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Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.

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This article is about the Persian Gulf War general. For his father and lead investigator in the
Lindbergh kidnapping, see Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr..

H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Schwarzkopf in November 1988

Birth name

Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.


"Stormin' Norman"[1]
"The Bear"[1]


August 22, 1934

Trenton, New Jersey, U.S.


December 27, 2012 (aged 78)

Tampa, Florida, U.S.

Buried at

West Point Cemetery, West Point,New

York, U.S.


United States of America


Years of service


Commands held

United States Army



1st Battalion, 6th Infantry

1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
24th Mechanized Infantry Division
I Corps
U.S. Central Command


Vietnam War
Invasion of Grenada
Persian Gulf War


Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Army Distinguished Service Medal
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star Medal
Purple Heart
Presidential Medal of Freedom
Congressional Gold Medal
Knight Commander of the Order of the
Bath (Honorary)


Brenda (Holsinger) Schwarzkopf


Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr.


H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. (/wrtskf/; August 22, 1934 December 27, 2012) was a United
States Army general. While serving as Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command, he
led all coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War.
Born in Trenton, New Jersey, Schwarzkopf grew up in the United States and later in Iran. He was
accepted into the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned as a second
lieutenant in the United States Army in 1956. After a number of initial training programs,
Schwarzkopf interrupted a stint as an academy teacher, and served in the Vietnam Warfirst as an
adviser to the South Vietnamese Army and later as a battalion commander. Schwarzkopf was highly
decorated in Vietnam, being awarded three Silver Star Medals, two Purple Hearts, and the Legion of
Merit. Rising through the ranks after the conflict, he later commanded the U.S. 24th Infantry
Division and was one of the commanders of the Invasion of Grenadain 1983.
Assuming command of United States Central Command in 1988, Schwarzkopf was called on to
respond to the Invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by the forces of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Initially
tasked with defending Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression, Schwarzkopf's command eventually grew
to an international force of over 750,000 troops. After diplomatic relations broke down, he planned
and led Operation Desert Storman extended air campaign followed by a highly successful 100hour ground offensivewhich destroyed the Iraqi Army and liberated Kuwait in early 1991. Highly
regarded for these exploits, Schwarzkopf became a national hero and was presented with many
military honors for what historians termed one of the most successful campaigns in U.S. military
Schwarzkopf retired shortly after the end of the war and undertook a number of philanthropic
ventures, only occasionally stepping into the political spotlight before his death from complications
of pneumonia in late 2012. Known for being a hard-driving military commander with a strong temper,
Schwarzkopf was nonetheless considered an exceptional leader by biographers and was noted for
his abilities as a military diplomat and in dealing with the press.

1Early life and education


2.1Junior officer

2.2Vietnam War

2.3Rise to general
2.3.1CENTCOM commander

2.4Persian Gulf War

2.4.1Operation Desert Shield

2.4.2Operation Desert Storm

3Later life




5Awards and decorations


5.1Other honors


7Further reading

8External links

Early life and education[edit]

H. Norman Schwarzkopf was born as Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. on August 22, 1934
in Trenton, New Jersey, toHerbert Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr.[2][3] and Ruth Alice (ne Bowman). [4][5] His
father was a German-American[6] 1917 graduate of the United States Military Academy and veteran
of World War I.[7] His mother was a housewife from West Virginia who was distantly related
to Thomas Jefferson.[6] The senior Schwarzkopf later became the Superintendent of the New Jersey
State Police, where he worked as a lead investigator on the 1932 Lindbergh baby kidnapping case.
In January 1952, the younger Schwarzkopf's birth certificate was amended to make his name "H.
Norman Schwarzkopf", reportedly because his father detested his first name. [8][Note 1] The younger
Schwarzkopf had two older sisters, Ruth Ann and Sally Joan. [11][12]

Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr., father to H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Norman Schwarzkopf was described by childhood friends as active and assertive, protective of his
sisters and a skilled athlete.[11][13] He spent his childhood attached to his father, who subsequently
became the narrator for the Gang Busters radio program. When Norman Schwarzkopf was eight
years old, his father returned to the military amid World War II.[14][15] His continuous absence made
home life difficult, particularly for his wife.[16] As a 10-year-old cadet at Bordentown Military Institute,
near Trenton, he posed for his official photograph wearing a stern expression because as he said
afterwards "Some day when I become a general, I want people to know that Im serious." In 1946,
when Norman Schwarzkopf was 12, he moved with his father toTehran, Iran.[17] In Iran, Norman
learned shooting, horseback riding, and hunting.[18] Schwarzkopf developed a lifelong interest in
Middle Eastern culture.[19] The family moved to Geneva, Switzerland, in 1947, following a new military
assignment for Herbert Schwarzkopf.[20] The senior Schwarzkopf visited Italy, Heidelberg, Frankfurt,

and Berlin, Germany during his military duties, and the younger Schwarzkopf accompanied him.
By 1951 he had returned to Iran briefly before returning to the United States. Herbert Schwarzkopf
died in 1958.[22] From a young age, Norman wanted to be a military officer, following his father's

