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SAMPLE Q N A

Persons and Family Relations


QUESTION No.1: Four employees of Act Theater Inc. were apprehended by the police officers for
allegedly tampering a water meter. On the basis of the foregoing, the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System cut the water service connection of Act Theater a few hours after a notice to such
effect was served upon the latter.
Did MWSS properly exercise its proprietary rights?
ANSWER: NO. Concededly, MWSS, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain
consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be
confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. Article 19 of the New Civil Code states
that Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner
which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor
can be held accountable. In this case, MWSS failed to act with justice and gave Theater Act what is due
to it when the former unceremoniously cut off the latters water service connection. (Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System vs Act Theater Inc., GR No. 147076, June 17, 2004)
QUESTION No.2: The spouses Pahang obtained a loan from Metrobank. The said loan was secured by
a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land owned by the spouses Pahang. For failure of the latter to
settle their obligation, Matrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and the
mortgaged property was sold to Metrobank as the highest bidder.
Before the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the spouses Pahang filed a
complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale alleging that Metrobank bloated their obligation to
frustrate their chances of paying the loan.
After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, Metrobank consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed property and, thereafter, filed a petition for Writ of Possession. This
was opposed by the spouses Pahang on the ground that the complaint filed by them is a prejudicial
question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings before the court.
Is the complaint filed by the spouses Pahang a prejudicial question to Metrobanks petition
for the issuance of a Writ of Possession?
ANSWER: NO. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and
there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et
de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The complaint of the petitioners for
annulment of extrajudicial sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore no prejudicial question can arise
from the existence of the two actions. (Spouses Pahang vs Vestil, GR No. 148595, July 12, 2004)
QUESTION No.3: Rodolfo and Marietta were married on March 5, 1959. On December 6, 1992,
Rodolfo left the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children.
In the meantime, Rodolfo, who was desirous of contracting another marriage, filed a petition
for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Marrieta on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Fully aware that Marrieta had already transferred to another residence, Rodolfo still
indicated in his petition that summons can be served upon Marrieta in her previous address. As a
consequence of which, Marrieta did not receive any summons and failed to file an answer. The court,
upon motion, declared Marrieta in default and allowed Rodolfo to adduce evidence ex parte. The
public prosecutor who appeared for the state offered no objection to the motion of Rodolfo. The
court rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Rodolfo and Marrieta void ab initio.
Was the grant of annulment of marriage by default proper?
ANSWER: NO. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of
the Family Code. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose
of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in

default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application of legal separation or annulment
through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated. (Ancheta vs Ancheta, GR No. 145370, March 4, 2004)
QUESTION No.4: Alfredo and Encarnacion were married on January 8, 1960. During the subsistence
of their marriage, they acquired 100,000 shares of stock in Citycorp and registered the same in the
name of Alfredo.
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc (PBMCI)obtained a loan
from Allied Bank. As added security for the said loan, Alfredo, as the Executive Vice President of
PBMCI executed a continuing guarantee with Allied Bank binding himself to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to Allied Bank.
PBMCI failed to settle its obligation with Allied Bank. Allied Bank filed an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment which was granted by the court. As a consequence of which, the
sheriff levied on attachment the 100,000 shares of Citycom stocks in the name of Alfredo.
Encarnacion, assisted by Alfredo, thereafter filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment.
Should the Motion to Set Aside the levy on execution be granted?
ANSWER: YES. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the
marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were
acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the
marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be
considered conjugal.
In this case, the evidence adduced by Encarnacion is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in
Citycorp were issued and registered in its corporate books in the name of Alfredo when the said
corporation was incorporated on May, 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of
Alfredo and Encarnacion. The shares of stock are thus presumed to be the conjugal partnership property
of Alfredo and Encarnacion. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate
books of Citycorp solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that Alfredo, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same. (Ching vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 124642, February 23, 2004)
Note: Under the Family Code, Article 93, the presumption is that property acquired during the marriage
belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those exclused therefrom. The presumption
in Article 116 of the Family Code will only arise if the future spouses agree in their marriage settlements
that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during the marriage
pursuant to Article 105 FC.

