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Domain 1: Politics

1A: political rights; the structure of democracy


Basic Political Rights

Right to recognition as a person before the law

Equality before the law
Right to an effective legal remedy
Right to public hearings
Right to the presumption of innocence
Ban on arbitrary detention
Several articles spell out the place of the individual in society:
Right to freedom of movement
Right to marriage and family
Right to privacy
Right to own property
Right to a nationality
Several articles relate to the fundamental freedoms:
Right to freedom of thought and religion
Right to freedom of opinion and expression
Right to freedom of assembly and association
Right to take part in government



Common Good

When citizens are working for the good of the community as a whole.

We expect that the government will disclose information and not lie to us.

Having the same privileges, rights, status, and opportunities as others.


The right to equal and fair treatment under the law.


The differences in culture, dress, language, religion, etc., that aren't just
tolerated, but celebrated as a strength.

The right to live without fear of injury or death by others or our government.

The right to think, act, or behave without any interference from our
Pursuit of Happiness

The right to seek pleasure in your own way as long as you don't violate the
rights of others.

Popular Sovereignty

The idea that citizens are the source of all governmental power.

Showing love and devotion to your country and its values.






1B: the practice of parliamentary democracy


The traditional view of the role of government in a market economy is that the
government is attempting to maximize social welfare. It is an exogenous agent
acting to correct market failures and its role is to provide a legal, regulatory and
institutional framework. To do this, it defines: the political rules needed for
decision-making; the economic rules, such as those concerning property rights
and the rules for contracts, enabling exchanges to take place. However, there are
now many theories which have been put forward to explain how political and
economic decisions are actually taken and you may come across these in the
literature, so we will mention some of them briefly.
In these new theories, government is not taken to be a single, exogenous entity,
but is viewed as a collective form of a number of legislative and institutional
groups, such as bureaucrats and political parties, each of which has its own set of
These theories may help us understand why certain policies are in place, and why
others, which are more desirable from an economic point of view, are not
attractive to policy-makers.
One of the main models is the rational choice model, which is based on the
idea that the individual actors in the decision-making process act rationally and
are trying to achieve their own aims in competition with one another. We will
concentrate on this model later in this section.
At the other end of the spectrum is the systems model, which treats the whole
social system as the basic unit for analysis and is concerned with how the
component parts of the system respond to the constraints of the system.

One example of this is the neo-Marxist approach where the state and the
economy are viewed as a system of relationships. The state is in a contradictory
position as it needs both to spend to achieve its aims and to control its spending.
In this model there may be close links between the state bureaucracy and the
industries needing regulating, which may be reflected in the choice of policy
instruments. State subsidies may well be chosen as the appropriate instrument,
as these will not cause conflicts between the bureaucracy and the regulated
In between the rational choice and the systems models is the institutions
model. Here the emphasis is placed on the institutions in place in the society and
their influence on the groups pursuing environmental aims. The institutions in
society affect which policies are likely to be implemented. One example of an
institution is the capitalist corporation, and in the institutions approach, the
modern corporation may have different long-term aims from the neoclassical
profit-maximizing firm of the rational choice model. It may prefer certainty of
future operations to profit maximization and therefore prefer command-andcontrol instruments which are more likely to stabilize the market. In other words,
the institutional factors affect the objectives of polluters. These factors vary
between countries and may help to explain why different instruments are favored
by different countries.
We now concentrate on the rational choice model and see how it can be
applied to environmental policy. To do this we can begin by making a list of groups
of people who are affected by, or have an interest in, the choice of an
environmental policy and its associated policy instrument:

political parties

polluters and polluters' organizations

regulators and other bureaucrats

environmentalists and their interest groups


All of these groups are acting in a political market which is similar to and linked to
the economic market. The political market can redistribute wealth and wealth
leads to economic power. The economic market can create wealth, which can then
enhance political power.
Each of these groups will have different objectives and will try to influence the
decision-making process so that the decision finally taken enables them to
achieve their objectives.
The rational choice model has led to other rational actor models which attempt to
explain how decisions are made. Two of these which you may find in the literature
are the clearing house model and the politician voter model, both of which
try to explain agricultural policy decisions.
Clearing house model - this concentrates on the interaction between pressure
groups, who are well informed, and voters, who are assumed to be ill-informed.
The pressure groups seek to achieve their own objectives, but face costs of
organization and communication, which may lead to free-rider problems if the
group becomes too large and dispersed. The government's role is as a clearing
house for the various pressure groups, and it is assumed to act in such a way as
to maximize the probability of its re-election.
Politician voter model (Downs 1957) - this model assumes that the influence of
pressure groups is not great, and concentrates on the link between politicians and
voters. Active politicians supply intervention as demanded by voters, who supply

political support to the politicians. The model assumes that voters have perfect
We will now take each of the groups in the rational choice model in turn and try to
see what their objectives are and how they affect decisions.
Political parties
The aim of politicians is to win office, so they may support issues not for the sake
of the issue itself, but in order to win votes. That is, political parties will tend to
pursue policies that guarantee the maximum number of votes. Parties will be
responsive to changes in public opinion, and may be reluctant to commit
themselves too strongly to a particular policy, in case public opinion changes.
There have recently been examples of political parties founded specifically to
support environmental issues, for instance, the Green Party in the United
Kingdom, but these have not won wide support from the voters. To win support, a
party usually needs policies on a wide range of issues as voters have a wide range
of concerns.
Political parties may try to compensate those sectors of the economy whose
relative incomes fall, and they will try to avoid decreases in real incomes for
sectors whose representatives have strong political power. Thus, there may be
political resistance to drastic changes in policy, once a policy has been put in
Polluters and polluters' organizations
We assume that the aim of polluters and their organizations is to maximize their
profits etc. They, like any other interest group, expend large amounts of money
on rent seeking, that is, on efforts to influence the outcomes of the legislative
process in a way that yields the highest possible benefits for them. Arguments

have been put forward that they will thus prefer subsidies to standards, and
standards to emission taxes, as these result in lower profit losses.
Most polluters' interest groups acknowledge the polluter pays principle, but reject
its application in their own country until it is also applied in other countries.
Polluters are likely to be relatively few in number, so will be more capable of
taking effective collective action than will the larger, more dispersed groups of
actors - voters, for instance. They may therefore have a significant influence on
the choice of policy instrument. This could be one reason for the widespread use
of standards as an instrument of environmental policy.
Regulators and other bureaucrats
The preferences of polluters may influence bureaucrats and politicians in their
choice of instrument, depending on the power that the groups of polluters can
exert. There may be collusion between the regulators and the regulated as these
groups have to work together and this will be easier with harmonious working
relationships. This is described in the literature as 'regulatory capture'.
But bureaucrats may also have their own objectives when deciding on policy
instruments and will be trying to achieve these objectives. These may include the
maximization of their own power, prestige, influence, involvement and room for
maneuver. These variables depend mainly upon the amount of the appropriated
budget and the scope of their responsibilities. Bureaucrats control much of the
relevant information on policies and also on their own activities, and may be able
to use this in a way to achieve their own objectives. The bureaucracy is supposed
to be scrutinized by the political decision-makers (the parliament), but this
monitoring is usually imperfect, given the informational deficiencies and
asymmetries involved.

On this basis, the bureaucrats may also prefer standards to the other policy
instruments as standards involve the highest degree of administrative
involvement and give them more direct control over polluters than do subsidies,
taxes or permits. Bureaucrats would probably prefer subsidies to taxes because
the former involve less potential for conflict and possibly higher administrative
involvement. They would probably rate permit systems last because this would
imply handing over the responsibility for the instrument to the market
Environmentalists focus on the impact of environmental policy on the
environment. Environmental interest groups, like other interest groups, are rent
seeking and are trying to maximize benefits by influencing the outcome of
legislation. There are many influential interest groups in the environmental field,
including Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. In the past, they have often
disapproved of incentive-based instruments such as subsidies and marketable
permits, as these infer that the polluter has some right to pollute. Permit systems,
in particular, have often been regarded as a 'sell-out' of the environment.
Although there is now a growing feeling that incentive-based instruments are
acceptable, the preferred policy instrument is still standards. This is because
standards offer the highest certainty that the environmental policy goal will
actually be achieved.

Voters, in the rational choice model, are considered to be rationally-acting
individuals who aim to maximize their utility. They have concerns about many
issues and decide to vote for the party whose 'package' gives them maximum

utility. Environmental concerns may not feature highly in these packages, and
voters may be more likely to concentrate on economic, health or education issues
when choosing the package.
Although the individual voters may not see themselves as having much influence
over national environmental policies they are more likely to get involved in local
issues, where the local benefits and costs are more apparent.
They may want environmental improvements in theory, but be reluctant to pay
the associated costs. In this respect, it is important to note that voters are usually
also taxpayers. However, as a country's income rises, its voters are more likely to
demand higher environmental quality. It has been suggested in the literature that
voters will tend to prefer standards to other instruments for the same reason as
environmentalists, that is, the higher certainty of achieving the environmental
policy goals.


