Galvez v.

CA
G.R. No. 114046
Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with
homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma
Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
Sometime in 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte
Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original information. This motion was granted by Judge
Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket
of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new information against herein
petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new information for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment
of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an
order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original information, and setting the
arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment
was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued
by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners motion to quash filed for the new information. As
earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February
18, 1994, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original information is null and void on the
ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.
Ruling:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners
had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted
before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing
thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three
informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and
the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would
obviously have been no cause for the instant petition.
Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion
to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us
as a candid presentation of their real position. Petitioners contention that the dismissal of the
original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right
to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the
original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still
stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent
ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the

evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a
new information. Contrary to petitioners submission, the absence of notice and hearing does
not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that the
order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof
of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent
court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or
the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the
dismissal and not certiorari.

Baloloy vs Hular
G.R. No. 157767
FACTS:
Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in
Barangay Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon ( Lot No. 3347 ) of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the
property was agricultural, while the rest was residential. November 11 and 25, 1961: When Lino
Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on over
the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347, ( 15,906 sqm) and the residential portion of the property
(287 sqm) to Astrologo Hular. In 1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado asked Hulars permission to
construct a house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed.
Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land (north of the residential portion of Lot
3347 Lot No. 3353 (9302 sqm) and registered the same. Iluminado constructed his house on a
portion of Lot No. 3353. He and his family, including his children, forthwith resided in said house.
In 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347,
which, however, occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353.
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children continued
residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of Iluminados children, later
constructed his house near that of his deceased father. When Astrologo died, he was survived by
his children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among others, who
continued to reside in their house.
Sometime in l991 the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed and discovered that the
residential area deeded by Lagata to Astrologo Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters,
instead of 287 square meters only.
Respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of real property against the
children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo
and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. He prayed among others that he be declared the absolute
owner of the property in question.

ISSUE:

Whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the trial
court.
RULING:
Respondent adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate, they were survived
by their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the coowners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery
of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. If the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession
thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the
subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that
the other co- owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to
the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court.

Pardell vs. Bartolome

23 Phil. 450
FACTS:
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome
were the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and codefendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without an judicial
authorization or even extra judicial agreement the administration of the properties of the late
Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a
house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes Street, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be rendered in restoring and returning
to them one half of the total value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the
aforementioned properties.
However, respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the plaintiff her
share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar is obliged
to pay rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the said
property.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the
said property was a mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community
nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in
the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde
occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her
sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the
stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the
plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of
his co-owners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder
cannot be determined and every one of the co-owners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment
of the same.
Caro v. CA
113 SCRA 10
Facts:
Alfredo, Mario and Benjamin all surnamed Benito were the original co-owners of two
parcels of land in Sorsogon. Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia
Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed in Special Proceeding No.
508 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint administrators of Mario's estate.
On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin, executed a deed of absolute sale of
his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro,
for the sum of P10,000.00. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Subsequently, with the
consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as shown in their affidavits, a subdivision title was
issued to petitioner Luz Caro .
Sometime in the month of May, 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito
learned from an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 508
that the latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided
share in each of the two parcels of land. After further verification, she sent to petitioner thru her
counsel, a written offer to redeem the said one-third undivided share dated August 25, 1966.
Inasmuch as petitioner ignored said offer, private respondent sought to intervene in Civil Case
entitled "Rosa Amador Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and mortgage and
cancellation of the annotation of the sale and mortgage involving the same parcels of land, but

did not succeed as the principal case was dismissed on a technicality, that is, for failure to
prosecute and the proposed intervenor failed to pay the docketing fees. Private respondent, thus,
filed the present case as an independent one and in the trial sought to prove that as a joint
administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required by
Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
On the other hand, petitioner presented during the hearing of the case secondary
evidence of the service of written notice of the intended sale to possible redemptioners in as
much as the best thereof, the written notices itself sent to and Saturnino, could not be presented
for the reason that said notices were sent to persons who were already dead when the complaint
for legal redemption was brought. Instead, the affidavit of Benjamin, executed ante litem
motam, attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of
his intention to sell his undivided share, was presented in evidence. The deposition of Saturnino's
widow was likewise taken and introduced in evidence, wherein she testified that she received
and gave to her husband the written notice of the intended sale but that the latter expressed
disinterest in buying the property.
Issue:
Whether or not right of redemption could still be exercised when the property sought to be
redeemed is not co-owned anymore.
Ruling:
On the theory that there is no longer co-ownership, with partition of the property. In the
case of CARAM vs. CA - though this case refers to conveyance made after partition. Once a
property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and
there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption (purpose is to reduce the number of
participants until the community is done away with -no difference with respect to conveyance
before partition agreement. When there is partition already, you can't exercise right to redeem
on allegation of fraud: fraud in securing the registration of titles to the land should be supported
by clear and convincing evidence -since subdivision title issued, and 1 year from date of entry of
subdivision of title no claim for redemption, the Certificate of Title becomes indivisible, cannot be
indirectly attacked.
On the assumption that there is still co-ownership and right of legal redemption still
exists -as administratrix, no personality to exercise right. In the case of BUTTE vs. UY AND SONS:
"While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of
the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses
of administration, and the administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or
protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and
administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a
stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of another, because in such case, the right of
legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and
formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted
to the heir of the deceased co-owner." -not discuss whether or not she could bring action as heir
of a co-owner because her pleading specifically stated that she brought the action in her
capacity as administratrix WON action for enforcement of right of redemption already expired?
Moot and academic -Caro argues that the tender of payment w/n 30 d from written notice of sale
by co-owner already prescribed, and such being a condition precedent to file action for

enforcement of right, it already prescribed -court did not rule on it, saying issue was already
moot and academic.