PERSONS
QUESTION:
A, a German citizen, married B, a Filipina, in Germany and begot two children. In 1996, B
filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. In 1997, while a second motion to dismiss
was pending, A obtained a decree of divorce in Germany which granted parental custody over their
children to him. An order granting the Motion to Dismiss was issued because of the dissolution of the
marriage. However, a motion asking that the case be set for hearing for the purpose of determining
the issues of custody of children and the distribution of their properties was granted and the lower
Court issued an order partially setting aside the former order. Said order was opposed on the ground
that there was nothing to be done anymore as the marital tie of the spouses had already been
severed by the divorce decree and that the decree has already been recognized by the court in its
order.
Is the contention proper? Why?
ANSWER:
NO. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable
in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must
still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary
(Roehr vs. Rodriguez,et.al., G.R.No.142820, June 20, 2003).
QUESTION:
What requisites must be complied with in order that there may be legal ratification of marital
cohabitation?
ANSWER:
In order that there may be legal ratification of marital cohabitation, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage (Manzano vs Sanchez)
NOTE: With respect to the second and third requisites, the Supreme Court, in Ninal vs Bayadog, held that
cohabitation for 5 years under this Article should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. It is therefore required
that the parties must be without legal impediment not only at the time of marriage, but also at the time
of the cohabitation.
QUESTION: During their courtship period, Darwin consistently and persistently asked Margaret to
have carnal knowledge with him. Margaret, however, would always tell Darwin to be patient and
wait until after their wedding is over for she had made a vow to give up her virginity only after she
had been lawfully wedded to her husband. During the night of their wedding day, Darwin discovered
that Margaret was no longer a virgin, and the same was admitted by Margaret. Darwin thereafter
filed an action to annul the marriage.
a) Will the action prosper?
b) What are the acts that constitute fraud that would warrant annulment of marriage?

ANSWER:
a) NO. The law provides that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune
or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for the annulment of marriage. (Art. 46,
FC)
b) Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in No.3, Art. 45, FC:
1. Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of the other part of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
2. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
3. Concealment of a sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of
the marriage; or
4. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the
time of the marriage.
QUESTION:
A man complained about the sexual infidelity of his wife. Aside from that, he said that during
the marriage, she turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had
extramarital affairs with several men including a Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim whom
she married and with whom she had two children. When the Ibrahim left the country, she returned
to the man bringing with her the two children which the man accepted as his own. But some time in
December 1995, she abandoned him once again to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children.
During the trial, witness for the plaintiff declared the wife as suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity. This, he alleged amounted to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Does the aberrant sexual behavior of the
wife fall within the term psychological incapacity?
ANSWER:
No. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is very
complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, her sexual
infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such extent that she could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that her promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception
of the marriage. What is in fact, disclosed by the records was a blissful marital union at its celebration,
later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Her sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
(David B. Dedel vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004)
QUESTION: What are the jurisprudential guidelines to prove psychological incapacity?
ANSWER:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a) medically or clinically identified;
b) alleged in the complaint;
c) sufficiently proven by experts; and
d) clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the of the celebration of the
marriage;
4. Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of the marriage;

6.
7.
8.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced in Arts. 68-71, Family Code as regards
husband and wife, as well as Arts. 220, 221 and 225 of the same in regard to parents and their
children;
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial tribunal of the Catholic Church of
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
The trial courts must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor general to appear
as counsel for the State (Republic vs CA, Molina)

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. (REPUBLIC vs
HAMANO, GR No. 149498, MAY 20, 2004)
QUESTION: Under what grounds may the legitimacy of the child be impugned?
ANSWER:
The legitimacy of the child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1. That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
2. That it is proved that for biological or scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of
the husband, except in the instance provided in par. 2, Art. 164, Family Code; or
3. That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence (Art. 166, Family Code).
QUESTION: PNP Gen. Carlos and Corrina were married on August 18, 2002 without a marriage
license. On August 18, 2004, Gen. Carlos contracted a subsequent marriage with Gwendolyn, this
time, complying with all the essential and formal requisites outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Family
Code. On August 1, 2005 Gen. Carlos died. As a consequence of which, Corrina was able to collect
P500,000 and Gwendolyn, P50,000 as death benefits. Gwendolyn now claims that she is entitled to
of what Corrina received on the ground that she is the lawful wife of Gen. Carlos, alleging in
support of her claim that the marriage between Gen. Carlos and Corrina was celebrated without a
marriage license.
a) What is the status of the marriage between Gen. Carlos and Corrina?
b) Is Gwendolyn correct in claiming that her subsequent marriage with Gen. Carlos was valid
and thus entitles her to a share of what Corrina received?
c) Is Gwendolyn entitled to of what Corrina received? Why or why not?
d) What is the property regime of Gen. Carlos and Corrina?
ANSWERS:
a) Art. 4 Family Code provides that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio. Hence, for having been celebrated without a marriage license, a formal
requisite presrcibed in Article 3, Family Code, the marriage between Carlos and Corrina is void ab
initio.
b) NO. The fact remains that her marriage with Carlos was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of Corrina and the deceased Carlos void. Hence, the marriage of
Gwendolyn and the deceased Carlos, is likewise null and void because the law requires that the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remmariage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void (Art. 40, FC) and that a marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void (Art. 41, FC)

c)

d)

