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APPELLANTS INFORMAL BRIEF


Case No. 15-35963
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: DENISE SUBRAMANIAM
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM
Defendant Petitioner
v.
LNV CORPORATION
Plaintiff Respondent
Gabrielle D. Richards
Respondent
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the
District of Oregon Portland Division
Respondent
Judge Michael W. Mosman
Respondent

From the United States District Court


District of Oregon Portland Division
Judge Michael W. Mosman Presiding
Case No. 3:14-cv-01836

PARTIES OF INTEREST

Denise Subramaniam
c/o 1905 SE 24th Ave
Portland OR 97214
503-764-5300

Gabrielle D. Richards
Martin & Richards, LLP
111 SW Fifth Ave, Suite 3150
Portland, OR 97204
503-444-3449
Fax: 503-296-5834
Email: gabby@cascadialawyers.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Pro se Petitioner

Counsel for LNV Corporation


Appellants Informal Brief

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Erick J. Haynie
Perkins Coie, LLP
1120 NW Couch Street
10th Floor
Portland, OR 97209-4128
503-727-2017
Fax: 503-727-2222
Email: ehaynie@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Counsel for LNV Corporation

Jeffrey M. Peterson
Perkins Coie, LLP
1120 NW Couch Street
10th Floor
Portland, OR 97209-4128
503-727-2075
Email: jeffreypeterson@perkinscoie.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Counsel for LNV Corporation

APPELLANTS INFORMAL BRIEF


Originating from the United States District Court District of Oregon Portland
Case No. 3:14-cv-01836
RELATED CASES
Subramaniam v. Beal et al, 3:12-cv-01681-MO;
Subramaniam v. Beal, 3:14-cv-01482-SI
Subramaniam v. Beal et al, 3:15-cv-02002-MO
ADDITIONAL RELATED CASES ARE NOTICED SEPARATELY
AND MADE PART OF THIS BRIEF
NOTICE: Appellant and the other parties in opposition to LNV Corporation, or other corporate
fiction alter egos for D. Andrew Beal, in the additionally noticed related cases are in fact victims
of a crime specific to prohibited racketeering activities pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 1961 et seq.
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO).

Appellants Informal Brief

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APPELLANTS INFORMAL BRIEF

Here comes Appellant/Defendant, Denise Subramaniam, self-represented, hereafter

referred to as Ms. Subramaniam, incorporates herein her other pleadings in this

court and appeals the summary decision of District Court Judge Michael W.

Mosman in Case No. 3:14-cv-01836 granting Appellee LNV Corporations motion

for summary judgment to foreclosure against Ms. Subramaniam and awarding

LNV Corporation, hereafter referred to as LNV a monetary judgment on a

forged promissory note, and hereby requests that this Appellate Court reverse said

summary judgment and dismiss LNVs complaint against Ms. Subramaniam with

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prejudice for the following reasons:

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I. LNV FAILS TO STATE A FORECLOSURE CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF


CAN BE GRANTED BECAUSE LNV LACKS STANDING TO SUE

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LEGAL ARGUMENT

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A. Applicable Pleading Standard

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A Rule 12(c) motion may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal

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theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

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theory. Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 Fed. Appx. 489, 493 (9th Cir.

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2009) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must allege facts that are sufficient to

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raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A court is not required

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to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Ashcroft v.


1.

Appellants Informal Brief

Brief

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Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Further, the court need not accept

allegations as true if they are contradicted by documents before the court.

Hawkins v. First Horizon Home Loans, No. 10-1876, 2010 WL 4823808, *9

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010); see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d

979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a court need not accept as true

allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metro. Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67, 70 (9th

Cir. 1957) ([J]udicial notice may be taken of a fact to show that a complaint

does not state a cause of action.).

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B. LNV Lacked Standing To Sue From The Outset

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The Supreme Court has made it clear that the burden of establishing standing

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rests on the plaintiff, and in this action - on LNV Corporation.

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DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 342, n.3; FWIPBS Incorporated v.

