REMEDIAL CASES:

1. G.R. No. L-40437 September 27, 1977

LOURDES GUARDACASA VDA. DE LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO A. AVENDAO, as Presiding Judge of Bian Br. I of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, HON. WENCESLAO E. HERCE, as Municipal Judge of San Pedro, Laguna, ROGELIO S.
MOLINA, as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Laguna and JOSE O. LEGASPI, respondents .
Castro, Makalintal, Mendoza, Gonzales & Associates for petitioner.
Jose M. Luison for private respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the nullification and setting aside of the order of dismissal and denial
of the petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction dated January 30, 1974 of respondent Judge
Herminio A. Avendao of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. 929 as well as all his subsequent
orders confirmatory of or enforcing the same, particularly, that of January 28, 1975 declaring his order of
November 11, 1974 final and executory, and the writ of execution and order of demolition issued by respondent
Judge Wenceslao E. Herce of the Municipal Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. 953 of said court, an
action for ejectment, and to enjoin enforcement of said orders by respondent sheriff, upon the main ground that the
issue of ownership between petitioner and private respondent over the property involved is precisely being litigated
in said Civil Case No. 929, an action for quieting of title.
On June 21, 1971, private respondent Jose O. Legaspi and Pilar O. Legaspi filed with the Municipal Court of San
Pedro, Laguna presided by respondent Judge Herce an action for forcible entry with preliminary injunction against
petitioner to recover a residential lot (Lot 17, Block 56, Poblacion "A", Tunasan Homesite at A. Mabini Street of
said municipality) on which the defendant had a building with a dancing hall and bowling alleys therein, the
plaintiffs being brother and sister and the defendant claiming to be the widow of a brother of said plaintiffs. After
said defendant had unsuccessfully moved for the dismissal of said case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, since
the issue of ownership of the premises involved was being raised by her, she was declared in default for having
failed to file answer. Judgment was subsequently rendered against her, which became final, and so a writ of
execution and later an order of demolition were issued, whereupon, said defendant, herein petitioner, instituted
Civil Case No. 927, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 12, 1972, a special civil action for
certiorari to set aside the said proceedings. Petitioner succeeded in securing a writ of preliminary injunction, which
was however questioned by private respondent in an appropriate special civil action in the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 01551.
In the meanwhile, on March 8, 1972, petitioner filed in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna another action,
Civil Case No. 929, for quieting of the title over the lot in issue, and as a preliminary remedy therein, prayed for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction likewise to suspend the demolition ordered by the municipal court.
The record is not clear as to whether petition in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
01551 did actually involve both Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929. All that appears is that the prayer of the petition
read thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most prespecfully prayed of this Honorable
Court of Appeals:
(a) That upon the filing of this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with this Honorable Court,
and the posting by petitioner of a bond of P500.00 or in the amount which this Court may fix, duly
approved by this Court, A Writ of Preliminary Injunction be forthwith issued against the

respondent in this case, restraining them from proceeding with the trial of the Petition of certiorari
in Civil Case No. B-927 and of the Complaint in Civil Case No. B-929, now pending before the
respondent Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, on December 21 and 28, 1972 at 8:30 a.m.
or at any time or date thereafter until further orders from this Honorable Court;
(b) That after due hearing, judgment be rendered in the above-entitled case as follows:
(1) Annulling and setting aside the orders of the respondent Judge in Civil Case
No. B-927 dated April 5, 1972 (Annex "GG") and August 21, 1972 (Annex "LL"),
and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the respondent Judge
under the said order;
(2) Prohibiting the respondent Judge from entertaining, hearing and deciding Civil
Case No. B-927 for certiorari;
(3) Dismissing the petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. B-927 of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I;
(4) Making the Writ of Preliminary Injunction theretofore issued by this
Honorable Court final, permanent and perpetual;
(5) Ordering the private respondent to pay to the petitioner the costs of this suit;
and
(6) ( 6) Granting to the petitioner herein such other and further reliefs which may
be deemed just and equitable in the premises. (Pp. 5 to 6, Record.)
In due course, and after having previously issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the lower court from
further proceeding with Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929, the Court of Appeals rendered the following judgment on
July 9, 1973 in said CA-G.R. No. 01551:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. Annulling and setting aside the order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. B-927, Annexes
GG and LL, dated April 5, 1972, respectively, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
issued pursuant to said orders;
2. Enjoining respondent Judge from hearing and deciding Civil Case No. B-927 which is hereby
ordered dismissed;
3. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case permanent; and
4. Ordering the private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Page 6, Record.)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied, hence she came to this Court on October 1, 1973
for a review of the Court of Appeals decision, and on October 4, 1973, We issued the following resolution:
L-37554 (Hon. Herminio A. Avendao, etc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.). Considering the
allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition,

without prejudice to petitioners' seeking injunction in Civil Case No. B-929 for quieting of title to
real property, pending in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, in Bian. (Page 7;
Record.)
This resolution eventually became final.
It turned out that as early as July 14, 1973, petitioner had already virtually pressed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 929 by filing a motion to that effect, apparently in reiteration of her
original prayer in the petition in said case of March 8, 1972. The proceedings relative to said motion were
overtaken by Our above resolution of October 8, 1973. But evently misconstruing both Our resolution as well as
the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondent judge not only refused to grant petitioner's motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction but even to proceed with the trial on the merit of Civil Case No. 929, dismissing the same.
Upon this premises, We do not hesitate in holding that respondent judge acted precipitately and the grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the orders complained of. Considering the basic nature of the controversy between petitioner
and private respondent which simply is who between them has the better right to the lot in question, the same being
up to the present a public land with a standing award apparently in favor of petitioner, but impugned by said
respondent, it is quite clear that the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case in the Municipal Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, Civil Case No. 953, is of very little consequence in the resolution of this case. It is elementary that
matters involving dominical rights are beyond the jurisdiction of municipal courts, except chartered cities, hence
the San Pedro court decision just mentioned may not be deemed to have in any manner foreclosed the right of
petitioner to retain possession of the subject lot so long as the appropriate judicial action to determine petitioner's
right thereto has not been finally terminated and the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.
On the other hand, the vehement claim of respondent's counsel that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 01551 setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Laguna in
Civil Case No. 927 settled the issue on dominical right between the parties is farfetched and obviously nothing but
a subjective rationalization. Nowhere in the appellate court's opinion rendered in said case is any reference
whatsoever made to the issue of ownership raised by herein petitioner, much less is any mention at all made therein
of Civil Case No. 929. Rightly or wrongly, despite its having issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
proceedings in both Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929, in its whole opinion, the Court of Appeals made no validly
binding pronouncement as regards the propriety of the filing by herein petitioner of the action for quieting title in
Civil Case No. 929. The appellate court limited itself exclusively to the issue of whether or not it was in order for
the Court of First Instance of Laguna to restrain in Civil Case No. 927, which involved no more than a petition for
certiorari against the inferior court premised on the sole proposition that said court had acted improvidently in its
Civil Case No. 953, the writ of execution and order of demolition issued by said inferior court. And in so far as that
particular point is concerned, the Court of Appeals acted correctly, hence when its decision was brought to this
Court for review, We dismissed the petition, as may be seen in Our aforequoted resolution of October 4, 1973 .
As matters have developed, however, it is the import of this resolution of October 4, 1973 that has become the
bone of contention in the case at bar. Obviously induced and persuaded by the arguments of counsel for herein
private respondent, respondent judge has taken the position that the said resolution may not be deemed as
modifying that part of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals "making the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in this case permanent." It is claimed that since the preliminary injunction was in
regard to the proceedings in both Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929 and the same was made permanent and that
decision is already final, respondent judge had no more authority relative to Civil Case No. 929 except to dismiss
the same. Such is the sense of His Honor's order of January 30, 1974. And in the subsequent order of November
11, 1974, His Honor made the following observation:
The plaintiff's further claim that when the Supreme Court issued its resolution dated October 4,
1973 wherein it denied the petition of the plaintiffs' "without prejudice to petitioner" seeking
injunction in Civil Case No. B-929 for quieting of title to real property pending in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, in Bian' it had intended to modify the decision of the Court of

