You are on page 1of 44

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Decided On: 24.04.1973


Appellants: His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru
Vs.
Respondent: State of Kerala
Hon'ble

Judges:

S. M. Sikri, C.J., A. N. Grover, A. N. Ray, D. G. Palekar, H. R. Khanna, J. M. Shelat, K. K.


Mathew, K. S. Hegde, M. Hameedullah Beg, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, S. N. Dwivedi, A. K.
Mukherjea and Y. V. Chandrachud, JJ.
Case Note: Constitution - basic structure of Constitution - Sections 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 (1), 18,
29 and 291 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Constitution of India, Section 29 (1) of
Indian Evidence Act and Indian Contract Act - batch of six writ petitions challenging
validity of Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Amendments of Constitution majority upheld validity of twenty-fourth Amendment which inserted Clauses (3) and (4)
in Article 13 - all Judges opined that by virtue of Article 368 as amended by twenty-fourth
Amendment Parliament had power to amend any or all provisions of Constitution including
those relating to fundamental rights although the same was not unlimited - majority were
of view that power of amendment under Article 368 was subject to certain implied and
inherent limitations - in exercise of amending power Parliament cannot amend basic
structure or framework of Constitution - right to property did not form part of basic
structure - individual freedom secured to citizens was basic feature of Constitution - grant
of power is always qualified by implications of context and considerations arising out of
general scheme of statute - inherent limitations under unamended Article 368 would still
hold true even after amendment of Article 368 - Sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) and first part of
Section 3 of twenty-fifth Amendment held valid - majority invalidated second part of
Article 31-C introduced by twenty-fifth Amendment which excluded jurisdiction of Courts
to inquire whether law protected under that Article gave effect to policy of securing
directive principles mentioned therein - validity of twenty-ninth Amendment which
inserted Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 and Kerala Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1971 was upheld.

Olga Tellis and Ors.


Vs.
Respondent: Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors.
AND
Appellants: Vayyapuri Kuppusami and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble
Judges:
Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., A. V. Varadarajan, O. Chinnappa Reddy, S. Murtaza Fazal
Ali and V. D. Tulzapurkar, JJ.

Constitution fundamental right Articles 14, 19, 21, 32, 37, 39 and 41 of Constitution
of India and Sections 312, 313 and 314 of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888
petition seeking direction against Government Order regarding demolition of dwelling
units of petitioners petitioners contended that provisions of Act of 1888 specially Section
314 ultr vires Constitution of India Section 314 empowered Municipal Commissioner to
cause to be removed encroachments on footpaths or pavements over which public have
right of passage of access without notice to affected persons Court observed that
Section 314 cannot be read to mean that Commissioner must cause removal of
encroachment without issuing previous notice Section 314 or other provisions of Act of
1888 held not to be unreasonable or violative of Article 21 as no person has right to
encroach on footpaths pavements or other place reserved for public purpose by erecting
structure on it State Government assured Court that alternative would be provided to
slum dwellers who were caused to be evicted Ordered accordingly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Writ Petition No. 231 of 1977
Decided On: 25.01.1978
Appellants: Mrs. Maneka Gandhi
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Anr.
Hon'ble

Judges:

M. Hameedullah Beg, C.J., N. L. Untwalia, P. N. Bhagwati, P. S. Kailasam, S. Murtaza Fazal


Ali, V. R. Krishna Iyer and Y. V. Chandrachud, JJ.
i) Constitution - validity of provision - Articles 14, 19 and 21 of Constitution of India and
Section 10 (3) (c) of Passports Act, 1967 - validity of Section 10 (3) (c) challenged procedure in Article 21 means procedure which conforms to principles of natural justice power conferred under Section 10 (3) (c) not unguided and it is implied in it that rules of
natural justice would be applicable - held, Section 10 (3) (c) not violative of Article 21.
(ii) Right of dignity - right to live is not merely confined to physical existence - it includes
within its ambit right to live with human dignity.
(iii) Inter-relationship - principle of reasonableness provided under Article 14 must apply
to procedure as contemplated under Article 21 - Article 21 controlled by Article 19 also in case a law does not infringe Article 21 even then it has to meet challenges of Articles
14 and 19.
(iv) Post-decisional hearing - petitioner's passport impounded and not given predecisional notice and hearing - Government contended that rule audi alteram partem
must be excluded because it may have frustrated very purpose of impounding passport concept of post-decisional hearing developed to maintain balance between administrative
efficiency and fairness to individual - Court stressed that fair opportunity of being heard
following immediately Order impounding passport would satisfy mandate of natural
justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Writ Petition (C) No. 290 of 1997 with Interlocutory Application No. 2 in Writ Petition (C)
No. 679 of 1995 with writ petion (C) No. 300 of 1997 with Civil Appeal No. 4368 of 1999
(arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 12231 of 1997) with Review Petion (C) Nos. 2
Decided On: 10.08.1999
Appellants: Dr Preeti Srivastava and Anr.
Vs.
Respondent: State of M.P. and Ors.
Hon'ble

Judges:

Dr. A. S. Anand , C.J., S. B. Majmudar, Sujata V. Manohar, K. Venkataswami and V. N.


Khare , JJ.
Constitution - relaxation - Articles 15 and 16 of Constitution of India, Sections 2, 12 and
32 of The Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh Act,
1966 and Regulation 27 of the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research,
Chandigarh Regulations, 1967 - Regulation 27 framed under Section 32 provides for 20%
of seats in every course of study in institute to be reserved for candidates belonging to
scheduled castes, scheduled tribes or other categories of persons in accordance with
general Orders issued by Central Government from time to time - Regulation 27 cannot
have application at highest level of superspecialities as such application would defeat very
object of imparting best possible training to select meritorious candidates - contention
that reservations made for candidates not consistent with constitutional mandate under
Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) liable to be upheld.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Civil Appeals Nos. 2684-90; 4043 of 1982,
Decided On: 16.11.1992
Appellants:Indra Sawhney etc. etc
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India and others, etc. etc.
Hon'ble

Judges:

Harilal Jekisundas Kania, C.J., M. N. Venkatachaliah, S. Ratnavel Pandian, Dr. T. K.


Thommen, A. M. Ahmadii, Kuldip Singh Singh, P. B. Sawant, R. M. Sahai and B.P. Jeevan
Reddy Reddy, JJ.
Constitution - reservation - Articles 16 (1) and 16 (4) of Constitution of India and Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Act, 1976 - matter pertaining to
reservation for backward classes in public services - for reservation class must be backward
and not adequately represented in services under State - identification of backward classes
subject to judicial review - reservations contemplated in matter of employment in Article 16
(4) not to exceed 50% - rule of 50% to be applied each year - said rule cannot be related to
total strength of class, service or cadre - reservation of posts under Article 16 (4) confined
to initial appointment only and cannot extend to providing reservation in matter of
promotion - vacancies reserved to be carried forward for maximum period of three years creamy layer amongst backward class of citizens to be excluded by fixation of proper
income or status.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Writ Petition Nos. 173 to 175 of 1967
Decided On: 29.04.1969
Appellants: A.K. Kraipak and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
Hon'ble

Judges:

M. Hidayatullah, C.J., J. M. Shelat, K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover and Vishishtha Bhargava, JJ.


Case Note: Service - Selection - Section 3(1) of All India Services Act, 1951 Government of India made selection among officers serving in forest department to the
Indian Forest Service - Hence, this Petition - Whether, impugned selection could be
quashed - Held, selection of officers in junior scale service, selections to both senior scale
service as well as junior scale service were made from same pool - Every officer who had
put in service of 8 years or more, even if he was holding post of Assistant Conservator of
Forests was eligible for being selected for senior scale service - Consequently, some of
officers who had put in more than eight years of service had been selected for junior scale
service - Hence, it was not possible to separate two sets of officers - Thus, selections set
aside - Petitions allowed
Ratio Decidendi: "Power exercised by selection board is administrative power and test
validity of selections."

