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<a href=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2014) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Studies in History and Philosophy of Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa Introduction The progress of science About 50 years ago, Thomas S. Kuhn published his seminal book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , which forcefully questioned the idea that science makes steady, rational progress towards truth. After half a century, his challenge is anything but outdated. Look at the failure of economic science in the financial crisis, or the fierce debate about whether string theory is just a mathematical gimmick, unable to connect to empirical data. At the same time, however, the scientific enterprise appears to be more dynamic than ever, with increasingly collaborative research programs, an exponentially growing number of publications and the emergence of new sub-disciplines. These developments sparked a conference entitled ‘‘Progress in Science’’, which was held in April 2012—the 50th anniversary of Structure —at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) in the Netherlands. The papers in this special section were presented at the conference. They approach the problem of scien- tific progress from a variety of angles, e.g., formal modelling, agent- based simulations, and case studies in the history and practice of modern science. By collecting novel contributions from interna- tionally leading philosophers of science and aspiring talents, we provide a snapshot of the state of the art and highlight promising roads for future research. Two contributions defend, in spite of Kuhn’s criticism, an account of progress as approximating truth or verisimilitude. Ilkka Niiniluoto draws on the crucial distinction between real progress and estimated progress, explicated by the difference between absolute degrees of truthlikeness and their evidence-relative ex- pected values. He then uses this account to reply to Alexander Bird’s recent criticism of semantic definitions of progress. Theo Kuipers builds on recent work by Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Roberto Festa to offer—after 30 years!—a generalization of his qualitative approach to nomic truth approximation and empirical progress. Other authors embrace Kuhn’s negative claims about cumulative scientific progress, but they realize that his view is not without problems. For example, even in terms of problem- solving ability Kuhn’s account seems incapable of accommodating our pre-theoretical intuition about the progressiveness of the scientific endeavor. Heather Douglas argues that these problems stem from a general problem with philosophy of science, namely its exclusive focus on pure science. She traces the history of the distinction between pure and applied science, shows that it cannot be maintained, and suggests that we broaden the notion of scien- tific progress by including social and ethical factors. Ladislav Kvasz defines four levels of complexity on which progress takes place and explains persistent disagreement in discussions on progress as conflations of these different levels. He shows that classical debates such as the one between Kuhn and Lakatos can be resolved by showing their complementarity within his classification of epistemic ruptures. Wolfgang Pietsch conducts a case study on the redefinition of four physical base units: kilogram, ampere, mole, and kelvin. Pietsch argues, in a Kuhnian spirit, that these metrological developments exemplify confirmation holism and theory-dependence of observation, but he also explores the limita- tions of the Kuhnian approach because this instance of revolution- ary progress occurs within a period of normal science. Finally, Rogier De Langhe sets up an agent-based simulation model for describing how various kinds of progress can result from the inter- actions of rational individual scientists. This allows him to derive a few surprising and empirically testable consequences, for example, about the lifetime of scientific theories and research programs. We would like to thank the authors and referees for their excellent work, as well as the conference participants for their stimulating discussions, all of which contributed to the quality of the present papers. We are also highly indebted to the editor- in-chief of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , Anjan Chakravartty, and the Managing Editor, Stephanie Petsche, for their trust and their active support of this project. Guest Editors Rogier De Langhe Tilburg University, Netherlands E-mail address: rogierdelanghe@gmail.com Stephan Hartmann LMU Munich, Germany E-mail address: s.hartmann@lmu.de Jan Sprenger Tilburg University, Netherlands E-mail address: J.Sprenger@uvt.nl Available online xxxx http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.02.005 0039-3681/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. " id="pdf-obj-0-3" src="pdf-obj-0-3.jpg">
<a href=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2014) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Studies in History and Philosophy of Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa Introduction The progress of science About 50 years ago, Thomas S. Kuhn published his seminal book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , which forcefully questioned the idea that science makes steady, rational progress towards truth. After half a century, his challenge is anything but outdated. Look at the failure of economic science in the financial crisis, or the fierce debate about whether string theory is just a mathematical gimmick, unable to connect to empirical data. At the same time, however, the scientific enterprise appears to be more dynamic than ever, with increasingly collaborative research programs, an exponentially growing number of publications and the emergence of new sub-disciplines. These developments sparked a conference entitled ‘‘Progress in Science’’, which was held in April 2012—the 50th anniversary of Structure —at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) in the Netherlands. The papers in this special section were presented at the conference. They approach the problem of scien- tific progress from a variety of angles, e.g., formal modelling, agent- based simulations, and case studies in the history and practice of modern science. By collecting novel contributions from interna- tionally leading philosophers of science and aspiring talents, we provide a snapshot of the state of the art and highlight promising roads for future research. Two contributions defend, in spite of Kuhn’s criticism, an account of progress as approximating truth or verisimilitude. Ilkka Niiniluoto draws on the crucial distinction between real progress and estimated progress, explicated by the difference between absolute degrees of truthlikeness and their evidence-relative ex- pected values. He then uses this account to reply to Alexander Bird’s recent criticism of semantic definitions of progress. Theo Kuipers builds on recent work by Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Roberto Festa to offer—after 30 years!—a generalization of his qualitative approach to nomic truth approximation and empirical progress. Other authors embrace Kuhn’s negative claims about cumulative scientific progress, but they realize that his view is not without problems. For example, even in terms of problem- solving ability Kuhn’s account seems incapable of accommodating our pre-theoretical intuition about the progressiveness of the scientific endeavor. Heather Douglas argues that these problems stem from a general problem with philosophy of science, namely its exclusive focus on pure science. She traces the history of the distinction between pure and applied science, shows that it cannot be maintained, and suggests that we broaden the notion of scien- tific progress by including social and ethical factors. Ladislav Kvasz defines four levels of complexity on which progress takes place and explains persistent disagreement in discussions on progress as conflations of these different levels. He shows that classical debates such as the one between Kuhn and Lakatos can be resolved by showing their complementarity within his classification of epistemic ruptures. Wolfgang Pietsch conducts a case study on the redefinition of four physical base units: kilogram, ampere, mole, and kelvin. Pietsch argues, in a Kuhnian spirit, that these metrological developments exemplify confirmation holism and theory-dependence of observation, but he also explores the limita- tions of the Kuhnian approach because this instance of revolution- ary progress occurs within a period of normal science. Finally, Rogier De Langhe sets up an agent-based simulation model for describing how various kinds of progress can result from the inter- actions of rational individual scientists. This allows him to derive a few surprising and empirically testable consequences, for example, about the lifetime of scientific theories and research programs. We would like to thank the authors and referees for their excellent work, as well as the conference participants for their stimulating discussions, all of which contributed to the quality of the present papers. We are also highly indebted to the editor- in-chief of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , Anjan Chakravartty, and the Managing Editor, Stephanie Petsche, for their trust and their active support of this project. Guest Editors Rogier De Langhe Tilburg University, Netherlands E-mail address: rogierdelanghe@gmail.com Stephan Hartmann LMU Munich, Germany E-mail address: s.hartmann@lmu.de Jan Sprenger Tilburg University, Netherlands E-mail address: J.Sprenger@uvt.nl Available online xxxx http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.02.005 0039-3681/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. " id="pdf-obj-0-8" src="pdf-obj-0-8.jpg">

