Nuclear energy coop af

1ac

1ac plan
The United States federal government should ofer to lift
restrictions on foreign ownership of nuclear power reactors for
investors from the Peoples Republic of China in exchange for
the Peoples Republic of China suspending nuclear spent fuel
reprocessing development programs, expanding antiproliferation outreach eforts targeted at the domestic nuclear
industry, and establishing high-level intelligence exchanges
between China National Nuclear Corp. and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.

1ac solvency
China is leapfrogging Americas nuclear industry --- refusing to
open domestic plants up to foreign investment means the U.S.
gets left behind
Desai and Schroeder 16 [Sachin Desai is a law clerk for the Atomic Safety &
Licensing Board Panel at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Kathleen
Schroeder is an attorney with the Department of Energy General Counsel's Office for
Civilian Nuclear Programs, U.S. Nuclear Foreign Ownership Policy Ready for a
Refreshed Interpretation, Energy Law Journal Vol. 37, No. 1, 2016]

A. Increasing Globalization of the Nuclear Energy Industry

the United States remains

far and away the world's largest generator of [*87] nuclear power. n1 However, the
future of the industry is increasingly being shaped by investment in the rest of the
world, in particular the developing world.
With ninety-nine reactors producing around 771 billion kilowatt-hours in 2015,

China leads the world in new nuclear reactors, with thirty reactors in operation, twenty-one
under construction, and more primed to start construction . n2 India is planning to drastically increase
nuclear power production, n3 including tentative arrangements to build the largest nuclear power project in the

the rest of the developing world is also

showing a keen interest in nuclear power . Iran's plans to develop nuclear power have been wellworld in Jaitapur, India. n4 Apart from China and India,

publicized, but few know that Saudi Arabia plans to build sixteen reactors. n5 The UAE, n6 Jordan, n7 Egypt, n8
Romania, n9 Argentina, n10 Turkey, n11 and Hungary, n12 just to name a few, are all building or have inked plans
to build new reactors, in some cases their country's first reactor.

American, Japanese, or European companies are not the ones building these
projects. Chinese companies are leading the projects in Romania and
Argentina, n13 Russian companies lead the projects in Jordan, Turkey, Hungary, and Egypt, n14 and a Korean
consortium the project in the UAE. n15 Although the Jaitapur project in India is being led by French-owned Areva,
India has developed the capacity to [*88] construct its own nuclear power reactors. n16 While Western and
Japanese companies are showing reluctance to invest in nuclear power, new players such as Russia and China are
eager to pour their money into nuclear projects. n17

the U.S., European, and Japanese nuclear energy economies

are stepping away from nuclear power while the developing world is surging
ahead. Since 2010 the United States has retired or planned to retire at least six nuclear
plants, n18 with more to follow, n19 and is building only a few new reactors to offset
the losses. n20 In France, delays and regulatory hurdles have led to tremendous losses for French nuclear
This is in part because

company Areva SA, which is now majority-owned by Electricite de France (EDF). n21 Germany has planned to shut
down all of its reactors by 2022, n22 while France is looking to cut its dependence on nuclear power to 50% of its
electricity need. Japan's restart of its reactor fleet post-Fukishima is slow and uncertain, and while it waits, its
countrywide carbon emissions skyrocket. n23
While many politicians in America, Europe, and Japan have categorized nuclear power as a hazard, the developing
world is taking a long-term view, in which nuclear power is one of the few viable options to cost-effectively reduce
[*89] carbon emissions while satisfying baseload demand. n24 Energy experts briefed at the Paris COP21 Climate
Meeting suggested that,

in some countries with growing power demands, like China,

nuclear power would be essential for staying within a strict emissions budget.
n25 These experts chastised the United States for shutting down existing nuclear
plants due to the near-term low profitability. n26 Yet, while Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz stated

that, "we need to build on America's clean energy successes and drive innovation from renewables to carbon
capture to nuclear," there are few indicators of a strong push in nuclear energy policy at home. n27

leadership in research and development of the next

generation of nuclear reactors is moving away from the United States to
destinations such as China and India. India is leading research on plants that use thorium as a fuel
instead of uranium. n28 China is spending big both on fission research n29 and fusion
research, n30 and has plans to develop its own floating small modular reactor.
A key result of this trend is that

n31 Russia has recently activated the world's largest fast reactor. n32 [*90] One of the world's most promising

United States companies developing

cutting edge reactor designs are moving abroad for development . n34 TerraPower, Bill
Gates' nuclear startup with a novel Travelling Wave Reactor (TWR) design, recently signed an
agreement to develop its prototype TWR and first commercial reactor in China, in conjunction with the
China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). n35 But TerraPower is not alone; for example, secretive
fusion energy startups is based in Canada. n33 Moreover,

fusion-energy startup Tri Alpha Energy has sought major investment from Russian government-backed venture

When companies such as these later seek to return and build new
plants in the United States, they will have necessarily taken foreign funding and
may even be majority-foreign-owned. n37
capitalists. n36

The plan revitalizes the US nuclear industry through opening

up US nuclear plants to Chinese investment in exchange for
approving their nuclear tech. China says yes- they agreed to a
similar QPQ with Britain and theyre trying to expand to the
U.S. now
Desai and Schroeder 16 [Sachin Desai is a law clerk for the Atomic Safety &
Licensing Board Panel at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Kathleen
Schroeder is an attorney with the Department of Energy General Counsel's Office for
Civilian Nuclear Programs, U.S. Nuclear Foreign Ownership Policy Ready for a
Refreshed Interpretation, Energy Law Journal Vol. 37, No. 1, 2016]
B. The Need to Revisit Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Nuclear Power Reactors in a Changing World

The average age of a nuclear reactor in the U.S. is 30 years old . n38 Given the carboncutting requirements of the Clean Power Plan and the needs for addressing climate change generally, even if U.S.
nuclear reactors do not grow as a share of the energy mix they will need to be replaced in the future. n39 However,

U.S. utilities will need to work with foreign vendors and

accept foreign capital to construct new plants. In addition, intangible assets such
as expertise and experience with new reactor designs will increasingly have to
be imported. n40 This means that foreign ownership and control of the U.S.
nuclear [*91] fleet will increase by necessity. This may not be something to fear,
however. As discussed above, the foreign companies investing the U.S. nuclear
industry will not be gaining, but instead providing the know-how and technology ;
indeed, based on current trends, foreign involvement may become more of a necessity
than a preference if we are to maintain the modernity of the U.S. nuclear
industry.
if current trends continue,

Foreign involvement in the U.S. nuclear industry is not a new phenomenon . For
instance, eight of the fifteen uranium mines in the U.S. are foreign-owned n41 and the majority of the U.S. uranium
supply comes from abroad. n42 Two of the largest nuclear plant construction companies in the U.S. are joint
ventures with Japanese companies: GE Hitachi is a joint venture 40% funded by the Japanese company Hitachi; n43
and Westinghouse is 90% owned by Japanese firms Toshiba and IHI. n44 A number of foreign-owned companies,
including Japan's Mitsubishi, and China's CNNP, have indicated interest in buying a stake in France's Areva after the
EDF buyout. n45 The next domain for foreign entry will be in reactors.

The potential scale of foreign ownership in the construction and operation of new
reactors, which has generally been the domain of domestic companies and investors, could grow
exponentially. The United Kingdom (UK) serves as an example. In a speech by Amber Rudd in November of
2015, the UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change explained that the current UK
government will heavily focus on nuclear power along with natural gas development in the future. n46 To

urged China to help be an on-the-ground-floor

investor in this new initiative. n47 EDF announced recently that CNNC has agreed to take a
33% stake in the planned UK Hinkley Point C nuclear plant in southwestern England in
exchange for EDF's assistance in gaining UK approval for China's flagship
advanced reactor, with potential for [*92] deploying it in the UK. n48 UK Chancellor
George Osborne has said that CNNC's participation could lead to China developing and
owning a future nuclear plant in eastern England , possibly at Bradwell, a site earmarked for
nuclear development. n49 As part of this deal, Chinese companies are close to
submitting for design assessment in the UK its indigenously-designed "Hualong
One" reactor for eventual development in Essex. n50 Given China's activity in the UK, it is not
incredible to imagine that China would make its next investment in the
United States. Although past efforts by EDF to enter the U.S. nuclear market have
been unsuccessful, n51 in part due to America's foreign ownership restrictions
that are the focus of this article, China's recent tactics indicate that they are likely to
attempt to enter the U.S. nuclear market soon. n52
accomplish this, in September Secretary Rudd

The primary legal barrier to foreign investment in U.S. nuclear reactor industry is
found in the Atomic Energy Act's (AEA) n53 prohibition on foreign ownership, control, or
domination of U.S. nuclear reactor licensees , herein called the "FOCD provision." As we will
discuss further, the AEA prohibits granting a nuclear reactor construction or operating license to a "corporation or
other entity if the Commission knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a
foreign corporation, or a foreign government." n54 Although the key terms of this provision, " owned,

controlled, or dominated" are vague and open to interpretation , the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission) n55 has been alleged to have strictly applied the provision since the Cold War,
when nuclear power was intrinsically linked in the U.S. social consciousness with fear of nuclear war, and access to
nuclear technology was largely monopolized by Soviet or NATO countries.

A key point of contention has been the definition of the word "owned" in the FOCD
provision, because while control and domination can both be mitigated , [*93] foreign
ownership may act as a complete bar to licensing . n56 In particular, there is controversy
as to whether the AEA prohibits greater than 50% ownership of U.S. nuclear reactor
licensees, and how its prohibitions apply to indirect n57 ownership of nuclear reactor
licensees. If majority foreign ownership of nuclear plant licensees, direct or indirect,
is not allowed, it could significantly impact the role of foreign entities in developing
the next generation of nuclear plants in the United States. As discussed more below, the
Commission has historically been hesitant to make definitive statements on this topic, leading the Commission's
Staff to reach diverging views with applicants on the meaning of the term.

The NRC can approve foreign ownership --- opening up nuclear

plants to Chinese investment infuses the American nuclear
industry with cash and improves Americas nuclear
competitiveness
Desai and Schroeder 16 [Sachin Desai is a law clerk for the Atomic Safety &
Licensing Board Panel at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Kathleen
Schroeder is an attorney with the Department of Energy General Counsel's Office for
Civilian Nuclear Programs, U.S. Nuclear Foreign Ownership Policy Ready for a
Refreshed Interpretation, Energy Law Journal Vol. 37, No. 1, 2016]

foreign ownership of U.S. nuclear

production and utilization facilities becomes an unavoidable reality . Furthermore, the
global agenda to stop climate change must include a strong efort to develop
new nuclear plants. However, the manner in which Congress and the Commission has thus far gone
As the global energy economy becomes increasingly fluid,

about regulating this shift has left many remaining issues in controversy.

the federal court precedent and the practical realities illustrated by

other agencies' policies make clear that the NRC need not be bound to a limited
construction of the "ownership" term as a total prohibition on 100 % [*134] or
majority foreign indirect ownership of nuclear plants . Read in its totality, the AEA's foreign
ownership, control, and domination provision provides a holistic approach for the
Commission to expand, through rulemaking or clear guidance, global
participation in the U.S. nuclear market while meeting its safety objective and
promoting the domestic use of newer, safer nuclear technologies . Even if the NRC were to
adopt a new approach to the FOCD provision, it does not guarantee that 100% indirectly foreign
owned power plants will become commonplace; it would simply allow the agency to
engage with industry to find out if such arrangements could be feasible. A
rigid view of the statutory prohibition should not be the default view, which would prevent the
United States from participating in the global efort to improve nuclear safety
and address climate change.
As discussed above,

interpreting the FOCD provision will allow for the United

States to reach its alternative energy targets with sophisticated regulatory and
corporate structuring while strengthening the AEA's overall aim to protect U.S. safety
and national security. Foreign partners will be able to introduce new, safer nuclear
technologies to the United States, and U.S.-led start-ups, such as TerraPower or Tri Alpha
Energy, will not be prevented from getting significant foreign contributions
to develop their prototypes. n362 Therefore, the Commission should reconsider the idea that
foreign ownership cannot be "consistent with the NRC's usual practice, which
prioritizes ensuring that decisions relating to safety at a licensed facility remain in
the hands of U.S. citizens." n363
The authors' proposed approaches to

1ac nuclear power adv

Advantage 2: Nuclear Power
Chinas rapidly investing in nuclear power, both domestically
and internationally --- theyve already agreed to build a plant
in the UK, and they want to establish export markets --bolstering transparency is crucial to ensure safe tech
expansion
Wbbeke and Ting 16 [Jost Wbbeke is head of the economy and technology
program at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin. Guan Ting is
a visiting academic fellow at MERICS, China's Nuclear Industry Goes Global, The
Diplomat, February 11, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinas-nuclearindustry-goes-global/]

A European nuclear plant built and operated by China? Unimaginable, one might say, as China still has to prove to
be a reliable partner in operating critical infrastructure, meeting strict safety requirements, and managing the

nuclear reactors are about to be built with Chinese participation

in the United Kingdom. And that is just the beginning. Chinese power corporations are
initiating new projects all over the globe and have the potential to become the
next big civil nuclear technology suppliers for several countries (see the map below). As this
trend is assuming shape, the next decade will be critical to ensure that Chinese
technology is safe and that China adheres to non-proliferation agreements.
complex technology. Yet,

Chinas nuclear energy strategy

There is a strong desire among Chinese leaders to base future economic growth on
innovation and to become a global supplier of high-tech commodities created in
China. The objective is to seize strategic industries photovoltaics, high-speed railways, computer chips and
the like and their global markets. The One Belt, One Road strategy is intended to shape global economic

advancing nuclear technology as one of Chinas new

high-tech export brands, as railways before . The business opportunities are tremendous, as building
integration and trade by Chinese terms,

one nuclear power plant equals the value of several hundred thousand car exports.