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


C.A. No. 1884 of 1993 with C.A. No. 7433 of 1995
Decided On: 19.08.1998
Appellants: Punjab National Bank and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Sh. Kunj Behari Misra
Hon'ble Judges:S. C. Agrawal, S.P. Bharucha and B.N. Kirpal, JJ.
Service - retirement benefit - Section 21 (8) of Punjab National Bank Officer Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 - appeal against Order of High Court setting aside
imposing penalty and directed appellant to release retirement benefit to respondents
-disciplinary authority to give an opportunity to officer charged of misconduct to file
representation before disciplinary authority before taking final decision - principles of natural
justice violated - more than 14 years elapsed since delinquent officer had superannuated no valid ground to interfere with Order passed by High Court - appeal dismissed.
19. In Karunakar's case (supra) the question arose whether after the 42nd amendment of
the Constitution, when the inquiry officer was other than a disciplinary authority, was the
delinquent employee entitled to a copy of the inquiry report of the inquiry officer before
the disciplinary authority takes decision on the question of guilt of the delinquent. It was
sought to be contended in that case that as the right to show cause against the penalty
proposed to be levied had been taken away by the 42nd amendment, therefore, there
was no necessity to give to the delinquent a copy of the inquiry report before the
disciplinary authority took the final decision as to whether to impose a penalty or not.
Explaining the effect of 42nd amendment the Constitution Bench at page 755 observed
that "All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to
advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the
enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to
consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its
conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges." The Court explained that
the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, inquiry
officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when
the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. It is
the second right which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment but the right of the

charged officer to receive the report of the inquiry officer was an essential part of the first
stage itself. This was expressed by the Court in the following words:
"The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an
essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural
justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before
the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to
come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings
including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary
authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded
without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported
by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary
authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair
opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the
tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings
recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity
to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its
own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that
the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry
officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry
officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to
influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward
the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute an additional material
before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge.
However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above,
which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in
ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are
taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both
the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice,
therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the
delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings.
The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the
enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it."

21. Under Regulation - 6 the inquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an inquiry
officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry
officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand
concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary
authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry
officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry, an opportunity of hearing has
to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry
officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an
opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that
where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of
representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry

officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In
our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent
before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and
punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as
explained in Karunakar's case (supra).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal Nos. 194-202 of 1986
Decided On: 02.05.1990
Appellants:The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers' Association and
others
Vs.
Respondent:State of Maharashtra and others
Hon'ble Judges:
Sabyasachi Mukherjee, C.J, L. M. Sharma, S. Ratnavel Pandian, P. B. Sawant and K.
Ramaswamy, JJ.
Service Seniority - Article 32 of Constitution of India, 1950 Whether seniority in service
between direct recruits and promotees be on same platform Held, State was under a duty to
prepare fresh seniority lists for particular period and this was done after framing Rules No
merit in challenge to Rules and thus writ petitions fit to be rejected Petition raised by an
application under Article 32 of Constitution must be held to be barred by principles of res
judicata including rule of constructive res judicata In view of findings Court did not find any
merit in any of civil appeals, writ petitions and special leave petitions which accordingly
dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Civil Appeal Nos. 3595-3612 of 1999, 1861-2063 and 3849/2001, 3520-3524/2002 and
1968 of 2006 (Arising out of SLP (C) 9103-9105 of 2001)
Decided On: 10.04.2006
Appellants: Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Umadevi and Ors.
Affirmative Action
Hon'ble
Y.

K.

Judges:
Sabharwal,

C.J., Arun

Kumar, G.

P.

Mathur, C.

K.

Thakker and P.

K.

