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G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970 [Judicial Power]

Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents
sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and
teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was
improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc the graduation already
proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on
Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against
judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the
legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.

The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance
of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to
the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine
Brief Fact Summary. The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed tape recordings made of
President Nixon (the President) discussing the scandal with some of his advisers. The President claimed executive
privilege as his basis for refusing to turn over the tapes.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Although a President deserves great deference regarding his Article II constitutional
privilege, that privilege is not absolute and must be balanced against other constitutional interests.
Facts. The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape recordings of conversations involving
the President and his advisers regarding the scandal. The Presidents counsel moved to quash the subpoena citing
Article II of the United States Constitution (the Constitution) and its grant of privilege to the President. The
Presidents counsel also argued it was a non-justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts of
the executive branch.
Issue. Is the Presidents Article II constitutional privilege absolute?
Held. The Presidents executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to Amendment 4 and Amendment 5
requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of defendants to face their accusers.
Courts are not required to proceed against the President as if the President was any other individual.
Courts should review communications claimed to be privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers).
Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) had to balance the executive privilege
against the rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. The Court made the point that
the President is not a normal citizen, and therefore should receive great deference regarding executive claims of
privilege. However, executive privilege is not absolute and must be balanced against the right of the accused in
criminal proceedings. The Court took great care to limit its opinion because it was delving into a political dispute
between the President and Congress, something the Supreme Court is loath to do.
ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.

Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide
demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March
1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004
elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I
Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase
III Electronic Transmission.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the
sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the
release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter
to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to
glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the
noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed
at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;

Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution
No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and
void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further
ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project.

Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and
observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware
and software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements
designed to safeguard the integrity of elections:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of its
Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were violations of the
mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the
automated election system IHaECA
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the
technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the automated counting
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument, the Court deems it
sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award, and their effect on the
present controversy
In view of the bidding process
Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or criteria the
condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given

the passing mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM hardware but
also the development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for use in the following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
3. Election Day Use."
In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the Contract to the "winning"
bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore
nothing but a sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one that would be used on election day.
What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the subject of the Contract was
still to be created and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being considered as being in final
In view of awarding of contract
The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the Automation of the
2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility
Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if its
bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself.
The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, business registrations,
licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary
evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the
contract; and financial documents, including audited financial statements for the last three years, to establish the
bidder's financial capacity.
However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of
agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported consortium.So, it necessarily follows
that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged consortium really
existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory and
sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's interest.
In view of standing
On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens
respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly,
Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on
the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of
the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further
argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts;
therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."
In view of prematurity
The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the
prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The
letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient
compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the
procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.
Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may
be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."
23 SCRA 405
April 29, 1968

Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction


Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration. By the
terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,
emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."

On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the
original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and
investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to
his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary
Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the
President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of
the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the
Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their
answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises
judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the
Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is
administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or
duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the
principle of the separation of powers.

WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First


it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a
member of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be
investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would
necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature
had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the
President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the
rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature,
through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials
the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is
made in plain and unequivocal language.
- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges
of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed
only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would
violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive
over such officials.
Decision: Writs denied, petition dismissed
In Re: Laureta
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and
Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that
members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from
participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the
Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited
himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz
with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an AffidavitComplaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies
of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioners Complaint
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave
professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are
entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness
of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement of the
fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government
such that the three co-equal branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own
sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with
the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering
that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power
is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
G.R. No. 166886, July 30 2008
Jimmy A. Uy (Uy) filed a trademark application with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT) for registration of the trademark "BARBIE" for use on confectionary products, such as milk, chocolate,
candies, milk bar and chocolate candies.
Mattel, Inc. (Mattel), filed a Notice of Opposition against Uy's "Barbie" trademark as the latter was confusingly similar
to its trademark on dolls, doll clothes and doll accessories, toys and other similar commercial products.
Public respondent Estrellita B. Abelardo, the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, IPO, rendered a Decision
dismissing Mattel's opposition and giving due course to Uys application for the registration of the trademark "Barbie"
used on confectionary products. The Director held that there was no confusing similarity between the two competing
marks because the goods were non-competing or unrelated.
Mattel filed MR which was denied then it appealed the decision with the Director General.
Public respondent Emma C. Francisco, the Director General, rendered a Decision denying the appeal on the ground
that there was no proof on record that Mattel had ventured into the production of chocolates and confectionary