Chinas leaders use any possible state visit to negotiate new nuclear
deals, for which they promise generous financial backing. At home, everything has been
Acting as salesmen,

in preparation for the going out years ahead. On basis of foreign technology and own original research, China has
developed its own third generation reactors.

The advanced reactors

Hualong-1, CAP1400, and a high-

temperature gas-cooled reactor design (HTR) are supposed to conquer international markets . To
achieve that, the government is coping with combining the design development and global activities of the
vigorously competing nuclear corporations.
Chinas nuclear export ambitions coincide with an increase in market opportunities. As if the Fukushima incident did

nuclear power is developing rapidly as countries around the world seek

energy security and low-carbon power generation . And China wants a slice of that pie.
However, China is fighting an uphill battle in a global nuclear market divided among
the well-tested technologies of Canada, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. As Chinese
home-grown technology does not yet enjoy a comparable reputation, the entry point
not happen,

for Chinese companies are projects that use foreign-built reactors, but use Chinese money and construction
expertise.

Chinas most recent nuclear projects around the globe fit into this pattern. In October 2015, China General Nuclear
(CGN), one of the countrys three large nuclear enterprises, agreed with lectricit de France (EDF) to jointly invest
in, construct, and operate two nuclear reactors at Hinkley Point C, United Kingdom. The reactor design is provided
by EDF. Similarly, CGN and its largest domestic rival China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) entered into
agreements with Romania and Argentina to build Canadian designed CANDU-6 reactors.

These projects are intended to create overseas experience for

the Chinese companies and build trust among current and potential customers.
All this is only the first step.

Ultimately, China seeks to sell its own reactor designs, especially the Hualong-1 and CAP1400. This strategy seems
to have bright prospects for success.
The nuclear enterprises base additional Hualong-1 projects on preceding projects with foreign technology. The deal
with EDF to build the reactors at Hinkley Point C also includes an agreement to collaborate towards constructing a
Hualong-1 reactor at Bradwell. The UK government has yet to make a decision on the project. The Argentinian
government already agreed to build a Hualong-1 at the Atucha site in Buenos Aires province.
Chinas third largest nuclear enterprise, the State Power Investment Cooperation (SPIC), is in negotiations with the
Turkish government about the construction of two CAP1400 reactors. CNNCs most advanced projects are in
Pakistan, with two Chinese small-sized reactors already in operation and two more under construction. In August
2015, the first Chinese overseas construction project for Hualong-1 started in Karachi.
How can China enter a market dominated by others for decades? Chinese firms offer a complete package including
state of the art technology, financing, and construction services. With 30 nuclear plants in operation and 21 under

China has gathered plenty of knowledge about how to build and run
a plant. In addition, the government supports the oversea projects with generous concessional loans (see table).
construction at home,

the nuclear enterprises are able to initiate and revive projects

that had previously stalled due to financial shortfalls. Before the participation of CGN, the
With these resources,

Hinkley Point C projects ran out of funds despite a U.K. government loan guarantee of 2 billion pounds. Similarly,
the Cernavoda project in Romania was on the verge of failure before when GDF Suez, CEZ and RWE, and other
major shareholders withdrew from the project.
Safety and non-proliferation concerns
Nuclear power is never going to be 100 percent safe, but with its untested technology, Chinas nuclear industry is
under particular pressure to prove its reliability. Xing Ji, the chief designer of Hualong-1, claims that the reactor is
among the safest in the world. However, China itself just began building its own demonstration projects for
Hualong-1 in Fujian and Guangxi. Every future foreign project that might deploy technologies developed in China,
and in particular the Karachi project in Pakistan already under construction, will be an adventurous experiment.
It will be essential for China to convince its prospective customers of its technology. In this regard, it made a step
forward as the Hualong-1 passed the IAEAs Generic Reactor Safety Review in December 2014. However, the
greatest challenge will be to pass the European Utilities Review and similar procedures in the United Kingdom. This
will not only take approximately five years and a lot of funding, but also put the reactor design through thorough
examinations. If the Hualong-1 can obtain these core approvals, it will experience a real boost on global markets.

The results of these assessments will critically decide the success of Chinese
overseas ambitions. The assessments will have to be very strict, in order to avoid any possibility of a
Chinese reactor experiencing a negative incident in Europe or anywhere else.
Chinese-built reactors in countries with a mature nuclear regulatory framework will hopefully be as safe as the

However, Chinese nuclear enterprises also try to tap

markets without much previous nuclear experience such as Kenya, Jordan, and
Algeria. Chinese nuclear regulators, already grappling to supervise the rapid
domestic nuclear build-up, will hardly be able to ensure the safety standards of
exported nuclear equipment. Chinas future customers will likely also have
insufficient regulatory regimes to assess the safety implications of nuclear projects.
existing reactors in these countries.

China will also face pressure to comply with non-proliferation regimes as it expands its nuclear energy trade. In
Pakistan, China has the most favorable conditions for testing its technology abroad, and no competition from other
suppliers. Pakistan is currently the most important buyer of Chinas home-grown nuclear technology. For the CNNC,
which builds these reactors, its Pakistan activities are central for its global strategy.

these deals may undermine global regimes intended to control the spread of
nuclear weapons-related materials and technologies. The Nuclear Suppliers Group,
which unites the most important supplier countries of nuclear technology, prohibits
the supply of nuclear equipment to non-signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons such as Pakistan. China is undermining this rule with its activities at the
Chashma and Karachi sites. These engagements can further aggravate the security
situation in Southern Asia.
However,

Thirty years from now, we will possibly see dozens of reactors outside of China built by Chinese companies and

It is therefore of the highest interest for both China and

its foreign customers to make sure that the technology is safe. The experiences
with the demonstration projects of Hualong-1 in Fujian and Guangxi may decide Chinas
success in the global market.
possibly even using Chinese designs.

If Chinese technology turns out not to be safe, international customers may refuse
to buy Chinese technology despite the fact that it will be offered with generous
financial support. China has a lot homework to do if it really wants to become a
major global supplier of nuclear technology. A pivotal step to demonstrating the
reliability of the technology is a more transparent nuclear industry and safety
regime within China itself.

Chinese designs are key to rapid global nuclear energy

transitions --- their capital flows and labor costs make Chinese
exports more cost-efective than any other country
Spegele 16 [Brian, graduate degrees in Mandarin and Chinese Studies from
Nanjing University, WSJ China correspondent, China Inc.s Nuclear-Power Push,
Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-inc-snuclear-power-push-1456251331]

SHENZHEN, ChinaChina

wants to shift from customer to competitor in the global

nuclear industry as it seeks to roll out its first advanced reactor for export, a move
that adds new competition for already struggling global firms.
Two state-owned firms teamed up to design the advanced indigenous Hualong One reactor with plans to sell

China General Nuclear Power Group, hosted dozens of business

executives from Kenya, Russia, Indonesia and elsewhere , as well as diplomats and journalists,
overseas. On Tuesday, one of them,

at its Daya Bay nuclear-power station to promote the Hualong One for export.
Asked how much of the global market share for new nuclear reactors CGN wants Hualong One to win, Zheng
Dongshan, CGNs deputy general manager in charge of international business, said: The more the better.

The move marks a turnaround for China and the nuclear-power industry . For three
decades, China served as a big market for nuclear giants including U.S.-based, Japanese-owned Westinghouse

More than 30 reactors have been built across China since

the 1990s with reliance on foreign design and technology .
Electric Co. and Frances Areva SA.

Chinas push into nuclear power comes as many nations have been re-examining
the risks of nuclear energy and its costs compared with natural gas and other fuels .

Two dozen reactors are under construction across China today, representing more
than one-third of all reactors being built globally , according to the International Atomic
Energy Agency.

The scale and pace of building has given CGN and other Chinese companies
opportunities to bulk up on experience in the home market and gain skills in
developing reactor parts, technologies and systems . That experience, combined
with Chinas lower costs of labor and capital, makes the new Chinese reactor
potentially attractive to international customers, industry experts said.
Its the right time to promote the Hualong One, said Franois Morin, China director of the World Nuclear
Association, a trade group. They

have a window of opportunity.

No doubt, turning promotion into sales takes time, and there is no guarantee the Hualong One will find success
abroad. Discussions over building the reactor overseas in many cases remain preliminary, and the first of Hualong
One model reactor wont enter service in China for several more years.

the Hualong One reactor marks a big leap by Chinas national nuclear champions
to move up the export value chain. Jointly designed by CGN and China National Nuclear Corp., the
But

reactor, also known as the HPR1000, has similar specifications to other so-called Generation 3 reactors such as
Westinghouses AP1000, like advanced so-called passive safety systems.
Mr. Zheng, CGNs deputy general manager, said the development of the new reactor model reflected technological
leaps made by Chinas nuclear industry since the 1990s.
We developed the HPR1000 because we accumulated experience and because we knew how to incorporate our
experience into new technology, he said.
The nuclear reactor relies in part on modified French technology used in China for many years. But CGN says the
new design is Chinas own. The developers received hundreds of original patents for the reactor, and industry
experts said they dont foresee major intellectual property issues in exporting it.
While CGN and China National Nuclear designed the reactor together, the companies are marketing it separately,

A third company, State Nuclear Power Technology Corp., plans to export

another reactor based on U.S. technology .
CGN executives said.

Regulatory approvals are among the challenges China Inc. faces as it seeks to sell homegrown reactors abroad.
CGN executives said obtaining needed regulatory permits in the U.K. and other countries for the Hualong One would
still take several years, a process that would need to conclude before construction gets under way.

CGN says it is more transparent than many Chinese state-owned enterprises,

offering public tours of its Daya Bay facility outside the southern city of Shenzhen. CGNs first nuclearpower plant went online in the 1990s and supplies power for Hong Kong. The company owns 16 commercial
reactors, with an additional 12 under construction.
At the heart of its sales pitch for potential customers overseas, CGN touts itself as a one-stop shop for nuclear
needsfrom nuclear design to construction, financing and other services.
If you choose the HPR1000, its like youre joining a big family, Yang Maochun, a deputy general manager of
CGNs international business department, told the visiting foreign executives on Tuesday.
CGN executives said the cost of building a Hualong One would vary depending on labor costs and other factors,
though they said the price for the units being built in China is around $2,500 per kilowatta midrange for reactor
costs globally. The Hualong One, the executives said, was designed to balance affordability with incorporating the
industrys most advanced technology.

reactors are already under construction in the south Chinese regions of

with additional units planned or being considered by CGN and CNNC in the
U.K., Pakistan, Argentina and elsewhere.
Four Hualong One

Fujian and Guangxi,

Political concerns over Chinese nuclear investment in the West could also pose
hurdles, though these may be overcome through jointly investing with local
partners.

Multifaceted nuclear industry engagement between the US and

China establishes a culture of safety cooperation that
establishes efective global safeguards
Nakano 14 [Jane, Fellow, Energy and National Security Program, The
Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S.-CHINA CLEAN
ENERGY COOPERATION, Statement before the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, http://
uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Testimony_Nakano_USCC_4%2025%202014_revised.pdf ]
Nuclear energy has become central to energy planning for China, the worlds most populous country whose pace
and scope of economic growth and social transformation continue to put upward pressures on its national energy
demand. Heavy dependence on energy imports and rising levels of greenhouse gas emissions are two of the
negative externalities of this immense energy demand. Irrespective of the Fukushima disaster, these two macro
factors drive political support for, and public and private investment in, the expansion of nuclear power generation
in China.

The gap between Chinas physical nuclear capacity expansion and institutional
capacity, however, warrants serious attention. This concern has fostered a range of cooperative
engagements between the United States and China. In one sense , each countrys nuclear energy
profile is quite different and, therefore, the logic for cooperation may not be readily evident. The United
States is home to the largest nuclear reactor fleet in the world but with a declining demand while China is a nascent
market with by far the most ambitious build-out targets in the world. Key characteristics of their nuclear energy
profiles, however, provide a unique synergy and basis for growing bilateral cooperation. In fact, as the world

the value of nuclear safety

cooperation will only grow for the United States and China. The emerging
commercial ties between the two countries began shifting the tone of relationship
from some variation of co-existence to a nascent version of mutual dependence
in the global nuclear energy sector. As American and Chinese businesses eye an increasing
level of partnership in the global marketplace, US participants will have a
bigger stake in preventing a low-probability, high-impact event like a nuclear
accident in China, even if it did not involve a US-designed reactor.
continues to learn and process lessons of the Fukushima nuclear accident,

For bilateral cooperation to effectively enhance nuclear safety standards in the

US and in China, the engagement needs to continue growing in a more
multifaceted direction. In particular, human dimensions in nuclear safety warrant engagement at
regulatory, technology, and commercial levels as each brings a unique and indispensable value that are also
synergistic. Bilateral safety cooperation has for the past decades centered on regulatory issues and technology R&D
primarily through government-to-government channels. But the introduction of a US-design reactor has opened up

The US nuclear industry has

decades of operational experiences and has a critical role to play in helping to
enhance operational safety standards in China, just as US nuclear regulators have been fostering
an opportunity for closer safety engagement at the industry level too.

regulatory best practices through bilateral and multilateral engagements despite the limited level of funding and
staff.