NO. Article 148 provides, in part, that only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common.
Considering that the marriage of Gwendolyn and Carlos is a bigamous marriage, the application of
Article 148 is in order. The disputed P500,000, being remunerations, incentives, and benefits from
the government earned by the deceased as a police officer, are not owned in common by Gwendolyn
and the deceased, but belong to the latter alone and that Gwendolyn has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And Gwendolyn, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. (Carino vs
Carino)
The property regime between Gen. Carlos and Corrina is governed by article 147 of the Family Code
which applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nontheless void for other reasons, like the absence of
marriage license. Under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between
them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. (Carino vs
Carino, GR No.132529, Fab.2, 2001)

QUESTION:
When Elna and Bruno were still live-in partners, they purchased on installments a
condominium unit as evidenced by a Contract to Sell between Bruno as buyer and JVSCC as seller.
Upon completion of payment, title to the condominium was issued in the name of Elna. The two got
married on March 14, 1985. This marriage was however later declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The lower court ruled that the condominium belonged to Bruno considering
that it was purchased by exclusive funds from him prior to the marriage. Is the lower court correct?
ANSWER:
NO. The rule on co-ownership should govern in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
In order for Article 147 to apply, the man and the woman (1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. The disputed
property was purchased on installment during the time when they were already living together. Hence it
should be considered as their common property and hence, should be divided in accordance with the law
on co-ownership.
QUESTION:
Rosalina married Isaac on November 17, 1974. During the subsistence of their marriage,
Rosalina gave birth to Vicente. Isaac died on January 15, 1981. As a consequence of which, Rosalina
and Vicente inherited a 5,000 square meter lot located in Cubao. Vicente died on January 18, 1999.
Soon thereafter, Maria, claiming to be an illegitimate daughter of Vicente as evidenced by a birth
certificate signed by the latter, filed a case for partition with damages against Rosalina. Rosalina
however countered that the birth certificate signed by Vicente was insufficient to establish filiation.
If you were the judge, will you sustain Rosalinas position? Explain.
ANSWER:
NO. The act of Vicente in signing the birth certificate of Maria was an act of acknowledgement of
his paternity.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
a) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or final judgment; or
b) An admission of illegitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by :
a) the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child; or

b)

any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.(Article 175 in relation to
Article 172, Family Code)
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or any authentic writing is in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. (Eceta vs Eceta, GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004).
QUESTION:
Can an illegitimate children use the surname of his father?
ANSWER:
YES. Article 176 of the Family Code has been amended by RA 9255, otherwise known as an Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use the Surname of their Father which was approved on February 4,
2004. The said law provides that illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through:
a) the record of birth appearing in the civil register; or
b) an admission in a public document or a private handwritten instrument.
Provided that the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime.

QUESTION:
Judge Salvador, an MTC judge of Bulatan, Camarines Sur visited his relatives in Nabua,
Camarines Sur. Judge Salvador was approached by his brother Mario one morning and begged that he
solemnize the marriage of the latters best friend Lino. Mario explained that the priest which was
about to celebrate the marriage just died of heart attack and that the would be couple, their
relatives and friends were already waiting as everything has already been prepared. In order not to
embarrass his brother and out compassion to the parties concerned, he solemnized the marriage of
Lino and Grace. Is the marriage valid?
ANSWER:
YES. In Mercedita vs Judge Occano (AM No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002), the facts of which are
in fours with the case under consideration, the Supreme Court, citing Navarro vs Domagtoy, held that
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside of his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which, while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

PERSONS
1.
Bon, a Filipino, got married to Naiz, an Australian citizen, but the marriage was
dissolved by a divorce decree on May 18, 1989 issued by an Australian family court. On
June 26, 1992, Bon became an Australian citizen and got married to Elaine on January 12,
1994. They lived separately without judicial decree. On March 3, 1998, Elaine filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Bon on the ground of bigamy
stating that prior to the marriage, she did not know that her husband had a previous
marriage. On July 7, 1998, Bon was able to obtain a decree of divorce from Elaine, hence
he prayed in his answer to the complaint that it be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action. The court dismissed the case on the basis of the divorce which
dissolved the marriage and recognized the Philippines. Was the divorce between Elaine and
Bon duly proven?