Balasubramanyan, JJ.
Constitution of India - Articles 14, 16 and 142--Employment--Regularisation-Confirmation--Daily wagers, temporary employees and contractual employees -- Legal
position under constitution scheme settled--No legitimate expectation--Decisions of
Supreme Court holding to contrary held not laying down any precedent -- General
directions issued--Directions under Article 142 also issued in respect of daily wagers of
Commercial Tax Department of State of Karnataka.
Regular recruitment should be insisted upon, only in a contingency an ad hoc appointment
can be made in a permanent vacancy, but the same should soon be followed by a regular
recruitment and appointments to non-available posts should not be taken note of for
regularization. The cases directing regularization have mainly proceeded on the basis that
having permitted the employee to work for some period, he should be absorbed, without
really laying down any law to that effect, after discussing the constitutional scheme for
public employment.
Regularisation is not and cannot be the mode of recruitment by any State and it cannot
give permanence to an employee whose services are ad hoc in nature.
A. Umarani v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, (2004) 7 SCC 112 (Three-Judge Bench),
approved.

Adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is a must in the process of public


employment. The adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic
feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a
Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14
or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14
read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public
employment, the Supreme Court, while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that
unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition
among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a
contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it
were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would
come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim
to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified
that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a
time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in
regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the
original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged
by the relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the
instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of
ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right.
High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily
issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the
recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the Constitutional scheme. Merely
because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, he would not be
entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such
cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if
ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it
to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him,
whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular
procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is
really not required. The Courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere
unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities
or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the by-passing of the constitutional and
statutory mandates.
While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made
permanent, Courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for
some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person
who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the
nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true
that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arms length--since he might have been
searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he
gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the Constitutional
scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or
casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will
be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court

were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were
not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief
to that employee. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the
post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the
employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the
procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested
on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
The invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to
claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service
though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in
certain cases the Court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those
cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The
argument if accepted, would also run counter to the Constitutional mandate. When a
person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual
worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the
relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being
temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of
legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post
could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases,
in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate
expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual
employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging
these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The
State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory
cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. Those
who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that
they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of
the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim
that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and
made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for
claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have
been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they
have a right to be absorbed in service. They cannot be said to be holders of a post, since,
a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the
requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally
with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for
equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating
unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service
even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules.
A mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that
the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal
right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a
mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to

make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable
legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them
permanent.
There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) of duly
qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the
employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of
orders of Courts or of Tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such
employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by
this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context,
the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to
regularize as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have
worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of
Courts or of Tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken
to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary
employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion
within six months from this date.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Writ Petition Nos. 1118, 1119, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1230, 1244-45, 1262, 1263, 1268,
1304, 1331, 1373-74, 1389, 1420-23, 1431, 1437-39, 1440, 1441-43, 1461, 1494-97,
1566-67, 1574-75 and 1586 of 1979
Decided On: 13.11.1980
Appellants: Ajay Hasia and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors.
Hon'ble

Judges:

Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., P. N. Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, V. R. Krishna Iyer and A. D.


Koshal, JJ.
Constitution - Admission - Petitioner challenged validity of admissions made to Regional
Engineering College for academic year 1979-80 - Hence, this Appeal - Held, marks
secured by them at qualifying examination were much less than marks obtained by
Petitioners - However, successful candidates succeeded in obtaining admission to college
by virtue of very high marks obtained at viva voce examination - It was clear from chart
submitted on behalf of Petitioners that marks awarded at interview was in inverse
proportion to marks obtained by other candidates and also not commensurate with marks
obtained in written test - Such chart also not create a strong suspicion that Committee
deliberately manipulated marks at viva voce examination with a view to favouring other
candidates as against Petitioners - therefore, selection for academic year 1979-80 could
not be interefered - Petitions dismissed.
Ratio

Decidendi:

"Person shall entitle for admission as per qualification in each and every test held by
authority in institute."

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Writ Petition Nos. 356-361 of 1977
Decided On: 09.05.1980
Decided On: 31.07.1980
Appellants: Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
Hon'ble
Judges:
Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., A. C. Gupta, N. L. Untwalia, P. N. Bhagwati and P. S. Kailasam, JJ.

