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oo DOCUMENT RESUME : BD 212 990, cS 006 502° AUTHOR Iran-Nejad, Asghar; Aod Others . TITLE Affect A Functional Perspective. Technical Report No. 222. . INSTITUTION Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., Cambridge, Mass eae Illinois Univ., Urbana. Center for the Study of = Reading. * ’ oe . - SPONS ‘AGENCY National. Inst. of Education (ED), Washington, D.C, + PUB DATE “Oct 81 . . ) CONTRACT 400-76-0116 . . NOTE. 66p. . . : EDRS PRICE MFO1/PC03 Plus Postage. ~ Owe DESCRIPTORS *aAffective Behavior; *Emotional Response; Model: > “ Neurological Orgapization; Reading Attitudes;’ . *Reading Research; *Research Design; *Research Needs; .. ‘ *Theories D : IDENTIFIERS *Functional Context “ABSTRACT . fo t This paper presents a coherent account of affect based on the functional properties of the nervous system. The paper, # begins with a brief discussion of the nature of a structural theory , and contrasts it with a-functional view. Then’ the functional view is ‘discussed in more detail. The following two assumptions of the functional view are described: emotions are created by the : . ‘simultaneous activity of various cpmponents of the neuronal system - © and emotional structures persist only as long as the underlying d neuronal elements remain in a state of functioning. Next, the paper demonstrates that. traditional psychological research on affective + variables is more ‘consistent with a.functional theory of affect as “opposed to a structural theory. Finally, some of the empirical implications of the functional view are discussed interms of, they ? study of affective functioning. (RL) Se : 55 6G A Eee eee eeee eee ere itr eLeceT Tet rece tTerreeet tees ereeee ean * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that canbe made” * * . from the original document. . . fe errr trr rete ictretces res vecseterratTeetecerererserererens ne fo. . ° US, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION . ; . Serena cenen vox tue stuny,or neanine © AQSoreagce Ss a : > - ae oa d . rt cnet open ora o. 7 ot Ree Geen : a : 5 4 0 5 nw os oot Technical Report No. 222" a s Y 5 PE lo. . ql . tu . ° , “lL. AFFECT: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE = ; Asghar Iran-Néjad, Gerald L. Clore, - - and Richard J. Vondruska - wt 7 . University of IJlinofs at Urbana-Champaign - 4 . [ October 1981 : ; . ‘ 4 . - 5 - 5 University of Illinois oy . 7 at Urbana-Champeign “Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. ot 51 Gerty Drive 50 Moulton Street . Champaign, Illinois 61820 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238 dh “ . : 5 a] pr . . od) The research reported herein was supported in part by ‘the National Insti- 5 Ss tute of Education under Contract No. HEW-NIE-t~4G0-76-0116. : oP Bs a - i : Y) . < , . oo i - i i “ . os ha, EDITORIAL BOARD : ‘ S . : : . . u ee Paul Jose and Jim Yosenthal : os . Co-Eaitgrs : . ‘ eo ° x . Harry Blanchard \ Asghar Iran-Nejad . 0 Nancy Bryant’: . Jill LaZansky ~ : Larry Colket ~ . > ann Myers - : . Avon Cristore . | Kathy Starr + Roberta Ferrara + -Gindy Steinberg Anne Yay Willian Tirre . a ~ ‘ _ : Paul Wilson, Michael Niveys, Editorial Assistant . : “Affect: A Functional Perspective | During the last four decades, dominant thebries, of comprehension and cognition—information processing theories, stinulus~response, theories, and \ " achema theories--have ignored affect. In .a recent’ asticle, Zajone (1980) points out: 5 Contemporary cognitive psychology simply ignores affect.: The words * affect, attitude, feeling, and sentiment do not appear in the indexes of any‘of the major works on cognition (Anderson, 1976; Andersoq & Bower, 1973; p ~ Bobrow, & Soiutns, 1975; Crowder, 1976; Kintech, 19745 Lachngn, Lachaan, & Butterfield, 1979; Nornan & Rumelhazt, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Tulving & Donaldson, 1972). Nor do these concept’ appear in Neisser“s (1967) ériginal work ‘that gave riee. to the cognitive revolution iw experimental psychology. And in the ‘six volumes and the 2,133" pages of ‘the Handbook of Learning ani Cognitive Processes (Estes, 1975-1578), there is only one entry for affect and only ane for attitude. It is worth’noting tHat, both-of these entries are in-Volune 3 in a contribution written by a soctal psychologist.’ In the last titree volunds-y ‘no princtpally devoted to cognition--there are no references to affeét- hoses whatsoever. . (p. 152, Footnote 3) . This lack of attention, to affective funzttoning fe puzzling in view. of “the fact that several prominent authors ave crphinteed the suddepensable role : + : dof afféct and have studied it extensively (evg., Bartlett, 1932; Berlyne, 1960, 1973; Festinger, 1957; Hebb, 1955; Olds, 1973;.Schachter & Singer, 1962; Wundt, 1907). What 1s even more puzzling is that authors, from time to time,, acknowledge the significance of affect but’ continue to fevers Little’ attention 4. to tt. For Anetance, tanto Opper (1969) writé: . ¢ Piaget recognizes that emotione tnt ffence thought, and. . , he tepeatedly \states that no act’ of intelligence is complete without emotions. . . . Nevertheless, Piaget“s enpirical” investigations and detailed theories. substantially ignore the emotions in favor of the . gtructure of the intellect. (p. 5).': * How can this -paradox between wha ie preached and what .f8 practiced be : e % * explained? There to one prplenatton, “which nay very well ba the only major Feason: Structural cognitive theorles are not optimally equipped to deal with affect. This supposition 1s consistent with the fact that structural theori that study affect (e.g. , Bower, 1981; de Rivera; 1977, Lehnert, Note 1) have ‘primarily ignored the tradition#™ research on affective functioning. What seems to be missing is a theoretical framework that is able_to provide a basis for ddenttfjing and integrating important affective, variajes and for + spectfying/the relation between ‘affect and cognition in .a /parsimdnious . ve fashion. _ In an attempt to solve this problem, we have. develéped a coherent theory emphasizing the functional properties of the neurdnal ystem. ~ The / principle aspects of structural models and their constituent conceptual metaphors have been discussed by Bransford, McCarrell, Franks, - and Nitech (1977), IramNeljad (1980), Jenkeind (1977), and Iran-Nejad and Ortony (Note 2). Iran-Nejad and Or tony also ‘discuss how a functional theory, diffefs fron a structural approach. Othe: theories) siatlar in spirit to the present functional approach are those developed by John (1967, 1972) and by Katchalsky and his sociated (e-g., Katchaleky, Rowland, & Blumenthal, 1974). This paper will Eiret present a ‘brief discussion of what @ structural theory ts tke and .will, contrast it with a functfonal view. Then the “‘funetional view @111-be qiecu , in more detail. Next, we ‘will’. demonstrage that traditional psycHologidal reséarch~on affective variables, such as that of Bexiyne (1960), Festinger 1380, | ‘and Schachter (e.g-, Schachter & sina 1962), 8 more tonsistent with a functional, a opposed to a structural, theo of affect. Finally, ve will discuss sone of the enpirical tuplications of the fungtional view for the oeuty of affective functioning. ° We will @tecuss the functional view only ineofar as tt felates directly | to the phenonenoi of affect. The reader interected- in other aspects of the functional theory, euch oy remembering, comprehension, and learning, is referred to the sources~tited above.- . mad 5 Lo -¢ » Tie Structural Approach to Affect and Emotion Ad an exemple of a structural theory, consider ffret dq Rivera’ (1977) theory of emotion. While de Rivera deferibes his views {n terns of Plaget’s Structuralism, his theory fe also reminiscent of another slightly different structural approach, nagely, the senantic “network cheortes of long-term senory. In a network -apdel, ‘there! to on abptrace multidimensional space .or, network encompassing + the snepbe epectrun of psychological patterning. According to de Rivera ‘affective structures (emotions) belong in such a ‘ oe | . — 5 : + Affect . . > 5 Psychological space. Each ‘emotion is a schema in the Plagetian-sense: a - -" self-regulated, holistic system of transformations. In such a network, “each different emotion has a place in an overall structure of- which it ts @ part” t. “ : x (de-Rivera, 1977, p. 36), The relative Jdcation of different: emotions determines the extent of their psychologital closeness. . Transforsations are movenents alSigdinénsions “of psychologteal “space. 7 : 5 These’ transformations are sot changes along intrinsic organismic dimensions, me oe of epotion (e.g., anger, love) reflects different transfornations. , , such ag charges “in the activity of the sympathetic nervous eyared (e-g-, : changes in heartrate); rather, they are internal representations (images) ’ of overt of covert changes. involved in «the way the organism, as a whole, interacts with the environment (e.g., “digging a hole,” “noving avay from ot toward others,” etc.). They are internalized Piagetian action sequences. Fially, “the baste unit of enétional analysis is the dyad (the person and the J q other) rather than the individual” (p. 37). The emotion of anger, for instance, involves the transformation of the “person” uoving the “other” away from the “self.” Fear differs from anger « fl since it involves “the person moving:away from the other.” ‘Similarly, love is ; “movement of person toward the other,” and desire is the “person moving the at . . . L other toward him.” These transformations aré manifested in oir bodfly | movements. Love is a “giving” enotion (+ extension) and desire.ie a “getting” . 