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Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990):

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All the theories plaintiffs have offered to support their standingare


unavailing. Because plaintiffs have no standingthe lower courts erred by
considering their claims against it on the merits. The judgment of the Sixth
Circuit is therefore vacated in part, and the cases are remanded for
dismissal

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At each stage of the litigation-from the initial pleading stage, through summary

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judgment, and trial- LNV must carry that burden. In Lujan v. Defenders of

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Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) the Supreme Court states:


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One of those landmarks, setting apart the Cases and Controversies that
are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III-serv[ing] to identify
those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)-is the doctrine
of standing.
In Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) the Supreme Court states:
Although we have acknowledged before that the concept of Art. III
standing has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the
various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it, Valley
Forge, supra, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 475, certain basic principles have been
distilled from our decisions. To establish an Art. III case or controversy, a
litigant first must clearly demonstrate that he has suffered an injury in
fact. That injury, we have emphasized repeatedly, must be concrete in
both a qualitative and temporal sense. The complainant must allege an
injury to himself that is distinct and palpable, Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 501, as opposed to merely [a]bstract, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U. S. 488, 414 U. S. 494 (1974), and the alleged harm must be actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U. S. 95, 461 U. S. 101-102 (1983). Further, the litigant must satisfy the
causation and redressability prongs of the Art. III minima by showing
that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action, and is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 38, 426 U. S. 41 (1976);
Valley Forge, supra, 454 U.S. at 472. The litigant must clearly and
specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy these Art. III standing
requirements. A federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by
embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing. See Warth,
supra, 422 U.S. at 508, 422 U. S. 518.

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Standing must exist on the date LNV filed the complaint and throughout the

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litigation. Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008).

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Moreover, standing cannot be conferred by agreement. E.g. even if a

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predecessor had standing to bring this action (which none does), LNV cannot

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establish standing based on standing of some predecessor. Ms. Subramaniam


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can challenge standing at any time in the litigation, including on appeal. In

some circumstances, the court may challenge standing sua sponte. Ms.

Subramaniam challenges LNV's standing to bring its judicial foreclosure action

in the U.S. District Court.

The United States Supreme Court states: We are obliged to examine standing

sua sponte where standing has erroneously been assumed below. See Steel Co.

v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) ( [I]f the record

discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the

defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it ) (quoting

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United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936)). Adarand Constructors

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Incorporated v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001). By contrast, courts of appeal

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are obliged to examine standing under all circumstances. See, e.g., Wyoming

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Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 165 F.3d 43, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

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LNV Corporation must demonstrate standing for each claim and each request

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for relief. Monsanto Company v. Geerston Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754

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(2010) (plaintiffs must demonstrate standing to pursue each form of relief

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sought); Davis, 554 U.S. at 734; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105

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(1983). LNV alleges a single cause of action for judicial foreclosure and must

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demonstrate standing to prosecute that claim. There is no supplemental

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standing: standing to assert one claim does not create standing to assert claims

arising from the same nucleus of operative facts. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at

353. LNV's sole claim is for judicial foreclosure vis-a-vis an alleged promissory

note arising from an alleged beneficial interest in Ms. Subramaniam's deed of

trust, the end result of a purported Assignment of Deed of Trust from

Residential to LNV on March 10, 2008. The issue of LNV's lack of standing

has not been fully examined in this litigation.

Should this Appellate Court find that LNV lacks standing, then the District

Courts summary judgment favoring LNV must be reversed; and LNVs action

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in the lower court must be dismissed. And since LNV' s lack of standing cannot

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be cured by an action or inaction of any predecessor or LNV, the dismissal

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should be with prejudice.

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LNVs Purported Original Note is a Forgery

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LNV's principal claim of injury is that it is holder of an original Mortgage

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Promissory Note (Note) and original Deed of Trust securing Ms.

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Subramaniams property originally executed between Ms. Subramaniam and

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Peoples Choice Home Loans on February 10, 2004; and that Ms. Subramaniam

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defaulted on the Note. Even Judge Mosman admitted that if the Note is a

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forgery then LNV has no standing to sue Ms. Subramaniam:

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THE COURT: Well, if she's in default on a note that's forged, then she's
not in default in a way that matters for our case, right? You have to have an
authentic note for her to be in default on it, don't you? Isn't that sort of the
basic foundation of foreclosure? See District Court Document 92-1
Transcript of the Status Conference Hearing held on July 8, 2015 attached
hereto as Exhibit A-1.