(i) Constitution - amendment - Articles 13, 14, 19, 31-A, 31-B, 31-C, 32, 38, 132, 133,
134, 141, 226, 352 and 368 of Constitution of India - vires of Articles 368 (4) and 368 (5)
introduced by Section 55 of Constitution of India (43rd Amendment) Act under challenge Article 368 (5) conferred upon Parliament unlimited power to amend Constitution - Article
368 (4) deprived Courts of its power of judicial review over constitutional amendments Article 368 (5) struck down as Parliament had only limited amending power - such limited
power cannot be enlarged into absolute power - by expanding its amending powers
Parliament cannot destroy its basic structure - donee of limited power cannot convert
such power into unlimited one - Article 368 (4) prohibiting judicial review violates basic
structure - held, Articles 368 (4) and 368 (5) unconstitutional.
(ii) Directive principles of State policy - whether directive principles can have supremacy
over fundamental rights - merely because directive principles are non-justiciable it does
not mean that they are subservient to fundamental rights - destroying fundamental rights
in order to achieve goals of directive principles amounts to violation of basic structure giving absolute primacy to one over another disturbs harmony - goals of directive
principles should be achieved without abrogating fundamental rights - directive principles
enjoy high place in constitutional scheme - both fundamental rights and directive
principles to be read in harmony - held, amendments in Article 31C introduced by Section
4 of 42nd Amendment Act unconstitutional.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 16.11.1961
Appellants: Manohar Lal Chopra
Vs.
Respondent: Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal
Hon'ble
J. C. Shah, K. C. Das Gupta, K. N. Wanchoo and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.

Judges:

Case
Notes:
The case dealt with the validity of the order of temporary injunction restraining the party
from proceeding with suit in the another State Further, the inherent powers of the Court
to grant such injunction were discussed It was held that the order of injunction was
wrongly was wrongly granted and should be vacated The Civil Courts had inherent
power to issue temporary injunction in cases which were not covered by the provisions of
Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Further, a plaintiff of a suit in another
jurisdiction could only be restrained from proceedings with his suit if the suit was
vexatious
and
useless.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 23.05.1958
Appellants: Razia Begum
Vs.
Respondent: Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Ors.
Hon'ble
B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur and Syed Jaffer Imam, JJ.

Judges:

The appellant instituted a suit against the third respondent, for a declaration that she was
his legally wedded wife Though, the respondent filed a written statement admitting the
claim, but at the same time, respondent 1 and 2 filed as suit for being added as a party to
the suit as defendants as they were wife and daughter of the third respondent It was
questioned whether the respondent 1 and 2 as parties to the case was legal It was held that
according to the averments in the plaint only the third respondent but the other members of
his family including respondents 1 and 2, were interested in denying the appellants status
as a legally wedded wife, hence respondents 1 and 2 were proper parties to the suit

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Civil Appeal No. 3112 of 1995
Decided On: 16.10.1995
Appellants:Deva Ram and Another
Vs.
Respondent: Ishwar Chand and Another
Hon'ble
Kuldip Singh Singh and S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.

Property
plaintiffs
previous
action in

Judges:

claim Section 11 and Order 11 of CPC, 1908 appellants were tenants under
and were already in possession of land whether cause of action on basis of which
suit filed is identical to cause of action on which subsequent suit filed cause of
subsequent suit was entirely different Order of High Court modified.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 10.08.1962
Appellants: R. Ramachandran Ayyar
Vs.
Respondent: Ramalingam Chettiar
Hon'ble

Judges:

J. R. Madholkar, K. C. Das Gupta and P. B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.


The case questioned whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the findings of
fact recorded by the first Appellate Court and also, questioned whether it had jurisdiction to
entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous findings In view of the partnership
between the appellants and the father of the respondents 1 and 2, the second respondent
had executed a release deed in favour of the appellants On account of this, the appellants
had agreed to pay a certain amount to respondents 1 and 2 as a share of their father As a
result, the second respondent had filed a suit for setting aside the release deed and
accounts On the basis of facts and findings, the Trial Court decreed the suit, although, on
appeal the first Appellant Court had dismissed the suit When the second appeal was made,
the High Court interfered with the findings of the first Appellate Court and restored the
decree of the Trial Court It was held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with
the findings of fact and also, it had no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 22.01.1957
Appellants: L.J. Leach and Company Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: Jardine Skinner and Co.
Hon'ble
B. P. Sinha, Bhagwati, S. K. Das and T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar, JJ.