A policy is a decision implying impending or intended action (Bauer, 1968, p. 21). In
analyzing policies, two aspects are generally considered most significant process
(policy making) and content. The mass media are among the external groups which
influence the policy process at its various stages. For this study six policy stages
were identified from four works (Almond & Powell, 1978, pp. 14-15, 180; Dunn,
1981, p. 48; Jones, 1977, p. 12; Wirt & Mitchell, 1982, pp. 6-7). These stages

(a) Problem identification (articulation);

(b) Policy recommendation (aggregation);

(c) Policy decision (adoption);

(d) Policy implementation;
(e) Policy evaluation; and
(f) Policy resolution or change.
Communications researchers have analyzed mass media political functions
which correspond to the stages in the policy process. In studying reporter
influence, Lambeth (1978, p. 12) used a five-part framework developed by
Jones' (1977) to structure 10 possible media functions in the policy process:
(1) Anticipating problems in advance of public officials,
(2) Alerting the public to problems on the basis of official warnings,
(3) Informing the public of the stakes the competing groups had in solving
(4) Keeping various groups and the public abreast of competing proposals,
(5) Contributing to the content of policy,
(6) Deciding the tempo of decision making,
(7) Helping lawmakers decide how to vote,
(8) Alerting the public to how policies are administered,
(9) Evaluating policy effectiveness, and

(10) Stimulating policy reviews. From a survey of legislators, Lambeth

concluded that the impact of the press on elected officials is low to
In his study of lawmakers' use of reporters, Fico (1984, pp. 795, 799)
adopted Lambeth's framework, replacing Lambeth's functions 4 and 5 with
"informing affected groups of their own stakes in the problem" and
"informing the public of proposal content." In Fico's study, reporters were
more influential in the five functions involving their potential impact in
transmitting information to the public than in the functions involving
personal or professional influence in the legislative setting.
In the present study, a content analysis of recent newspaper items about
education tested and then modified the functions of Lambeth and Fico. Also
considered was the relationship between functions and the kinds and
purposes of articles.
Sources: News Media Functions in Policy Making. John R. Fischer. Athabasca


Democracy is identified by certain key principles, and by a set of institutions
and practices through which these principles are realized. Its starting point,
like that of human rights, is the dignity of the individual person. However,
democracy also has a specific focus - that of decision-making about the rules
and policies for any group, association or society as a whole - and a
distinctive conception of citizens, not only as the bearers of rights and

responsibilities, but as active participants in the collective decisions and

policies which affect their lives. The basic principles of democracy are that
the people have a right to a controlling influence over public decisions and
decision-makers, and that they should be treated with equal respect and as
of equal worth in the context of such decisions. These could be called for
short the principles of popular control and political equality, respectively. It is
important to start a discussion of democracy with its basic principles or
"regulative ideals", rather than with a set of political institutions (elections,
parties, parliaments, the separation of powers, the rule of law, etc.), for a
number of reasons. First, what justifies our calling these institutions
democratic is not merely a matter of convention, but of the contribution they
make to the realization of these underlying principles. They have not been
handed down to us in their current form readymade, but have evolved out of
popular struggles to make government more accessible to popular influence,
and to make that influence more inclusive. Secondly, to define democracy
simply in institutional terms is to elevate means into ends, to concentrate on
the forms without the content, and to abandon any critical standpoint from
which these institutional arrangements can be judged more or less
democratic in their given context and manner of working. Democracy is
always a matter of the degree to which certain principles are realized, rather
than some final state of perfection. Thirdly, to define democracy in terms of
its basic principles enables us to recognize democracy at work beyond the
formal level of government itself. In particular, whenever people organize
collectively in civil society to solve their problems, to protect or promote
their interests, to persuade fellow citizens to their point of view or openly to
influence government policy, this can be as much an expression of
democracy as the arrangements of government at such. Director, Centre for
Democratization Studies, University of Leeds. United Kingdom 21 KEY

important to begin any consideration of democracy with the citizen, rather

than with governmental institutions. It is from the citizens that democratic
governments receive their authorization, and it is to the citizens that they
remain accountable and responsive, both directly and through the mediating
organs of parliament and public opinion. The citizen is both the starting point
and the focus of the democratic process. At the same time, that process
requires certain qualities, among its citizen body to be effective and
sustainable. Among these, two are decisive. One is the ability and
willingness to play a part in common affairs, whether local or national,
whether sectional or societal, and to acknowledge some responsibility for
them. The second is a respect for the rights of other citizens, an
acknowledgment of their equal dignity, and the recognition of their right to
an opinion, especially when it differs from one's own. The essential
counterpart to the democratic principles of popular control and political
equality is thus a publicly active citizen body which is capable of exercising


prepared and edited by the Inter-Parliamentary Union Texts contributed by:
Cherif Bassiouni (General Rapporteur), David Beetham, Justice M. Fathima
Beevi (Ms.), Abd-El Kader Boye, Awad El Mor, Hieronim Kubiak, Victor
Massuh, Cyril Ramaphosa, Juwono Sudarsono, Alain Touraine, Luis Villoro
Inter-Parliamentar y Unio n Genev a 1998 p.21-23
1C: international comparison and international organizations



Treaty of Maastricht on European Union

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) represents a new stage in European
integration since it opens the way to political integration. It creates a
European Union consisting of three pillars: the European Communities,
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters (JHA). The Treaty introduces the concept of
European citizenship, reinforces the powers of the European Parliament and
launches economic and monetary union (EMU). Besides, the EEC becomes
the European Community (EC).
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht on 7 February
1992, entered into force on 1 November 1993. This Treaty is the result of
external and internal events. At external level, the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe and the outlook of German reunification led to a commitment
to reinforce the Community's international position. At internal level, the
Member States wished to supplement the progress achieved by the Single
European Act with other reforms.
This led to the convening of two Inter-Governmental Conferences, one on
EMU and the other on political union. The Hanover European Council of
27 and 28 June 1988 entrusted the task of preparing a report proposing
concrete steps towards economic union to a group of experts chaired by
Jacques Delors. The Dublin European Council of 28 April 1990, on the basis
of a Belgian memorandum on institutional reform and a Franco-German
initiative inviting the Member States to consider accelerating the political
construction of Europe, decided to examine the need to amend the EC Treaty
so as to move towards European integration.

It was the Rome European Council of 14 and 15 December 1990 which

finally launched the two Intergovernmental Conferences. This culminated a
year later in the Maastricht Summit of 9 and 10 December 1991.
With the Treaty of Maastricht, the Community clearly went beyond its
original economic objective, i.e. creation of a common market, and its
political ambitions came to the fore.
In this context, the Treaty of Maastricht responds to five key goals:

strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institutions;

improve the effectiveness of the institutions;

establish economic and monetary union;

develop the Community social dimension;

Establish a common foreign and security policy.

The Treaty has a complicated structure. Its preamble is followed by seven
titles. Title I contains provisions shared by the Communities, common
foreign policy, and judicial cooperation. Title II contains provisions amending
the EEC Treaty, while Titles III and IV amend the ECSC and EAEC Treaties
respectively. Title V introduces provisions concerning common foreign and
security policy (CFSP). Title VI contains provisions on cooperation in the
fields of justice and home affairs (JHA). The final provisions are set out in
Title VII.

The Maastricht Treaty creates the European Union, which consists of three
pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
The first pillar consists of the European Community, the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) and Erratum and concerns the domains in which
the Member States share their sovereignty via the Community institutions.
The process known as the Community method applies in this connection, i.e.
a proposal by the European Commission, its adoption by the Council and the
European Parliament and the monitoring of compliance with Community law
by the Court of Justice.
The second pillar establishes common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
enshrined in Title V of the Treaty on European Union. This replaces the
provisions of the Single European Act and allows Member States to take joint
action in the field of foreign policy. This pillar involves an intergovernmental
decision-making process which largely relies on unanimity. The Commission
and Parliament play a modest role and the Court of Justice has no say in this
The third pillar concerns cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs
(JHA), provided for in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The Union is
expected to undertake joint action so as to offer European citizens a high
level of protection in the area of freedom, security and justice. The decisionmaking process is also intergovernmental.
In the wake of the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty also expands
the role of the European Parliament. The scope of the cooperation procedure
and the assent procedure has been extended to new areas. Besides, the

Treaty creates a new decision procedure which allows the European

Parliament to adopt acts in conjunction with the Council. This procedure
entails stronger contacts between the Parliament and the Council in order to
reach agreement. Besides, the Treaty involves Parliament in the procedure
for confirming the Commission. The role played by the European political
parties in European integration is recognised. They contribute to forming a
European awareness and to expressing the political will of the Europeans. As
regards the Commission, the duration of its term of office has been extended
from four to five years with a view to aligning it to with that of the European
Like the Single Act, this Treaty extends qualified majority voting within the
Council to cover most decisions under the decision procedure and all
decisions under the cooperation procedure.
To recognise the importance of the regional dimension, the Treaty creates
the Committee of the Regions. Made up of representatives of the regional
authorities, this Committee plays an advisory role.
The Treaty establishes Community policies in six new areas:

trans-European networks

industrial policy

consumer protection

education and vocational training




The EMU puts the finishing touches to the single market. Economic policy
consists of three components. The Member States must ensure coordination
of their economic policies, provide for multilateral surveillance of this
coordination, and are subject to financial and budgetary discipline. The
objective of monetary policy is to create a single currency and to ensure this
currency's stability thanks to price stability and respect for the market
The Treaty provides for the establishment of a single currency in three
successive stages:

the first stage, which liberalizes the movement of capital, began on

1 January 1990;






1 January 1994




convergence of the Member States' economic policies;

The third stage should begin by the latest on 1 January 1999 with the
creation of a single currency and the establishment of a Central European
Bank (CEB).

