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121. Dela Vega v.

Ballilos, 34 Phil 683 (1916)

122. Barretto v. Barretto, 37 Phil 234 (1917)

After the death of Juan Antonio Barretto, Sr., his son Juan Antonio Grandpre, in his
own behalf and as the executor of his father, mortgaged, the cultivated half of
said hacienda in favor of Antonio Vicente Barretto as security for the amount of
P11,000 which the latter loaned to him.
By verbal agreement, Antonio will collect his credit from the products of the
His three children and heirs Antonio Ma Barretto, Ricardo Esteban Barretto, and
Guadalupe Barretto came to succeed after the death of Antonio.
Guadalupe made a donation inter vivos in favor of the plaintiff Alberto Barretto of
the undivided one-third part of the hypothecary credit and of the rights belonging
to her deceased father Antonio Vicente Barretto, assigning to the donee all the
rights and actions which she might have in the foreclosure proceedings exhibited
at the trial of the present action, on the condition that as soon as the donee
Alberto Barretto could collect the said one-third part of the credit or should obtain
the assignment of the property of the debtor, he would divide what was donated,
into nine equal parts among the donee himself and six living brothers and the
heirs of their two brothers now dead, each receiving one-ninth part.
Alberto Barretto, complying with the condition imposed in said document of the
donation paid to each of his brothers and nephews, and in exchange for the sums
received as such price his co-donees assigned and conveyed to him one-eight
part of the third of the said hacienda and whatever rights and interests the
grantors might have by virtue of the said donation in favor of the plaintiff
It is to be noted that the plaintiff bought one-eight undivided part of the third of
the whole hacienda of Balintagac and paid to every claimant the price of the eight
part sold to him. The third part of the ownership of the hacienda was transferred
to the plaintiff by the donor Guadalupe Barretto.
Antonio and Ricardo, as grantors, sold and conveyed all their rights and actions
included and derived from the said hypothecary credit for the price of P14,000
which would be paid by the grantee and vendee by installments and in the
manner prescribed in the said deed, assigning to him, besides, all the rights which
the said brothers had over the two-third parts of the said hacienda.

Issue: WON there was a transfer of ownership to Alberto?

No. the plaintiff did not obtain by assignment, sale, or transfer, as expressed in said
deeds, the ownership of the said hacienda of Balintagac, but only the hypothecary
credit which the heirs of the deceased creditor Antonio Vicente Barretto had inherited
from the latter, after the plaintiff had obtained from his other brothers the
conveyance of their respective rights to the donation.
The rights acquired by the creditor were transmitted by hereditary title through
operation of law to the heirs of the same Antonio M.a, Ricardo Esteban, and
Guadalupe, Barretto y Rocha and these in turn assigned, sold and transferred the
credit with all their rights as hypothecary creditors, as well as the right to the
usufruct of all the hacienda of Balintagac to the plaintiff Alberto Barretto.

When in the record of an action it is fully established that the parties indebted in a
certain amount, which is secured with a mortgage over of their hacienda, having
delivered to the creditor not only the mortgaged half but the whole hacienda, not in
the nature of an assignment of property in payment of a debt, still unpaid, but with
the object that the creditor may collect by means of usufruct his credit and the
interest agreed upon, the verbal contract which is inferred from such facts and
presumed to have been entered into between the parties, although not set in any
document, deserves in law the name of antichresis as defined in Article 1881 of the
Civil Code.
By the antichresis a creditor acquires a right to receive the fruits of real
property of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of
the interest, if due, and afterwards to the principal of his credit.
The creditor in antichresis cannot by mere possession of the real property which he
received by virtue of an antichresis acquire ownership over the same for failure of the
debtor to pay the debt within the stipulated time, any agreement to the contrary
being void; and the debtor on his part cannot recover the enjoyment and use of the
real property given in antichresis to the creditor, without having previously paid the
latter all his debt and interests thereon, the creditor being entitled to ask the courts
that the said real property be sold to satisfy his credit.
With regard to prescription, the creditor in antichresis can never by prescription
acquire the ownership of the real property received in antichresis, as he entered into
the possession of the same not as an owner but as a creditor with right only to collect
his credit from the fruits of said real property.
The extinguishment of the right as creditor and the termination of his use and
possession of the real property given in antichresis depend upon the full payment of
the debt and its interests, after the liquidation of the amounts entered on the account
of the debtors and received by the creditor.