products under the trademark "Barbie" to enable it to prevent Uy from using an identical "Barbie" trademark on said
goods; that the records were bereft of the fact that the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks (BOT) had already
declared the subject trademark application abandoned due to the non-filing of the Declaration of Actual Use (DAU)
by Uy.
Whether or not the application is deemed withdrawn or abandoned for failure to file the Declaration of Actual Use.
The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. Uy's declaration in his Comment and Memorandum before
this Court that he has not filed the DAU as mandated by pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 8293 is a
judicial admission that he has effectively abandoned or withdrawn any right or interest in his trademark.
Section 124.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides:
The applicant or the registrant shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect, as
prescribed by the Regulations within three (3) years from the filing date of the application. Otherwise,
the applicant shall be refused or the marks shall be removed from the Register by the Director.
Moreover, Rule 204 of the Rules and Regulations on Trademarks provides:
Declaration of Actual Use. The Office will not require any proof of use in commerce in the processing of
trademark applications. However, without need of any notice from the Office, allapplicants or registrants, shall file a
declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect within three years, without possibility of extension,
from the filing date of the application. Otherwise, the application shall be refused or the mark shall be removed from
the register by the Director motu propio.
Meanwhile, Memorandum Circular No. BT 2K1-3-04 dated March 29, 2001 of the IPO provides:
2. For pending applications prosecuted under R.A. 166 we distinguish as follows:2.1. Based on use must submit
DAU and evidence of use on or before December 1, 2001, subject to a single six (6) month extension. (Sec. 3.2,
Final Provisions of the Trademark Regulations, R.A. 8293, IPO Fee Structure and MC. No. BT Y2K-8-02)
Uy's admission in his Comment and Memorandum of non-compliance with the foregoing requirements is a
judicial admission and an admission against interest combined. A judicial admission binds the person who makes
the same. In the same vein, an admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration is true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the
truth, and it is his fault if it does not.
In the present case, Mattel is seeking a ruling on whether Uy's "Barbie" trademark is confusingly similar to it's
(Mattel's) "Barbie" trademark. Given Uy'sadmission that he has effectively abandoned or withdrawn any rights or
interest in his trademark by his non-filing of the required DAU, there is no more actual controversy, or no useful
purpose will be served in passing upon the merits of the case. It would be unnecessary to rule on the trademark
conflict between the parties.
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate
Emergency Power]
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon
me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and
PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;
(2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting
from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis,
and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration
Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.
In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only
rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary
power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls
for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declarea state of national emergency and
to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking
over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally

reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should
be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr.,
GR No. 86995

03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an
Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last
day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be
received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction,
respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988.
Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to
participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their
refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They
sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked
that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending
resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and
award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited
from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure
project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and
academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It
declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government
falling within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and

colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in
pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect
the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the exofficio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its
duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to
loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and
even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed
in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there
are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and
the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
Fortich vs. Corona (AJG)
G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of Sumilao, Bukidnon), NQSR Management
and Development Corporation
Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato Corona, Agrarian Reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao

Summary: The subject of the controversy is an agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidnon, measuring 144 hectares. The
municipality of Sumilao wanted to convert this into an agro-industrial land. In its Order dated March 29, 1996, Office
of the President acceded to this conversion, and converted the whole 144 hectares to agro-industrial land in order to
attract investors. This order became final and executory. Feeling aggrieve, farmers commenced a hunger-strike in
protest of this ruling. The OP wanted to appease the farmers, hence, they issued a new resolution. They said that
only 44 hectares will be converted into agro-industrial land and that the remaining 100 hectares will be distributed to
the farmers. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but there was no result because the justices voted
2-2 in resolving such MR. Now, the respondents wanted to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc. The
Supreme Court said that the resolution of the MR cannot be referred to the Court en banc. It based its reasoning on
Article 8, Sec. 4 (3) of the Constitution. From that certain paragraph, the Court differentiated CASES from
MATTERS. CASES are to be DECIDED, while MATTERS are to be RESOLVED. An example of a MATTER is a
motion for reconsideration, such as the one in this case. Only CASES which do not obtain the required number of
votes are required to be elevated en banc. On the other hand, as regards MATTERS, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. If there is a tie in resolving a
matter, the earlier decision of the Court is upheld.

