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International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) - 1970


Chair: John Tiernan


InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
DearDelegates,

WelcometoVAMUNXXXVIandtotheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency.Iamvery
excitedtobechairingthiscommittee.Ifyouenjoytacklingissuesofglobalimportanceand
workingtogetherwithyourfellowdelegatesforthecommongood,youcouldnotfindabetter
placetodosothantheIAEA.TheNonProliferationTreatywhichyouwillbenegotiatingis
historicallyoneofthemostimportantinternationalagreementseverreacheditisdifficultto
overstatetherisksthateverynationonEarthcouldbefacedwithtodayifitwerenotforthe
IAEAandtheNPT.

MynameisJohnTiernan,Iamathirdyearmajoringinlinguistics.Iamoriginallyfrom
MichiganbuthavelivedovertenyearsinVirginia.IgotmystartinModelUNduringhigh
schoolandinthattimeattendedmultipleWMHSMUNconferencesaswellasseveralsmaller
conferencesaroundNorthernVirginia.AsahistorybuffIhavealwayslovedworkingin
historicalcommittees,andIhopethatresearchingandparticipatinginthiscommitteewill
leaveyouallwithadeeperunderstandingofatimewhenthefutureoftheworldinthefaceof
nuclearthreatswasuncertainandanappreciationofhowsignificantanachievementtheNon
ProliferationTreatytrulyis.

Thisbackgroundguideshouldserveasyourintroductiontothecommittee,andIwillinclude
furtherresourcestobeginyourresearchattheend,buthopefullywhilewritingyourposition
papersyourresearchwillbranchoutandgodeeper.Iencourageyoutoresearchyourown
country'shistory,especiallythepoliticalclimateinyourcountryduringthe1950sandearly
1960s.

Iprefertoacceptpositionpapersthroughemailandifyouneedanyhelpinyourresearch,feel
freetoemailmeandIwilldowhateverIcantohelp.Youcanofcoursealsoemailmeanytime
withanyotherquestions,comments,concerns,orjusttointroduceyourself.

Allthebest,

JohnTiernan
jtl8bs@virginia.edu


InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
CommitteeOverview
ThefirstnuclearexplosiononplanetEarthoccurredonJuly16th,1945,andinthe
followingmonththeworldsawthefirstuseofnuclearweaponsinwar.Fromthatpointon,
leadersinmanycountriesacrossthegloberecognizedthehorrificpoweroftheseweaponsand
theneedforasystemthatwouldensurethatthefirstuseofnuclearweaponsinwarwould
alsobethelast.
ThefirstresolutionadoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblycalledforthe
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eliminationfromnationalarmamentsofatomicweapons whilerecognizingtheneedfor
exchangeofnucleartechnologiesforpeacefulpurposes.Theprinciplesoutlinedinthe
resolutionremainedconsistentinmanysubsequentnegotiationsfornonproliferationand
disarmamentagreements:theneedtopreventnewnuclearweaponsfrombeingbuilt,the
needtodismantleexistingstockpilesofnuclearweapons,andtheneedtoallowforpeaceful
useofnucleartechnology.
InJuneof1946,theBaruchPlanfornucleardisarmamentwasproposedbytheUnited
States.ItcalledforasystemofinternationalinspectionledbytheUNtoensurenostatewas
developingnuclearweapons,andannouncedthattheUnitedStateswouldmaintainits
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nuclearstockpileuntiltheUNinspectionswerefullyineffect. TheSovietUniondistrusted
thecodificationofaUnitedStatesmonopolyonnuclearweaponssupportedbythe
AmericandominatedUN,andrefusedtoagree.Threeyearslater,theSovietUniontestedits
firstnuclearbomb,officiallybeginningthenucleararmsrace.

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,FirstSession,Resolution1:EstablishmentofaCommissiontoDealWiththe
ProblemsRaisedbytheDiscoveryofAtomicEnergy.24January1946.
<https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/NR003252.pdf?OpenEle
ment>
2
TheUnitedStatespresentstheBaruchPlan.History.com.A&ENetworks.2009.Web.4June2016.


InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
Intheearly1950s,theSovietUnionandthePeople'sRepublicofChinacollaboratedon
mininguranium,constructingnuclearfacilities,andtrainingnuclearscientists,withthegoal
ofhelpingChinadevelopitsownnuclearbomb.In1952,theUnitedKingdomcompletedits
firstsuccessfultestofanuclearweapon,andbeganjointtestswiththeUnitedStatesshortly
thereafter.
PresidentEisenhowerdeliveredaspeechtotheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyin
1953thatlaidoutwhateventuallybecamethemainpillarsoftheNonProliferationTreaty.He
affirmedtheUnitedStates'commitmenttopeaceandtherightofallnationstobenefitfrom
thenewandseeminglyendlesspossibilitiesintheatomicage.Healsosupportedthecreation
ofaninternationalbodytoregulateandmonitormaterialsneededforthepeacefuluseof
nuclearenergy,asawayofensuringthatthedestructivepotentialofnuclearenergybe
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diminished.
InthewakeofthesedevelopmentsandideasfromsuccessiveAmerican
administrations,theUnitedNationsheldtheInternationalConferenceonthePeacefulUses
ofAtomicEnergyinGenevafrom8to20August1955.From1955to1956,agroupoftwelve
countriesdraftedastatutefortheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),whichwas
finallyapprovedon23October1956byaspecialUNConference.Thestatutewentintoeffect
on29July1957,andtheIAEAwashenceformallycreatedandUNcountrieswereaddedas
members.
TheIAEAseekstopromotethepeacefuluseofnuclearenergy,andtoinhibititsusefor
anymilitarypurpose,includingnuclearweapons.Thoughestablishedindependentlyofthe
UnitedNationsthroughitsowninternationaltreaty,theIAEAreportstoboththeUnited

Eisenhower,DwightD.AtomsforPeace.UNGeneralAssembly.NewYork,NY.8December1953.


InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
NationsGeneralAssemblyandSecurityCouncil.TheIAEAservesasanintergovernmental
forumforscientificandtechnicalcooperationinthepeacefuluseofnucleartechnologyand
nuclearpowerworldwide.TheprogramsoftheIAEAencouragethedevelopmentofthe
peacefulapplicationsofnucleartechnology,provideinternationalsafeguardsagainstmisuse
ofnucleartechnologyandnuclearmaterials,andpromotenuclearsafety(includingradiation
protection)andnuclearsecuritystandardsandtheirimplementation.
Thedateofthecommitteeis1July1968.Thiscommitteewillfunctionasastandard
GeneralAssembly,withstrictadherencetoparliamentaryprocedure.Delegateswillwork
togethertowriteworkingpapers,thenpresentthemtothecommitteeasdraftresolutions,
ultimatelyworkingtogetthempassedasresolutionswiththefullforceandeffectoftheIAEA.

NonProliferation
HistoryoftheIssue
TheUnitedStatesproducedtheworld'sfirstnuclearweaponsin1945,andthereafter
attemptedtoprotectitsstatusastheworld'sonlynuclearpower,promotingaglobal
nonproliferationpolicywiththeeventualgoalofdisarmingitselfpromisedsometimeinthe
future.AftertheSovietUniontesteditsfirstnuclearweaponin1949,theUnitedStates
becamelessfocusedonnonproliferationandconductednumeroustestsoflargerandmore
destructivenuclearweaponsthroughouttheearly1950s.TheSovietUnionbeganaiding
China'sdevelopmentofanuclearweaponin1951andaftertheUnitedKingdom'sfirst
successfultestin1952theUnitedStatesbegansharingnucleartechnologywiththem.Bythe


InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
beginningofnegotiationsfortheNuclearNonProliferationTreaty,FranceandChinahad
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testednuclearweaponsaswell,bringingthemembershipcountoftheNuclearClubtofive.
Bytheendof1961,theUNadoptedaresolutionontheneedtopreventwider
disseminationofnuclearweapons.Thesuccinctresolutionnotedtheimminenceofwider
nuclearproliferation,acknowledgeditasathreattoglobalpeaceandsecurity,andcalled
uponallnationsoftheworld,especiallythecountriesalreadypossessingnuclearweapons,to
cometogetherandnegotiateanagreementtopreventtheincreasedmanufactureofnuclear
weaponsacrosstheglobe.