Appeals. There is no legal basis for making such a conclusion considering that if the Honorable
Supreme Court wanted to allow this Court to continue hearing and deciding this case, it could have
easily lifted and/or dissolved the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. (Page 137-A Printed
Petition.)
It is thus evident that respondent judge made no real effort to imbibe the thrust of Our resolution in proper light.
Indeed, were We not convinced that His Honor may have acted in good faith, We could consider his action on said
resolution a deliberate misreading thereof warranting administrative sanction against him from this Court. In effect,
to say that We could have worded Our resolution differently had We intended to modify the decision of the Court
of Appeals is to suggest that this Court was not aware of the peculiar circumstances on which its resolution is
premised. The fact is that We well understood them. As already pointed out above, We did take note of the fact
that the appellate court decision did not pass on any issue related to Civil Case No. 929 and could not, therefore,
have validly meant to make permanent its preliminary injunction referring thereto. That petitioner had specifically
invited in its motion for reconsideration attention to such an omission about that case but the court denied said
motion in a minute resolution did not impart to the court's decision the legal significance respondents allege they
see in it. Much less did it produce the substantial effect of a resolution on the merits of petitioner's cause in Civil
Case No. 929.
As a matter of fact, the reason why We inserted in Our resolution the reservation about Civil case no. 929 was
precisely Our view that it is appropriate remedy open to petitioner to counteract the result of the forcible entry
case. Contrary to the observation of respondent judge, We did not have to spell out this point in black and white. It
should have been obvious to all concerned, assuming requisite objectivity and the adequate knowledge of the law
on their part, particularly His Honor. Respondent judge should have known that in situation similar to those
obtaining in the instant case, and whenever the special circumstances obtaining permit it, for the sake of
expediency and to save time in indicating what should be done, the Supreme Court may dismiss petitions filed to
correct errors of lower court's, but without prejudice to such directives and instructions to the private and/or public
respondents delineating the proper course that should be pursued in the premises, almost as if the petition has been
found meritorious, and all courts and parties are expected to act accordingly. to give due course to petitioners,
particularly those involving procedural matter, and thereby be required for further pleadings from the parties and
hearing the case, from the indubitable facts already before it, the matter in issue is already clear and can be readily
resolved, is a procedure not really consistent with the speedy administration of justice and may even be detrimental
to it. Accordingly, the Court has for sometime now resorted to the practice of merely indicating what should be
done, without having to give due course to petitions for review or in special civil actions, thereby lessening its
burden and at the same time disposing of procedural matters with utmost deliberate dispatch.
Now, coming to the basic procedural issue before Us in the instant case, which is, whether or not the final
judgment in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 953 of the San Pedro court, should be fully executed before the
final termination of the action for quieting of title, Civil Case No. 929 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, it is
Our considered opinion that it is at least a matter of equity that petitioner's physical possession of the premises in
controversy should not be disturbed in the meanwhile. Actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are intended
to avoid dirsuption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their
claimed right possession. In other words, the special civil action under Rule 70 has been designe to summarily
restore possession of land or building to one who has been forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the opposing claims of the parties to legal possession in the corresponding appropriate. Where the
action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff
to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and
less productive of confusion and disturbance physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and
expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownerhsip or not, is brought to
restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the
unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession
or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical
possession or ownerhisp. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the

other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any
attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the court.
In the instant case, the record before Us seems to indicate that notwithstanding that private respondent
denominated his complaint in Civil Case No. 953 as one of forcible entry, the actual situation at the time the said
complaint was filed was that petitioner had been in possession thereof for sometime already, even more than one
year. In other words, petitioner is actually the prior possession as between her and private respondent. Accordingly,
the true nature of the action from which the whole controversy in this case originated is, to view it in the light most
favorable to respondents, that of possible unlawful detainer. It results, therefore, that pursuant to the above
pronouncement, petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 929 was in order. And in this
connection, it may be added that it was not really Our intention in the resolution of October 4, 1973 to direct
respondent judge therein to issue the writ outright. By said resolution, all that We meant was for petitioner to file
the corresponding motion for preliminary injunction with the trial court and for that court to grant or deny the
same, after hearing both parties, as the facts shown to it by them might warrant, with the understanding naturally
that in determining the propriety of its action, the court should not be bound by what the inferior court in the
ejectment case might have already done or is doing. Indeed, We contemplated in said resolution, that if
circumstances should so require, the proceedings in the ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may
be found, in which event, the rentals due or whatever income might be derived from the premises owing to
whoever may ultimately be declared rightfully entitled to possession, should be ordered deposited with the inferior
court until the main case before it is finally terminated. To this end, all that is needed is for the party concerned to
include the prayer to that effect in the petition for preliminary injunction which may be acted upon by the Court of
Firs Instance without requiring joinder of the inferior court, albeit notice of the petition and the subsequent
developments should be given to it.
Incidentally, it may be stated that the same procedure as that just discussed should be observed whenever two
different parties are contesting between themselves the right to receive rentals or the income from the occupants of
the same premises, who are not claiming any right adverse thereto, are already litigating in court in an appropriate
proceeding their respective claims, even if a proper special civil action of interpleader under Rule 63 has not been
filed, considering, that in such an eventually, the pending action between the adverse claimants would already
serve the purposes of such interpleading. Of course, no such interpleader may be filed in an inferior court, because
of its limited jurisdiction, hence the inferior court in which any unlawful detainer suit is filed by any of the adverse
claimants against the occupants of the premises concerned must have to await and make all its actuations
subordinate to the developments in and the disposition of the main case in the Court of First Instance.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, all the impugned orders of respondent Judge Avendao are hereby
nullified and set aside, with the consequence that Civil Case No. 929 of the Court of Firs Instance of Laguna may
now take its regular course for its decision on the merits, and respondent Judge Herce and the sheriff, Rogelio S.
Medina, or whoever is acting in his stead, are ordered to suspend the enforcement and implementation of the writ
of execution and order of demolition issued in Civil Case No. 953 until after the final termination of Civil Case No.
929, when proper action may be taken consonant with the result of said case. Costs against private respondent.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

2. G.R. No. 131726

May 7, 2002

YOLANDA PALATTAO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 131 and MARCELO CO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the August 29, 1997
decision1 and the November 28, 1997 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40031, affirming the
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-17033 which reversed the
Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan, Branch 53, in an ejectment suit docketed as Civil Case No.
21755.1wphi1.nt
The antecedent facts are as follows: Petitioner Yolanda Palattao entered into a lease contract whereby she leased to
private respondent a house and a 490-square-meter lot located in 101 Caimito Road, Caloocan City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 247536 and registered in the name of petitioner. The duration of the lease contract
was for three years, commencing from January 1, 1991, to December 31, 1993, renewable at the option of the
parties. The agreed monthly rental was P7,500.00 for the first year; P8,000.00 for the second year; and P8,500.00
for the third year. The contract gave respondent lessee the first option to purchase the leased property.6
During the last year of the contract, the parties began negotiations for the sale of the leased premises to private
respondent. In a letter dated April 2, 1993, petitioner offered to sell to private respondent 413.28 square meters of
the leased lot at P7,800.00 per square meter, or for the total amount of P3,223,548.00. 7 Private respondent replied
on April 15, 1993 wherein he informed petitioner that he "shall definitely exercise [his] option [to buy]" the leased
property.8 Private respondent, however, manifested his desire to buy the whole 490-square-meter leased premises
and inquired from petitioner the reason why only 413.28 square meters of the leased lot were being offered for
sale. In a letter dated November 6, 1993, petitioner made a final offer to sell the lot at P7,500.00 per square meter
with a downpayment of 50% upon the signing of the contract of conditional sale, the balance payable in one year
with a monthly lease/interest payment of P14,000.00 which must be paid on or before the fifth day of every month
that the balance is still outstanding.9 On November 7, 1993, private respondent accepted petitioners offer and
reiterated his request for clarification as to the size of the lot for sale.10 Petitioner acknowledged private
respondents acceptance of the offer in his letter dated November 10, 1993.
Petitioner gave private respondent on or before November 24, 1993, within which to pay the 50% downpayment in
cash or managers check. Petitioner stressed that failure to pay the downpayment on the stipulated period will
enable petitioner to freely sell her property to others. Petitioner likewise notified private respondent that she is no
longer renewing the lease agreement upon its expiration on December 31, 1993.11
Private respondent did not accept the terms proposed by petitioner. Neither was there any documents of sale nor
payment by private respondent of the required downpayment. Private respondent wrote a letter to petitioner on
November 29, 1993 manifesting his intention to exercise his option to renew their lease contract for another three
years, starting January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1996.12 This was rejected by petitioner, reiterating that she was no
longer renewing the lease. Petitioner demanded that private respondent vacate the premises, but the latter refused.
Hence, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan, Branch 127, a case for specific
performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 16287,13 seeking to compel petitioner to sell to him the leased property.
Private respondent further prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent petitioner from
filing an ejectment case upon the expiration of the lease contract on December 31, 1993.
During the proceedings in the specific performance case, the parties agreed to maintain the status quo. After they
failed to reach an amicable settlement, petitioner filed the instant ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial

Court of Caloocan City, Branch 53.14 In his answer,15 private respondent alleged that he refused to vacate the
leased premises because there was a perfected contract of sale of the leased property between him and petitioner.
Private respondent argued that he did not abandon his option to buy the leased property and that his proposal to
renew the lease was but an alternative proposal to the sale. He further contended that the filing of the ejectment
case violated their agreement to maintain the status quo.
On July 28, 1995, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The dispositive portion
thereof states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering
the defendant and all persons claiming right under him to pay the plaintiff as follows:
1. P12,000.00 per month representing reasonable monthly rental from January 1, 1994 and months
thereafter until defendants shall vacate the subject premises;
2. P10,000.00 representing attorneys fee;
3. To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.16
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court reversed the assailed decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
53, this City, rendered on July 28, 1995, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. Likewise,
the motion for reconsideration was denied on August 29, 1997. Hence, the instant petition anchored upon the
following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC, CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 131, ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL IN FILING AN EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST
RESPONDENT CO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC, CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 131, ERRED IN FINDING
THAT AN INJUNCTIVE SUIT WILL BAR THE FILING OF EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST
RESPONDENT CO.
III
THE RTC, CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 131, ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS A
PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN THE PARTIES OVER THE LEASED PROPERTY.18
The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner was estopped from filing the instant ejectment suit against private
respondent by the alleged status quo agreement reached in the specific performance case filed by private
respondent against petitioner. A reading, however, of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the January
21, 1994 hearing discloses that the agreement to maintain the status quo pertained only to the duration of the
negotiation for an amicable settlement and was not intended to be operative until the final disposition of the
specific performance case. Thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