(We will learn the difference between Decision and Resolution in this case. This case is a Resolution, just in
case sir asks :D )


Background facts: On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike in front of the
Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City. They protested the decision of the Office of the
President (OP) dated March 29, 1996 which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural
to agro-industrial/institutional area. Note that this decision already became final and executory.
o The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC (Norberto Quisumbing
Sr. Management and Development Corp). It was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the property, and enacted an
ordinance converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors in order to
achieve economic vitality.
o Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of Agrarian Reform. The DAR
rejected the land conversion and instead opted to put the same under CARP and ordered the
distribution of the property to the farmers.
o The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decision reversing the DAR and converting the land to
agro-indusrial area, which became the subject of the strike of the farmers.
o The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded nationwide attention that even
church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for their cause.
These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win
Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29, 1996) after it had
already become final and executory.
o It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four
(44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified
The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and company and declared that
the Win-Win Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 resolution of the
OP already became final and executory.
ALERT This is where the issue relevant to our topic arose: Aggrieved, respondents Corona and Garilao
filed [separate] motions for reconsideration for the said ruling (separate MRs pero rinesolve ng Court
through one resolution).
o The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-TWO on the separate MRs filed by
Corona and Garilao assailing the April 24, 1998 Decision.
Hence, this motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred to the Court en banc. They contend that
inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by
a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case
should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or
in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court (the resolution addressing the MR, wherein
the justices voted 2-2) should be referred to the Court en banc NO.


A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw
a distinction between CASES and MATTERS.
o CASES are decided.
o MATTERS, which include motions, are resolved.
Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters,
applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
o This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the
other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.
Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks
only of case and not matter.
The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a
division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to
refer it to the Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a
motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the
failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed
decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court
in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Respondents further argue that the issues submitted in their separate motions for reconsideration are of first
impression. They are arguing that the local government unit concerned still needs to obtain the approval of
DAR when converting land. However, this was rebutted in the resolution dated November 17, wherein it was
expressed that:

Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import
to merit the attention of the Court en banc. In the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to
convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
o The Court voted uninamously in that case, hence, the argument of the petitioners that their MRs are
motions involving first impression is flawed.
Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration is generally prohibited, unless there is a showing of
extraordinary persuasive reasons and a leave of court is filed. In this case, there was none.
Remember that the Court, in its Decision, upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling of the OP because it was
already final and executory thus the Win-Win resolution cannot be implemented anymore? Well, because of
this, there was a litany of protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a
liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching
effects, the case was disposed of on a mere technicality.
o The Court however said that it was not a mere technicality because the finality of the March 29,
1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well
as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the
development of the property.
Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors have standing to intervene in this case.
The Court said there was none, because the source of their standing to file is the Win-Win Resolution
(note that in that resolution, pinamigay nga yung lupa sa mga farmers, ngayon, meron silang Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA). Dahil dun, nag intervene sila).
o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors who derived their rights from the
Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the CLOA to them does not grant them the requisite standing in
view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is
null and void.
G.R. Nos. 115236-37
January 16, 2003
Section 14: No Violation

Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration
of a Decision which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City finding them guilty of
rape and acts of lasciviousness. In his motion, Dy submits that our decision should have been merely
recommendatory, in view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (d) of the Constitution which provides
that the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. He contends that Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides
that death penalty cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible
with the aforementioned constitutional provision.
Bernardino, on the other hand, alleges that: (1) accused-appellants were not accorded their right to a fair,
unbiased resolution of the preliminary investigation when the reviewing prosecutor unilaterally reversed the
findings of the three-man investigating panel that recommended the dismissal of the charges against them;
(2) the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the lack
of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial; (3) the erroneous decision of the
trial judge to hold an expedited trial effectively deprived them of proper preparation for and presentation of
an adequate defense; (4) the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to establish his guilt
with moral certainty; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed accused-appellant Dy to remain at liberty even
after promulgation of judgment on the strength of the same bail bond posted by him during trial, while
denying accused-appellant Bernardinos petition for bail; (6) the legal doctrines cited in our Decision do not
apply in this case since the premises upon which these principles lie are not present herein; and (7) as a
matter of equity, the significant delay in the resolution of this appeal should at least merit our attention to the
peculiar effects of the decision in this case particularly as regards accused-appellant Bernardino.
ISSUE: Whether there is a constitutional violation of the accused-appellants rights
Dys contention is misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may
sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. At present, it is made up
of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and
distinct courts. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by
the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of
one and the same court.
With regard to Bernandinos contentions, it must be clarified that the allegation that there was no valid
arraignment is misleading and betrays a lack of comprehension regarding the procedural requirements of
arraignment in the context of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against him. The Court ruled that the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the
court enter a plea of not guilty in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the
accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.
The records also show that the proceedings were not hastily conducted. While the proceedings might have
been of short duration than usual, they were nevertheless conducted with due regard to the right of each
party to due process. The trial court should even be commended for conducting a speedy trial, which should
be the rule, rather than the exception. What is of prime consideration is not the speed by which the trial was
conducted but the manner by which the procedural and substantial requirements were complied with. The
records show that these requirements were adequately met.
Court does not see any irregularity in the conflicting findings of the investigating panel vis--vis those of the
reviewing prosecutor. It is the prerogative of the reviewing prosecutor to overturn the findings of the
investigating panel depending on how he appreciates the evidence.