It is discernible to every person who has seen the photographs Ms.

Subramaniam took on August 21, 2015 of LNVs purported original Note

that is a digitally altered forgery.

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See DktEntry 7-12 Page 6 of 7

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See DktEntry 7-12 Page 6 of 7


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A pressure indent on the reverse page is clearly visible in the high resolution

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close-up of Dana Lantrys signature on the back of the last page of the

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purported original Note executed in 2004. It is the ONLY signature with

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such a pressure indent on the document. Dana Lantrys endorsement

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purportedly conveys the Note from LaSalle Bank National Association, as

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Trustee for certificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC

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Asset Backed Certificates Series 2004-HE4\ to Peoples Choice Home Loan,

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Inc. However a close-up examination shows problems further identifying it as

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a forgery. A portion of the S in Peoples is cut off see image on

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following page. This is evidence that digital cut & paste was used to create this

endorsement. Writing is clearly seen under the letters A and N on the

stamped word CANCELLED. A close-up shows it to be in blue ink. This

endorsement originally had something else on the Pay To The Order Of line.
Something else was written on the line
under Pay To The Order Of it is clearly
visible behind the letters A and N

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Zoom in on
this and blue
ink is clearly
visible under
the stamp.

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See DktEntry 7-12 Page 5 of 7

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So there can be no room for doubt that this is an altered document. On the

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following page is a high resolution enlargement from the original photograph

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taken by Ms. Subramaniam.

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A photo of the reverse side of Ms. Subramaniams signature on the purported

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original Note (on the following page) shows no pressure indent like what is

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seen behind the Dana Lantry signature. This indicates the Lantry signature is

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recent; mostly likely made by a Beal employee in 2014 just before LNV filed

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its foreclosure complaint against Ms. Subramaniam.

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Other problems exist on this document that further point to it being a forgery

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and not a genuine original as LNV claims.

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See DktEntry 7-12 Page 7 of 7

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Judge Mosman Granted LNV Summary Judgment Solely on the Basis of


What Can Only Be A Perjured or Fraudulently Obtained Declaration by
Dana Lantry

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Judge Mosman erred when he relied exclusively on the declarative testimony of

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Dana Lantry as his basis for granting LNVs motion for summary judgment; see

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DC Document 108 and 108-1 attached hereto as Exhibit A-2. The Dana Lantry

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declarative testimony did not settle the questions of authenticity specific to

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LNVs purported original Note. Nor does it definitively authenticate the

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Dana Lantry signature on the Note because Dana Lantry admitted she did not
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recall signing the Note or the allonge bearing her signature. In her declaration

she specifically states:

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I reviewed the Note and allonges at issue in this lawsuit at the request of
Ms. Richards. I have no specific recollection of signing the allonge that
bears my name (I signed thousands of allonges during my career). I can
definitively say that the signature on the allonge is my own. The Note and
allonges are attached to this declaration as Exhibit 1.

A forged signature is intended to look like the signature being imitated. Ms.

Subramaniam has contended that Andy Beal and his employees use signatures

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digitally stored in the LPS Desktop Database. (Lender Processing Services

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Software is admittedly used by the Beal entities and their agents as per the

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deposition of Brett Malloney, see DktEntry 7-17 Page 22 26 of 322. And LPS

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was the corporate vehicle used in the crimes of Lorraine Brown, United States

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of America v. Lorraine Brown. Case No. 3:12-cr-198-J-25 MCR. (MD. Fla.))

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When forgeries are made by a method using electronic or digital copy, alter

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and paste the signatures would actually be Dana Lantrys but she never signed

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the documents in question. Her signature was electronically or digitally lifted

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from another document then placed unto the Subramaniam mortgage

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instruments to make appear that she signed it. It is extremely easy to do such

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digital alterations using software like Adobe Photoshop. The characteristics

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shown in the photographs on the previous pages indicate this is a cut & paste

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type of forgery.
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Forensic examination is required for definitive authentication. Enough

problems exist to show a genuine issues of material fact exists and Judge

Mosman erred in granting LNVs motion for summary judgement.

The Dana LantryDeclarative Testimony Is Less Than Truthful

Ms. Richards failed to show Dana Lantry an assignment of deed of trust

executed on December 29, 2005 also endorsed with her signature and recorded

in Washington County Oregon on June 28, 2006 as instrument # 2006-077542.

(Dana Lantry does not state in her declaration that this assignment was shown

to her nor is this assignment included in the exhibit attached to her declaration.)

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This assignment purports to convey beneficial interest from Peoples Choice

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Home Loan, Inc. to Homecomings Financial Network; see DktEntry 7-9 Pages

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1 & 2 of 6, while the allonge to the Note purports to convey the Note to

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Residential Funding Company, LLC. (This allonge is attached as the exhibit to

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the Lantry Declaration.) On the allonge Dana Lantry is Vice President and

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on the assignment of deed of trust she is Asst. Vice President.

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Although Dana Lantry states in her declaration, I held various titles at Peoples

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Choice, including Vice President and Assistant Vice President. She would not

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have held both titles on or around the same day. The Note and deed of trust

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would have been conveyed together; and since the assignment is the only

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document with an execution date of December 29, 2005 it can be assumed this

conveyance of the mortgage (if a legitimate conveyance took place, which it did

not) occurred on the same date.

Had Ms. Richards shown Dana Lantry this assignment it is most certain that a

35-year veteran of the mortgage industry would have noticed the bifurcation

problem created by an assignment of the deed of trust to one party while the

Note is conveyed to a different party; and the problem with her having two

different titles on or around the same day. It is unlikely an honest mortgage

industry professional would have made such a mistake. If Dana Lantry had been

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shown the assignment, it is probable she would have refused to sign the

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declaration as prepared by Ms. Richards because she would not have admitted

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to making such an obvious error.

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Ms. Richards most certainly knew Dana Lantry would notice the authenticity

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problems if she were shown the assignment of the deed of trust alongside the

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allonge. It appears Ms. Richards intentionally withheld the assignment from

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Dana Lantry with intent to deceive her so Ms. Richards could solicit a less than

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truthful declaration from her to use against Ms. Subramaniam.

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Furthermore the Dana Lantry Declaration contradicts what she said in the audio

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taped phone conversation with Ms. Subramaniam submitted to the District


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Court [Document # 104]. One fact of importance is that Dana Lantry says she

would not have signed allonges or assignments of deeds of trust when she

worked for Peoples because Peoples used MERS exclusively and MERS took

care of that. Ms. Subramaniams mortgage was in fact in MERS. This is

evidenced by the Declaration of William J. Paatalo entered into the related

District Court Case 3:12-cv-01681-MO as Document 91 (LNV included this

related case with their complaint so it is part and parcel with the present case).

The Paatalo Declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit A-3. Also attached

hereto as Exhibit A-4 is a MERS print from July 16, 2016. It is indisputable

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fact that Ms. Subramaniams mortgage was in MERS. Interestingly when Ms.

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Subramaniam entered her social security number to reveal the Investor it is

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JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. fka EMC the same entity shown to be the

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Servicer. No assignment to or from EMC, JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. or

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MERS was ever recorded; nor is there any assignment to or from any party to

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the Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE4. Although Ms.

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Richards claims that under Oregon law the deed of trust follows the note and

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doesn't require recordation of the deed of trust see DC Document 92-1 Exhibit

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X-T, Page 13 of 29, once a mortgage has been securitized, as the Subramaniam

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mortgage indisputably was, the Trusts Pooling and Servicing Agreement

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(PSA) is the binding contract as to whether or not assignments are in fact

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required. In the section of the PSA titled Governing Law; Jurisdiction it

states:

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This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State
of New York, and the obligations, rights and remedies of the parties
hereunder shall be determined in accordance with such laws.

Oregon law is not the controlling law specific to the assignments of deed of

trust in this case because as per the Paatalo Declaration (See Exhibit A-3) the

PSA explicitly states:

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CONVEYANCE OF TRUST FUNDREPRESENTATIVES AND


WARRANTIES

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Section 2.Ol CONVEYANCE OF TRUST FUND.

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Pursuant to the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, the Seller sold,


transferred, assigned, set over and otherwise conveyed to the Depositor,
without recourse, all the right, title and interest of the Seller in and to the
assets in the Trust Fund.

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The Seller has entered into this Agreement in consideration far the purchase
of the Mortgage Loans by the Depositor pursuant to the Mortgage Loan
Purchase Agreement and has agreed to take the actions specified herein.

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The Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery hereot hereby
sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the Trustee for
the use and benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right,
title and interest of the Depositor in and to the Trust Fund.

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In connection with such sale, the Depositor has delivered to, and deposited
with, the Trustee or the Custodian, as its agent, the following documents or
instruments with respect to each Mortgage Loan as assigned: (i) the original
Mortgage Note, including any riders thereto, endorsed without recourse to
the order of LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for
certificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC Asset
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-HE4, and showing an unbroken chain of
endorsements from the original payee thereof to the Person endorsing it to
the Trustee
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The Trust's Prospectus states, Assignments of the mortgage loans provided


to the custodian on behalf of the trustee will be recorded in the appropriate
public office for real property records, pg. S-24.

The operative words are WILL BE RECORDED and this did not happen.

The fact that this did not happen is a breach of the contract governed by New

York law.

Ms. Subramaniam has the right to challenge the authenticity of assignments,

and the lack thereof, in light of the landmark decision in Yvanova v. New

Century Mort. Corp., 62 Cal. 4th 919 (Feb. 18, 2016), which resulted in a

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change in law in the Ninth Circuit: Gieseke vs. Bank of America, NA., et al,

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9thCCA, Case No. 14-16651, (Cal. May 20, 2016); see also David Newman v.

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Bank of New York Mellon, et al, Case No. 13-17297, D.C. No. 30 1:12-cv-

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01629-AWIGSA (Cal. May 13, 2016).

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In David Newman v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al this court stated in its May

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13, 2016 order reversing in part and remanding in part:

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The district court dismissed Newmans claims for declaratory relief, quasi
contract, violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, violations of
California Business & Professions Code section 17200, and accounting
because the court determined that a borrower like Newman has no standing to
challenge a foreclosing entitys legal authority to foreclose. But while this
appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Yvanova v. New
Century Mortgage Corp., 365 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2016), which clarified that
borrowers do have standing to challenge a foreclosing entitys authority to
foreclose once the foreclosure has occurred. Id. at 86061. And it appears
that Newmans home was recently foreclosed on, bringing him within the
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class of people who have standing to bring these kind of claims. We therefore
reverse the district courts dismissal of these claims for the district court to
apply intervening California case law in the first instance.

Like with Newman Ms. Subramaniams home was recently foreclosed on,

bringing her within the class of people who have standing to bring these kind of

claims.

Suspect Jason J. Vecchio endorsed Allonges

Other issues of authenticity raised by Ms. Subramaniam in her pleadings in the

district court specific to the LNVs claim that it holds the original Note is the

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fact that on the second allonge endorsed by Jason J. Vecchio as Post Funding

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Manager of Residential Funding Company LLC, see DktEntry 7-13, the

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purported Jason J. Vecchio signature is a spot-on match to the Jason J.

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Vecchio signatures on nearly identical allonges to Notes LNV has produced in

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five other foreclosure cases related to Ms. Subramaniams and noticed as such,

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see DC Document 59 & 59-1, attached hereto as Exhibit A-5. These purported

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Jason J. Vecchio signatures do not match his known signatures; and in March

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2008 when these signatures were purportedly made the real Jason J. Vecchios

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legal name was Jason J. Vecchio-Smith. He was a commissioned Notary

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Public and Jason J. Vecchio-Smith was his official signature. A court

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document shows that in September 2010 the Hennepin County District Court of

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Minnesota granted Jason Vecchios application for a change of name to Jason

J. Vecchio see DktEntry 7-13.

These allonges with the spot-on-matching Jason J. Vecchio signatures were

forensically examined and found to be suspect. Since they are spot-matches

one to the other further evaluation is required to determine is one or if none of

them is a genuine wet-ink signature. It is already established fact that they

cannot all be genuine signatures. See the OMNI Report DC Document 101-3

attached hereto as Exhibit A-6 also see DktEntry 16-4.

In a North Carolina case where a stamped indorsement was on the note instead

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of an original signature the Court held that the stamped indorsement failed to

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establish holder status. See In re Bass (N.c. App., 2011). When affirming the

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dismissal of summary judgment the Court reasoned:

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The omission of a handwritten signature with respect to the challenged


stamp is competent evidence from which the trial court could conclude that
this particular stamp was not executed by an authorized individual and is
therefore facially invalid indorsement. Thus, even if Respondent had failed
to object to the stamp, which it did not, the burden properly remained upon
Petitioner to prove its validity. We further note it would be illogical to place
this particular burden upon Respondent, as Petitioner is in possession of the
Note and is in the best position to prove or disprove the authenticity of the
signatures included thereon. See Bank of Statesville v. Blackwelder
Furniture Co., II N.C. App. 530, 532, 181 S.E.2d 785, 786 (1971) (holding
that the burden of establishing the authority behind an indorsement was
properly placed on the bank because as a purchaser of the instrument, [the
bank] was in the best position to inform itself as to the authority of the
seller-indorser). Because we cannot presume the authenticity of this stamp
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as a signature, and because Petitioner offered no evidence establishing its


authenticity other than the Note itself, the stamp is a valid signature only if
it is selfauthenticating.

It is well settled by the decisions of other courts, and by approved text-writers,

that words written on the back of a negotiable instrument, purporting to be an

indorsement by which the instrument was negotiated, do not prove themselves.

The mere introduction of a note, payable to order, with words written on the

back thereof, purporting to be an indorsement by the payee, does not prove or

tend to prove their genuineness.

10

Whitman, Inc. v. York, 192 N.C. 87,133 S.E. 427, 430 (1926) (citations

11

omitted). In the case sub judice, Petitioner has offered only a bare assertion that

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the challenged stamp is a facially valid indorsement. Absent an allonge,

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testimony, or other evidence indicating that the stamp is an authorized

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signature, it would be imprudent for this Court to accept Petitioner's position.

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We hold that the facial invalidity of this stamp is competent evidence from

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which the trial court could conclude the stamp is "unsigned" and fails to

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establish Page 25 negotiation from Mortgage Lenders to Emax. Consequently,

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Petitioner has failed to establish it is the holder of the Note, and the trial court

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did not err in dismissing Petitioner's summary foreclosure proceedings against

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Respondent. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order is Affirmed."

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Suspect March 10, 2008 Assignments to LNV


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Several other Beal/LNV victims have March 10, 2008 Assignments endorsed

by either Michael Mead or Betty Wright and notarized by Diane M. Meistad

purporting to convey beneficial interest to LNV when LNV Corporation did

not exist on MARCH 10, 2008!

A non-entity, non-person lacks legal capacity to enter into a contract. The facts

and legal arguments are well made in Ms. Subramaniams Writ of Mandamus

DktEntry 7-1 so she will not be repetitive here and trusts the court will actually

read that pleading.

LNVs Purported Original Deed of Trust is a Forgery

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Prior to being forcibly evicted from her home Ms. Subramaniam had not seen

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LNVs purported original Deed of Trust entered into the District Courts

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record in color as Exhibit 2 to LNVs Amended Complaint, see DC Document

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5-2. This document was also filed as an exhibit to Ms. Subramaniams Writ of

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Mandamus, see DktEntry 7-11.

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Because Ms. Subramaniams belongings had all been thrown into storage units

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by LNV, making it impossible for her to find the black and white hard copies

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she was served of LNVs foreclosure complaint so she could prepare her Writ

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of Mandamus she asked another of the Beal victims to download LNVs

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complaint from PACER for her and this was the first time Ms. Subramaniam
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saw that what LNV purports to be original deed of trust was filed in color..

On every page where there is a blue ink signature Ms. Subramaniams initials

are in the same shade of blue; yet on all other pages Ms. Subramaniams initials

are black. This is definitive evidence that this document is a digitally altered

forgery made with intent to deceive; and it was in fact submitted to the District

Court by LNV as genuine for the sole purpose of deceiving the court into

believing it to be genuine when its manufacturer, Andy Beal aka LNV

Corporation, knows it is a forgery. This forged instrument was manufactured

via a process of digitally altering a black and white copy (i.e. forged) and

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passed off as genuine with the exclusive intent to defraud the court and to

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thereby deprive Ms. Subramaniam of her property to unjustly enrich Andy Beal

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while harming Ms. Subramaniam.