CourtBefore we go into the prayer for preliminary injunction and of the merit of the case I want to see if I
can make the parties settle their differences.
Atty. SiapanWe will in the meantime maintain the status quo on the matter pending further negotiation.
CourtAs a matter of injunction, are you willing to maintain a status quo muna [?]
Atty. MendezYes, your Honor.
CourtHow about Atty. Uy are you willing?
Atty. UyYes, your Honor.
CourtI will not issue any injunction but there will be a status quo and we will concentrate our efforts on
letting the parties to (sic) negotiate and enter into an agreement.19
xxx

xxx

xxx

I will give you the same facts of the case. I want to settle this and not go into trial because in due
time I will not finish the case, my stay here is only Acting Presiding Judge and there are other
judges nominated for this sala and once the judge will be (sic) appointed then I go, let us get
advantage of settling the matter. I will have your gentlemans agreement that there will be no
adversarial attitude among you will (sic) never arrive at any agreement.
Atty. SiapanIn the meantime, we will move for a resetting of this case your Honor.
Court
Anyway, this is a gentlemans agreement that there will be no new movement but the status quo
will be maintained.
Atty. Siapan, Atty. Mendez & Atty. Uy.
Yes, your Honor. (simultaneously (sic) in saying)20
The foregoing agreement to maintain the status quo pending negotiations was noted by the trial court in its January
21, 1994 Order postponing the hearing to enable the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, to wit:
Upon agreement of the parties herein for postponement of todays schedule as there might be some
possibility of settling the claims herein, let the hearing today be cancelled.
In the meantime this case is set for hearing on February 28, 1994 at 8:30 a.m., should the parties not arrive
at any amicable settlement.21

It is beyond cavil therefore that the preservation of the status quo agreed upon by the parties applied only during
the period of negotiations for an amicable settlement and cannot be construed to be effective for the duration of the
pendency of the specific performance case. It is a settled rule that injunction suits and specific performance
cases, inter alia, will not preclude the filing of, or abate, an ejectment case. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry
suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who
has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of
juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption
of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession." In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on
questions of ownership are provisional in nature.22
In Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al.,23 the issue of whether or not an ejectment
case based on expiration of lease contract should be abated by an action to enforce the right of preemption or prior
purchase of the leased premises was resolved in the negative. The Court outlined the following precedents:
1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or
other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate the latter; and neither
do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v.
Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v.
Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]).
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial
Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only
issue involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa, Sr. v.
C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]).
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property
(Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]).
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of
a lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987];
Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988]).
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de
retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600
[1975]).
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits
regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA
167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v.
Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v.
Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604
[1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608 [1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al., [annulment of sale and
reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).1wphi1.nt
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment
actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC
[annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758
[1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]).

The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial
Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in
the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved.
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. In Wilmon, the Court
recognized that Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendao24 was an exception to the general rule against suspension of an
ejectment proceeding.25 Thus:
x x x [A]s regards the seemingly contrary ruling in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendano, 89 SCRA 135 (1977),
this Court observed in Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167, 172-173 (1983), that the exception to the rule
in this case of Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present petition. The
right of the petitioner is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on
equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the
decision in the ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a factor not present in
this petition.
In the case at bar, the continued occupation by private respondent of the leased premises is conditioned upon his
right to acquire ownership over said property. The factual milieu obtaining here, however, hardly falls within the
aforecited exception as the resolution of the ejectment suit will not result in the demolition of the leased premises,
as in the case of Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendao. Verily, private respondent failed to show "strong reasons of equity"
to sustain the suspension or dismissal of the ejectment case. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Precedents are
helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially identical with previous
litigations.26 Faced with the same scenario on which the general rule is founded, and finding no reason to deviate
therefrom, the Court adheres to the settled jurisprudence that suits involving ownership may not be successfully
pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment.
Contracts that are consensual in nature, like a contract of sale, are perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. Once
there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter, consideration, and terms of
payment, a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance
must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and
without variance of any sort from the proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal,
constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer. Consequently, when something is desired which
is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent because any
modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer.27
In the case at bar, while it is true that private respondent informed petitioner that he is accepting the latters offer to
sell the leased property, it appears that they did not reach an agreement as to the extent of the lot subject of the
proposed sale. This is evident from the April 15, 1993 reply-letter of private respondent to petitioner, to wit:
I would like to inform you that I shall definitely exercise my option as embodied in Provision "F" (First
Option) of our Contract of Lease dated December 21, 1990. As per agreement, my first option covers the
490 square meters site which I am currently leasing from you at 101 Caimito Road, Caloocan City.
Specifically, your Transfer Certificate of Title #247536 delineates the property sizes as 492 square meters.
Your offer, however, states only 413.28 square meters are for sale to me. I trust that this is merely an
oversight on your part. Notwithstanding the rumors to the effect that part of the property have already been
sold to other parties, I would like to believe that you still retain absolute ownership over the entire property
covered by my Contract of Lease. Kindly enlighten me on this matter so that we can proceed with the
negotiations for the sale of your property to me.28
Likewise, in his November 7, 1993 reply-letter, private respondent stated that:

While it is true that you first offered your property for sale to me last April 14, 1993, it is also equally true
that you only correspond with me on this matter again on October 27, 1993. I answered your April 14 offer
with a registered mail on April 15, 1993. In it, I stated that I am definitely exercising my first option to
purchase your property in accordance with Provisions "F" of our Contract of Lease dated December 21,
1990. Likewise, I requested you to explain the discrepancy between the size of the property being offered
for sale (413.28 square meters) as against the size stated in my option which is 492 square meters.
However, I did not get any reply from you on this matter. Hence the negotiations got stalled. If anybody
should be blamed for the prolonged negotiation, then surely it is not all mine alone.29
The foregoing letters reveal that private respondent did not give his consent to buy only 413.28 square meters of
the leased lot, as he desired to purchase the whole 490 square-meter-leased premises which, however, was not what
was exactly proposed in petitioners offer. Clearly, therefore, private respondents acceptance of petitioners offer
was not absolute, and will consequently not generate consent that would perfect a contract.
Even assuming that the parties reached an agreement as to the size of the lot subject of the sale, the records show
that there was subsequently a mutual withdrawal from the contract.30 This is so because in the November 10, 1993
letter of petitioner, she gave private respondent until November 24, 1993 to pay 50% of the purchase price, with
the caveat that failure to do so would authorize her to sell to others the leased premises. The period within which to
pay the downpayment is a new term or a counter-offer in the contract which needs acceptance by private
respondent. The latter, however, failed to pay said downpayment, or to at least manifest his conformity to the
period given by petitioner. Neither did private respondent ask for an extension nor insist on the sale of the subject
lot. What appears in the record is private respondents November 29, 1993 letter informing petitioner that he shall
exercise or avail of the option to renew their lease contract for another three years, starting January 1, 1994 to
December 31, 1996. Evidently, there was a subsequent mutual backing out from the contract of sale. Hence,
private respondent cannot compel petitioner to sell the leased property to him. 1wphi1.nt
Considering that the lease contract was not renewed after its expiration on December 31, 1991, private respondent
has no more right to continue occupying the leased premises. Consequently, his ejectment therefrom must be
sustained.
As to the monthly rental to be paid by private respondent from the expiration of their contract of lease until the
premises is vacated, we find that the P12,000.00 awarded by the Metropolitan Trial Court must be reduced to
P8,500.00, it being the highest amount of monthly rental stated in the lease contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 29, 1997 decision and the November 28, 1997 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40031 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan, Branch 53, in Civil Case No. 21755 is REINSTATED subject to the modification that the monthly
rental to be paid by private respondent from the date of the termination of the lease contract until the leased
premises is vacated is reduced to P8,500.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

3. G.R. No. 48766 February 9, 1993

GODELIVA S. DULAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, as a formal party and in his Official
Capacity, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his
Official Capacity, and ANGELES DICO, in her Private Capacity, respondents.
Rodrigo B. Lorenzo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Bonaparte E. Terrazona, Pedro A. Gizon & Artemio Rodriguez for A. Dico.