Monetary policy is based on the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),

consisting of the CEB and the national central banks. These institutions are
independent of the national and Community political authorities.
Special rules apply to two Member States. The United Kingdom has not
proceeded to the third stage. Denmark has obtained a protocol providing
that a referendum shall decide on its participation in the third stage.

Thanks to the social protocol annexed to the Treaty, Community powers are
broadened in the social domain. The United Kingdom is not a signatory of
this protocol. Its objectives are:

promotion of employment;

improvement of living and working conditions;

adequate social protection;

social dialogue;

the development of human resources to ensure a high and sustainable

level of employment;

The integration of persons excluded from the labour market.

One of the major innovations established by the Treaty is the creation of
European citizenship over and above national citizenship. Every citizen who
is a national of a Member State is also a citizen of the Union. This citizenship
vests new rights in Europeans, viz.:

the right to circulate and reside freely in the Community;

the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for European and

municipal elections in the State in which he or she resides;

the right to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of a

Member State other than the citizen's Member State of origin on the
territory of a third country in which the state of origin is not represented;

The right to petition the European Parliament and to submit a

complaint to the Ombudsman.

The Treaty on European Union has established the principle of subsidiarity as
a general rule, which was initially applied to environmental policy in the
Single European Act. This principle specifies that in areas that are not within
its exclusive powers the Community shall only take action where objectives
can best be attained by action at Community rather than at national level.
Article A provides that the Union shall take decisions as close as possible to
the citizen.
The Maastricht Treaty represents a key stage in European construction. By
establishing the European Union, by creating an economic and monetary
union and by extending European integration to new areas, the Community
has acquired a political dimension.
Aware of the progress of European integration, future enlargement and the
need for institutional changes, the Member States inserted a revision clause
in the Treaty. To this end, Article N provided for an Intergovernmental
Conference to be convened in 1996.
This conference culminated in the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty in

Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) The Treaty of Amsterdam increased

the powers of the Union by creating a Community employment policy,
transferring to the Communities some of the areas which were previously
subject to intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice and home
affairs, introducing measures aimed at bringing the Union closer to its

citizens and enabling closer cooperation between certain Member States

(enhanced cooperation). It also extended the decision procedure and
qualified majority voting and simplified and renumbered the articles of the

Treaty of Nice (2001) The Treaty of Nice was essentially devoted to

the "leftovers" of Amsterdam, i.e. the institutional problems linked to
enlargement which were not resolved in 1997. It dealt with the make-up
of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and the
extension of the areas of qualified majority voting. It simplified the rules
on use of the enhanced cooperation procedure and made the judicial
system more effective.

Treaty of Lisbon (2007) The Treaty of Lisbon makes sweeping

reforms. It brings an end to the European Community, abolishes the
former EU architecture and makes a new allocation of competencies
between the EU and the Member States. The way in which the European
institutions function and the decision-making process are also subject to
modifications. The aim is to improve the way in which decisions are made
in an enlarged Union of 27 Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon also
reforms several of the EUs internal and external policies. In particular, it
enables the institutions to legislate and take measures in new policy areas

This Treaty has also been amended by the following treaties of accession:

Treaty of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden (1994),

which increased



of Member


of the


Community to fifteen.

Treaty of Accession of Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,









Slovenia (2003) This Treaty increased the number of Member States of

the European Community from 15 to 25.

Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania (2005). This Treaty

increased the number of Member States of the European Community from
25 to 27.


Treaties of Accession

Treaty on European Union

Date of

Entry into





(Treaty on Maastricht)

Treaty of Amsterdam

Official Journal

OJ C 191 of



OJ C 340 of

Treaty of Nice



OJ C 80 of

Treaty of Lisbon



OJ C 306 of

Treaty of Accession

Treaty of Accession of Austria,

Date of

Entry into







OJ C 241 of

Finland and Sweden

Treaty of Accession of the ten




new Member States

Treaty of Accession of

OJ L 236 of



Bulgaria and Romania


Domain 2: Welfare State

2A: History of the welfare state

OJ L 157 of


Post-WWII Europe: Welfare State and Consumer Society
After World War II, there was almost universal agreement in Europe that
social and economic conditions had played a major role in allowing dictators
like Mussolini and Hitler to seize power. Political leaders on both sides of the
Iron Curtain were determined to make sure that Europes postwar societies
would be prosperous enough to keep populations from turning to extremist
movements. Through the Marshall Plan, inaugurated in 1947, the United
States encouraged the western European nations to work together to
encourage trade and economic development.
The countries of Western Europe continued to have capitalist
economies, but they made important modifications to the free-market
system to prevent a recurrence of anything like the Great Depression. In
many western countries, key industries were nationalized and turned into
public services. France adopted a system of centralized economic
planning. In most western countries, trade unions were given a voice in
the running of large companies. These policies were adopted to try to make
sure that economic decisions benefited the entire community, and not just a
few wealthy investors.
The movement toward European unification began as an effort to
promote economic cooperation and prosperity among western European
nations. In 1951, six western European countries (France, West Germany,
Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) created the European Iron
and Steel Community, the first major economic agreement. In 1956, these
six nations made a broader agreement, creating the European Economic

Community or Common Market. New member states joined in

subsequent decades, and the purpose of the group broadened from purely
economic cooperation to an effort to create a common sense of European
identity. Renamed the European Union in 1992, the community is now
committed to expanding to 26 members over the next few years.
The decades between the wars had also shown how unstable
democracy could be if citizens did not feel that their governments responded
to their needs. New social policies adopted after the war were intended to
guarantee a satisfactory level of life to every member of the population; the
result came to be known as the welfare state. Social programs varied from
country to country, but usually included health insurance, free public
education, generous unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and
subsidized cultural activities. Tax policies were deliberately designed to
promote greater social equality by transferring income from rich to poor.
Advocates of the welfare state had not anticipated how rapidly
European economies would recover from the damage of the war. By the
1960s, Western Europe had become a wealthy consumer society. Most
European families could now afford things that had been luxuries for the rich
until 1939: household appliances, private automobiles, foreign
travel. Critics began to complain that European values were being
overwhelmed by materialism, a process they sometimes blamed
on Americanization. The sexual revolution of the 1960s, made possible
by the introduction of birth control pills, added to this impression that old
values were being abandoned for the pursuit of purely individual desires.
The long period of postwar prosperity ended in the early
1970s. Europe did not experience a shock like the Great Depression,
but economic growth stagnated and unemployment surged throughout
the Continent. Welfare state measures prevented mass unrest, but critics

charged that the high taxes needed to pay for them discouraged investment
and initiative. Political candidates like Margaret Thatcher in Britain (197994) won elections by promising to limit social spending, lower taxes on the
wealthy, and privatize national industries.


The European Economic Recovery





The Economic situation at the end of WWII


Legacy of the Depression


Impact of the war

Reasons for recovery


Europes hidden resources


Nationalizations and planning


The role of American aid

From recovery to postwar growth


The postwar baby boom


European economic unification

Welfare State and Consumer Society



The motives for the welfare state


Protection against depression and political extremism


The argument for social justice

Features of the welfare state




Support from cradle to grave


Educational and cultural opportunities

The growth of consumer society


A new standard of living


Materialism and hedonism


The end of public life?

Welfare State and Consumer Society in a Period of Economic


The economic shocks of the early 1970s

Thatcherism and neo-liberalism

Privatization of nationalized industries


The crisis of the welfare state


2B: social rights and duties; characteristics of a welfare state



Characteristics of social welfare programs:

1. serve community interests - derived from community need
assessment, service design to satisfy such needs;
2. value-based - e.g. human rights, citizen responsibility, social justice,
prosperity, stability, equity,....etc.;
3. non-market activities - not directly capital generating, not subject to
purely market mechanism/ dynamics (i.e. demand and supply),
depends on donation, subsidy, fee charging; [but more recent theories
suggest that welfare can also be operated in a mixed market mode]
4. accessible to all - citizen right, efficient service delivery system, equal
5. accountable to public - effective public and social administration,
professional code of practice;


2C: the practice of the welfare State


New Institutionalism and Welfare State Politics
Patterns of governance matter. The "new institutionalist" resurgence in political science
reflects a renewed appreciation of how relatively stable, routinized arrangements
structure political behavior. The political institutions of different countries vary along
crucial dimensions, such as the rules of electoral competition, the relationship between
legislature and executive, the role of the courts, and the place of subnational
governments in politics. Institutions establish the rules of the game for political
struggles--influencing group identities, policy preferences, and coalitional choices, and
enhancing the bargaining power of some groups while devaluing that of others.
Institutions also affect government capacities--their administrative and financial
resources for fashioning policy interventions.
In the field of comparative social policy, the claim that political institutions must be
considered consequential structures has been developed primarily in the work of Theda
Skocpol and her collaborators. These researchers have raised significant questions
about the dynamics of welfare state development, pointing out, for example, that the
power resources approach has had little success in accounting for pre-World War II
social policy developments. The new institutionalism research agenda, however, has
centered on explaining "American exceptionalism"--the belated and halfhearted
development of social welfare policies in the United States. Just as a focus on Sweden
was central to the development of the power resources model, concentration on the
United States has underscored the importance of political institutions.
Institutionalisms make two broad claims about welfare state development. First, strong
states are likely to produce strong welfare states, with state strength defined in terms of
governmental administrative capacities and institutional cohesion. Extensive
administrative and financial resources make it easier to build expansive social
policies. Where political authority is fragmented, entrenched minorities will often block

social legislation. Federalism, separation of powers, strong bicameralism [End Page