5 : feat does\got-manifest contraction (~ contraction) « 5 oo ; . Affect a + 6 “Like, de Rivera’s theory, the majority of structural theories of affect : 4 ° ‘and emotion (e.g-, Bower, 1981; Plutchik, 1962) are network models. Semantic . ry nt the ‘meaning’ of words in the long-term metry (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969). network models were originally postulated to repri The most direct application of thése qodels to the problém of affect was made ‘ 7 N ; in a’ recent] paper, by Bower (1981), who extended the network model to explain the state-dependent aspect of emotion. According to Bower, “each dietinet endtion such as joy, depression, or fear has a specific node or unit in memory that collects together many other aspects’ of the enotion that are connetted to At by associative pointers” (p. 135). Other structuralists, while not denying that structures have nodes or elements, emphasize that “the elements of a structure are. subordinated to [étructural] laws ... not reducible to cumulative one-by-one association of its elements” (PLaget, 1968/1970, p. 7). . . . In spite of their differences, alt structural. dodels seen to share ‘at Yeast two global attribut First, they are all intralevel theories (see Winsatt, 1976): They assume Fat the holistic structures and their, ‘constituent elements are both mental in nature? Thus,.they do not take into account the functional propertie: of -the biological hardware; mental structures are characterized in terms’ of méntal elements. Secondly, they assime that psychological permanence is an inherent property of mégtal —Gtructures and their organization. It is taken for ‘granted that‘there exist long-term mental structures and relations, By contrast, the furcttonal view se is an interlevel approach. It assumes that at the mental level:there are only unanglfzable wholes and no elements. Elements, on the other hand, ‘exist at, the nedronal level; and it is the group functionting of thesg neuronal elements . N that cénuffs in the creation of holtstic mental structures. Furtheraore, the functional view assumes that mental atructures are tahérent3y transient; and psychological Permanence is dZeflection of ‘tie covsistent and stable functdonal properties of neuronal eleaents . : Intralevel versus Interlevel Reductionion aN yl : a + ae » While structural thegries acknowledge that, the mind ie unanalyzabl¢, they, nonetheless, proceed to dichotomize and dissect it. It is often claimed: : that mental structures *possess characteristics that are unique to these seh holistic patterns, Congequently, any elemental analysis of, the structures will destroy their properties. But since the- notion of elements within a structure is unavoidable, the :schena is defined @ collection of mental : elesents and merital relations .(adsoctations, rules—e.g., multiplication rules, and 0° on). * Since a structure is a whole with “overrall properties distinct from the properties of its eleneats,” one mst adopt “from the start a re¥itional perspective, according to viich it is relations anoug eleuents . . that count” (Piaget, 1968/1970, p.‘ 79). . Integers, for distance, have fae properties “which are. quite,different from the properties of number’ Andividuale” (Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 7); 35-18 a rene while both 3 and 5, on the one hand, aid 7 and-S, on the other, are, prime.~ What Plaget (1968/1970) argues against 18 intralevel reductiontea, 1. reductionisa thin the mental domain. “But there: are at legst two in their functionally distinct kinds of reduction which are so differen functions . ... that one te led to doubt not only: the unitary model’ of 9 “reduction but also the primacy’ of structure. over function in its characterization” (Wimsatt, 1976, “pp. 214-215). vefasatey “argued that the problems traditionally associated with redictionisn are only applicable ‘so tong 2s ong. takes’ an intralevel approach. The alternative to an intralevel approach 18 an interlevel approach that attempte to specify the interface , between the mind and the functional Properties of the nervous system. Intralevel theorists often specify cauéal links directly between mental and _ dekiwioral’ states. For’ instance, Lehnert“s~ (Note 1) process model ts : d characterized in terms gf affect maps that consist of affective units and Links between them. These links. are assuned to signify causalities of affect within and acrdes charaaters. The dnterlevel approach, on the other’ hatid, astunes that caisal interaction cannot be epectfied strictly within the aental : “+, sor behavioral donain without reference to the’ functional properties of the “mental ‘structures exert their causal influence “biological hardware. Rather} on the functioning of neufonal.,elenents, and the functioning of neuronal constellatious, in tugn, results ‘in the creation! of mental structures (sce Dewan, 1976; Katchalsky, Rowland, & Blumenthal, 1974; Maturana, 1978; Sperry, etal . 1996; Wimsatt, 1976). "According to Katchalsky and his associates, the aystery soe 5 : le in the old aphorism that "the qualitative whole is more than the quantitative sgh ot its parts” is in the word more. It implies sonething for ndthing. However, 1£ the “more” emerges as a consequence of the functioning of ological -nechantens, /At-t3 no longer obtained for nothing. ‘This is because selfsorganizing dynamic properties of these pechanisus dissipate energy in order to aclifeve this. a . Such argunents suggest that the solution to the partevuhole problem . mst be sought in the spectficazion of the functional properties 9f. the eoxponente of the biological system and in the way these components function to create mental . structures, Mental structures theagelves, of bhe-other hand, aust be studied only insofar as such investigation bears on the nature of the ‘functional properties of the nervous system. “Structural theories of affect~and enotion often postulatd’a get of basic + emotions that mfx to produce more complex emotions. Plutchik (1962) used the He argued 7 analogy of the’color-vheel to iliustrate the mixing of emotions that “At 19 necessary to conceive of the primary egotions as hues which aay ; 5 e ry in degree of intermixture (saturation) as well as inténsity, and as . arrangeable around an emotion-cirgle simflar’ to. a color-vheel" (p. 109). Berlyne (1971) has drawn attention to a potential difficulty injeuch a direct “a analysis and synthesis of emotional structures: * Attempts to dist b spectrum up into regions of similar color, with the possibility of adding gle onctions are like attempts to divide the visible to the nunber of hues by color mixture. The princlple.difficulty,, with f ~~ + jeolor as with eaotion, te. a lack of objective criteria, aid thus of agreenent,’on where the boundary lines should be drawn, ih has, for example, been established by the experiments of paycholinguists that the’ familiar seven “colors of the rainbow” are peculiar to our. culture; members’ of other cultures .dividé up the spectrum quite differently. . : (pp: 73-74) © . a are 5 ea : aaa : ~ L 2 * Affect zi . a * 10 eae i. oo . 5 wo. While there sand to Ve no universal criteria for dividing up thé color= wheel nto primary colors, it hes been.shown that the untversals ‘of color : “9 enantics can be explained in terns of the functional properties yof Pe neuronal elenents underlying the perception af color. Kay and MeDaniél 3%) » : have-reviewed the recent ‘evidence on color-term semantics and argue that a “Widespread ‘belief i Linguistics and the philosophy of language, thallenged * by thewata reviewed here, is the doctrine that ‘there exist ultimate .semantic associates present a nqurophystologt cat model indicating that “all ‘the basic ‘eGlor Gategories of “the, languages of the world are based on the Od fondasentad neural response ‘categories, whose structures are determined ‘by the * firing patterns. of . . . cell in the visual pathway” (Kay, 1981, p. 64). Statlarly, the functional view assumes that affect and emotion can be amore primes \which are discrete entities”, (p. 611).+ As an alternative, Kay and his readily ‘explained in terus of the functional properties of the“nervous s eysten, 4 - ‘and not in terms’ of some abstract, emotion-circle or petwork. + Functional Permanence and Frame Permanence: An Example and an Analogy 7 - The second general characteristic of- structural approaches is that they eo: 5 al1 place the locus of permanence at the mental level. ‘They all assume that Permanence is a property of mental structures, that-there exists a long-term menory store or-conceptual network, and, that"it is in terms-of the structure : and the organization-of such a storehouse or network ‘that. psychological Pérmpnence must be specified. However, Bransford et al. (1977). and Jenkins (1977) have seriously cliallenged the permanent storage metaphor. They have argued that this ts but one of the many fodeible alternatives. With feapéct to-permanence, affect has been tieated v: tly differently by . different! vettede, ” For ‘notivation theoriste such ae MeClellind and his , MeClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lovell, 1953), tt t0 a and consistent Anetsgator of action. Por. others}, (eee, is Little more then transitory “thrilie,” “pangs,” and "glows" (e.g., a glow 1é sg, “associates (e +5 Ryle, 1949: REC of pleasuré), * "~ fa ok ‘The functional approach assumes that permanence 1s a characteristic of the biological *hardvate and is reflected. in the consistent ind stable functdonal properties of .the components of the aaa sysfea. Mental structures, on the. other hand; are inherently transient. . [ + The problem of permanence is a particular case of the more gener: problem of the pteservation of: form that goes beyond paycholégical phenonena. Considgr’ an,analdgy from Miller? ‘The Body in Question (1978): The survival of, fora-depends ‘on one of two principles: tle “intrinsic stability of the ‘materials froa which the object is made; or the 5 8 5 ae ‘ 2 ‘ | + energetic, replenishment