He attended the Community High School in Tehran, later the International School of Geneva,[23] and
briefly Frankfurt American High School, in Frankfurt, Germany (1948-49), and Heidelberg American
High School, in Heidelberg, Germany (1949-50).[24] He finally graduated from Valley Forge Military
Academy.[Note 2] He was also a member of Mensa.[26] Schwarzkopf graduated valedictorian out of his
class of 150,[27] and his IQ was tested at 168.[28][29] Schwarzkopf then attended the United States
Military Academy, where he played football, wrestled, sang and conducted the West Point
Chapel choir.[26] His large frame, 6 feet 3 inches (1.91 m) in height and weighing 240 pounds
(110 kg), was advantageous in athletics.[30] In his plebe year he was given the nickname "Schwarzie,"
the same as his father, and he was often pushed by older cadets to imitate his father's radio show as
a traditional act of hazing. Schwarzkopf also gained a great respect for certain military leaders at
West Point, notably Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman and Creighton Abrams, believing
them excellent commanders who nonetheless did not glorify war.[31][32] He graduated 43rd of 480 in
the class of 1956 with a Bachelor of Engineering degree.[2][Note 3]

Junior officer[edit]
Commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry Branch, Schwarzkopf spent October 1956 to
March 1957 at United States Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, where he earned
his Parachutist Badge. His first assignment was as platoon leader, later executive officer, of E
Company, 2nd Airborne Battle Group, 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne
Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.[34] He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1958. In July 1959,
Schwarzkopf was assigned his first overseas assignment; as a staff officer alternating with duties as
a platoon leader, liaison officer, and reconnaissance platoon leader [35] with the 6th Infantry
Division in West Germany.[19] In July 1960, Schwarzkopf was assigned as aide-de-camp to Brigadier
General Charles Johnson, who commanded the Berlin Brigade in West Berlin.[36][35]
Schwarzkopf was promoted to captain in July 1961 and reassigned for Advanced Infantry School at
Fort Benning for eight months.[35] He also earned his Master Parachutist Badge in that time. In June
1962, Schwarzkopf enrolled at the University of Southern California in a Master of Science in
Engineering course studying missile mechanics. He graduated in June 1964, [37] having earned a
Master of Science in mechanical and aerospace engineering.[26][2] He then returned to West Point to
serve as an instructor in the Department of Mechanics.[37] He was originally intended to teach at the
Military Academy for three years, but after his first year he volunteered for service in South
Vietnambecause he thought that career advancement could be most quickly earned in combat. West
Point approved his request in early 1965 with the stipulation that he return and teach the remaining
two years after his tour.[38]

Vietnam War[edit]
In the Vietnam War, Schwarzkopf served as a task force adviser to the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam Airborne Division.[19][38] He was promoted to major shortly after arriving in Vietnam. After an
initial orientation at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), headquartered in Saigon,
Schwarzkopf was sent north to Pleiku in the central highlands, in the II Corps Tactical Zone.[39] He got
his first combat experience on August 3, when he was the senior adviser to a force of 1,000 South
Vietnamese paratroopers sent to relieve a beleaguered South Vietnamese Army force at c C
Camp. The paratroopers took heavy casualties and a second, larger force was required to relieve
them. That force too came into heavy contact. Schwarzkopf and his group fought continuously for
several days. At one point, he braved heavy North Vietnamese fire to recover and treat a handful of

