You are on page 1of 18


MONTEALEGRE [161 SCRA 700 (1988)]

Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto when he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table.
Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue.
Camantigue joined Abadilla in the resto and they both smelled the marijuana smoke from the
table of Vicente Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre.
Camantigue collared the 2 & said Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano? He forced them up, holding 1
in each hand but Capalad pulled out a knife & started stabbing Camantigue at the back.
Camantigue let go of Montealegre to get his gun but Montealegre restrained Camantigues hand
to prevent the latter from defending himself.
They grappled & fell on the floor. Capalac fled and Camantigue pursued him firing some shots.
Then he stopped and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalac was found slumped in the
street, with a bullet to his chest. Both he and Camantigue died the next day. Montealegre on
the other hand, escaped through the confusion. He was later apprehended.
Issue: WON Montealegre was rightly considered a co-principal for having corroborated with
Capalad in the killing of the police officer.
YES. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue 7 times and
Montealegre holding on to victims hands to prevent him from drawing the pistol and
defending himseld, as Abadilla had testified.
While it is true that Montealegre did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was
nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue for resisting the attack
against him.
Montealegre was a principal by indispensable cooperation under A17(3), RPC. The requisites of
this provision
Participating in the criminal resolution, i.e., theres either anterior conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose & intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; &
Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act w/o w/c it
would not have been accomplished.
But although there was no evidence of prior agreement between Capalad & Montealegre, their
subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court has consistently
upheld such view in previous cases (People v. Laganson, People v. Cercano, People v. Garcia
Cabarse, Dacanay v. People)
Montealegre was correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, qualified by treachery,
w/ assault upon a person of authority.
Vino v. People
J. Gancayco (1989)
At around 11pm of March 1985, while ERNESTO was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter,
he heard ROBERTO (his son) cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot
He immediately switched on the lights of their house and when he looked outside, he saw his son
ROBERTO wounded. Together with his wife and some neighbors, they went down to meet
ROBERTO who was crying and calling for help
After coming down, ERNESTO et al saw Lito VINO and Jessie SALAZAR riding a bicycle coming
from the south towards their direction
VINO was driving while SALAZAR was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching ERNESTO's house,
they stopped to watch ROBERTO. SALAZAR pointed his armalite at ERNESTO et al. Thereafter, the
two left
ROBERTO was brought to the hospital. He was still conscious and alive such that and PC/Col.
Cacananta was able to take his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement which ROBERTO
signed with his own blood (how cool is that?!), SALAZAR was identified as his assailant. Then
On account of said ante-mortem statement and the testimonies of the other witnesses, VINO and
SALAZAR were charged with murder before the MTC of Balungao, Pangasinan
MTC judge however referred the case against SALAZAR to the

Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) as he was a member of the military

case against VINO was given course

hence, only the

MTC referred case for PI to fiscal and an information for murder against VINO was ultimately filed
before the RTC of Pangasinan
Upon arraignment, VINO entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation
of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, VINO filed a
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence
RTC then rendered decision finding VINO guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and
imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor
as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
VINO appealed said conviction with the CA but the same was denied, TCs decision was affirmed
in toto hence this appeal
During the pendency of the appeal, JAGO has remanded
SALAZARs case to the civil courts as he was already discharged from military service. Indeed, he
was tried and prosecuted in the RTC for the crime committed and he was acquitted
Forthwith, VINO informed the Court of such development
WON his conviction as accessory can be sustained even when the information charged him as a
principal [YES]
WON a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the
alleged principal in a separate proceeding [YES]

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED. Motion for Reconsideration is also DENIED with FINALITY.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved
or established by the evidence In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in
the information. The commission of the said crime was established by the evidence; ergo, there
is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of
the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information,
the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory.
DOCTRINE: The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly
convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal
The offense as charged in this case is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved in
court, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved
Under Art 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of persons responsible for the
commission of the same offense, aside from the principal, are the accomplice and the accessory.
After the TCs findings of fact, there is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed
and that the evidence tended to show that SALAZAR was the assailant and VINO was his
VINO must have been present during its commission or at the very least must have known its
commission this is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately after the shooting,
VINO was seen driving a bicycle with SALAZAR holding an armalite, and they were together when
they left. It is thus clear that VINO actively assisted SALAZAR in his escape. Petitioner's liability is
that of an accessory
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged VINO as an accessory right then and there
because the degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence from the very
get-go. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner

The trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate
charge against the principal - The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice
and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal
It goes without saying therefore that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal (say, due to
the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity), the accessory may nevertheless be
convicted if the crime was in fact established
The acquittal of the principal will only work as an acquittal for the accessory if such acquittal was
based on the finding that no crime was committed inasmuch as the same has happened by
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the VINO
as an accessory was established. As to SALAZARs acquittal, it must be noted that he was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. In
SALAZARs trial, prosecution was not able to present convincing evidence such that the identity
of the assailant was not clearly established
In SALAZARs case, the ante-mortem statement was competently controverted by the defense.
There was also some fatal omissions on the part of the law enforcers that constrained the TC
judge to acquit SALAZAR on reasonable doubt
The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of
the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an
accessory is indubitable
Dissenting Opinions of Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ:
The basic principle established by the ponencia is agreeable that an accessory may be
convicted even when the identity of the principal cannot be known as long as the crime is
established and the degree of responsibility of the accused is proved.
HOWEVER, such general principle does not find application in the case at bar because the case of
VINO is sui generis
VINO was convicted of having aided SALAZAR who was named as the principal at VINO's trial. At
his own trial, SALAZAR was acquitted for lack of sufficient identification. VINO was convicted of
helping in the escape not of an unnamed principal but, specifically, of SALAZAR. As SALAZAR
himself has been exonerated, the effect is that VINO is now being held liable for helping an
innocent man, which is not a crime. VINO's conviction should therefore be reversed
The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code if
the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that "the accessory follows
the principal" appropriately applies

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant
Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant
for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant
was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of
rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments
on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of
the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant
aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence
of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration
are denied for lack of merit.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state,
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the
procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury.
Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as
a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the
death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or
not to impose the death penalty.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While
the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so
because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on
the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the
taking of life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms
of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not.
Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as
it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that
the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty
for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for
the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their
new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual
integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a
crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of
death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical
notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had
entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence
with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,

rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question
of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition
in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions,"
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation
in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven
following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the
death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to
abate criminality in society
what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the
same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and
mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential
and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and
hence, shock the moral self of a people.
The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of
society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of
his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual,
psychological, material and social preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing
acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the
death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim
is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped,
which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very
SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to
lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry
they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It
does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and
moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the
victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that
hurts not only the victim but the society itself.

PDEA v. Brodett and Jorge

G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011
FACTS: On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa charged Richard
Brodett and Joseph Jorge for violating Section 5, in relation to Section 26 (b) of RA 9165
after being caught selling and trading 9.8388 grams of methamphetamine HCL on

September 19, 2008. Likewise, on April 16, 2009, Brodett was charged for violating Sec. 11
of RA 9165 for possession of various drugs in an incident on the previously noted date.
On July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence, among which is a
2004 Honda Accord car registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett that PDEA refused to
return as it was used in the commission of the crime and which was supported by the OCP,
stating that such vehicle be kept during the duration of the trial to allow the prosecution
and defense to exhaust its evidentiary value.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC ordered the return of the car to Myra S. Brodett after it was
duly photographed. PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration, such being denied. PDEA then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was also denied, citing Sec.
20 of RA 9165.
ISSUE: Can the car owned by an innocent third party not liable for the unlawful act be returned
to its owner although such car was used in the commission of a crime?
RULING: The Court ruled that a property not found to be used in an unlawful act and taken as
evidence can be returned to its rightful owner but only when the case is finally terminated.
The Court further states that the order to release the car was premature and in
contravention of Section 20, Par. 3 of RA 9165 which states that property or income in
custodia legis cannot be disposed, alienated or transferred during the pendency of the
case. Court resolves that all RTCs comply with Section 20, RA 9165 and not release
articles, drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before rendition of judgment,
even if owned by innocent third party.
Respondents having been acquitted of the crime charged the Court will not annul the
orders of the RTC nor reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petition is DENIED.