Judges:

The case questioned whether the amendment made in the complaint filed by the
appellants could be allowed The appellants filed a suit for damages against the
respondents, who were the agents of the appellants, on the grounds that the respondents
had refused to deliver those goods as ordered by the appellants - It was found that a
fresh suit on the amended claim was barred by the limitation on the date when the
application had been filed It was held that the said amendment should be allowed
Also, the restriction to the fresh suit should be taken into consideration while taking the
decision regarding the amended plaint It should also not affect the power of the Court
to
pass
such
order
if
required
in
the
interest
of
the
justice

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 07.02.1957
Appellants: Pirgonda Hongonda Patil
Vs.
Respondent: Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Ors.
Hon'ble
P. B. Gajendragadkar, S. K. Das and T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar, JJ.

Judges:

The case questioned whether the application filed by the plaintiff regarding amendment to
be made in the complaint without altering the nature of reliefs filed by the plaintiff could
be allowed under Order 6, Rule 17, Order 21, Rules 97, 99 and 103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure The amendment was made by adding further and better particulars of the
claim A fresh suit on the amended plaint was barred by the limitation on the date when
the said application was made The trial judge rejected the application and dismissed the
suit but , the High Court had allowed the application It was held that the application for
amendment was rightly allowed by the High Court - Although, the said application was
made after the expiry of the limitation period, therefore, the appellant should not file a
new
case

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Civil Appeal No. 5412 of 1990
Decided On: 21.11.1990
Appellants:State of Haryana and others
Vs.
Respondent: Ch. Bhajan Lal and others

Hon'ble

Judges:

S. Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy, JJ.


Criminal - investigation - Sections 161 and 165 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 5
(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - investigation ordered against respondent for
offences under Sections 161 and 165 and under Act of 1947 by appellant - High Court
cancelled FIR terming it affected by political considerations granting costs in respondent's
favour - appeal - propositions laid by High Court unwarranted - incoming Government
cannot put its seal of approval to all commissions and omissions of outgoing Government
- Supreme Court quashed entire investigation as investigation was not entrusted to
proper legal authority - cancellation of FIR and granting of costs in respondent's favour
unjustified and bad in law - Court set aside judgment of High Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Crl.A. No. 1045 of 1998 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1177 of 1996)
Decided On: 08.10.1998
Appellants: Raj Deo Sharma
Vs.
Respondent: The State of Bihar
Hon'ble

Judges:

M. M. Punchhi CJI., K.T. Thomas and M. Srinivasan, JJ.


Criminal - speedy trial - Section 309 of CrPC, 1973 - criminal case was registered against
appellant for unexplained assets - appellant filed writ to quash proceedings as prosecution
could not take place even after 13 years of institution of FIR - High Court dismissed writ Supreme Court found decision of High Court against spirit of law - every accused has right
to speedy trial - inexplicable delay in starting prosecution after institution of FIR sufficient
enough to quash entire prosecution against appellant - impugned Order of High Court set
aside.
HELD See paras 2, 11, 16 and 17.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1977
Decided On: 02.08.1977

Appellant: State of Bihar


Vs.
Respondent: Ramesh Singh
Hon'ble Judges: N. L. Untwalia and P. N. Shingal, JJ.
Criminal - murder or suicide - Sections 202, 203, 209, 226, 227 and 228 of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 and Sections 201 and 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - appeal
against discharge of respondent under Section 209 - prosecution to prove that respondent
murdered his wife or wife committed suicide by herself setting fire to it - appropriate
charges be framed against respondent and trial to proceed further in accordance with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Crl. A. No. 184 of 2000 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3780 of 1999)
Decided On: 17.02.2000
Appellants:Michael Machado & Anr.
Vs.
Respondent:Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.
Hon'ble

Judges:

K. T. Thomas and A. P. Misra, JJ.


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319Indian Penal Code, 1860Section 120B,
420, 467, 468 and 471Criminal trialPower of Court to proceed against other persons
appearing to be guiltyScope of Section 319, Cr. P.C.Power discretionary to be exercised
only to achieve criminal justiceNo compelling duty on Court to proceed against other
personsFour persons charge-sheeted for criminal conspiracy, cheating and forgeryTwo
appellants not charge-sheeted by C.B.I. due to inadequacy of evidence but departmental
proceedings against them recommendedWhen 3 witnesses examined after examination of
49 witnessesMagistrate feeling the need to start afresh only because said 3 witnesses

disclosed something against appellantsThough statement of three witnesses creating


some suspicion against appellantsStill suspicion not sufficient to hold that there is
reasonable prospect of convicting appellants of offence of criminal conspiracyNo situation
to waste whole massive evidence already collected by trial court so far against 4
accusedHence order of trial court under Section 319, Cr.P.C. not sustainableJudgment of
High
Court
and
order
of
Magistrate
set
aside.
The basic requirement for invoking section 319, Cr.P.C. is that it should appear to the
Court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person,
who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that
person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that
the Court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another
person in the offence. In other words, the Court must have reasonable satisfaction from
the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has
committed an offence. Second is that for such offence, that other person could as well be
tried
along
with
the
already
arraigned
accused.
But even then, what is conferred on the Court is only a discretion as could be discerned
from the words the Court may proceed against such person. The discretionary power so
conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the Court
should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that
another person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a
conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and
the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the Court
had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no
compelling
duty
on
the
Court
to
proceed
against
other
persons.
The Court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code,
must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of sub-section
(4), that proceedings in respect of newly added persons shall be commenced afresh and
the witnesses re-examined. The whole proceedings must be re-commenced from the
beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and crossexamine them in order to reach the stage when it had reached earlier. If the witnesses
already examined are quite a large in number, the Court must seriously consider whether
the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise is worth wasting the whole labour
already undertaken. Unless the Court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the
case as against the newly brought accused ending in conviction of the offence concerned,
we would say that the Court should refrain from adopting such a course of action.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 1977
Decided On: 31.10.1977
Appellants: Madhu Limaye
Vs.
Respondent: The State of Maharashtra
Hon'ble

Judges:

D. A. Desai, N. L. Untwalia and P. K. Goswami, JJ.


Criminal - revision powers - Sections 199 (2), 199 (4), 203, 204 (4), 397, 397 (1), 397
(2), 398, 435, 476 and 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 500 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and Section 115 Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC, 1908 - appeal by special leave
against rejection of revision filed under Section 397 (1) of Code of 1973- High Court
rejected revision saying it was not maintainable under Section 397 (2) of Code of 1973 High Court did not consider petition on merit - instant case squarely covered by Section
482 where High Court competent to exercise its inherent powers - High Court competent
to proceed under Section 398 and may invoke its inherent jurisdiction - Supreme Court
remitted case back to High Court to dispose petition on merit in accordance with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 04.11.1958

Appellants: Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya


Vs.
Respondent: The State of Bombay
Hon'ble

Judges:

K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo and N. H. Bhagwati, JJ.


Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s.157
Evidence Preparation of Notes of Attendance by Solicitor Admissibility for corroborating
solicitor Statement if necessary for admissibility for communication to another

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 26.04.1956
Appellants: Nagubai Ammal and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: B. Shama Rao and Ors.
Hon'ble

Judges:

Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., Syed Jaffer Imam and T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar, JJ.
Transfer of Property Act , s.52 Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 142 In the
execution proceeding, nonjoinder of Receiver in insolvency - Effect Transferee pedente lite
,if entitled to attack execution sale on that ground.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 27.04.1959
Appellants: Dolgobinda Paricha
Vs.
Respondent: Nimai Charan Misra and Ors.
Hon'ble

Judges:

A. K. Sarkar, K. Subba Rao and S. K. Das, JJ.


Family relationship Sections 5, 32, 32 (5), 50 and 60 of Indian Evidence Act - respondent
filed suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of property mother sold some
portion to reversioners and others Subordinate Judge held alienation without legal
necessity appeal before High Court High Court affirmed finding of Subordinate Judge as
relationship of plaintiff-respondent existed appeal before Supreme Court evidence devoid
of

merits

appeals

dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 12.10.1966
Appellants: Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India (UOI).
Hon'ble
G. K. Mitter and K. N. Wanchoo, JJ.