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A forged deed of trust conveys no authority to foreclose on real property.

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Forgery of a deed is a class C felony crime in Oregon pursuant to ORS

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165.013.

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District Court Erred in Granting LNV Summary Judgment to Foreclose

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Judge Mosman erred in granting LNV motion for summary judgment because

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significant evidence of forgery exists and is apparent to every reasonable person

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who sees the photographs taken of LNVs purported original Note and who
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sees LNVs purported original deed of trust filed into the District Courts

docket by LNV on November 21, 2014 as Document 5-2.

Why Judge Mosman cannot see what is obvious to every other person who has

viewed these documents can only be explained by his overt bias against Ms.

Subramaniam as shown in his condescending attitude towards her and his

outrageously discriminatory behavior against her as reflected in the District

Courts record.

In granting LNVs motion for summary judgment Judge Mosman denied Ms.

Subramaniam even an iota of due process before depriving her of her property,

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her life quality and her liberty. This is the exact reason Ms. Subramaniam and

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the other Beal victims filed Notices of Constitutional Questions challenging the

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constitutionality of summary judgments.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY

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A very recent United States Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Pennsylvania,

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U.S. Supreme Court, No. 15-5040 filed on June 9, 2016 speaks directly and

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specifically to the constitutional requirements for judicial impartiality and

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appearance of judicial impartiality:

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Held:

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1. Chief Justice Castilles denial of the recusal motion and his subsequent

judicial participation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment....The Court applies an objective standard that requires recusal

when the likelihood of bias on the part of the judge is too high to be

constitutionally tolerable. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S.

868, 872.

2. An unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes structural error that is not

amenable to harmless-error review, regardless of whether the judges vote

was dispositive, Puckett v. United States, 556 U. S. 129, 141....A

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multimember court must not have its guarantee of neutrality undermined, for

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the appearance of bias demeans the reputation and integrity not just of one

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jurist, but of the larger institution of which he or she is a part. Because Chief

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Justice Castilles participation in Williamss case was an error that affected

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the State Supreme Courts whole adjudicatory framework below, Williams

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must be granted an opportunity to present his claims to a court unburdened

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by any possible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true

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between the State and the accused, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532. Pp.

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1214.

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__ Pa. __, 105 A. 3d 1234, vacated and remanded.

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BINDING PRECEDENCE

Binding precedent according to the United States Department of Justice website,

https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/glossary is:

A prior decision by a court that must be followed without a compelling

reason or significantly different facts or issues. Courts are often bound by the

decisions of appellate courts with authority to review their decisions. For

example, district courts are bound by the decisions of the court of appeals

that can review their cases, and all courts both state and federal are bound

by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.

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On May 20, 2016 this court reversed a district court summary decision in a case

11

similar to this one. David Newman v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al. This court

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made its decision in light of Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corporation,

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Supreme Court of California, No. S218973, Filed February 18, 2016. Also See

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Gieseke v. Bank of America, N.A. et al, No. 14-16651 D.C. No. 3:13-cv-04772-JST,

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Northern District of California, San Francisco (May 20, 2016). In its one page

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order the court wrote:

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On May 2, 2016, the court ordered the parties to show cause why the district
courts judgment should not be summarily reversed and remanded for
reconsideration in light of the California Supreme Courts decision in
Yvanova v. New Century Mort. Corp., 62 Cal. 4th 919 (Feb. 18, 2016).

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The parties have responded, and, following consideration of the responses, as


well as the record on appeal, we REVERSE the district courts judgment and
REMAND for reconsideration in light of Yvanova. See also Keshtgar v. U.S.
Bank, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253 (Apr. 27, 2016).

Court should REVERSE the District Courts Summary Order and Dismiss LNVs

foreclosure complaint against Ms. Subramaniam because LNV lacks standing.

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Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Denise Subramaniam

________________________________________
Denise Subramaniam
Self Represented (not by choice but due to economic hardship)

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