152] or reliance on referenda all may restrict welfare state development. Although much
of the work on institutions and welfare states has been based on comparative historical
case studies, this claim about formal institutional veto points has recently received
support in an important quantitative study as well.
The second central institutional argument concerns policy legacies, or feedback--the
consequences of previously introduced welfare state programs. Arguments about policy
feedback are essentially arguments about the consequences of big government. As
policy decisions have had increasingly pervasive effects on economic and social life,
their impact on political processes has expanded. Given that the welfare state is at the
very heart of big government, it should come as no surprise that studies of welfare state
development have generated some of the most persuasive arguments about policy
The possible consequences of preexisting policy structures for welfare state politics are
quite diverse. Welfare state structures affect the size and orientation of various societal
groups as well as patterns of interest-group formation. Programs may provide the basis
for processes of social learning that affect prospects for future program expansion,
whether negatively or positively. Policies can create long-term commitments--such as
the pay-as-you-go intergenerational contracts common to public pension systems--that
lock in particular paths of policy development.
How easily can these arguments be applied to the distinctive politics of retrenchment?
Again, there is no reason to assume that claims for earlier periods can simply be turned
on their heads. For example, there is little reason to expect that bureaucratic capacities
will be particularly important in an age of retrenchment. Can we administer it? may be
an important question in a discussion of new or greatly expanded public initiatives, but
for advocates of retrenchment the primary goal is to dismantle existing programs.
Closing offices, curtailing services, and cutting benefits do not require formidable
administrative capacity.

Arguments about the consequences of governmental cohesion also need to be

reappraised in this new context. At first glance, one might [End Page 153] expect that
systems with fewer institutional veto points would be in a stronger position to pursue an
agenda of radical retrenchment. Because retrenchment is generally unpopular,
however, there are compelling reasons to question this expectation. While cohesive
systems concentrate authority, they also concentrate accountability. The former
tendency facilitates retrenchment, but the latter impedes it. Where authority is
centralized, the public knows that the government of the day can prevent groups from
suffering cutbacks. Strong governments, anticipating the high political cost of
retrenchment, may forgo the opportunities provided by concentrated power. Thus, the
theoretical basis for believing that government cohesion facilitates retrenchment is
weak. We are left with the empirical question of whether concentration of power effects
outweighs concentration of accountability effects.
The tremendous scope of modern welfare states suggests that institutionalist arguments
about policy feedback may be even more relevant to the politics of retrenchment. There
are, however, two quite different ways to apply policy feedback arguments to
retrenchment. First, one could develop nuanced arguments that emphasize the
distinctive characteristics of individual programs and their implications for successful
retrenchment. Alternatively, one could present arguments about the overarching
structures of particular welfare state regimes, suggesting that they are likely to promote
a particular kind of politics.
The first approach has promise but is difficult to carry out in practice. Previous policies
help shape the distribution of political resources. Preexisting policy designs may
influence interest-group networks, the extent of long-term commitments, the rules
governing programmatic reform, and the availability of techniques to reduce the visibility
of cutbacks. These kinds of arguments have been used in qualitative case studies of
both welfare state expansion and retrenchment. Because they often apply to
idiosyncratic characteristics of individual programs, however, it is hard to use them to
generate general propositions about variations across countries.

The alternative of developing broad arguments about how welfare state regimes affect
contemporary politics is more easily applied to cross-national comparisons. EspingAndersen has developed propositions that link welfare state structures to cross-national
variation in occupational [End Page 154] structures and, in turn, to contemporary
political cleavages. He suggests, for example, that social democratic welfare states like
Sweden will face growing clashes between public and private sector workers, while
conservative welfare states like Germany will produce a divide between labor market
"insiders" and "outsiders." Such an approach offers the tantalizing promise of linking the
evident significance of large welfare state structures to clear propositions about political
change. Unfortunately, the argument does not work. As I will document in the next
section, the hypothesized political cleavages emerge in only muted forms and have
failed to generate a sustained backlash against the welfare state. The flaw in these
broad arguments about welfare state regimes is that they greatly underestimate the
difficulty of assembling and sustaining proretrenchment coalitions.
New institutionalist arguments have contributed greatly to our understanding of welfare
state politics. Moreover, unlike arguments about the role of organized labor, there is no
reason to think that the importance of institutional structures and the legacies of
previous policy choices has declined. These arguments cannot simply be transferred
from one context to another, however; they must be recast to apply to the specific
settings and strategic problems that are characteristic of retrenchment politics.



The model of welfare production and the virtuous circle In order to perform a
country-by-country comparison of various features of social security systems
both in terms of the resources they require and the type of institutions that
implement them as well as from the perspective of the citizens, we need a
theoretical framework a model that allows both macro- and microlevel
analysis. For this, we turn to the model of welfare production designed by
Hill and Bramley (1986). In this model, effectiveness and efficacy both factor
into the process of production in which inputs are translated into outputs.
Together with some other factors, these outputs then influence the wellbeing of society and of individual citizens. Mitchell (1991) aligned the
comparative welfare state research approach with this model, and Hagfors et
al. (2003) used it as the structural underpinning of their study on the
economic security of pensioners. Kuivalainen (2004) used the model to
compare the income protection systems of six countries. The idea in this
model is to proceed by stages through the process of welfare production. A
rough outline of the model is presented in Figure 1, in which the model is
applied to the comparison of social security systems. By virtue of its
structure, the model of welfare production makes it possible to undertake
systematic classifications in comparative welfare state research (see Mitchell
1991, 153199). In Figure 1, the topmost box represents politics, including
descriptions of social security systems at the general level and the
institutional features and historical trends of such systems. The extensive
studies of the features of Western welfare states conducted by P. Flora
(1986) have been seen as representative examples of this approach. Moving
on to the actual process of production, the first issue we encounter is the
amount and the type of resources used for the implementation of social
policy. Comparisons focusing on this aspect represent a resource-centred
approach that looks at the issue from the welfare effort perspective. In
Figure 1, this approach is represented by the box entitledinputs. A typical

example is to use the ratio of public expenditure to GDP as an aggregate

indicator of resource use, as is done in Wilensky (2002). The next box in
Figure 1 is labelled "production. It refers to a number of different structures
related to welfare state typologies and regimes, such as the methods by
which social policy programmes are funded and what objectives they are
designed to pursue. Esping-Andersen's studies (1990, 1999) are one
example of such an approach. In comparative welfare state research, social
security systems are described in terms of their institutional features, such
as their coverage and generosity (represented by various replacement
rates). In Figure 1, such an approach would be placed in the box
entitledoutputs. The research conducted by W. Korpi and J. Palme (1998)
using the SCIP data is a good example of this approach. At the end of the
sequence of processes that makes up the model of welfare production are
the outcomes which manifest themselves as poverty or inequality and as
factors with a broader impact on well-being. From the wide range of studies
6 focusing on outcomes, we can point to the welfare state research based on
data from the Luxembourg Income Study, such as Smeeding, OHigging and
Rainwater (1990). As we noted earlier, the following is a rough schematic
representation of the model of welfare production. It will be used, as
applicable, in the analysis that follows.

Another central concept in this study is the virtuous circle. We use it here to
refer to the propensity of actions with positive effects to function in a selfreinforcing manner. In the welfare state context, this means that to the
extent that a welfare effort has a positive effect on well-being and the
reduction of inequality, the citizens are willing to maintain and even to
intensify such an effort. Reference to this idea is made in such documents as
the 2006 World Development (chapter 6, page 108). The virtuous circle is
represented schematically in Figure 2. In Figure 2, the virtuous circle is
portrayed as a construct consisting of two concentric circles. This is central
to the purposes of our study. The inner circle can be seen as a kind of core
which reflects indirect effects to the outer circle. The key components of the
welfare state located on the outer circle have a more direct effect on general
welfare. Our purpose in this study is to concentrate on the functioning of the
inner circle, without ignoring the significance of the outer circle to the