Judges:

The case debated on whether the copy of award duly certified to be true copy by the
umpire and then signing the award could be considered as a true copy as required under
Section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act (10 of 1940) It was held that the document
was an accurate and full reproduction of the original and was a copy of the same Thus the
document was a copy of the original and was a signed copy, as it was bearing the
signature of the umpire.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1978
Decided On: 27.10.1978
Appellants: Tehal Singh and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: State of Punjab
Hon'ble

Judges:

Jaswant Singh and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.


Criminal - murder - Sections 34, 120-B and 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and
Section 32 of Evidence Act, 1872 - three accused convicted under Sections 34
and 302 - High Court confirmed conviction and sentence - appeal against
conviction - Apex Court observed that in order to attract applicability of Sections
34 and 302 it is not necessary that every accused must have inflicted serious
injury.

N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 03.12.1952

Appellants: Zwinglee Ariel


Vs.
Respondent: State of Madhya Pradesh
Hon'ble

Judges:

Mehr Chand Mahajan, Sudhi Ranjan Das and Bhagwati, JJ.


Criminal Illegal gratification Section 161 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Appellant charged
for offence under Section 161 for accepting illegal gratification - Appellant acquitted by
Session Judge On appeal High Court set aside Order of acquittal and convicted appellant
for offence under Section 161 and sentenced him to nine months of imprisonment Hence,
present appeal Charges denied by appellant - Prosecution made a case of guilt founded on
the alleged confessional statements and not on the conduct of appellant in not putting
forward such a defence at the time the notes were found on his person Absence of
satisfactory evidence to prove case against appellant beyond reasonable doubt Held,
Additional Session Judge justified in extending appellant benefit of doubt to appellant
Appeal allowed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Civil Appeal Nos. 2317 of 1972 and 922 of 1973
Decided On: 26.08.1975
Appellants: The Premier Automobiles Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and Ors.
Hon'ble

Judges:

A .Alagiriswami, N. L. Untwalia and P. K. Goswami, JJ.


(i) Labour and Industrial - jurisdiction - Sections 9, 80 and Order 1 Rule 8 of CPC, 1908 incentive scheme introduced by appellant - scheme was further altered on regularisation
of 27 temporary workers - suit instituted in Civil Court by union on behalf of members and
non-members of union - Civil Court granted decree of injunction restraining appellant
from implementing terms of altered scheme - appeal challenging jurisdiction of Civil Court
for entertaining suit filed by union - source of rights of workers who were non-members of
union was different from workers who were members of union - representative suit on

their behalf not maintainable - union sought Order of injunction in Civil Court - suit for
permanent injunction not maintainable as Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant relief.

(ii) Termination of contract - company terminated contract under Section 19 (2) termination not accepted by union of workers - remedy available to workers was to raise
industrial dispute - suit instituted in Civil Court not maintainable.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Decided On: 16.10.1961
Appellants: Haji Sk. Subhan
Vs.
Respondent: Madhorao
Hon'ble

Judges:

J. C. Shah, K. C. Das Gupta, K. N. Wanchoo and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.


The case dealt with the decree for possession of the shares purchased by the respondent
in an auction sale, where in objections were raised to its executability The Madhya
Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands), Act, 1950, that
provided for vesting in the State of all proprietary rights came into force during pendency
of appeal of the said dispute in the High Court The case debated on the effect of
executability of decree of the High Court It was held that the principle that the Execution
Court could not question the decree and had to execute the decree had no operation on
the facts of the present case since the objection of the appellant was based not with
respect to the invalidity of the decree but on the effect of the provisions of the Madhya
Pradesh Abolition of Property Rights Act, 1950.