NOCON, J.:
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us to confine public respondent Director of the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the principle of res judicata in
administrative proceedings by nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978 order giving due course to the letter-petition of
private respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of Mrs. Angeles Dico
against Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and the "Cancellation of Fishpond
Lease Agreement No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay" and (2) his telegrams dated August 14, 1978 stating that
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order "cannot be entertained" and
advising petitioner of the continuation of the formal investigation of the private respondent's letter-petition
scheduled for September 4 to 9, 1978.
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office of the President, both of which have
attained finality. As condensed by the Office of the Solicitor General, these are as follows:
1.
entitled
v.
Annex ("A") 1

Re: DANR

Case
"Angeles
Juan

No. 2898
Dico
Quibete"

The salient antecedent facts stated in the decision of the Office of the President dated November
14, 1969, are as follows:
That by a barter agreement entered into between Juan Quibete and Jose Padios
sometime in 1932, the former exchanged his parcel of land situated at Sitio
Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio, province of Iloilo, for the latter's fishpond
area of about 24 hectares located at sitio Talaba-an, municipality of Cadiz (now
Cadiz City), province of Negros Occidental;
That Juan Quibete, also in 1932, applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit over
the area (F.P.L.A. No. 1709). The application was disapproved because the area
covered thereby was not yet declared available for fishpond purposes. The records
of that application were lost during World War II so much so that Juan Quibete
had to renew his application in 1945 (Fp. A. No. 716). His application was
approved on February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E was issued;

That on February 6, 1958, private respondent (Angeles Dico) filed her fishpond
application (Fp. A. No. 18206) to occupy the area covered by petitioner's fishpond
lease agreement;
That her application was disapproved on the ground that the area she applied had
already been awarded to Juan Quibete, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner,
under
Fishpond
Permit
No. F-738-E, and that a motion for reconsideration thereon was denied;
That on February 29, 1964, Juan Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his
rights and interests over the area under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E to one
Petronilo Retirado;
That on April 28, 1964, private respondent Angeles Dico filed a protest with the
Philippine Fisheries Commission alleging that Juan Quibete was occupying and
improving lot (Lot No. 489-C) which was not the area covered by his fishpond
permit and that he transferred his rights and interests over the said area without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
That the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner dismissed the protest on October 16,
1964 and declared that Lot No. 489-C was the same area granted to Juan Quibete
under his fishpond permit and not any other lot;
That from the decision private respondent Angeles Dico brought her case to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who dismissed her appeal on
December 7, 1965;
That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the Office of the
President. Her appeal was in turn dismissed in the decision of November 14, 1969.
2.
Re:
entitled
V-3-3852,
Applicant-Appellant
Juan
Appellee" (Annex "F") 2

DANR

Case
"F.P.A.
Angeles

Quibete,

No.

3447
No.
Dico,
v.
Claimant-

The facts of the case are as follows:

That on November 13, 1965, while DANR Case No. 2898, supra, was still
pending decision by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, private
respondent Angeles Dico filed with the Director of Lands a free patent application
(No. V-3-3852) for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C covered by Fishpond
Permit
No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete;
That Juan Quibete, claiming preferential right over the area applied for, protested
to the application;
That the Director of Lands, in a decision dated May 30, 1967, rejected the
application of private respondent Dico and directed Juan Quibete to file the
appropriate public land application, if qualified, for the 4-hectare dry portion;

That a motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondent Dico
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case
No. 2898 aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed on July 9, 1970 the decision of the
Director of Lands (Annex "F"), stating that the 4-hectare area subject of the appeal
covered a portion of the same tract of land which was the subject matter of DANR
Case No. 2898;
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's decision, Annex
"F", but her motion was denied on January 26, 1971. A second motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied per Order dated May 5, 1971.
3. As already stated, Petronilo Retirado became the successor-in-interest of Juan Quibete by virtue
of a deed of transfer of rights and improvements executed by Juan Quibete in favor of Petronilo
Retirado on February 29, 1964 over the area covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan
Quibete (Annex "A").
4. Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and interests over the area in
question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of Sale of Fishpond
Improvements and Transfer of Rights" (Annex "J") transferring their rights and interests in favor
of the petitioner over a portion of Lot No. 489-Cconsisting of 19.15 hectares, more or less, and
covered by their Fishpond Permit No. 158-2.
5. On October 22, 1974, after application with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, petitioner was issued a fishpond lease agreement (No. 2169) [Annex "K"] over a
portion of Lot 489-C consisting of 18.3675 hectares, expiring on December 31, 1998.
6. On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles Dico) submitted a letter-petition to the
respondent officials (Annex "L") requesting for a "reopening of fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico
vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on newly discovered
evidence". It was there alleged that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete did not cover
the area in question (Lot No. 489-C) located in Sitio Talaba-an, Municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz
City) but Lot No. 487 located in Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that petitioner's Fishpond
Lease Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a new one be issued in her name.
7. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res judicata (Annex "M"). She
argued that the two administrative decisions in DANR Case No. 2898 and DANR Case No. 3447
(Annexes "A" and "F"), involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action, have
already become final and settled the matter once and for all.
8. Claiming that res judicata is not applicable, private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss
(Annex "P"). This was the subject of a rejoinder (Annex "Q") which was again excepted to by
private respondent on the argument that res judicata does not apply in cases where the government
has to exercise its inherent power to regulate (Annex "R").
Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in abeyance. In an "Interlocutory
Order" dated February 24, 1978, he reserved to resolve the motion "until after termination of the
investigation" brought about by private respondent's letter-petition. 3
By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the letter-petition of respondent Angeles Dico dated
October
28,
1977
but
also
the
denial 4 of her motion for reconsideration 5 and the insistence of respondent Director in conducting his investigation

on September 4 to 9, 1978 at the Bacolod City Fisheries Office, 6 the situation had become urgent for petitioner.
Thus, she filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order
claiming that unless one is immediately issued, respondent will proceed with the investigation as scheduled, and if
petitioner refuses or fails to appear in said investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will proceed
with the investigation and reception of evidence ex-parte as clearly threatened by the respondent Director in his
telegrams to the petitioner and his counsel, marked as Annexes "I", "U", "W" and "W-1" herein.
As prayed for, We issued a temporary restraining order in the Resolution of September 7, 1978. 7
Private respondent Angeles Dico's request for the reopening of the case of "Dico vs. Quibete, et al." and the
cancellation of the Fishpond Lease Agreement of petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay on the ground of fraud committed
by Juan Quibete and Petronila Retirado is anchored, allegedly, on the following pieces of newly-discovered
evidence, to wit:
(1) Order of then Philippine Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Rolden, dated May 12, 1964,
recognizing the fishpond application (No. 18206) of private respondent, dated Feb. 6, 1958, over
the area in question located at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City;
(2) The Plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area of Lot 489 of which the subject area is a
portion;
(3) The Fishpond Application (No. 18950) of Juan Quibete (herein petitioner's successor-ininterest) for 5 hectares covered by Lot 489-B (25 hectares), situated at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an,
Diotay, Cadiz City, was denied by Hon. Jose R. Montilla Assistant Director of Fisheries on May
19, 1960 because Juan Quibete was already a holder of a previously approved fishpond application
under Permit No. 738-E under Lot 487 covering a 20-hectare area situated at Barrio Luna, Cadiz
City;
(4) The Plan of the aforesaid Lot 487;
(5) Affidavits of three (3) persons who attest to the fact that Juan Quibete's fishpond area (Lot 487)
is located at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. The witnesses are Mansueto D. Alarcon, then Municipal
Secretary of the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental dated January 6, 1965; Patrolman
Eligio O. Javier, member of the police force of Cadiz, Negros Occidental, dated October 22, 1963
and Melecio Quibete, son of Juan, executed in May 1964. 8
After an exhaustive review of the records of the case, We grant the petition and make permanent the temporary
restraining order issued earlier on September 7, 1978.
Private respondent's letter-petition, 9 filed October 28, 1977, states clearly that it is a "Request for Reopening of
Fishpond Conflict of Mrs. Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on
New Discovered Evidence . . . ."
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction. 10
DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" was decided by the Office of the President on
November 14, 1969. 11 Since the same was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the same has long become
final and executory.

DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No. V-3-385 of
private respondent Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected her application. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. 12 The findings of fact in said
DANR case, which were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are deemed
conclusive by operation of law. 13 Said DANR case, not having been brought likewise to the courts for judicial
review has also become final and executory. 14
Private respondent points out that the Director of Lands, Ramon N. Casanova, treated her motion for
reconsideration as a petition for relief from judgment. That may be so but Director Casanova's action was not in
accord with the administrative rules on appeal. Actually, the next step that private respondent should have taken
from the July 9, 1970 Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was to appeal the same to the
Office of the President within 30 days from receipt of said Decision. 15 Private respondent received the Decision on
September 21, 1970, 16 and should have been appealed the same by October 24, 1970, the last day of filing. Instead
she filed a motion for reconsideration only on November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July 9, 1970 decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447 had become final and executory.
On the assumption, however, that private respondent's November 3, 1970 motion for reconsideration was properly
treated as a petition for relief from judgment, thereby also assuming that E.O. 19 (1966) was not applicable to
private respondent's case, a careful review of her alleged "newly discovered evidence" does not support the charge
of fraud.
Private respondent's allegation is that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Juan Quibete, was given Lot 487 under
Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E while Lot 489-C, which she applied for under Fp. A. No. 18206, was what Juan
Quibete actually improved. He sold his rights over this Lot 489-C to Retirado, who in turn sold his rights to
petitioner.
Actually, private respondent filed on February 6, 1958 with the Bureau of Fisheries Fishpond Application, Fp. A.
No. 18206, to occupy Lot No. 489-C after having allegedly verified from the records of the Bureau of Forestry that
there was no prior lessee. 17 Her application was initially denied on the ground that said Lot 489-C, mistakenly
written as Lot 487 in Quibete's original sketch, had already been granted to Quibete under Fishpond Permit No. F738-E as early as February 10, 1949. 18
In fact, it appears that what private respondent applied for was the very area of her husband, Celso Dico. This was
confirmed by the Assistant Director of Forestry in his letter dated October 15, 1963 to the Commissioner of the
Philippine Fisheries Commission. 19
Private respondent protested on April 18, 1964 the denial of her application. To allow for further verification of her
claim, the November 6, 1963 order denying her application was set aside by the order of May 12,
1964 20 the first alleged newly-discovered evidence of private respondent and another verification made on
May 23, 1964 by one of the Commission's investigators, Mr. Cesar Alelis. 21 It was established that it was
Quibete's Lot 489-C which private respondent was claiming, although erroneously labelled as Lot 487 by Quibete
himself in the handwritten sketch he submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries on December 5, 1946. 22 Consequently,
private respondent's Fishpond Application No. 18206 was denied with finality by the Philippine Fisheries
Commission on October 16, 1964. 23
Again, acting on the motion for reconsideration of his Office's denial of private respondent's appeal of said October
16, 1964 Order, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources ordered on March 6, 1968, one of the lawyers
in his Office's Legal Division, Atty. Guillermo B. Bautista, to conduct another investigation and ocular inspection
of the fishpond in dispute. 24
The results were the same. It was Lot 489-C that was improved by Juan Quibete and not Lot 487. A surprise that
cropped up in this latest investigation was the withdrawal by Melecio Quibete, son of Juan Quibete, of his
statements in favor of private respondent which he said he made during the initial investigation regarding private

respondent's Fishpond Application No. 18206 only because he was promised money to do so. 25 It turned out that
private respondent welched on her promise. Since private respondent's claim to the land is anchored on her
purchase of said land, together with improvements, from Melecio Quibete, 26 the withdrawal by the latter of his
statements renders private respondent Dico's claim fallacious.
To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond and which rights he sold to Retirado was
investigated TWICE after the Philippine Fisheries Commission reinstated private respondent's Fishpond
Application No. 18206 in its Order of May 12, 1964. Both investigations more than three years apart with
investigators from different offices showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot 489-C although in the
different documents, including maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot 487. Thus, no merit can be
given to private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence, number 2 and 5(page 7-8, supra) as all these HAD already
been studied thoroughly by both Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate investigations.
The matter having become final as of August or September 1970, 27 it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give due course to privaterespondent's letter-petition of October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved
herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Ordered ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
are the (1) February 20, 1978 Order of the public respondent giving due course to the letter-petition of private
respondent and the (2) two August 14, 1978 telegrams issued by public respondent setting private respondent's
letter-complaint for formal investigation. The temporary restraining order issued last September 7, 1978 is hereby
made PERMANENT. Costs against private respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

4. G.R. No. , 133 SCRA 141

Traders Royal bank vs IAC
September 30, 1984
G.R. No. , ,
vs.
,.
, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition involves the authority of a Regional Trial Court to issue, at the
instance of a third-party claimant, an injunction enjoining the sale of property previously levied upon by the sheriff
pursuant to a writ of attachment issued by another Regional Trial Court.
The antecedent facts, undisputed by the parties, are set forth in the decision of the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court thus: ?
Sometime on March 18, 1983 herein petitioner Traders Royal Bank instituted a suit against the Remco Alcohol
Distillery, Inc. REMCO before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CX, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 9894-P, for the
recovery of the sum of Two Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Eight & 71/100
Pesos (P2,382,258.71) obtaining therein a writ of pre attachment directed against the assets and properties of
Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc.
Pursuant to said writ of attachment issued in Civil Case No. 9894-P, Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago levied
among others about 4,600 barrels of aged or rectified alcohol found within the premises of said Remco Distillery
Inc. A third party claim was filed with the Deputy Sheriff by herein respondent La Tonde?a, Inc. on April 1, 1982
claiming ownership over said attached property (Complaint, p. 17, Rollo).
On May 12, 1982, private respondent La Tonde?a, Inc. filed a complaint-in- intervention in said Civil Case No.
9894, alleging among others, that 'it had made advances to Remco Distillery Inc. which totalled P3M and which
remains outstanding as of date' and that the 'attached properties are owned by La Tonde?a, Inc.' (Annex '3' to
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss dated July 27, 1983 ? Annex "C" to the petition).
Subsequently, private respondent La Tonde?a, Inc., without the foregoing complaint-in- intervention having been
passed upon by the Regional Trial Court, Branch CX, (Pasay City), filed in Civil Case No. 9894-P a "Motion to
Withdraw" dated October 8, 1983, praying that it be allowed to withdraw alcohol and molasses from the Remco

Distillery Plant (Annex 4 to Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss-Annex C, Petition) and which motion was granted per
order of the Pasay Court dated January 27, 1983, authorizing respondent La Tonde?a, Inc. to withdraw alcohol and
molasses from the Remco Distillery Plant at Calumpit, Bulacan (Annex "I" to Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition dated
August 2, 1983 ? Annex E to the Petition).
The foregoing order dated January 27, 1983 was however reconsidered by the Pasay Court by virtue of its order
dated February 18, 1983 (Annex A ? Petition, p. 15) declaring that the alcohol "which has not been withdrawn
remains in the ownership of defendant Remco Alcohol Distillery Corporation" and which order likewise denied La
Tonde?a's motion to intervene.
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order of February 18, 1983 was filed by respondent La Tonde?a,
Inc., on March 8, 1983 reiterating its request for leave to withdraw alcohol from the Remco Distillery Plant, and
praying further that the "portion of the order dated February 18, 1983" declaring Remco to be the owner of subject
alcohol, "be reconsidered and striken off said order". This motion has not been resolved (p. 4, Petition) up to July
18, 1983 when a manifestation that it was withdrawing its motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent La
Tonde?a Inc.
On July 19, 1983, private respondent La Tonde?a Inc. instituted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch IX,
Malolos, Bulacan presided over by Respondent Judge, Civil Case No. 7003-M, in which it asserted its claim of
ownership over the properties attached in Civil Case No. 9894-P, and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction (Annex B,id ).
A Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the application for a writ of Preliminary Injunction by herein respondent
La Tonde?a Inc. was filed by petitioner on July 27, 1983 (Annex C, p. 42, Id.)
This was followed by respondent La Tonde?a's opposition to petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on August 1, 1983
(Annex D, p. 67, Id.).
A reply on the part of petitioner was made on the foregoing opposition on August 3, 1983 (p. 92, Id.).
Hearings were held on respondent La Tonde?a's application for injunctive relief and on petitioner's motion to
dismiss on August 8, 19 & 23, 1983 (p. 5, Id.).
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective memoranda (Annex F, p. 104; Annex G, p. 113, Rollo).

Subsequently, the questioned order dated September 28, 1983 was issued by the respondent Judge declaring
respondent La Tonde?a Inc. to be the owner of the disputed alcohol, and granting the latter's application for
injunctive relief (Annex H-1, Id.).
On October 6, 1983, respondent Sheriff Victorino Evangelista issued on Edilberto A. Santiago Deputy Sheriff of
Pasay City the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction (Annex N, p. 127, Id.).
This was followed by an order issued by the Pasay Court dated October 11, 1983 in Civil Case No. 9894-P
requiring Deputy Sheriff Edilberto A. Santiago to enforce the writ of preliminary attachment previously issued by
said court, by preventing respondent sheriff and respondent La Tonde?a, Inc. from withdrawing or removing the
disputed alcohol from the Remco ageing warehouse at Calumpit, Bulacan, and requiring the aforenamed
respondents to explain and show cause why they should not be cited for contempt for withdrawing or removing
said attached alcohol belonging to Remco, from the latter's ageing warehouse at Calumpit, Bulacan (Annex F, p.
141, Petition).
Thereafter, petitioner Traders Royal Bank filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside the Order dated September
28, 1983 of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch IX, issued in Civil Case No. 7003M; to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction dated October 6, 1983 issued pursuant to said order; to prohibit
respondent Judge from taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 7003-M, and to compel
private respondent La Tonde?a, Inc., and Ex- Oficio Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to return the disputed alcohol to
their original location at Remco's ageing warehouse at Calumpit, Bulacan.
In its decision, the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of legal and factual basis, holding
that the respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing the Order of September 28, 1983 and the writ of
preliminary injunction dated October 3, 1983. citing the decision in Detective and Protective Bureau vs. Cloribel
(26 SCRA 255). Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the respondent court denied the same in its resolution
dated February 2, 1984.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that respondent Judge of the Regional T- trial Court of Bulacan acted without jurisdiction in
entertaining Civil Case No. 7003-M, in authorizing the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction, which enjoined the sheriff of Pasay City from interferring with La Tonde?a's right to enter and
withdraw the barrels of alcohol and molasses from Remco's ageing warehouse and from conducting the sale
thereof, said merchandise having been previously levied upon pursuant to the attachment writ issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Civil Case No. 9894-P. It is submitted that such order of the Bulacan Court