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

<a href=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2014) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Studies in History and Philosophy of Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa Introduction The progress of science About 50 years ago, Thomas S. Kuhn published his seminal book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , which forcefully questioned the idea that science makes steady, rational progress towards truth. After half a century, his challenge is anything but outdated. Look at the failure of economic science in the financial crisis, or the fierce debate about whether string theory is just a mathematical gimmick, unable to connect to empirical data. At the same time, however, the scientific enterprise appears to be more dynamic than ever, with increasingly collaborative research programs, an exponentially growing number of publications and the emergence of new sub-disciplines. These developments sparked a conference entitled ‘‘Progress in Science’’, which was held in April 2012—the 50th anniversary of Structure —at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) in the Netherlands. The papers in this special section were presented at the conference. They approach the problem of scien- tific progress from a variety of angles, e.g., formal modelling, agent- based simulations, and case studies in the history and practice of modern science. By collecting novel contributions from interna- tionally leading philosophers of science and aspiring talents, we provide a snapshot of the state of the art and highlight promising roads for future research. Two contributions defend, in spite of Kuhn’s criticism, an account of progress as approximating truth or verisimilitude. Ilkka Niiniluoto draws on the crucial distinction between real progress and estimated progress, explicated by the difference between absolute degrees of truthlikeness and their evidence-relative ex- pected values. He then uses this account to reply to Alexander Bird’s recent criticism of semantic definitions of progress. Theo Kuipers builds on recent work by Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Roberto Festa to offer—after 30 years!—a generalization of his qualitative approach to nomic truth approximation and empirical progress. Other authors embrace Kuhn’s negative claims about cumulative scientific progress, but they realize that his view is not without problems. For example, even in terms of problem- solving ability Kuhn’s account seems incapable of accommodating our pre-theoretical intuition about the progressiveness of the scientific endeavor. Heather Douglas argues that these problems stem from a general problem with philosophy of science, namely its exclusive focus on pure science. She traces the history of the distinction between pure and applied science, shows that it cannot be maintained, and suggests that we broaden the notion of scien- tific progress by including social and ethical factors. Ladislav Kvasz defines four levels of complexity on which progress takes place and explains persistent disagreement in discussions on progress as conflations of these different levels. He shows that classical debates such as the one between Kuhn and Lakatos can be resolved by showing their complementarity within his classification of epistemic ruptures. Wolfgang Pietsch conducts a case study on the redefinition of four physical base units: kilogram, ampere, mole, and kelvin. Pietsch argues, in a Kuhnian spirit, that these metrological developments exemplify confirmation holism and theory-dependence of observation, but he also explores the limita- tions of the Kuhnian approach because this instance of revolution- ary progress occurs within a period of normal science. Finally, Rogier De Langhe sets up an agent-based simulation model for describing how various kinds of progress can result from the inter- actions of rational individual scientists. This allows him to derive a few surprising and empirically testable consequences, for example, about the lifetime of scientific theories and research programs. We would like to thank the authors and referees for their excellent work, as well as the conference participants for their stimulating discussions, all of which contributed to the quality of the present papers. We are also highly indebted to the editor- in-chief of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , Anjan Chakravartty, and the Managing Editor, Stephanie Petsche, for their trust and their active support of this project. Guest Editors Rogier De Langhe Tilburg University, Netherlands E-mail address: rogierdelanghe@gmail.com Stephan Hartmann LMU Munich, Germany E-mail address: s.hartmann@lmu.de Jan Sprenger Tilburg University, Netherlands E-mail address: J.Sprenger@uvt.nl Available online xxxx http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.02.005 0039-3681/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. " id="pdf-obj-0-19" src="pdf-obj-0-19.jpg">