Because operational expertise reside primarily with US utilities (and not government

greater exchange between US nuclear reactor operators

and their Chinese counterparts would help facilitate homegrown efforts to
enhance the safety culture in China.
agencies or reactor vendors),

the active reactor build-out involving US-based design illuminates

prospects for more mutually beneficial cooperation over safety issues. The
construction of AP-1000 has been providing US regulators and engineers current and aspiring
engineers alikewith some first-hand observations and exposures that may otherwise
be limited in the United States. Such exposure should be further encouraged, particularly
for aspiring US nuclear engineers whose interests in the field and experiences would
be an indispensable asset for the United States as long as nuclear energy remains part of its national
Furthermore,

energy mix.

The continued expansion of its nuclear sector should increase Chinas stake in
operational safety around the world, forging a strong rationale for China to continue
sharing its construction and operational experiences with US stakeholders
in decades to come. Bilateral cooperation that is multifaceted and truly mutually
beneficial in the area of nuclear safety may lead to a new partnership between
the two countries in enhancing regulatory and safety standards around the
world.

Current energy supplies are collapsingincreased investment

in US nuclear power advances is key to prevent warming and
ensure sustainable energy production
Robock 16 [Zachary, JD, associate at Jones Day, where his practice focuses on
corporate and energy matters, Economic Solutions to Nuclear Energy's Financial
Challenges, 2016, http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1053&context=mjeal]//DBI
THE NEED FOR NUCLEARENERGY Next-generation nuclear power should be a key
component of Americas energy supply. It is the only carbon-free energy source
capable of supplying reliable baseload electricity , which today is produced mainly
by coal and other fossil fuels.7 Despite some high-profile accidents, nuclear power has a very
impressive safety and environmental record, especially in the United States,
and especially compared to coal, oil, and natural gas .8 That said, the nuclear technology in
I.

commercial operation today is antiquatedplant designs and construction typically date back to the 1960s and 70s

Next-generation nuclear technology, discussed

can significantly improve on many deficiencies in todays nuclear
plants in terms of efficiency, safety, and waste production. Unlike coal or
natural gas plants, nuclear reactors do not produce greenhouse gases or
pollutants that contribute to climate change, acid rain, smog, respiratory illnesses,
and mercury deposits, among other impacts.9 Other lifecycle impacts of fossil fuels
from exploration, pit mining, drilling, hydraulic fracturing, leaks, and spillsonly
exacerbate these ecological and human health harms. Renewable energy sources
can mitigate these impacts but come with their own environmental, economic, and
reliability concerns. Biofuels, for example, can be grown on polluted soil to absorb
toxins,10 but the pesticides and fertilizer necessary to grow such crops on an
and generate substantial long-lived nuclear waste.
infra in Part II,

industrial scale typically end up damaging waterways.11 Furthermore, burning

biofuels still releases greenhouse gases, as does manufacturing fertilizer.12
Biofuels are a good supplemental energy source, but they are not necessarily carbon neutral
(especially on a large commercial scale),13 and do not present an independent longterm energy solution. Wind and solar are beneficial energy sources and should be
encouraged; however, for grid stability and reliability purposes , [a]s the U.S.
incorporates greater amounts of intermittent renewable resources into the nations
generation mix, the need to maintain diversity in the baseload power portfolio is
critical.14 A recent study by researchers from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and
University of Colorado Boulder that pushes the envelope shows that intermittent renewables plus transmission

even with an overhaul of the long-term

transmission grid in the United States, intermittent renewables cannot entirely
displace fossil fuels, even in a scenario that pushes the envelope.
Another source of reliable baseload electricity is needed . Other than
nuclear, options for reliable baseload capacity are principally coal and natural gas.
Natural gas currently enjoys low prices and burns cleaner than coal, but it is still a fossil fuel with
harmful emissions, and methane leaks across the natural gas supply chain, still
poorly understood, may undermine its climate change benefits .16 Furthermore, natural gas is
largely obtained through fracking that may harm groundwater,17 and its prices are
historically volatile.18 Natural gas is good in the short term to wean off of coal, but an overreliance
on it will pose substantial challenges over the long term. There is an escalating
need for new energy capacity, especially baseload capacity. New EPA clean air
regulations are leading to increased closures of coal plants.19 This loss of
electric generation has not yet led to energy shortages, but only because of the
decline in energy demand caused by the recent recession .20 As the economyand
energy demandrecovers, energy adequacy is becoming increasingly
uncertain.21 EPA regulations appear likely to get increasingly stringent, leading
to additional old plant closures.22 Moreover, if the EPAs Clean Power Plan rule survives judicial review,
can eliminate most fossil-fuel electricity.15 In other words,

each state must submit a plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to target levels set by the federal
government.23 Nuclear power can be an important part of those state plans.24 That said, nuclear power has its
own environmental concernsnamely, uranium mining, waste disposal and storage, and the risk of nuclear
accident. The proliferation of nuclear energy also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism, either through a nuclear
explosion or a dirty bomb.25 Advanced nuclear is not a perfect silver bullet, but it is carbon-free and reliable, and

many of the environmental and safety concerns with current nuclear energy can be
addressed and substantially reduced by advancing nuclear technology, as
discussed throughout this Note. II. INTRODUCTION TO GENERATION IV ADVANCED NUCLEAR A central tenet of this

nuclear power needs to advance, not stagnate or disappear .26 The

nuclear industry is at a critical junctureinvest in fundamental, long-term design
improvements and drive the clean energy industry, or keep a low bottom line and
trudge along with inefficient, antiquated technology until eventually becoming
obsolete. Advanced nuclear promises improvements in safety, efficiency, and
the reduction, elimination or even consumption of nuclear waste , as discussed
Note is that

below in Section II.A.

US-China cooperation over safe nuclear power development in

China is key to prevent warmingnow is key
Hansen 14 [James, adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and
Environmental Sciences at Columbia University, elected to the National Academy of
Sciences, has won several awards for his climate change research, Renewable
Energy, Nuclear Power and Galileo: Do Scientists Have a Duty to Expose Popular
Misconceptions?, 2/21/14,
http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2014/20140221_DraftOpinion.pdf]//DBI
China U.S. cooperation & planetary resurgence There are many reasons for China and the United States to
cooperate in stabilizing climate, the most basic fact being that all nations are in the same boat and will either sink

China and the U.S. are the source of more than 40% of todays
emissions (Fig. 7a). Reduction of their emissions is essential and urgent. The United
or sail together.

States and China also are responsible for much of the excess CO2 in the air today, the U.S. portion more than 25%
and Chinas more than 10% (Fig. 7b). Within a few decades Chinas contribution is likely to be comparable to that of

Scores of nations bear little or no responsibility for global

climate change yet stand to sufer greatly if climate change continues, especially
nations at low latitudes or with large populations near sea level. The U.S. and China
will bear both moral and legal responsibilities to these other nations, much
more so if these two great nations now that consequences of inaction have
become clear do not now cooperate to take reasonable actions to mitigate climate
change. Cooperation between China and the United States on two vital matters could
change the destiny of our planet and our people. First, the basic requirement for phasing
the U.S. if recent trends continue.

down voracious fossil fuel consumption and moving to clean energy is a rising price on carbon emissions.
Agreement by China and the U.S. on rising internal carbon fees would be the turning point, opening the door to
near-global movement toward ascendancy of clean energies. A carbon fee is likely to be acceptable to the public
and conservative thought leaders in the U.S., provided that it is revenue neutral and thus is not used to make the
government bigger and more intrusive. A carbon fee will drive all of the important tools for reducing fossil fuel use:

the United States and China

should agree to cooperate in rapid deployment to scale in China of advanced, safe
nuclear power for peaceful purposes, specifically to provide clean electricity
replacing aging and planned coal-fired power plants, as well as averting the need
for extensive planned coal gasification in China, the most carbon-intensive source of
electricity.14 China has an urgent need to reduce air pollution and recognizes that
renewable energies cannot rapidly provide needed base-load electricity at
large scale. The sheer size of Chinas electricity needs demands massive
mobilization to construct modern, safe nuclear power plants , educate more nuclear
scientists and engineers, and train operators of the power plants. The United States nuclear industry
and universities have much to ofer, and in turn they have much to gain by
cooperating in development of modern safe nuclear power in China. Opposition to nuclear
energy efficiency, renewable energies, and nuclear power. Second,

power in the U.S. has slowed but not stopped progress in nuclear technology. However, the realistic size of the
market in the U.S. for improved nuclear designs, as well as for evolving still more advanced designs, is limited, at
least in the near-term. Furthermore, for reasons that do not need to be debated here, construction time for a

deep
nuclear cooperation between the China and the U.S. over the next 1-2 decades
could produce both (1) base-load electricity in China that allows Chinas carbon
emissions to peak within a decade and then decline, as is essential if climate is to be
stabilized, (2) an opportunity for both countries to achieve progress in nuclear
technology and thus a basis for comparing the merits of the most advanced
renewable and nuclear technologies. Failure of the United States and China to
nuclear power plant in the U.S. is of the order of a decade, while it is as short as 3-4 years in China. Thus

achieve such cooperation would practically guarantee the future predicted by the
pessimists who believe that humanity is incapable of exercising intelligent free-will in a situation as complex as
global climate change, where rewards for fossil fuel use are immediate and the most undesirable consequences are

Failure of the two largest polluters to cooperate, while there is still time to
avert disastrous change, would assure that global warming moves well into the
dangerous zone, unleashing domino efects as global climate impacts would
make it more difficult for all nations to move to clean energies. Success in
the proposed cooperation would not only clear the skies in China and avert lock- in
of enormous carbon pollution from coal-fired power and coal gasification. Open
involvement of industries of both nations would allow development,
demonstration and assessment of the most advanced carbon-free power
sources. China is deploying all renewable energies, as well as nuclear power, on large scales. Thus
development and assessment of these technologies will aid clean-energy
replacement of fossil power plants in the United States and provide cleanenergy options for the next intensively developing regions such as India.
Successful cooperation is crucial for the future of our planet and the well-being
of young people, future generations and nature. Abundant affordable energy is
essential if the scourge of poverty is to be defeated . The task begins at home
for China and the United States, but the repercussions of success would ring
throughout the planet.
delayed.

Warming causes extinction---geological history proves

Bushnell 10 - MS in mechanical engineering, won the Lawrence A. Sperry Award,
AIAA Fluid and Plasma Dynamics Award, the AIAA Dryden Lectureship, and is the
recipient of many NASA Medals for outstanding Scientific Achievement and
Leadership
Bushnell (Dennis, "Conquering Climate Change," The Futurist 44. 3, May/Jun 2010,
ProQuest)
Unless we act, the next century could see increases in species extinction, disease, and
floods affecting one-third of human population. But the tools for preventing this scenario are in our
hands. Carbon-dioxide levels are now greater than at any time in the past 650,000 years, according
to data gathered from examining ice cores. These increases in CO2 correspond to estimates of man-made
uses of fossil carbon fuels such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas. The global climate computations, as reported by the
ongoing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) studies, indicate that such man-made CO2 sources could be
responsible for observed climate changes such as temperature increases, loss of ice coverage, and ocean
acidification. Admittedly, the less than satisfactory state of knowledge regarding the effects of aerosol and other issues make
the global climate computations less than fully accurate, but we must take this issue very seriously. I believe we should act in

When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the

precautionary measures become obligatory, even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not
fully established scientifically. As paleontologist Peter Ward discussed in his book Under a Green Sky, several "warming
events" have radically altered the life on this planet throughout geologic history . Among the
most significant of these was the Permian extinction, which took place some 250 million years ago. This event
resulted in a decimation of animal life, leading many scientists to refer to it as the Great
Dying. The Permian extinction is thought to have been caused by a sudden increase in CO2
from Siberian volcanoes. The amount of CO2 we're releasing into the atmosphere today, through human
activity, is 100 times greater than what came out of those volcanoes . During the Permian
accordance with the precautionary principle:
environment,

extinction, a number of chain reaction events, or "positive feedbacks," resulted in oxygen-depleted

oceans, enabling overgrowth of certain bacteria, producing copious amounts of hydrogen sulfide,
making the atmosphere toxic, and decimating the ozone layer, all producing species die-off.
The positive feedbacks not yet fully included in the IPCC projections include the release of the massive
amounts of fossil methane, some 20 times worse than CO2 as an accelerator of warming, fossil CO2 from the
tundra and oceans, reduced oceanic CO2 uptake due to higher temperatures, acidification and algae
changes, changes in the earth's ability to reflect the sun's light back into space due to loss of glacier ice,
changes in land use, and extensive water evaporation (a greenhouse gas) from temperature increases. The
additional effects of these feedbacks increase the projections from a 4C-6C temperature rise by 2100 to a
10C-12C rise, according to some estimates. At those temperatures, beyond 2100, essentially all the ice would melt
and the ocean would rise by as much as 75 meters, flooding the homes of one-third of the global population.
Between now and then, ocean methane hydrate release could cause major tidal waves , and glacier
melting could affect major rivers upon which a large percentage of the population depends. We'll see increases in
flooding, storms, disease, droughts, species extinctions, ocean acidification, and a litany of
other impacts, all as a consequence of man-made climate change. Arctic ice melting, CO2 increases, and ocean warming are
all occurring much faster than previous IPCC forecasts, so, as dire as the forecasts sound, they're actually
conservative.