and reorganization of the, -maférial which is “constattly flowing, through St. The substances fron’which a marble otatue is made are stably bonded tpsether, 20 that the object: retatis not only “tte ohape but Lte"original material. ‘The configuration ‘of a fountain, on the other hand, 19 intrinsically unstable, and it can retain its shape * only by endlessly renewing the material which constitutes it; that is, by organizing dnd iaposing structure on the unremitting flow. of its own cubstance. Statues preserve thetr shapes; fountaine perform und erpotfdem theirs, “(p. 140; italics added) : * structures . , Affect \. a © “thus, ‘there are two ‘types 8f tructures: stable and unstable. And there’ : are two types of permanence,’ Structural’ ere is inherent in the * ¢ ihe structure itself. Functional permanence is foherent in the functional . al pe Properties “ of * the underlying system(s) ‘that create and recreate the , These systeus and their properties, are permanent, to be sure, but SN are not the’ ‘same sort of stuff as ‘the structures they create. The engtiies, . ° the pipes, the pressure, and the water are not isomorphic with the fointata they Jointly create. Note that by epectfyidg the component’ of the underlying .system anq’how they relate, one can understand the way the fountain is ? attempt to spéeify long-term mental relations. Alternatively, one can assume created; but the latter (i.e., the created fountain) 18 not ‘reduced to the former. This ie the essence of an interlevel approach. fos oe ees 2 Structural peychological theories ascume that peraanence 1s an inherent Property of mental structures.. The functional view maintains’ that dental structures are inherently transient. They are created postfunctiqnally (see : ; . n Iran;Nejad &“Ortony, Note 2). They are foraed as a consequence $f neuronal functioning. And they last as” long as this functtoiing is* releatsed by hundreds of autonomous : neuronél elements each of which can, La principle, Participate in the creation of an indefinfte numbeAof structures. In accounting for the permahence of mental structures, therefore, it Seems that a choice would have to be made between twd different levele of analysis. One can assume the locus of permanence to be'in the structure and that permanence is inherent in,the functioning of autonomous neuronal elements s and-$ry to, sphcity functional Properties that would make {t possible for these elements to permanently and. consistently create and cdhsate transient a5 functional gtructures. Since in affect and in cognitfén, as in the case of * fountains, ve have to deal ‘with unstable and” constantly, varying structures, ” the functional qview deserves serious coletderatsoa. It urges a shift in‘the locus of analysis in peychblogy, from” a direct description of created structures to a description of. the functional’ characteristics of the underlying systems. However, this does not mean. mental relations mist not, be invedtigated. Rather, it-means (a) that a formal theory of mental structures based on precise algorithmic analyses ‘need not, and posetbly cannot; ~be. sonstructed, and (b) that investigatioh of mental structures aust not serye = toward an end goal of constructing a formal description of these structures; tt aust be done in sybordination to the goal of specifying the functional Properties of neuronal elenents. Mental structures are analyzed only insofar as’ such analysis directly helps us understand “the style of the bugin” (Arbtb, 1981). 4 . . . 5 an Sructural theories ate best suited to deal with permanent, Brctoces. This is probakly why philosophical structuralisn leads to such questions as whether or not the structure of-a statue exists in the block of stone before - it 19 carved, why psychological structuralied hypothestzes permanent mental +" * structures in the head, or why many structuraliste tend to hypothesize innate structures (e.g., Chomsky, 1980). “ According to the functional approach, . Permanent mental structures canpot exist; the latter mist be. created and récréated, ° 73 dos (e.g., dleteibuted nedronal ane the’ nervous systems’ it must (b) : wu What then“must a functional plyqPological (as opposed to an artificial 2s - intelligence) theory of affect do? Clearly} it nust not build a long-term Storage or permanent etructuraltnetwork. Nor sust it, as an cand goal, construct /a foreal, algorietiic, representational system of such F repository 7 or networh ‘that woud be programmable into a computer. Instead, it must (a) specify how global affective atate 5 aypanitcalty relate té Jocalized component Provide a plausible aceount of affedtive Walegee and awareness; it mist (c) Present a plausitle account of the concept of self; and, Stualty, it’ must (4) allow plausible dettations affective vartables (eg-, Pleasantness/unpleasantnese and Amteredtingnes )+ We hope this approach may Place us in a better ‘position to lesign, experiments leading toward an \ Antegrated body of data on affective and mental functioning. _ Curgent, research on affective functtontng A8 cazried ovt under a great number:of “spot” tHeories. As Athey (1976) notes fron the perspective of Féading education, “the. iiecrature on? affective factore misgeg.the connecting thread of a good theory*o make sense’of the plethora of inconclusive and “contradictory data” * — Eleuenta of a functional “theory of cognition are evident in the work of Bartlett (1932), Bransford and’ hie colleagien (e-g Bransford, MeCarrell, Franks, & Nitechs 1977), Jenkine-(1977), and Minsky (1980). “These authors have also given spectgl atiention to,thd! role affect plays in remembering. t when a subject is being asked Bartlett dravs attention to “the fact . ..’: that . rie Pee \ Affect ae a. ‘i 15 % Pao to remémber, very often .the first thing that emerges ‘is something of the nature of ai attitude” (p..207). Siailarly, Minsky maintains that “attitudes do really precede profositions” rather than the other way atound: — * In this aodern era of “tnfornatton Processing PoychoLogy” it may quaint “to tal of ‘nental states; it ts more fashionable to speak of \teptepmntations, frases, scvipte, of senentic nets. Bot vitle ve find it’ luefd enough to speak in such terms about ménories: of things, sentences, or even-faces, ‘it is much harder so -to deal with feelings, . 4 Aneights, and understandings--and ail the attitudes, dispositions, and A” a ways of seeing things that go-with \then. ... We usually put such @ seoves aside, saying that ont nust*firet understand simpler hinges, But what 1f feelings ad viewpoints are the simpler things? (p. 118) / ee : In order to explain mental’ states, “Kinsky (1980) conceived of “the mind “(or the buain) as [being] composed of many partially autonomous “agents.“* He proposed that “no single one of these 1ittle agents need know much by ttself, but each recognizes certain configuiations of a few associates and, responds by altering tte state” ( 119). Ta thts, section, we will. try to demonstrate how a similar assumption makes tt possible to present plausible agcounts of such baste aspects of affective functioning as avatene valence, as well as the nétion of self.’ ns and . . ‘ - , . ‘o - or a . Affect, 5 ‘i c 16 : Sot Awareness 7 . . Avareness, {- =~ As. Mandler (1975) has noted, “consciousness (awareness or “private ee experience) . + Ade generated sone of the “adat extreme positions in ¢ Payehological theory, varying fron its dental | aa some behavioriste to an « sdssertion of its exclusive dmtnance by some phenomenologists” (p. 12). while jottonal emphasizing the role of ayareness as jan dnportant parameter in “"s4 tunettoning, uandier aeo points out; . ‘ ae Pe ‘the private datum of consciousness into useful theoretical gp 9 OUairaays nan constructs remains one of the fiteresting tasks facing theoretical psychology. . .*. We still tend to use ancient and philosophical Interpretations of conscfoustiess. The theoretical-aialytic enterprise that’ properly dissects the‘ordinary language meaning of consciousness and constructs theoretically } meaningful terms and piScesses (and nog just a : : 4 single’ state or ‘echaniea) tyattii t to bes uidertaken. (p. 12) w / we oo e 7 The influence of the single-uriit philosopSical view of consciousness on : : Seebphystotogtstt wFesearch has beer discussed by Luria (1978). The primary : purpose ‘of thie Tesearch has been to identify a wtieary neuronal structure whose’, stimulation would give vthe individual: conscious experience and whose «4 “destruction would render the perso unconscious. As an alternative, Luria So what The calle a sénantie’ and system-based explanation of avareness,. + one that gges beyond the notign of consciousness’ as a changing etate of wakefulness that results frou the activity ‘of the reticular formation.” Luria | - emphasizes the contriiytion of other -brain regions such as, posterior and . frontal cqrtical areas. He writes:~ . bn va Attest : , . Lot, . : ug NY ‘i : . Attempts to seek the material substrate of consciousness at . the, eingle~ unit or synaptic level... - thus ‘begin to be seen as completely ar hopeless. The cerebral basis of man’s complex, semantic, system-based Conscious activity must be ‘sought in the combined activity of atecrete brain eystens, each of which makes its ovn special contribution to the y systepyas a whole. (p. 31) Mandler“s and Luria“s quotations seen to call for a diSteibuted account > work of the functional of awareness. Sintlar susgeatias have been tisde by Sperry (e.g., 19695 1976) and by Reotak.