wounded South Vietnamese soldiers and escort them to safety.[40] By August 17 the 173rd Airborne
Brigade arrived and broke the siege, ending the Battle of c C. GeneralWilliam
Westmoreland later arrived to review the incident and congratulate Schwarzkopf. For his leadership
in the battle, Schwarzkopf was awarded the Silver Star.[41][42] On February 14, 1966, Schwarzkopf led
an ARVN paratrooper assault on a Viet Cong position, during which he was wounded four times by
small arms fire. In spite of this, he refused medical evacuation or to relinquish command until the
objective had been captured. For this, he was awarded a second Silver Star and a Purple Heart.[43]
After ten months of combat duty, Schwarzkopf was pulled from the front by MACV and reassigned as
senior staff adviser for civil affairs to the ARVN Airborne Division. Then, he returned to the United
States and finished his teaching assignment at West Point, where he was an associate professor in
the Department of Mechanics. In 1968, he attended the Army's Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, completing the course in June 1969. In this time back home,
he also met Brenda Holsinger, a flight attendant for Trans World Airlines. They were introduced at a
West Point football game in 1967 and married the next year.[43] The couple would later have three
children: Cynthia, born in 1970; Jessica, born in 1972; and Christian, born in 1977. [44]
Schwarzkopf was promoted to lieutenant colonel and ordered to a second tour in Vietnam,[19] leaving
in June 1969. He was assigned as executive officer to the chief of staff at MACV headquarters,
based at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon.[43] Schwarzkopf later recalled this second tour of duty was
very different from his first; there were 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Vietnamization strategy
was in effect, and recent events such as the Tet Offensive and My Lai Massacre put troops under
increased political scrutiny. In December 1969 he gained his first field command, taking over the 1st
Battalion, 6th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade at Chu Lai. He later said these troops were initially
demoralized and in poor condition, racked with rampant drug use and disciplinary problems as well
as a lack of support from home.[45] Despite the brigade's otherwise controversial performance record,
Schwarzkopf was quickly regarded as one of its best combat commanders. [46] He aggressively
stepped up patrols and operations to counter Viet Cong infiltration in the battalion's sector.[47] He
developed his leadership attitudes during this command. Fellow commander Hal Moore later wrote
that during his time in Vietnam Schwarzkopf acquired his well-known temper, while arguing via radio
for passing American helicopters to land and pick up his wounded men. [48] He also showed a
preference of leading from the front and prided himself on avoiding the rear areas, which he called a
During this second tour, Schwarzkopf noted two incidents which haunted him. On February 17,
1970, two men in C Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry were killed by friendly firefrom an American
artillery shell that had been ordered by Schwarzkopf, but which had struck a tree near their position
on its way to a target. The parents of one soldier blamed him for the death of their son, a claim which
Schwarzkopf strongly denied and termed an accident of war. On May 28, 1970, Schwarzkopf landed
his helicopter when discovering troops of B Company who had stumbled into a minefield. Two
company officers had been wounded and two soldiers were trapped, fearful of setting off more
mines. Although amedevac was on its way, Schwarzkopf ordered his UH-1 Huey to remove the
wounded. As he attempted to help the troops back out of the field, one soldier struck a landmine,
breaking a leg, and began to panic. Fearing he would set off another landmine,
Schwarzkopf pinned the soldier to the ground while another soldier put a splint on the wounded
man's leg. In doing so, another mine was set off, killing three and wounding Schwarzkopf's artillery
Returning to the United States in 1970, Schwarzkopf was awarded a third Silver Star and a second
Purple Heart for risking his life to protect the soldiers, as well as three Bronze Star Medals and
a Legion of Merit for his command performance.[2][52] Still, his experiences in Vietnam embittered him
to U.S. foreign policy. Upon returning to the United States, he remarked of a wariness of future
conflicts to author C. D. B. Bryan in 1971:[53] He related these experiences under the assumed
name of Lieutenant Colonel Byron Schindler.[54]

I don't think there will ever be another major confrontation where the armies line up on both sides. If that
happens, it's inevitably going to be nuclear weapons and the whole thing. So I think all wars of the future
are going to beand again, God forbid, I hope we don't have any. War is a profanity, it really is. It's
terrifying. Nobody is more anti-war than an intelligent person who's been to war. Probably the most antiwar people I know are Army officersbut if we do have a war, I think it's going to be limited in nature like
Vietnam and Korea. Limited in scope. And when they get ready to send me again, I'm going to have to
stop and ask myself, 'is it worth it?' That's a very dangerous place for the nation to be when your own
army is going to stop and question."[53]

Rise to general[edit]

Schwarzkopf, then a colonel, consults with other officers during a training mission in California in 1977.

Disgruntled by the treatment of Vietnam veterans in the United States after the war, Schwarzkopf
considered leaving the military, but ultimately decided to stay, hoping to fix some of the problems
encountered by the military during the war.[55] He underwent surgery atWalter Reed Army
Hospital shortly after his return from Vietnam to repair longstanding back problems exacerbated by
parachute jumps.[44]
Between 1970 and 1983, Schwarzkopf and his family lived primarily in Washington, D.C., as he took
on a number of different assignments. Promoted to colonel, Schwarzkopf volunteered for an
assignment in Alaska, and in late 1974 became deputy commander of the 172nd Infantry
Brigade at Fort Richardson, Alaska.[56][57] In October 1976, he moved to Fort Lewis, Washington, to
command the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division,[58] where he impressed his division commander,
Major General Richard E. Cavazos. The two frequently hunted together and developed a close
friendship.[59] Having been very successful improving the combat readiness of the 1st Brigade, he
was nominated to receive his first star as a brigadier general.[44] His promotion ceremony occurred at
Fort Lewis shortly after relinquishing command of the brigade. [60]
In July 1978, Schwarzkopf became deputy director of plans at the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii.
He then served a two-year stint as assistant division commander of the 8th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) in Germany.[62] He returned to Washington D.C. for an assignment as director of
personnel management for the Army, subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
General Maxwell R. Thurman.[63] Schwarzkopf was promoted to major general. In June 1983, he
became commanding general of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia.[64]
He immediately established an extremely rigorous training regimen and became well known
among the troops of the command for his strict training and aggressive personality.[66]
On October 25, 1983, Schwarzkopf was appointed to the command group for the Invasion of
Grenada. He was the chief army adviser to the overall operation commander, Vice Admiral Joseph
Metcalf III, Commander, United States Second Fleet/Commander Joint Task Force 120. The
operation was plagued by logistical difficulties, exacerbated by poor communication and lack of
cooperation between the branches of the United States military.[67] Schwarzkopf was named deputy
commander of the invasion at the last minute, leaving him with little say in the planning.
Schwarzkopf helped lead the initial landing operations while aboard USS Guam. He was involved
in an incident where the colonel commanding the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit initially refused to fly

Army troops in Marine helicopters.[69] He flew into St. George's on the second day of the operation.
While he initially did not think the U.S. should have been involved in the conflict, he later said he
considered the mission a success because it re-asserted the dominance of the U.S. military after the
Vietnam War. Following the invasion, Schwarzkopf returned to the 24th Infantry Division and
completed his tour as its commander.[70] He was subsequently among those leaders who were
criticized for the poor inter-service cooperation in the operation, particularly poor communication
between forces of the different branches in combat.[68] The operation was a learning experience for
Schwarzkopf, who saw the need to develop greater cooperation between the services for future joint
operations. He would later push for more policies to make joint warfare and inter-service cooperation
standard practice in warfare.[71] Specifically, the operation demonstrated a need for greater joint roles
in planning, deploying troops, and communicating operations. Subsequent operations gave more
authority to joint commanders in operations and doctrine emphasized joint warfare doctrine over
service-centered doctrine.[72]
In July 1985, Schwarzkopf began an 11-month assignment as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans at the Pentagon. On July 1, 1986, he was promoted tolieutenant general, and
was reassigned to Fort Lewis as commander of I Corps.[70] He held this post for 14 months before
returning to the Pentagon as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in August 1987. [73] In a
second role, Schwarzkopf served as the Army's senior member on the Military Staff Committee at
the United Nations Security Council, where he began to build diplomatic skills in dealings with
representatives from other countries.[70] As a part of his duties during the posting, he sat in on arms
reduction talks with leaders from the Soviet Union.[74]
CENTCOM commander[edit]

Schwarzkopf (right) takes command of United States Central Command in November 1988

In November 1988, Schwarzkopf was named commander of United States Central

Command (CENTCOM), succeeding General George B. Crist. Schwarzkopf was selected over a
more popular choice, Vice Admiral Henry C. "Hank" Mustin, because commanders considered him
an accomplished strategic thinker who had experience both in combat and with diplomacy, and who
had great knowledge of theMiddle East from his childhood experiences there. He assumed
command of CENTCOM, with his headquarters at MacDill Air Force Basein Tampa, Florida, and was
promoted to general.[74] At the time of this appointment, CENTCOM had overall responsibility for U.S.
military operations in 19 countries, and had 200,000 servicemen on call should a crisis arise.
Schwarzkopf immediately took to changing the focus of the command, which to that point had
focused on the "Zagros Doctrine", a hypothetical ground invasion by the Soviet Union through
the Zagros Mountains which the U.S. would counter in Iran. Schwarzkopf was more concerned with
the effects of the IranIraq War on the stability of the region than of an external threat posed by the
Soviet Union.[76]
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1989, Schwarzkopf maintained
that the Soviet Union was a threat to the region, but when giving an overview of the countries in the
region, noted that Iraq posed a threat to its weaker neighbors. He implored that the U.S. "seek to
assert a moderating influence in Iraq." [76] With regional turmoil growing, Schwarzkopf became
concerned about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, focusing the attention of his command to

prepare to respond to what he thought was a "more realistic scenario." That year, his command
began planning to counter an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, seeing it as a likely conflict which would
threaten the interests of the United States. In early 1990 he testified again before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in threat-assessment hearings that the Cold War was ending and it was less
likely the Soviet Union would exert military force in the region. Though he declined to identify Iraq
specifically as a threat, he noted a regional conflict was the most likely event to destabilize the
region, and noted Iraq's ceasefire with Iran meant it was continuing to grow and modernize its
military.[77] In early 1990, he drafted a war plan, Operations Plan 1002-90, titled "Defense of the
Arabian Peninsula," which envisioned an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia through Kuwait. [32]
During CENTCOM military exercises in July 1990 termed Internal Look '90, Schwarzkopf wrote up a
scenario that tested how the command would respond to a regional dictator invading a neighboring
country and threatening oil fields there, a scenario which closely mirrored the rising tension between
Iraq and Kuwait.[77] One week after the end of these exercises, Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2,

Persian Gulf War[edit]

Main article: Gulf War
U.S. President George H. W. Bushriding in a Humvee with General Schwarzkopf in Saudi Arabia