On July 18, 2003, petitioner filed a complaint for civil forfeiture of assets with the RTC of
Manila against the bank deposits in account number CS 005-10-000121-5 maintained by
GLASGOW in CSBI. The case was filed pursuant to RA 9160 or the Anti-Money Laundering Act of

On July 21, 2003, the RTC of Manila issued a 72-hour TRO. And on August 8, 2003 a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. Meanwhile, summons to GLASGOW was returned unserved
as it could no longer be found at its last known address.

On October 8, 2003, petitioner filed a verified omnibus motion for a) issuance of alias
summons and b) leave of court to serve summons by publication. On October 15, 2003, the trial
court directed the issuance of alias summons. No mention was made of the motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication.

On January 30, 2004, the trial court archived the case for failure of the Republic to serve
alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to reinstate the case and resolve
the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

On May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case directing the
Republic to serve the alias summons to Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days.

On July 12, 2004, petitioner received a copy of the sheriffs return stating that the alias
summons was returned unserved as GLASGOW was no longer holding office at the given
address since July 2002.

On August 11, 2005, petitioner filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of GLASGOWs motion to dismiss by way of
special appearance alleging that 1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had
not yet been served on it 2) the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action and 3)
there was failure to prosecute on the part of the Republic.

On October 17, 2005, the trial court dismissed the case on the grounds of 1) improper
venue 2) insufficiency of the complaint in form and substance and 3) failure to prosecute and
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner filed a petition for review.

Whether or not the complaint for civil forfeiture was properly instituted.

Sec. 12 (a) of RA 9160 provides two conditions when applying for civil forfeiture:

when there is suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction report deemed

suspicious after investigation by the AMLC;

the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose; ordered the seizure of any
monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to
said report.

The writ of preliminary injuction issued on August 8, 2003 removed account no. CA005-10-000121-5 from the effective control of either GLASGOW or CSBI or their
representatives or agents and subjected it to the process of the court. Since this account
was covered by several suspicious reports and placed under the control of the trial court
upon the issuance of the writ, the conditions provided in Section 12 (a) of RA 9160 were
satisfied. The petitioner properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.

PEOPLE v. OYANIB [354 SCRA 196 (2001)]

Manolito Oyanib & Tita Oyanib were legally married. Years thereafter they separated. Tita had
affairs w/ other men. Manolito reminded her that they were still legally married, but Tita still
continued with her affairs.
One day, Manolito came to see Tita to inform her of a meeting w/ their sons school regarding
their sons failed subject. He then came upon Tita and his paramour, Jesus Esquierdo, having
sex w/ the latter on top of the other w/ his pants down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the check and Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus.
Tita left the room, got a Tanduay bottle and hit Manolita with it in the head. Tital then stabbed
Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita
as well.
Thereupon, Edgardo, owner of the house where Tita was staying entered the room. Manolito
hid but later gave himself up.
He was found guilty of homicide and parricide and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of 6 month, 1 day to 6 yrs of prision correccional as minimum to 6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay P50K civil indemnity and costs for the death of Jesus and to
reclusion perpetua, to pay P50K and costs for the death of his wife Tita.
He appealed, admitting the killings but arguing that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstance provided in A247 RPC
Issue: WON hes entitled to the exceptional privilege under RPC A247
YES. He invoked Art. 247, RPC as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory cause
is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment
there is no penalty imposed.
Having admitted the killing, it is inucumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstanbces to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relived of any criminal liability.
RPC A247 prescribes the ff essential elements for such defense:
That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person;
That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, his defense
would be untenable.
The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused
after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infideltity. Simply put, the killing of the husband of
his ide must concur with her flagrant adultery
The Court finds the accused to have acted within the circumstances contempleated in Art.
247, RPC
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of RPC A247.
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates;
the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing
the errant spouse as a purification is so sever that it can only be justified when the unfaithful

spouse is caught in flagrante delicto, & it must be resorted to only w/ great caution so much so
that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately
thereafter (People v. Wagas)
Court thus sentenced Manolito to 2 yrs & 4 mos of destierro and shall not be permitted to
enter or be w/in a 100 km radius from Iligan City.