(1999, 1981). According to Sperty (1969), “eonsetous properties +++ are directly paresis ‘on the action Sf the component, neuronal elenents” (ps 534)5 and a Regtak (1981) put 48, tt 0 possible “that the interaction between nflitons ‘of neurona-within the brain induces complex electric fields, chet are ultimately responsible for’ consciousness” (p. 19). ‘However, the detatls of a distributed accdunt of avareness have not yet been speljed out. » This section attempts to present ‘such an account. '¢ . a The Totus of the generation and pereapetol "of jarenebs. The, gentral cr ; $ + assumption of the present functional vem ts te ixist physically unitary and fUnetdonally. @utononods neuronal elenents that can. function, 4n aPrineiple, independently of ther neuronal eleaente and, therefore, oan participate in an indefinite number of functional conbinations.” "One possible outgone of considefing discret? systems’ enbedded in a continuous-system would + ‘be the subordination of ‘obvious structural discreteness to a functional one: the. Spattarty discrete elements could be brought to functiqnal continuity . +++ 0F the structurally continuous medium to , functional (dynamic) ; v ftedronal etenent 18 assumed to be spectalization or specificity of function, ) : = digcontinutt ge 7 78). The redoainant principle that determines functional Properties of This means that each heuronal element is specialized, or ie capable of getting specialized, fo function in a unique fashion and, thereby, to.nanifest some" * sngpitic functional properties. One such property is the generation, by the ( elenent as a neuroanatonie ayatem, of a unique feeling of awareness, a means of “conmuntcating” to the global system that "I, the functioning element, an” \ ,in a’ statélef functioning (activation or inhibition), either singly (explicit avarengse) or in combination with other elenents (implicit avareness). Concepgualized in “te fashion, | avareneas can equip the overana system not 5 only with a means of mien “monitoring” eee activity of tte. compongnts: but also with a basis ‘for atatinguishing between then. This is, however, to Speak metaphorically. In fondetonat & terms, the active anaes is assumed to be: at the sane, time the creator and the perceiver of avareness. Awareness aediates thé element-system relétionship by means of two couplenentary mechanisms gf simulténeous and independent functioning, which will be discussed later. ° Functional constellations and nonspecific + awareness. | unct ional Propertieg of individual neuronal elements are specific properties; they can, in principle, be traced, to a specific physical eysten, the element itself. However, it must be emphasized that neuronal elements do not represent’ ¢ Particular emotions or ideas. The latter are created when a great number of elements function simultaneously, | Such functional combinations have nonspecific properties, properties that cannot be traced to SA one specific 20 : . Affect 7 19 physical’ (systen. Mental states and’patterns, therefore, are nonspecific and vnanatyeadg in this particular sense, as are, by analogy, thé physical + (structural) se of water, Te 48 not clear wliat, oxygen or hydrogen contributes to the physical properties of water; it is only possible to see* BAe ec Preece} reer tiecfiecers[tnetisieoteeei ce etn fungpontag of the neuronal systen and the generation and the experience of awareness canbe 5 conceptualjzed more srealtly by analogy to a light constellation. Imagine ‘a constellation of lightbulbs in which each individual lightbulb is painted a unique color and, ‘consequently, produces a unique pattern of light: In such-a constellation, when a subset of lightbulbs ‘is 6n,. it creates a unique - : nonspecific light pattern. The pattern 18 nonspecific = ite global of properties (1.e., the overall: color of th generated light pattern) are’ creited by ‘group‘unctioning of -severa} lightbulbs and can be traced only to oo the functioning constellation as a whole and’not to any discrete (specific) element (i.e., to aby one Lightbulb). . a . * + «Am thporgant consequence of thig view of avdreness is that changes in avateness occur as a function of changes in the funetioning of underlying netronal elements. At one extreme, abrupt changes, mean sharp awareness of the ae changing elenents. At the othet saegg, no change {5 functioning’ generates no awareness. By analogy, changes in the overall Light Pattern generated by a alae) set “of cblored Lightbulbs can gome about when new lights go.on, old lights go -)' + Gffs and/or when sone dghts go brighter or diame, gt by changing the : = . . « Yegultant light pattern ‘tteelt dito a new form. aeeaa | : } : : Affect fe : 2g. ‘ . . . \ . wa If the present’view is correct, it means that, within certain specifiable - “constraints, the constellation of neuronal ,lenente that are agtiye ata sive moment Will combine to create a unitary functional patter fad, consequently, a unitary feeling “of avarenesd. Evidence for such combinatorial nature of | fwareness coven fron phe eplit-braia research carrted out by Sperry (eos, 1968) ant others. Th¥s evidence suggests that "in the normal brain, the Fight ’ and left heatspherte components coubine and function ag a unit.ia the causal ence of cerebral control. In the divided brain, on the other hand, edch hemtepheric coaponent gets tts own separate Causal effect as 4 distinct entity” (Sperry, 1976, p. 174); in the latter case, each separae J sphere forms its. own unitary functional combinatio4; gach | hemiaphere creates "a mind t- Fe of its own. . . af -Finally, ‘the {nterface between the functionally autoribuous neuronal elements and the nonspecific, postfunctional’ psychological patterns aay be “conceptualized by analogy with’ the concepts of ‘genotype and Yenotype ‘as used in genetied.- At the “genotypic” fneuronal eve), there \are spectalized neuronal elements that can, like genes, paiticipatetln an indefinite auaber of " combizatons. The ,psychological’ level teaelt, however, corresponds to the phenotypic level. Ini ohe same fashion that a wee combination of genes ° acts as a Basie: for the creation of a particular organism with parétqilar Phenotypic, charactéristicg, a partioylar combination of neuronaKgléeents acts to, create a particular paychological structure: The analody, however, breaks down an, far ao the relative’ persanence of phenotypic orgentenic atructures, as opposed to the a, ‘of psychological structures, is concerned.’ Grovn 5 : . ‘i , Affect - a oe . . ie a code : : | oy organisms, cannot be “undone” into their elementary genes, s0 the latter could . each partictpate in ‘some other organism. Psychological structures can, a . presumably, “uncombine,” at the genotyyie level, intp their component neuronal ~~ “+ elenents. , . The Combinatorial Aspects of Mental Fun&tioning ~ . 5 What holds the system together? A system comprising functionally autonomous elements that interact via’ the estab: fhment of transient # —- pooptuncttonal relations constifutes a fully dynante systda. In order to run, mec such a system would have to somehow resolve two problems, both having’to do with how the codplex systen holds together as a unitary coherent entity. 5 . Fist, the component elements would have to have soue way of establishing dynamic relations with the overall pystem and vice versa. Following Bartlett (1932),~ we believe that the mechanism responsible for such interaction. 1s awareness; the active colipqnent elenent is the creator and the perceiver of a untqué féettig of awareness, the¥eby catching, via ite very functioning, the etentiod” of the Sverall system by becoming itself the focal center of awareness ih it. As Bartlett states, awareness gives the. system a way of ane . “turning round upon itself.” 7 . ; Secondly, “the component.” elements . would have to have \qoue way of + eatablighing dynants, relations anong theriselves. What sort of mechanism vould Fender this interaction possible? The functional view assunes that the causal ocue of elenent-elenent interdetion mst also be sought in the -functfoning. of the specialized autonomous “elenent itself. for instance, a functioning a a : elenent can generate a unique pattern of physical energy whose presence in the “element leads’ to initiation of functioning in ‘happen would be 1£ the functioning pf the firer “functional relation between ivo elencnte fe irrelevance 1 Affect 22 systen ean, in turn, serve ao/a sufftetent condition for another spéctalized element, or a constellation; to get activated. consonance, Three types of functional relations\ may be hypotbes zed dissonance, and irrelevance (Festinger, \1957). two” (of ‘more) “neuronal elements are consonant if they aré specialize such that functioning of one he other. One way this cotld leneit resulted in the generation of a unique pattern of energy which\would, in turn, serve as (sufficient) condition for the second element to bein. funettontng. thé functioning of one has no effect on the functioning of the other. - Functional dissonance arises when congonantly related elekents tend ‘to function {n a’ direction’ opposite. to the one required by their consonant’ functioning. Suppose tiie ee between A and B ‘ie abtiyation- | activation and between C \and 8 ie a in Dissonatce will Since this will cause \B \to arise 4£ A and C tend to function simul efnedusly’ fluctuaté ip two ofposite functional directions, namely, activation (dud to stimulation from A) and inhibition (due to stimulation from C). : The simple systen of, postfunctional relations hypothesized here can Provide “a basis for explaining the création and recreation of affective and cognitive patterns.’ Together with ayareness, it also sakes it poasible to sce how component~comydnent and syskea-component interaction pay take Plage. See . o ¥ aatter fs a conbinatorial'- mechanism. '- Any system comprising autSnonous “elenents, must have some’ vay of uabigding WP glready combined’ elements’ in | order for the-latter to be uaéd in w¥conbinatione.’ Tas is ‘accoupliched by whiat titght be "called achena dissolution, Therefore, in principle 4 NOW all schemata-of~the-monent can be characterized by resolution. The’ Ce wed ; ue £ . é eae \ . 