NO, Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence our courts cannot grant
it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Arts. 15 and 17, NCC. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Art. 26
of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws (Van Dorn vs. Romillo). The same
must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient (Garcia vs. Recio; Roehr vs.
Rodriguez, June 20, 2003).
2.
Au and Jay are married without a valid license. During their marriage, Jay
contracted a subsequent marriage with Jen. Au discovered that Jay was cohabiting with
Jen and that he was disposing of their properties without her consent. A petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Au. Jay filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the petition stated no cause of action it being superfluous and unnecessary,
their marriage being void. Is Jays contention tenable?
NO. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is explicitly required either as
cause of action or a defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void (Art. 40, FC). With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
3.
In 1975, Roberto, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S Govt., contracted a bigamous
marriage with Joan, despite the fact that his first wife, Sofie, was still living. In 1977,
Roberto and Joan jointly bought a parcel of riceland, with the title being placed jointly in
their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased a house and lot which was placed in
Joans name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Roberto died and Sofie promptly filed an action
against Joan to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot claiming them to be
conjugal property of the first marriage. Joan contends that she is the owner of the house
and lot and the Riceland is co-owned by her and Roberto. Assuming that Joan fails to prove
that she had actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you decide the case?
Sofies action to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot is well founded. Both
are conjugal property in view of the failure of Joan to prove that her own money was used in
the purchases made. The Supreme Court, in one case applies Article 148 of the Family Code
despite the fact that the husbands death took place prior to the effectivity of the said law.
However, even under Article 144 of the Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been
reached in view of the bigamous nature of the second marriage.
4.
Jun and Angel signed a marriage contract but their marriage was not solemnized.
Subsequently, Jun married Rhea. Can Jun be liable for bigamy?
NO. The subsequent marriage of Jun and Rhea is valid. Since the marriage of Jun and
Angel was not solemnized, Jun cannot be charged with bigamy when he contracted a second
marriage. The mere signing of the marriage contract was a mere private act. Thus, the
marriage of Jun and Angelica did not exist in the eyes of the law (Morigo vs. People).
5.
George and Cynthia Abad, both Filipino citizens, contracted marriage in 1990.
Sometime in 1996, George and Cynthia, together with their two children, migrated to the

United States. After two years of stay in the US, their marriage turned sour. As a
consequence, Cynthia and their two children went back to the Philippines. After George
successfully obtained US citizenship, he filed for a divorce and was granted by the court.
Subsequently, George went back to the Philippines and married his childhood friend,
Marian.
What is the status of the marriage of George and Marian? Explain.
The marriage of George and Marian is void ab initio because it is a bigamous marriage
contracted by George during the subsistence of his marriage with Cynthia. The marriage of
George and Marian does not validly exist. Art. 26 of the Family Code do not apply because the
marriages covered by the said provision are only mixed marriages from the very beginning. In
addition, Art. 15 of the New Civil Code provides that regardless of where a citizen of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her
family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.
6.
Pam and Toshio, a Japanese national started a common-law relationship in Japan.
The two thereafter lived in the Philippines. After some time, Pam gave birth to their child.
Pam and Toshio were married under a civil ceremony. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas. That promise was not
fulfilled as Toshio never came back to them. Toshio likewise stopped giving financial
support to her and their child. Pam then filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
a. Were the alleged acts of abandonment and irresponsibility of Toshio amount to
psychological incapacity?
NO. The guidelines under Republic vs. Molina incorporate three basic requirements:
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. If the
totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. However,
the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some psychological
illness.
b. Is Pam entitled to moral damages?
NO. Pam cannot claim moral damages unless there is evidence that the marriage was
done deliberately and with malice by Toshio who had knowledge of his disability and willfully
concealed it. Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must discharge or assume, it removes the basis for the contention
that Toshio purposely deceived Pam (Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura, March 31, 2005).
c. Assuming that the marriage is declared void by reason of psychological
incapacity, what shall be the effects of such void marriage?
The effects of a marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity are
as follows: (1) The property relation is co-ownership; (2) The same shall be partitioned and
distributed equally; and (3) Properties acquired are prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts and industry.
7. Ismael, a wealthy business man, is married to Noeli with three children. During their
marriage, Ismael had an affair with Vida, and a child named John, was born out of such

union. When Ismael died, VIda filed an action to compel the children of Ismael and Noeli to
recognize John as Ismaels illegitimate son. Will the action prosper?
NO. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy. Secondly, only the husband, and in
exceptional cases, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of the child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy
of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child
of his mothers alleged paramour (Liyao, Jr. vs. Liyao, Mar.7, 2002).
8.
Sharlyne holds a public document signed by her alleged father, containing an
admission of legitimate filiation. Is there a need for Sharlyne to seek a decree of
recognition from the courts?
NO. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public instrument or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned is a complete act of recognition without need
of court action (De Jesus vs. De Jesus, Oct. 2, 2001).
9.
Jem and John contracted marriage without a valid marriage license. Subsequently,
Jem and Edwin contracted another marriage. John then filed a criminal action for bigamy
against Jem. On the other hand, Jem filed a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to John. Jem claimed that the civil case constitutes a prejudicial question in the
criminal case for bigamy. Is the contention of Jem tenable? Explain.
NO. The elements of a prejudicial question are the following: (1) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the criminal action for bigamy was instituted
or filed ahead of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The civil case must be
filed ahead of a criminal case in order to be considered a prejudicial question.
Moreover, as held in Mercado vs. Tan, it is only a judicially declared prior void marriage
which can constitute a defense against a criminal charge for bigamy. The previous void
marriage of A and B must be judicially declared a nullity before A can use it a defense in the
criminal action instituted by B.

MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED TOPICS IN CIVIL LAW


Source: U.P. Law Center
Persons and Family Relations
TOPIC: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE (1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002)
I
What is the status of the following marriages and why?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

A marriage
A marriage
A marriage
A marriage
A marriage
(1999)

between two 19-year olds without parental consent.


between two 21-year olds without parental advice.
between two Filipino first cousins in Spain where such marriage is valid.
between two Filipinos in Hong Kong before a notary public.
solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction.

ANSWERS:
A.
The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was defective.
Being below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their
parents. The consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its
validity.
B.
Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of parental advice,
because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requisite i.e., the marriage
licenseand does not affect the validity of the marriage itself. This is without prejudice to the
civil, criminal, or administrative liability of the party responsible therefore.
C.
By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is void [Art. 38,
par. (1), FC], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign country in this
case, Spaindoes not validate it, being an exception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said Code
which accords validity to all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines x x x and valid there
as such.
D.
It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hong Kong law, the
marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is invalid in Hong Kong will be
invalid in the Philippines.
E.
Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a marriage
but said law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town mayor of such
authority. However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the judiciary to
solemnize a marriage, it would seem that the mayor did not have the requisite authority to
solemnize a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void,
unless it was contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the mayor
had the legal authority to solemnize this particular marriage [Art. 35, par. (2), FC].
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
C.
The marriage is void. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article
which marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage
between first cousins is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even
though valid in Spain where it was celebrated.
D.
If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary Public is authorized to
solemnize marriage, then the marriage is valid.
E.
The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to
solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority
even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the marriage he solemnized outside his municipality
is valid. And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality, such
marriage will, nevertheless, be valid because solemnizing the marriage outside said
municipality is a mere irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259
SCRA 129. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the celebration by a judge of a marriage
outside the jurisdiction of his court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the validity of the
marriage notwithstanding Article 7 of the Family Code which provides that an incumbent
member of the judiciary is authorized to solemnize marriages only within the courts
jurisdiction.
OTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:

C.
By reason of Article 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to
Filipinos wherever they are, the marriage is void.
E.
The marriage is void because the mayor has no authority to solemnize marriage outside
his jurisdiction.
II
On Valentines Day, 1996, Elias and Fely, both single and 25 years of age, went to the
city hall where they sought out a fixer to help them obtain a quickie marriage. For a fee, the
fixer produced an ante-dated marriage license for them, issued by the Civil Registrar of a small
remote municipality. He then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant behind the
city hall, and the latter solemnized their marriage right there and then.
A. Is their marriage valid, void, or voidable?
B. Would your answer be the same if it should turn out that the marriage license was
spurious? Explain. (1996)
ANSWERS:
A.
The marriage is valid. The irregularity in the issuance of a valid license does not
adversely affect the validity of the marriage. The marriage license is valid because it was in
fact issued by a Civil Registrar (Arts. 3 and 4, FC).
B.
No, the answer would not be the same. The marriage would be void because of the
absence of a formal requisite. In such a case, there was actually no valid marriage license.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.
It depends. If both or one of the parties was a member of the religious sect of the
solemnizing officer, the marriage is valid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect and
both of them were aware of the fact, the marriage is void. They cannot claim good faith in
believing that the solemnizing officer was authorized because the scope of the authority of the
solemnizing officer is a matter of law. If, however, one of the parties believed in good faith
that the other was a member of the sect, then the marriage is valid under Article 35(2), FC. In
that case, the party in good faith is acting under a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law.
TOPIC: PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (1989, 1992, 1994, 1995,
1998, 2000)
I
In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a bigamous
marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975,
Mauricio and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of Riceland, with the title being placed jointly in
their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot) which was
placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Mauricio died, and Carol promptly filed an
action against Erlinda to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot, claiming them to be
conjugal property of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio were
co-owners of the Riceland; and with respect to the house and lot, she claims she is the
exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to prove that she had actually used her own money in
either purchase, how do you decide the case? (1998)
ANSWER:
Carols action to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both
are conjugal property in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage, to
prove that her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case
applied Art. 148, Family Code, despite the fact that the husbands death took place prior to the
effectivity of said law. However, even under Art. 144, Civil Code, the same conclusion would
have been reached in view of the bigamous nature of the second marriage.

ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under Art. 148 of the FC, which applies to bigamous marriages, only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Moreover, if
one of the parties is validly married to another, his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community/conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used her own money to buy the
Riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the Riceland nor the
exclusive owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauricios. And since his share
accrues to the conjugal partnership with carol, Carol can validly claim such properties to the
exclusion of Erlinda (Art. 144, Civil Code).
II
In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975,
Bob inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a two-room
bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth P800,000 while
the house, when finished cost P600,000. In 1989, Bob died, survived only by his wife, Issa and
his mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of both assets remained at the same
proportion:
A. State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but
exclusive property of her deceased son.
B. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988? (1998)
ANSWERS:
A.
Since Bob and Issa got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New Civil Code
(Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied as regards the property
of the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Art. 119,
Civil Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry (Article 142, Civil
Code). In this instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own separate property, he having
acquired the same by lucrative title (Art. 148, par. 2, Civil Code). However, the house
constructed from his own savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is
conjugal property and not exclusive property in accordance with the principle of reverse
accession provided for in Art. 158, Civil Code.
B.
Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their marriage
way back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains (Art. 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if Bob died before or
after August 3, 1988 (effectivity of the Family Code), what matters is the date when the
marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the
property relation that governs them is still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil
Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
A.
Sofia, being her deceased sons legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse (Arts.
985, 986, and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but
belong to the hereditary estate of Bob, the value of the land being more than the cost of the
improvement (Art. 120, FC).
B.
If Bob died before August 3, 1988, which is the date the Family Code took effect, the
answer will not be the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The land would then be
deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used in constructing it. The
husbands estate would be entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land from conjugal
partnership funds.

III
For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer, live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated
to marry each other. Since Tonys salary was more than enough for their needs, Susan stopped
working and merely kept the house. During that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house
in a plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and Susan decided to separate.
A. Who will be entitled to the house and lot?
B. Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was
previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2000)
ANSWERS:
A.
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares. Under
Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during their
cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts , work or industry and
shall be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them
consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
B.
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the
parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those
properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered
adequate contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share
therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is
his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the
house and lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
IV
Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza is not
employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household chores.
After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary
earnings during that period the amount of P200,000 presently deposited in a bank. A house and
lot worth P500,000 was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. Of the
P500,000 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the property, P200,000 had come from
the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned by Luis and P300,000 from the rentals of
a building belonging to Rizza. In fine, the sum of P500,000 had been part of the fruits received
during the period of cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P100,000 being
used by the common-law spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by her parents.
Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give
them your legal advice on the following:
A. How, under the law, should the bank deposit of P200,000, the house and lot valued
at P500,000 and the car worth P100,000 be allocated to them?
B. What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been living
together all the time, i.e., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage? (1997)
ANSWERS:
A.
Art. 147 of the FC provides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit

of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules of co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Thus:
1) The wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000 shall be divided equally
between Luis and Rizza.
2) The house and lot valued at P500,000 having been acquired by both of them
through work or industry shall be divided between them in proportion to their
respective contribution, in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. Hence, Luis
gets 2/5 while Rizza gets 3/5 of P500,000.
3) The car worth P100,000 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza, the same having been
donated to her by her parents.
B.
The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been celebrated
20 years ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of gains,
under which the husband and wife place in common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and
income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouse shall be divided equally between them (Art.
142, Civil Code).
Thus:
1) The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of P200,000 and the house
and lot valued at P500,000 shall be divided equally between Luis and Rizza.
2) However, the car worth P100,000 donated to Rizza by her parents shall be
considered to her own paraphernal property, having been acquired by lucrative
title (par.2, Art.148, Civil Code)
TOPIC: DECLARATION OF NULLITY
ANNULMENT (grounds, declarations and effects) (1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997,
2002)
LEGAL SEPARATION (grounds and effects) (1989, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2002)
I
Bert and Baby were married to each other on December 23, 1988. Six months later, she
discovered that he was a drug addict. Efforts to have him rehabilitated were unsuccessful.
Can Baby ask for annulment of marriage, or legal separation? Explain. (1996)
ANSWER:
No, Baby cannot ask for annulment of her marriage or for legal separation because both
these actions have already prescribed.
While concealment of drug addiction existing at the time of marriage constitutes fraud
under Art. 46 of the FC which makes the marriage voidable under Art. 45 of the FC, the action
must, however, be brought within 5 years from the discovery thereof under Article 47(3), FC.
Since the drug addiction of Bert was discovered by Baby in June 1989, the action had already
prescribed in June of 1994.
Although drug addiction is a ground for legal separation under Art. 55(5) and Art. 57 of
the FC requires that the action must be brought within 5 years from the occurrence of the
cause. Since Bert had been a drug addict from the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
action for legal separation must have been brought not later than 23 December 1993. Hence,
Baby cannot, now, bring action for legal separation.