CurrentStatusoftheIssue
Severalstatesaresuspectedofworkingtodevelopnuclearweapons,andothersare
engagedinprogramswithnuclearweaponsstatestosharenucleartechnologywhichlackany
realassurancethatalltechnologysharedispeaceful.Evenamongstateswithnocurrent
nuclearaspirations,relinquishingthisaspectoftheirmilitarysovereigntytotheIAEAisa
seriouscommitment.Somenonnuclearweaponsstateswillnotagreetononproliferation
beforenuclearweaponsstateswillagreetodisarmament,whilesomenuclearweaponsstates
requirecommitmentstononproliferationbeforetheywillbeginanyprocessofdisarmament.

ABriefHistoryofNuclearWeaponsStates.(n.d.).RetrievedAugust22,2016,from
http://asiasociety.org/education/briefhistorynuclearweaponsstates
5
UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,SixteenthSession,Resolution1665:PreventionoftheWiderDissemination
ofNuclearWeapons.4December1961.
<https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/18/IMG/NR016718.pdf?OpenElem
ent>
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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
AnalysisoftheIssue
Thattheriskofnuclearwarincreaseswiththenumberofnuclearweaponsstatesisa
reasonableconclusionwhichhasbeendrawnbymostcountriesoftheworld,includingthe
nuclearweaponsstates.Aglobalpolicyofnonproliferationamongnonnuclearweapons
statesisperhapsevenmoreimportantthanaglobalpolicyofdisarmamentamong
nuclearweaponsstates.However,committingtononproliferationisnotsimple.Someseethe
commitmenttononproliferationastantamounttoacceptingapermanentlyweakened
positionmilitarilyrelativetostatesthathavealreadydevelopednuclearweapons.Evenstates
withnoaspirationstowardsdevelopingnuclearweaponsmayseetherequirementsof
committingtoanonproliferationagreementasacapontheirindustrialandtechnological
potential,assafeguardsagainstnuclearproliferationmayalsorestrictsomeresearchinto
peacefulnucleartechnology.However,itwilllikelybeespeciallyimportantforstateswith
developedpeacefulnuclearprogramstocommittononproliferationinorderfora
comprehensivetreatytobeeffective,asthesestates,termedthresholdstates,arecapableof
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quicklydevelopingnuclearweaponsshouldtheydecideto.
Globalcommitmenttononproliferationisperhapsthemostsignificantgoalofthis
committee.Itrequiresagreementamongover100countriestoneverdevelopnuclear
weapons.Withoutcommitmenttononproliferation,theothergoalsoftheIAEAareuseless,as
anynationmayarmitselfandanypeacefulnuclearprogrammaybeweaponized.

Sitt,B.(n.d.).Theconceptofthenuclearthresholdanditspoliticalandstrategicimplications.Retrieved
August22,2016,fromhttp://www.cesim.fr/observatoire/eng/82/chronique/
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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
QuestionstoConsider
1. What,ifany,exchangeofnucleartechnologybetweennuclearandnonnuclearstatesis
acceptable?
2. Willcommitmenttononproliferationbeeffectiveimmediately,orbeginatacertain
date?
3. HowshouldthecommitmentwithintheIAEAtonuclearproliferationrelatetocurrent
regionalorbilateralagreementsregardingnonproliferationorsharingofnuclear
technology?

Disarmament
HistoryoftheIssue
Disarmamenthasbeenagoalstatedinseveraloftheproposalswhichcamebeforethe
NonProliferationTreaty.TherefusaloftheUnitedStatestocommittodisarmamentbeforea
fullfledgedinternationalsystemtoenforcenonproliferationisindicativeofoneofthemain
issueskeepingothernuclearweaponsstatesfromcommittingtodisarmament.Withouta
guaranteethatotherstatesweresimilarlyreducingtheirstockpiles,onecountrydisarming
risksweakeningthemselvesrelativetoothers.Inadditiontothis,nuclearweaponsarebeing
activelyusedasnegotiationchipsinthecurrentfieldofforeignaffairs.Disarmamenthence
causesconcernregardingthepossibilityofgreaterconflict,asthepossiblelossesassociated
withaggressiveactionmaybeperceivedasbeinglessifnuclearweaponsarenotinthe
equation.


InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
CurrentStatusoftheIssue
ThePeople'sRepublicofChinabecamethefifthmemberoftheNuclearClubin
October1964,andseveralotherstatesareknownorsuspectedtobedevelopingtheirown
nuclearweapons.Thresholdstates,whilenotsuspectedofdevelopingnuclearweapons,have
peacefulnuclearprograms,whichcouldpotentiallybeusedtoproducenuclearweaponsvery
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quickly. Disarmamentnegotiationsmustincludethefivestatesknowntocurrentlypossess
nuclearweapons,althoughthestatessuspectedofclandestinenuclearweaponsprogramsmay
needtobeconsideredaswell.Inadditiontothis,nationsmustattempttodrawupaseriesof
penaltiesandactionstobetakenforaviolationofdisarmament,orformakingnuclear
weaponsintheaftermathofdisarmament.

AnalysisoftheIssue
Nationscommittingtodisarmamentfacemanyofthesamequestionsthatarefacedby
nationscommittingtononproliferation.Itisunlikelythatanuclearweaponsstatewill
committodisarmamentwithoutthesamecommitmentfromtheothers.Nonationcanbe
expectedtowillinglyweakenitsmilitarypotentialwhileitsenemies,rivals,orevenalliesdo
not.Thecommitmenttodisarmamentamongnuclearweaponsstatesmustbeunanimous,
anditwillrequireindependentverificationwheremutualtrustfails.
Thegoalsofthiscommitteewithrespecttodisarmamentinvolvefacilitatingan
agreementamongtheUnitedStates,SovietUnion,UnitedKingdom,People'sRepublicof
China,andFrancetoreducetheirstockpilestozero,eventuallyeliminatingnuclearweapons

Sitt,B.(n.d.).Theconceptofthenuclearthresholdanditspoliticalandstrategicimplications.Retrieved
August22,2016,fromhttp://www.cesim.fr/observatoire/eng/82/chronique/
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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
fromtheplanet.Thenationsgatheredmustalsoreachaconsensusonwhatpunitivemeasures
shouldbecarriedoutifnuclearweaponsaremadebyanyothernations.

QuestionstoConsider
1. HowcantheIAEAbringnuclearweaponsstatestomakethefirststepincommittingto
disarmament?
2. Whatagreementsmustbereachedamongnuclearweaponsstatesleadinguptothe
agreementtodisarm?
3. Whatwilltheconditionsofdisarmamentbe?
4. Whatkindoftimelinefordisarmamentcanbeagreedupon?

PeacefulUseofNuclearTechnology
HistoryoftheIssue
PresidentEisenhowertoldtheUNGeneralAssemblyin1953thatpeacefulpowerfrom
atomicenergyisnodreamofthefuturethatthiscapabilitywouldrapidlybetransformed
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intouniversal,efficient,andeconomicusage .Inthe1960s,fivecountrieshadnuclear
reactorsgeneratingelectricity,anditwasestimatedthatbythe1980stherewouldbe300
nuclearreactorsacrosstheglobe,producingenoughplutoniumtomanufactureupto20
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nuclearbombseveryday. Theproblemofsharingnucleartechnologywasnotonlyhowto
ensurethattechnologywasnotsharedwiththeintentofhelpinganotherstatedevelopa

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,SixteenthSession,Resolution1665:PreventionoftheWiderDissemination
ofNuclearWeapons.4December1961.
<https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/18/IMG/NR016718.pdf?OpenElem
ent>
9
Godsberg,Alicia.NuclearNonProliferationTreatyBackground.TheNuclearInformationProject.Fas.org.
Web.nd.29May2016.


InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
nuclearweapon,butalsothatthenucleartechnologymustnotbeutilizedtobuildweapons,
whilestillrespectingtherightsofstatestoreapthemanybenefitsofpeacefulnuclear
facilities.

CurrentStatusoftheIssue
TheUnitedStatesandSovietUnionactivelysharenuclearresearchwithboth
nuclearweaponsandnonnuclearweaponsstates.Bothworldsuperpowersrecognizethe
incrediblepotentialbenefitsofpeacefulnucleartechnologyacrosstheglobe,andboth
recognizetheriskthatsharednucleartechnology,evenifpeaceful,couldbeeventuallyusedto
furtherresearchintonuclearweaponsprograms.Inadditiontothis,awaymustbeworked
outtosharethesecretsofpeacefulnuclearusage,forusuallyonlyprivilegednationscan
accessandusenucleartechnologyfortheirownbenefit.Waystoimplementandcoordinate
peacefulusageonaglobalstagewouldhelpcreateamoreegalitariancommunityofnations
andreducemutualdistrust.