5 " re ‘ St e.. . pe | Affect ‘ : ee : “7 6 * of-the-moment " can also be dissolved, dissolving, or undissolved. A dissolved Schema~of-the-moment is one that can maintain a coherent organization only. to the extent that many elements dissonant with it canbe inhibited. The global Ne fee erteeeter(tnclecencle teh eae “unconefocise®s A dissolving. ° . ei _ Hage - + .Schema-of-the~monent is one that is ina state of crisis because, while the “schema is not yet totally disrupted, dissonant elements are being introduced. . An undissolved schena-of-the-uonelt 18 a “stalling” chess which cannot move c : 4n the direction of dissolution because further dtssonant elenents fail to’ get ~ “Antroduegd into it. 4 4, ue _ Nongpectfite Properties of the Schema 5 Tf one considers the configuration of a fountatif at‘a particular point ta time, a set of unique global properties ¢ ‘be identified--the particular + 7 shape, the stiverioh beads or spray, the diffused oMesents, the sound, and so. . on. These are nonspecific properties because, while the fountain consists of. @ great nuaber of specific springs, the ‘properties of the whole fountain cannot be traced to any discrete underlying component; they are the creation of the act of combination. pone ly, every schema-of-the-moment has its “unique global propertiend” TE the fungtional theory 1s correct, the relevant * variables influencing ke global, Properties of the schena-ofghe-moment are .< * such factors ag’ awaréness valence (positive, ‘negative, or neutral), Yesolution/digsslution (résolved, resolving, unresolved, ~ dissolved, + diasolving, or undissolved), ndependent/simultaneous functioning (local or + + global focus), and change (gradual or abrupt). A ‘resolved schena~of-the- - moment cai give rise to such feelings as ‘coherende, completeness, i] 7 . meaningfulness, contentuent, and so on. A'resolviigysqjena-of-tié-nonent may ‘generate suspense, uncertainty, expectation, interestingnese, and anxiety. Similar feelings of avareness nay be associated with unresolved (e.g-, Ancompleteness, discontent), dissolved (e.g-, incoherence, senselessniéss, anomaly), dissolving (e.g-, confusion, puzzlement), and undissolved (e-g-, Stress, restlessness). It,is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in any detail internal state concepts’ in the context of ‘the functional approach. Therefore, - we close thigceftion with the hypothesis that factors governing thgeaning, categorization, and vse of internal state words (see, e.g, Hall _& Nagy, 1979) may Sree the functional dimensions suggested here. Consider, for instance, meaning. Earlier; it vas clained that awarentes is an, fndiepensable aspect. of affective fungtioning. I£ thie is true, tt met souchow be reflected “in the meaning of internal state words. The vnacceptabtlity of (1a)-(le) supports this claim: | * (la)+ T am angry“but Ign not aware of it. “(lb) Father Brown béliévis that God created the world in seven days but he 4s not aware of 14, 7 (1e) TI remember the name of my cousin but I am not aware of it. Im fact, oy the functional theory 48 correct, there to nothing else fo thé meaning of internal state words than ‘ms transient state they refer to. This. eae claim is in digect opposition to the nétion that there exists a permanent representation for the meaning of every word in some alleged senangic netwokk. The fact that (2b) 4s more acceptable than (2a) ° suggests -that our intuitions contradict the pre-existence of such , ‘ representationst ae > Affect 28 mo . . +. Ga) T know the meaping.of the vord structuralisn but I have forgotten “ it. . ia : , (2b) T have Piaget“s book called -Structuralism but I have forgotten Le : where I pave'put it. “FL, . 2 TE forgetting meagt that "I have the meaning represented in ay head but“T fatlto find and to access tt,” as’ sone structuraliete would put 1t, then (2a) would have to be'as azceptabi™as (2b). -Given the functional view, the tera know can only be , ‘eantagfully. applied to the transient «phenotypic peychological Yevel! Tt 4 we we Mithout being ‘avare: of’ it. The unacceptability of (2a) indicates that our often suggested that people might know something Amtuitions contradict this. What ve are not avare of is not (yet) -what we a Moe know; and what we, rémember is not ‘what we retrieve but what we conceive (ereate), e : ‘ = 4 Mental Functioning and the, Self Teadteional research bearing on the phenomenon of affect, especially the reséarch ‘motivated’ by consistency theortes (see, e+g-, Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Neweoab, Rosenberg; & nr 1968), suggests a clone Anterrelationshtp among the self,..dleeghance, and affective valence. The Nature of this interaction, however, is currently unclear. Perhaps the major reason for this ig that, we: know nothing: about the self- beyond , the +f Phenonenological, ordinary language notion of self, a vuattary Homuncular entity capable of performing essentially everything the individual as a whole can do. For instafce, Puccetti (1981) speculated, om the badie of evidence ves, from split-brain .patients, that there are two one in each y hemfsphere. In Her commentary on Puccetti“s article, Churchland (1981) argued that ghe controversy over the musber of selves and their location 1s tke the B* ‘atepate over how many’ angels can dance on the head of the provetb{al pin. The Ts sELe, tke angels and demonsy “ts 00 {11 elements in one area (e.g., the visual cortex) manages tov function independently, by changing ‘ite rate of functioning under exogenous. or endogenous stimulation. The particular area bacones the focus of attention at that moment. Yet at another level of focusing, particular. local elenents in a yi stFe8_ aren ox function Andependenty of other elenents in the sane region “and/or of glenents in other area? y : , If this way of charaétertzing attention 4s correct, there must be two * distinguishable aspects togetention on a given’ cosponent. There mist be an attention phase of short duration. This ve will call the attention-catching © °° aspect, and we bélieve it 1s deternined by independent functioning. ‘There a™st also be an attention phase of variable, and often Ibnget, duration. - This can be called the attention-holding dopect and must be detetained by. similt@ieous functioning. This account of attention 1s cofsistent’ with “the known” neurophysiological and Peychologteal” data on attention. Pribram and e A McGinness (1975), who reviewed this data, conclude Be - nes ae : Theee deirglty distinct and separate attentional dystems--arousal [the short phase], activation [the long phase], and efforb.-operate upon the information protessing* mechanisa. ‘The presumed operdb{on of these « + Contfol systems is perhaps be: it Alluatrated 8 follove: The orienting Yeaction involves arousal but no gctivation;, vigilant readiness involves : : - * : e oS 35 aétivation but ‘no -arousal; the defense reaction \avotves arousal and : “activation; when neither arousal nor activation is present, behavior 19 automatic, that 1s, stimulusrresponse contingencies are direct without the Antervention of any of the control nechanisas of attention. (p.'133) - An obvious difference between our account and that of Pribram and NeGinness is that the present functional view does not allow geurally distinct mechanisue.» On the contrary, the functional, view ‘tmplics that attention must be a distributed’ phenomenon; any@Meronal constellation can become’ the focus. of attention provjded that it functions independently. - tow about the “effort abpect of ~attentton? White” independent + functioning under “the influence of atternal stimulation may take place ta,a 7 more or lees effortless fashion, endogénous independent functioning-—that caused by internal sources Of initiation—often involves the psychological empertence of “effort.” What functional conditions give rise to ‘thie vr experience? We believe it results when an inactive’ elenent or constellation “must get activated under the influence of other already-active elements. In, a other words, active components of the schema-of-the-aonent mist be utilized as 4 source of initiation of functioning in inactive elenents. his 18 pos thle because 1f a component of the schena-of-the-uonent. functions Andependently, tt . generates & characteristic energy pattern that, as we mentioned earlier, can eae serve as a sufficient condition for activating othér elements; as might happen, for instance, when the schema*of-the-mopent already containe an idea _ Yo and we want to verbalize it. At times, this type of functiohal initiation ‘may Anvolve trial and error, and, as Bartlett (1932)shaé noted, it may be only -* Affeét : . 36 Possible through the mediation of awareness. It happens when the global . A structure manages to influence the functioning of local neuronal elements; when the overall system ddnehow tanages to “turn round upon itself.” - wie If the present account’ of attention 1s correct, the interface between the Phenotypic paychological” level’ and the genotypic neuronal level mst .fora a) Gausal_loop. First in this loop comes initiation of functioning in particular neuronal elements. This can happen ii different areas of the nervous system, ' under the influence of different internal or external sources, of “stimulation, and at different tises-elements creating an ided need not . initiate functioning at the same time.” Next comes the combination of thése elements, within themselves ‘and with those that are already actfve, and the creation of particular ideas at the phenotypic Jevels when thi happens, recognition and The idea ts conceived so Pree aa Hens is created, hb-moment—the attention-holding explicit avareness of the just-creatad idea occur: to speak. After this attention-catching phase, i.