123. Legazpi & Salcedo v. Celestial, 66 Phil 372 (1938)

124. Pando v. Gimenez, 54 Phil 459 (1930)
FACTS: This action was instituted for the purpose of foreclosing a mortgage executed
by defendant Antonio Gimenez. Massy Teague was also impleaded for having
purchased at public auction one of the mortgaged properties.

In order to secure the payment of P8,000 which the defendant Gimenez owed
the plaintiff, he mortgaged the house at No. 655 Santa Mesa, Manila, and the
leasehold right on the lot upon which it stands (Exhibit A). This was payable
on October 27, 1925, but, in spite of nonpayment, the creditor, who is the
plaintiff herein, did not foreclose the mortgage.
The defendant was leaving the City of Manila in order to attend to his
business in the Province of Cagayan, and at the special instance and request
of the herein plaintiff, said defendant gave to the plaintiff the full control, and
complete and absolute administration of the building and the parcel of land
on which said building was erected, situated in Santa Mesa, District of Santa
Mesa, mortgaged to the plaintiffIt and it was agreed between them that the

plaintiff would collect the rents of said house, in order to apply them to the
payment of interest on the amount of the indebtedness.
For default in the payment of taxes for the years 1925 and 1926, the house
was on November 23, 1926 sold at public auction, and, for failure to exercise
the right of legal redemption, the City of Manila, the attachment creditor and
vendor of the property, executed a final deed of sale in favor of the
purchaser, the other defendant Massy Teague.
Furthermore, for default in the payment of the rents due on the lot of said
house for the years 1925 to 1928, the Santa Mesa estate, the lessor of said
land, cancelled the lease on July 13, 1928, pursuant to the terms of the
The appellant Gimenez contends that the plaintiff was responsible for the
delinquency in the payment of both the tax on the house and the rent of the
lot, which caused him the loss of the said house and the leasehold right on
the lot, because the plaintiff was at that time in charge of the administration
of the premises with the obligation to attend to the payment of the tax and
the rents.
The plaintiff denied that he had such obligation, alleging that his duties were
confined to the collection of the rents of the house in order to apply them to
the payment of the interest on the mortgage.
Such was in fact the original agreement; but the appellant asserts that it was
modified by the letter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the administration of the property in question assumed by
the plaintiff toward the end of October, 1925 is antichretic in character.

Taking into account the language of the letter Exhibit 1 and the appellant's
unimpeached testimony, we are constrained to hold that it has been proved
by a preponderance of evidence, that even though at first the plaintiff had
only undertaken to collect the rents of the house, later on, towards the end of
October, 1925, he assumed the obligation to pay both the tax on the house,
and the rent of the lot.
As to the consideration contained in the judgment appealed from to the effect
that, in view of the reduction of the rent of the house in May, 1926, the
plaintiff would not have accepted the administration under the conditions
alleged by the defendant-appellant, it must be remembered that the plaintiff
took over such complete administration months before such reduction of
rents, and it does not appear that the reduction was foreseen.
From all these circumstances it follows that the administration of the property
in question assumed by the plaintiff toward the end of October, 1925 is

antichretic in character, and therefore justice and equity demand that

application be here made of the Civil Code provisions touching the obligations
of the antichretic creditor, to wit:
The creditor is obliged to pay the taxes and charges which burden the
estate, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
He shall also be obliged to pay any expenses necessary for its
preservation and repair.
Any sums he may expend for such purposes shall be chargeable
against the fruits. (Art. 1882, Civil Code.)
These obligations arise from the very nature of the covenant, and are
correlated with the plaintiff's acquired right to take charge of the property
and collect the fruits for himself.

125. Peralta v. Quimpo (CA), 51 O.G. No.3, p. 1383, Sept. 2, 1954

126. Villanueva v. Ipondo, 44 O.G. No. 11, p. 4377, Sept. 24, 1947