II
A.
Give a brief definition or explanation of the term "psychological incapacity" as a ground
for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.
B.
If existing at the inception of marriage, would the state of being of unsound mind or
the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism be
considered indicia of psychological incapacity? Explain.
C.
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal
separation, or would they render the marriage voidable? (2002)
ANSWERS:
A.
"Psychological incapacity" is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing the
incapability of one or both spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of love,
respect, cohabitation, mutual help and support, trust and commitment. It must be
characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability and its root causes must be
clinically identified or examined. (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 1995])
B.
ln the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court held
that being of unsound mind, drug addiction, habituaI alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
may be indicia of psychological incapacity, depending on the degree of severity of the disorder.
However, the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
is a ground for annulment of marriage.
C.
ln accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they:
1) Will not constitute as grounds for declaration of nullity (Art 36, Family Code);
2) Will constitute as grounds for legal separation (Art. 55, FC); and
3) Will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voidable (Art. 45 and 46, FC).
III
Cadio and Corona contracted marriage on June 1, 1982. A few days after the marriage, Corona
discovered that Cadio was a homosexual. As homosexuality was not a ground for legal
separation under the Civil Code, there was nothing that Corona could do but bear with her
problem. The couple, however, started to live separately. With the enactment of the Family
Code, Corona decided to be legally separated from Cadio based on the new ground of
homosexuality. Corona brought her action for legal separation on September 15, 1988. Will the
action prosper? Give your reasons. (1989)
ANSWER:
Yes, the action will prosper because the cause arose only on August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code, and the action had not yet prescribed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will prosper. The offense of homosexuality as a continuing offense can be a
ground for legal separation. The prescriptive period of five years will apply only when the
offense has a fixed period of time and, therefore, the date of its occurrence can be computed.
A. RN and DM, without any impediment to marry each other had been living together
without benefit of church blessings. Their common-law union resulted in the birth of
ZMN. Two years later, they got married in a civil ceremony. Could ZMN be legitimated?
Reason (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. ZMN was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of RN and DM because at the time he was
conceived, RN and DM could have validly married each other. Under the Family Code,
children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the formers
conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other are legitimated
by the subsequent marriage of the parents.

Sample Exam Questions:


1. While in Afghanistan, a Japanese by the name of Sato sold to Ramoncito, a Filipino, a parcel of land
situated in the Philippines which Sato inherited from his Filipino mother.
a.) What law governs the formality in the execution of the contract of sale? Explain your answer and give
its legal basis.
b.) What law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land? Explain your answer and give its legal
basis.
c.) What law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land? Explain your answer and give its legal
basis.
2. Yvette was found to be positive for HIV virus, considered sexually transmissible. Her boyfriend, Joseph
was aware of her condition and yet married her. After two (2) years of cohabiting with Yvette, and in his
belief that she would probably never be able to bear him a healthy child, Joseph now wants to have his
marriage with Yvette annulled. Yvette opposes the suit contending that Joseph is estopped from seeking
annulment of their marriage since he knew even before their marriage that she was afflicted with HIV
virus. Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriage with Yvette prosper? Discuss fully.
3. Isidro and Irma, Filipinos, both 18 years of age, were passengers of Flight No. 317 of Oriental Airlines.
The plane they boarded was of Philippine registry. While en route from Manila to Greece, some passengers
hijacked the plane, held the chief pilot hostage at the cockpit and ordered him to fly instead to Libya.
During the hijacking, Isidro suffered a heart attack and was on the verge of death. Since Irma was already
8 months pregnant by Isidro, she pleaded the hijackers to allow the assistant pilot to solemnize her
marriage with Isidro. Soon after the marriage, Isidro expired. As the plane landed in Libya, Irma gave
birth. However, the baby died a few minutes after complete delivery.
Back in the Philippines, Irma immediately filed a claim for inheritance. The parents of Isidro opposed her
claim contending that the marriage between her and Isidro was void ab initio on the following grounds:
(a) they had not given their consent to the marriage of their son; (b) there was no marriage license; (c)
the solemnizing officer had no authority to perform the marriage; and (d) the solemnizing officer did not