U.S. nuclear leadership will collapse in the status quo

expanding access to global markets ensures the US continues
to shape global nuclear norms
Wallace et al, 13 CSIS Senior Advisor [Michael, John Kotek, Sarah Williams,
Paul Nadeau, Thomas Hundertmark, George David Banks, June, CSIS, Restoring Us
Leadership in Nuclear Energy, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3f
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130614_ RestoringUSLeadershipNuclearEnergy_
WEB.pdf, accessed 7/17/16, ge]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Americas nuclear energy industry is in decline. Low natural
gas prices, financing hurdles, failure to find a permanent repository for high-level
nuclear waste, reactions to the Fukushima accident in Japan, and other factors are
hastening the day when existing U.S. reactors become uneconomic, while making it
increasingly difficult to build new ones. Two generations after the United States took
this wholly new and highly sophisticated technology from laboratory experiment to
successful commercialization, our nation is in danger of losing an industry of unique
strategic importance and unique promise for addressing the environmental and
energy security demands of the future. The decline of the U.S. nuclear energy
industry could be much more rapid than policymakers and stakeholders anticipate.
With 102 operating reactors and the worlds largest base of installed nuclear
capacity, it has been widely assumed that the United Stateseven without building
many new plantswould continue to have a large presence in this industry for
decades to come. Instead, current market conditions are such that growing numbers
of units face unprecedented financial pressures and could be retired early. Early
retirements, coupled with scheduled license expirations and dim prospects for
new construction, point to diminishing domestic opportunities for U.S. nuclear
energy firms. The outlook is much different in China, India, Russia, and other
countries, where governments are looking to significantly expand their nuclear
energy commitments. Dozens of new entrants plan on adding nuclear technology to

their generating mix, furthering the spread of nuclear materials and knowhow around the globe. It is in our nations best interest that U.S. companies
meet a significant share of this demand for nuclear technologynot simply
because of trade and employment benefits, but because exports of U.S.-origin
technology and materials are accompanied by conditions that protect our
nonproliferation interests. Yet U.S. firms are currently at a competitive
disadvantage in global markets due to restrictive and otherwise
unsupportive export policies. U.S. efforts to facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear
technology helped build a global nuclear energy infrastructurebut that
infrastructure could soon be dominated by countries with less proven
nonproliferation records. Without a strong commercial presence in new nuclear
markets, Americas ability to influence nonproliferation policies and nuclear safety
behaviors worldwide is bound to diminish. In this context, federal action to
reverse the U.S. nuclear industrys impending decline is a national security
imperative. The United States cannot afford to become irrelevant in a new nuclear
age. This brief outlines why.

1ac terrorism adv

Global nuclear power plants are vulnerable to both physical
and cyber terrorist attacksnow is key to establish good
practices
Decker and Rauhut 16 [Debra, Senior Advisor at the Stimson Centers Managing
Across Boundaries Initiative, strategy and risk expert with a specialization in critical
infrastructure and weapons of mass destruction, Kathryn, attorney specializing in
international security, works primarily on nuclear security governance,
accountability, and liability issues, Nuclear Energy: Securing the Future, January
2016, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Nuclear-Energyweb-122315.pdf]//DBI
NUCLEAR POWER FACES UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS Global nuclear expansion
comes with increased concerns The Fukushima incident in Japan caused countries to rethink their
current reliance on and future development of nuclear energy. However, many countries reaffirmed
their commitment to nuclear development . Even the European Parliaments Energy Roadmap 2050
agreed on the principle that nuclear energy would continue to play a large and significant
role in energy production.1 Nuclear is a large, stable baseload power source with low
carbon emissions. The 2015 joint report of the International Energy Agency and Nuclear Energy Agency notes
that to meet the goal of limiting the rise in global temperature to two degrees Celsius
by 2100, energy emissions need to be cut 50 percent by 2050; to achieve this, the
nuclear power industry must double its capacity .2 Indeed, 65 power reactors are
currently under construction worldwide, with China accounting for the largest share
of this increase. Countries from Egypt to Indonesia are considering nuclear power
generation, and so-called newcomer countries with limited or no experience
operating nuclear power reactors present even higher risks (see Appendix I). This
expansion and the related increased commerce in nuclear materials raise the
potential for future adverse incidents as well as the need for new ways to mitigate
security and other risks. Some States with existing nuclear power facilities, as well
as newcomers, are challenged by an array of governance issues including
regulatory capability, reputational risk, and human resource issues .
Regulatory oversight is often initially placed within an atomic energy agency that
promotes development, which is in potential conflict with regulatory enforcement,
and safety and security oversight may reside in different State entities. Questions
have also arisen about regulators relationships to plants under the build-ownoperate (BOO) model, such as Rosatoms in Turkey ,3 and which risks are increased or
reduced in the BOO model.4 Furthermore, regulators and insurers have found that
even within one country, behavioral norms can differ within each facility as a result
of variations in management and oversight. Challenges are plentiful. The industry
has to contend with aging infrastructure and facilities, rapidly evolving
cybersecurity challenges, and new plant designs. Even with security and
safety built into some new plant designs, industry is apprehensive over the likely
high cost of regulator-defined security affecting the profitability of the developing small
modular reactors. Furthermore, the escalating costs of new builds make nuclear facilities
more costly to finance and thus to insure. Threats, vulnerabilities, consequences
pose potentially high risks These general concerns are all in addition to rising threats from

malevolent actors that could target nuclear operations. Terrorist attacks against
vulnerable populations have increased, with tragedies in many countries that could
easily be translated into attacks against vulnerable targets .5 With Boko Haram and
ISIL in or near countries that have or are considering nuclear facilities, and with the
spreading reach of all terrorists including through cyber potential
threats increase. But how vulnerable are nuclear facilities to threats? One recent Harvard study finds:
There are still countries with: no on-site armed guards to protect nuclear
facilities...; no required background checks before granting access to nuclear
facilities and materials; and limited protections against insider theft. Few
countries conduct realistic tests of their nuclear security systems ability to
defeat determined and creative adversaries; and few have targeted programs to
assess and strengthen security culture in each relevant nuclear organization .6
Nuclear security is only as good as its last successful ability to prevent, detect, and
respond to a nuclear security event. The global threat, planning, and coordination of
recent terrorist attacks, such as those recently in Europe, only highlight the
urgency. Vulnerabilities are compounded by simple lack of awareness. Although
industry associations share information on safety, they often consider security information
too sensitive to share and/or not within their purview . Considering cyber risks, a Chatham
House report notes that nuclear energy executives lack sufficient awareness of cyber
threats and vulnerabilities due partly to a lack of information sharing both within
the nuclear industry and with other industries; developing countries are
particularly at risk given their limited resources to invest in cybersecurity .7 (See
Appendix III for a sample of some incidents.) Most recently, one plant at the facility in Doel, Belgium, was sabotaged

Transformers
and the grid can be an issue as nuclear plants not only contribute power to the electric
grid but also rely on electricity for running and maintaining their plant operations. The electric sector and
nuclear facilities have indeed been targets. Two of the most infamous attacks to
date have been: the 2013 sniper attacks on transformers supporting the electric grid in California, with an
insider likely involved;9 and the 2007 attack also with reported insider assistance on a
South African nuclear research facility that houses highly enriched uranium.10 The
in 2014, and another plant was faced with a fire after an open-air transformer exploded in 2015.8

defense-in-depth approach that commercial power facilities generally follow allows for multiple, independent,

incidents
happen that defy the defenses. Emergency response plans limit consequences, but major events
can displace populations temporarily as with Three Mile Island, or longer term as with Chernobyl and
redundant systems to protect against hazards; thus these events were not of high consequence. Yet,

Fukushima. Less considered but of important consequence is the possible loss of electric output from a plant,

For countries without an integrated, well-managed grid

system, heavy reliance on a nuclear plant that suffers an outage could lead to
incapacitating blackouts. Good practices need to be front and center The
potential for establishment of agreed-upon baseline good practices can help
address some of these risks and reduce uncertainties associated with the expansion
of nuclear power. Efforts to reduce some of the risks would be easier to undertake
today than in the future. Currently there are only about 30 countries operating
commercial nuclear power plants. This number is likely to increase by about 50
percent over the next 25 years, even without considering the development and
potentially widespread use of small modular reactors in the future .
especially any long-term outages.

Theft of nuclear material is the only scenario for nuclear

terrorismsecurity improvements are key
Bunn et al 16 [Matthew, Professor of Practice at Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government, winner of the American Physical Society's Joseph A.
Burton Forum Award for "outstanding contributions in helping to formulate policies
to decrease the risks of theft of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials", Martin
Malin, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvards Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, research focuses on security
consequences of the growth and spread of nuclear energy, Nickolas Roth, Research
Associate at the Belfer Centers Project on Managing the Atom, Research Fellow at
the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland,
William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, former deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?, March 2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web.pdf]//DBI
Two years ago, when the last nuclear security summit occurred, the Islamic State (IS) was one of many small Islamic
extremist groups.1 Within months, the IS had seized major portions of Syria and Iraq and declared a global

Today, the IS governs wide swathes of Iraq and

Syria, is recruiting from around the globe, has demonstrated a desire and capability
to strike far beyond its borders, and has stated its ambition to launch major attacks
on the United States. As the ISs dramatic rise makes clear, it is impossible to
predict what the terrorist threat will look like five, ten, or twenty years into the
future making it all the more essential to ensure that future terrorists can never
acquire the essential ingredients of nuclear bombs . To make a nuclear bomb, a
terrorist group would have to have separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium
(HEU)materials that do not occur in nature and are likely beyond the ability of
terrorists to produce. Hence, if all the worlds nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
materials can be locked down and kept out of terrorist hands, terrorists can be
prevented from ever getting a nuclear explosive. There are many steps that
should be taken to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism , but securing nuclear stockpiles is the
caliphate, making its global ambitions clear.

single most important chokepoint blocking the terrorist pathway to the bomb. Despite significant progress over the

some nuclear weapons materials remain dangerously vulnerable to

theftand incidents such as an IS operatives intensive monitoring of a senior
official of a Belgian facility with significant stocks of HEU highlight the continuing
threat. In the two years since the last nuclear security summit, security for nuclear materials has improved
modestlybut the capabilities of some terrorist groups, particularly the IS, have grown
dramatically, suggesting that in the net, the risk of nuclear terrorism may have
increased. Given these ever-changing terrorist capabilities, it is critical to ensure
that all nuclear weapons, and all materials that could be used to make them,
wherever they may be in the world, are effectively protected against a wide
spectrum of plausible adversary capabilities and tactics . Policymakers can never be
satisfied that the work of nuclear security is done. Nuclear security approaches must focus on
continuous improvement in the face of an ever-evolving threat, changing
technologies, and newly discovered vulnerabilities . Nuclear security that is
not getting better is probably getting worse .
past two decades,

Extincton
Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures
and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to
Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf; kdf)
Technology contains no inherent moral directiveit empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has
always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and

our present situation is that modern technology

can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before . We
now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as
destructive asor possibly even more destructive than those held by any nationstate. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to
kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man,
woman, and child on earth . The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting
the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging . Just thinking about the
awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of

subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the

Failing
nation-stateslike North Koreawhich possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a
nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem
is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less
understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on
terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the
danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison.
The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack . Nation
needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore.

states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find
which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming
retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental

Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on

their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in
point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a
massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts
anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan . Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host
equation of retaliation has become reversed.

state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless
al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since
9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually,

the world will recognize that stateless

groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons
and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited
themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren,
decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.

Cyberattacks cause grid collapse and nuclear meltdowns

Baylon et al 15 [Caroline, Information Security Research Lead at AXA, Master's
degree, Social Science of the Internet (Focus on cyber security and internet policy),
Roger Brunt, appointed Director, Office for Civil Nuclear Security, UK, appointed
Head of Transformation in the UK's newly formed Office for Nuclear Regulation,
member of the Director General's Advisory Group on Nuclear Security, David

Livingstone, Associate Fellow, International Security, Chatham House, Cyber

Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks, September 2015,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20151
005CyberSecurityNuclearBaylonBruntLivingstone.pdf]//DBI
A cyber attack on a nuclear plant could cause a widespread loss of power. Nuclear
reactors using water in their primary cooling circuit are designed to give a high level of protection to that water, but

the water supply that cools the turbines which in turn generate the electricity is not
so well protected. Without that water supply, the turbine could be tripped and
electricity generation halted, with a serious impact on the power grid. In
countries that rely on nuclear energy, power provided by nuclear plants is
considered to be the base load, or a steady and constant source of supply . Other
sources of power generation, for example gas-fired electricity generation, can be more responsive to demand and
so can be adjusted to meet peaks in demand and to reduce supply when there is a lower requirement for power.

a cyber attack that took one or more nuclear facilities offline could, in a very
short time, remove a significant base component to the grid, causing
instability. According to Source 27: In the US, its very easy to have this ripple efect
because if those plants go off the grid quickly enough, its a pretty significant
percentage of the grids base load that all of a sudden disappears, which causes
the entire grid to become burdened. If you did that to a reasonable number of those
larger substations, you could cause a significant grid event. The consequences of
a loss of power could be severe. In theory, a cyber attack on a nuclear plant could
bring about an uncontrolled release of ionizing radiation . An adversary with
sufficient technical knowledge and adequate resources could mount an attack on a
nuclear power plant that could trigger the release of significant quantities of
ionizing radiation. All nuclear power plants need offsite power to operate safely
and all have a standby generator system which is designed to be activated when a
loss of mains power occurs. Attacks on the offsite power supply and the on-site
backup system could create some of the effects that occurred following the 2011 earthquake and
Thus

tsunami at Fukushima Daiichi, although multiple failures of the many safety features at modern nuclear power
plants would also need to occur at the same time as that loss of offsite power and the disruption of standby
generators.