AnalysisoftheIssue
Nucleartechnologyhasincrediblepotentialtobenefittheworld,butitalsohasthe
potentialtobedangerousanddestructiveifusedmaliciouslyorevenincompetently.
Countriesbeginningpeacefulnuclearprogramsmustconsiderthepotentialrisksagainstthe
potentialbenefits,andtheIAEAmaylikewisewishtoaddressthesepotentialrisksand
benefitswhenconsideringhowtoregulatethepeacefuluseofnucleartechnologyintheworld.
Atthesametime,nuclearreactorsmaybemodifiedforamilitaryuse,andsomonitoringsuch
reactorswillhavetobeaprioritymovingintothefuture.

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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
Commitmenttononproliferationandeventualdisarmamentarethemaingoalsof
theseIAEAtalks,butpeacefulnucleartechnology'splaceintheworldmustalsobediscussed.
Thiscommitteeshouldaddresstherisksofallowingpeacefulnuclearprogramsintheworld,
andhowitmaymitigatethoserisks.

QuestionstoConsider
1. Docountrieshavetherighttopursueresearchintothepeacefulusesofnuclear
technology?
2. Donuclearweaponsstateshavearighttosharetheirtechnologywithnonnuclear
weaponsstates?Underwhatconditions,ifany?
3. Whatcanbedonetoensurethatnonnuclearweaponsstatesarenotatapermanent
technologicaldisadvantagetonuclearweaponsstates?

Enforcement
CurrentStatusoftheIssue
Theenforcementofanyagreementreachedinthiscommitteewillbeahugetaskthat,if
successful,willbeanunprecedentedachievementinthehistoryofinternationalpolitics.
Beforeanystateswillagreetocommittoeithernonproliferationordisarmament,theywill
requireproceduresinplacetoenforcetheseagreementsamongallpartiestothetreaty.The
countriesmustalsoconsiderhowthedyingremnantsofColdWarpoliticsdemandthatsuch
situationsmustbehandleddelicately,asanymisunderstandingscanhavegravepolitical
consequences.Specificareasofenforcementpoliciestoconsiderarethatthereissufficient
andcompetentpersonnelwithregulationsincludedfortheirsafety,thatabnormalconditions

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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
areregularlyreported,andthatpublicandenvironmentalconcernsaretakenintoaccount.
Monitoringpoliciesandtrustbetweencountriesregardingthosepoliciesarealsokeyissuesto
beconsideredwhendiscussingenforcement.

AnalysisoftheIssue
Howtoenforceanyagreementsondisarmamentornonproliferationisnotjusta
problemoflogisticsbutalsooneofmaintaininginternationalsecuritywhilerespecting
nationalsovereignty.Manyoftheproposedmethodsofenforcingandverifyingcompliance
withatreaty,suchasindependentinspectionsofnuclearfacilitiesorseismicmonitoringto
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tracknucleartests, requirethewillingnessofallstatesenteringintoatreatytoallowsome
measureofindependentaccesstoinformationregardingtheirnuclearprograms.
Enforcementisatthecenterofallthreeoftheaboveissuesfordiscussion.Withouta
viablesystemtoenforcethetermsofanagreement,anyagreementismeaningless.
Additionally,thecommitteemustattempttostructuresuchenforcementguidelineswhile
takingintoaccountthecurrentbipolarstateoftheworld.

QuestionstoConsider
1. Whoseresponsibilitywillitbetoenforcethetermsofanagreement?
2. Howshouldtheenforcerbeselected?
3. Shouldtheenforcerhavetheauthoritytoperforminspectionswheneverorwherever
theyseefit?
4. Howcanfairandequalenforcementbeensured?

10

JonathanBerger.SeismicMonitoringofaMultilateralNuclearTestBanTreatyinNuclearNonproliferation
andtheNonProliferationTreaty,ed.M.P.Fryet.al.(Berlin:SpringerVerlag,1990),118.

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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
5. Whatincentivesshouldexisttobringcountriesintocompliancewiththeenforcer's
requests?
6. Shouldnoncompliancebepunished?How?
7. Shouldstatesbefreetoleavethetreaty?How?Underwhatconditions?

CurrentInterests
Duetothearmadaofnationsassembled,andtheimportanceofeveryissuethatwillbe
consideredwhiledraftingsuchimportantdocuments,itishardtoeasilydividethenations
intotwodistinctgroupsthatwillprobablyhaveastaticopinionforeverytopic.Instead,itis
advisedtolookatthefollowingsectiontoattempttoplaceyournationinamorebroad
categorybasedonthehistoryandbackgroundofyournation.

NATO/NATOleaning
TheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationwasfoundedasamilitaryalliancein1949,and
ininternationalpoliticsNATOmemberstatesfrequentlyfollowtheleadershipoftheUnited
States,althoughtheUnitedStatesdoesnotleadthealliance,andcountriesinNATOcanand
doactindependently.Ingeneral,NATOcountriesarelikelytoseenonproliferationasthe
mostimportantgoalofnucleartreatynegotiations.TheUnitedStatesrefusestosharenuclear
weaponstechnologywithanymemberofNATOexcepttheUnitedKingdom,withwhomthe
UnitedStatesenjoysveryclosediplomaticrelations.Thiscloserelationshipcausedearly
fissuresinNATOwhenFrance,underdeGaulle'sleadership,beganwithdrawingitsforces
fromNATO,restrictingtheprivilegesofNATOforceswithinitsterritory,anddevelopingits

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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
ownnuclearweapons.NATOisbyfarthemosteconomicallypowerfulbloc,butin1968there
wereonlyfifteenofficialmembers.

WarsawPact/WarsawPactleaning
TheWarsawPact(officiallyTreatyofFriendship,Cooperation,andMutual
Assistance)wasformedin1955andisoftenseenastheSovietUnion'sresponsetoNATO.
UndertheSovietUnion'sleadership,theWarsawPactismuchmorecohesivethanNATO,
althoughtheSovietUnion'scontrolovercountriesintheWarsawPactvariesHungarywas
invadedin1956afteritannounceditsintentiontowithdrawfromtheWarsawPact,but
Albaniahasnotablydissentedinseveralrecentinstancesanddistanceditselfslowlyfromthe
Sovietsphereoverthepastseveralyears.TheSovietUnionhashistoricallynotbeenopposed
tocooperatingonnuclearprojectswithitsallies,evenaidingthemindevelopingtheirown
nuclearweaponsortransferringnuclearweaponstoothernations,mostnotablyCuba.The
SovietUnionhasviewedmanypreviouslyproposedplansfordisarmamentwithsuspicion,
andSovietalignedcountriesaremorelikelytoprefermaintainingtheirmilitarysecurityto
cooperatingwithinternationaleffortsfordisarmamentandnonproliferation.

NonAlignedMovement
Intermsofnumberofstates,thisisbyfarthelargestcategory,butalsotheleast
unifiedintheirhistoriesandideologies.Mostnonalignedstatesstronglyfavorglobal
disarmament,whileothersaresuspectedofpursuingtheirownnuclearweaponsprograms.
TheNonAlignedMovementiscommittedingeneraltoworldpeaceandmutualsecurity,

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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
thoughsomenonalignedcountriesadvocatefortheirownnationalinterestsasoftenasfor
thegreatergood.

InFavorofNuclearWeapons
Afewstatesareopenlyinfavorofdevelopingnuclearweapons,andevenmorestates
havepoliticaloracademicfigureswhoadvocateproliferation.Oftentheyareadvocatesonlyof
theirownnation'snuclearweaponsprogramforthesakeofpreservingnationalsecurityor
increasingglobalinfluence,butsomehaveadvocatedforproliferationamongmorecountries
acrosstheworldasameanstoincreaseglobalsecurity.Thisviewpointisofteninsupportof
mutuallyassureddestruction:theideathataslongastwosidesofaconflictpossessnuclear
weapons,neithersidewillbethefirsttousethem,becausetherewouldbenowinner.

InFavorofNuclearEnergy,AgainstNuclearWeapons
Manystatessupportthedevelopmentofpeacefulnuclearenergyprogramswhile
remainingstronglyopposedtonuclearproliferation.Nuclearpoweriswidelyseenasthe
futureofenergywhenproperlyexecuted,itisastableandcleansourceofenergyandan
alternativetofossilfuels.Inalmosteverycountrywithadevelopednuclearpowerindustry,
however,therearegroupswhoopposeitsuse,forenvironmental,safety,oreconomicreasons.
Moststateswithdevelopednuclearpowerindustriesarethresholdstateswhoareconsidered
capableofquicklyproducingnuclearweapons,butchoosenotto.