practice of social policy in the welfare state. In order to provide a

comprehensive picture, we present the core circle as a set of coordinates on
whose axes we place the key variables and which divides the core into four
quadrants, which we refer to as steps. On one axis, we place the variables
representing welfare effort, and on the other, the variables representing
inequality. This allows us to examine, within the first quadrant, the links
between inequality and the practice of social policy. The grey arrows on the
axes stand for the direction which corresponds to our view of the virtuous
circle. A 7 increase in welfare effort results in a decrease in inequality. Here
already we see an indirect effect that impacts on the outer circle. Recent
research has shown that a decrease in inequality has a positive effect on
public health, which in turn leads to lower spending on health care (Frizell
2006). Furthermore, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) have found that a
decrease in inequality has a causal relationship with public trust that runs
from inequality to trust but not vice versa. Through greater trust, a decrease
in inequality, then, appears to produce an increase in social capital.
Assuming that empirical counterparts exist for the variables in the first and
fourth quadrants, it should be possible to test the aforementioned crowdingout hypothesis. As we move on to the third quadrant (or step), we begin
from the assumption that social capital has increased in the preceding
stages. The effects that bear on the outer circle now stem from the dynamic
whereby societies which build up social capital through
communitymindedness are also positively inclined to the accumulation of
human capital.1 This has a positive effect on education spending and,
consequently, on productivity.2 The starting assumption for the fourth
quadrant is that social capital and well-being achieved in society are
positively correlated. A similar correlation is assumed to obtain in the fourth
quadrant, based on the idea that the level of well-being that exists in society
and the way it is distributed contribute to more positive public attitudes

towards the development of social security. Increased well-being is a product

partly of greater social capital and of increased allocation of public resources
to social policy. Well-being is impacted by a kind of bifurcation effect where
progression on one axis coincides with progression on the other, and where
the area demarcated by the axes grows. The education-driven productivity
increase and the drop in health and social expenditures as a result of
reduced inequality, along with the positive public attitudes, lead to the
allocation of additional resources to social policy. Thus, we have come full
circle, but thanks to the bifurcation effect now occupy the outer sphere
of the virtuous circle. In Figure 2, we see that the inner circle has in a way
shoved the outer circle away from the core. In this study, we compare only
welfare states with an advanced level of social protection. In the case of
countries with less advanced social systems, it can be assumed that, given
an inauspicious starting position, the virtuous circle may not become
activated at all. A small input into social protection may not produce a
decrease in inequality, which in turn may cause public trust to weaken (or at
least not to strengthen). Where trust is weak, universal systems that would
hold the potential to reduce inequality may not be created at all. This may
lead to a lack of broad and unified support for inputs into social protection,
creating a situation which Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) refer to as social

international comparison and international organizations


The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights exists
The rights of every individual within the EU were established at different
times, in different ways and in different forms.
For this reason, the EU decided to clarify things and to include them all in a
single document which has been updated in the light of changes in
society, social progress and scientific and technological developments: this
document is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (the Charter).
It entrenches:

all the rights found in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU;

the rights and freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on

Human Rights;

Other rights and principles resulting from the common constitutional

traditions of EU countries and other international instruments.
The Charter sets out a series of individual rights and freedoms.
The Charter is a very modern codification and includes 'third generation'
fundamental rights, such as:

data protection;

guarantees on bioethics; and

Transparent administration.
The Charter is consistent with the European Convention on Human
Rights adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe: when the
Charter contains rights that stem from this Convention, their
meaning and scope are the same.
When the Charter applies
The provisions of the Charter are addressed to:

the institutions and bodies of the EU with due regard for the principle
of subsidiarity; and

The national authorities only when they are implementing EU law.

For example, the Charter applies when EU countries adopt or apply a
national law implementing an EU directive or when their authorities apply an
EU regulation directly.

In cases where the Charter does not apply, the protection of fundamental
rights is guaranteed under the constitutions or constitutional traditions
of EU countries and international conventions they have ratified.
The Charter does not extend the competence of the EU to matters not
included by the Treaties under its competence.
How the Charter became part of the EU Treaties
The Charter was initially solemnly proclaimed at the Nice European Council
on 7 December 2000. At that time, it did not have any binding legal effect.
On 1 December 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the
Charter became legally binding on the EU institutions and on
national governments, just like the EU Treaties themselves.
For the first time, members of the College of Commissioners swore a solemn
declaration to uphold the Charter as well as the Treaties in May 2010.
The Charter strengthens the protection of fundamental rights by making
those rights more visible and more explicit for citizens.


Domain 3: pluralist society

3A: history of the pluralist society



Pluralism as a political philosophy is the recognition and affirmation of

diversity within a political body, which permits the peaceful coexistence of
different interests, convictions and lifestyles. Political pluralists are not
inherently socialists (who put equality as their guiding
principle), liberals (who place liberty as their guiding principle)
or conservatives (who place tradition as their guiding principle) but advocate
a form of political moderation. Nor are political pluralists necessarily
advocates of a democratic plurality, but generally agree that this form of
government is often best at moderating discrete values.
As put by arch-pluralist Isaiah Berlin, Let us have the courage of our
admitted ignorance, of our doubts and uncertainties. At least we can try to
discover what others [] require, by [] making it possible for ourselves to

know men as they truly are, by listening to them carefully and

sympathetically, and understanding them and their lives and their
needs." Pluralism thus tries to encourage members of society to
accommodate their differences by avoiding absolutism (adhering solely to
one value, or at the very least refusing to recognize others as legitimate)
and engaging in good faith dialogue. Pluralists also seek the construction or
reform of social institutions in order to reflect and balance competing
principles. One of the more famous arguments for institutional pluralism
came from James Madison in The Federalist paper Number 10. Madison
feared that factionalism would lead to in-fighting in the new American
republic and devotes this paper to questioning how best to avoid such an
occurrence. He posits that to avoid factionalism, it is best to allow many
competing factions (advocating different primary principles) to prevent
anyone from dominating the political system. This relies, to a degree, on a
series of disturbances changing the influences of groups so as to avoid
institutional dominance and ensure competition. Like Edmund Burke, this
view concerns itself with balance, and subordinating any single abstract
principle to a plurality or realistic harmony of interests.
Of course, pluralism recognizes that certain conditions may make good faith
negotiation impossible, and therefore also focuses on what institutional
structures can best modify or prevent such a situation. Pluralism advocates
institutional design in keeping with a form of pragmatic realism here, with
the preliminary adoption of suitable existing socio-historical structures where

3B: fundamental rights that belong to the pluralist society



Pluralism refers to a society, system of government, or organization that has

different groups that keep their identities while existing with other groups or
a more dominant group. Rather than just one group, subgroup, or culture
dictating how things go, pluralism recognizes a larger number of competing
interest groups that share the power. Pluralism serves as a model of
democracy, where different groups can voice their opinions and ideas.
Pluralism in Real Life

Many cities in the United States have areas referred to as Little Italy or
Chinatown, where people from those countries keep their cultural traditions.

JoAnnes parents are from Lebanon, and though JoAnne has grown up
in the United States, she embraces her Lebanese roots. She has lived in
Lebanon and often cooks traditional Lebanese meals.

Amish people live alongside those who are not Amish, but travel by
horse and buggy, do not have electricity, and have established stores,
schools, and other organizations that are used by members of the Amish

Native American tribes have separate governments, religions, schools,

and communities in which they practice and live out their traditions and

Born and raised in Mexico, Flor came to the United States as a

teenager. She was eager to learn English and to adapt to the culture around
her, but she also continued to celebrate the traditions she grew up with and
passed them on to her children.

The United States has been referred to as a melting pot, where people
of different cultural backgrounds have come to live but are able to keep alive
their own cultural traditions.

Labor unions and employers share in meeting the needs of employees.

When environmental groups decide that there is a need for a new law
regulating some form of pollution, they seek compromises from chemical
companies. People from the public voice their opinions, as does the
Environmental Protection Agency and members of Congress. Any law that
follows is a result of various groups speaking up and is an exercise in

In India, Hindus and Hindi-speaking people are the majority, but

people of other backgrounds, religions, and languages also live there.

Indonesia is a pluralistic society, where people of different

backgrounds (religion, caste, culture, language, and ethnicity) live side by

The city of Bethlehem in the Middle East exhibits pluralism when

families of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faiths desire to live peacefully in
the midst of the fighting around them.

Olgas family came to the United States from Czechoslovakia, and

though she and her siblings learned English at school, they maintained their
native language at home.

Almost everyone in Phoenix seems to have moved there from

somewhere else in the country, so the ideas and backgrounds of the people
there have merged into a pluralistic society.

Because it is so close to the Mexican border, Tucson exhibits many

influences of Mexican culture even though it is not in Mexico.

Couples of differing religious faiths may decide to celebrate the

practices of both of their religions.

In ancient Rome, people worshipped many gods, and were left to their
own religious practices if they were not considered threats to the Roman

Historically, when one country occupies another, a pluralistic society

developed if the people native to the country were allowed to continue their
traditions alongside the traditions and practices of the occupying country.

When Britain occupied India, both British Christian and Indian Hindu
traditions were practiced side by side.

Teresa grew up in China but came to New York as a child. It is

important to her that her son learns about his heritage, so he attends
Chinese school every Saturday.