Cyberattacks that collapse the grid go nuclear

Tilford 2012(Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, July 27, Cyber
attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast,
http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-theelectric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa, brackets edit out ableist language)
a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could
also cripple [destroy] the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids
that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power
every military base in our country. Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage
To make matters worse

with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out, he said. Which means

military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats
to our country would shut Down completely. Communication between commanders and their
troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power,
said Senator Grassley. So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would

be left scrambling

to maintain base functions, he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed
the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national security officialsincluding the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director have
said, preventing a cyber attack and improving the nations electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our
country (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a

A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an

Act of War and could be met with a full scale US military response. That could
include the use of nuclear weapons , if authorized by the President.
war over it, for sure.

Meltdowns cause extinction

Lendman 11 [Stephen, Research Associate -- Center for Research on
Globalization, 3-13, Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,
http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-injapan]
For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that

nuclear technology threatens life on our planet with extinction . If present trends
continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with
enough radioactive pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any
plague humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear
power proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and
Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying: "The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami
that sent walls of water (six meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it
was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage. "Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were
impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail
company" reported three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for. Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast
destruction, shook city skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed
thousands, and caused a nuclear meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and tsunami devastation, almost
minor by comparison under a worst case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged
Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling
systems broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the
40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the
containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times
above normal. Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster.
This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets
are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to
live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying:
Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its
seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the
ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to
contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the
containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at

Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear
radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment,"
Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has
been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within
nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the
radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." " No
citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from
radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe.
Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if
Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through
(its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at
least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely
dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake,

aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison.

Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized.

Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity
far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility
could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing,
but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety
analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have
occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large
leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core
meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to
anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If
the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you
could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire
region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western
Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia.
Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can occur
anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling
Fukushima an "apocalyptic event," Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones.
It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central
America, and parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this
writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book
titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal
operations, nuclear power generation causes significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands
of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year. Moreover, nuclear plants are
atom bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb able to
devastate a large city, besides causing permanent radiation contamination. Nuclear Power not Cleaner and Greener Just the
opposite, in fact. Although a nuclear power plant releases no carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary greenhouse gas, a vast
infrastructure is required. Called the nuclear fuel cycle, it uses large amounts of fossil fuels. Each cycle stage exacerbates the
problem, starting with the enormous cost of mining and milling uranium, needing fossil fuel to do it. How then to dispose of mill
tailings, produced in the extraction process. It requires great amounts of greenhouse emitting fuels to remediate. Moreover, other
nuclear cycle steps also use fossil fuels, including converting uranium to hexafluoride gas prior to enrichment, the enrichment
process itself, and conversion of enriched uranium hexafluoride gas to fuel pellets. In addition, nuclear power plant construction,
dismantling and cleanup at the end of their useful life require large amounts of energy. There's more, including contaminated
cooling water, nuclear waste, its handling, transportation and disposal/storage, problems so far unresolved. Moreover, nuclear power
costs and risks are so enormous that the industry couldn't exist without billions of government subsidized funding annually. The
Unaddressed Human Toll from Normal Operations Affected are uranium miners, industry workers, and potentially everyone living
close to nuclear reactors that routinely emit harmful radioactive releases daily, harming human health over time, causing illness and

The link between radiation exposure and disease is irrefutable, depending

only on the amount of cumulative exposure over time , Caldicott saying: "If a regulatory
gene is biochemically altered by radiation exposure, the cell will begin to incubate
cancer, during a 'latent period of carcinogenesis,' lasting from two to sixty years." In
fact, a single gene mutation can prove fatal . No amount of radiation exposure is
safe. Moreover, when combined with about 80,000 commonly used toxic chemicals and
contaminated GMO foods and ingredients, it causes 80% of known cancers, putting
everyone at risk everywhere. Further, the combined effects of allowable radiation
exposure, uranium mining, milling operations, enrichment, and fuel fabrication can
be devastating to those exposed. Besides the insoluble waste storage/disposal problem, nuclear
accidents happen and catastrophic ones are inevitable. Inevitable Meltdowns Caldicott
and other experts agree they're certain in one or more of the hundreds of reactors
operating globally, many years after their scheduled shutdown dates unsafely.
Combined with human error, imprudently minimizing operating costs, internal
sabotage, or the effects of a high-magnitude quake and/or tsunami, an eventual
catastrophe is certain. Aging plants alone, like Japan's Fukushima facility, pose unacceptable risks based on their record
early death.

of near-misses and meltdowns, resulting from human error, old equipment, shoddy maintenance, and poor regulatory oversight.
However, under optimum operating conditions, all nuclear plants are unsafe. Like any machine or facility, they're vulnerable to
breakdowns, that if serious enough can cause enormous, possibly catastrophic, harm. Add nuclear war to the mix, also potentially
inevitable according to some experts, by accident or intent, including Steven Starr saying: "Only a single failure of nuclear
deterrence is required to start a nuclear war," the consequences of which "would be profound, potentially killing "tens of millions of
people, and caus(ing) long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth's protective ozone
layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people." Worse still is nuclear winter, the ultimate
nightmare, able to end all life if it happens. It's nuclear proliferation's unacceptable risk, a clear and present danger as long as
nuclear weapons and commercial dependency exist. In 1946, Enstein knew it, saying: "Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by
those possessing the power to make great decisions for good and evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything
save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." He envisioned two choices - abolish all forms of
nuclear power or face extinction. No one listened. The Doomsday Clock keeps ticking.

1ac prolif adv

Advantage 1: Prolif
China is planning a massive expansion of nuclear reprocessing
capabilities that causes other Asian countries to follow suit
and undermines non-prolif
Green 16 [Jim Green Nuclear Monitor editor, Reprocessing and plutonium
stockpiling in East Asia, Nuclear Monitor, Issue: #82145510, June 4, 2016,
https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/821/reprocessing-and-plutoniumstockpiling-east-asia]

China's reprocessing plans

China criticized
Japan's reprocessing plans, noting that Japan has enough plutonium to produce a
large number of nuclear weapons, and that some Japanese advocate weapons production.10
At an October 2015 session of the First Committee session of the U.N. General Assembly,

But China doesn't bring a great deal of moral authority to the debate . An editorial in the
Japanese Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper said: "China criticizes Japan for possessing enough plutonium 'to produce a
large number of nuclear weapons.' Is China, which keeps the actual situation concerning its nuclear weapons secret
and is reportedly enhancing its nuclear capability, in a position to criticize Japan?"9

China is planning to massively increase domestic reprocessing . China

National Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) and Areva envisage a commercial-scale plant
processing 800 tonnes of spent fuel annually, with capital costs of CNY 100 billion (US$15.4 billion,
Moreover

13.8 billion).18

Corker accused the Obama

administration of encouraging reprocessing despite the concern over proliferation,
pointing to the renegotiation of a nuclear cooperation agreement with China last
year that allows the reprocessing of fuel from U.S.-designed reactors . "We're not calling
for a plutonium time-out like we could have done," Corker said.7 Democratic Senator Ed Markey warned of a
domino efect in East Asia, saying if Japan and China went ahead with their
reprocessing plants, there would be pressure on South Korea to pursue its own
reprocessing eforts, which would in turn undermine eforts to get North
Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.7
In mid-March, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Bob

In Beijing, U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz voiced concern about China's plans for its first commercial-scale

China's recent announcement that it would

press ahead with a reprocessing program "certainly isn't a positive in terms of nonproliferation" and that "we don't support large-scale reprocessing". Moniz continued: "I don't
think in any way we've been coy about our arguments with all of our partners. We
just see so many problems. It's just, on objective grounds, very difficult to
understand."19
reprocessing plant. He told the Wall Street Journal that

Areva didn't respond to a request from the Wall Street Journal for comment on Moniz's remarks and CNNC said its
press officers weren't available.19

East Asian reprocessing catalyzes a race to stockpile

plutonium --- that provides a cover for weapons development
Sokolski 16 [Henry, executive director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center in Arlington, Virginia; an adjunct professor at Georgetown Univ, Can East
Asia avoid a nuclear explosive materials arms race?, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March 26, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/can-east-asia-avoid-nuclearexplosive-materials-arms-race9295]

Later this week, from March 31 to April 1, Washington will host the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit.

the commercial plutonium plans of Japan, Korea, and China wont be on

the agenda. That's a shame because, as everyone knows, plutonium is a nuclear explosive. Whats at
stake is nothing less than a race to stockpile plutonium in East Asia that could
end very, very badly.
Unfortunately,

North Koreas fourth nuclear test, on January 6, intensified these concerns. Shortly after the
test, leaders of the South Korean National Assemblys ruling party publicly urged President Park Geun-hye to
consider reprocessing fuel from nuclear power plants to extract plutonium, as a military hedge against further North
Korean nuclearization. Technically, this is feasible: A recent analysis in Seouls leading daily, Chosun Ilbo, detailed
how South Korea could use its existing facilities to acquire its first bomb, perhaps as early as 18 months from now.

Those pushing to acquire a nuclear option want a countermeasure against the

North. They also complain that Washington has authorized Japan, Americas other East Asian security ally, to
reprocess spent US-origin fuel (fuel made in the United States but burned in reactors in Japan) to produce
plutonium. This grates on Seoul, given the historical enmity between Japan and South Korea. Washington has yet to
grant South Korea similar recycling rights.
In fact, Japan now has about 11 metric tons of plutonium on its soil (and another 37 metric tons stored abroad)
enough to make roughly 2,000 nuclear weaponsand plans to open a large, decades-delayed commercial
reprocessing plant at Rokkasho after the US-Japan civilian nuclear cooperation agreement automatically renews late
in 2018. The Rokkasho plant will produce enough plutonium to make more than 1,500 nuclear warheads annually
roughly equivalent to the entire operationally deployed US nuclear force.
This has raised Chinas hackles. Chinese officials in Beijing and at the United Nations have repeatedly complained
that Japan's continued stockpiling and planned production of plutonium is a not-so-subtle threat to go nuclear. There

Beijing announced its latest five-year plan to

commercially reprocess spent fuel, and is in the late stages of negotiations with the French firm
Areva for a reprocessing plant similar in size to that of Rokkasho. If China builds and operates this
plant, it plans to stockpile plutonium for 10 to 20 years ostensibly for advanced reactor fuel
producing enough plutonium for between 15,000 and 30,000 bombs, roughly the
number of weapons worth of nuclear explosives that the United States or Russia
could remilitarize if they weaponized the massive amounts of surplus nuclear
weapons fuel in their respective stockpiles.
is a bit of hypocrisy in this. Just last week,

This could be militarily significant. Currently, Chinas nuclear arsenal is believed to

be only 200 to 400 weapons. Its surplus plutonium stockpile, moreover, is only large
enough to produce some additional hundreds of bombs , and China lacks any working military
plutonium production reactor. Would a Chinese commercial plutonium program serve as a
work-around? This may not be Chinas intention now, but if tensions in the region
increased, might this change? One has to hope not.
What makes these civilian plutonium-recycling efforts all the more dubious is how little economic and technical
sense they make.

They are not only unnecessary to promote nuclear power or manage

nuclear waste, but also clear money losers. Privately, Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean officials
and other government advisers concede these points; publicly, they dont.
For all these reasons, US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz chose to speak up earlier this month. In an editorial
board meeting at The Wall Street Journals Beijing office, he made it clear: We dont support large-scale
reprocessing. As for Chinas latest announcement that it would proceed to build its first commercial-scale
reprocessing plant, he noted that it certainly isnt a positive in terms of nonproliferation. On this, Moniz speaks
with some moral authority. He coauthored a major 2011 MIT study that concluded investing in commercial
plutonium recycling should be deferred, and his Beijing pronouncement came on the heels of a politically difficult
decision he made to terminate the Department of Energys own costly plutonium fuel fabrication plant at Savannah
River.
The Secretary, however, is not the only US official to speak up. The day Moniz made his Beijing statement, both
Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator Bob Corker and minority committee member Senator Ed
Markey of Massachusetts emphasized the nonproliferation and regional security value of backing an East Asian
commercial plutonium recycling time-out in a committee hearing on the Nuclear Security Summit.
Easily as important: The administration witness, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman, quickly agreed. I would be very happy to see all countries get out of the
plutonium reprocessing business, he noted. Countryman went further, saying that there

are genuine
economic questions where it is important that the US and its partners in Asia have a
common understanding of the economic and nonproliferation issues at stake before
making a decision about renewal of the 123 [civilian nuclear cooperation] agreement, for
example, with Japan. All at once, although there has been no officially acknowledged change in US policy,
the automatic renewal in 2018 of the 123 agreement no longer seems, well,
automatic.
The question now is whats needed next. Besides following through on the economic and
nonproliferation discussions Countryman called for in East Asia, it would be useful for others in Congress to speak
up. Congressman Brad Sherman, ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the

Others should follow

his lead, emphasizing the need for US officials to make the nonproliferation and
regional security case for Japan, South Korea, and China to follow Americas example of
deferring the commercializing of plutonium fuels .
Pacific, has long championed the idea of an East Asian commercial plutonium time-out.