Introduction

The progress of science

About 50 years ago, Thomas S. Kuhn published his seminal book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which forcefully questioned the idea that science makes steady, rational progress towards truth. After half a century, his challenge is anything but outdated. Look at the failure of economic science in the financial crisis, or the fierce debate about whether string theory is just a mathematical gimmick, unable to connect to empirical data. At the same time, however, the scientific enterprise appears to be more dynamic than ever, with increasingly collaborative research programs, an exponentially growing number of publications and the emergence of new sub-disciplines. These developments sparked a conference entitled ‘‘Progress in Science’’, which was held in April 2012—the 50th anniversary of Structure—at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) in the Netherlands. The papers in this special section were presented at the conference. They approach the problem of scien- tific progress from a variety of angles, e.g., formal modelling, agent- based simulations, and case studies in the history and practice of modern science. By collecting novel contributions from interna- tionally leading philosophers of science and aspiring talents, we provide a snapshot of the state of the art and highlight promising roads for future research. Two contributions defend, in spite of Kuhn’s criticism, an account of progress as approximating truth or verisimilitude. Ilkka Niiniluoto draws on the crucial distinction between real progress and estimated progress, explicated by the difference between absolute degrees of truthlikeness and their evidence-relative ex- pected values. He then uses this account to reply to Alexander Bird’s recent criticism of semantic definitions of progress. Theo Kuipers builds on recent work by Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Roberto Festa to offer—after 30 years!—a generalization of his qualitative approach to nomic truth approximation and empirical progress. Other authors embrace Kuhn’s negative claims about cumulative scientific progress, but they realize that his view is not without problems. For example, even in terms of problem- solving ability Kuhn’s account seems incapable of accommodating our pre-theoretical intuition about the progressiveness of the scientific endeavor. Heather Douglas argues that these problems stem from a general problem with philosophy of science, namely its exclusive focus on pure science. She traces the history of the

distinction between pure and applied science, shows that it cannot be maintained, and suggests that we broaden the notion of scien- tific progress by including social and ethical factors. Ladislav Kvasz defines four levels of complexity on which progress takes place and explains persistent disagreement in discussions on progress as conflations of these different levels. He shows that classical debates such as the one between Kuhn and Lakatos can be resolved by showing their complementarity within his classification of epistemic ruptures. Wolfgang Pietsch conducts a case study on the redefinition of four physical base units: kilogram, ampere, mole, and kelvin. Pietsch argues, in a Kuhnian spirit, that these metrological developments exemplify confirmation holism and theory-dependence of observation, but he also explores the limita- tions of the Kuhnian approach because this instance of revolution- ary progress occurs within a period of normal science. Finally, Rogier De Langhe sets up an agent-based simulation model for describing how various kinds of progress can result from the inter- actions of rational individual scientists. This allows him to derive a few surprising and empirically testable consequences, for example, about the lifetime of scientific theories and research programs. We would like to thank the authors and referees for their excellent work, as well as the conference participants for their stimulating discussions, all of which contributed to the quality of the present papers. We are also highly indebted to the editor- in-chief of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Anjan Chakravartty, and the Managing Editor, Stephanie Petsche, for their trust and their active support of this project.

Guest Editors

Rogier De Langhe

Tilburg University, Netherlands E-mail address: rogierdelanghe@gmail.com

Stephan Hartmann LMU Munich, Germany E-mail address: s.hartmann@lmu.de

Jan Sprenger

Tilburg University, Netherlands

E-mail address: J.Sprenger@uvt.nl

Available online xxxx

0039-3681/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.