In the United States many religions and denominations within religions

are practiced side by side, with each group allowed to voice their concerns
and thoughts.
Each of these are different types of pluralism that exist, allowing multiple
entities to share their beliefs and power.
The term moral obligation has a number of meanings in moral philosophy,
in religion, and in layman's terms. Generally speaking, when someone says
of an act that it is a "moral obligation," they refer to a belief that the act is
one prescribed by their set of values. While is a term that conveys a sense of
moral commitment or obligation to someone or something.
3C: the practice of the pluralist society


Urban Indigenous Peoples and Migration: Challenges and Opportunities The
issue of urban indigenous peoples and migration will be the focus of a halfday discussion on 21 May as part of the Sixth Session of the UN Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues, to be held at UN Headquarters in New York
from 14 25 May. While the majority of indigenous peoples worldwide still
live in rural areas, they are increasingly migrating to urban areas, both
voluntarily and involuntarily. This is a reflection of the growing trend of
global urbanization, whereby the majority of the worlds population will soon
live in cities. Factors that contribute to indigenous peoples urban migration
include land dispossession, poverty, militarization, natural disasters, lack of
employment opportunities, the deterioration of traditional livelihoods
combined with the lack of viable economic alternatives, and the prospect of
better opportunities in cities. Challenges Indigenous peoples worldwide are
vulnerable to a range of social and economic factors that affect their human
rights. They tend to lack access to education, to live on lands that are
vulnerable to natural disasters, with inadequate or no sanitation and poor
access if any, to health services; all of which contribute to lower productivity
and incomes among indigenous populations. At the same time, their limited
political power means that they are unable to use the political system to
improve their position. Indigenous peoples that migrate to urban areas face

particular and often additional challenges, most prominently unemployment,

limited access to services and inadequate housing. In addition, indigenous
peoples in urban areas may experience discrimination and have difficulties in
sustaining their language, identity and culture and educating future
generations which can result in a loss of indigenous heritage and values.
Many young indigenous people find themselves in a no mans land between
the urban societies that do not fully accept them and their indigenous
communities that often fail to offer them the opportunities they need and
desire. The forced displacement of many indigenous communities by
development projects is resulting in extreme impoverishment and
contributing to urban drift. In the cities, indigenous peoples suffer major
disparities in all measurable areas such as lower wages, lack of employment,
skills and education; poor health, housing and criminal convictions. They live
in poor human settlements outside the support of traditional community and

I. Removed from our land we are literally removed from ourselves. Mick
Dodson, Australian indigenous leader and Member of the Permanent Forum
Opportunities However, migration can also be a positive experience,
providing more and better opportunities for indigenous peoples in the area of
employment and education, with income generated by urban indigenous
peoples often used to support families in their communities of origin. In
some instances, indigenous peoples have been able to adapt and improve
their situations, preserving their indigenous identities while maximizing the
benefits of urban society. Using the term edgewalkers to describe such
youth in the Pacific region, one indigenous author explained: [Edgewalkers]
are part of a generation of Pacific peoples who have mastered skills that
have enabled them to adopt situational identities that allow them to weave
between traditional indigenous contexts and the technological and
information worlds.

II.Country examples In Mexico, where the indigenous population was

estimated at 12.4 million in 2000 (12 per cent of the total population),
almost one in every three indigenous people lives in a city. * Illiteracy rates
among the urban indigenous population are four times higher than nonindigenous city-dwellers. * Indigenous people living in cities have been found
to drop out of school to seek employment earlier than their nonindigenous
counterparts. This leads to a pattern of working in poorly paid, low-skilled
jobs, with 50 per cent of the indigenous population earning an income of
between $150- 300 per month. * Urban indigenous generally live in lower
quality housing, with more than one-third of indigenous homes in Mexico
City having only one room and a higher proportion of indigenous homes
incorporating asbestos sheeting (16.1 per cent compared with 9 per cent of
non-indigenous housing).

III. In The Philippines, indigenous peoples typically migrate to cities as a

result of a loss of livelihood, lack of social services or due to tribal conflicts.
Due to their limited skills and education, they often face unemployment and
poverty. For example, in the northern Philippine city of Baguio (where over
60 per cent of the population is made up of indigenous peoples from the
Cordillera region), it is estimated that some 65 per cent of indigenous
migrants suffer from extreme poverty.

IV. In Africa, forced migration to urban areas has often resulted from land
loss due to the creation of wildlife reserves and the construction of dams,
mining projects or other development projects. In Tanzania, 90 per cent of
Masaai men who have migrated to the capital city, Dar es Salaam, end up
working as security guards, earning around $40 per month and are often
only able to afford to live in slums on the outskirts of the city.

v. In India, where it is estimated that indigenous peoples (called Scheduled

Tribes) make up 8.2 per cent of the total population, indigenous migration
to cities has been involuntary as well as, increasingly, voluntary (for better
education opportunities for example). Negative impacts of urban migration
on indigenous peoples in India have included cultural erosion, loss of
language, exploitation and In Canada, it is estimated that
more than 50 per cent of the indigenous population now live in cities

VII. with reasons given for their migration including family and housing, as
well as education (for those migrating from reserves) and employment (for
those migrating between cities). There is a high level of mobility among the
Aboriginal population from city to city and between cities and reserves,
which can have a disruptive effect on the provision of social programs such
as health, education and family support


Based on my research and readings, Migrants, asylum seekers and illegal
immigrants are at high risk of poverty and social exclusion and there is
evidence that they sometimes do not receive the care that best responds to
their needs. Improved access to general health care, including also health
promotion and prevention strategies, is therefore essential to minimizing
disadvantage for migrants.
3D: international comparison and international organizations


National Identity and Support for European Integration How can one explain
support for European integration? The question is as old as the European
Union, and it has been the subject of some one hundred articles, yet there is
no scholarly consensus on the answer. One line of explanation builds on
trade theory to theorize a calculus of economic costs and benefits. The
presumption is that citizens are able to rationally evaluate the economic
consequences of European integration for themselves and for the groups of
which they are part, and that such consequences drive their attitudes. A
second explanation draws on cognitive and social psychology to assess how
individuals use political cuesgrounded in ideology or in elite communication
as a short-hand guide to new and complex issues. A third line of
explanation draws on the psychology of group membership and emotional
attachment to consider how group identities and, above all, national
identities, bear on support for European integration. Each line of explanation
conceives of the object of attitude formationthe European Union
differently. The political-economic approach views the European Union as a
regime that facilitates economic exchange, with profound distributional
consequences arising among individuals from differences in asset mobility
and among countries from institutional differences. The political cue
approach views the European Union as an extension of domestic politics, and
seeks explanations of public attitudes in domestic ideology or domestic
political institutions, above all, national political parties. The national identity
approach conceives of the European Union as a polity overarching
established communities, and considers how this interacts with citizens
conceptions of their identity. We find support for each of these lines of
explanation, but we conclude that the latter is by far the most potent.

Conceptions of in-groups and out-groups are immensely powerful in

explaining public opinion on European integration. Rational evaluation of
costs and benefits figure in our explanation, but they take second place after
group attachments. European integration seems to provoke emotional
responses on the part of citizens that engage communal identities. But such
identities are not objective. Rather they are debated, contested, and
constructed in national contexts. We proceed by stages. In the next section
we summarize the main lines of theorizing and the models that have been
put forward to account for public opinion on European integra- * The names
of the authors are in random order. 2 tion. In the following sections we
operationalize key variables, and evaluate their statistical power in a multilevel analysis. Multi-level analysis is particularly appropriate for the
questions we are asking. It is well suited to probing contextual effects in a
multi-level polity. The core idea of multi-level governance is that public
decision making is diffused across multiple territorial levels or contexts.
Multi-level modeling allows an intimate dialog between theory and evidence
in explaining the effects of such contexts. In this paper we consider public
opinion on European integration as an interaction between individual-level
attributes and the national and party-political contexts in which they are
mobilized. To predict individual attitudes, we must therefore generalize about
the contexts in which they are shaped. 1. Theorizing Support for European
Integration Political Economy The main thrust of European integration has
been to sweep away barriers to economic exchange, facilitate mobility of
capital and labor, and create a single European monetary authority. It is not
surprising, therefore, that explanations of support for European integration
have focused, above all, on subjective and objective economic factors at the
individual and national level. There are many ways to hypothesize the
economic effects of market liberalization, and yet more ways to build
interactive terms to capture these effects. But there is a common, core

expectation that, in general, market liberalization favors those with higher

levels of income, education, and occupational skill (Anderson and Reichert
1996; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Inglehart 1970a; McLaren 2002; Carey 2002).
There are several reasons for this. Market liberalization rewards those who
have high levels of human capital and penalizes those with low levels of
human capital (Becker 1976; Gabel 1998a, 43). Market liberalization
increases the international substitutability of labor and consequently
intensifies job insecurity, particularly for less skilled workers (Rodrik 1997).
Market liberalization puts pressure on the viability of welfare systems (Huber
and Stephens 2001; Scharpf 2000; Streeck 1996). And finally, market
liberalization shifts the burden of taxation from mobile factors of production
that have the option to exit the tax regime to immobile factors that do not
(Scharpf 2000). Theories of support for European integration based on
rational calculation of objective economic costs and benefits at the individual
level have been extended in two directions. First, subjective evaluations, as
well as objective factors, can be taken into account. Sec- 3 ond, sociotropic
evaluations concerning ones group (in this case, nation), can be theorized
alongside egocentric evaluations. The corresponding four lines of theorizing
are represented in the cells of Figure 1. Figure 1: Political-economic Effects
objective subjective egocentric 1 2 sociotropic 4 3 Positive egocentric and
sociotropic evaluations of economic well-being (cells 2 and 3 in Figure 1) are
hypothesized to increase support for European integration (e.g. Anderson
1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Rohrschneider 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton
1993, 510). The rationale for this is that European integration profoundly
affects economic life chances, both for individuals and for countries, and is
perceived to do so. Citizens who feel confident about the economic future
personally and for their countryare therefore likely to regard European
integration in a positive light, while those who are pessimistic or fearful are
likely to be euroskeptical.1 A fourth stream of theorizing hypothesizes that

citizens respond sociotropically to objective economic conditions (cell 4).