¢. it can become implicty~in the scheme-of- aspect. This occurs through simultaneous or “choral” ‘functioning of’ the genotypic neuronal clement, when eldments come’ to function harsontously with te participating in the echena-of-the-morient. Once an idea 1s inplfcit “in the schema-of-the~moment, explicit’ awareness, (discrimination) of {t can o¢cur’ only if the underlying neuronal elenent can somehow manage, endogenously “or exogenously, to function independently (i.e., *dhange its rate of functioning toa level different froa that of the scheas-ofsthe-monent). Finally, evs fs : ae Andependent functioning at the genotypic “euronal level generates a unique attern of energy that can serve as a sufficient éondition to initiate Affect 7 “functioning “in other neuronal elenerits, and the causal loop, continues during : all waking hours. - ’ a “ Thus, the functional view provides the concepts for specifying the \ interface between the phenotypic psychological level and genotypte-n functioning. Tt also makes it possible to specify the functional \ tnterrelationship among different regions (1-e., visiial, auditory, aoter, ete.) of the nervous sygien. For instance, at a broad level, the functional c view is consistent with the notions of partial, independence of fective functioning (Zajonc, 1980) Physiological evidence, such as gathered by Olds ' . and his associates (see, e-g-, Olde, 1973), suggests that there are areas of . the brain, sometimes calied the Plépaure/onplessuce regions (Weil, +1974), that . .tey contain the genetypie* neuronal’ eleaente. cunderlying what Zajone (1980) . “calle the preferenda, ‘At the genotypic level, tt te Noneetvabie, ‘therefore, that, titttatton of functioning in the pleasure/unpleagure région can occur before, after, or even without such cognitive ag/s as recognition,” @tscrinination, or avareness ofan idea at the’ phenotypic Ipfel. This ts + because ideas are created“ and are, consequently,’ felt, recognized, or - discriminated only when constellations of elenents required to create thea are Za fully, but.not partially, ina state of functioning. The elenents res} jonsible - “tot the king of an idea, may “be” active “Yong before the constellation responaible tor Lis creation as a whole betones functional and the idea is . ereated. a eS CL - f Zhe creation of the explicit awareness, aq a: discriminatory aechanisa; Resulting from independent unctioning déqerves to .be|menfioned again in : * a . vs Affect a : closing this section. It'is perhaps in reference to such coincidence of functional change and awareness that ‘William James considered-physiological - “changes (such as in heartrpte or, suscular activity) to, be ‘the same as emotions. It is only when our heartrate reaches above its normal rate that we decoue aware of it, or it catches our attention. And everyone has had the experiece of “hearing” the clock only after it stops ticking. . The Functional Approach and Traditional Theories of Affect + > fe present section will summarize this Unlike - current cognitive ne ee several earliér authors ~ concentrated oh the study of affect. research ant ee argue that it is more consistent with a functional theory of affects te = Consistency Theories Several psychologists have assumed that cognitive functioning tends ' toward consonance or consistency (Festinger, 1957; Heidér, 1958; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). Dissdnance,or inconsistency, onthe other hand, gives ride tp negative affect aiid, consequettly, people try to avoid or resolve it. By far the most influential consistency theory has been dibgonance theory, “developed by Featinger and his assoc{ates (Aronson, 1968; Aronson, Carlemithy & Darley, 1963; Carlemith eiaroreon 1963). Aronson pointed out in 1968 that the -najor strength of, Festinger" 's theory is that it constantly aN geperates research (see also Zajouc, 1968, p. 359). Today it continues to do 26 (nee, ©-g., Htgeins, Rhodewalt,”& Zanna, 1979). 39 v In ite original and aoe standard formation, dissonance theory ‘is + Brindefiy,-ecricerned with the” dtesonance between one’ private beliefs and i actions. Inagine subjects" wedeing ‘apvgssay in fayor of a topic to which they 4 are serongty opposed (e.g... the military sdreze). If they do sounder =“ : condtttons ¢ of internal ' justification (e.g., free } chotee, oF , tnsuftictont a), they Ein gGeae their attitude qn @ more » favorable djrection.. If, - on the other hand} they do“ this snder external suscsesintton Geig-s, forced + “eoupliance, ‘or sufftetent reward), no ouch change vould Sour. Acesedtng to “freely chooging ‘to write” a. sounteratefeadioat aay creates Yor" } s o Festinge dtesonance between neue Anvolved 41 I am opposed to the‘milithry draft, and ee 2. 1 am dagaged in writing (auggesting to readers, i . “et . As iw ade of eleieonte consonant with a ‘Aeoreanen, ci dented of _~ desonance yi increase. Subjects ay think that they. are Fighéty oppésed” tos 7 . oa 2 +" + the dratt’ bécause!Anerican youths should not be forced to ight othe people“ ee ward in faravay lands. Simtlarly, if the number of elements dissonang with #2 +. intveases, the Regnitude of dissopance will also neve think that he is being dishonest by, ‘arguing publicly in favor of what he ie ~ ' The. ouBJect may as? ptivately opposed to, Conversely, 1£ tne Gasper of ‘elements dissonant withfl | / + or consonant with #2 increases, the magnitude of dissonance will decrease. . bad : (the Ettse. case, sub Jeet -Bay think that the quality of “american, servicenen * " ‘aed the all-volunteer ray has deteriorated and hao plaged the Uatted States a +, - 4n’a dangerously vulnerable Position militafily. In the skeond ‘case, “they may fe . , 40 : eas To. Fe , . " ‘think they are merely participating in an experiment and by writing the essay * they are doing the-experimenter ¢ favor.) ~ i . . “ on the part of the subject to reduce the dissot taeredhof in the magnitude of dissonance wil izeault in cognitive effort ce. One way to do this is to change one attitude towards a yore favorable one. However, if there 4s 7 external Justification, thei.the latter in itself provides elenents consonant with #2 and, to that extent, there Will be xo dissonance and, therefore, no attitude change. 7 a4 oa Dissonance theortsts have attacked several basic probleas concerning sees functioning and ite relation ‘to cognition. The hypotheses most central to dissosance theory are that digsonance is an unplelsant . state and that tt 1s thts. unpleasantness that motivates (causes) ite resolution. Several authors have also presented evidence bearing on such problems as whether dissonance situations are arousing (Kiesler & Pallak, 1976) or whether te te the avousal or the unpleasantness of diseonance situations thet motivates dissdnance resolution (Higgins, Rhodewalt, & Zana, 1979). a a + FoF yeare dissonance’ research his:been dealing with soae of the nore, ¢ _ destcult probless Of psychology. Perhaps because of the relative vagueness of ‘the concepts ‘ravotveds the research has not attracted the attention of aany modern peychologists. Here, we have defined dissonance at the genotypic ~ _ neuronal level.as well as at the _Phesotyple psychological level. We have also f gifted it relationship with avareneas valence and vith the-eelf. The origtiflY hypothesis of dtesotiance theoty—that the negative valence reculting ‘from the functioning of self-dissonant elements motivates ‘the resolution of fs 4BQY oe _ Felation Affect aL such dissonance--may indeed be an important aspect of the causal loop characterizing the interface between the mind and the brain. Optinal~Levél Theories affective state Optimal-level theorists concentrate on attempts to discover invariant ships between external stimulation and mental functioning. Wundt " (1874) was the first to propose a curve Linking stigulue intensity’ and Stimlue tntensity up toa’ goderate level vas ‘ascuned to be " pleasant,®and beyond this ‘optimal level, yopleasantness vould’ increase with a inerenents in inténaity. During the 1950°s, “evidence accumlated demonstrating that organisus often seek dissonance and prefer It(gee, e.g., Berlyne, 1960). This evidence was difficult to explain in teyfs of the tension-reduction hypothesis of consistency thedries. How c(uld dissonance be pleasant and unpleasant at the same time? The optinal~level fudetion seened to provide an ansver. upon Wundt“s original formulation, psychologists hypothesized "that in order to experience pleasantness, organisms vould haye "yp encounter sonething new (ooasthing different~oba what they were accustomed to) but not too new ( Hebb, 1949, p. 323). Based on this fein called by Hebb (1349) =“ (1958); was. no Longer excuitvoly ~ negative.» Rather, Atscrepancies ip to Building » dissonance or discrepancy, as - optinal level would “be pleasant; those above it were’ assumed to be ee . While optingl-level theorists agreed there - wa proceeds” Carkep $6 Garske, 1977, p. ¥49). that there was an optimal level, Some | arguedthat | the ‘widespread, dteagreeuent "“on the'mechantam by witch optintzation individual. , ! Son wots ms tries fo optimize’ the anount of arousal (e.g., Berlyne, 19603, Hebb, eh Some argued that the Individual * seeks an optinal degree of psychologi “complexity (e.g. Dorfnan, 1965; Safeh | Dorfaan, 1975; iatker, 1973). Others argued for an optinal amount of deviation fron the adaptation ievel (e.g., “Haber,- 19585 \MeClelyand, Atkinson; Clark, & Lovell, 1953). And stilt others Affect ‘Proposed an optimal Level of congruity (@-g., Hunt, 1971). The observation, sade by-optinal"lével theorists, that organtens often osc external stind oa in the: "pence. of any aversive biological or red dztves and ta th absence ef. any overt or covert goale is ‘an Auportants one. "Tapuitant also “fo the’ realization’ that the explanation for this-ust be sought in the © for functioning of the organteaie eystens,’and not dn’ the relatioial propefties ‘hae hold abstract knowledge systems together. o the oe ‘level function very informative. We However, we do not fii bettove se ta an detitate ‘Feauiting fron atlgsete fo relate the organism to the world at the Srong,level a specificity, to pap external stinulatton patterns to: ve the optimal-level ‘research, in spite of ité relatively long fiatory, has not s, faternal peyehdlogteal patterns directly. (This is probably why managed to go beyond sinple perceptual stinul. The functional view maintains that the locus of organtan-earisonngnt, relationship. lies: at ge selon m Neuronal level: It is at this levél that external energy" ‘patterne play .their indispensable role of inietating functioning tn the’ nevonat elenente, elenents that ‘are phylogeaetically or ontogenetically specialized to start functioning in/'the presence of such energy patterns. 