constitutes undue and illegal interference with the exercise by the Pasay Court of its coordinate and co-equal
authority on matters properly brought before it.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the action filed by private respondent La Tonde?a, Inc., as third-party claimant, before the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 7003-M wherein it claimed ownership over the property levied
upon by Pasay City Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago is sanctioned by Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Thus ? ?
If property taken be claimed by any person other than the party against whom attachment had been issued or his
agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds
of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the officer while the latter has possession of the property, and a
copy thereof upon the attaching creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property under the attachment,
unless the attaching creditor or his agent, on demand of said officer, secures aim against such claim by a bond in a
sum not greater than the value of the property attached. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
decided by the court issuing the writ of attachment. The officer shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or
keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant, unless such a claim is so made and the action upon the
bond brought within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of said bond. But nothing
herein contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by proper action ...
The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person who claims to be the owner
of property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third- party claim with the sheriff, and if the attaching
creditor posts an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff, to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his
claim (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, 45 SCRA 314). And this precisely was the remedy resorted to by private
respondent La Tonde?a when it filed the vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court.
The case before us does not really present an issue of first impression. In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs.
Ramos, 1 this Court resolved a similar question in this wise: ?
The objection that at once suggests itself to entertaining in Case No. 12263 the motion to discharge the preliminary
attachment levied in Case No. 11531 is that by so doing one judge would interfere with another judge's actuations.
The objection is superficial and will not bear analysis.
It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who claims to be the owner of the property attached is
appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such action may render judgment ordering the
sheriff of whoever has in possession the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from

seizing it. It follows further that the court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be
necessary, to release the property pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action includes
jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve the subject
matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. This is self-evident.
It is true of course that property in custody of the law can not be interfered without the permission of the proper
court, and property legally attached is property incustodia legis. But for the reason just stated, this rule is confined
to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interest. When
the sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not apply and
interference with his custody is not interference with another court's order of attachment.
It may be argued that the third-party claim may be unfounded; but so may it be meritorious, for that matter.
Speculations are however beside the point. The title is the very issue in the case for the recovery of property or the
dissolution of the attachment, and pending final decision, the court may enter any interlocutory order calculated to
preserve the property in litigation and protect the parties' rights and interests.
Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is
applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the
judgment or process of another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the proper
appellate court . 2 The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate
jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.It is further argued that
since private respondent La Tonde?a, Inc., had voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Pasay Court by
filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 9894-P, the denial or dismissal thereof constitutes a bar to the present
action filed before the Bulacan Court.
We cannot sustain the petitioner's view. Suffice it to state that intervention as a means of protecting the third-party
claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring an
independent suit. 3 The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a
subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from
the order denying his original third-party claim. 4
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
AC-G.R. No. SP-01860 is affirmed, with costs against petitioner Traders Royal Bank.SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

5. G.R. No. 84975 July 5, 1989

ZENAIDA GALINDEZ, CAROLINA JUNIO AND GERONIMO SERNADILLA, petitioners,
vs.
RURAL BANK OF LLANERA, INC., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 85211. July 5, 1989
RURAL BANK OF LLANERA (N.E.), INC., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND ZENAIDA GALINDEZ, respondents.
Carlito T. Frias for the Bank.
Victor W. Galang for Zenaida Galindez.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Arising from the same facts and involving the same issues and questions of law, these separate Petitions were
ordered consolidated in this Court's Resolution of 9 November 1988.
The undisputed facts follows:
Zenaida Galindez, petitioner in G.R. No. 84975, was, since March 1979, the Cashier of the Rural Bank of Llanera,
Inc. (Nueva Ecija), which is the petitioner in G.R. No. 85211 (the Bank, for short).
Sometime in January of 1981, the said Bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, with a Receiver
designated to take over the management of the Bank as well as its reorganization.
On 3 April 1981, the Receiver applied for clearance with the Regional Office No. III, Nueva Ecija Labor Office, at
Cabanatuan City (docketed as R03 NELO Case No. 700), to terminate the services of Zenaida Galindez (Galindez
for brevity) and two of her co-employees, namely, Carolina Junio and Geronimo Sernadilla, based on
retrenchment. Prior to that, however, or on 1 April 1981, notice of termination was sent to them informing them of
the termination of their services effective 16 April 1981.
All three, namely, Galindez, Junio and Sernadilla opposed the application for clearance on 20 April 1981. On 4
May 1981 the Nueva Ecija Labor Office recommended the approval of the application and the dismissal of the
employees' opposition. The case was thereupon referred to the Arbitration Branch, Region 3, San Fernando,
Pampanga.
Pending resolution of the Bank's application for clearance, the Central Bank filed a "Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of the Bank" with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, on 23 August 1982. This
was granted by the Trial Court on 13 July 1983.
In the interim, or on 4 May 1983, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision denying the Bank's application for
clearance to terminate Galindez and, instead, ordered her reinstatement. The dispositive portion of that Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the application for clearance is hereby denied and the applicant Rural Bank of
Llanera is ordered to reinstate oppositor Zenaida Galindez to her former position as Cashier

without loss of seniority rights and privileges, with full backwages from April 16, 1981 up to her
actual date of reinstatement including all the mandatory benefits provided by law.
Applicant is further ordered to pay separation pay benefits to oppositors Carolina Junio and
Geronimo Sernadilla equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
SO ORDERED. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 84975).
No appeal having been filed within the reglementary period, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution.
On 22 August 1983, the Bank filed a "Petition to Alter or Modify Judgment" which, however, was denied by the
Labor Arbiter on 16 September 1983 on the principal ground that the Decision of 4 May 1983 had become final
and executory.
On 7 October 1983, the Bank interposed an appeal to the NLRC by way of a "Notice of Appeal with Injunction to
Stay Execution" of the Labor Arbiter Decision of 4 May 1983.
On 24 August 1984, the NLRC, in an en banc Resolution, dismissed the appeal holding that the Decision of 4 May
1983 had already become final and executory.
On 28 November 1984, the Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution commanding the Sheriff to reinstate
petitioner and to collect the sum of P 63,707.20 the newly computed liability of the Bank. However, the said Writ
could not be enforced because the Regional Trial Court, at Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, issued a Restraining Order
suspending its enforcement on the ground that the monetary claims against the Bank should be coursed through the
said Court as the Liquidation Court.
On 28 January 1985, the Bank filed with the Labor Arbiter a "Petition for Relief from Judgment" principally on the
ground that execution could no longer issue because the Bank was already in the process of liquidation. Said
Petition was denied by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit on 30 January 1985. The Bank appealed the Order to the
NLRC on 16 February 1985.
On 8 July 1986, since almost two (2) years had elapsed without any implementation of the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC (en banc), Galindez filed a "Petition for Mandamus with Damages" before the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 (Spec. Procs. No. 1936), seeking reinstatement to her former position as
Cashier and payment of her backwages and mandatory benefits. The Bank filed its Opposition thereto on 6 August
1986.
On 2 December 1986, said Trial Court issued an Order disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P106,817.00 which shall answer for all
damages that may be sustained by the respondent Rural Bank of Llanera, Inc., in case this petition
is finally decided in its favor, let a peremptory writ of mandamus issue to implement this order.
SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Rollo of G.R. No. 84975)
On 29 January 1988, the Court of Appeals, Fifth Division, to which said Order was elevated, rendered a Decision
in CA-G.R. Nos. 12136 and 11047-SP, the pertinent portion of which reads:
... What the Court a quo acted upon is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor
Commission and not with the Regional Trial Court. In fact, a Decision having been rendered
already by the NLRC, appeal therefrom, if still available, should be by petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court to review the Decision of the NLRC. Neither the Regional Trial Court, nor