Initially believing the Iraqi Army would only advance to the Ramallah oil field, Schwarzkopf was
surprised when the Iraqis captured Kuwait City.[78][79] Fearing Iraq would next invade Saudi Arabia,
Schwarzkopf ordered contingency plans put in motion, with the 82nd Airborne Division, 101st
Airborne Division and 24th Infantry Division put on alert. He was then called to an emergency
meeting with PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush (also a combat veteran), where his Internal Look '90
strategic plans were made the basis of a potential counteroffensive plan. By August 5, Bush opted
for an aggressive response to the invasion. Schwarzkopf then accompanied Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney to meet with Saudi King Fahd to convince him to allow U.S. troops into Saudi
Arabia to counter the Iraqi military.[80][81] With Fahd's consent, Bush ordered troops into Saudi Arabia
on August 7, initially tasked to defend Saudi Arabia should Iraq attack.[82] U.S. commanders from the
beginning wanted a quick conflict characterized by decisive, overwhelming force, as opposed to the
gradual escalation of U.S. involvement as had been seen in Vietnam. [83] Schwarzkopf in particular
was very adamant that many of the policies governing military operations in Vietnam, especially slow
escalation of air power and troop force, not reoccur. His plan for direct and overwhelming force was
initially criticized in Washington as uncreative. [84] By August 13, the news media began to closely
cover Schwarzkopf, who had been named to lead the operation. [1]
Operation Desert Shield[edit]
From his headquarters in Tampa, Schwarzkopf began planning the operations to defend Saudi
Arabia. Lieutenant General Charles Horner, USAF, ran the headquarters inRiyadh.[85] Schwarzkopf
planned supply lines for the 50,000 troops initially sent to Saudi Arabia, tapping Major
General William G. Pagonis as director of the logistical operations, with U.S. Air Force cargo aircraft
landing supplies at Dhahran and U.S. Navy ships offloading troops and supplies at Dammam.[86] By
August 20, 20,000 U.S. troops were in Saudi Arabia, with another 80,000 preparing to deploy, and a
further 40,000 reserves tapped to augment them.[87] Schwarzkopf arrived at the CENTCOM
command in Riyadh on August 25,[88] and on August 29 he conducted his first front-line tour of the
potential combat zone, accompanied by reporters. Over the next several weeks, Schwarzkopf spoke
frequently with both reporters and troops under his command, conducting many high-profile press
conferences and updates to the situation in Saudi Arabia. Schwarzkopf worked to help coordinate
the contributions of the different nations contributing military forces to the effort. [89] By mid-October,
Schwarzkopf indicated he was confident the forces were of a sufficient level that they could defend
Saudi Arabia if it was attacked.[90] Through October, Schwarzkopf and his command were occupied
with setting up facilities and supply lines for the troops streaming into Saudi Arabia. He also worked

to minimize the culture clash among foreigners in sharia-dominated Saudi Arabia, such as the high
visibility of women in military roles. Schwarzkopf remained at his command in Riyadh through
December, making frequent frontline visits to the troops. [87] On December 29, 1990, he received
a warning order from The Pentagon to be ready to attack into Iraq and Kuwait by January 17. [91]

Schwarzkopf talks with GeneralColin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a press conference
regarding the Gulf War.

Initially, Operation Desert Shield involved a sea interdiction campaign that saw international warships
detaining and inspecting tankers from Iraq. As the buildup continued, Schwarzkopf was occupied
with planning an offensive operation against the Iraqi units along the border, sometimes working 18hour days in planning, assisted by a close group of aides. He frequently met with subordinates and
Saudi commanders. Schwarzkopf planned counters both for Iraq's large armored forces and air
forces, as well as its elite Republican Guardforces.[92][93] While planning, Schwarzkopf remained in
frequent contact with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell(both Vietnam
veterans) concerning Schwarzkopf's plans for the offensive. [94] Schwarzkopf devised an operational
plan, dubbed "Operation Desert Storm," to be based on overwhelming force and strong infantry
attacks supported by artillery and armor. It incorporated the desert warfare strategies used by British
commander Bernard Montgomery in his defeat of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel at
the Second Battle of El Alamein in World War II. By November 8, Bush agreed to commit 400,000
U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia at Schwarzkopf's insistence. [95] Schwarzkopf believed larger numbers of
troops would reduce the likelihood of high casualties. [96] He planned a strategic bombing campaign to
precede an offensive into Kuwait,[97] simultaneously striking the forward Iraqi forces and their supply
lines. In the meantime, diplomatic solutions began to break down, and the deadline established by
the United Nations Security Council, January 15, 1991, passed without a solution. [95]
By this time, Schwarzkopf commanded an international army of 750,000, [57] comprising 500,000 U.S.
troops and 250,000 troops from other nations, as well as thousands of main battle tanks, combat
aircraft and six carrier battle groups. Most of the U.S. and allied forces, however, were not combat
veterans, and Schwarzkopf and the other allied commanders wanted to fight cautiously to minimize
casualties.[98] Schwarzkopf's experience in the Middle East allowed him to understand the factors
surrounding the conflict, including allied commanders, with greater ease. He had a good relationship
with Saudi commander Khalid bin Sultan, who in turn helped Schwarzkopf win over the Saudi
Arabian populace.[99] In spite of the cooperation, he later said he considered the Arab troops to be the
least effective of the war.[100] Schwarzkopf also had an agreeable relationship with his deputy
commander, Lieutenant General Cal Waller, who handled much of the administrative burden. Peter
de la Billire, commander of the British contingent, and Michel Roquejeoffre, commander of the
French contingent, also cooperated well with Schwarzkopf. The good relationship between the allied
commanders meant their forces were able to cooperate effectively during the operation. [101]
Operation Desert Storm[edit]

Schwarzkopf speaks with troops supporting Operation Desert Shield in 1991

The air campaign against Iraq began on January 17, 1991, after 139 days of planning and buildup. [102]
Schwarzkopf sent a prepared statement to the troops ahead of the first airstrikes, which were
timed to hit their targets at 02:40. He oversaw the strikes from his war room in Riyadh, then emerged
from his command center late in the day on January 18 to speak to the press, saying the air war had
gone "just about exactly as we had intended it to go". He then began making frequent briefings to
the media to increase press coverage of the results.[104] He declined to measure the success of the
campaign by counting suspected Iraqi casualties, believing this would undermine his credibility.
The air campaign proved to be a success by achieving air superiority and destroying the Iraqi
military's communications network, supplies, as well as many tanks and armored vehicles. [106] By
January 20 he announced Iraq's nuclear test reactors had been destroyed, and by January 27 he
announced that the coalition had total air superiority in Iraq. [107] Bush then gave Hussein an ultimatum
to withdraw from Kuwait by 12:00 on February 23 or Schwarzkopf's ground forces would attack. [108]

Ground troop movements February 2428, 1991 during Operation Desert Storm

Schwarzkopf began his ground campaign in earnest at 04:00 on February 24, with the Saudi-led
Arab forces attacking into Kuwait City, while two U.S. Marine Corps divisions struck at the oil fields,
and the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps on the left flank struck quickly to cut off the Iraqi forces
from the west, which would later be known as his "Left Hook" strategy. Schwarzkopf expected the
war to last several weeks, and had anticipated chemical weapon attacks by the Iraqi forces, which
did not occur. Resistance was lighter than Schwarzkopf expected, and Iraqi troops surrendered in
large numbers.[109][110] Within 90 hours, his force had destroyed 42 of 50 Iraqi Army divisions at a cost
of about 125 killed and 200 wounded among American troops, [111]and about 482 killed, 458 wounded
among all of the coalition.[112] He ordered his forces to destroy as much Iraqi armor and equipment as
possible in order to ensure the country's military would be weakened in the long term.
Schwarzkopf, who had ordered a media blackout during the ground offensive, finally appeared

before journalists on February 27 to explain his strategy. On March 3 he arrived in Kuwait City to
survey the aftermath of the Iraqi occupation and negotiate a ceasefire with Iraqi military leaders, as
well as work out the return of prisoners of war on both sides.[111][114][115] With this in place, he then began
the process of overseeing U.S. troops returning from the conflict. [116][117]
For his services during the war, he was welcomed back to America with a large parade
down Broadway in New York, along with other honors. Schwarzkopf led a highly publicized
homecoming parade in Washington, D.C., on June 8, 1991, where he was greeted by Bush amid
thousands of onlookers.[118] His accomplishments were praised in a manner much differently from
commanders who returned from the Vietnam and Korean Wars. He became an instant national
celebrity and the source of great curiosity by the general public. He was quick to award praise and
medals to the troops, part of what he saw as restoring pride in the U.S. armed forces after the
Vietnam War.[119]

Later life[edit]
Schwarzkopf leads a homecoming parade for troops returning from the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Schwarzkopf returned to the United States after the Persian Gulf War as a national hero, and his
ability to effectively deal with the press left him a positive image. [120] Schwarzkopf indicated a desire to
retire from the military in mid-1991. He was initially considered for promotion alternatively to General
of the Army or to Army Chief of Staff, and was ultimately asked to assume the latter post, but he
declined. He was later questioned about running for political office, but, considering himself
an independent, expressed little interest in doing so. Schwarzkopf was not vocal about his political
opinions during his military career.[121] He retired from the military in August 1991, moving to Tampa,
Following his retirement, Schwarzkopf attained a status as celebrity, and was highly praised in the
news media. He was profiled by the Associated Press, the Washington Post, and Newsday, People,
as well as praised in a Random House publication on the war, Triumph in the Desert. Schwarzkopf's
speaking fees topped $60,000 per public appearance. [122]
In 1992, Schwarzkopf published a memoir, It Doesn't Take a Hero, about his life; it became a
bestseller.[123] Schwarzkopf sold the rights to his memoirs to Bantam Books for $5,000,000. In 1993,
Schwarzkopf was found to have prostate cancer, for which he was successfully treated. Among the
many honors he received was the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2002.[120] Queen Elizabeth
II honorarily knighted Schwarzkopf and he was awarded many other military accolades from foreign
countries. He led the Pegasus Parade at the Kentucky Derby and was an honorary guest at
the Indianapolis 500.[124] He supported several children's charities and national philanthropic causes,
and he was a spokesperson for prostate cancer awareness, recovery of the grizzly
bear from endangered species status, and served on the Nature Conservancy board of governors.
Schwarzkopf otherwise sought to live out a low-profile retirement in Tampa, though he briefly
served as a military commentator for NBC.[125]
At first, Schwarzkopf was ambivalent during the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003. He initially endorsed
an invasion after Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations on February 6, 2003. When
weapons of mass destruction were not located in the country after the invasion, he changed his
stance. He was critical of the lack of a reconstruction plan after the fall of Baghdad, feeling the initial
offensive operations plans did not take into account the cultural complexities of Iraq. [125] In 2004, he
was critical of Donald Rumsfeld and his handling of Operation Iraqi Freedom.[120] He felt it was a
mistake to send U.S. Army Reserve troops into the country without adequate training. [125]

Schwarzkopf speaks after receiving the Congressional Gold Medal in 2002.

Schwarzkopf endorsed George W. Bush in the 2000 U.S. presidential election and the 2004 U.S.
presidential election. He supported John McCain in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. He was on
several occasions encouraged to run for United States Senate or President of the United States as a
member of the Republican Party, but showed no interest.[124]


A soldier presents Schwarzkopf'scremated remains at his memorial service on February 28, 2013.

Schwarzkopf died at age 78 on December 27, 2012 of complications following a bout ofpneumonia.
A memorial service was conducted on February 28, 2013 at the Cadet Chapel at West Point,
which was attended by Colin Powell, Schwarzkopf's family, and others. Schwarzkopf
was cremated and his remains were buried near to those of his father in the West Point Cemeteryin
a ceremony attended by cadets, military leaders, and New Jersey State Police officers. [126]
Among reactions to Schwarzkopf's death, George H. W. Bush said of him; "General Norm
Schwarzkopf, to me, epitomized the 'duty, service, country' creed that has defended our freedom and
seen this great Nation through our most trying international crises. More than that, he was a good
and decent man and a dear friend."[125] In a statement, President Barack Obama said "From his
decorated service in Vietnam to the historic liberation of Kuwait and his leadership of United States
Central Command, General Schwarzkopf stood tall for the country and Army he loved." [125] In a letter,
Secretary of the Army John McHugh and Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odiernowrote in a
joint statement, "Our nation owes a great debt of gratitude to General Schwarzkopf and our Soldiers
will hold a special place in their hearts for this great leader. While much will be written in coming
days of his many accomplishments, his most lasting and important legacies are the tremendous
Soldiers he trained and led."[127]

During his tour of duty in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf developed a reputation as a commander who
preferred to lead from the front, even willing to risk his own life for his subordinates. [71] His leadership
style stressed preparedness, discipline and rigorous training, but also allowed his troops to enjoy the
luxuries they had.[30] His rehabilitation of the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry stressed survival as well as
offense.[128] Like Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel and General George S. Patton, Schwarzkopf

highly regarded decisiveness and valued determination among his commanders. He pushed for
offensive combat over defensive operations in the Gulf War.[129] He was known to be extremely critical
of staff officers who were unprepared, but was even more contentious with other generals whom he
felt were not aggressive enough. His frequently short temper with subordinates was well known in
his command.[130] His leadership style was sometimes criticized by subordinates who felt it reduced
their ability to solve problems creatively.[131]Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono, a lifelong friend of
Schwarzkopf, described him as "competent, compassionate, egotistical, loyal, opinionated, funny,
emotional, sensitive to any slight. At times he can be an overbearing bastard, but not with
me."[132] While Colin Powell would say Schwarzkopf's strengths outweighed his weaknesses, Dick
Cheney personally disliked what he considered Schwarzkopf's pretentious behavior with
subordinates. Cheney doubted Schwarzkopf's ability to lead the Gulf War, and so Powell dealt with
Schwarzkopf instead.[133][134]
The quick and decisive results of the Persian Gulf War were attributed to Schwarzkopf's leadership.
Historian Rick Atkinson considered Schwarzkopf "the most theatrical American in uniform
since Douglas MacArthur."[136] Atkinson further contended that in his leadership during the Persian
Gulf War, Schwarzkopf conducted one of the greatest military campaigns of all time, providing the
United States with its "first battlefield hero in decades." [137] His accomplishments were later compared
favorably to that of General Tommy Franks during Operation Enduring Freedom.[138] However, in an
analysis of the effects of the Gulf War, several historians, including Spencer C. Tucker, contended
that Schwarzkopf's ceasefire agreement allowed Iraq to continue to fly armed helicopters, which
allowed it to later conduct operations against its Shia Arab andKurdish populations.[120] Schwarzkopf
later wrote it would have been a mistake to continue the offensive and capture all of Iraq, noting that
the U.S. would likely have had to pay the entire cost of rebuilding the country.[139] In a 2012 book,
historian Thomas E. Ricks wrote Schwarzkopf's lack of experience with politics were
disadvantageous to his conduct of the war. Ricks said that Schwarzkopf was overly cautious in the
execution of his plans because of his fear of repeating mistakes in Vietnam, which meant his troops
failed to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard. Ricks further criticized Schwarzkopf for failing to relieve
General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., as well as other subordinates who Schwarzkopf later said in his
memoirs were ineffective. Ricks concluded that the Gulf War was a "tactical triumph but a strategic
draw at best."[140] In his memoirs, Schwarzkopf responded to these kinds of criticisms by saying his
mandate had only been to liberate and safeguard Kuwait, and that an invasion of Iraq would have
been highly controversial, particularly among Middle Eastern military allies. [141]
Schwarzkopf sought to change the relationship between journalists and the military, feeling that the
news media's negative portrayal of the Vietnam War had degraded troops there. When he took
command during the Persian Gulf War, he sought an entirely different strategy which was ultimately
successful, where he favored greater media coverage, albeit subject to strict controls on the
battlefield.[57] Schwarzkopf favored the intense press surrounding the Gulf War conflict, feeling that
blocking the news media as had been done in Grenada would contribute to negative public
perception of the war in the United States. His dealings with the press were thus frequent and very
personal, conducting regular briefings for journalists. He would usually not attack media coverage,
even negative coverage, unless he felt it was blatantly incorrect. [142] He staged visible media
appearances which played to patriotism.[143] In fact, Schwarzkopf believed extensive press coverage
would help build public support for the war and raise morale. In some press conferences, he showed
and explained advanced war-fighting technology the U.S. possessed to impress the public. These
also had the side effect of distracting the public from focusing on U.S. casualty counts or the
destruction wrought in the war.[144] Schwarzkopf's strategy was to control the message being sent, he
therefore ordered media on the battlefield to be escorted at all times. [145] In spite of this, several highprofile reports publicized the CENTCOM strategy.[146] After the war Schwarzkopf was very critical of
military analysts who scrutinized his operation, feeling that some of them were poorly informed on
the factors involved in his planning, and that others were violating operational securityby revealing
too much about how he might plan the operation. [147]