That is to say, citizens are sensitive to their collective economic
circumstances, as well as to those that affect them individually. We
hypothesize that citizens in countries that are net recipients of European
Union spending will be inclined to support, while those in donor countries will
oppose European integration (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Brinegar, Jolly,
and Kitschelt forthcoming). Recent theorizing on the topic goes further,
building on the types of capitalism literature to hypothesize how distinctive
political-economic institutions frame the effects of European integration
within a member state, and hence the response of its citizens (Ray
forthcoming; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming). Each typemarketliberal capitalism, the Rhine model, and the social democratic modelis
composed of mutually reinforcing labor market, corporate governance, and
welfare institutions. The costs of change for any 1 The connection between
subjective economic evaluations and attitudes towards European integration
is likely to be all the more apparent to respondents because they are
measured in the same Eurobarometer survey. However this effect is limited
for the measures of subjective economic evaluations that we use in this
article because they are drawn from questions that are asked prior to
questions concerning European integration or support for European
integration. 4 model in any one of these areas are large because these
institutions are complementary (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall and
Gingerich 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999). Each type is the
result of deep-seated historical conflicts, and the resultant institutions are
embedded, both horizontally, in relation to other institutions, and vertically,
in the expectations of those working within them. However, these models
have not been equally influential in the process of European integration. The
Rhine model, by virtue of the fact that it is the home model of the core
countries in the European Community, and that it stakes out a middle

ground between the weak redistribution of the liberal model and the strong
redistribution of the social democratic model, has been the most influential.2
We therefore hypothesize that citizens in countries with the alternative types
of capitalism i.e. the liberal and social democratic typeswill be less
supportive of European integration. Political-economic models assume that
citizens are well-informed about the economic consequences of alternative
institutional arrangements (McLaren 2002). Given the lack of even
rudimentary knowledge of the EU on the part of many, even most, citizens
(Anderson 1998; Wessels 1995a), we need to explore further to find the
sources of their support or opposition. In the next section, we examine
political cues, which frame how citizens regard European integration, and in
the following section we examine how support for European integration
depends on basic identities. Political Cues Cognitive and social psychologists
have shown that human capacity for calculation is far more limited than
utilitarian models presume (Chong 2000; Kinder 1998; Simon 1985). This
has directed attention to cognitive short-cuts and emotive anchors that
provide essential and prior cues that help a person decide what is in his or
her interest. Extending preexisting values or identities to new objects can be
understood as rationalist aids to cognition and as the expression of a
psychological need for consistency (Conover and Feldman 1984; Feld and
Grofman 1988; Feldman 1988; George 1979; Jennings 1992; Sears 1993;
Sears and Funk 1991). 2 This is consistent with the median voter theorem.
Of course, the outcomes in question are contested (Hooghe and Marks
1999). Several areas of economic integration have been characterized by
negative integration biased towards the removing of barriers and the
introduction of market competition akin to the liberal model (Scharpf
1999). A weaker version of our argument would be that citizens, including
those in countries with liberal or social democratic types of capitalism,
perceive that their institutions are peripheral, and respond to European

integration accordingly. 5 The cues that appear most relevant to European

integration arise in the domestic arenas of EU member states, from political
ideology and from political parties. The European Union has evolved into an
encompassing political community, which is present in all areas of life that
governments usually care to regulate. From capital flows to agriculture,
transportation, monetary policy, regional policy, environment, social
regulation, education, and more recently, defense, immigration, and law and
order, national governments share authority with the European Union.
Deepening has gone hand in hand with the creation of a system of multilevel governance in which domestic groups, including national political
parties, are involved in EU decision-making (Hooghe and Marks 1999). As
European politics has become intertwined with domestic politics, it is worth
looking to domestic politics to explain public opinion. Political choices in
European domestic politics are structured by a left/right dimension tapping
contestation concerning economic equality vs. economic freedom and the
role of the state in regulating social and market outcomes. This dimension of
contestation serves as a set of cues for taking positions on a range of
subjects about which one is likely to have limited knowledge. Does left/right
structure opinion on European integration (Gabel and Anderson 2002; Marks
and Steenbergen forthcoming; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996)? For public
opinion in the aggregate, the answer appears to be no. There is no robust
linear association between citizens left/right ideology and their position on
European integration. But aggregate findings may hide a multitude of sins
or causal patternsand we need to take up the suggestion of Leonard Ray
and Brinegar et al., who argue that the connection between left/right
ideology and support for European integration depends on the national
context (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming; Marks forthcoming; Ray
forthcoming). Their insight derives, once again, from the varieties of
capitalism literature. If EU outcomes reflect the preferences of the median

member state, then citizens in countries with social democratic systems of

capitalism can expect to see their encompassing and highly redistributive
welfare systems diluted. By the same logic, citizens in liberal capitalist
countries can expect to be led in a more redistributive direction. This has
obvious and compelling implications for how citizens on the left and right
view European integration. In social democratic systems, the left will be
opposed to European integration and the right will be supportive. In liberal
market systems, the positions of left and right will be reversed. Political
parties also provide cues. Research on political parties finds that the
positions they stake out on European integration correspond to those of their
supporters (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002;
Wessels 1995b; Carrubba 2001). Steenbergen and Scott (forthcoming)
argue that the causality runs mainly from parties to 6 voters, rather than the
reverse, which accords with the perception that the views of individual
citizens on European integration do not determine party positioning on this
issue. National Identity Emotional or gut commitments can be extremely
powerful in shaping views towards political objects, particularly when other
cognitive frames of reference do not transparently apply (Chong 2000;
Kinder and Sears 1981). In the words of Lauren McLaren, Antipathy toward
the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive
mobilization but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures (2002,
553). The logic of this approach is all the more persuasive because the
European Union is not merely an international regime intended to lower
barriers to trade, reduce transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining,
or reap scale-efficiencies. On the contrary, the EU is a polity in the making,
and as such it threatens not only the decisional autonomy of national
institutions, but core values of national sovereignty and national identity.
McLaren conceptualizes the consequences of this in terms of the degree to
which citizens fear cultural diversity and cultural degradation as a result of

European integration. Feelings of xenophobia, even if not directed precisely

at foreigners in the EU, can, she hypothesizes, explain individual support or
opposition to the EU. One might also inquire into territorial identity. Diffuse
support for the political communityunderstood as basic attachment to the
nation beyond the present institutions of government (Norris 1999, 10)
has long been hypothesized to be a requisite for a stable national state
(Easton 1965; Smith 1992). Does this line of reasoning apply to the
European Union? This line of theorizing is double-edged. First, we would
expect that the stronger an individuals European identity, the greater her
support for the European Union (Carey 2002; Citrin and Sides forthcoming;
Risse 2002). Second, we would expect that the stronger an individuals
national identity, the weaker her support for the European Union. The first
expectation is rooted in the literature linking community attachment to
support for the political system. While identities are not cast in stone, there
is much evidence that they are relatively stable over individual life spans,
and so can be meaningfully considered to constrain more malleable
preferences over regime support. The second expectation, by contrast, is
contested. On the one hand, it is obvious to anyone who reads the
newspapers in Britain or Denmark, that opposition to European integration is
often couched as defense of the nation against control from Brussels (on
Britain, Usherwood 2002; on Denmark, Buch and Hansen 2002; on the role
of the media in fram- 7 ing EU debates, Semetko, de Vreese, and Peter
2000). Populist right-wing political parties in a growing list of countries,
including France, Denmark, Italy, and Austria, tap nationalism and
ethnocentrism to reject further integration, and since 1996 such parties have
formed the largest reservoir of Euro-skepticism across the European Union
(Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Several studies find that individuals or
countries with higher levels of national identity have lower levels of support
for European integration. Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) show this for

individuals in relation to a common European currency; Eichenberg and

Dalton (1993) and Deflem and Pampel (1996) use country data to explore
national variations. However, until an article by Sean Carey published in
2002, no-one had shown that national identity at the individual level had a
significant negative effect on support for European integration. On the other
hand, several writers argue that high levels of national identity are
consistent with support for European integration. Marks finds that
attachment to ones country is positively associated with attachment to the
European Union in bivariate analysis (1999; see also Bruter forthcoming,
Citrin and Sides forthcoming). Identities to different territorial communities
are, in this view, mutually inclusive, rather than mutually exclusive. A person
may, for example, have mutually compatible attachments to her city, Cardiff,
her country, Wales, alongside Britain and the European Union (Haesly 2001).
This is precisely what Diez Medrano and Gutirrez find for Spain, where
people who identify strongly with Spain or/and their region also identify
strongly with Europe. Spaniards have thus developed a sort of hyphenated
identity with respect to Europe (2001, 772). Along similar lines, van
Kersbergen (2000) conceives of European allegiance as embedded in
national allegiance. Citizens, he argues, identify with the European Union to
the extent that they believe it strengthens the capacity of national states to
achieve economic welfare and security. While Carey (2002, 402), as noted,
finds that national identity reduces support for European integration under
controls, he also shows that the effect is small for individuals with high levels
of European identity. One way of resolving these conflicting expectations is
to inquire into the conditions under which national identity is politically
mobilized into nationalism that sustains stark opposition to European
integration (Marcussen et al. 1999). In some contexts, national identity may
exist alongside, or even reinforce, support for European integration. In
others, national identity is mobilized around the contested claim that the