5 3 on Affect 43 P . Why do organioms seék external energy patterne? Without entering into much detail, we will uention the elenents’ that are Qecessary for putting together’ an explanation in terms of the functional perspective: ' ¢ . . . 1. Constant independent functioning of neuronal elements in the context of the schema~of-the-monent is absolutely essential if an: internally 2 «consistent (i.e., pogitive) iftherent self is fo be maintained. 1 that the inherent self was the totality of the experience (or ° : awareness pattern) of the moment generated by the funetioning of neuronal élenents throughout the neuronal system. According to thie view, no gimultaneous or independéat functioning means no’ avarenes is "= expertence, and consequently, no gelf. > 2. Endogenous sources of inftiation—internal energy patterns-~are, by , : themgelves, inadequate to keep the ‘resolving schena-of-the-moment constantly alive. This’ is, because some of the elements that ust” e enter the “chain” of combination must depend on external energy f ee tr / Patterns in order to become functional. <” fThe functional theory, therefore, not only can explain why organtens seck : extebfal sthixTation, byt algo “implica ‘tine they must; that 1s, 1 the , Guherent self is to suivive. so mn ae * Tee . + Baychophystologtcal Theor Like many optinal-lev#t theories, poychophystological models suggest that / affective functioning 1s -mediated by the activity of the autonomic arousal, system, William James (1884), the famous Americari psychologist, and Cafl | Lange (1885/1922), the Danish physiologist, defined emotions 17 terns/ of perceived changes ih the activity of the sympathetic and motor eystens. They . a) : » ‘suggested that we are angry because our legs start to shake and our hearts start to pound. ‘a “ ome . Evidence in support of the Jaues-Lange theory comes fron the research es with parapleste or quadriplegte patients. These patients report feeling less -o_ > . enotionalafter the damage to their spinal cord (Hohmann, 1966). They are only capable of getting thinking mad or afraid but not shaking/mad or afraid. * tn 1927, cannon leveled several argunents against the Janeo-Lange theory. e ~ He noted, for. instance, ‘vat the same physiological changes in the rate of functioning of the sympathetic or motor eystens (rapid heart rate, ete.) occur 7 during -2 variety of emotional experiences. Any theory based on merely?these changes vill fail to distinguish different emotions. Cannon hypothesized that } the origin of exctional, experiences just ‘be sought primarily in the activity 7 of the lower portions of the centr: ‘nervous systen. 4 According to s theory devel anley Schachter and his associates 5 (Schachter, 1971; « Schachter & Singex, 1962), the functioning of the sympathetic arousal system and/or the activity of neurons located-in the lower brain centers are not sufficient to account for various emotional experiences. : \' Ratiter, the activity of other (cognitive) brah centers must also be considered. jased on this view, arousal 1s a general functional state that e Can be interppeted and iabsied ‘as different emotions depending on situational . ctreumstgnees. Evidence for Schachter’s peychophystologtcal theory cones fro a controvpretal experiment conducted by Schachter. and Singer (1962). “In this expefinent, ‘the sdae Physiological state of arousal, induced by injection of nF * Affect . : 45 « ‘ , . : 3 epinephrine, was interpreted by some subjects as “anger” and by wothers as “euphoria,” depending on whether the subject vatnea @ stooge act angrily or euphorically. Schachte: 8 theory te consistent with the present functional view maintaining that an enotion is a nonspecific functional state created by he totality of active neuronal elements ofthe moment, located at various tions of the neuronal network. aptetea 1 Overview ° ~ 7. 7 ~The theories discussed above can lead to one general cofclusion: "Affect (emotional experience) is a consequence of the functional interaction anong ° various dynamic mechanisms of mental, functioning. “the functional approach argues that the causal cei for thts interaction are physically unitary, “functionally autonomous, and dtétributed neuronal elenents. Stmitaneous and independent functioning of these elentnte- are responsible for, the’ creation and Among the advantages of the functional “perspective is its explanatory Power. With only a” few basic assumptions, it plausibly brings such Peychological. phenoaena as attention (broad or focused) and avarene: (explicit or implicit) under the control of the sane nechgnieus, namely, Xf simultaneous and independent sungbtoning. Platsible ‘solutions can also “be L offered to traditionally controversial problems. As an example, consider the quéstion of Jocattegeton Of mental functions in the brain. Early favestigators tried to locate separate ‘neural centers for such complex A. behavior as reading English or French (iinshelwood, 1900). Lashley“s (1929) classte expecinent with rate demonstrated that it was the amount of brain . uaitigation of transient mental structures. a : . , Affect : u . . 46 Cd tissue destroyed, and notso mich the destruction of specific’ areas, that ‘correlated with the animal“s behavior. This led to the conclusion that the brain acts. as a mass and all areas are equipotential. @ore recent neurophysiological research (e.g., Heath, 1964; Heath & Gallant, 1964; Olds & - Milner, 1954) has provided evidence supporting finer localizations. a -correct, there can be ao isoncrphioa between mental or behavioral structures and neural Structures, in the sane fashion that one would not expect to find individual genes of unique gene cosbtaatio for whole bodily orgatis such ae‘the lungs, for fcemee, Even the a Psychological patterns are created by the functioning of * many neuronal, elenents, located at various areas of the bécin. (For a discussion of how “reaote” coamunteation anong neuronal elenents can take place, ee Tran-Hejad & Ottony, Hote 21). This indicates that reaoval of @ particular elenent or .. particular local group of elesenta cane’ be expected to eliminate any specific behavio# and only that behavior.” Rather, removal of brain tissue + should have a gross effect on a host of behaviors “ tuplications o! he functional approach for earch concerning the nature of - dntrinsic activation, Many poychologiers, have naintained ‘that ageective valence (pleasadtness/unpleasantness) is the primary , motivational factor. Consistency theories, for instance, belleve that resolution of inconsistency” fe motivated by the” unpleasantness that it generates. ‘ Optinal-level theorists, 1fke Berlyne, have suggested that the activity .of some unitary . + arousal systen is the Primary sotivational factor by virtue of its effect on Boat: : 4B: + Finally, for the sake of illustration, we will discuss some enpirical ‘ . Affect . sO p - a7 the functioning of the pleasure/unpleasure system. The functional view, on the other hand, implies that the primary source of intrinsic motivation must also be sought in the siéultaneous or independent functLoning ae This is because of distributed neuronal constellations. such functioning is the causalew “origin of avareness valente, attention, the taherent self, and’ the acquired pt-ot-setts = First, independent functioning, togetter with simultapeous functioning, is the sole perpetual creator of the fnherent self—the totality of the 1. . soe ‘awareness experience of the moment. Without independent functioning the inherent self ceases to exist; that is, the organism goes to sleep. The only time-this can happen is when endogenous and exogenous conditions are right. for the organism to da so. Othervise,+independent functioming (1.e., activation of positive or self-consonant constellations and inhibition of ‘negative or self-dissonant constellatiofis) cust take, place to keep the inherent self alive. ~ and “ py:" And, since endogenous sources of initistion of functioning are often inadequate for continued promotion of independent. functioning, the, only other real option for'the organism is to engage in active or passive exposure to! external sources of inttiation, "y S ° * Secondly, 1t-ts through independent functioning that the organism can _Pecoe explicitly aware “of the conponents of ‘the ene of self (4ie., the famediate or long-ters coieerns and goals). Kecall that “it ie through Independent functioning that interaction between the systen as a vhole’ and {te components (inclsdiag those involved tn the acquired concept of self) 1 possible (see the, section on the combinatorial aspect). No fndependent _ : : oo . 48 functioning of a particular couponent vould mean no explicst avareness of it 7 and, consequently, there would be no way of “determining” the extent to which ‘that component is, for instance, consonant or dissonant with the self. Thus} F + the self. It is, therefore, reasonable to agsume that it is the primary Sottvattonsi-necheatone! — : a “1g sndopendent and simultaneous functtontng are as Amportant the functtonat view implies, then they aust sonchow aantfest thesselves in aentel YS Sexperience. Are, there’ any poychologtcal experiences that could be assumed to % \ correspond to then?’ Surprise, excitement, _suspenses curiosity, and f dnterestingness seem to be candidates, depefiding on the- type of schena-of- 2 the-nonent (188, resotved, Fesolving, ete:). There nay also be othere ouch Bas the socalled, “click” of comprehension. p11 of these .s@em to possess the attention - cateiiing/hélding quality they are expected to have. Furthermore, ‘they all seen to cqrrelate with avareness as independent or simultaneous i * funetfoning vould ‘Recessitate. Therefore, they say\indeed be Payéhologieat nanifestations df the functioning of distributed neuronal eleneate- + If dnterestingness, for “example, is. to be defined as an inherent - consequence of * biological functioning, such a definition must be conofotent with what is knoim about the concept of intérestingness. Por tustance, it-~ 48 generally * agreed that both positive ee experiences can be . ‘ ; interesting. To the extent that this 1e.the c: one would expect Banipulations of independent functioning te be interesting regardless of whether théy davolve positive or negative ‘components. We have recently ‘ gathered sone data that support this hypothesis. ‘ 7 BS ‘ : edt fl - independent functioning is essential for the maintenance of both aspects of 2 ~ Affect > ‘The actual framework uses passages which consist of two parte: a stem and an ending. Subjects read the stem, whith contains/does not contain, inplicttly or explicitly, events that follow in an ending. In thie fashion, - it 46 possible to present subjects with endings that are, totally expected (at © ong extrene), because they are also stated im the, sten ("no” independent functioning), totally unexpected (at the other extrehe) because the aten does not: allow subjects to entertain the idea of the events in the oo (abrupt dadependent functioning), or lie somewhere in between (gradual“independent functioning). Subjects can, then, rate thir experience on various affective scales innediately after they finish reading the ending. Included anong the rating scales were several measures of valence, an imterestingness scale, an empathy scale, and several measures of dissonance (incongruity). A preliminary prinetple-components dnalysis. shoved that aD interestingness, valenge, and ‘incongruity loaded on three separate factors, thdieating qualitative differences underlying judgaents of these variables. How does thé funct4onal. model specify these underlying differences? Incongruity differs. from independent functioning in that the former involves dissonant funcdideing. Independent functioning of a constellation /zeans haraontous (éonsonant) functioning of the elements of the constellation} ‘and subsequent staultancous functioning meang consonance with the scheas-of-the- mosent. While dissonant (incongruous) functioning ueans just the opposite. It ie this harmonious functioning that allows the attention catching/holding . 5 ‘ ' aspect that seems to be the basis for the-judgment of interestingnesy. -In d48sbnant functioning atteB¢ion fluctuates among the dissonant coupon: consequently, results in confision. | - “y ae : 51 , ee How does ‘sntereetingnesp' dtffer fron valerice? Consider, a partiéular Jocal component of the schena-of-the-aonent, eay, a constellation in the vioual cortex. Independent functioning of thie constellation means” a change - in the wisual cortex in%the functioning of this constellation as compared to the functioning of ether components of the schena-sf-the-monent in other - Fegions of the brgin. There are two wepects to tht ere Attention ‘catching/hélding aspect: The very ‘act of independené sizultaneous functioning “results in focal or broad attention and, consequently, in che judgment gf interestingness. The second aspect “is the | evar goss va the act Pe functioning is assumed to generate.’ This is the Basis for the Judgnent of vaience. Thus, while attentiod (hence, Anterestingness), 18 common to all instances of independent and staultaneous functioning, awareness (hence, valence) is a property of the particular a functioning constelldtioi 4 : zi ’ By providing the basis for identifying and plausibly defining a host ’ of factors and méchanisus that are assumed to figure centrally in affective functioning, we have. ee a plausible characterization of affect. These ~ factors and nechantens (e-g., valence, independent and simultaneous functioning, specialization, Fesolution and, dissolution) are indepetdent of | / pareiGitar knowledge structures and are, therefore;” candidates for ‘(or «> manifestations of) domain-independent universal principles. This functional Wer of cognitive/affective universals nay be contrasted with the structural approaches that’ hypothesize. domain-specific universals such as universal story \ schemata (e.g-,.Mandler, Seribner, Cole, & DeForest, -1980). To be sure, People from différent cultures nay share ‘sone sort of eschena for stories, in "the same vay that people from most mollera cultures may share a schena for Wehtcles. Hoyever, we ,beliéve ouch “donain-spectfic stractures are not . : .eultatde candidates for cognitive untversals. People who Lived ore’ than hundred years ago had a perfectly normal cognitive system without schemata for eltise asthe _the_telephone,_or_nodern_vehicles-—By———_—— contrast, pathological congétions could be suspected 1f the components of, ait * Individual’ neuronal system were incapable of denonstrating independent or simultaneous functioning at the genotypic neuronal level, or if a person were - > fMpenatie to experience eurtosity; suspense, oF avarenesés at the phenotype : Poychological level. It might be argued that prevgxtoting’ ‘schemata or paris are necessary for the experience of curiosity or suspense. But euch Peychological experiences can be explained at least as clearly in terms of the internal consjetency of tiie components of the schena-of-the-uonent, determined, by the functional properties of the participating elements. Finally, we must say sonething about the rolé of stfuctural analysis in a functional” os In recent years, stgntfteant achievements have been mide in the analytical approaches'to language and inavledge sbructu‘es. The “treet! Ygoal of this: research has been to develop structural representations, consisting of franes and transformations.” oe a, & : The functional approach; assunes that attempts at ae analysis of < Cobnitive structures with ‘the aia of utldiag structural Tepfqsentat fons of Peychological validity can serve only atthe onpense, of operating, at the wrong level of spectttesty. Knowledge structures are unanalyzable. and cannot be _ nee LX | 53° . Affect a 4 . . 8 7 7 oN . ; nO : ij : = , specified to the extent that a finite set of precise algorithms (of the nature tiplication rules, for , instance) would require in order to allow the construction OF a formal strictural description. This is espectaily true of ae 1 1 wy . + global affective structuras. 7 ie a - 4 » : vIn tHe functional approach, structural analysis is Gnly ‘an intermediate ~ tool. It takes the form of semi-arbitiary, heuristic, rather’ than precise, algorithmic analyses. While such heuristic rules may éven have indispensable ~ - practical value, they are never attributed psyehological statue. Their value io determined to the extent that .they serve to clarify the nature of , independently specified, functional properties of the nervous ° system. - Puriettonal analysis and structural anglysis go‘ fidhd in hand, but- the former comes first. I Summary, ‘This paper presents a point of view on affect that starkly contiaste with Soe 5 structural theories of enotion. The finctional view maintains that notional ‘experiences must be described in terms of functional properties of . underlying neuronal elements and not in terms of properties of abstract emotional . ’ structures. ° mo . ee _Strietural théories ‘have been+ Particularly slov in dealing with the problea of affect. We argued that this aay very Well be because they cannot do so. This arguaent was supported by the fact thatthe majority of existing theorfes of’ enotion are, essentially functional aad by the fact that the ' . recently energing atructural theories of aifect _SEtgh ¢ choose to ignore this tich wealth of theoretical and ‘ompiiical knowledge. . SO; . heen definitely solved” (p. 188). ti "1980, Minsky “found it necessary to “warn; “things” tp. 118). * , ue y e foie thoughts dnd "enotions, there is Ree deal of in _afototosicat theorizing” to, Pecone » involved with concepte y : Agnoring affect, pointing out “that pet Jay. for, them, oe problens of Reso obly to-be taken up efter, the Bimpler ones. of ‘the present have é seas that” “feelings and viewpoints.. vp. « [md actually be] the simpler We fos that wiiat. cufrently separates: peyghological. and neutological concept vis the absence of a plausible Language to bridge the gap. We think” ’ enh fetsonal approach has ithe potential for providing thts rallase, . 5° Reference Notes - “ an . . 1+ Lehnert, W. G. Affect units and narrative summarization (Research Report + - No. 179). New Haven, conn: Yale University, Department of Computer ‘ Setence, 1980., + Tran-Nejad, As, & Ortony, A. Cognition: An Nglternative view. 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Though the latter is" in principle possible; dt presusably never occurs. In reality, ‘several (hundred) neurons function at any given time to create an idea and/or to focus on a certain aspect of it in a particular region of “the brain; ideas are not created locally, while images probably are. : Neuronal elements creating a particular idea or weaning are ‘distributed in vartovd areas throughout the nervous aystea. ne

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