Exercise Internal Look

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be
challenged and removed. (July 2009)
Internal Look is a major planning wargame exercise of US Central Command. Up to 1990 often
held annually, it is now biennial. From 1983 to 1990, it was often focused on a rapid deployment of
U.S. forces to the Zagros Mountains in Iran, where they would have attempted to stop an expected
Soviet invasion by the Soviet Southern Strategic Direction. The Southern Strategic Direction,
headquartered in Baku, would have consisted of the Transcaucasus Military District, North Caucasus
Military District, Turkestan Military District and follow-on forces.




It proved to be prophetic during July 1990, when held just prior to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's army. As noted above, US Central Command's wartime mission as
envisaged during cold war days was to stop the Soviets from seizing the precious Iranian oil fields.
When General Norman Schwarzkopf took over the reins of Central Command he decided to review
this mission.[1] In his perceived opinion the threat was no longer from the Soviet Armed Forces, but
from Saddam's Iraqi Army. Accordingly he tasked his operational staff to play up a fresh scenario
wherein Iraq would attack Saudi Arabia.
The exercise was conducted with the setting up of a mock headquarters at Hurlburt Field, and Duke
Field in Florida, sponsored by the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) computer wargaming simulation
agency. The scenario envisioned a force of 300,000 soldiers, 3,200 tanks and 640 combat planes
being amassed in south Iraq prior to attacking theArabian peninsula. Central Command's operational
role required them to prevent seizure of Saudi oil fields, shipping ports and refineries.
The lessons learned during this war game proved invaluable for the Coalition forces during their
initial buildup for Desert Shield especially with regards to the logistic management of the forces.
Many planners[who?] would just turn around and say "hey we just did this on Internal Look, right".
General Schwarzkopf's astute foresight and in-depth understanding of the Arab politics coupled with
a desire to have Central Command ready for any contingency scenario was the cornerstone of the
success that was to follow in the days ofDesert Storm. later reported that Internal Look 96 commenced March 20, 1996, at Camp
Blanding, an Army National Guard facility near the town of Starke in northeast Florida. [2] It was
CENTCOM's largest domestic training exercise. The eight-day exercise involved approximately
4,000 active duty and reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians from the Department
of Defense and other supporting agencies.

Previously last held in 1990, Internal Look was scheduled at the time to become a biennial event.
However, Internal Look 98 was cancelled due to 'real-world events' (probably the chain of events
that led to Operation Desert Fox).
From 717 November 2000, CENTCOM executed Internal Look 01, by establishing a Contingency
Forward Headquarters and simulating the execution of one of the principal plans. The exercise
trialled a number of military messaging systems for SIPRNET and NIPRNET.

Internal Look '03, actually held in late 2002, enabled General Tommy Franks and his staff to practice
what became Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In 2012, Internal Look was used to simulate the consequences of an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear
facilities, finding that this would lead to a regional conflict into which American forces could be
dragged, and sustain substantial losses.[3]
The New York Times said Internal Look "forecast[ed] that the strike would lead to a wider regional
war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to
American officials."
The exercise "played out a narrative in which the United States found it was pulled into the conflict
after Iranian missiles struck a Navy warship in the Persian Gulf, killing about 200 Americans,
according to officials with knowledge of the exercise. The United States then retaliated by carrying
out its own strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The initial Israeli attack was assessed to have set
back the Iranian nuclear program by roughly a year, and the subsequent American strikes did not
slow the Iranian nuclear program by more than an additional two years. However, other Pentagon
planners have said that Americas arsenal of long-range bombers, refueling aircraft and precision
missiles could do far more damage to the Iranian nuclear program if President Obama were to
decide on a full-scale retaliation." (New York Times)