No. 108747. April 6, 1995
Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation by his employees. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati sentenced him of prision correccional in its minimum period in
each crime committed on each date of each case. Francisco then elevated the case to the RTC in
which they sentenced him only of eight straight months for appreciating mitigating
Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTCs decision making it final. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest, but before Francisco was to be arrested, he filed an application for probation
which the MTC denied. He went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation.
No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the Probation
Law in which no application for probation shall be entertained after the judgement is final.
Second, Francisco misunderstood when he thought that his prison sentence held by the MTC was
not qualified for probation. Multiple prison terms should not be added up. Consequently,
Francisco lost his right to probation when he appealed the MTC decision to the RTC. The law
considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
Third, Franciscos appeal to the RTC was not for reducing his penalties but for his assertion of his
innocence. The Probation Law prevent opportunism when petitioners apply for probation when
their appeal was dismissed.
Lastly, the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.

China Airlines v CA (G.R. No. 129988)

Respondents, Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to
pursue a cable business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films. Initially, Morelia Travel
Agency booked their flight with China Airlines (CAL).
Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than American Express Travel (Amexco), they
dropped the services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and Salvador had a
confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave to Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued
previously to Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking.
When the respondents were at the airport, CAL prevented them from boarding because their
names were not in the passenger's manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when Morelia
revoked the booking. But the respondents were able to get a flight with Northwest Airlines.
1. Whether or not there was a breach in the contract of carriage.
2. Whether or not there there was bad faith.
3. Whether or not there was sufficient claims for damages.
1. Yes. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain

date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on
that flight and on that date.
When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in possession of the confirmed tickets, from
boarding its airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it ocnsituted a breach of
contract of carriage.
2. No. Bad faith should always be established by clear and convincing evidence since the law
always presumes good faith.
In the case, there were three reasons why CAL cancelled the reservations. First was Amexco's
unauthorized use of the record locator number. Second was CAL's negligence in confirming the
reservations of Amexco. Third was the absence of the correct contact numbers of private
respondents. There was no concerted effort on the part of CAL to cancel respondent's
reservations in favor of other passengers.
3. Not entitled to moral damages because not every case of mental anguish, fright or anxiety
calls for the award of moral damages.
Not entitled to exemplary damages because CAL was not in bad faith and its employees did not
act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Not entitled to actual damages because respondents did not shell out any money for their CAL
tickets. Respondents would have been entitled to the price difference between the tickets of CAL
and Northwest had the latter cost more than the former but this was not the case. Evidence
shows that Northwest tickets ($625) cost less than CAL tickets ($629). The court cannot order
reimbursement of the Northwest tickets because this would have enabled respondents to fly for
free. The cost of the tickets were a necessary expense that private respondents could not pass
on to CAL.
Entitled to nominal damages of P5,000 when the plaintiff suffers some species of injury not
enough to warrant an award of actual damages.




dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (victim, San Antonios
ex-live-in partner) went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door
of the bedroom ahere dela Cruz was demanding him to go out

Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that Macapagal was pointing the gun at him, he
immediately went back to the room and closed the door.

The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a gun (.35 caliber revolver).

The two immediately grappled each other and not long after, shots were heard and Macapagal
fell dead on the floor.

Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he surrendered the gun he
used and told the police that he shot Macapagal in self defense.

According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were non-penetrating

(upper jaw, below the left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his life was on the left
side of the chest penetrating the heart.

Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-defense in order to extenuate
him from the crime.

Held: No.


Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:


Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed

presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of
a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly at the time the
defensive action was taken against the aggressor.

In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing
the victim pointing a gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly
closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim.



Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression
The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self defense. The
four gunshot wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures, appellant
could no longer argue that there was no provocation on his part

Claim of self defense rejected

People vs. Patriarca

The person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects
Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before RTC
Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder for the killing of
one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels,
Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public
Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of
War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably
granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his
What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca,
Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.
Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while Criminal Cases
Nos. 2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed.(People vs. Patriarca, Jr. G.R. No. 135457,
September 29, 2000)

People vs. Casido

In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon, as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty
Commission. They were granted conditional pardon during the pendency of their appeal. Their
applications for amnesty were also favorably acted upon.

Whether or not the pardon and amnesty was valid

The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them
and not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while
amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article
36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the
appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of
Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants
voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by
both Houses of Congress. (People vs. Casido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997)

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez

Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez

G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949
Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon Admission Not Needed in Amnesty

Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the
war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found.
Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became
aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty
as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14 th Amnesty Commission refused to process
the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as
charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed
the crime being charged to them.
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons
or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason
it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36, RPC).
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary
that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal
act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that
the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by
the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or
not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the
benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or
claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that
the accused is entitled to said benefits.

Florencio Pelobello vs Gregorio Palatino

Absolute Pardon
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding
alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted
before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello
averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked
par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was
converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon
was already after Palatinos election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that since
there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the prior
conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in

Philippine Rabbit vs. People

G.R. No. 147703
April 14, 2004
Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event
of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a
criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accusedemployee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime
or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In
fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although
in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their
employees in the event of the latters insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the
absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment
of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the
stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to
allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision
convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability
of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable
by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly
contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Quinto v. Andres
G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005

Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, EX to Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
Laws Applicable:
November 13, 1995 7:30 am: Edison Garcia, 11 year-old and Grade 4 elementary school pupil,
and his playmate, Wilson Quinto saw Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a
drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson
agreed while Garcia seeing that it was dark inside, opted to remain seated in a grassy area about
two meters from the entrance of the drainage system
Only Pacheco had a flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage
system and left without saying a word. Then, Andres came out, went back inside, and emerged
again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid his body down in the grassy area.
Garcia, shocked, fled from the scene. Andres went to the house of Melba Quinto, Wilsons
mother, and informed her that her son had died. They rushed to the drainage culvert. Wilson
was buried without any complaints filed.
November 28, 1995: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) took the sworn statements of
Pacheco, Garcia and Quinto
Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with Andres and
Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBIs autopsy showed that the cause death is drowning with traumatic
head injuries as contributory
NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and Pacheco with the RTC
Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his
head could have hit a blunt object, That the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons
head could have rendered the him unconscious so he drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on
the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of
mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.
RTC: granted demurer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC
ISSUE: W/N Acquittal in criminal case bars a civil action where the judgment of acquittal holds
that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
o The civil liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages
GR: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
EX: the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged
into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act
of the accused
o While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime
charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of the private complainant
against the accused for damages and/or restitution.
o Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is
burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. failed
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even
Garcia testified that
the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid
that he refused to join
respondents Andres and Pacheco inside
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the
before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing
GR: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

EX: civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does
not exist
a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
o Natural - an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events
o Logical - a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury
or damage
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury
o Proximate cause
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other
events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor
o There must be a relation of cause and effect,
cause = felonious act of the offender
effect = resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.
The cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the
o pre-existing conditions
pathological condition of the victim
predisposition of the offended party
physical condition of the offended party
o concomitant or concurrent conditions
negligence or fault of the doctors
conditions supervening the felonious act
pulmonary infection
not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
1. there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting
injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or
2. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim
The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated
or contributed to the death of the victim.
the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things:
1. first, the criminal act - objective
2. second, defendants agency in the commission of the act - subjective element of crimes

In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove:
1. the death of the party alleged to be dead
2. that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was
not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide
3. that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the
act which produced the death