Reprocessing arms races cause an atmosphere of paranoia and

instability that escalates to nuclear acquisition and causes
global prolif
Armstrong 16 [Ian Armstrong is a Supervisor and Researcher at Wikistrat, he
previously assisted in research at Temple University, the University of Pennsylvania,
Scottish Parliament, and Hudson Institute's Center for Political-Military Analysis,
where he has focused on non-proliferation and international energy, his research
has been presented at conferences at Tufts University and University of Edinburgh,
and his analysis has been featured at prominent outlets such as Business Insider,
Foreign Policy Association, CBS News, and RealClearEnergy, East Asian plutonium
policies risk regional stability, Global Risk Insight, April 25, 2016,
http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/04/east-asian-plutonium-policies]

Chinas plutonium reprocessing ambitions are only now beginning to

materialize into concrete plans. Recently, Beijing announced plans to accelerate the
In contrast,

construction of its first reprocessing facility, in spite of its repeated criticism of the Japanese
program. The plant, envisioned to produce a similar 8 tons of plutonium per year, is now set to begin construction in
2020 and come online in 2030.

the
acceleration of the program represents an implied risk for nuclear terrorism and a
future increase in Chinas latent capacity for nuclear weapons . It also suggests that Japans
reprocessing eforts have exacerbated regional tensions and produced a
noticeable escalation in East Asian nuclear policies.
Even as a nuclear weapons state, Chinas current stockpile is significantly smaller than Japansbut

South Korea, is not engaged in nuclear reprocessing and has

it is also represents the clearest link between
reprocessing and nuclear weapons acquisition . For several years now, Seoul has
increasingly demanded that the United States grant it legal consent to begin
nuclear reprocessing under the U.S.-Korea nuclear agreement. In doing so, South Korea
The third major East Asian power,

not yet established plans to do sobut

points to Japan for precedent, and argues that reprocessing is a necessary step in managing the waste from a
growing nuclear power industry.
While this may be a genuine intention, it is also clear that South Koreas interest in reprocessing coincides with
North Korean nuclear tests. When North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in 2009, South Koreas opposition
party demanded the nuclear sovereignty to reprocess plutonium. After Pyongyangs recent test in January,
demands for reprocessing once again spiked, this time coming from within leading figures of the ruling party. In

increasing South Korean interest in nuclear reprocessing not only presents

heightened potential for nuclear terrorism, but also a more clear risk of nuclear
weapons proliferation.
short,

Regional risks beyond terrorism

Clearly, East Asias increasing pursuit of reprocessed plutonium presents increased risk of rogue non-state actors
securing dangerous nuclear materials. That being said, the influence of ISIS and similar radicalized groups seeking
radiological agents has remained generally weak in East Asia, and nuclear security procedures are improving in the
region.

The greater risk comes from feedback loops and reactionary chains when one
nation escalates their pursuit of nuclear reprocessing, the others follow suit. China,
Japan, and South Korea are imbued in lasting geopolitical anxieties, and the pursuit of these policies
regardless of intentiononly facilitates an atmosphere of greater paranoia and
instability. Although nuclear proliferation may not be the goal at present, a future plutonium buildup in East Asia would perpetuate the chance that the race to reprocessing
transpires into a full-fledged nuclear arms race if relations begin to deteriorate.
countries with budding nuclear energy programs in more terror-prone
regions of the worldsuch as Turkey and Egyptmay feel justified in pursuing
reprocessing as a result. Similarly, Iran could utilize the international allowance of
plutonium production in East Asia as a cover for future attempts at atomic
arms. The programs would also complicate multilateral discussions with North Korea on
de-nuclearization, as concerned international entities would now appear hypocritical.
With these risks made clear, there is little question that the hazards of East Asias
growing interest in nuclear reprocessing far outweigh any benefit achieved in
nuclear waste management.
More broadly,

Unmanaged tech breakout causes nuclear war --- commercial

reprocessing triggers the link
Sokolski 9 [Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, 6/1/2009, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5534]

Fissile for peace and war

Compounding this worrisome prospect are large amounts of weapons-usable
materials in military and growing civilian stockpiles that could be quickly militarized
to create or expand existing nuclear bomb arsenals . Russia, for example, has at least 700 tons of
weapons-grade uranium and over 100 tons of separated plutonium in excess of its military requirements, while the
U.S. has roughly 50 tons of separated plutonium and about 160 tons of highly enriched uranium in excess of its

Chinas surpluses of highly enriched uranium and separated

plutonium are already estimated to be large enough to allow Beijing to triple the
number of weapons it currently has deployed .15
military needs. As noted before,

stockpiles of civilian materials that could be drawn upon to make additional

bombs are large or growing. China, for example, is planning to complete two
commercial reprocessing plants by 2025 that will be able to produce each year
enough material to make at least 1,000 crude nuclear weapons.16 Meanwhile, Japan, a
In addition,

nonnuclear weapons competitor of Beijing, already has roughly 45 tons of separated plutonium (much of which is
stored in France), 6.7 tons of which is stockpiled on its own soil enough to make roughly 1,500 crude nuclear
weapons. Japan also will soon be separating enough plutonium at its newest commercial reprocessing plant to make
between 1,000 and 2,000 crude-weapons-worth of separated plutonium a year. Almost all of this newly separated
plutonium will be in surplus of Japans civilian requirements and will be stored in the country.17
As for India and Pakistan, they have no declared military surpluses. India, however, has stockpiled roughly 11 tons
of unsafeguarded civilian reactor-grade plutonium enough to make well over 2,000 crude fission weapons
and can easily generate over 1,200 kilograms of unsafeguarded plutonium annually. Pakistan has no such reserve
but, like India, is planning to expand its civilian nuclear generating capacity roughly twenty-fold in the next two
decades and is stockpiling weapons-grade uranium. Both countries are increasing their nuclear fuel-making
capacity (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing) significantly.18
Atoms for peace?

several new nuclear weapons contenders are also likely to emerge in the next two
Among these might be Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran,
Algeria, Brazil (which is developing a nuclear submarine and the uranium to fuel it), Argentina, and
possibly Saudi Arabia (courtesy of weapons leased to it by Pakistan or China), Egypt, Syria, and
Turkey. All of these states have either voiced a desire to acquire nuclear weapons or
tried to do so previously and have one or more of the following: A nuclear power
program, a large research reactor, or plans to build a large power reactor by 2030 .
With a large reactor program inevitably comes a large number of foreign nuclear
experts (who are exceedingly difficult to track and identify) and extensive training, which is certain to include
nuclear fuel making.19 Thus, it will be much more difficult to know when and if a state is
acquiring nuclear weapons (covertly or overtly) and far more dangerous nuclear
technology and materials will be available to terrorists than would otherwise. Bottom line: As
more states bring large reactors on line more will become nuclear-weapons-ready
i.e., they could come within months of acquiring nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.20
Finally,

to three decades.

As for nuclear safeguards keeping apace, neither the iaeas nuclear inspection system (even under the most

optimal conditions) nor technical trends in nuclear fuel making (e.g., silex laser enrichment, centrifuges, new South
African aps enrichment techniques, filtering technology, and crude radiochemistry plants, which are making

This
brave new nuclear world will stir existing security alliance relations more than it will
settle them: In the case of states such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, it could prompt key allies to go
ballistic or nuclear on their own. Nuclear 1914 At a minimum, such developments will be a departure
from whatever stability existed during the Cold War . After World War II, there was a clear
successful, small, affordable, covert fuel manufacturing even more likely)21 afford much cause for optimism.

subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers strong alliance systems the U.S.-led free
world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial
wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United
States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a
relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is
increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan,
Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weaponarmed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them
strategic partners (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), non-nato allies (e.g., Israel
and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status
(e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world,
every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan
could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by
Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of
these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such
a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international
system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can
rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of

actions of
just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state
could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty
containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such
threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied
upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic
below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the
perfect nuclear storm: Small diferences between nuclear competitors that would
put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break
out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new
nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and
nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly
each nuclear states military would place an even higher premium than before on being
able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable,
nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the

and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced
military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and longrange, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options.

relations between states could become far less stable .

Relatively small developments e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces;
Certainly, in such a world,

Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking
activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored

could easily prompt

nuclear weapons deployments with strategic consequences (arms races,
strategic miscues, and even nuclear war ). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world every
quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is
possible today.23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor
assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc.

their critics, would ever want. None of this, however, is inevitable.

Prolif causes extinction --- only impact capable of breaching

mutually assured deterrence
Kroenig 15 [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in
the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University, The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?, Journal
of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015]

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international
peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional
instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further
nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is
not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this

we should be
pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation . Many of these threats
section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why

will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Irans advanced nuclear program.
Nuclear War

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in
possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere,
someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war.
To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of
nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be nave to think that nuclear
weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the
1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be
surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This
author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime.

Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in
which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states
might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran
acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike

given its small size and lack of strategic

depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and
respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to
build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear
threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force .
capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal,

the state with

the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a
crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm
Irans nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israels
aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state
with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose
them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk
having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war
could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack .49 If there are advantages to striking
first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it
In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First,

would be better to go first than to go second . Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this
dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an IsraeliIranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran
might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from
an opponent.

there is still a
risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational
Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities,

leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past
and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future.

Irans

theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy
since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could
one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear
weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a
nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction.
One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may
deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As

nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still

seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited
was discussed above,

nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that
might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States
planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATOs conventional
inferiority.51 As Russias conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to
rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear
weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to
de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistans military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from
conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against
a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency.

leaders can make a threat that leaves something to

chance.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of
nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to
force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in
nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And
scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about
future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than
existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis
could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.
Second, as was also discussed above,

Nuclear Terrorism

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54
While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had

Laden declared it a religious duty for AlQaeda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring
it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West .55 Unlike states, which can
Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin

be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56
Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the
greatest threat to US national security.57
Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire

as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will

eventually fall into terrorist hands increases . States could intentionally transfer
nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good
nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless,

reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread,

the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that
Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to

a new
nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to
theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to
transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from
terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists,

Pakistans atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qaeda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59

a nuclear-armed state could collapse , resulting in a breakdown of law and

order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to
Finally,

Pakistans nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further
amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The
regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nucleararmed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Irans nuclear arsenal.

Regional Instability
The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to
regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military
attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that
they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more
aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy . In this way, nuclear weapons provide a
shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed,
international relations theories about the stability-instability paradox maintain that stability at the nuclear level
contributes to conventional instability.60

the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their

possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have
demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon
states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear -weapon states and that
this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less
experience with nuclear diplomacy. 61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan
Historically, we have seen that

reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons,
which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62
Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel,

nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up

support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive
diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could
witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle
East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of
those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.
but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A

Engagement with global markets gives the US leverage to

shape reprocessing norms the alternative is proliferation
Wallace et al, 13 CSIS Senior Advisor [Michael, John Kotek, Sarah Williams,
Paul Nadeau, Thomas Hundertmark, George David Banks, June, CSIS, Restoring Us
Leadership in Nuclear Energy, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3f
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130614_ RestoringUSLeadershipNuclearEnergy_
WEB.pdf, accessed 7/17/16, ge]

CONTROLLING THE SPREAD OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES

Growth in nuclear electricity production outside the United States will drive a
commensurate increase in the demand for enriched uranium (or for plutonium
recovered from used fuel via some form of reprocessing). Inevitably, the facilities
needed to supply this demandbecause they can be used to produce both nuclear
fuel and nuclear weapons-usable materialare of particular concern from a national
security standpoint. During the 1960s, the United States supplied a significant
percentage of the market for uranium enrichment services outside the former Soviet
Union, through government-owned uranium enrichment plants located in Ohio,
Kentucky, and Tennessee (Oak Ridge). The United States was also a major supplier
of uranium. At its peak in 1979, employment in the U.S. uranium industry was nearly
22,000 person-years.55 Employment in 2011 was 1,191 person-years,56 only about
5 percent of the employment level in this industry in the 1970s. Meanwhile,
domestic uranium production has fallen, for reasons discussed in the previous
chapter, to about 11 percent of the 1980 production level.57 In addition to
determined efforts by Urenco (the European enrichment company) as well as China
and Russia to expand their commercial enrichment capabilities (see discussion in
previous chapter), several additional countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran,
Japan, and Pakistan, have small enrichment capabilities. Enrichment plants in India
and Pakistan lack safeguards and many believe that Irans enrichment capabilities
are intended to support a weapons program, despite the efforts of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply nonproliferation safeguards. The North
Koreans are known to have at least one enrichment plant and there are reasons to
believe they might have more such facilities. Other countries, while not currently
operating enrichment facilities, have made clear that they do not intend to forego
their rights under the NPT to do so in the future.58 In a recent paper titled Limiting
Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints and
Options, Fred McGoldrick, an expert in nuclear security and nonproliferation,
describes several ways in which the diffusion of enrichment technologies can
increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation59: First, enrichment facilities can
produce nuclear materialshighly enriched uranium (HEU)that are directly usable
in nuclear weapons. With such materials, a state could abrogate its nonproliferation
commitments and produce a nuclear weapon within a short period of time. Given
the legal ability of a party to the NPT to acquire enrichment (and reprocessing)
facilities, produce weapon-usable materials and then withdraw from the Treaty after
giving notice of its withdrawal three months in advance, a state would be free to
develop nuclear weapons without, strictly speaking, violating the NPT. Second, it is
difficult to detect, either through national technical means or international
inspections or both, clandestine enrichment plants using such technologies as
centrifuge or laser isotope separation. Third, having enrichment capability could
increase the chance that nuclear weapons advocates could convince leaders of a
state to develop nuclear weapons. Other states fearing such an outcome may be
tempted to build standby capabilities of their own. (In this regard a strong
distinction should be made with power reactors, for which there is little evidence
that a decision to proceed with a nuclear energy program increases the probability
of a state deciding also to pursue a nuclear weapons program.) Finally, highly
enriched uranium produced at enrichment plants offers a tempting target for

terrorists or other non-state actors. The potential for the spread of reprocessing
technology raises similar proliferation concerns. While the United States. does not
reprocess commercial reactor fuel, several leading nuclear nationsincluding
France, Russia, and Japando. China 60 and India61 are both conducting
reprocessing on a limited scale and could expand their use of reprocessing
technology in the future. Reprocessing in France and Russia (and past
reprocessing in the United Kingdom) has led to the accumulation of large stocks of
separated plutonium that is intended for reuse in reactors but that has not been
converted into fuel form.62 There are many reasons why the supply of separated
plutonium has outpaced demand, including technical challenges associated with the
use of plutonium fuel in todays reactors and the slower-than-expected development
of advanced reactors that can more readily use plutonium as fuel. But regardless
of the reasons, experience has shown that nations that engage in large-scale
reprocessing can wind up having to manage and secure large quantities of weaponsusable materials. While this isnt necessarily a cause for alarm in the nations that
are presently managing these stockpiles, the obvious concern is that nations that
are not presently nuclear weapons states could engage in reprocessing
as allowed under the NPTand accumulate plutonium inventories that could be
readily diverted to a nuclear weapons program. Concerns regarding the
potential misuse of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities have long been the
basis for U.S. efforts to halt the spread of these technologies. One of the most
significant developments in the history of efforts to achieve this objective came in
the late 1970s, when the major nuclear suppliers agreed to form the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG established guidelines governing exports of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology. In addition, members agreed to exercise
restraint in the transfer of sensitive materials and technology, and specifically to
establish special controls on the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technology.63 Unfortunately, past performance is no guarantee of future success.
The fact remains that nonnuclear weapon states have a right to enrichment and
reprocessing technology under the NPT.64 If the United States were to develop and
deploy a competitive uranium enrichment technology, international demand for this
technology might put the United States in a stronger position to seek
nonproliferation assurances from recipient nations that go beyond what is required
by the NPT (and beyond what is required under NSG guidelines). Currently,
however, Americas role as a supplier of uranium enrichment services and
technology looks set to decline, along with U.S. engagement in global markets
for nuclear technology more generally. This will likely mean a loss of leverage in
persuading aspiring nuclear nations to refrain from reprocessing.

China abandoning reprocessing now is key --- encourages a

shift to safer tech --- delay ensures bureaucratic momentum
locks-in long-term reprocessing
Nature 16 [Nature editorial, Nature is the weekly, international, interdisciplinary
journal of science, Editor-in-Chief: Philip Campbell, BSc, aeronautical engineering,
University of Bristol; MSc, astrophysics, Queen Mary and Westfield College,
University of London; PhD and postdoctoral fellowship, upper atmospheric physics,

University of Leicester, The nuclear option: China is vigorously promoting nuclear

energy, but its pursuit of reprocessing is misguided, Nature, May 4, 2016,
http://www.nature.com/news/the-nuclear-option-1.19844

If theres one country that could disprove the old joke among engineers about nuclear power that nothing can

China. Nuclear power is enjoying a theoretical

renaissance in the United States, with researchers advancing a new generation of
inherently safe designs and with start-up companies attracting venture capital. But
so far, only China has shown the kind of long-term, strategic thinking that would
be required to launch a real nuclear revival.
compete with a paper reactor it may be

Nuclear engineers from elsewhere know this, and are racking up frequent-flier
points on trips to Beijing and Shanghai to support partnerships that may put paper
reactors to the test. Already, China is building a 210-megawatt demonstration of a pebble-bed reactor, led
by researchers at Tsinghua University in Beijing. It could come online by next year, marking a first for safer
generation IV reactor designs.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences is also working with the US Department of Energy
on molten-salt reactors, which were originally developed and tested at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee in the 1960s. Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge are pursuing a
partnership to advance an entirely new design that includes elements of both molten-salt and pebble-bed reactors.

TerraPower, which is based in Bellevue, Washington, and funded by Microsoft cohas signed a memorandum of understanding with the China
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to pursue the companys travelling wave
reactor, which is designed to minimize the need for uranium enrichment.
And the relative newcomer

founder Bill Gates and others,

These partnerships illustrate the advantages of international collaboration . China

thinks big and moves quickly, and the world may one day reap the benefits . But the
countrys zeal for advanced nuclear technology has an ominous side : Chinas latest
five-year plan also promotes the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. CNNC officials are currently
negotiating with the French nuclear giant Areva to build such a facility.
The promise of nuclear reprocessing has not panned out . The idea dates back to the beginning of
the nuclear era, when officials feared a shortage of uranium resources. Plutonium extracted from spent fuel would
be redeployed in breeder reactors, which produce more fuel than they consume. But as it turns out, there is more
than enough uranium for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the technologies proved expensive, and the risks
became all too clear in 1974 when India used reprocessed plutonium in its first nuclear bomb.
For all of these reasons,

the United States and many other nations abandoned the idea

decades ago. The United Kingdom is closing its reprocessing operations, and the world would be a safer place
if countries such as France and Japan followed suit. China should abandon reprocessing
before the inevitable bureaucratic momentum builds up . Instead, the country
should focus on reducing costs and developing technologies that might enable
nuclear energy to play a larger part .

Extra Solv
China says yes theyre desperate to find any market for
nuclear exports
Thomas 16 [Steve Thomas, professor of energy studies at the University of
Greenwich, in London, Why Chinas Nuclear Exports May Struggle to Find a
Market, May 13, 2016, China File, https://www.chinafile.com/environment/whychinas-nuclear-exports-may-struggle-find-market]

Chinas nuclear power industry has eyed up a big push to export its technologies as
countries around the world consider low-carbon alternatives to coal.

But despite an increasingly clearer field for Chinese nuclear exports mainly because of
the woes dragging down French and Russian competitors selling reactors abroad is likely to prove
to a much tougher task than had first been thought.
the biggest uncertainty is whether there will be much of a nuclear
export market at all.
Perhaps

reactors built in China have accounted for the majority of the worlds new
reactor construction. In 2015, seven new construction projects were launched, six of which were for China.
Since 2008,

While there are a large number of countries talking about buying reactors, many of which would be their first
nuclear projects, the history of these types of exports suggests only a small number of these will be translated into
real orders.

many countries have major concerns about relying on China for the supply
of such a strategically important piece of infrastructure.
Moreover,

their concerns centre on the quality of components , the rigour of the

Chinese regulatory system, the risk of dependence on China and the potential leakage of
technologies that have hugely strategic geopolitical use.
In particular,

There is little hard evidence on the precise impact of these issues on decision-making but it is clear that they
warrant serious questions from any country wanting to buy reactors from China.
For example, Philippe Jamet, a French nuclear safety commissioner, said in 2014: Unfortunately, collaboration [with
China] isn't at a level [where] we would wish it to be".
He added: "One of the explanations for the difficulties in our relations is that the Chinese safety authorities lack
means. They are overwhelmed.

Chinas great strengths in nuclear are its well-oiled component supply chain and the
ability of its vendors to call on Chinese government finance .
For example, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has agreed to offer loans of 10 billion (74 billion yuan)
to support CGNs nuclear project in Romania.

There is also a presumption that Chinese reactors will be cheap, although until China
competes in open markets, we dont know this for sure.

its competitors in the nuclear export market are in

various states of disarray. Of the two historic market leaders, Frances Areva is mired in debt, while
An advantage to China is that

Westinghouse isnt in much better shape.

US-headquartered Westinghouse was bought by Toshiba in 2006 and the Japanese companys reactor division has
made losses from 2012 onwards.
The Toshiba group as a whole is expected to lose US$4.5 billion for 2015.
In July last year, Toshiba admitted it had overstated its profits for the previous six years, resulting in a record fine
from the Japanese authorities and its credit rating being reduced to junk.
Progress with construction of the eight reactors using the AP1000 design is no better than with the European
Pressurised Reactor (EPR), developed by Frances Areva. Four reactors in China are now at least three-to-four years
late while the four in the US suffered further delays and are also several years late after only two years of
construction.
The real competitor appears to be Russia, which claims a formidable book of about 20 firm orders in Bangladesh,
Egypt, Finland, Hungary, India, Iran, Jordan, Turkey and Vietnam - far more than the rest of the nuclear vendors put
together.
It also claims to be in advanced negotiations in Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Nigeria.
Russia's woes

there has always been a presumption that Russia would be able to supply
the finance and that Russian reactors would be cheap .
Like China,

The combination of sanctions against Russia and the collapse of the world oil price
has left Russia with depleted financial reserves.
it has supplied only about a dozen new orders and its ability to
provide the five or six reactors per year, which are be needed to fulfil its order book,
must be in serious doubt.
Since the Chernobyl disaster,

Chinese nuclear industry growth is the single greatest risk to

global nonprolif --- inducing Chinese nuclear sector
transparency and government-to-government information
exchange ensures efective safety measures
Bowen 13 [Wyn Q. Bowen, professor of nonproliferation and international security
and the director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies in the Department of
War Studies at King's College in London, his expertise is in nonproliferation,
terrorism, and US security policy, from 1997 to 1998, he served as a weapons
inspector on several missile teams in Iraq with the UN Special Commission; he has
also worked as a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency, more
recently, he was a specialist adviser to the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs
Committee for inquiries into Britain's decision to enter the Iraq War, also written
with Ian J. Stewart and Daniel Salisbury, Engaging China in proliferation
prevention, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 29, 2013,
http://thebulletin.org/engaging-china-proliferation-prevention]

China continues to be the key source of goods and technology for the prohibited
nuclear and missile programs of Iran and North Korea, with some officials estimating
that China is used as a transit route for up to 90 percent of goods destined for
those programs. The alleged serial Chinese proliferator Li Fang Wei (aka Karl Lee) reportedly was able to earn
more than $10 million from the sale of missile-related items to Iran after the United States indicted him in 2009 on
more than 100 criminal counts of falsifying business records related to illicit trade with subsidiaries of an Iranian
military agency. Meanwhile, the Chinese service sector provides many of the financial and transport services
through which the strategic programs of North Korea, in particular, are sustained.

Chinese industry is on the cusp of attaining production capability for a wide

variety of strategic commodities that are high on the list of procurement priorities
for nuclear and missile programs of concern . Simply stated: Nuclear proliferation from
or through China may pose the single biggest risk to the international
community's nonproliferation eforts.
Today,

China has slowly expanded its commitments to and

implementation of nonproliferation measures. The latest such step was the Chinese Ministry of
Nonetheless, over the past two decades,

Commerces announcement that it will implement UN sanctions on all trade with North Korea. Though China has
previously prohibited the export of proliferation-sensitive goods to North Korea, the buy-in to the sanctions marks a
turning point in global efforts to prevent proliferation.
The international community must now carefully calculate how best to encourage Beijing to take further action in
curbing proliferation. There appear to be three basic options: inclusion, exclusion, or maintaining the status quo.
The ministrys recent announcement on North Korea, as well as our fieldwork in China and discussions with officials
involved in interdiction operations all suggest that Beijing is ready to travel the path of inclusion and engagement

The international community should respond

positively but not navely. Chinas nonproliferation commitments have expanded, and its record has
improved, butif China is to claim a place as a fully responsible strategic technology
holderthe Chinese government must invest more resources in government
agencies responsible for nonproliferation and outreach efforts to industry .
with international nonproliferation regimes.

