soon be
leaving for the USA. Villarba assured Tango that the former will file a petition
so that the latter can live with her in the USA and in the event that the
petition is denied, Villarba promised to return to the Philippines to live with
Tango. Thereafter, Villarba and her family flew to Seattle, USA. Tango and
Villarba kept in touch for a year before Villarba stopped responding to
Tangos letters. Tango had inquired from Villarbas uncle of Villarbas
whereabouts but it turned out that even the latters relatives had no idea.
Tango solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas, but to no avail. Finally,
Tango sought the aid of his parents in Los Angeles and his aunt in Seattle,
but again, to no avail. This prompted Tango to file a petition before the RTC
for the declaration of presumptive death of Villarba under Article 41 of the

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Mendoza, Glenn S.
Family Code. The RTC issued an Order declaring Villarba presumptively dead.
On appeal by the Republic of the Philippines, the CA affirmed the RTCs order.
Tango has established a basis to form
founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead.

a well-

Held: By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a

summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in
the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with
the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit
in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal. In the case before us, petitioner committed a
serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of
Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving
due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the
case to the appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire
jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express provision of
law, was immediately final and executory. Adding to the confusion, the Court
of Appeals entertained the appeal and treated the same as an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous
appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by
express provision of the law, the judgment was not appealable.
Cases on Annulment of Marriage:
1. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals. G. R. No. 132955. October 27,
2006. 505 SCRA 564.
Facts: In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in
Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said
that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even
hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten
him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was
pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated
Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations
and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she
showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.
Issue: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case
at bar.
Held: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is
untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his
marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed
against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys
allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove
that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created
in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and
her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and
that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to
vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as
well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged
inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half
years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage.
2. Republic vs. Iyoy. G. R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005. 470
SCRA 508.
Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the
decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null
and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each
other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, in the same year
she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus
learned that Fely married an American and had a child. Fely went back to the
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of
one of her children in which she used her husbands last name as hers in the
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and
were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his
testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and
the invitation where Fely used her new husbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard,
womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was already an American
citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient
and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity?
Held: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish
psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves,
also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration
of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.
3. Corpus vs. Ochotorena. A. M. No. RTJ- 04-1861. July 30, 2004.
4. Maquilan vs. Maquilan. G. R. No. 155409. June 8, 2007.
Facts: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses
who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a
son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both
accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the
part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and
private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the
AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from
sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
Issue: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a
disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property?
Held: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of
civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read
with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.
5. Dino vs. Dino. G. R. No. 178044. January 19, 2011.
Facts: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May
2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was
not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court
declared their marriage void ab initio.
only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
It later altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be
issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code
Issue: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Held: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch
102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question
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that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled
by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties
before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus,
what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Cases on Legal Separation:
1. Gandionco vs. Penaranda. G. R. No. L-72984. November 27, 1987.
Facts: Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint
against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint
of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered
by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for
pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him.
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He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with
the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have
to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
Issue: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed
pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
Held: Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were
incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from
or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof
including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the
children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent
spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of
in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge.
If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered
as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
2. Brown vs. Yambao. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957. 102 Phil. 168.
3. Pacete vs. Carriaga, Jr. G. R. No. 53880. March 17, 1994. 231 SCRA
Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred
in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had
a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an
extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which
decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Held: The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In
case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is
more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before
six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in
order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is
further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
4. Lapuz vs. Eufemio. No. L-30977. January 31, 1972. 43 SCRA 177.
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September
21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage.
Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go
Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.
However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved
to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that
the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102
of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen
by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an
action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action
involved property rights.
Held: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic
and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property
rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of

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the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
5. Corpus vs. Ochotorena. A. M. RTJ-04-1861. July 30, 2004. 435
SCRA 446.
Cases on Essential Marital Obligations
1. Arroyo vs. Arroyo. G. R. No. L-17014. August 11, 1921.
2. Tenchavez vs. Escano. No. L-19671. November 29, 1965. 15 SCRA
Facts: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love
affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had
an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by
Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad ,
he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents
in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when
it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for
divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the
Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married
Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She
acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from
joining her husband.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
Held: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine
courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.
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Mendoza, Glenn S.
Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can
afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano
with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation
prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano
are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to
validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree
of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiffappellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao,
P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Cases on Donation by Reason of Marriage:
1. Matabuena vs. Cervantes. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971. 38 SCRA
Facts: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this
period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the
two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner,
sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition
because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent
were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.
Issue: Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between
live-in partners.
Held: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to pr
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event the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition
shall not apply also to common-law relationships. The court, however, said
the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily
that the
Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.

2. Agapay vs. Palang. G. R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997. 85 SCAD 145.
Facts: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan
on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their
only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that
as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone
in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year
old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A
house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand,
Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6
parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In
1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years
later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery
of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought
to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court
dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be
awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
Held: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the
subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
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proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an
actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to
persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the subjected
riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old
compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US
Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could
have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to
justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland
should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of
the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate
their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or
without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not
specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of
Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22
years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the
purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly
provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies
to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would
turn out to be better than those in legal union.
3. Gercio vs. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada. No. 23703.
September 28, 1925. 48 Phil. 53.
Facts: January 29, 1910: Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada issued
a 20-year endowment insurance policyon the life of Hilario Gercio
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Insurance company agreed to insure the life of Gercio for the sum of
P2,000, to be paid him on February 1, 1930, or if the insured should die
before said date, then to his wife, Mrs. AndreaZialcita, should she survive
him; otherwise to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the insured.
Policy did not include any provision reserving to the insured the right to
change the beneficiary.
End of 1919: she was convicted of the crime of adultery.
September 4, 1920: a decree of divorce was issued.
March 4, 1922: Gercio formally notified the Sun Life that he had
revoked his donation in favor ofAndrea Zialcita, and that he had designated
in her stead his present wife, Adela Garcia de Gercio, as the beneficiary of
the policy.
Sun Life refused.
Gercio filed a petition for mandamus to compel Sun Life.
Trial Court: favored Gercio.
Issue: Whether or not Gercio has the right to change the beneficiary of
the policy
Held: NO. Dismissed.
The wife has an insurable interest in the life of her husband.
The beneficiary has an absolute vested interest in the policy from the
date of its issuance and delivery. So when a policy of life insurance is taken
out by the husband in which the wife is named as beneficiary, she has a
subsisting interest in the policy.
Applies to a policy to which there are attached the incidents of a loan
value, cash surrender value, an automatic extension by premiums paid, and
to an endowment policy, as well as to an ordinary life insurance policy.
If the husband wishes to retain to himself the control and ownership of
the policy he may so provide in the policy.
But if the policy contains no provision authorizing a change of
beneficiary without the beneficiary's consent, the insured cannot make such
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Accordingly, it is held that a life insurance policy of a husband made
payable to the wife as beneficiary, is the separate property of the beneficiary
and beyond the control of the husband.
Effect produced by the divorce, the Philippine Divorce Law, Act No.
2710, merely provides in section 9 that the decree of divorce shall dissolve
the community property as soon as such decree becomes final.
Absence of a statute to the contrary, that if a policy is taken out upon a
husband's life the wife is named as beneficiary therein, a subsequent divorce
does not destroy her rights under the policy.
Neither the husband, nor the wife, nor both together had power to
destroy the vested interest of the children in the policy.
4. Garcia vs. Sangil. No. 29593. December 29, 1928. 53 SCRA 968.

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