file an affidavit of marriage with the proper civil registrar. Resolve each of the contentions (a to d) raised
by the parents of Isidro. Discuss fully.
4. Ana Rivera had a husband, a Filipino citizen like her, who was among the passengers on board a
commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean ten (10) years earlier and had never been heard
of ever since. Believing that her husband had died, Ana married Adolf Cruz Staedtler, a divorced German
national born of a German father and a Filipino mother residing in Stuttgart. To avoid being required to
submit the required certificate of capacity to marry from the German Embassy in Manila, Adolf stated in
the application for marriage license that he was a Filipino citizen. With the marriage license stating that
Adolf was a Filipino, the couple got married in a ceremony officiated by the Parish Priest of Calamba,
Laguna in a beach in Nasugbu, Batangas, as the local parish priest refused to solemnize marriages except
in his church. Is the marriage valid? Explain fully. (Bar Question)
5. At age 18, Marian found out that she was pregnant. She insured her own life and named her unborn
child as her sole beneficiary. When she was already due to give birth, she and her boyfriend Pietro, the
father of her unborn child, were kidnapped in a resort in Bataan where they were vacationing. The
military gave chase and after one week, they were found in an abandoned hut in Cavite. Marian and
Pietro were hacked with bolos. Marian and the baby delivered were both found dead, with the baby's
umbilical cord already cut. Pietro survived.
a.) Can Marian's baby be the beneficiary of the insurance taken of the life of the mother?
b.) Between Marian and the baby, who is presumed to have died first?
c.) Will Pietro, as surviving biological father of the baby, be entitled to claim the proceeds of the life
insurance on the life of Marian? (Bar Question)
6. Roderick and Faye were high school sweethearts. When Roderick was 18 and Faye, 16 years old, they
started to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. When Faye reached 18 years
of age, her parents forcibly took her back and arranged for her marriage to Brad. Although Faye lived with
Brad after the marriage, Roderick continued to regularly visit Faye while Brad was away at work. During
their marriage, Faye gave birth to a baby girl, Laica. When Faye was 25 years old, Brad discovered her
continued liaison with Roderick and in one of their heated arguments, Faye shot Brad to death. She lost
no time in marrying her true love Roderick, without a marriage license, claiming that they have been
continuously cohabiting for more than 5 years.
a.) Was the marriage of Roderick and Faye valid?
b.) What is the filiation status of Laica?
c.) Can Laica bring an action to impugn her own status on the ground that based on DNA results, Roderick
is her biological father?
d.) Can Laica e legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents? (Bar Question)
7. Gianna was born to Andy and Aimee, who at the time of Gianna's birth were not married to each other.
While Andy was single at the time, Aimee was still in the process of securing a judicial declaration of
nullity on her marriage to her ex-husband. Gianna's birth certificate, which was signed by both Andy and
Aimee, registered the status of Gianna as "legitimate," her surname carrying that of Andy's and that her
parents were married to each other.
a.) Can a judicial action for correction of entries in Gianna's birth certificate be successfully maintained
to:
i.) Change her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and
ii.) Change her surname from that of Andy's to AImee's maiden surname?
b.) Instead of a judicial action, can administrative proceedings be brought for the purpose of making the
above corrections?
c.) Assuming that Aimee is successful in declaring her former marriage void, and Andy and Aimee
subsequently married each other, would Gianna be legitimated? (Bar Question)
8. Despite several relationships with different women, Andrew remained unmarried. His first relationship
with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy, now 30 years old. His second, with Carla, produced two sons: Jon
and Ryan. His third, with Donna, bore him no children although Elena has a daughter Jane, from a
previous relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but they informally adopted
without court proceedings. Sandy's now 13 years old, whom they consider as their own. Sandy was
orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to them by the midwife who attended to Sandy's birth. All the
children, including Amy, now live with Andrew in his house.

a.) Is there any legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew? To the legal adoption of Sandy by
Andrew and Elena?
b.) In his old age, can Andrew be legally entitled to claim support from Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina, Wilma, and
Sandy assuming that all of them have the means to support him?
c.) Can Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina, WIlma, and Sandy legally claim support from each other?
d.) Can Jon and Jane legally marry? (Bar Question)
9. 26-year-old Gav Mas Hermin Ghuckles is the Crowned Prince of the Kingdom of Antartiqua, a smallisland country located near Antartica. Civil war broke out in the Kingdom. Gav Mas Hermin Ghuckles and
the rest of the Royal Family went into exile in Manila early this year. During his exile, Gav Mas Hermin
Ghuckles met Gigi, a 21-year-old Filipina nursing student residing in Manila. They fell in love instantly and
decided to get married. Both of them went to the local civil registrar to apply for a marriage license.
a.) Can Gav Mas Hermin Ghuckles and Gigi file the required sworn application for a marriage license
jointly?
b.) What document does Gav Mas Hermin Ghuckles need to present to the local civil registrar in order for
the latter to issue him a marriage license?
c.) During the course of civil war, the rebel forces dropped a nuclear bomb on Antartiqua which sunk the
entire island-country and killed all of the inhabitants therein. Now without a country, does Gav Mas
Hermin Ghuckles still have to obtain the required marriage license? (2008 SBC Pre-Week reviewer)
10. Siblings Geo, Gino, and Gelo were completely orphaned ten years ago when both their parents died in
plane crash. At that time, Geo was thirteen, Gino was eleven, and Gelo was only six years old. Now 23
years old, Geo wants to marry her boyfriend Ivan. Geo and Gino agreed that they would sell the home
that their parents left them to use some of the proceeds for Geo's wedding celebration and the rest of the
proceeds to pay the rentals in the apartment unit where Gino and Gelo were going to move. Geo and Gino
also agreed that Gelo will stay with Gino until he graduates from high school. May Geo and Gino validly
sell the house their parents left them?