even this Court can review the decisions issued under the Labor Code (No. 16-E of the Interim
Rules of Court; Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145 SCRA 2681). (p. 10, Rollo of G.R.
No. 84975)
On 10 May 1988, acting on the appeal of the Bank from the Order of the Labor Arbiter, dated 30 January 1985, the
NLRC, through its Second Division, issued the questioned Resolution modifying the Labor Arbiter's Decision of 4
May 1983. The pertinent portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
Since reinstatement is no longer possible due to the liquidation of the bank, oppositor-appellee
should be awarded separation pay equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service.
WHEREFORE, the May 4, 1983 decision of the Labor arbiter is Modified, the applicant Rural
Bank is ordered to pay oppositor-appellee separation pay equivalent to one-half month salary for
every year of service, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year, in lieu
of reinstatement. The award for backwages is hereby limited to three (3) years without any
qualification or deduction. No other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo of G.R. No. 84975)
Motions for Reconsideration filed by both parties having been denied, Galindez and the Bank filed these separate
Petitions for certiorari with this Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. We resolved to
give due course.
The issues raised by the parties may be summed up thus:
1. Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in modifying a final and
executory judgment of the Labor Arbiter;
2. Whether or not backwages can be awarded without the grant of reinstatement; and
3. Whether or not the award of backwages and separation pay can be enforced directly with the
bank or should be coursed through the Court taking cognizance of the liquidation proceedings
against the Bank.
Galindez claims grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in that the NLRC cannot modify the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC en banc, which had attained finality, and that the only ministerial
duty of the Labor Arbiter is to execute it.
The general rule is, indeed, that once a judgment becomes final and executory, said judgment can no longer be
disturbed, altered, or modified. That principle, however, admits of exceptions as in cases where, because of
supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the higher interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to
harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances (Seavan Carrier, Inc., vs. GTI Sportswear Corp., No.
L-65953, July 16, 1985, 137 SCRA 580) or whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual vs.
Tan, 85 Phil. 164 [1949]; Central Textile Mills, Inc., vs. United [CMC] Textile Workers Union-TGWF, No. L51077, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 883).
In the case at bar, the modification of the judgment, rendered by the Labor Arbiter on 4 May 1983, is warranted by
the fact that the Bank had been placed under liquidation thereby permanently foreclosing any possibility for the
Bank to resume its business. Reinstatement of Galindez, as Cashier, therefore, was rendered inappropriate
considering the Bank's eventual closure.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, another reason which militates strongly against Galindez's
reinstatement is the fact that the position of cashier has been abolished as a result of liquidation. In point is the
ruling in Pizza Inn vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 74531, June 28, 1988, reading:
Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still
exists or there is an unfilled position more or less of similar nature as the one previously occupied
by the employee. Admittedly, no such position is available. Reinstatement therefore becomes a
legal impossibility. The law cannot exact compliance with what is impossible.
It is true that in the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 29, dated 2 December 1986, it
disbelieved that the position of Cashier had been abolished stating that one "Mrs. Aurora Lazaro signed the
receipts as Bookkeeper-Cashier of the respondent bank and collected certain amounts from the bank borrowers" (p.
4 Order, Sp. Procs. No. 1936). As is obvious, however, the two positions were already merged thereby showing
that the Bank was, in fact, retrenching its employees in the process of liquidation. That merger cannot be construed
to mean that the position of Cashier was being retained.
Reinstatement having been rendered non-available, the modification of the Labor Arbiter's Decision by the NLRC
(Second Division) by the deletion of the same, was thus in order. A circumstance had transpired which rendered
execution of the said Decision legally impossible. The separation pay, which was awarded in lieu of reinstatement,
was likewise proper, Section 4(b), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code being
explicit in that:
(b) In case the establishment where the employee is to be reinstated has closed or ceased
operations or where as former position no longer exists at the time of reinstatement for reasons not
attributable to the fault of the employer, the employee shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent
to at least one month salary or to one month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a
fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year.
As to the second issue, it is the Bank's position that entitlement to backwages necessitates the grant of
reinstatement. That is not so. They are two different forms of relief. In Santos vs. NLRC (No. L-76721, September
21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166), it was squarely held:
The two forms of relief are distinct and separate, one from the other. Though the grant of
reinstatement commonly carries with it an award of backwages, the inappropriateness or nonavailability of one does not carry with it the inappropriateness or non-availability of the other.
Besides, the modification by the NLRC (Second Division) of the Labor Arbiter's Decision of 4 May 1983 was
limited to the matter of reinstatement. The original award of backwages had to remain as there was no
extraordinary circumstance which rendered the execution of backwages impossible or impractical. The NLRC,
however, correctly reduced it to three (3) years following doctrinal jurisprudence.
We come now to the third and final issue. The Bank contends that the award of separation pay (for Galindez, Junio
and Sernadilla), and backwages (for Galindez) should be enforced through formal claims with the Liquidation
Court. We agree, considering that the Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, is now such a Court by
virtue of its Order, dated 13 July 1983, in connection with a "Petition for Assistance in Liquidation" filed by the
Central Bank before it. This is but in keeping with the cardinal rule against multiplicity of suits and in order that
the assets of the Bank may not be unduly depleted to the prejudice of other creditors.
The fact that the insolvent bank is forbidden to do business, that its assets are turned over to the
Superintendent of Banks, as a receiver, for conversion into cash, and that its liquidation is
undertaken with judicial intervention means that, as far as lawful and practicable, all claims
against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceedings. The judicial liquidation is

intended to prevent multiplicity of action against the insolvent bank (Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of
Lucena, Inc., January 10, 1978, No. L-29791, 81 SCRA 75).
So also was the rule laid down in the case of Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal (G.R. No. L-73884, September
24, 1987, 154 SCRA 257) that:
In the instant case, the stay of execution of judgment is warranted by the fact that the respondent
bank was placed under receivership. To execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of
respondent bank to the obvious prejudice of other depositors/creditors, since, as aptly stated in
Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Morfe (63 SCRA 114), after the Monetary Board has
declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the
trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including the depositors. The assets of
the insolvent banking institution are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its
insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or preference over another by an attachment,
execution, or otherwise.
xxxxxxx
The time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial. It is the execution that will obviously
prejudice the other depositors and creditors. Moreover, as stated in the said Morfe case, the effect
of the judgment is only to fix the amount of debt, and not to give priority to other depositors and
creditors.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), through its Second Division,
dated 10 May 1988, which modified the Labor Arbiter's Decision of 4 May 1983, is hereby AFFIRMED. The
monetary awards adjudged therein, however, must be enforced through formal claims filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, which is taking cognizance of the liquidation proceedings of the Rural Bank of
Llanera, Inc. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

6. HERMOGENES PALOMARES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, -versusAGRIPINO JIMENEZ, ET AL.,

defendants-appellants. Miguel Manguerra for appellees. Cecilio Maneja for appellants. TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of Honorable Eusebio Ramos, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Marinduque,
denying a motion for relief under Rule 38 on the ground that the motion had been filed out of time. In so far as the
facts may be gleaned from the papers before us, the plaintiffs, now appellees, sought to recover a real estate. The
case coming on to be heard, both parties presented their evidence. It is not definitely shown whether the case was
submitted for decision before the trial closes, or the court declared the trial terminated and the case ready for
decision. It is asserted, however, in the motion for relief as reproduced in the record of appeal, that upon the
conclusion of the trial, which had been held before another Judge Hon. Juan F. Enriquez, "the attorney for the
defendant requested that the same (Exhibit "A") be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, for
examination as to the age of the entire writing, etc., which request was granted by the court without objection on
the part of the attorney for the plaintiff . . . and (that) pending action on said request, the court proceeded to render
the decision above mentioned and the proceeding thus taken behind the back of the defendants was taken against
them by surprise and excusable neglect, depriving the defendants their right to present other proof in maintaining
their legal defense." Of the above decision, which was against the defendants, the latter or their attorney was

notified on December 30, 1948, according to the appellee's brief. It is also stated that the defendants filed on
January 28, 1949, a pro forma motion for new trial, which was denied in an order of February 14, 1949; that
thereafter, on February 21, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the defendants, which motion was denied in
an order dated March 7, 1949; that in the meantime, on February 14, 1949, a writ of execution was issued, the
judgment, it was held, having become final and executory. To set aside the writ of execution, the defendants filed a
petition for certiorari in this Court against Judge Eusebio Ramos. This Court, in a unanimous decision, with the
exception of Mr. Justice Feria who did not take part, denied the petition on December 31, 1949. Four months after
that, namely, on April 30, 1950, the present motion for relief was docketed. It was contended in the court below,
and it is contended on this appeal, that although "more than 15 months have elapsed, after the judgment was taken,
nevertheless, from March 19, 1949 to March 4, 1950 or about 12 months, the Judge of First Instance of
Marinduque had lost jurisdiction and control of the aforesaid judgment for the reason that the same was then under
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in certiorari proceedings, G.R. No. L-2893." Counsel adds: "Obviously, the
defendants-appellants were in no way responsible for the period of time used by the higher court in giving due
consideration to the said petition for certiorari." In other words, it is the position of the present appellants that the
petition for certiorari before this Court suspended the period prescribed by Rule 38. The relief provided for by Rule
38 is of equitable character and is allowed only in exceptional cases; where there is no other available or adequate
remedy. (49 C.J.S. 693.) It is not regarded with favor and the judgment would not be voided where the party
complaining "has, or by exercising proper diligence would have had, an adequate remedy at law, or by proceedings
in the original action, by motion, petition, or the like to open, vacate, modify, or otherwise obtain relief against, the
judgment." (49 C.J.S. 695.). The defendants could have appealed and had indeed taken steps in that direction. In
fact, the proper procedure to correct the alleged mistake was by appeal. There had been a full trial, and the sole
complaint was that the court had decided the cause without waiting for the result of the examination of a
documentary exhibit by the National Bureau of Investigation, a document, by the way, which, the opposing party
alleged, had not been introduced in evidence. The fact that the defendants did not appeal and that the time appeal
from the decision as it stood is now gone, does not alter the situation. Considering the purpose behind it, the period
fixed by Rule 38 is non-extendible and is never interrupted. It is not subject to any condition or contingency,
because it is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency. The remedy allowed by Rule 38 is an act of grace,
as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance. Being in the position of one who begs,
such party's privilege is not to impose conditions, haggle or dilly-dally, but to grab what is offered him. This
observation also answers the main or sole proposition urged in this appeal that upon the institution of the
certiorari proceedings in the Supreme Court, the trial court lost jurisdiction to vacate its judgment. What is more,
the proposition is not well taken. The application for certiorari was an independent action, not a part or
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complaint of. An independent action,
needless to say, does not interrupt the course of a cause unless there be a writ of injunction stopping it. For another
reason, the defendants could no longer avail themselves of the relief under Rule 38 even if we assume that the
certiorari proceedings did not prevent the respondent judge from touching his judgment. It has generally been held
that a party waives his right to apply for a vacation of the judgment by pursuing other remedies, as by taking an
appeal from it, or by instituting an independent action for substantially the same purpose. (49 C.J.S. 513).
Wherefore, the appealed order will be affirmed with costs.

7. G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986

HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD.,
and SHUYA NODA, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondents.
RESOLUTION

FERIA, J.:
Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division of the Court
promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of
respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.
The issue in this case is whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for reconsideration
of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.
Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period for appeal from
final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen
(15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where the period
for appeal remains at forty- eight (48) hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record
on appeal is no longer required except in appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these
exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on appeal is required. Moreover Section
18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required for an appeal, and Section 4 thereof
disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly states, to avoid the procedural
delays which plagued the administration of justice under the Rules of Court which are intended to assist the parties
in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.
However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and
ruled that the failure of defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the judgment within the reglementary
period was due to excusable neglect, and, consequently, the record on appeal was allowed. The Court did not rule
that the motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration could not be granted.
In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 178), a division of
the Court cited the Gibbs decision to support a statement that a motion to extend the reglementary period for filing
the motion for reconsideration is not authorized or is not in order.
The Intermediate Appellate Court is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been dismissed on the basis of the
original decision in this case.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved that the
interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied prospectively from the
time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because
they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On
the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or
a petition for review on certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the
final disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the guidance
of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion
either grant or deny the extension requested.
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may be filed within the
reglementary period of thirty (30) days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, July
25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken within the
original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend
the period for appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said
motion after the expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs.
Court of Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, September 28, 1973, 53
SCRA 228).
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of, and to set aside, the decision of August 5, 1985 is granted and
the petition is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.

8. G.R. No. 111985 June 30, 1994

INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORP. and/or LORENZO TANGSOC, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CONCORDIA DOS PUEBLOS and LOLITA
SANCHEZ,respondents.
Patrick R. Battad for petitioner.
Estanislao Ebarle, Jr. for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
In
the
earlier
case
of
Industrial
Timber
Corporation
v.
NLRC,
G.R.
No. 83616, 1 this Court affirmed the finding of the NLRC that the petitioners are the employers of private
respondents and remanded the case for a determination of the validity of the quitclaim allegedly signed by the
latter.
In its resolution dated February 3, 1992, 2 the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado M.
Solamo on February 26, 1987, ordering the petitioners to reinstate the private respondents (complainants therein)
without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay them back wages, ECOLA, 13th month pay, holiday pay,
vacation and sick leave pay in the amount of P24,300 each, moral and exemplary damages of P10,000 each, and
attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
In view of the lapse of time since the promulgation of the decision, the NLRC likewise directed the petitioners to
pay the private respondents severance benefits equivalent to one month pay for every year of service computed
from the date of their employment up to the promulgation of the resolution should reinstatement of the private
respondents to their former position be no longer possible. 3
This resolution became final and executory on March 9, 1992, and entry of judgment was made on March 25,
1992.
The private respondents meanwhile had filed on March 20, 1992, an ex parte motion for issuance of a writ of
execution with manifestation that from February 26, 1987, up to the present, they have not been reinstated and thus
were entitled to back salaries for the said period and until actual reinstatement shall have been made.
Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez thereupon directed the Fiscal Examiner of the Arbitration Branch to
compute the actual amount that the private respondents should receive. In a report dated March 22, 1992, 4Fiscal
Examiner Renrico N. Pacamo found that each of them was entitled to P175,964.84, representing three years back
wages, ECOLA under Wage Order No. 6, 13th month pay, legal holiday pay, vacation and sick leave pay and other
privileges under the collective bargaining agreement likewise for a period of three years. In addition, the private
respondents should also be awarded moral and exemplary damages of P10,000 each and attorneys fees equivalent
to 10% of the total monetary award. In sum, the petitioners were held liable to the private respondents for the total
amount of P387,122.65.
Both the petitioners and the private respondents filed their respective objections to this computation. Meanwhile,
the Executive Labor Arbiter transferred the case to Labor Arbiter Leon P. Murillo, who thereafter issued an order
dated November 19, 1992, 5 concurring with the computation of the Fiscal Examiner Pacamo.
The Commission, on appeal of the computation, only made a slight modification of the amount of the award and
directed the petitioners to pay the private respondents the sum of P375,795.20. 6 The motion for reconsideration

filed by the petitioners through JRS-Butuan, a private letter-forwarding company, reached the NLRC a day late and
was denied on August 31, 1993, mainly for tardiness. 7
In this petition now before us, the NLRC is faulted with grave abuse of discretion for merely modifying the award
of damages and denying the motion for reconsideration.
On the first issue, the petitioners submit that the NLRC decision of February 3, 1992, which affirmed in toto the
order of Arbiter Solamo and remanded the case for immediate execution need not be recomputed because the
monetary awards due the private respondents had already been determined and fixed in the said order. It is argued
that to allow the decision of Arbiter Murillo to prevail and sizably increase the monetary award to the private
respondents would in effect allow an arbiter to change a decision of the Commission that has become final and
executory. Arbiter Murillos duty, it is stressed, is limited to the ministerial act of executing the NLRC decision.
We disagree.
It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed.
However, this principle admits of exceptions, as where facts and circumstances transpire which render its
execution impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to direct its
modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances." 8
The general rule is indeed, that once a judgment becomes final and executory, said judgment can
no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. That principle, however, admits of exceptions as in
cases where, because of supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the higher interest of
justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing
circumstances (Seavan Carrier Inc. vs. GTI Sportswear Corp., 137 SCRA 580) or whenever it is
necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 164; Central Textile Mills
vs. United Textile Workers Union, 94 SCRA 883). In the case at bar, the modification of the
judgment,
rendered
by
the
Labor
Arbiter
on
4 May 1993, is warranted by the fact that the Bank had been placed under liquidation thereby
permanently foreclosing the possibility for the Bank to resume its business. Reinstatement of
Galindez, as Cashier, therefore was rendered inappropriate considering the Banks eventual
closure. (Emphasis supplied). 9
Applying this exception to the case at bar, we note with approval the following observations of the Solicitor
General: 10
It may be true that the amount of backwages and other benefits due to the private respondents as
recomputed, is not in harmony with the literal import of the dispositive portion of the decision
subject of execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact that at the time the recomputation
was made in 1992, five (5) years had already elapsed from the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his
Decision on February 26, 1987. Thus, a recomputation was necessary to arrive at a just and proper
determination of the monetary awards due the private respondents.
Indeed, the back wages and other benefits awarded by Arbiter Solamo to each of the private respondents in the
amount of P24,300.00 correspond merely to the period between their illegal dismissal on April 26, 1986, up to the
time of the rendition of the decision on February 26, 1987. There is no dispute that from April 26, 1986, to this
date, the private respondents have not been reinstated nor has payment of the monetary awards decreed by the
NLRC been made to them.
A similar action was taken in the recent case of Sampaguita Garments Corporation v. NLRC, 11 where this Court
upheld the nullification of a decision of the NLRC ordering the reinstatement of an employee after her conviction
of the same offense of which she was absolved in the administrative case.

On the issue of the timeliness of the petitioners motion for reconsideration, we find that the NLRC correctly
applied the rule that where a pleading is filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service, it is deemed
filed on the day it is actually received by the court, not on the day it was mailed or delivered to the messengerial
service.
As this Court held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC: 12
The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency
is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of
actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of
filing of that pleading.
The 10th day for filing the motion for reconsideration was June 26, 1993, which fell on a Saturday. The last day for
filing would have been the following business day, June 28, 1993, which was a Monday. The petitioners counsel
claims he was able to deliver the pleading to JRS-Butuan on June 26, 1993, but the motion for reconsideration
reached the Commission on June 29, 1993, or a day late.
At any rate, the respondent Commission noted that the motion contained no substantial matters to warrant the
reconsideration sought and could have been denied just the same on that ground.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions of the respondent NLRC dated May 31, 1993, and
August 31, 1993, are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.