Chinas nonproliferation record. Although Chinese entities have clearly played an important role in illicit trade, the
type of entities involved in proliferation and the level of government complicity have changed significantly over
time. In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of Chinas large state-owned defense enterprises sold large quantities of
conventional arms and missiles, complete nuclear and missile facilities, and dual-use and unfinished technologies to
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
More recently, the involvement of large state-owned strategic and defense companies has subsided. Today, the
primary source of goods for prohibited programs is Chinas private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized
enterprises that often act as distributors or middlemen in trade with western manufacturers. Setting aside the
questionable transfer of reactor technology to Pakistan over the past two decades, state-authorized transfers of
complete missile systems and nuclear or missile production facilities have ceased. Instead, proliferation most often
involves goods that are dual-use in nature or are below control-list thresholdsthat is, just below the point when a
specific controlled item or technology becomes subject to export licensing requirements.

large state-owned enterprises in China are determined to protect their

international business by, at least publicly, demonstrating their nonproliferation
compliance policies and practices. It is true that subsidiaries of Chinese state-owned enterprises may
be less well-informed than their parent companies, but the trend is clear. Smaller firms, often without a
It is clear that

presence in Beijing, are frequently less aware of nonproliferation issues. Even though state-owned enterprises show
signs of improved compliance, vast numbers of dual-use manufacturers and traders are not being similarly engaged
on trade control issues.
The broad positive changes in Chinas approach are illustrated by a number of developments. It has signed up to
international supplier regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and voluntarily adheres to the Missile
Technology Control Regime guidelines (albeit only the 2002 lists), even though the regime has so far refused to
grant China membership. Moreover, Chinas domestic export licensing system is said to use the control lists and
guidelines of both these regimes as well as the Australia Group, which seeks to control the trade in sensitive

chemical and biological materials and technologies. Such involvement goes beyond use of the guidelines and lists,
as China also actively participates in the maintenance of both. In this context, Chinas active participation in the
Nuclear Suppliers Groups recent fundamental review of its control lists should be looked upon positively.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has supported a range of relevant UN resolutions on
both export controls and sanctions on North Korea and Iran, even actively participating in industry awareness
activities in this area. The Chinese government has also undertaken prosecutions of a small number of companies
for breaching export controls, publicizing their details and imposing fines.

some observers view decisions in recent

years to sell commercial nuclear power reactors to Pakistan under a so-called grandfather
arrangement as a significant indicator of the country's lack of commitment to
nonproliferation principles. But such a view may be oversimplified. First, the reactors would be subject to
Given China's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Before joining the group, China had already sold several reactors to
Pakistan, and the commercial light water reactors involved are at best sub-optimal for use in supporting the
countrys weapons program. Moreover, the reactor sale also must be understood in the context of the US-India
nuclear deal that many believe was, in part, designed to strengthen Americas relationship with India to

it was only through intense US

diplomacy that the Nuclear Suppliers Group exempted India from its full-scope
safeguards requirement, which previously had prohibited sales of the most sensitive
nuclear technologies to countries such as India and Pakistan . Because the reactors will be
counterbalance the rising regional influence of China. Indeed,

under safeguards, one could therefore view the sale as a way for China to respond to US-led nuclear trade relations
with India without directly assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
The issue is enforcement. While no country can expect every company under its jurisdiction to comply completely
with export control laws, the ratio of potentially sensitive exports to prosecutions in China does raise significant

It is not clear how diligently and with what resources China monitors
proliferation by Chinese companies and investigates breaches. Concerns are heightened by
concerns.

Chinas response to Western requests for interdiction of proliferation-related trade. China is not a member of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, an international mechanism for interdicting shipments of materials related to
weapons of mass destruction, but Western governments frequently pass intelligence tips to their Chinese
counterparts. China is known to have taken action to prevent illicit transactions in some cases, but too often there is
insufficient transparency regarding the actions that have, or have not, been taken.
The Karl Li case is a stark example. A 2009 US indictment alleged that Li repeatedly sold prohibited missile-related
technology to Iran. According to open sources, his activity was allowed to continue despite US requests for Chinese
intervention. There is little evidence that the Chinese government undertook substantial investigative action with
any consequence in this case.
China has investigated other potential breaches identified on the basis of Western intelligence tips. But Chinese
officials often state that such intelligence-derived information is incomplete, and protest against what are seen as
illegitimate and unfair sanctions imposed on Chinese entities for their role in proliferation.

Engaging China on nonproliferation. It is apparent that the scale of the challenge facing Chinese
nonproliferation officials is immense and growing. There are purportedly thousands of exporters
of dual-use technologies in China, and this number is only going to grow . The Chinese
manufacturing base for proliferation-sensitive goods is expanding, as the government has authorized strategic
investment in the nuclear, semiconductor, composites, and alloys sectors through multiple five-year plans.
Technology from each of these sectors appears in the lists of the international export-control regimes; in fact, the
listing of these technologies may be one reason that China is seeking an indigenous capability to produce them.
Despite Chinas significant progress to date, Chinese authorities will have to adopt a comprehensive approach to
overcome the multiple challenges associated with meeting the countrys nonproliferation obligations. Other states
face many of these same challenges, although they are perhaps more acute in China. There are clearly many ways
in which Western states and China could learn from each other and better meet nonproliferation objectives. Before
they can do so, however, the international community must decide how it will engage China in curbing illicit trade:
through including, excluding, or maintaining the nonproliferation status quo?

Sufficient progress has been made in China to warrant pursuit of an inclusive

approach to engaging China in implementing nonproliferation controls. Opting for

any other strategy will risk missing a great opportunity to assist with capacity
building as Chinas industry continues to grow.
Practically speaking, this option would entail the Missile Technology Control Regime member states laying out clear
expectations as to what China must be required to do to join the regime. The international community should also
be prepared to work with, and potentially provide resources to, China to help it implement a national strategy to
prevent illicit trade. Such a strategy should cover all aspects of trade-control implementation.

develop intelligence exchanges

with China on proliferation issues. And the government should expand outreach programs to the
Under this approach, relevant Western governments would continue to

private sector, perhaps through the adoption of a formal industry engagement strategy.
The principal objective would be to encourage China to resource its own outreach and enforcement activities in the
medium-to-long term, so that China would eventually become a true non-proliferation partner on an equal footing
with other states.

What should China do? While China has adopted domestic legislation to comply with its international
obligations, both this legislation and its implementation could be improved. The main body of Chinas dedicated
export-control legislation was put in place in 2002, before the UN Security Councils adoption of a 2004 resolution
requiring countries to implement an effective system of export controls. That resolution aside, there are specific
export-control improvements China should seek to implement.

law, Chinas export-control legislation appears to provide

a solid basis for Chinese officials to act when there is a need to do so. Nonetheless, the
Chinese export laws do appear to lack certain controls particularly, transshipment
controls to prevent the passage through China of sensitive goods from other
countries to destinations of concern. China should ensure that all necessary elements of an effective
Though not consolidated in a single

control system are included in its export-control legislation. Although there is no specific need for China to place its
legislation in a single consolidated export control act, Chinese officials may nonetheless wish to explore this in the
medium-to-long term.
The

implementation and enforcement of export controls present a significant interagency challenge for all countries , requiring foreign ministries, licensing authorities, technologists,
enforcement agencies, prosecution bodies and intelligence agencies to collaborate. There is growing evidence that
Chinas government departments and agencies are working together. Even so, there is also evidence that

the

inter-agency process in China still suffers from a lack of transparency and

coherence. China has become increasingly responsive in recent years to information
about proliferation activities, but many suspected proliferators continue to appear to go unpunished.
Chinese authorities should make its interdepartmental process more transparent,
among other things including providing details to international partners on what
action has been taken, if any, in response to intelligence tips . Chinese officials should also
consider making a statement on what investigative action was taken against Karl Li. China also needs to ensure
that relevant agencies and departments at the provincial level place the same priorities on nonproliferation as does
Beijing.
Beyond the challenges of deepening inter-agency cooperation, China clearly lacks the capacity to enforce
nonproliferation measures across the countrys growing industries. As the number of businesses in China explodes,
Chinese transport nodes are also growing in size and capacity. Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai are all now among
the 20 largest airports in the world. Similarly, China hosts six of the eight busiest seaports in the world, and nine out
of the top 20. Chinas enforcement capacity must grow to reflect the prominence of its transportation nodes in the
global economy, and more central government and provincial staff must be assigned to enforce laws and conduct
outreach to the private sector.
Finally, China must do more to engage exporters in nonproliferation programs . By
allowing government ministries to work with international partners and hold a number of outreach events in recent
years, the Chinese government has demonstrated a growing appreciation of the value of engaging export business.
Workshops have been well attended, both by state-owned enterprises and by other businesses. But true

nonproliferation success requires that all exporters know the risks associated with trading in sensitive goods and
technologies.

Chinese authorities at both the central and provincial levels must, therefore, develop an industryengagement strategy that includes workshops and other mechanisms to raise
awareness of export controls across Chinese industry. Chinese authorities should
also create a strategy to engage the international academic and research
community in implementing trade-control obligations. Though face-to-face training can be
effective, new tools, such as e-learning and other web-based resources, may be required to meet the growing scale
of the challenge posed by industrial expansion in China.

China has made notable strides in its international

nonproliferation commitments and domestic efforts to ensure they are met. Significant
challenges remain and, given Chinas expanding capacity to manufacture sensitive
technologies, efforts to engage China on nonproliferation should be coordinated, so
that resources can be put to best use at this crucial time.
Clear progress, with remaining challenges.

The international community should respond positively to Chinas demonstrated

intention to work toward nonproliferation objectives, and international partners
should work with Beijing to implement a comprehensive strategy that
includes industry engagement. Pursuing an alternative course of action to
engagement risks overlooking Chinas gradual progress and alienating the
Chinese leadership. Not only could this result in Chinas commitment waning, but
it could also undermine broader nonproliferation eforts around the world .

Warming is anthropogenic the most comprehensive data-sets

are conclusive
Green 13 Professor of Chemistry @ Michigan Tech
*John Cook Fellow @ Global Change Institute, produced climate communication
resources adopted by organisations such as NOAA and the U.S. Navy
**Dana Nuccitelli MA in Physics @ UC-Davis
***Mark Richardson PhD Candidate in Meteorology, et al.,
(Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific
literature, Environmental Research Letters, 8.2)
An accurate perception of the degree of scientific consensus is an essential element to public support for climate
policy (Ding et al 2011). Communicating the scientific consensus also increases people's acceptance that climate
change (CC) is happening (Lewandowsky et al 2012). Despite numerous indicators of a consensus, there is wide
public perception that climate scientists disagree over the fundamental cause of global warming (GW; Leiserowitz et

In the most comprehensive analysis performed to date, we have

extended the analysis of peer-reviewed climate papers in Oreskes (2004). We examined a
large sample of the scientific literature on global CC, published over a 21 year
period, in order to determine the level of scientific consensus that human activity is
very likely causing most of the current GW (anthropogenic global warming, or AGW).
Surveys of climate scientists have found strong agreement (9798%) regarding
AGW amongst publishing climate experts (Doran and Zimmerman 2009, Anderegg et al 2010).
al 2012, Pew 2012).

Repeated surveys of scientists found that scientific agreement about AGW steadily
increased from 1996 to 2009 (Bray 2010). This is reflected in the increasingly definitive statements issued by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the attribution of recent GW (Houghton et al 1996, 2001,
Solomon et al 2007). The peer-reviewed scientific literature provides a ground-level assessment of the degree of
consensus among publishing scientists. An analysis of abstracts published from 19932003 matching the search
'global climate change' found that none of 928 papers disagreed with the consensus position on AGW (Oreskes
2004). This is consistent with an analysis of citation networks that found a consensus on AGW forming in the early
1990s (Shwed and Bearman 2010). Despite these independent indicators of a scientific consensus, the perception
of the US public is that the scientific community still disagrees over the fundamental cause of GW. From 1997 to
2007, public opinion polls have indicated around 60% of the US public believes there is significant disagreement
among scientists about whether GW was happening (Nisbet and Myers 2007). Similarly, 57% of the US public either
disagreed or were unaware that scientists agree that the earth is very likely warming due to human activity (Pew

this study provides the

most comprehensive analysis of its kind to date in order to quantify and evaluate
the level and evolution of consensus over the last two decades . 2. Methodology This letter
2012). Through analysis of climate-related papers published from 1991 to 2011,

was conceived as a 'citizen science' is not provided. Schulte estimated a higher percentage of endorsements and
rejections, possibly because the strict methodology we adopted led to a greater number of 'No Position' abstracts.
Schulte also found a significantly greater number of rejection papers, including 6 explicit rejections compared to our
0 explicit rejections. See the supplementary information (available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/8/024024/mmedia) for a
tabulated comparison of results. Among 58 self-rated papers, only one (1.7%) rejected AGW in this sample. Over

among 'global climate change' papers that state a

position on AGW, we found 97% endorsements. 5. Conclusion The public perception of a
the period of January 2004 to February 2007,

scientific consensus on AGW is a necessary element in public support for climate policy (Ding et al 2011). However,

there is a significant gap between public perception and reality, with 57% of the US
public either disagreeing or unaware that scientists overwhelmingly agree that the
earth is warming due to human activity (Pew 2012). Contributing to this 'consensus
gap' are campaigns designed to confuse the public about the level of agreement
among climate scientists. In 1991, Western Fuels Association conducted a $510000 campaign whose
primary goal was to 'reposition global warming as theory (not fact)'. A key strategy involved constructing the
impression of active scientific debate using dissenting scientists as spokesmen (Oreskes 2010). The situation is
exacerbated by media treatment of the climate issue, where the normative practice of providing opposing sides
with equal attention has allowed a vocal minority to have their views amplified (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). While
there are indications that the situation has improved in the UK and USA prestige press (Boykoff 2007), the UK

The
narrative presented by some dissenters is that the scientific consensus is '...on the
point of collapse' (Oddie 2012) while '...the number of scientific "heretics" is growing with each passing year'
(Allgre et al 2012). A systematic, comprehensive review of the literature provides
quantitative evidence countering this assertion. The number of papers rejecting
AGW is a miniscule proportion of the published research, with the percentage slightly
decreasing over time. Among papers expressing a position on AGW, an
overwhelming percentage (97.2% based on self-ratings, 97.1% based on abstract ratings) endorses
the scientific consensus on AGW.
tabloid press showed no indication of improvement from 2000 to 2006 (Boykoff and Mansfield 2008).