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You are on page 1of 9

December, 2015

Answer Question 1 and any 5 of the remaining 6 questions.

1) The island nation of San Felicidad has N skilled workers and N unskilled

workers. A skilled worker can earn $wS per day if she works all the time and an

unskilled worker can earn $wU per day if he works all the time. A worker who

can earn w per day and spends the fraction ` of his or her time NOT working

will earn (1 `)w per day. There is a single consumption good, which is the

numeraire. Preferences of all workers are represented by the utility function

U (c, `) = ln c + ln `

(1)

where c is the amount of the consumption good consumed per day and ` is

the fraction of the consumers time that is spent not working. Suppose that

the government is able to recognize who is skilled and who is not skilled and

collects a lump sum tax of t per day from each skilled worker and pays a lump

sum subsidy of t per day to each unskilled worker.

A) Write down the daily budget constraint for a skilled worker and for an

unskilled worker. If workers choose their labor effort so as to maximize the

utility function in Equation 1, find the fraction of time that each type of worker

will spend at leisure as a function of that type of workers wage and the variable

t.

B) A politician who opposes taxing the rich says that Redistributive taxes

harm the economy. An increase in such taxes will reduce the total supply of

labor. A politician who favors taxing the rich says that Tax increases have

no effect on the total value of labor earnings and will actually increase the

average productivity of labor. To evaluate the claims of these politicians,

do the following for the economy described in this problem: (i) Show how the

total number of hours worked by San Felicidad workers of each type changes

as t changes. (Remember that skilled workers pay a tax of t and unskilled

workers get a subsidy of t.) As t increases, does the total number of hours

worked by all workers increase, decrease or stay constant? (ii) Show how the

total labor earnings of each type of worker changes as t changes. As t increases,

does the total labor earnings of all laborers in the country increase, decrease or

stay constant? (iii) Determine whether an increase in t increases, decreases, or

leaves unchanged, the average productivity of labor as measured by the ratio

of total labor earnings to total hours worked by San Felicidad workers.

C) Find the indirect utility function v(w, ) where v(w, ) is the utility of a

worker with utility function given by Equation 1 who is paid a wage of w per

day and who pays a tax of to the government, where could be either positive

or negative and where > 0 means a tax and < 0 means a subsidy.

D) Suppose that young people in San Felicidad dont know whether they will

be skilled or unskilled. Each of them thinks the probability of either outcome

is 1/2. Suppose that they are expected utility maximizers with von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions given by Equation 1. If the government collects

a tax of t from each skilled worker and pays a subsidy of t to each unskilled

worker, write down an expression for the expected utility of a young person.

Find the tax rate t that maximizes the expected utility of such young people.

2

1/2

1/2

U (x1 , x2 ) = x1 + x2

.

(2)

Find this consumers Marshallian demand function for each of the two goods.

Then find a simple expression for the fraction of her income that she spends on

each good.

3 Consider a pure exchange economy with 200 consumers. All of them have

the utility function given in Equation 2 of Question 2. There are 100 Type A

consumers who have initial endowment of 90 units of good 1 and no units of

good 2. There are 100 Type B consumers who have initial endowment of 10

units of good 2 and no units of good 1. Let Good 1 be the numeraire. Find the

competitive equilibrium price of good 2 for this economy. Find the competitive

equilibrium consumption of each good for each type of consumer. (Hint: Finding

the competitive equilibrium price requires only a very simple calculation.)

form must that persons von Neumann Morgenstern utility function take? Show

that your answer is correct.

initial wealth w and prefers not to take between a gamble such that with probability 1/2 he would win $x and with probability 1/2 he would lose $y. Is it

possible that if this individuals wealth were much greater, he would want to

accept the gamble? Prove your answer.

5 State Walras Law. Provide some assumptions under which Walras Law holds

and prove that Walras Law holds under these assumptions.

6 A) State (i) the Weak axiom of revealed preference, (ii) the Strong axiom of

revealed preference and (iii) the generalized axiom of revealed preference. (Be

sure to define is revealed preferred to.)

B) Show that a consumer who makes choices that maximize a continuous, transitive, strictly convex preference relation must satisfy the strong axiom of revealed

preference.

7) Consider a pure exchange economy with two consumers and two goods.

Consumer 1 has an initial endowment of x units of good x and 0 units of good

y. Consumer 2 has an initial endowment of y units of good y and 0 units of

good x. Consumer 1s utility function is U (x1 , y1 ) = min{x1 , y1 } and consumer

2s utility function is U (x1 , y1 ) = x1 y1 , where xi and yi are consumptions of

goods x and y respectively by consumer i.

A) Draw an Edgeworth box representation of this economy.

B) Suppose that y0 < 2x0 . Where good 1 is the numeraire, find the competitive

equilibrium price for good 2. Also find the competitive equilibrium quantities

consumed by each consumer in competitive equilibrium.

For Extra creditonly if you have extra time. What can you say about competitive equilibrium for this economy if y0 > 2x0 .

9

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