European Union threatens national institutions, weakens the national

community, and undermines national sovereignty (Risse 2001). It is clear
that countries vary widely in this respect, and we introduce a dummy
variable describing whether or not a country has had a referendum on
membership in the EU or on a major EU treaty, to capture the extent to
which debate over European integration has been politicized. Such referenda
increase the salience of European issues, 8 and, perhaps more importantly,
limit the capacity of political parties and their leaderships to control debate.
Unlike general elections, referenda highlight conflicts within, as well as
among, political parties. General elections set the stage for the formation of
governments and political parties, especially major political parties, exploit
this to demand unity within their ranks. Referenda, by comparison, are
unconstrained expressions of preference, with a reputation for spinning out
of elite control (Leduc 2001). If this line of thinking is on the right track, one
would expect national identity to play to a different tune in countries which
have experienced one or more referenda on European integration. Models
Table 1 summarizes ten explanatory models of public opinion on European
integration. The table lists the dependent variables used in these analyses,
the most powerful independent variables (in the boxes), the method, and
the proportion of the variance explained. These models are, in our view,
among the most interesting, influential, or original analyses to have
appeared over the past decade. They also represent the major directions in
theorizing. Direct comparison of results across these models is complicated
because the dependent variable varies, as do the population encompassed in
the study, the time point of the data, and the method employed. But some
general lessons can be learned. Most of these models, like the field as a
whole, emphasize political-economic variables, notwithstanding that Ronald
Ingleharts pioneering work in this field was primarily noneconomic (1970a,
1970b). Values and identities are far less prominent, though we have

oversampled on this dimension by including Sean Careys identity model and

Lauren McLarens cultural threat model. The European Union is a moving
target, and it is not surprising that analyses of public opinion have changed
over time. Up to the mid-1990s and the Maastricht Treaty it was fair to say
that the EU was essentially a means to institutionalize market integration,
and analyses of public opinion sensibly reflected this. Matthew Gabels fine
book, based on his dissertation, Interests and European Integration, from
which we draw the policy appraisal and national political economy models,
is primarily oriented to economic costs and benefits (Gabel and Palmer
1995; Gabel 1998a, 1998b), as is Anderson and Reicherts economic
benefits model (1996). Another stream of work has examined cross-national
variation in support in terms of aggregate economic factors (e.g. Anderson
and Kaltenthaler 1996; Carrubba 1997; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998;
Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). In recent years, however, the debate over
European integration has engaged culture and identity as elite conflict on the
issue has widened and populist right parties have taken up 9 Table 1a: Public
Opinion on European Integration: Key Economic Models Gabel and Palmers
economic voting model (1995) Anderson and Reicherts economic benefits
model (1996) Gabels policyappraisal model (1998) Gabels national political
economy model (1998) Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelts types of capitalism
model (2002) Dependent variable Membership + unification Membership
Membership Membership Interaction of perceived actual and desired speed
Cognitive factors Egocentric economic factors Occupation, income,
education, proximity to border Occupationc, income, education Occupationd,
income, education, proximity to border Human capitale, relative wagef ,
occupation Sociotropic economic factors Evaluation of national economya,
national benefitb EU trade, budget returns EU trade Types of capitalismi ,
structural funding Political factors Political stabilityg Party cue Ideology/
political values Post-materialism Valuesj , left/right self-placement Cultural

threat Identity Other Length of membership, age, gender Gender, age

Geopolitical securityh Country dummies YES NO YES YES NO Method OLS
pooled time series OLS over different years OLS pooled time series OLS
pooled time series OLS R2 .38 (EU) .04.10 (EU) .13-.14 (EU) .11-.13
(EU) .17 (EU) a Measured by retrospective evaluation: weak effect. b
Measured by benefit question: strong effect. c Occupation is a dummy for
farmer. d Dummies: farmer, professional, manual worker. e Interaction of
occupational category and personal income. f Relative to EU wage by
occupation. g Voters of parties opposing democratic capitalism. h War deaths
in WWII. i Items tapping wage bargaining system, labor market regime,
welfare regime, welfare redistribution. j Views on welfare state, gender
equality. 10 Table 1b: Public Opinion on European Integration: Key Noneconomic Models Andersons national proxies model (1998) Rohrschneiders
democratic performance model (2002) Steenbergen and Jones party cue
model (2002) McLarens cultural threat model (2002) Careys identity model
(2002) Dependent variable Membership 3 items tapping support for EU
governmentc Membership + desired speed Membership + benefit
Membership Cognitive factors Opinion leadership Opinion leadership
Egocentric economic factors Evaluation of personal economy Evaluation of
personal economy Occupation, income, education, proximity to border
Occupation, income, education; evaluation of personal economy Sociotropic
economic factors Evaluation of national economy Evaluation: single market,
national economy Perceived economic threate Evaluation of national
economy Political factors System supporta, government support, party
supportb Perceptions EU representation, satisfaction EU democracy party
cued Ideology/ political values Post-materialism Left/right selfplacement
Cultural threat Perceived cultural threatf Perceived cultural threatg Identity
National prideh, territorial attachmenti Other Country dummies NO NO NO
YES YES Method OLS OLS, MLA MLA OLS ordered LOGIT R2 .09.20 (nat) .

23.40 (nat) CALCULATE (EU) .17.21 (EU) 59% correct (EU) a Satisfaction
with national democracy. b Voted for establishment party. c (1) EU
government responsible to EU Parliament? (2) More power for EP good/bad?
(3) EP more/less important role? d Level of EU support among political
parties, constituting a cue to party supporters. e Minorities abuse social
benefits. f Religious practices of minorities threaten our way of life. g EU
threatens national identity; language. h Interaction: national pride +
exclusive national identity. i Local, regional, national, European. 11 the cause
of Euroskepticism (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Taggart 1998). We
detect a corresponding turn in the analysis of public opinion, and a greater
sensitivity to the view, espoused by a scholar sympathetic to rational
calculus, that, Individual preferences are guided by both [pre]dispositions
and incentives. This means that, in selecting between any set of alternatives,
an individual may, by virtue of his group identifications and values, be
predisposed to favor one alternative independently of the current incentives
associated with the alternatives (Chong 2000, 74; see also Citrin, Reingold,
and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991). In a longitudinal analysis of twentyfive years of EU public opinion, Bernhard Wessels concludes that, the
impact of stratifying characteristicseducation and occupationon attitudes
towards the EC has declined, while that of political values such as left/right,
postmaterialism, and party identification has increased (Wessels 1995a,
135). Sean Careys identity model (2002) elaborates different measures of
regional, national and European identity, and finds that they powerfully
structure EU public opinion. Lauren McLarens cultural threat model
demonstrates that attitudes toward the European Union tend to be based in
great part on a general hostility toward other cultures (2002, 564). Several
models root public opinion towards European integration in the domestic
political context. Andersons national proxies model (1998), Carrubba
(2001), Rohrschneiders democratic performance model (2002) and

Steenbergen and Jones party cue model (2002) all draw attention to
national political-institutional variables, of which party support or party cue
appear especially powerful. Analysts have sought in different ways to handle
the multi-level structure of the data. All are aware, of course, that public
opinion varies across countries as well as across individuals. One approach is
to run the same model for as many countries as there are in the data set
(Rohrschneider 2002; Anderson 1998). Another is to deal with one level only
or with each level separately (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Bosch and
Newton 1995; Carrubba 2001; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Eichenberg and
Dalton 1993; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Wessels 1995a). A standard strategy is
to absorb clustering of residuals by country in a series of dummy variables
(e.g. Gabel 1998a). Such variables are sphinx-like in that they increase the
variance explained by the model, but tell us little or nothing substantively.
Finally, there are two analyses that, like the analysis of this paper, use multilevel analysis. Both are represented in Table 1. Models that account for the
most variance sometimes rely on independent variables that appear
uncomfortably close to the dependent variable. Most writers, including those
selected here, face up explicitly to the problem of establishing direction of
causality. One may ask whether evaluations of the extent to which
respondents feel represented by the 12 European Parliament influence
support for European integration or result from it?3 Given the welldocumented lack of knowledge of the European Parliament among most EU
citizens, it seems possible that responses to a question about whether the
European Parliament protects ones interests may issue from more diffuse
attitudes, including those towards the European Union generally. Similarly, it
seems strained to consider the perception of whether ones country has
benefited from integration as an independent variable, especially because it
is sometimes used together with membership as indicator for support. The
authors listed in Table 1 have evidently thought through such concerns. In

this paper we do not include European identity among our independent

variables on the grounds that it plausibly results from, as well as contributes
to, support for European integration.