1

G.R. No. 177148

June 30, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL NUEZ y REVILLEZA
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated January 19, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate court affirmed the
Decision2 dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 8614-01-C for
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.3
On June 25, 2001, Raul R. Nuez was formally charged with violation of Section 16,
Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Information reads:
That at around 6:00 oclock in the morning of the 24th day of April 20014 at Brgy. San
Antonio, Municipality of Los Ba[]os, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, and in a
search conducted at his residence as stated above, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody thirty[-]one (31)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride
otherwise known as "shabu", a regulated drug, with a total weight of 233.93 grams in
violation of the aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The facts are as follows:
At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in
coordination with the Los Baos Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a
search in the house of Raul R. Nuez based on reports of drug possession. The group,
led by Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included SPO1 Odelon Ilagan, SPO3
Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano, PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue,
PO2 Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector Uriquia.
Before proceeding to appellants residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group
summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist
them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellants house, Mundin called on
appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuez
the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellants room in his
presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the
living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised

burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet
containing P4,610 inside appellants dresser. The group also confiscated a component,
camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools
on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1
Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized6 and a Certification of Orderly Search7 which
appellant signed.
In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant and sentenced him
as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for Violation
of Republic Act 6425 as amended and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties under the law. Accused is ordered to
pay the fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals on May 2, 2006, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.9 On January
19, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming appellants conviction. The
appellate court dismissed appellants defense of frame-up and upheld the credibility of
SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega. It observed that the inconsistencies in their testimony
were minor at best, and did not relate to the elements of the crime.
The appellate court in its decision decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
From the appellate courts decision, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. This Court
required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the appellant manifested that they are adopting
their briefs before the appellate court.
In his brief, appellant contends that
I.

2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AND DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF
FRAME-UP INTERPOSED BY [THE] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE IMPUTED CRIME DESPITE THE INHERENT
WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.11
Simply, the issue is whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Possession
of Regulated Drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. He points out variances
in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which cast doubt on his culpability: first,
SPO1 Ilagan testified that they picked up the barangay officials before going to
appellants house but PO2 Ortega claimed that Chief Tanod Joaquin was already with
them when they left the police station; second, while SPO1 Ilagan confirmed the
presence of the accused during the search, PO2 Ortega related otherwise. More
importantly, appellant assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his
exact address but only the barangay and street of his residence. He maintains that none
of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room. Finally,
appellant questions why the prosecution did not call the barangay officials as witnesses
to shed light on the details of the search.

imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in
possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly
constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug.12 All these were found present in the instant case.
While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor as
it can easily be fabricated and is commonly used as a facile refuge in drug cases. 13 In
cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to the narration
of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary.14
In this case, SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellants room; but appellant retorts that it
was planted. The latters daughter, Liezel Nuez, testified on the alleged planting of
evidence as follows:
xxxx
Q: While you were walking towards the direction of your bath room at that time have you
notice anything which catches your attention?
A: I saw a man inside the room taking a plastic from his bag, sir.

Conversely, the OSG argues that appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. It agrees with the trial court that appellant failed to overcome the presumption that
the law enforcement agents regularly performed their duties. Further, the OSG brands
the testimonies of appellant, his wife and their child as self-serving, absent ill-motives
ascribed to the search team. It brushes aside appellants protest, on the validity of the
search warrant, for having been belatedly made.

Q: Did you also notice, what did that man do with that plastic in the bag?
A: He put under the bed fronting the door, sir.
xxxx

After considering carefully the contentions of the parties and the records of this case, we
are in agreement that appellants petition lacks merit.

Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court what was that something that the man took
out from his bag and placed the same underneath your parents bed?

Appellant was indicted for possession of regulated drugs under Section 16 of Rep. Act
No. 6425 as amended which provides:

A: It is a plastic containing like a tawas, sir.

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be

Q: Have you noticed Miss Witness about how many plastic bag (sic) did the man take
from his bag?

3
A: Only one, sir.15 [Emphasis supplied.]
xxxx

A: It was Raul Nuez, Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo who are inside the room. I stayed near
the door along with Brgy. Capt. Mundin and Chief Tanod who were looking at what was
going on, sir.18 [Emphasis supplied.]

Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellants bed,
appellant had not advanced any reason to account for the thirty-one (31) packets of
shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he readily
signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly Search. Neither
did appellants daughter identify the police officer who allegedly planted evidence. Absent
any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely testify against appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands and we agree that his
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.16

On cross-examination, PO2 Ortega did not falter:

In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the nonpresentation of the barangay officials who purportedly observed the search. The matter
of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even for the trial court
to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should present its
case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witness. 17 It
bears stressing that by no means did the barangay officials become part of the
prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence, even the accused
could have presented them to testify thereon.

Besides, any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained thereby was deemed waived when no objection was raised by
appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or
impliedly.20

Appellant alleges that SPO1 Ilagan verified his presence inside the room during the
search in contrast to PO2 Ortegas account. The records, however, disclose otherwise.
On direct examination, PO2 Ortega recounted:

xxxx
Q: Who among you went inside the room of Raul Nuez?
A: Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo, Raul Nuez, myself, Chief Tanod Alfredo and Capt. Mundin,
sir.19 [Emphasis supplied.]

As regards the contradiction in the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega as to
whether they picked up ChiefTanod Joaquin at the barangay hall, the same is
inconsequential. After all, the witnesses testimonies need only corroborate one another
on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime.21

WITNESS:

Here, we find the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega believable and consistent
on material points: appellant was shown the search warrant; the search was conducted
in the latters presence; and SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellants dresser. It has been
ruled that an affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses without motive to
perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony. Records show that appellant and the
police officers were strangers to each other. Hence, there is no reason to suggest that
the police officers were ill-motivated in apprehending appellant.22

A: Capt. Mundin together with Raul and then the three of us went to the room of Raul
Nuez, sir.

Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court is pertinent:

xxxx

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of personal property:

FISCAL:
Q: What did you do next?

Q: So, among the group that went to the room of Raul Nuez who went inside?
(a) Subject of the offense;

4
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by
the authorities.23 In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 4224 specifically authorized the
taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the
principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or
kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be
limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be
something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference. 25
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted.
Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer,
jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the
word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In
seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and
determined for themselves which items in appellants residence they believed were
"proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in our view,
absolutely impermissible.26
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly
described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those
particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.27 Accordingly, the objects taken
which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.
1avvphi1

Lastly, we find the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court
proper. Under Section 20(3)28 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659,
possession of 200 grams or more of shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride) renders
the accused liable to suffer the maximum penalty under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425,
which is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000.
In the case at bar, appellant was found in possession of 233.93 grams of shabu. Hence
there being no modifying circumstance proven, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with its
accessory penalties, and P2,000,000 fine which the Court of Appeals meted on appellant
is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CR. H.C. No. 02420 isAFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the official custodian of
the objects taken during the search which are not otherwise regulated drugs or drug
paraphernalia, is ORDERED to return them to appellant. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165122
November 23, 2007
ROWLAND KIM SANTOS vs. PRYCE GASES, INC., VELASCO, JR
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the Decision dated 16 January 2004 1 and Resolution dated 26 July
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74563. The decision reversed the twin
orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 29, quashing the search
warrant it issued and ordering the return of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders
seized from petitioner, whereas the resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
As culled from the records, the following antecedents appear:
Respondent Pryce Gases, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
oxygen, acetylene and other industrial gases as well as in the distribution of LPG
products in the Visayas and Mindanao regions. Its branch in Iloilo City has been selling
LPG products directly or through various dealers to hospitals, restaurants and other
business establishments. The LPG products are contained in 11-kg, 22-kg or 50-kg steel
cylinders that are exclusively manufactured for respondents use. The LPG cylinders are
also embossed with the Pryce marking and logo.2
In the beginning of the year 2002, respondent noticed the decline in the return of its LPG
cylinders for refilling. Respondents employees suspected that the LPG cylinders had
been removed from market circulation and refilled by respondents competitors, one of
whom was Sun Gas, Inc. Petitioner Rowland Kim Santos is the manager of Sun Gas,
Inc.3
Arnold T. Figueroa, respondents sales manager for Panay, sought the assistance of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to recover the LPG cylinders
allegedly in the possession of Sun Gas, Inc. Acting on Figueroas complaint, CIDG
operatives conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas, Inc. located at 130
Timawa Avenue, Molo, Iloilo. The CIDG operatives requested the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas, Inc.s warehouse with
some of the CIDG operatives led by PO2 Vicente D. Demandara, Jr. posing as BFP

5
inspectors. The CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were able to take
photographs of the LPG cylinders.
On 4 June 2002, PO2 Vicente D. Demandara, Jr. applied before the RTC of Iloilo City for
a warrant to search the premises described as No. 130, Timawa Avenue, Molo, Iloilo.
The application alleged that petitioner was in possession of Pryce LPG tanks, the Pryce
logos of some of which were scraped off and replaced with a Sun Gas, Inc. marking, and
other materials used in tampering Pryce gas tanks.4 It also averred that petitioner was
illegally distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of respondent, in violation of
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 623,5 as amended by R.A. No. 5700.6
After conducting searching questions on witnesses PO1 Aldrin Ligan, a CIDG operative,
and Richard Oliveros, an employee of Pryce Gases, Inc., Hon. Rene B. Honrado, the
presiding judge of Branch 29, issued the corresponding search warrant. The search
warrant authorized the seizure of the following items:
1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different
kilograms.
2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC.,
trademark and embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.
3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS cylinders.7
On the same day, CIDG agents served the search warrant on petitioner and were able to
recover the following items:
- Five Hundred Forty Four (544) empty 11 Kgs[.] PRYCE LPG tank cylinders;
- Two (2) filled 11 Kgs. PRYCE LPG tank cylinders with seal;
- Seven (7) filled 11 Kgs. Pryce LPG tank cylinders without seal;
- Forty Four (44) empty 22 Kgs. PRYCE LPG tank cylinders;
- Ten (10) empty 50 Kgs. Pryce LPG tank cylinders; and
- One (1) filled 6 Kgs. PRYCE LPG tank cylinder without seal.8

On 7 June 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash9 the search warrant on the grounds of
lack of probable cause as well as deception and fraud employed in obtaining evidence in
support of the application therefor, in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
and Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court. Respondent opposed petitioners
Motion to Quash.
On the same day, the CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo against petitioner, charging the latter with violation of R.A. No. 623, as
amended.
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order10 dated 16 July 2002, granting petitioners
Motion to Quash. The trial court upheld the validity of the surveillance conducted on
petitioners warehouse in order to obtain evidence to support the application for a search
warrant and declared that based on the evidence gathered in support of the application
for search warrant, the CIDG was able to establish probable cause that petitioner was
tampering with Pryce LPG cylinders and making them appear to be those of Sun Gas,
Inc. This conclusion, notwithstanding, the trial court made a turnaround, stating that the
probable cause as found by it at the time of the application for search warrant fell short of
the requisite probable cause necessary to sustain the validity of the search warrant.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion To Quash is hereby GRANTED. PO2 Vicente Dernadara, Jr.
and the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Region VI are hereby directed to
return the "Pryce" LPG cylinders enumerated in Return of Search Warrant Seized by
virtue of the invalid Search Warrant No. 02-16 to the Rowland Kim Santos immediately
upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.11
Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the
seized items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the 16 July 2002 Order but was
denied in an Order13 dated 9 August 2002.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for
certiorari,14 arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing
the search warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant
despite a prior finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove that he
bought the seized items from respondent. It also challenged petitioners personality to file
the motion to quash.

6
On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, 15 which set
aside the two orders of the trial court dated 16 January 2002 and 9 August 2002. The
appellate court also ordered the return of the seized items to respondent. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but was denied in an order dated 16 July 2004. 16

Petitioner takes exception to the Court of Appeals conclusion, contending that petitioner
may assail the questioned search warrant because he was named as respondent in the
application for search warrant and in the criminal complaint subsequently filed before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:

Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 18

I.
WHETHER PETITIONER ROWLAND KIM SANTOS HAS THE LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO ASSAIL THE SEARCH WARRANT FOR HE WAS NAMED
RESPONDENT THEREIN AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHARGED FOR
VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 623, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 5700, BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ILOILO IN I.S. NO. 2015-2000
ENTITLED "PNP-CIDG V. ROWLAND KIM SANTOS."
II.
WHETHER THE PETITIONER SHOULD RETURN THE SUBJECT PRYCE LPG
CYLINDER TO RESPONDENT DESPITE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE
THAT THE SAME WERE SOLD BY THE LATTER TO ITS CUSTOMERS.
III.
WHETHER THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENT
PRYCE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR NOT
BEING THE PROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS OF THE TRIAL
COURT.17
Briefly, the petition raises the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioner has authority
to seek the quashal of the search warrant; (2) who has proper custody of the seized
items; and (3) whether or not respondent correctly availed of the special civil action for
certiorari to assail the quashal of the search warrant.
As to the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial
courts quashal of the search warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a mere
manager of Sun Gas, Inc., failed to show his authority to act on behalf of the corporation
and, therefore, had no legal personality to question the validity of the search warrant.
Thus, it concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
and subsequently granting petitioners motion to quash.

Petitioner is the real party-in-interest to seek the quashal of the search warrant for the
obvious reason that the search warrant, in which petitioner was solely named as
respondent, was directed against the premises and articles over which petitioner had
control and supervision. Petitioner was directly prejudiced or injured by the seizure of the
gas tanks because petitioner was directly accountable as manager to the purported
owner of the seized items. It is noteworthy that at the time of the application for search
warrant, respondent recognized the authority of petitioner as manager of Sun Gas, Inc.
when the application averred that petitioner had in his possession and control the items
subject of the alleged criminal offense. Respondent should not be allowed thereafter to
question petitioners authority to assail the search warrant. Moreover, the search warrant
was directed against petitioner for allegedly using Pryce LPG cylinders without the
authority of respondent.
The Court of Appeals misapplied the ruling in Stonehill, et al. v. Diokno, et al.19 that only a
corporation has the exclusive right to question the seizure of items belonging to the
corporation on the ground that the latter has a personality distinct from the officers and
shareholders of the corporation. Assuming arguendo that Sun Gas, Inc. was the owner of
the seized items, petitioner, as the manager of Sun Gas, Inc., had the authority to
question the seizure of the items belonging to Sun Gas, Inc. Unlike natural persons,
corporations may perform physical actions only through properly delegated individuals;
namely, their officers and/or agents.20 As stated above, respondent cannot belatedly
question petitioners authority to act on behalf of Sun Gas, Inc. when it had already
acknowledged petitioners authority at the time of the application of the search warrant.
The resolution of the second issue as to who has legal custody of the seized items
depends upon the determination of the existence of probable cause in the issuance of
the search warrant. In the questioned Order dated 16 July 2002, the trial court reversed
its earlier finding of probable cause on the ground that the failure of the CIDG agents to
seize other materials and tools used by petitioner to tamper with the LPG cylinders
invalidated the search warrant because "there would be nothing to show or prove that
accused had committed the offense."21The trial court elaborated that the mere

7
possession of Pryce LPG cylinders seized from petitioner was not illegalper se, absent
any showing that petitioner illegally used the same without the consent of respondent.
Moreover, the trial court concluded that respondent had already parted ownership of its
gas cylinders upon their sale to customers who paid not only for the contents but also for
the value of the gas cylinders.
Although respondent advanced several arguments rebutting the aforementioned
conclusions in its petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals sidestepped those
arguments and reversed the trial courts quashal of the search warrant only on the
ground of the lack of legal personality on the part of petitioner to assail the search
warrant.
Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrants
validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. 22
The instant controversy pertains only to the existence of probable cause, which the trial
court found wanting after evaluating the items seized from petitioner. Petitioner does not
dispute that the items seized from him, consisting of Pryce LPG tanks of assorted
weights, were particularly enumerated in the search warrant. Petitioner is neither
assailing the manner by which the trial court conducted the determination of probable
cause.
The trial court retracted its earlier finding of probable cause because the seized items
were incomplete or insufficient to charge petitioner with a criminal offense, thus, negating
its previous determination of probable cause.
We disagree. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had
raised the standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold
petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects

sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 23 A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction.24 The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of the judge should not
disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. 25
The application for a search warrant was based on the alleged violation by petitioner of
certain provisions of R.A. No. 623, as amended by R.A. No. 5700. Respondent claimed
that petitioner was illegally using or distributing its LPG cylinders without its authority.
The amended provisions of R.A. No. 623 state:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the
manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has successfully registered the marks of ownership
in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles,
boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar
containers so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy or
traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not to use the same for drinking
vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than that
registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more
than one year or both.
Sec. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or
seller, without written permission of the latter of any such bottler, cask, barrel, keg, box,
steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the
possession thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or
dealer in casks, barrels, kegs, boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or
other similar containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and registered as
herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or possession
is unlawful.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 623, as amended, clearly creates a prima facie presumption of the
unlawful use of gas cylinders based on two separate acts, namely, the unauthorized use
of the cylinder by a person other than the registered manufacturer and the possession
thereof by a dealer. The trial courts conclusion that the mere possession by petitioner of
the seized gas cylinders was not punishable under Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, as
amended, is not correct. The trial court failed to consider that petitioner was not only in

8
possession of the gas cylinders but was also distributing the same, as alleged by PO1
Aldrin Ligan in his answer to the searching questions asked by the trial court. 26
As pointed out by respondent in its petition for certiorari, the failure of the CIDG
operatives to confiscate articles and materials used in tampering with the Pryce marking
and logo did not negate the existence of probable cause. The confluence of these
circumstances, namely: the fact of possession and distribution of the gas cylinders and
the claim by respondent that it did not authorize petitioner to distribute the same was a
sufficient indication that petitioner is probably guilty of the illegal use of the gas cylinders
punishable under Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, as amended.
More importantly, at the hearing of the application for the search warrant, various
testimonies and documentary evidence based on the surveillance by the CIDG
operatives were presented. After hearing the testimonies and examining the
documentary evidence, the trial court was convinced that there were good and sufficient
reasons for the issuance of the same. Thus, it issued the search warrant. The trial courts
unwarranted turnabout was brought about by its notion that the seized items were not
sufficient to indict petitioner for the crime charged.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez,27 it was held:
True, the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any,
but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based on sound and valid grounds. In this
case, there was no compelling justification for the about face.
xxxx
Moreover, an application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is neither a trial nor a
part of the trial. Action on these applications must be expedited for time is of the
essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of
the complainant and the witnesses.28
A word of caution, though. In affirming the sufficiency of probable cause in the issuance
of the search warrant, this Court is not preempting the subsequent determination by the
investigating prosecutor if there is cause to hold the respondent for trial. After all, the
investigating prosecutor is the person tasked to evaluate all the evidence submitted by
both parties.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to
respondent. Section 4, Rule 12629 of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly
1wphi1

mandates the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to
be kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The
delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and
accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search warrant
is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a
detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court,
together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the
foregoing constitutes contempt of court.30
The CIDG operatives properly delivered the seized items to the custody of the trial court
which issued the search warrant. Thereafter, the trial court ordered their return to
petitioner after quashing the search warrant. When the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial courts quashal of the search warrant, it erred in ordering the return of the seized
items to respondent because it would seem that respondent instituted the special civil
action for certiorari in order to regain
possession of its LPG tanks. This cannot be countenanced. The seized items should
remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search warrant pending the
institution of criminal action against petitioner.
Last, the special civil action for certiorari was the proper recourse availed by respondent
in assailing the quashal of the search warrant. As aforementioned, the trial courts
unwarranted reversal of its earlier finding of probable cause constituted grave abuse of
discretion. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct recourse to this Court 31 or to
the Court of Appeals32 via a special civil action for certiorari from a trial courts quashal of
a search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74563 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the seized items
should be kept in custodia legis. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153087
August 7, 2003
BERNARD R. NALA vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR.
In determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the
examining magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro
forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses.1 Probable cause must be shown
by the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of

9
such evidence is necessary especially where the issue is the existence of a negative
ingredient of the offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license required by law.2

allegedly seized under the said warrant; and (3) direct the release of the air rifle seized
by the police officers.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the
October 18, 20013 and February 15, 20024 Orders5 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay City, Branch 10, which denied petitioners Omnibus Motion to Quash 6 Search
and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01.7

Respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to Quash but ordered the return of the air
rifle to petitioner. As to the validity of the search warrant, respondent found that probable
cause was duly established from the deposition and examination of witness Ruel
Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser who personally conducted a
surveillance to confirm the information given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized
were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same because the
items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant
although his first name was erroneously stated therein as "Romulo" and not "Bernard",
considering that the warrant was couched in terms that would make it enforceable
against the person and residence of petitioner and no other. The dispositive portion of
the questioned Order reads:

On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to
search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in
the application as "Rumolo8 Nala alias Long"9 of "Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon."10 The application was filed in connection with petitioners alleged illegal
possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Republic Act
No. 8294, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, or the law on Illegal
Possession of Firearms. On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel
Nalagon, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, issued
Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01, against "Romulo Nala alias Lolong Nala who is
said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon."
At around 6:30 in the morning of July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other police officers searched
petitioners house and allegedly seized the following articles, to wit
-1- one piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number 1125609
-1- one pc. fragmentation grenade (cacao type)
-1- one pc. .22 long barrel
-5- pcs live ammunition for caliber .38 revolver
-4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used
for packing of shabu11
On July 5, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. 10943-2001-P and 10944-2001-P for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives were filed against the petitioner
before the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kitaotao, Bukidnon.12
On August 8, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion13 seeking to (1) quash Search
and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01; (2) declare inadmissible for any purpose the items

WHEREFORE, finding the Omnibus Motion to be without merit, the same is hereby
DENIED. However, as to the questioned Air Rifle, the same is allowed to be withdrawn
and ordered returned to herein movant.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on February 15,
2002.15 Hence, he filed the instant petition alleging that respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the
search and seizure warrant? (2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search
and seizure warrant against petitioner? and (3) Whether or not the firearms and
explosive allegedly found in petitioners residence are admissible in evidence against
him even though said firearms were not listed in the search and seizure warrant.
At the outset, it must be noted that the instant petition for certiorari was filed directly with
this Court in disregard of the rule on hierarchy of courts. In the interest of substantial
justice and speedy disposition of cases, however, we opt to take cognizance of this
petition in order to address the urgency and seriousness of the constitutional issues
raised.16 In rendering decisions, courts have always been conscientiously guided by the
norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and
not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate

10
rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except
a particular case from its operation.17
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction,
and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. 18
Corollarily, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide
for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in
writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the person and
place to be searched and the things to be seized.19

On the first issue, the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first
name of petitioner, which is "Bernard" and not "Romulo" or "Rumolo", does not invalidate
the warrant because the additional description "alias Lolong Nala who is said to be
residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon" sufficiently enabled the police officers
to locate and identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed
party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will
enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.20
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within
the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay.21 In determining its existence, the examining magistrate must
make a probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the
applicant and the witnesses.22 Probable cause must be shown by the best evidence that
could be obtained under the circumstances. On the part of the applicant and witnesses,
the introduction of such evidence is necessary especially where the issue is the
existence of a negative ingredient of the offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license
required by law.23 On the other hand, the judge must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavits but must make his own extensive inquiry on the existence of such license,
as well as on whether the applicant and the witnesses have personal knowledge thereof.
In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) v. Asuncion,24 we declared as
void the search warrant issued by the trial court in connection with the offense of illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, on the ground, inter alia, of failure
to prove the requisite probable cause. The applicant and the witness presented for the
issuance of the warrant were found to be without personal knowledge of the lack of
license to possess firearms of the management of PICOP and its security agency. They
likewise did not testify as to the absence of license and failed to attach to the application
a "no license certification" from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine
National Police. Thus Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But
his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in
violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or
explosives
xxx

xxx

xxx

11
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP
security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not
meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP
compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its
guards were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP.
Yet, he made no statement before the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security
agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his
witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned
"no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to
present it during the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained,
considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was
also based.25

Q I am showing you this document/sworn statement of Ruel Nala[gon] given to PO3

Rodrigo Delfin, Investigator, SCOT/PDEU Bukidnon Police Provincial Office, Camp
Ramon Onahon, Malaybalay City on or about 12:30 in the afternoon of June 25, 2001, in
the presence of PO3 Macrino Alcoser, Operative of Special Case Operation Team. Are
you the same Ruel Nalagon who has given a statement before the above-named police
officer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You have given a statement before the abovenamed police officer or Investigator
that you have personal knowledge that a certain Romulo Nala in Purok 4, Poblacion,
Kitaotao, Bukidnon has in his possession a .22 magnum pistol and 9MM pistol[?] Why
and how do you know that he has in his possession such pistols?
A Because I personally saw and witnessed him bringing or carrying said pistols.
Q Where did you see him bringing or carrying said pistols?

In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in connection with the
offense of illegal possession of firearms, the elements of which are (1) the existence of
the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does
not have the license or permit to possess the same. 26 Probable cause as applied to illegal
possession of firearms would therefore be such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession of
a firearm and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same. Nowhere,
however, in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L.
Alcosers application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that
petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. While Alcoser testified before the
respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this
does not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only "personal belief" because neither he
nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a certification from the appropriate
government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. This could
have been the best evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner had no license to
possess firearms and ammunitions, but the police officers failed to present the same.
Regrettably, even the examination conducted by the respondent judge on Nalagon and
Alcoser fell short of the required probing and exhaustive inquiry for the determination of
the existence of probable cause. Thus
COURT: [To witness Ruel Nalagon]

A I saw him personally in the public market of Kitaotao, Bukidnon. I also witnessed him
firing said pistol especially when he is drunk.
Q How often did you see him carrying and firing said pistols?
A Many times.
Q Do you know Romulo Nala? Are you friends with said person?
A Yes, sir because we are neighbors in Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.
Q This Romulo Nala, is he bringing these two (2) pistols at the same time?
A No sir, he is bringing often times the .22 magnum and I saw him only twice bringing
9MM pistol.
Q Do you have something more to add or say in this investigation?
A None as of this moment.
That is all.27

12
COURT:
Next witness [PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser]
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Regarding this application filed by your office, what is your basis in arriving into a
conclusion that this certain Romulo Nala of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon has
in his possession illegal firearms?
A Based on the report of our reliable asset, a civilian agent who was able to personally
witness this Mr. Romulo Nala who has in his possession one (1) .22 magnum and one
(1) 9MM pistols which are unlicensed.
Q What action [was] commenced by your office if any as to the report made by your
asset regarding the alleged possession of Mr. Romulo Nala of unlicensed firearms?
A Our officer through authorized personnel, conducted surveillance operation on the
spot, headed by this affiant.
Q What was the result of the surveillance conducted by your office?
A The result turned out to be positive and we have [concrete] evidence that indeed this
Romulo Nala is engaged with the above illegal act.
Q Are there more information you wish to inform this Court.
A None, as of the moment.
Q Do you affirm the truthfulness of the above statement made by you and [will you]
voluntarily sign the same?
A Yes, sir.
That is all.28
It did not even occur to the examining judge to clarify how did the police officers conduct
an "on the spot" surveillance on June 25, 2001 on a 2-hour interval between 12:30
p.m.,29 when Nalagon executed the affidavit, and 2:30 p.m., 30 when PO3 Macrino L.

Alcoser testified before the respondent judge that they "conducted surveillance operation
on the spot" right after Nalagon executed his affidavit. Even if we apply the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty, the "on the spot" surveillance claimed by Alcoser
contradicts his statement in the application for the issuance of warrant that he
"conducted long range surveillance" of petitioner. At any rate, regardless of the nature of
the surveillance and verification of the information carried out by the police officers, the
fact remains that both the applicant, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser, and his witness Ruel
Nalagon did not have personal knowledge of petitioners lack of license to possess
firearms, ammunitions and explosive; and did not adduce the evidence required to prove
the existence of probable cause that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm.
Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented is
void.
Can petitioner be charged with illegal possession of firearms and explosive allegedly
seized from his house? Petitioner contends that said articles are inadmissible as
evidence against him because they were not the same items specifically listed in the
warrant. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, on the other hand, claims that petitioner
should be held liable because the items seized bear a direct relation to the offense of
illegal possession of firearms. These arguments, however, become immaterial in view of
the nullity of the search warrant which made possible the seizure of the questioned
articles.
The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by
virtue of a void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are
inadmissible against the accused. In Roan v. Gonzales,31the prosecution sought to
charge the accused with illegal possession of firearms on the basis of the items seized in
a search through a warrant which the Court declared as void for lack of probable cause.
In ruling against the admissibility of the items seized, the Court said
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it
was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant,
the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who
entered the petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right
either to seize the pistol and bullets."32
Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of petitioner cannot be used as
evidence against him because access therein was gained by the police officer using a
void search and seizure warrant. It is as if they entered petitioners house without a
warrant, making their entry therein illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible.

13
Moreover, it does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject
thereof is necessarily illegalper se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A warrant is still necessary,33 because possession of any firearm becomes
unlawful only if the required permit or license therefor is not first obtained. 34

exclusion of these unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. 37 Hence, the
complaints filed against petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and explosive based
on illegally obtained evidence have no more leg to stand on. 38 Pending resolution of said
cases, however, the articles seized are to remain in custodia legis.39

So also, admissibility of the items seized cannot be justified under the plain view
doctrine. It is true that, as an exception, the police officer may seize without warrant
illegally possessed firearm, or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain
view. However, said officer must have a prior right to be in the position to have that view
of the objects to be seized. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.35

Finally, the Court notes that among the items seized by the officers were "four pcs. of
disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu."
These items are not contraband per se, nor objects in connection with the offense of
illegal possession of firearms for which the warrant was issued. Moreover, it is highly
preposterous to assume that these items were used in connection with offenses involving
illegal drugs. Even granting that they were, they would still be inadmissible against the
petitioner for being products of an illegal search. Hence, the subject articles should be
returned to petitioner.40

1wphi1

No presumption of regularity may be invoked in aid of the process when the officer
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case,
the firearms and explosive were found at the rear portion of petitioners house 36 but the
records do not show how exactly were these items discovered. Clearly, therefore, the
plain view doctrine finds no application here not only because the police officers had no
justification to search the house of petitioner (their search warrant being void for lack of
probable cause), but also because said officers failed to discharge the burden of proving
that subject articles were inadvertently found in petitioners house.
The issue of the reasonableness of the implementation of the search and seizure
warrant, i.e., whether the search was conducted in the presence of witnesses and
whether the air rifle which the trial court ordered to be returned to petitioner was indeed
among the items seized during the search, are matters that would be best determined in
the pending administrative case for grave misconduct and irregularity in the performance
of duty against the police officers who conducted the search.
Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was procured in violation of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioners house, being
"fruits of the poisonous tree", are "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The October 18,
2001 and February 15, 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Branch 10, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it denied petitioners omnibus
motion to quash the search warrant. Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01 dated June
25, 2001 is declared VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof are declared
inadmissible in evidence. Pending resolution of Criminal Case Nos. 10943-2001-P and
10944-2001-P for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosive against
petitioner, the items (caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 1125609 and 5 pieces live
ammunitions; fragmentation grenade; and .22 long barrel) subject thereof, must remain
in custodia legis. The four pieces of disposable lighter and cellophane seized should be
returned to petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168306
June 19, 2007
WILLIAM C. YAO, SR., LUISA C. YAO, RICHARD C. YAO, WILLIAM C. YAO JR., and
ROGER C. YAO vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETRON CORPORATION
and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr., and Roger C. Yao
pray for the reversal of the Decision dated 30 September 2004,2 and Resolution dated 1
June 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 79256, 3 affirming the two Orders,
both dated 5 June 2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City,
relative to Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003. 4 In the said Orders, the RTC
denied the petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant5 and Motion for the Return of the
Motor Compressor and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Refilling Machine. 6

14
The following are the facts:
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION
(MASAGANA), an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products.
Private respondents Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG
in the Philippines. Their LPG products are sold under the marks "GASUL" and
"SHELLANE," respectively. Petron is the registered owner in the Philippines of the
trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LPG products. It is the sole entity
in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and
distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its trademarks. Pilipinas Shell, on the
other hand, is the authorized user in the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks,
symbols, or designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
(Shell International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL device in connection
with the production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation
in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and
distribute SHELLANE LPG containers and products.7
On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca
(Oblanca) filed two applications for search warrant with the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City,
against petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA compound located at
Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City, for alleged violation of
Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as
"The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines." 8 The two applications for search
warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief, and personal verification of
Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling, offering for sale and/or
distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames,
trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation
of the rights of the said entities.
In his two separate affidavits9 attached to the two applications for search warrant,
Oblanca alleged:
1. [That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") received a
letter-complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on behalf
of among others, [Petron Corporation (PETRON)] and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (PSPC), the authorized representative of Shell International Petroleum
Company Limited ("Shell International"), requesting assistance in the investigation and, if
warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain persons and/or establishments

suspected of violating the intellectual property rights [of PETRON] and of PSPC and
Shell International.
2. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was
assigned as the NBI agent on the case.
3. [That] prior to conducting the investigation on the reported illegal activities, he
reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued in favor of [PETRON], PSPC
and Shell International as well as other documents and other evidence obtained by the
investigative agency authorized by [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International to
investigate and cause the investigation of persons and establishments violating the rights
of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International, represented by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar.
Certified copies of the foregoing trademark registrations are attached hereto as Annexes
"A" to ":E".
4. [That] among the establishments alleged to be unlawfully refilling and unlawfully
selling and distributing [Gasul LPG and] Shellane products is Masagana Gas Corporation
("MASAGANA"). Based on Securities and Exchange Commission Records, MASAGANA
has its principal office address at 9775 Kamagong Street, San Antonio Village, Makati,
Metro Manila. The incorporators and directors of MASAGANA are William C. Yao, Sr.,
Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr., and Roger C. Yao. x x x.
5. I confirmed that MASAGANA is not authorized to use [PETRON and] Shellane LPG
cylinders and its trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or distributors of [PETRON
and] Shellane LPGs.
6. I went to MASAGANAs refilling station located at Governors Drive, Barangay
Lapidario, Trece Martires City (sic), Cavite to investigate its activities. I confirmed that
MASAGANA is indeed engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and/or distribution of
[Gasul and] Shellane LPG cylinders. I found out that MASAGANA delivery trucks with
Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612, WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603 coming in and out of
the refilling plant located at the aforementioned address contained multi-brand LPG
cylinders including [Gasul and] Shellane. x x x.
7. [That] on 13 February 2003, I conducted a test-buy accompanied by Mr. Bernabe C.
Alajar. After asking the purpose of our visit, MASAGANAs guard allowed us to enter the
MASAGANA refilling plant to purchase GASUL and SHELLANE LPGs. x x x. We were
issued an order slip which we presented to the cashiers office located near the refilling
station. After paying the amount x x x covering the cost of the cylinders and their
contents, they were issued Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated February 13, 2003. We were,

15
thereafter, assisted by the plant attendant in choosing empty GASUL and SHELLANE 11
kg. cylinders, x x x were brought to the refilling station [and filled in their presence.] I
noticed that no valve seals were placed on the cylinders.
[That] while inside the refilling plant doing the test-buy, I noticed that stockpiles of multibranded cylinders including GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders were stored near the
refilling station. I also noticed that the total land area of the refilling plant is about 7,000 to
10,000 square meters. At the corner right side of the compound immediately upon
entering the gate is a covered area where the maintenance of the cylinders is taking
place. Located at the back right corner of the compound are two storage tanks while at
the left side also at the corner portion is another storage tank. Several meters and
fronting the said storage tank is where the refilling station and the office are located. It is
also in this storage tank where the elevated blue water tank depicting MASAGANA
CORP. is located. About eleven (11) refilling pumps and stock piles of multi-branded
cylinders including Shellane and GASUL are stored in the refilling station. At the left side
of the entrance gate is the guard house with small door for the pedestrians and at the
right is a blue steel gate used for incoming and outgoing vehicles.
8. [That] on 27 February 2003, I conducted another test-buy accompanied by Mr.
Bernabe C. Alajar. x x x After choosing the cylinders, we were issued an order slip which
we presented to the cashier. Upon payment, Cash Invoice No. 56398 was issued
covering the cost of both GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders and their contents. x x x
Both cylinders were refilled in our presence and no valve seals were placed on the
cylinders.
Copies of the photographs of the delivery trucks, LPG cylinders and registration papers
were also attached to the aforementioned affidavits.10
Bernabe C. Alajar (Alajar), owner of Able Research and Consulting Services Inc., was
hired by Petron and Pilipinas Shell to assist them in carrying out their Brand Protection
Program. Alajar accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance of and test-buys at the
refilling plant of MASAGANA. He also executed two separate affidavits corroborating the
statements of Oblanca. These were annexed to the two applications for search warrant. 11
After conducting the preliminary examination on Oblanca and Alajar, and upon reviewing
their sworn affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang (Judge
Sadang), Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, found probable cause and
correspondingly issued Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003. 12The search
warrants commanded any peace officer to make an immediate search of the
MASAGANA compound and to seize the following items:

Under Search Warrant No. 2-2003:

a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing the tradename "SHELLANE",
"SHELL" (Device) of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other
devices owned by Shell International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of
illegally refilling LPG cylinders belonging to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation bearing
the latters tradename as well as the marks belonging to Shell International Petroleum
Company, Ltd., enumerated hereunder:
1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;
2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic refilling system);
3. LPG hydraulic pump/s;
4. LPG refilling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles and levers;
6. LPG weighing scales; and
7. Seals simulating the shell trademark.
c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other books
of accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale and/or
distribution of the aforesaid goods/products.
d. Delivery truck bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks,
and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or intended to be
used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned counterfeit
products.
Under Search Warrant No. 3-2003:
a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing Petron Corporations (Petron)
tradename and its tradename "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used
exclusively by Petron;

16
b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of
illegally refilling LPG cylinders belonging to Petron enumerated hereunder;

c. Eight (8) filled 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;

2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic filling system);

d. Three (3) empty 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

3. LPG hydraulic pump/s;

e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system.
4. LPG filling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
Pursuant to Search Warrant No. 3-2003, the following articles were also seized:
5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles levers;
6. LPG weighing scales; and

a. Six (6) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders without seal, bearing Petrons tradename and its
trademark "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;

7. Seals bearing the Petron mark;

b. Sixty-three (63) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its
trademark "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;

c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other books
of accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale and/or
distribution of the aforesaid goods/products; and

c. Seven (7) tampered 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its
trademark "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;

d. Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612 and WFC-603, hauling trucks,
and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used for the purpose of
selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned counterfeit products.

d. Five (5) tampered 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark
"GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron with tampered
"GASUL" logo;

Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Oblanca and several NBI operatives
immediately proceeded to the MASAGANA compound and served the search warrants
on petitioners.13 After searching the premises of MASAGANA, the following articles
described in Search Warrant No. 2-2003 were seized:

e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system; and

a. Thirty-eight (38) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
b. Thirty-nine (39) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;

f. One (1) set of LPG refilling machine.

On 22 April 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash Search Warrants No.
2-2003 and No. 3-200314on the following grounds:
1. There is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and the conditions
for the issuance of a search warrant were not complied with;
2. Applicant NBI Agent Ritchie N. Oblanca and his witness Bernabe C. Alajar do not have
any authority to apply for a search warrant. Furthermore, they committed perjury when
they alleged in their sworn statements that they conducted a test-buy on two occasions;

17
3. The place to be searched was not specified in the Search Warrant as the place has an
area of 10,000 square meters (one hectare) more or less, for which reason the place to
be searched must be indicated with particularity;
4. The search warrant is characterized as a general warrant as the items to be seized as
mentioned in the search warrant are being used in the conduct of the lawful business of
respondents and the same are not being used in refilling Shellane and Gasul LPGs.
On 30 April 2003, MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for
the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine. 15 It claimed that it is the
owner of the said motor compressor and LPG refilling machine; that these items were
used in the operation of its legitimate business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its
business interests.
On 5 June 2003, the RTC issued two Orders, one of which denied the petitioners Motion
to Quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003, and the other one also denied
the Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine of
MASAGANA, for lack of merit.16
With respect to the Order denying the petitioners motion to quash Search Warrants No.
2-2003 and No. 3-2003, the RTC held that based on the testimonies of Oblanca and
Alajar, as well as the documentary evidence consisting of receipts, photographs,
intellectual property and corporate registration papers, there is probable cause to believe
that petitioners are engaged in the business of refilling or using cylinders which bear the
trademarks or devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell in the place sought to be searched
and that such activity is probably in violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of
Republic Act No. 8293.
It also ruled that Oblanca and Alajar had personal knowledge of the acts complained of
since they were the ones who monitored the activities of and conducted test-buys on
MASAGANA; that the search warrants in question are not general warrants because the
compound searched are solely used and occupied by MASAGANA, and as such, there
was no need to particularize the areas within the compound that would be searched; and
that the items to be seized in the subject search warrants were sufficiently described with
particularity as the same was limited to cylinder tanks bearing the trademarks GASUL
and SHELLANE.
As regards the Order denying the motion of MASAGANA for the return of its motor
compressor and LPG refilling machine, the RTC resolved that MASAGANA cannot be
considered a third party claimant whose rights were violated as a result of the seizure

since the evidence disclosed that petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that
they conduct their business through the same juridical entity. It maintained that to rule
otherwise would result in the misapplication and debasement of the veil of corporate
fiction. It also stated that the veil of corporate fiction cannot be used as a refuge from
liability.
Further, the RTC ratiocinated that ownership by another person or entity of the seized
items is not a ground to order its return; that in seizures pursuant to a search warrant,
what is important is that the seized items were used or intended to be used as means of
committing the offense complained of; that by its very nature, the properties sought to be
returned in the instant case appear to be related to and intended for the illegal activity for
which the search warrants were applied for; and that the items seized are instruments of
an offense.
Petitioners filed Motions for Reconsideration of the assailed Orders, 17 but these were
denied by the RTC in its Order dated 21 July 2003 for lack of compelling reasons. 18
Subsequently, petitioners appealed the two Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals
via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 19 On 30
September 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the Orders of
the RTC.20 It adopted in essence the bases and reasons of the RTC in its two Orders.
The decretal portion thereof reads:
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to disturb the assailed Orders of the
respondent judge. Grave abuse of discretion has not been proven to exist in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders
both dated June 5, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
but this was denied in its Resolution dated 1 June 2005 for lack of merit. 22
Petitioners filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF RTC CAVITE CITY HAD SUFFICIENT BASIS IN DECLARING THE
EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE;

18
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NBI AGENT
(RITCHIE OBLANCA) CAN APPLY FOR THE SEARCH WARRANTS
NOTHWITHSTANDING HIS LACK OF AUTHORITY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
REQUIREMENT OF GIVING A PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE
SEARCHED WAS COMPLIED WITH;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
APPLICATIONS AND THE SEARCH WARRANTS THEMSELVES SHOW NO
AMBIGUITY OF THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT
IS DIRECTED AGAINST MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION, ACTING THROUGH ITS
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, HENCE MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION MAY NOT
BE CONSIDERED AS THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT WHOSE RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED
AS A RESULT OF THE SEIZURE.23
Apropos the first issue, petitioners allege that Oblanca and Alajar had no personal
knowledge of the matters on which they testified; that Oblanca and Alajar lied to Judge
Sadang when they stated under oath that they were the ones who conducted the testbuys on two different occasions; that the truth of the matter is that Oblanca and Alajar
never made the purchases personally; that the transactions were undertaken by other
persons namely, Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva as shown in the Entry/Exit Slips of
MASAGANA; and that even if it were true that Oblanca and Alajar asked Nikko Javier
and G. Villanueva to conduct the test-buys, the information relayed by the latter two to
the former was mere hearsay.24
Petitioners also contend that if Oblanca and Alajar had indeed used different names in
purchasing the LPG cylinders, they should have mentioned it in their applications for
search warrants and in their testimonies during the preliminary examination; that it was
only after the petitioners had submitted to the RTC the entry/exit slips showing different

personalities who made the purchases that Oblanca and Alajar explained that they had
to use different names in order to avoid detection; that Alajar is not connected with either
of the private respondents; that Alajar was not in a position to inform the RTC as to the
distinguishing trademarks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that Oblanca was not also
competent to testify on the marks allegedly infringed by petitioners; that Judge Sadang
failed to ask probing questions on the distinguishing marks of SHELLANE and GASUL;
that the findings of the Brand Protection Committee of Pilipinas Shell were not submitted
nor presented to the RTC; that although Judge Sadang examined Oblanca and Alajar,
the former did not ask exhaustive questions; and that the questions Judge Sadang asked
were merely rehash of the contents of the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar.25
These contentions are devoid of merit.
Article III, Section 2, of the present Constitution states the requirements before a search
warrant may be validly issued, to wit:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(emphasis supplied).
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides with more
particularity the requisites in issuing a search warrant, viz:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place to be searched.26

19
The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or information
personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. 27 The applicant or
his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense being complained of. "Reliable information" is insufficient.
Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant
and his witnesses.28
Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting trademark
infringement, thus:
SEC. 155. Remedies; Infringement. Any person who shall, without the consent of the
owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant
feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be
used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for
infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the
infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this
subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services
using the infringing material.
As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a
registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or
services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the
buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.
In his sworn affidavits,29 Oblanca stated that before conducting an investigation on the
alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark
registrations issued by the Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and
Pilipinas Shell; that he confirmed from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that MASAGANA is not

authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinder
containers; that he and Alajar monitored the activities of MASAGANA in its refilling plant
station located within its compound at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece
Martires, Cavite City; that, using different names, they conducted two test-buys therein
where they purchased LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE;
that the said GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were refilled in their presence by the
MASAGANA employees; that while they were inside the MASAGANA compound, he
noticed stock piles of multi-branded cylinders including GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders; and that they observed delivery trucks loaded with GASUL and SHELLANE
LPG cylinders coming in and out of the MASAGANA compound and making deliveries to
various retail outlets. These allegations were corroborated by Alajar in his separate
affidavits.
In support of the foregoing statements, Oblanca also submitted the following
documentary and object evidence:
1. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 44046 for "SHELL (DEVICE)"
in the name of Shell International;
2. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 41789 for "SHELL (DEVICE)
in the name of Shell International;
3. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 37525 for "SHELL (DEVICE) in
the name of Shell International;
4. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. R-2813 for "SHELL" in the
name of Shell International;
5. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 31443 for "SHELLANE" in the
name of Shell International;
6. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 57945 for the mark "GASUL"
in the name of Petron;
7. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. C-147 for "GASUL CYLINDER
CONTAINING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS" in the name of Petron;
8. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 61920 for the mark "GASUL
AND DEVICE" in the name of Petron;

20
9. Certified true copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Masagana;
10. Certified true copy of the By-laws of Masagana;
11. Certified true copy of the latest General Information Sheet of Masagana on file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission;
12. Pictures of delivery trucks coming in and out of Masagana while it delivered Gasul
and Shellane LPG;
13. Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated 13 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the Gasul
and Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
14. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by Cash Invoice No. 56210
purchased from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
15. Cash Invoice No. 56398 dated 27 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the Gasul
and Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar; and
16. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by Cash Invoice No. 56398
purchased from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar.30
Extant from the foregoing testimonial, documentary and object evidence is that Oblanca
and Alajar have personal knowledge of the fact that petitioners, through MASAGANA,
have been using the LPG cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE without
permission from Petron and Pilipinas Shell, a probable cause for trademark infringement.
Both Oblanca and Alajar were clear and insistent that they were the very same persons
who monitored the activities of MASAGANA; that they conducted test-buys thereon; and
that in order to avoid suspicion, they used different names during the test-buys. They
also personally witnessed the refilling of LPG cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and
SHELLANE inside the MASAGANA refilling plant station and the deliveries of these
refilled containers to some outlets using mini-trucks.
Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable cause.
It should be borne in mind that the determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of the rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As the term implies, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of
a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown
trial.31

The fact that Oblanca and Alajar used different names in the purchase receipts do not
negate personal knowledge on their part. It is a common practice of the law enforcers
such as NBI agents during covert investigations to use different names in order to
conceal their true identities. This is reasonable and understandable so as not to
endanger the life of the undercover agents and to facilitate the lawful arrest or
apprehension of suspected violators of the law.
Petitioners contention that Oblanca and Alajar should have mentioned the fact that they
used different names in their respective affidavits and during the preliminary examination
is puerile. The argument is too vacuous to merit serious consideration. There is nothing
in the provisions of law concerning the issuance of a search warrant which directly or
indirectly mandates that the applicant of the search warrant or his witnesses should state
in their affidavits the fact that they used different names while conducting undercover
investigations, or to divulge such fact during the preliminary examination. In the light of
other more material facts which needed to be established for a finding of probable cause,
it is not difficult to believe that Oblanca and Alajar failed to mention that they used aliases
in entering the MASAGANA compound due to mere oversight.
It cannot be gainfully said that Oblanca and Alajar are not competent to testify on the
trademarks infringed by the petitioners. As earlier discussed, Oblanca declared under
oath that before conducting an investigation on the alleged illegal activities of
MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued by the
Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. These
certifications of trademark registrations were attached by Oblanca in his applications for
the search warrants. Alajar, on the other hand, works as a private investigator and, in
fact, owns a private investigation and research/consultation firm. His firm was hired and
authorized, pursuant to the Brand Protection Program of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, to
verify reports that MASAGANA is involved in the illegal sale and refill of GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders.32 As part of the job, he studied and familiarized himself with
the registered trademarks of GASUL and SHELLANE, and the distinct features of the
LPG cylinders bearing the same trademarks before conducting surveillance and testbuys on MASAGANA.33 He also submitted to Oblanca several copies of the same
registered trademark registrations and accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance and
test-buys.
As to whether the form and manner of questioning made by Judge Sadang complies with
the requirements of law, Section 5 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, prescribes the rules in the examination of the complainant and his witnesses
when applying for search warrant, to wit:

21
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record.- The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely
on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-andfast rule governing how a
judge should conduct his investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be
probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro
forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his
own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.34

Anent the second issue, petitioners argue that Judge Sadang failed to require Oblanca to
show his authority to apply for search warrants; that Oblanca is a member of the AntiOrganized Crime and not that of the Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that all
complaints for infringement should be investigated by the Intellectual Property Division of
the NBI; that it is highly irregular that an agent not assigned to the Intellectual Property
Division would apply for a search warrant and without authority from the NBI Director;
that the alleged letter-complaint of Atty. Bienvenido Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and
Angangco Law Office was not produced in court; that Judge Sadang did not require
Oblanca to produce the alleged letter-complaint which is material and relevant to the
determination of the existence of probable cause; and that Petron and Pilipinas Shell,
being two different corporations, should have issued a board resolution authorizing the
Villaraza and Angangco Law Office to apply for search warrant in their behalf. 38

After perusing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the preliminary examination, we

found the questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and
perfunctory.35 The testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent with each other and
their narration of facts was credible. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:

We reject these protestations.

This Court is likewise not convinced that respondent Judge failed to ask probing
questions in his determination of the existence of probable cause. This Court has
thoroughly examined the Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken during the investigation
conducted by the respondent Judge and found that respondent Judge lengthily inquired
into the circumstances of the case. For instance, he required the NBI agent to confirm
the contents of his affidavit, inquired as to where the "test-buys" were conducted and by
whom, verified whether PSPC and PETRON have registered trademarks or tradenames,
required the NBI witness to explain how the "test-buys" were conducted and to describe
the LPG cylinders purchased from Masagana Gas Corporation, inquired why the
applications for Search Warrant were filed in Cavite City considering that Masagana Gas
Corporation was located in Trece Martires, Cavite, inquired whether the NBI Agent has a
sketch of the place and if there was any distinguishing sign to identify the place to be
searched, and inquired about their alleged tailing and monitoring of the delivery trucks. x
x x.36

[That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received a lettercomplaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on behalf of
among others, Petron Corporation (PETRON) [and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
(PSPC), the authorized representative of Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
(SHELL INTERNATIONAL)] requesting assistance in the investigation and, if warranted,
apprehension and prosecution of certain persons and/or establishments suspected of
violating the intellectual property rights of PETRON [and of PSPC and Shell
International.]

Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and
his witnesses, the findings of the judge deserves great weight. The reviewing court can
overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or
ignored the clear dictates of reason.37 We find no compelling reason to disturb Judge
Sadangs findings herein.

The authority of Oblanca to apply for the search warrants in question is clearly discussed
and explained in his affidavit, viz:

11. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was
assigned as the NBI agent on the case.39
The fact that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime Division and not that of
the Intellectual Property Division does not abrogate his authority to apply for search
warrant. As aptly stated by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the
provisions on search warrant under Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which specifically commands that the applicant law enforcer must be a
member of a division that is assigned or related to the subject crime or offense before the
application for search warrant may be acted upon. The petitioners did not also cite any
law, rule or regulation mandating such requirement. At most, petitioners may only be
referring to the administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice of the NBI.
However, not only did petitioners failed to establish the existence thereof, but they also

22
did not prove that such administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice are
inviolable.
Neither is the presentation of the letter-complaint of Atty. Somera and board resolutions
from Petron and Pilipinas Shell required or necessary in determining probable cause. As
heretofore discussed, the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish probable cause. It can
also be presumed that Oblanca, as an NBI agent, is a public officer who had regularly
performed his official duty.40 He would not have initiated an investigation on MASAGANA
without a proper complaint. Furthermore, Atty. Somera did not step up to deny his lettercomplaint.
Regarding the third issue, petitioners posit that the applications for search warrants of
Oblanca did not specify the particular area to be searched, hence, giving the raiding
team wide latitude in determining what areas they can search. They aver that the search
warrants were general warrants, and are therefore violative of the Constitution.
Petitioners also assert that since the MASAGANA compound is about 10,000.00 square
meters with several structures erected on the lot, the search warrants should have
defined the areas to be searched.
The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. 41
Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officers prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant
had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the
compound described in the affidavit.42
The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to make an immediate
search on MASAGANA compound located at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario,
Trece Martires, Cavite City. It appears that the raiding team had ascertained and reached
MASAGANA compound without difficulty since MASAGANA does not have any other
offices/plants in Trece Martires, Cavite City. Moreover, Oblanca, who was with the raiding
team, was already familiar with the MASAGANA compound as he and Alajar had
monitored and conducted test-buys thereat.

Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no
need to particularize the areas to be searched because, as correctly stated by Petron
and Pilipinas Shell, these structures constitute the essential and necessary components
of the petitioners business and cannot be treated separately as they form part of one
entire compound. The compound is owned and used solely by MASAGANA. What the
case law merely requires is that, the place to be searched can be distinguished in
relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably, this requisite was complied
with in the instant case.
As to the fourth issue, petitioners asseverate that the search warrants did not indicate
with particularity the items to be seized since the search warrants merely described the
items to be seized as LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE
without specifying their sizes.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 43
While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is
required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would
not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, however, the
articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute
concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie would suffice. 44
Measured against this standard, we find that the items to be seized under the search
warrants in question were sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be
confiscated were restricted to the following: (1) LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks
GASUL and SHELLANE; (2) Machines and equipments used or intended to be used in
the illegal refilling of GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders. These machines were also
specifically enumerated and listed in the search warrants; (3) Documents which pertain
only to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603,
hauling trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or

23
intended to be used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing GASUL and SHELLANE
LPG cylinders.45
Additionally, since the described items are clearly limited only to those which bear direct
relation to the offense, i.e., violation of section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293, for which
the warrant was issued, the requirement of particularity of description is satisfied.
Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL and SHELLANE
LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
Finally, petitioners claim that MASAGANA has the right to intervene and to move for the
return of the seized items; that the items seized by the raiding team were being used in
the legitimate business of MASAGANA; that the raiding team had no right to seize them
under the guise that the same were being used in refilling GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders; and that there being no action for infringement filed against them and/or
MASAGANA from the seizure of the items up to the present, it is only fair that the seized
articles be returned to the lawful owner in accordance with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-106-SC.
It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an
entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers. However, when
the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons,
or in the case of two corporations merge them into one.46 In other words, the law will not
recognize the separate corporate existence if the corporation is being used pursuant to
the foregoing unlawful objectives. This non-recognition is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity or disregarding the fiction of corporate
entity. Where the separate corporate entity is disregarded, the corporation will be treated
merely as an association of persons and the stockholders or members will be considered
as the corporation, that is, liability will attach personally or directly to the officers and
stockholders.47
As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA, are utilizing the
latter in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus,
petitioners collectively and MASAGANA should be considered as one and the same
person for liability purposes. Consequently, MASAGANAs third party claim serves no
refuge for petitioners.
Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from that of the
petitioners, the effect will be the same. The law does not require that the property to be

seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrants is directed.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized.48 Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the properties seized belong to
MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search warrants is still
valid.
Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling machine and the GASUL
and SHELL LPG cylinders seized were the corpus delicti, the body or substance of the
crime, or the evidence of the commission of trademark infringement. These were the
very instruments used or intended to be used by the petitioners in trademark
infringement. It is possible that, if returned to MASAGANA, these items will be used
again in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. 49 Thus, the
RTC was justified in denying the petitioners motion for their return so as to prevent the
petitioners and/or MASAGANA from using them again in trademark infringement.
Petitioners reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC,50 is not tenable. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is not applicable in the present case
because it governs only searches and seizures in civil actions for infringement of
intellectual property rights.51 The offense complained of herein is for criminal violation of
Section 155 in relation to Section 17052 of Republic Act No. 8293.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79256, dated 30 September 2004 and 1 June 2005,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129651
October 20, 2000
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION vs. BIR
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the
Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank
Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an
Affidavit1stating:
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION
(hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes

24
Street, under the active management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling
by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without issuing receipt. This
is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:

5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which
corporation was being controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now
running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing
the same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.

(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;

(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the
canned sardines processed by UNIFISH;
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and
buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;
(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin
Ho delivers to the different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano,
etc.;
(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by
checks drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These
payments are also not receipted (sic);
(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had
withdrawn from the corporation;
3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos
direction is the sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of
smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH, being an export company registered with
the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil
as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export. These tax
exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to be
used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold
unprocessed as is to local customers.
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also
enjoys tax exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that
these are to be used as containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans
are never intended to be sold locally to other food processing companies.

6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of

both UNIFISH AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its
factory site at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue City. The particular place or spot where
these records [official receipts, sales invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or
sales books, stock cards, accounting records (such as ledgers, journals, cash
receipts books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is
best described in the herein attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices
furniture and fixture of the corporation which is made an integral part hereof and
marked as Annex "A",
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing
allegations and he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation
Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu. The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued
the disputed search warrants. The first2 is docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-1079 FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253" ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two
pages. A verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
Plaintiff,
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

25
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of
said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of
the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring
said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

- versus UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,

Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

x-------------------------x
(sgd.)
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
The second warrant3 is similarly docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR:
VIOLATION OF SEC. 253" ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced
below, is almost identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions
indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one page.

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic),

Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo
Abos that there is a (sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section
253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and
sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan
Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
Plaintiff,
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
- versus -

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and

Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

x-------------------------/

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

(with sketch)

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

SEARCH WARRANT

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

26
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic],
Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo
Abos that there is a [sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section
253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and
sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho aliasFrank Uy and Unifish Packing
Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control,
the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

(hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for the docket number and the designation of
the crime in the body of the warrant ("Section 238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance
of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales
invoices"), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the
Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of
petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the
RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of
Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of
said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of
the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring
said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,4 which was docketed as "SEARCH
WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263"

On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with
Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent
motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to
comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA), which states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a
copy thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings
and other pertinent documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated
November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to
Quash, (2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution
denying the motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the
Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the
right to post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal,
after judgment on the merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the
case of Lai vs. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:

27
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has
other remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the
petition for certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge
Diez, the same should not have been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy
and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for
their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate court in its
decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the
Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the
fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180
as amended by P.D. 911);
3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash theinformati
on in the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of Court).
4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment ofthe court after the case shall h
ave been tried on the merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is notcertiorari but to
go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. In
the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the
merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search
Warrants without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore
that the Court committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched;
that the Search Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken;
the absence of probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the discriminating
manner in which the properties were taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding,
certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.5
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
was committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant
petition for review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and
documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for

Reconsideration. An examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first

submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out
petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to
its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could
have been decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA
deemed them essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records
from the RTC. Third, in a similar case,6 we held that the submission of a document
together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a certified true copy
of "material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto" along with the petition. So should it be in this
case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally
guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated. 7
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the
resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the
case of "Lai vs. Intermediate," cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does
not appear in "220 SCRA 149." The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as
observed by petitioners,8 appears to have been taken from the case of Yap vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is inapplicable since
that case involved a motion to quash acomplaint for qualified theft, not a motion to
quash a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,9 where we held that the issuing judges
disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave
abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that
certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions "has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that
Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant.
Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon

28
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the
municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized; and that "no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense."
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule
renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the
order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may
properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate
nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure
of her personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and
documents which had been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot
afford an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress
to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding
Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,10 which also involved a special civil action
for certiorari:11
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional
requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure
to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared
in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the
capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance
of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion".
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge
violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the
disputed search warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all
the records and documents of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its
business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy that would afford
petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional
and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.12

29
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants.13 The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, "for there is
not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing
to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence
of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrants will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions
of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify
under it.14
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command
their nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons
against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants
(Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same place, at a
single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of
probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the
things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to
petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence. 15
Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy
Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City" while the body of the same
warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St.,Mandaue City." Parenthetically, Search
Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes
St., Mandaue City."
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized." 16 The
rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended 17 and
distinguish it from other places in the community.18 Any designation or description known
to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads
the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. 19 Thus, in Castro vs.
Pabalan,20 where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners
therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court
"admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation."

In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found
in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in
locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore,
inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that
would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search
Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against "Uy Chin Ho alias
Frank Uy." Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against "UY CHIN HO
alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing Corporation."
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,21 it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically
derived, does not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the described
premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described
premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or
occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the
warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is
incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of
the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer
making the search as to the place to be searched. 22
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or
occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search
could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or
occupants of the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names. 23
Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place
In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for
the same crime (violation of "SEC. 253" of the National Internal Revenue Code). It
appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the
inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish
Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant

30
A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the
persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to be
searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two
warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the
apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the
latter should be deemed revoked by the former.

A. No.
Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.

The alleged absence of probable cause

Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing
Corporation?

Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the
subject search warrants.

A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts
instead of the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.

Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.24

Q. From where did you get that information?

In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require
an examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.25 Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner,
would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. 26
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge.
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause.27 Search warrants are not issued on loose,
vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief.28
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses,
namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old
employee of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are
hearsay. We agree with this contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who
stated during the examination:
Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?

A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.29

The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal
activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely
supplied by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay,
standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the search warrants.30
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but
is supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices
was apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos
detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes,
and described the place where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes
were located:
Q Do you know Frank Uy?
A Yes.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.
Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
A Hernan Cortes St.

31
Q What is it being engaged of?

Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?

A It is engaged in canning of fish.

A White Gold and Gaisano.

Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business
dealings that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?

Q How did you know this fact?

A Yes.

A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the
last three years. I was the Operating Chief.

Q How is it done?

Q Until now?

A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time

making his authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products.
He sells these products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole
Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is
him selling the goods and he does not issue any invoices.

A No. I was separated already.

Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?

Q How does he do this manipulation?

A Thru delivery receipts.

A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to
his customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the
company.

Q Is the delivery receipt official?

A No. It is unregistered.

Q When?
A August, 1993.

Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or
whatever?

Q For how long has this been going on?

A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not for
the BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company
and him. It is not made to be shown to the BIR.
1wphi1

A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.

Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?
A August, 1993, last month.

Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?

Q How did you happen to know about this last month?

A Yes.

A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket

did not go directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the
company for the goods that he sold.

Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.

32
Q Based on what?

Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept
by Gina?

A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.

A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery
receipts, sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your
affidavit, which are only for the consumption of the company?

Q Where are they now?

A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).

A Yes, not for the BIR.

Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview
(sic) of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording
all the confidential transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers
and notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the
records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the
receipts. The second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of
all the stocks.

Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me,
especially this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the
months of January, February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in
these xerox copies which appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of
January, what does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his
customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the
BIR?
A As far as I know, it does not reflect.

This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these
people are stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina
because according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?

Q What are these xerox copies of checks?

A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for
payment of sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for
collection.

A Yes.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?
Q But how can you enter the bodega?
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go
straight there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening
the door.

A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned
tuna for export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I
know, they profit more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil
are sold to another company.

33
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material
but instead they are selling it locally?
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt
was the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are
seeling (sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by
this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging
materials. When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that
advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia
Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.

The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made
by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find
such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.
Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject
warrants and those inStonehill vs. Diokno,32 Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs.
Ruiz,33 and Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.34
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements."
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set
forth by the Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized
be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major object: the elimination
of general warrants.

Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since
according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept
by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there?

In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as
those in Stonehill:

A Yes. I have received information.

The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:

COURT: Alright.31
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company
records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the
contention that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he
testified. The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications; accounting and business records; checks and
check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."

34
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and
of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.
xxx
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to
explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
"x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically
require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the
things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant
- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that
abuses may not be committed. That is the correct interpretation of this constitutional
provision borne out by the American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the
search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs.
Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the
foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those
articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should
come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description
contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates,
amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments,
certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale,
messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of
foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.

In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be
seized, i.e., "Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation
receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and
disbursements and general ledger, etc." was held to be "an omnibus description" and,
therefore, invalid:
x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of
petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in
several motions filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO
carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only
the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and
beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general
public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We
have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents
sought to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of
these documents from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic
description thereof. The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is
acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is
unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general
description in a warrant.35 The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of

35
books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books
or records, provisional & official receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock
cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial records," and "bank
statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances
of this case.
As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase &
sales invoices," however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that
the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do
so precisely because they are unregistered.36 Where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into
consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.37 Although it appears that
photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the
issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every
receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render
the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of
unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the
warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly
described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. In United States v.
Cook,38 the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the following
pronouncement:
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13
Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two
particularly described books and myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the
California Supreme Court held that only the books were particularly described in the
warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but
rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the defective portions of
the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole.
Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if
viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with
respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the
authorization relating to the named books x x x. The search for and seizure of these

books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles.
xxx
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of
state courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district
judge should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional
muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that
were not described with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be suppressed,
but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with the purposes
underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits the
Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from considering
illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not
particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who
would be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description. As the leading
commentator has observed, "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was
issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be
invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and
permitting a search for other items as well." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to
petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also
taken by the enforcing officers:
1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,
2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,
6. Surety Agreement.39

36
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those
not particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply
with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property
to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property
can be taken thereunder.40 In Tambasen vs. People,41 it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police
acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to
limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and
that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache
& Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886
[1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of
security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and
giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA
547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally
seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task
of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself
prevail against the constitutionally protected right of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231
SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is
the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v.
Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court
aptly puts it inBagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive
in the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties
relative to such violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular
description of the things to be seized.

As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the
present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 42
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and
14 May 1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are
hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search
Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles
subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered
to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and belonging to
petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and
sales invoices. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998
PEOPLE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD
SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's
petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of
the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996. 2 as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996
denying the People's motion for reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had
been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of
February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I.
Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on
December 15, 1995, 4
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant,
and

3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court

within five (5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner
considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."

37
The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for
search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar
Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at
Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95)
against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt.
No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the
arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of
shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including
cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00
(receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of
$5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the
court on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece
of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1)
fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search
warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol;
(c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for
explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a
return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and
effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was
no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged; **" and on the same date, submitted
their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated
comment on petition forcertiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular
inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent
Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the
order dated January 30.1996 ** to wit:

1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment

No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the
building as it is correspondingly called only as "Apartment
No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's
Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from
Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have
its own respective doors used for ingress and egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of the
Court, let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly
granting the motion to quash search warrant**; 5
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to
dismiss** ;

8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed

a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order
quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the
motion for reconsideration** ;
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the
motion for reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents
filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.

38
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to,
the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court
of Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth
Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996,
dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial
Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to
by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The
place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then
residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from,
and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store,
the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted
the particular place to be searched was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed
by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search
Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead **directed them
to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207** in the Order **dated
December 15, 1995" this, too, being the address given "in the
Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by
P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The untenability
of the claim is made more patent by the People's admission, during the
hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said
sketch was in truth "not attached to the application for search
warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for reconsideration." 7
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations
of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.: 8

d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different

from the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is
the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes,
SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who
were all EDUCATED CULTURED and ADEPT to their

tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED

IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR
MOUTH to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who
issued the Search Warrant the words "KATABI", or
"KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE
ang papasukin namin" or if they happen to be an
ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to
open their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH
WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or
"NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are
going to raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful
occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of
the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living
room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law. 9
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as
required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77
hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court. 10
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search
warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Pao (139
SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court
in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that
whenever a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof
and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result
of the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal case is more substantial
than the search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal
case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).

6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge,

in light of "Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the
special civil action ofcertiorari.

39
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court
of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the
proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence** to the
contrary;"

(No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the Judge who issued
warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search
warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the
premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended,
they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the
Judge reproduced in the search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt
1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan."
And the scope of the search was made more particular and more restrictive by the
Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein
described."

3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"

4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be
diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at
bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule;" and
6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the
validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved
without informing petitioner thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was
validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for
the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to
surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of
four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the
same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a
sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but
unfortunately, the place they had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units

Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5)
distinct places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four
(4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single
structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors
through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of
the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its
individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5)
places, but of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that
immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of
the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge
Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after
having received the warrant which directs that the search be "limited only to the
premises herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding
the apartment units at the rear of the store they did not ask the Judge to correct said
description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place
to be searched clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have
submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient
particularization of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief
of Staff, AFP, 11 allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant
as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.

40
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon
perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said
case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at
"No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and
No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because both search
warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error,
of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was
absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one
place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2)
distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this
Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to be searched
when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused
by the "obviously typographical error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the
records in the official court file. 12
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical
error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but
the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the
search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately
perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case there is no
ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the
absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for
the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the
place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing
officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to
allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the
claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in
their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment
units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in

support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place
to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated
in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to
officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched
may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to
the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge
Bacalla's finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the
record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out
inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant
itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. 13 In
Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt
the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause
before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded,
the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant which, of
course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not
that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that
what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than
that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly
issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 the first
of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which
the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:

14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the things to be seized.

41
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on
probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under
oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, 15 the manifest
intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence
obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 16
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points
sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch
of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units the place to be
searched being plainly marked was in fact attached to the application for the search
warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the
place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was
diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals
had improperly refused to receive "evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been
denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy of the special civil
action ofcertiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The
resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the
search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search
warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of
their argument that anyway the premises searched were precisely what they had
described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where
a search warrant has been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal
case," the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before
the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of
the warrant is afterwards filed. 17 In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines"
laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 18 concerning "possible conflicts of
jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is
pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of
personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second
guideline reads: 19

2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main
criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same
may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to
any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party
aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original
or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they
shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court
and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in
another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed
for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending.
However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of
the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject
to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in
the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved
by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are
involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a
motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing
of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to
suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other
hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was
filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to
quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise
contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was

42
ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC
that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case
thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court
must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of
September 11, 1996 which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9,
1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in
the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182010
August 25, 2010
ESQUILLO vs. PEOPLE
Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines
(petitioner) challenges the November 27, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July 28, 2003 Decision of Branch 116 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 convicting Susan
Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting petitioner
reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in her possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).2 (underscoring supplied)
At the trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary
evidence of the prosecution, particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports
issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen
(de Belen),3 subject to her defenses, to thus dispense with the testimony of de Belen.
De Belen recorded the results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet
in Dangerous Drugs Report No. DD-02-613,4 viz:

xxxx
SPECIMEN:
White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked
"SRE" and further placed in bigger marked transparent plastic sachet.
xxxx
F I N D I N G S:
Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS
for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the results
thereof in Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-41285 reading:
xxxx
SPECIMEN:
Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo.
Bayanihan, Maricaban, Pasay City.
xxxx
F I N D I N G S:
Volume of urine = 60 mL.
pH of urine = 5.0
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid

43
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS
for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its
metabolite AMPHETAMINE. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on its documentary evidence and the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1
Cruzin),6 a member of the Pasay City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG),
the prosecution established its version as follows:
On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2
Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St.,
Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious
snatcher operating in the area known only as "Ryan."
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the
target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away
and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure
what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting
strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to
petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette
case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but
was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent
plastic sachet from the cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic
sachet7 on which he marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item, petitioner was
brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E.
Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum 8 dated
December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila
requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the substance contained in the plastic
sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on the
person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension9 recounting the details of their intended surveillance and the
circumstances leading to petitioners arrest.
Repudiating the charges, petitioner10 gave the following tale:

At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at
home, several policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and
asked her whether she knew one named "Ryan" who they claimed was a notorious
snatcher operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative. The police officers
then forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she
was detained.
While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they
claimed contained shabu and recovered from her.
In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was "planted," stemming from an
all too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioners daughter Josan Lee11 and family friend
Ma. Stella Tolentino,12corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that the
police officers never informed them of the reason why they were taking custody of
petitioner.
By Decision13 of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession
of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby
renders judgment finding the accused Susan Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of R. A. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and absent any
modifying circumstance to either aggravate or mitigate the criminal liability of the same
accused, and furthermore, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the same accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8)
months and One (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P350,000.00, Philippine
Currency, plus costs.
The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or "Shabu" involved in this case
is declared forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate disposition in
accordance with the provisions of the law.14 (underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to
thus render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.

44
In its challenged Decision affirming petitioners conviction, the appellate court, citing
People v. Chua,15 held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner
under the "stop-and-frisk" concept, a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting
warrantless searches.16
Brushing aside petitioners defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner
failed to adduce evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to
falsely charge her, and that she was even found positive for substance abuse.
1wphi1

In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate courts application of the "stopand-frisk" principle in light of PO1 Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was
being committed, he having merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case
which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could only
be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the
suspicion.17
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance of the
appealed decision but seeks a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9165.
Appellants conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment.
Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised
the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on
the occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court. 18 By
such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her
arrest.19
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed
engender the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers
were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1
Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into
her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement
officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That
petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and
inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search
warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:

(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and
aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving
vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the
prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce
fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.20 (emphasis
underscoring supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the
determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, taking into account, among other things, the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 21
Elucidating on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the
Court in People v. Chua22 held:
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance
with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should
therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply.
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of
Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes,
walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld
the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v. Solayao, we also
found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that
his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers
were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere
roaming the vicinity. (emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
1wphi1

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who
manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about

45
him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.23

clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts
of government officials. This it failed to do.

From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu
initially noticed in petitioners possession - later voluntarily exhibited24 to the police
operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a
cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer.
And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact
attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.

While the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision, it overlooked the error in the
penalty imposed by the trial court. The trial court, applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced petitioner to "suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight
(8) months and One (1) day, as maximum."

It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available
defenses she would raise. While such admissions do not necessarily control in
determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they nevertheless provide a
reasonable gauge by which petitioners credibility as a witness can be measured, or her
defense tested.

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

It has not escaped the Courts attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by adopting two
completely inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she argues that
the "stop-and-frisk" search upon her person and personal effects was unjustified as it
constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Constitution. In the same breadth,
however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her version that she was at home
resting on the date in question and had been forcibly dragged out of the house by the
police operatives and brought to the police station, for no apparent reason than to try and
extort money from her. That her two witnesses a daughter and a friend who were
allegedly present at the time of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their
claim that they were not informed why she was being arrested, should dent the credibility
of their testimony.

xxxx

Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of
petitioners, that they are victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has
been held as a shop-worn defense of the accused in drug-related cases, the allegation
being easily concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce

Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.25
A word on the penalty.

Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:

xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows:

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than
five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana
resin or marijuana resin oil, metamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to MDMA or "ecstacy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB
and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possesses is far behind therapeutic
requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is punished
by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, "the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed

46
by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same."
The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the penalty is thus in
order.
The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision
of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186529
PEOPLE vs. RACHO

and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant
immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants
pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.5
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated
specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it
with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations on
the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.6
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of
R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law
for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:

August 3, 2010

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8,
2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there,
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or
4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a
regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the
same.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

CONTRARY TO LAW."7

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone
with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the
police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the
local police force to apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellants
name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would
arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.

"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the
said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or
delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license
from the proper authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he
was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day
wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves
along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a
Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential
agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the
bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to
his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his
brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against
him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his
arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was
riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and
underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation.9

47
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of
Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He
likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug
because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his
supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the
validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when
there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case. 13

sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse,
coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with
jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of
his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless
arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. 16
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out
with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Said proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of
the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy
that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the
validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant
were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and
appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. This
Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal,
if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance
in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional
mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt.14
1avvphi1

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed
below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured. 19

48
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was
caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the
presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a
sachet of shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was
deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this
well-established doctrine.

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must
precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 21 Thus, given the factual
milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause
to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it
ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 22

The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v.
Nuevas.27

The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a

reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the
police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The
agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team
to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the
agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler,
Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members
posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m.
of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus,
the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the
latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the
police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from
his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a
small sachet containing the suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence
of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was
the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu.
This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is
sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling
Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of
marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves
near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a
Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got
off. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was
then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced
themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the
apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana
leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel
Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted
surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was
involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that
Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of
marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted
themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and
helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked
if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves. 29
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person,
more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand,
and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana
leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking,
they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted
the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the
plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two

49
other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two
male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police
approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they
were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana
leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because
there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act
indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to
commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini
bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude
that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information
given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search
would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been
confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information"
sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v.
Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v.
Montilla,35 People v. Valdez,36and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court
sustained the validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt
acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed,
was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the
Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the
rule against warrantless searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do
away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a
member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19,
2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical
description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on
the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day
(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. 39

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of
his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active
participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights.
Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and
seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless
of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking
in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of
our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court
appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the
end never justifies the means.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero
Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the
Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days
from notice. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164815
September 3, 2009
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO vs. CA and PEOPLE

50
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso
(Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008
Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.

Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the
Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a
certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the
name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9

The facts are briefly stated as follows:

On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson
testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
follows:

One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.

On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened
by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled
him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet
(outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments
later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril
sa loob!"11

without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.

Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However,
the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.12

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.

Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993
covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col.
Angelito Moreno.14

During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2
Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police
District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms
and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted
Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The
gun subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the government. 15

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the
desk officer directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest,
issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
ransom.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum term
of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his
hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to
the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where
they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso.
They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched
him. They found a Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces
of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7

On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court to once more
take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 21

51
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its Comment
on Valerosos Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends
Valerosos acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers
the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with
Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of
Valerosos constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be
excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject firearm
was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime, since he
was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt
issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with
the OSGs position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial
rights must ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. While
a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is
within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior
leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a
particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzmans motion for reconsideration, we still
entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. In that case, we
said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities,
petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime
which he might not have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second
motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of
the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the
ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v.
Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized
the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve
respondents second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral

arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second
motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in
the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be within our power
to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation. 29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested,
is different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was
arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about
to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily
searched him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the
other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After
serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police
officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they
discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for
acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the
version of the defense.
Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if
so, would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution which states:

52
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual. 30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in
Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding." 31

8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]

9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
and building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured. 34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down
above, is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.

The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized
instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32

For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations.
In People v. Leangsiri,35People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the
occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in
the permissible area within the latters reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the

53
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested.42

The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendants guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51

In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of
his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They
pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his
hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. 43 The other police officers remained
inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm
and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers
served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him
immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the
room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was
locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because
there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be
used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as
well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be
used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident
to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained
beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the case before us, search was made in
the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valerosos immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement
the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valerosos children,
because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In
other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently,
any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso.
However, in this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject
firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
1avvphi1

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of
an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers
who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. 54

54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III
of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the
articles on governmental power.55

That on or about April 10, 1995 in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, without being authorized by law, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously transported, delivered and possessed 1.7 kilos dried marijuana
leaves which are prohibited drugs.

Without the illegally seized firearm, Valerosos conviction cannot stand. There is simply
no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who
might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a
crime he did not commit.57

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised
by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic
constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and
prosecutory powers of the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30,
2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is
hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141137
January 20, 2004
PEOPLE vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN WATES
From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold
Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article IV of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, they lodged the
present appeal.

Upon arraignment on September 11, 1995, appellants, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m., as about fifteen police officers were
manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735,
otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men
on board sped past them.2 One of the police officers blew his whistle3 and ordered them
to return to the checkpoint.
Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1
Haydenburge Goc-ong (SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th Company
thereupon asked them why they sped away to which appellant Victor Vinecario
(Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and in front of
appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is a member of the
army.4 When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not,
however, offer any. At this point, the police officers noticed that a big military backpack
was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were his coappellants, to be afraid and acting suspiciously.5 SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario
what the contents of the backpack were. Vinecario answered that it merely contained a
mat and proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble who, however,
returned it to Vinecario.6

The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows:

Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to
disperse, following which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Vinecario did as ordered
and as SPO1 Goc-ong noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the
same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit reiterating that it was only a mat.

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused for VIOLATION OF SECTION 4,

ARTICLE II IN RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF R.A. 6425, committed as
follows:

SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed
it,7 resulting to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in
the air.

55
Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong "let us talk about this," 8 but the latter ignored
Vinecario and instead called his Commanding Officer and reported to him that marijuana
was found in Vinecarios possession.
On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants along
with two bundles of marijuana, the backpack and the motorcycle to the battalion office at
Camp Catitipan in Davao City and were turned over to one PO2 Cabalon, an investigator
of Regional Mobile Force 11. Before proceeding to said battalion office, however, the
incident was blottered9 by PO3 Edward Morado at the Buhangin Police Station.10
On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1 Pual
Padasay brought the confiscated suspected marijuana to the camps crime laboratory for
examination11 which determined it to weigh 1,700 grams12 and to be indeed positive
therefor.13
As for appellants, their version of the incident follows:
Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry Division of the
Philippine army stationed at Pagakpak, Pantukan,14 approached motorcycle driver Wates
at a terminal in Andile, Mawab and requested him to bring him to his elder brother at
Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00 which he paid.15 The two thus proceeded to
Carmen, Panabo where they picked up Roble to alternate with Wates as driver, and at
8:00 a.m., the three left for Parang.16
On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his brother
Teofanis to shoulder the medical expenses of his son. At about 4:30 p.m., after partaking
of snacks at Teofanis residence, appellants left for Davao City.
Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecarios former co-employee at
Emerson Plywood where he previously worked, blocked the motorcycle. 17 Vinecario thus
alighted from the motorcycle and shook hands with Datolarta18 who asked where they
were headed for and requested that he ride with them. Vinecario turned Datolarta down
as there was no longer any room in the motorcycle. Datolarta then asked if he
(Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas,
Tagum. Without examining its contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolartas bag and
left with his co-appellants.19
On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there was a
checkpoint,20 sped past it. When they were about 50 to 60 meters away from the
checkpoint, they heard a whistle, prompting Wates to tap Vinecario, telling him that the

whistle came from the checkpoint. Vinecario then told Roble to go back to the
checkpoint.
While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed them to
alight from the motorcycle. One of the officers asked Vinecario who he was, and
Vinecario identified himself as a member of the Philippine National Police. 21 The officer
asked for identification and when Vinecario could not produce any, the former got the
backpack slung on Vinecarios shoulder.
The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as Vinecario
acquiesced, two officers opened the bag upon which they shouted that it contained
marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the backpack to confirm if there was indeed
marijuana. At that instant, the police officers held his hands and brought him, together
with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station, and later to Camp Catitipan.
At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the assistance of
counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not
allowed to read.22
The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient to prove the
guilt of all three accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused PFC
Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, pursuant to Sec. 4, Art. II in relation to
Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by Rep. Act 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are
jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection, under Rep
Act 8177 in the manner and procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act
7659, amending Art. 81 of the Revised Penal Code.
Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC 16 Davao
City, is ordered to elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court,
Supreme Court Manila, for the automatic review of this Decision, after its promulgation.
SO ORDERED.23 (Underscoring supplied)
By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20, 1999 and
disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:

56
Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this aspect, on the imposition
of the penalty against all accused, even if invoked only be accused Venecaio (sic)
through his counsel de officio, will apply to all accused since there exists conspiracy of all
in the commission of the offense charged.
Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside and reconsidered,
only insofar as the imposition of the supreme penalty of death through lethal injection
under Republic Act No. 8177, is concerned.
All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, are instead
sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. IV, Sec.
21, in relation to Art. IV of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as decided
by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Peope (sic) vs. Ruben Montilla G.R. No.
123872 dated January 30, 1998.
However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all aaccused (sic) of the offense
charged, is (sic) sustained. The corresponding motion (sic) for reconsideration of all
accused through their counsel for their acquittal of (sic) the offense charged, is denied,
for lack of merit.

GRAVELY ERRED IN MISAPPREHENDING FACTS IF NOT A COMPLETE

DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE, BOTH DOCUMENTARY AND
TESTIMONIAL.
2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE RECANTATION MADE BY POLICE
OFFICERS HAYDENBURG GOC-ONG AND VICENTE CARVAJAL THAT BOTH
APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE WERE NOT NERVOUS AND
APPREHENSIVE AT THE TME (sic) OF THE OPENING OF THE MILITARY
PACK CONTAINING MARIJUANA NEAR THE CHECKPOINT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE THAT THEY WERE
MERELY HIRED BY VICTOR VINECARIO TO BRING HIM TO PARANG,
MAGUINDANAO FOR A FEE OF P500.00 WITH FREE FOOD AND GASOLINE.
4. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE RENTAL OF
P500.00 WHICH VINECARIO PAID TO THE OWNER OF THE [MOTORCYCLE]
AS INADEQUATE BY TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE BUS FARE OF
P268.00 FROM MACO, DAVAO PROVINCE TO SUN WAY CROSSING,
MAGUINDANAO DOWN TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO.28

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)

The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 dated September 14, 1995 of
the above-mentioned Order of the trial court, it arguing that the commission of the
offense charged against appellants was attended by an aggravating circumstance in that
it was committed by an organized or syndicated crime group, thus warranting the
imposition of the death penalty.
In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal 26 on September 15, 1999.
Vinecario followed suit and filed his Notice of Appeal. 27
The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecutions Motion.
In their brief, Roble and Wates assign the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURTS OBSERVATION THAT APPELLANTS WATES AND
ROBLE CONSPIRED WITH VICTOR VINECARIO IN TRANSPORTING
MARIJUANA FROM PARANG, MAGUINDANAO IS NOT BORNE BY THE
EVIDNECE (sic) ON RECORD AND SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT

Wates and Roble argue that there is no iota of evidence to prove that they acted with
unity of purpose and in the execution of any unlawful objective with Vinecario. 29 They
assert that they had no prior knowledge of Vinecarios plan to meet with a man who
would give the backpack containing marijuana; that prosecution witnesses SPO1 Gocong and PO1 Carvajals declaration that they (appellants Wates and Roble) were not
nervous, uneasy or apprehensive when the backpack was opened buttresses their claim
that they did not conspire with Vinecario; and that the prosecutions theory of conspiracy
was merely based on the testimony of PO1 Carvajal that they acted nervously when the
backpack was ordered opened for inspection; that there was a "great variance" in the
testimonies of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal in the direct examination and their
testimonies on rebuttal as to the events that transpired on April 10, 1995, thus casting
serious doubts on the trial courts findings of guilt.
On September 17, 2001, Vinecario filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, 30 stating
that he is "practically satisfied with the decision of the trial court"; that "he would not
waste anymore the effort of the honorable Supreme Court Justices in further reviewing
his case"; and that as he was "driven by the sincerest desire in renewing his life," he
"irrevocably moves for the withdrawal of his appeal." On even date, Roble and Wates

57
likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,31 stating that they admit the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted; that they are satisfied with the
decision of the trial court; and that they are already serving the penalty for their offense
and "realize the overt admittance of guilt as the only vehicle in [their] gradual renewal."
By Resolution of November 27, 2001, this Court denied the Motions of appellants and
directed Vinecario to file his brief within forty-five days from notice of the resolution.
In a brief dated January 25, 2002, Vinecario attributes the following errors to the trial
court:

The rule is constitutionally enshrined that no search and seizure can lawfully be
conducted without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution so ordains:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose,
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH

UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE
ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS (sic) VALID.

And Section 3(2), Article III of the same Constitution mandates that any evidence
obtained in violation of the right of the people under Section 2 shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE

AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF
MARIJUANA AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of

certain exceptions, however. Search and/or seizure may be made without a warrant and
the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives
his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. 34

III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN
GIVING THE POLICEMEN THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY DESPITE THE APPARENT IRREGULARITIES IN
THE MANNER OF ARRESTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.32
Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted
by the police officers was incident to a lawful arrest; that he could not have been
deemed to have consented to the search as any such consent was given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances; and that there existed no probable cause
to justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence, it being a product of illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who arrested and investigated him failed to inform
him of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his
choice, thereby violating Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. 33

Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 35 For
as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot
be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. 36
x x x [Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as
where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and
safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the
government.
xxx
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present
government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and
economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to
defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government
intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has

58
the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for
best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists
right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are
required to answer a brief question or two. x x x
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held
by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this
Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee.40 (Emphasis supplied).

"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the
potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways
are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both
appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized
manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to
law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public
interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by
official responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of
limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to
locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and
since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room
for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol
stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review." 37

That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers at the
checkpoint is gathered from the following testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong:

Judicial notice is taken of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2735 imposing a
gun ban during an election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) of the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).38 The national and local elections in 1995
having been held on May 8, the present incident, which occurred on April 10, 1995, was
well within the election period.

A: When they returned back (sic) I asked them why they speeded away?

Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians
passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may
be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender
or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. 39

Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your unit do when these three
persons approached?
A: We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and speeded away.
Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding away?
A: One of my men blew his whistle ordering to (sic) return back (sic).
xxx
Q: When they returned back (sic) what happened?

Q: What did they answer?

A: One of them said that he is a member of the army.
Q: If that person who said that he is a member of the army is in court, can you point to
him?
A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and pointed to a man wearing yellow tshirt who stood up and when asked about his name answered that he is Victor
Venecario).

59
xxx
Q: What was your reaction when Venecario failed to show any identification papers to
show that he is really a member of the army?
A: We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside.

Q: So what was your reaction when you saw the three passing the bag from one person
to another?
A: My suspicion was it was a bomb and ordered my men to scatter.
Q: Tell us why are you (sic) concerned about explosives was there any incident prior to
that checkpoint?

Q: Who was carrying that big backpack?

A: Election was past (sic) approaching and there was a threat that Davao City will be
bombed.

A: Venecario.
xxx

Q: Prior to that was there any incident?

xxx

Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us
why did you (sic) ask him?
A: In Ipil, Zamboanga on April 4.
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were
afraid and different reactions (sic).

Q: If you recall when was that?

Q: They were acting suspiciously?

A: April 4 of the same year.

A: Yes.

Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your men to scatter, what
happened next?

Q: That is what you have observed from their faces?

A: I ordered Venecario to open the backpack.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did Venecario do when you ordered him to open?
Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the contents of that backpack?
A: They opened the backpack..41
A: He said that it is a mat and passed it on to his companion.
SPO1 Goc-ongs testimony was corroborated by PO1 Vicente Carvajal:
Q: You said he passed it on to his companion, there were two (2) companions, to whom
did he pass it on?

Q: At about 10:45 in the evening of that date April 10, 1995 do you recall of any unusual
incident while you were conducting that checkpoint?

A: He passed it on to Wates and Wates passed it on to Roble.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did Roble do when Wates passed it to him?
Q: What was that incident all about?
A: Roble returned it back (sic) to Venecario.

60
A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw this motorcycle passing
and flagged them to stop and there were three (3) persons and one was manning and
they briefly stopped but speeded away.
xxx

A: He was in camouflage and wearing sleepers (sic).

xxx
Q: After that what happened?

Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what happened?

A: We were able to observe that he was carrying a bag.

A: The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army.

Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked what was (sic) the contents
of the bag?

xxx
A: He appeared to be hesitant and he said that it contained clothes.
Q: You said these three persons were nervous and one of them introduced himself as an
army man, what did you do?

Q: Before that what did Venecario do?

A: I asked for an ID.

A: He placed it in (sic) his shoulder.

Q: Who among you asked for an ID?

Q: What did he do with the backpack?

A: Sgt. Goc-ong.

A: When asked he passed it to his other companions.

Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID?

Q: What did Venecario when he passed it to his companion?

A: I was behind him because I backed him up.

A: Venecario passed it to his companion and that companion passed it to his other
companion.

Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked to produce an ID?
Q: After this companion received the backpack from his companion what did he do?
A: He answered that he has no ID.
A: He returned back (sic) to Venecario.
Q: What was the reaction of the group when Venecario failed to show any ID that he was
an army man?

Q: They passed it from one person to another until it was returned to Venecario?

A: Our other companion moved closer as security.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why?
A: We were on alert because on April 4 the one who attacked were (sic) in uniform.
Q: At that time what was Venecario wearing?

xxx
Q: You said that backpack was passed from one person to another and when he got hold
of that backpack what happened?

61
A: He opened the backpack.

A: Yes.

Q: Who told him to open the backpack?

Q: What happened after Crossing Parang?

A: Sgt. Goc-ong.42

A: There was a person who blocked us.

In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when
interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the
reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the
checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to
dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable
cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were
offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some
offense.

Q: A former companion of yours?

As to Vinecarios allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the
custodial investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and material
only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes
the basis of his conviction.43 In the case at bar, the trial court convicted appellants on the
basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of SPO1
Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.

A: Before I became a soldier, I worked in Emerson Plywood.

Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows:

Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any unusual incident that took
place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked us.
Q: Where?
A: Parang Highway.
Q: Coming here to Davao?

A: Yes.
Q: A former soldier?
A: No, sir.
Q: You said your former companion, am I correct?

Q: So that person who flagged down you were (sic) your former companion?
A: Yes.
Q: You are familiar with him?
A: I know him very well.
Q: He was your close friend?
A: Yes.
Q: What is the name of that person who stopped you?
A: Abdul Karim Datolarta.
Q: He was alone when he stopped you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened when your friend Abdul Karin (sic) Datolarta stopped you?

62
A: When he stopped us, I immediately disembarked from the motor vehicle and shook
hands with him.

Q: Where in Tagum?
A: Roxas, Tagum.

Q: He was the one who stopped you or you were the one who told the driver to stop?
Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his cousin in Tagum?
A: My friend.
A: I asked him what was (sic) the contents?
Q: You immediately recognized the face of that friend of yours?
Q: What did he answer you?
A: Not yet.
A: He answered clothes.
Q: What else happened aside from shaking hands and greeting?
Q: What did you do?
A: He asked me where I was heading.
A: Because were (sic) were in a hurry I slung it in (sic) my shoulder.
Q: What was your answer?
Q: You did not become suspicious?
A: I told him that I am going back to Davao.
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: He told me if he can also ride with us.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I told him we were already three.
Q: What happened next?
A: Since I refused he asked me if I could bring his bag and he mentioned the name of
that cousin of his in Tagum.
Q: He mentioned the name?
A: Yes, Merly.
Q: What is the family name?
A: He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum.

A: No more because I trusted the person and I have an emergency to take (sic) that
time.44
Vinecarios account - that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his co-appellants
were cruising along the highway, a person whom he failed to recognize but who turned
out to be an acquaintance, Abdul Karim Datolarta, flagged down 45 the motorcycle, and as
requested by Datolarta, he readily agreed to bring a backpack to Datolartas cousin
without checking its contents - is incredible, contrary to human experience, and taxes
credulity. Datolarta was not even apprehended nor presented at the trial, thus further
eliciting serious doubts on Vinecarios tale.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act.46
The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution
witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely
charge appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and
unsubstantiated denial of appellants.

63
As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants, the same
fails.

Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us
why did you (sic) ask him?

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it.47 Where the acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals.48 To exempt himself from criminal liability, the
conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
unlawful plan to commit the crime.49

A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were
afraid and different reactions (sic).

In People v. Concepcion,50 this Court held:

x x x Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred
from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred
from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.
In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived in unlawfully
transporting the subject marijuana. Roble, who was driving the motorcycle at Ulas, did
not stop but instead sped away upon seeing the checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid
inspection by the police officers. When asked as to the contents of the backpack by
SPO1 Goc-ong, appellants passed the same to one another, indicating that they knew its
contents. These circumstances manifest appellants concerted efforts and cooperation
towards the attainment of their criminal objective.
Wates and Roble assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1
Carvajal, they contending that these witnesses contradicted their testimonies-in-chief
when they subsequently testified on rebuttal that appellants were not nervous or
apprehensive at all when they were being inspected by the policemen.
It bears noting, however, that the alleged conflicting observations of SPO1 Goc-ong and
PO1 Carvajal referred to by Roble and Wates on their deportment pertain to different
stages of the checkpoint inspection as a scrutiny of the records reveals. Thus, in his
direct examination, SPO1 Goc-ong testified as follows:

Q: They were acting suspiciously?

A: Yes.
Q: That is what you observed in their faces?
A: Yes, sir.51
PO1 Carvajal, on cross-examination, echoed Goc-ongs observations on appellants
deportment upon returning to the checkpoint:
Q: You said when these three (3) suspects riding the motorcycle returned and stopped
you said you noticed one of them was nervous, did I get you right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Only one was nervous?
A: All of them.
Q: When you said they appeared to be nervous, could that mean that they were
trembling?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark and it was 10:00 oclock in
the evening?
A: There was light.

64
Q: The place was well-lighted?
A: Yes, sir.52
On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or
apprehensive when he flagged them down as they crossed the checkpoint.53
PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervous as
Vinecarios backpack was being opened.54
As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the following
arguments of the Office of the Solicitor General, which are quoted with approval, should
dispose of the same:
It is incorrect to suggest that just because SPO1 Goc-ong testified that other vehicles
passed through the checkpoint before the appellants arrived, the latter could not have
sped away from the checkpoint. SPO1 Goc-ong did not give any testimony that other
vehicles were still at the checkpoint at the time the appellants arrived. On the contrary,
he testified there was no other vehicle ahead of the appellants at the checkpoint when
the latter arrived on their motorcycle (TSN, June 17, 1999, p.7).
It is also incorrect to suggest that appellants may not have noticed the checkpoint just
because SPO1 Goc-ong made no mention of using reflectorized objects at the
checkpoint. As described earlier in his Brief, this witness explained that the checkpoint
was visible because it had a sign board at the middle of the road that read, "COMELEC
GUN BAN" (TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 6 and 8). There is no way for appellants not to have
noticed the checkpoint.55
In fine, appellants defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of delivering or
transporting marijuana.
The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of delivering or
transporting illegal drugs. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined
to mean: "to carry or convey from one place to another." When accused-appellant used
his vehicle to convey the package containing marijuana to an unknown destination, his
act was part of the process of transporting the said prohibited substance. Inherent in the
crime of transporting the prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The very act of
transporting a prohibited drug, like in the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The mere commission of the act constitutes
the offense and is sufficient to validly charge and convict an individual committing the

act, regardless of criminal intent. Since the appellant was caught transporting marijuana,
the crime being mala prohibita, accused-appellants intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof
need not be shown.56(Underscoring supplied)
A word on the penalty. As provided in Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
transport any prohibited drug. Section 20, Article IV of the same act provides that the
penalty imposed in Section 4 shall be applied if the dangerous drug is, with respect to
marijuana, 750 grams or more. In the case at bar, the marijuana involved weighed 1,700
grams. Since the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, a resort to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code57 is necessary. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetuawas properly imposed by the trial court. A fine of P500,000.00
should, however, been likewise imposed on the appellants in solidum in accordance with
the law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in
Criminal Case No. 35233-95 finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn
Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally transporting marijuana under Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are sentenced to each suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and solidarity pay a fine of P500,000.00. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170672
August 14, 2009
JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III vs. P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA and SPO3 CESAR
RAMIREZ
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 10 July 2004 Decision2 and 18
October 2004 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217 (trial court),
in Civil Case No. Q-98-33442 for Damages.
The Antecedent Facts
Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4)
and (9) of the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria) and SPO3
Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24 March
1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in

65
Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents),
accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the
Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was
suspicious of the request and told respondents that he would proceed to the PNP
Headquarters after he had brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked
his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his
Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant.
The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the
shotguns license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his search and
then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle.
Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate charge, at
the PNP special detention cell.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3
Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William
Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just
left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him,
he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him
to the police headquarters as he was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria
and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioners residence, they caught
up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a
gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the drivers seat as petitioner opened the door.
They also saw a shotgun at the back of the drivers seat. The police officers confiscated
the firearms and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also arrested
other persons who were identified to be with petitioner during the shooting incident.
Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An
administrative case was also filed against petitioner before this Court. 4
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 10 July 2004 Decision, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint.
The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay
Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of
the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and
that the firearm used in the commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial
court ruled that petitioners warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms
were valid and legal. The trial court gave more credence to the testimonies of

respondents who were presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with law.
The trial court rejected petitioners claim of frame-up as weak and insufficient to
overthrow the positive testimonies of the police officers who conducted the arrest and the
incidental search. The trial court
concluded that petitioners claim for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code is not
warranted under the circumstances.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
In its 18 October 2004 Order, the trial court denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
The issues in this case are the following:
1. Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were
illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
2. Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages under Articles 32(4) and (9)
of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner are
conclusive in this case.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Application of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Petitioner alleges that his arrest and the search were unlawful under Section 5, Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner alleges that for the warrantless
arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts that the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit

66
an offense. Petitioner alleges that the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the
arresting officers, and thus they have no personal knowledge of facts as required by the
Rules.
We do not agree.

involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up
his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioners act of trying to get
away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Plain View Doctrine
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.5
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.6 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 7 A reasonable suspicion, therefore,
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.8
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own
eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident.
SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was

The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.9 The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of
the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure.10
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught
up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when
petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported
that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the
firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
Civil Liability Under Article 32 of the Civil Code
Petitioner alleges that respondents are civilly liable under paragraphs (4) and (9) of
Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code respectively state:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

67
xxxx

Bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment differ as follows:

(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree
of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.

xxxx
In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant and
that firearms were validly seized from his possession. The trial court found that petitioner
was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. We agree with the
trial court in rejecting petitioners allegation that he was merely framed-up. We also agree
with the trial court that respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be held civilly liable for their
actions.
Res Judicata Does Not Apply
Respondents raise the defense of res judicata against petitioners claim for damages.
Res judicata has two aspects: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment
provided under Section 47(b) and (c), Rule 39, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure11 which provide:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

1avvphi1

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This
is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently,
any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.12
For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial
of the case;
(c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions
are substantially between the same parties.13
While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential
facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An administrative
case deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the respondent for
the commission of the acts complained of.14 The case before us deals with the civil
liability for damages of the police authorities. There is no identity of causes of action in

68
the cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the application of res
judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,15 it is required that there must
always be identity of parties in the first and second cases.
There is no identity of parties between the present case and the administrative case. The
administrative case was filed by Benjamin Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against petitioner. Sia Lao is
not a party to this case. Respondents in the present case were not parties to the
administrative case between Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present case, petitioner is the
complainant against respondents. Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to
petitioners complaint for damages, respondents nevertheless cannot be held liable for
damages as discussed above.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 10 July 2004 Decision and 18
October 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Civil Case
No. Q-98-33442. SO ORDERED.