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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
OpposedtoNuclearEnergyandWeapons
Somestatesareopposedtonuclearenergyinallforms,whetherweaponizedor
peaceful.Statesopposedtonuclearenergyinitsentiretyoftencitethepotentialforserious
accidents,theproblemsofstoringnuclearwasteanditsimpactontheenvironment,thehigh
startupcostofanuclearpowerplant,andthepotentialfornuclearpowerplantsastargetsfor
attacksasreasonstorejectnuclearenergy.

GuidelinesforResearch
TheIAEAmaintainsawebsite(iaea.org)whichincludesachronologyofthe
NonProliferationTreatyifyouneedthemostbasicstartingpoint,thisisit.Keepinmindthe
startingdateofthiscommittee(July1968),however,asalotofthischronologyextends
beyondthat.TheIAEAwebsitehasseveralotherusefulresourcesthatwouldworkwellfor
yourinitialresearch.TheArmsControlAssociation(armscontrol.org)hasseveralgood
articlesaboutthehistoryoftheNonProliferationTreaty'sdevelopment,aswellasapagewith
resourcesaboutthehistoryofmanydifferentcountries'nuclearprogramsandpolicies.
Whenresearching,keepinmindtheinternalpoliticsofyourcountryinthistime
period.Forthis,anencyclopediaisagoodplacetostartfromthereyoucandelvedeeperinto
slightlymorenuancedtopics,suchasdebatesinyourcountry'slegislativebody(ifapplicable)
andyourpublic'sattitudetowardsnuclearweaponsandnuclearenergy.Ifyou'rehaving
troublefindingsources,I'mreachablebyemailandcanalmostdefinitelypointyouinthe
rightdirectionifyouneedit.
Finally,Iwon'tdiscourageyoufromreadingthetextoftheactualNuclear
NonProliferationTreaty,butkeepinmindthatatthestartingpointofthiscommittee,that

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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
texthasnotyetbeenwritten.Iverymuchencourageyoutobecreativeincomingupwithyour
ownsolutionstotheissuesdescribedinthisbackgroundguideandnottolettherealworld
NonProliferationTreatyguideyourpositionpapersanddiscussions.

Bibliography

ABriefHistoryofNuclearWeaponsStates.(n.d.).RetrievedAugust22,2016,from
http://asiasociety.org/education/briefhistorynuclearweaponsstates

Corden,PierceS.,andDavidHafemeister."NuclearTestingandProliferation:ATaleofTwo
Treaties."PhysicsToday,April2014,19.
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1445&context=phy_fac.

Eisenhower,DwightD.AtomsforPeace.UNGeneralAssembly.NewYork,NY.8December
1953.

Fry,MP,NPKeatinge,andJ.Rotblat,eds.NuclearNonProliferationandthe
NonProliferationTreaty.Berlin,DE:SpringerVerlag,1990.

Godsberg,Alicia.NuclearNonProliferationTreatyBackground.TheNuclearInformation
Project.Fas.org.Web.nd.29May2016.

Richardson,JL."AustraliaandtheNonproliferationTreaty."CanberraPapersonStrategy
andDefence3(1968):123.

Sitt,B.(n.d.).Theconceptofthenuclearthresholdanditspoliticalandstrategicimplications.
RetrievedAugust22,2016,from
http://www.cesim.fr/observatoire/eng/82/chronique/

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,FirstSession,Resolution1:Establishmentofa
CommissiontoDealWiththeProblemsRaisedbytheDiscoveryofAtomicEnergy.24
January1946.
<https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/NR
003252.pdf?OpenElement>

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,SixteenthSession,Resolution1665:Preventionofthe
WiderDisseminationofNuclearWeapons.4December1961.
<https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/18/IMG/NR
16718.pdf?OpenElement>

UnitedStates.ArmsControlandDisarmamentAgency.ExplanatoryRemarksabouttheDraft
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InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)1970
oftheNonProliferationTreaty.Vol.47.WashingtonDC:USArmsControland
DisarmamentAgency,1968.129.

TheUnitedStatespresentstheBaruchPlan.History.com.A&ENetworks.2009.Web.4
June2016.

Willrich,Mason.NonProliferationTreaty:FrameworkforNuclearArmsControl.
Charlottesville,VA:MichieCompany,1969.

Young,Elizabeth."TheControlofProliferation:The1968TreatyinHindsightandForecast."
AdelphiPapers,no.56(April1969):122.

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