Firestone Tire vs. CA

Firestone Tire & rubber Co. vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 113236

March 5, 2001

Quisumbing, J.:
Forjas-Arca Enterprise Company is maintaining a special savings account with Luzon Development Bank,
the latter authorized and allowed withdrawals of funds though the medium of special withdrawal slips. These are
supplied by Fojas-Arca. Fojas-Arca purchased on credit with FirestoneTire & Rubber Company, in payment FojasArca delivered a 6 special withdrawal slips. In turn, these were deposited by the Firsestone to its bank account in
Citibank. With this, relying on such confidence and belief Firestone extended to Fojas-Arca other purchase on credit
of its products but several withdrawal slips were dishonored and not paid. As a consequence, Citibank debited the
plaintiffs account representing the aggregate amount of the two dishonored special withdrawal slips. Fojas-Arca
averred that the pecuniary losses it suffered are a caused by and directly attributes to defendants gross negligence
as a result Fojas-Arca filed a complaint.
Whether or not the acceptance and payment of the special withdrawal slips without the presentation of the
depositors passbook thereby giving the impression that it is a negotiable instrument like a check.
No. Withdrawal slips in question were non negotiable instrument. Hence, the rules governing the giving
immediate notice of dishonor of negotiable instrument do not apply. The essence of negotiability which characterizes
a negotiable paper as a credit instrument lies in its freedom to circulate freely as a substitute for money. The
withdrawal slips in question lacked this character.
Marburry vs. Madison
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President John Adams (President
Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against President Thomas
Jeffersons (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to
review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are
set by the United States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the Congress.
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure Federalist
control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these
efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42
new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jeffersons
inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marburys, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office.
The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury
sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No.
As the President signed Marburys commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made, and Marbury
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marburys commission, that the Supreme
Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of
the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government to do a particular thing therein specified, mandamus is
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the
constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.
Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case establishes the
traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also
transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the federal
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara
was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of
the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the
Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a
resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by
claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC
cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is
the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the
source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments
of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private
schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also
provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any
law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to

censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that
such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any
injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for
state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to
wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part
of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

Tan vs. macapagal

G.R. No. 96541, Aug. 24, 1993


Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that
there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right
to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which
may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
Joya vs. PCGG
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christies of New
York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior
to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the auction sale.
Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christies of New
York for the sale of the artworks










The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that
the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must
be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.



On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having
interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise
the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.








There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when
a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary
and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987
Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important
cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public
properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They
allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the
paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The
foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On
this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof,
although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from
friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them.
When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were
taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The
confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the
ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and
statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the
government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their
proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear




Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a
mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may
be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive
duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act
because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by
the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for





Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge
the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which
may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving
public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit
that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.


For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of
this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a
particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We
find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.
Macasiano vs. NHA
Facts: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.He predicates his
locust standi
on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works andHighways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of
Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain
(executed immediately after hisretirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a
taxpayer. As tothe first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy
thatserve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said
sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which heassiduously and faithfully carried out
in the past."
As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a directinterest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintainsthat, the instant petition is
devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for theexercise of judicial review in cases involving
the constitutionality of a law. He contends that thereis no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse
legal rights or interests, that thepetitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper
party toquestion the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that thereis no showing
that the question of constitutionality is the very
lis mota
presented. He argues thatSections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.Issue: Whether or not
Petitioner has legal standingHeld: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an
act of thelegislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised andpresented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case,
., the issue of constitutionality must be very
lis mota

To reiterate, the essential requisites for asuccessful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the
existence of an actualcase or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b)
theconstitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question mustbe raised at the
opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must benecessary to the decision of the case.
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of.It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites
areabsent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or bothof the capacities
in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performinghis duties as a consultant and
exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertionby other parties of any benefit under the
challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial reviewcannot be exercised
in vacuo
. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversiesarising between adverse litigants."Wherefore, for
lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED