You are on page 1of 109

Restricted

Ship Security Plan
“MV XXXX”
IMO Number XXX
Prepared By
V.Ships Brasil

Control Copy Number

of

SSP/1103/XXX
[date], Version 01

Issued to:

_____________

Restricted

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX

[address]
©V.Ships, Brazil 2003
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
The copyright in this document, which contains information of a proprietary
nature, is vested in V.Ships, Brazil. The content of this document may not be
used for purposes other than that for which it has been supplied and may not be
reproduced, either wholly or in part, in any way whatsoever, nor may it be used
by, or its content divulged to, any other person whomsoever without the prior
written permission of V.Ships, Brazil.

November 2003/Issue 01

ii
Restricted

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX

Acknowledgement Sheet
This manual should be read by the Master and by all other officers, and this page should be signed by
each officer as confirmation. Subsequently, all officers joining this vessel must read this manual and
sign as confirmation
Name

Rank

Date

November 2003/Issue 01

Signature

1-1
Restricted

[CSO Details] As a controlled document future revisions of this plan will be controlled and recorded on the revision sheet.Ships. 2 V. Approvals Signature Prepared By V. The discarded sections or pages are to be destroyed.Ships Brazil Date CSO.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Summary This plan is valid from the date of issue and subject to approval by flag or a recognised security organisation (RSO). Brazil 3 November 2003/Issue 01 1-1 Restricted . alterations or amendments is to be referred to the undersigned using the procedure provided in Appendix 1. This plan is not to be marked up and any suggestions. Transpetro Date Transpetro Date Signature Reviewed By Signature Approved By Distribution Name Office Copy Company Copy Number Transpetro 1.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Document history Version history Version date Issue 01 superseded documents/description/details First Issue to Transpetro for review and approval. Amendments New version Author of amendment Date of amendment Summary of changes Section paragraph Synopsis of change November 2003/Issue 01 Change request form reference 1-2 Restricted .

......................................................................................................................................................................1 1...................................................................1 3.................................2-1 Master.............2-3 Training...................................................2-2 Ship Security Officer (SSO)....2-2 Officers and Crew.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5-1 Use of Force.......................................................5 1......................................................1-2 Disclosure and Protection of Information ........................................... 3.............................................................2-3 SECURITY PLAN AND ADMINISTRATION.............................................................................................................................................1 5.................................................................................................................................................1 2............................................3-2 Reporting of Security Incidents ..................................................3-1 Security Surveys & International Ship Security Certificate ..........3-3 Continuous Synopsis Record .....................................................................1-2 Security Policy and Objectives ....................................4 2................................................3 5....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1-1 1........................5-2 Restricted Areas......................................................6 4..................................................................................................3 5......................... 2..................................................................................5-3 November 2003/Issue 01 1-3 Restricted ..............5 3.....................3-1 Audit and Review ....................................................................................................................................................................................2 1........................3 3.......1 4......... 5............................................ 3-1 Ship Security Assessment.2 4........................................1-4 RESPONSIBILITIES.........4-1 Security Monitoring ..................4 Introduction .......................................3 1.............................2 3.. 2-1 Company Security Officer (CSO) .............................3-3 ESTABLISHING SECURITY LEVELS...............................................5-1 Alarms ............................1-2 Scope ............................................................................................................1-1 Purpose ...............................................................................4-1 Guidance.............................3-2 Records ..........................................................................................................................................................................2 2....................................................................... GENERAL................6 2................................................................................................................ 4.....4 1.......................................... 5-1 Security of Ship’s Crew.........4 3........5 3..............................................4-2 GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES...........................................2 5........................................................... 4-1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Contents Acknowledgement Sheet Summary Approvals Distribution Document History Contents Abbreviations 1.....................................................3 2.................................................................................1-3 Conflict of Interest......................................................................................................

........................... 10-1 10.....8-1 When Raiders are Detected .....2 6.......................... 6.....10 7...............................................................3 8........7-1 Stowaway Checklist......4 7..................7 5..............................6-4 Ship Stores and Spares.................................................................................... EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND BOMB THREATS........................................6-3 Security Rounds...................13 6..........................................................................................7-4 PIRATES ..........................................6 5..........................................9-1 Military Assistance ..........6-7 Unaccompanied Baggage .......................................................................................5-5 Suspicious or Unattended Packages............................................. 6-1 Ship/Port Interface and Declaration of Security ....2 8........................4 6........................6-7 STOWAWAYS...........................6-1 Access and Restricted Areas......................................................................................6-5 Cargo .....1 The Problem..........................................................................................9-2 After the Assault .................................................8-1 General Precautions ...........................................................................................................................6 6.........................................................................5-4 Master’s Safe and Cash ................5-6 Non-Manifested Goods/Contraband Measures .....6-3 Gangway Watch ............................................................................................................1 8................................................................................................................5 8......................................................................................................................................................................................2 9...............................................................................................................................5-7 Ship Identification Number ...................5 9............................................................................................... 9-1 The problem ...................................................................................................................................................3 6...........................................................7 6...............................4 9......................................................................................................................................................... 8-1 The Problem.....................................1 7.........................5 Keys and Locking of Spaces .............................................5-5 Specialised Security Equipment .................................................................................................10-1 November 2003/Issue 01 1-4 Restricted .....2 7...................9-1 When Hijackers have Boarded..................................................5-4 Security Lighting ...............................................................................................................................................9 5....................3 7.......................................................................................................... 9.............................6-2 Warning Signs..............................................................................................9-2 10...............................................................................................................................5-6 Evacuation......................5 6...........5-7 PORT SECURITY.............. 7-1 The Problem.7-1 Precautions to Avoid Stowaways .................................................................................................................................9 6..........................6-5 CREW & PASSENGER LISTS .........6-4 Unauthorised Craft ..............................................8-2 After an Attack ......................................................................................................................................................4 8............................................................7-2 Action Upon Discovering Stowaways .........................5-6 False Distress Signals ...............................................................................................................................................................Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5.......................................................................8 6...............................................................................................................9-1 Precautions....................................................................... 8...........................10 5..........................................8 5..................................................................................................................7-2 P&I Club Involvement .......................8-3 HIJACKING AND TERRORISTS...........................................................................................................11 5............................................................................................ 7...............................................................................5 5...........................................................................................................................................................................................................1 6......................3 9...............................1 9..................................................................................................................................12 5..............8-2 If Raiders have Boarded ...........

......................................................................................................................3 11.6 11...........Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 10..................11-3 If Drugs are Discovered .................................................................................2 10............................ 1 1..........2 Framework..................................11-3 Drug Searches ..................... Appendix 2 – Company Contact Details and Ship Communication Details Appendix 3 – Declaration of Appointment of Ship Security Officer Appendix 4 – Form of a Declaration of Security Appendix 5 – Training...................................11-4 1..................5 11. ANTI-DRUG SECURITY...........4 11..............................................................1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................3 10........................................10-2 Action on Discovering a Bomb or Suspicious Package ..................................................................................................11-1 Methods of Drug Smuggling..................10-2 11..............................11-2 Precautions to Avoid Drug Smuggling ...........7 The Problem............................ 1 Declaration of Security.......................................................................................1 11.................................................................................................... Drills.........................................................................................................................................................................4 Types of Explosive Devices ........10-1 Action in the Event of a Bomb Threat..................2 11.......................... 11-1 11........................ Duties and Responsibilities Appendix 6 – Ship Specific Security Information Appendix 7 – Summary of SSA Recommendations Appendix 8 – Ship Security Alert System Appendix 9 – Visitors Log Appendix 10 – Stowaway and Drug Checklist Appendix 11 – Bomb Threat Checklist Appendix 12 – Recording a Security Breach Appendix 13 – Ship Security Officers Assessment Form Appendix 14 – Ship Security Audit Form Appendix 15 – Additional Requirement for the USA Appendix 16 – Additional Information Appendix 17 – Trading Pattern and Recent Ports of Call November 2003/Issue 01 1-5 Restricted .....................................................................1 Appendices Appendix 1 – SSP Review and Update Procedure.............................................................................

Abbreviation Definition CSO: Company Security Officer CSR: Continuous Synopsis Record CTU Cargo Transport Unit DOC: Document of Compliance DOS: Declaration of Security GA Ships General Arrangement IMO: International Maritime Organisation ISPS Code: International Ship and Port Facility Security Code ISSC: International Ship Security Certificate OOW: Officer of the Watch PFSO: Port Facility Security Officer RSO: Recognised Security Organisation SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea SMC Safety Management Certificate SSA: Ship Security Assessment SSO: Ship Security Officer SSP: Ship Security Plan USCG: United States Coast Guard November 2003/Issue 01 1-6 Restricted .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Abbreviations The following abbreviations are used within this report.

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX

1.

General

1.1

Introduction
New security measures and procedures adopted by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) establish an international marine security framework to enhance
the protection of ships, personnel, cargo, and ports. The initiative called the
International Ship and of Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), responds to an increased
threat of terrorist attacks.
The new security measures and procedures apply to cargo ships of 500 tons or more
involved in international trade, passenger ships and high-speed passenger craft, mobile
offshore drilling units, and port facilities for the above ships on international voyages.
While these new security requirements are designed to combat terrorism, they can also
help to effectively protect against other threats, such as piracy and hijacking. Terrorists
pose a potential threat to ships and shipping because a ship could be used:

To smuggle terrorists or weapons to countries to carry out an attack.

Take control and use the ship as a weapon,

Attack a ship directly,

Take hostages from the ship

Use the ship to hold a port hostage,

Use the cargo on the ship to cause environmental or economic problems for a
coastal state, or

Use a ship as a platform to mount a strike.

Each Ship and port facility is responsible for determining the security measures
necessary to respond to potential threats. Ship operators and crew and port authorities
and facility operators are required to conduct threat assessments, security surveys,
vulnerability assessments, and then develop security plans to mitigate unacceptable
risks. Personnel responsible for the security of Ships and ports are also required to
provide training and drills to ensure a familiarity with security plans and procedures.
These security requirements for Ships must be approved by the “Administration,” that
is responsible for ensuring the enforcement of international conventions. Port security
measures must be approved by the “Contracting Government” which is signatory to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Ships will be required
to carry an International Ship Security Certificate onboard similar to the Safety
Management Certificate, indicating they have an approved Ship Security Plan and the

November 2003/Issue 01

1-1
Restricted

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX
crew understands their security responsibilities. The certificate and parts of the Plan are
subject to a Port State Control inspection.
The Administrations for the Contracting Governments will be responsible for
developing procedures for assessing threats and establishing the appropriate readiness
conditions or security levels. The Contracting Government will also be responsible for
defining the security measures and procedures for each of the three Security Alert
Conditions: Security Level 1, Security Level 2, and Security Level 3. The Company
and Ship Security Officers will be responsible for the development and implementation
of the Security Plan. All ship operators and port facility operators will be required to
ensure that the minimum Security Level for the appropriate readiness condition is
implemented.

1.2

Purpose
The purpose of this Ship Security Plan (SSP) is to provide policy, procedures and
guidance in order to promote a security culture throughout the organisation and protect
the ship, her crew and passengers from threats and actions by hostile persons or
organised crime.

1.3

Scope
This plan is issued to all Transpetro vessels and office’s and is applicable to all sea and
shore staff.
The contents of this plan are designed to comply with amendments to SOLAS Chapters
V, XI-1 and XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in
force from 1st July 2004. It is Transpetro policy that all vessels fully comply with both
Parts A and B of the ISPS Code. All procedures included in this plan are subject to
both internal and external verification by means of auditing.
Sections 1 to 11 are generic for all vessels.
The appendices within this document are designed for the inclusion of ship specific
information, contingency measures and any other useful information which may help
increase or improve security onboard. This information is to be complied by the SSO
with the assistance of the CSO. The appendices will be maintained and updated as
required.

1.4

Security Policy and Objectives
Transpetro fully endorse the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
and in doing so strive to provide a secure working environment by establishing and
maintaining security measures in order to prevent illegal activity or hostile acts against
ships which endanger the safety and security of persons, property and the environment.
The company security objectives are to:

Provide security procedures, practices and guidance for ship operations to protect
the security of the ship, ports and the wider community

November 2003/Issue 01

1-2
Restricted

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX

Establish safeguards to reduce the risk to passengers, crew and port personnel

Improve the security skills and awareness of Company personnel ashore and
onboard ship

Prepare contingency measures for emergencies relating to possible security
incidents

In order to achieve the above, the Company shall:

Arrange a ship security assessment, prepare a ship security plan for each ship and
arrange verification and certification for an International Ship Security Certificate

Organise comprehensive security training for personnel both ashore and afloat

Actively promote security awareness amongst all Company personnel

Carry out regular reviews and audits of security procedures and plans so as to
promote continual improvement.

All personnel must comply with the Company’s security requirements and Ship
Security Plans and ensure that they are familiar with their duties in relation to proactive on-board ship security.
The Company shall ensure that the Company Security Officers, Ship Security Officers
and Masters are given the necessary support to fulfil their duties and responsibilities in
accordance with SOLAS Chapter XI-2.
Maintaining ship security is an ongoing task. As potential new threats are identified,
additional security measures and procedures might need to be implemented.

1.5

Disclosure and Protection of Information
This Plan contains restricted and confidential information made available only to
relevant ship and office staff. The CSO and/or SSO will determine who are to be
considered as relevant staff in this context. The contents are not to be disclosed to third
parties with the exception of Flag State inspectors or Recognised Security Organisation
inspectors (where designated by Flag State) in the course of conducting their duties in
verifying the plan and issuing/endorsing the International Ship Security Certificate
(ISSC).
Port State inspectors may ask to see certain information, including the ISSC and
records of the past ten ports. However the Port State inspector does not have the right
to inspect this plan without sufficient grounds and then only after the Company
Security Officer has been advised of this request by the Master and given his/her
approval.
The ship will be supplied with one paper copy of the SSP and the CSO will hold
another copy in the office. In order to protect the ship’s copy, the SSO or Master is to
ensure that the SSP is kept securely locked but be readily accessible to authorised
users. Similarly the CSO shall ensure that all copies of SSP are kept in a secure
environment.

November 2003/Issue 01

1-3
Restricted

6 Conflict of Interest It is recognised that sometimes the interests of security may conflict with those of safety. Where such a conflict is seen between the Company’s safety requirements and the security requirements contained within this plan. November 2003/Issue 01 1-4 Restricted . the Master and the CSO is to ensure that safety takes precedence. In such cases of conflict the Master is to advise the management office.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 1.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 2.1 Company Security Officer (CSO) The Company Security Officer is responsible for. agents or authorities • Establishing reporting and recording procedures. Where practicable. November 2003/Issue 01 2-1 Restricted . • promoting security awareness and vigilance amongst the fleet of ships through effective communication • promoting ship’s security awareness amongst relevant office staff • promulgating any relevant information regarding security received from ports. b) who decides the employment of the ship and c) who are parties to the current charter party or parties • Ensuring that consistency is maintained between security requirements and safety requirements and that the latter is not compromised The company security officer for the MV XXXX is Captain Geoff Hindmarch and contact details are provided in Appendix 2. the CSO is to participate in ships security training exercises. • Co-ordination of the implementation of this plan with the Ship Security Officer and the Port Facility Security Officer • Ensuring that the Master has available information which authorised officers of contracting governments can determine a) who appoints crewmembers and others onboard engaged in the business of the ship. Responsibilities 2. • maintaining basic security details of each ship in case of emergency • reviewing and updating the Ship Security Plan on a regular basis • Arranging for the development and submission of security plans • Arranging for certification and verification by Flag State or RSO. • Arranging internal security audits and any required follow up • Advising the levels of threats likely to be encountered by the ship • Ensuring that ship security assessments are conducted by appropriately skilled/qualified persons. • Ensuring suitable security training is carried out.

The appointment is to be made in writing with a copy of the declaration of appointment contained in Appendix 3 of this plan). • To maintain and approve a shipboard security programme that ensures appropriate measures are taken to protect those on board. awareness and onboard vigilance • the periodic testing of the effectiveness of the security plan by conducting drills or other means • Ensuring that all security incidents.2 Master The Master has. This includes denial of access to persons (except those authorised by contracting governments) or their effects and refusal to load cargo. but not limited to.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 2. charterer or any other person from taking any decision that. The Master shall not be constrained by the Company.3 Ship Security Officer (SSO) The SSO is responsible to the Master for. non-conformities and corrective actions taken are reported to the Master. Company Security Officer and authorities as required. tested. 2. calibrated and maintained • Co-ordination of the implementation of this plan with the Company Security Officer and the Port Facility Security Officer • Liaison with waterfront / Port Facility Security Officers. in his judgement. crew. the following: • the implementation of the ship security plan • the maintenance and development of the ship specific sections of this plan • conducting regular security inspections • ensuring that adequate resources are available for maintaining watches and/or security patrols • ensuring that personnel are aware of their responsibilities and duties concerning security • ensuring that adequate onboard security training is given • encouraging the security culture. is required to maintain the security of the ship. • Ensuring that any security equipment supplied to and deployed by the ship is properly operated. • To appoint a senior officer as Ship Security Officer (The SSO is to be duly certified with an appropriate security training certificate. • Overall responsible for the safety and security of the ship. passengers and cargo. • To maintain security records. including containers or other closed cargo units. November 2003/Issue 01 2-2 Restricted .

Drills and training onboard shall include practical exercises and encourage participation by all crew members. A list and full details of these drills are to be maintained in Appendix 5 and a record of training conducted kept in the Master’s Security File. hijacking/terrorist attack. a copy of the appointment letter is provided in Appendix 3. • To seek to eliminate security infractions and violations • To familiarise crew with the contents and procedures of this manual • To make clear to all personnel the penalties associated with smuggling or espionage • To ensure that all staff tasked with security patrols and searches are familiar with their duties • To ensure that all crew are aware of areas of restricted access and how to identify and handle any breach of restricted access areas. Such training must be compliant with the IMO Model Course. stowaways.4 Officers and Crew All other members of the ship’s staff and crew are responsible to the SSO and the Master for ensuring that they remain vigilant at all times and reporting any security breaches. Persons delegated with specific security roles are to have sufficient knowledge and ability to carry out the task. 2.5 Training Persons appointed as SSO and CSO must have successfully completed a period of training approved by the company or other suitably qualified organisations and have been issued with certificates. Training must be comprehensive.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX The ship security officer appointed by the Master of the MV XXXX is _____________________. be effective and have clearly defined objectives. The CSO and SSO are responsible for ensuring that adequate training is conducted including the need to exercise security contingency drills. pirate attacks. bombs and bomb threats. The SSO is to ensure that onboard training includes as a minimum the following objectives: • To encourage prompt reporting of security breaches • To assist crew in recognising suspicious activities. Duties and responsibilities for all personnel delegated by the SSO to carry out security tasks are to be included in Appendix 5. This may be in a similar format to that of a muster list or individual brief job descriptions. contacts or internal conspiracies and ensure the reporting of the same. They are also responsible for understanding the contents of this plan along with their respective duties designated to them by the SSO. 2. Training and drills are to include general security guidance (including the understanding of alert status and alarms). November 2003/Issue 01 2-3 Restricted .

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX

To ensure that all crew can identify any breaches of integrity in spaces used
for cargo (including cargo containers) and to report the same in an urgent
manner.

Security drills are to be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, where
more than 25% of the crew have changed and are new to the ship, a drill is to be
conducted within one week of the crew change. Such drills may include but are not
necessarily limited to the following:

Anti-Piracy Measures

Search for Unauthorised Personnel

Bomb Threat & Search

Contraband Search

Access Training (including bag & personnel search)

Vessel Evacuation

Wherever possible, larger scale exercises are to be conducted involving PFSOs, CSOs,
SSOs and any other relevant authority in order to test communications, coordination,
resources and response. These exercises are to be carried out at least once per calendar
year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. These exercises may be:

Full scale or live

Table-top simulation or seminar or

Combined with other exercises held such as search and rescue or emergency
response exercises

November 2003/Issue 01

2-4
Restricted

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX

3.

Security Plan and Administration

3.1

Ship Security Assessment
The CSO shall ensure that a Ship Security Assessment is carried out on the vessel. This
will assist in the process of developing this Security Plan, in particular Appendix 6 –
Ship Specific Security Information. The person or company that shall carry out the
assessment will be competent and have the required skills in accordance with
SOLAS/ISPS Code. The ship security assessment will include the following:

An on-scene security survey

Identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations

Identification and evaluation of key shipboard operations required to be protected

Identification of possible threats to key shipboard operations

Identification of weaknesses including human factors, policies and procedures

The ship security assessment can reveal weaknesses in the overall security of the vessel
and therefore shall be treated as a controlled document and separately maintained. The
MV XXXX Ship Security Assessment, Reference SSA/1003/XXX, Issue 01, dated 14th
October 2003 presents the observations and recommendations.

3.2

Security Surveys & International Ship Security Certificate
On approval of the Ship Security Plan and satisfactory completion of an initial Ship
Security Survey, Flag State or the Recognised Security Organisation will issue an
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). This certificate is issued for a period of
five years and will be subject to at least intermediate verification as well as renewal
surveys. Note that there is no extension or window to this five year validity and
renewal surveys must be arranged and conducted prior to the date of expiry.
In certain circumstances an Interim Certificate may be granted but will be limited to
either new ship where there has been a change of management or change of flag. An
interim certificate will be valid for a maximum period of six months and no extensions
will be granted.
Failure to successfully pass a security survey or intermediate verification audit will
result in the ISSC either being not issued or withdrawn. Note that the ISSC is a trading
certificate and accordingly if the ISSC is withdrawn then the ship will be detained.

November 2003/Issue 01

3-1
Restricted

Restricted
SSP/1103/XXX

3.3

Audit and Review
Internal auditing of the ship’s security plan along with the activities and procedures
contained therein will take place at least once per year and form part of the vessel’s
normal annual internal audit programme.
Following a breach in security or concerns being raised as to the effectiveness of the
security plan the SSO will review and modify the security plan as appropriate and
report the proposed changes to the CSO.
The CSO will seek approval from the appropriate authority (Flag State or RSO) for all
changes; this may be done annually incorporating a number of changes at the same
time or more frequently where significant changes need to be incorporated
immediately.
All change requests, including response from CSO, Flag or RSO are to be filed;
Appendix 1 provides the change request procedure and form.

3.4

Records
The Master is to maintain a file of all security records which is to be kept in his
possession. Records are to include as a minimum:

International Ship Security Certificate

Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR)

Security training, drills and exercises

Reports of security incidents

Reports of breaches of security

Notifications and changes in security levels

Port Records including Declarations of Security (Note that records for a minimum
of the past ten ports must be kept filed within this section – any previous records
are to be archived on board)

Maintenance and calibration of any security equipment carried on board

Communications relating to the direct security of the vessel including specific
threats

Security survey documentation

Copy of Internal Security Audits

Reviews and log of changes to the Ship’s Security Plan

Details of companies/persons that a) appoint crewmembers and others onboard
engaged in the business of the ship, b) decide the employment of the ship and c) are
parties to the charter party or parties.

November 2003/Issue 01

3-2
Restricted

All relevant details of the incident are to be reported. When the ship transfers management and/or ownership the CSR is to remain on board and transferred with the vessel. 3. The CSR is to be retained on board ship and made available for inspection at all times.5 Reporting of Security Incidents Security incidents include threats to the ship. When in port. November 2003/Issue 01 3-3 Restricted . the Port Facility Security Officer is to be advised as soon as practicable. All CSO's will have access to a list of appropriate contacts within contracting governments. Records are to be made available to authorised officers of contracting governments in order to verify that the provisions of the SSP are being implemented. boarding of non-authorised persons.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Records are to be held on board for the duration of the ships management agreement. 3. piracy.6 Continuous Synopsis Record The purpose of the Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) is to provide an on-board record regarding the history of the ship and contains the following information: • The name of the state whose flag the ship is entitled to fly • The date on which the ship was registered with that state • The ship’s identification number (see 5. Where changes are made a new CSR is to be issued within three months. A new Port Security contact list will be made available in the future through IMO. theft and any other breaches of security.13 of this Plan) • The name of the ship and port of registry • Details of the registered owners and bareboat charterers if applicable • The name and address of the Management Company • Classification Society • Issuing authority of the DOC and SMC • Name of the Administration or Responsible Security Organisation issuing the International Security Certificate • Date on which ship ceased to be registered with the relevant Flag State The CSR is issued by the Flag State and any changes made to the above by the Company or the ship is to be advised to the Flag State without delay. see Appendix 12 and copied to the CSO. The CSO is to be notified of any such incident as soon as practicable whether at sea or in port by the most appropriate means. showing the changes carried out.

4. comfort and personal privacy of the ship’s personnel and their ability to maintain their effectiveness over long periods. restricted areas. The Master and SSO must also ensure that the vessel is kept as secure as is practically possible.2 Security Monitoring Effective security monitoring of the ship is one of the most fundamental methods of good security management. particular consideration should be given to the convenience. In reviewing and implementing the recommendations the following factors should be taken into consideration: • Monitoring visually November 2003/Issue 01 4-1 Restricted . The GA plan is to be marked up with items such as access. When developing security measures. Reference SSA/1103/XXX addresses the issues and recommendations for the effective planning for the monitoring of the above for each security level. Monitoring includes the use of persons conducting surveillance rounds and the correct use of equipment available on board such as lighting or specialised security equipment.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 4. A general arrangement plan is to be kept in Appendix 6 of this document. The CSO and SSO should always have regard to the effect that security measures may have on ship’s personnel who will remain on the ship for long periods. Establishing Security Levels 4. evacuation routes and any other useful security information. at anchor or in suspect areas whilst at sea.1 Introduction In all cases the Master and SSO must ensure that staff are vigilant in maintaining thorough checks and watches whilst in port. Security monitoring is to be planned and carried out for the following areas: • Access to the ship • Deck areas • Surrounding areas (water-side) • Surrounding areas (quay-side) Section 2 (Access) and Section 7 (Monitoring of Security) within the Ship Security Assessment.

4.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX • Monitoring by cameras • Use of alarms and sensors • Use of security/existing lighting • Use of security rounds/patrols and their frequency The recommendations from the Ship Security Assessment are provided in Appendix 7 for reference. However the ship must operate at the higher level. November 2003/Issue 01 4-2 Restricted . Contracting Governments. Flag States and/or the Company Security Officer will advise the Master where a security level is expected to be greater than Level 1. and • The potential consequences of such a security incident. The Master will confirm to the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) the security level being implemented by the ship and the adoption of any particular measures required by this plan. Primarily the three levels are for use in port or at anchor. The SSO and the PFSO are then to liaise and coordinate their actions. Factors which are considered in setting the appropriate security level include: • The degree that the threat information is credible • The degree that the threat information is corroborated • The degree that the threat information is specific or imminent. A declaration of security form is provided in Appendix 4 and is to be used to identify and indicate the different measures or actions to be taken at each security level. Any difficulties in implementing such measures or procedures are to be reported and the SSO and the PFSO should liaise and co-ordinate appropriate actions. It should be noted that in such cases the port may not accept the higher level and may continue to operate the port to the lower level.3 Guidance There are three security levels recognised internationally depending on the security risk.1 Security Level 1 (Low Threat) This is the normal condition with the minimum appropriate security level maintained at all times with general security measures implementing including. Any change from one security level to another must be acknowledged by the Master to the authority advising him of the change. however it is prudent to adopt a similar alert status for when the vessel is at sea.3. Any changes from one security level to another must be carried out without undue delay. 4. the port state must be advised of the instruction by the ship. When a Flag State or the Company instructs a ship in port to set a security level greater than 1. Completed forms are to be kept in Appendix 4 of this plan.

Additional security measures may include. • Suspension or cargo.3. Such measures include. 4. stores and baggage handling. stores and personal belongings coming on board • radio communication between relevant watch personnel • all other general security measures as outlined in sections 3 and 4 as applicable Security Level 2 (Medium Threat) This is where additional measures require to be taken due to a heightened threat of an unlawful act against a port facility or ship.2 • 24 hour deck watch officer • all watch personnel familiar with the contents of the security plan • suitable gangway watch with visitors’ log implemented • random checks of packages. Security Level 3 (High Threat) This is the highest security level and means that an unlawful act against a port facility or ship is probable or imminent.3. Extra protective measures over and above levels one and two will have to be adopted during this period. At security level 3 the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat.3 • All requirements of Level 1 • Specific Risk Assessments to be conducted • All personnel fully briefed regarding security risk or threat • Contingency measures in place and drilled • Shore leave restricted or modified as required by the Master • Additional lighting as required • Enhanced gangway watch and persons/baggage searched • Increased deck rounds and patrols • Communication with shore authorities established • Any other additional precautions as identified by this plan and/or by the Master or SSO. Specialised advice will normally be given by the shore authorities and/or Company. • Possible evacuation of the vessel.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 4. • Full search of the vessel. November 2003/Issue 01 4-3 Restricted . • Suspension of embarkation/disembarkation of persons other than those responding to the incident or threat.

When on board. Personnel should always exercise the minimum amount of force necessary to discharge their assigned duties. the SSO is to remind the crew about their own personal security both on and off the ship. General Security Measures 5. Crewmembers are entitled to exercise the right of self-defence in response to hostile acts.1. Ships staff are also liable to be randomly searched on embarkation of the vessel. 5. threats to his person or family or other means of extortion) to assist in the smuggling of illegal goods or stowaways. checking references and carrying out personal interviews. Masters and other officers must be vigilant in observing the behaviour and actions of their colleagues and advise the Company of any suspicions that they may have about a person. In addition periodic background checks of existing staff may be conducted.1 Personal Security Before entering ports.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5.1. intruders will be well organised and usually armed either with knives or guns. 5. it is essential for all personnel to know the levels of force and the specific rules of engagement. November 2003/Issue 01 5-1 Restricted . crewmembers must ensure that their cabins are kept locked and that they hold onto their own keys safely. The Company may conduct security screening of new staff by verifying applications. Graduated degrees of force include Presence.1 Security of Ship’s Crew 5. As a result the use of physical force against these persons is highly dangerous and is to be discouraged. whether in times of peace or during a war. However. Verbal Persuasion and the use of Fire Hoses to repel intruders.2 Risk of Ship’s Own Crew to Security Occasionally a seafarer may be tempted (either by money.2 Use of Force In general.

Where practicable. It is essential that the SSO ensures that all personnel are familiar with the word/code and what to do on hearing it.g. including instructions.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5. November 2003/Issue 01 5-2 Restricted . it shall advise the Flag State and also notify the State/s in the vicinity of where the ship is operating. 5. store rooms) which may be left unattended for a considerable period and/or pose a high security risk.1 Ship Security Alert System Ships will be fitted with a Ship Security Alert System which. the audible alarm should be easily heard from areas of the ship normally manned. In other words the alarm is covert and will not alert the persons attacking the ship or another station linked with the attack. location and details of the Designated Authority are to be included in Appendix 8. However in other cases.3. The word or phrase must not be written down. particularly during an attack by pirates.3 Verbal Alarms A covert word or phrase is to be used in order that crew members can pass word of an attack amongst each other. Therefore caution and due consideration is to be exercised before the sounding of an audible alarm. when activated. such alarms can be relayed to an indicator on the bridge and/or cargo control room/ship’s office. 5. Activation points will include the bridge and at least one other location and be designed to avoid accidental initiation. such as hijacking by terrorists.3. Details of the system. When the designated authority is alerted. will send an emergency signal to a competent shore authority designated by the Flag State. This signal will identify the ship and her position and will indicate that the security of the ship is under threat or has been compromised.3 Alarms 5.2 Fire/General Alarms Alarms such as the fire or general alarm may be of some use. If such alarms are fitted. 5.3. the sounding of such an alarm may cause the hijackers to panic and/or take violent action against the crew. The emergency alert system is designed so that the alarm will not be heard on board the ship or by other ships and will continue until the alarm is deactivated or reset.3.4 Other Alarms Individual alarms are also to be considered for certain spaces (e. The designated authority may be the Flag State itself or may be the Company or RSO and is to be recorded in Appendix 8 of this plan. Such alarms may be similar to household burglar alarms using magnetic contact switches on doors/windows and/or infra-red sensors. where they may assist in frightening off the perpetrators.

4 Restricted Areas In order to control access to key areas on board the ship. steering gear room. • Any other area as determined by the SSO or Master. Section 3. Measures for frequency and intensity of the monitoring and control of access to restricted areas at the different security levels are to identified.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5. During the Ship Security Assessment a provisional list of restricted areas was discussed with the Master and the summary table is presented in SSA. These many include the setting up of additional restricted areas in proximity to the security incident / threat to which access is denied and searching of restricted areas as part of a search of the ship. Ranks and ratings of personnel authorised access to these restricted areas must also be included within this list. • At level 3 the ship is to comply with instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat. The following areas (as a minimum) were assessed during the SSA: • Navigation bridge (and compass deck) • Cargo spaces including pump rooms where appropriate • Machinery spaces. A copy of the GA plan is also to be marked up with restricted areas. These are to be reviewed and endorsed by the SSO with all restricted areas being marked as follows: RESTRICTED AREA AUTHORISED PERSONNEL ONLY November 2003/Issue 01 5-3 Restricted . • Use of door seals to confirm that after search door has not been re-opened. Such additional measures may include: • Establishing restricted areas adjacent to access points. pumps etc • Crew Accommodation • Spaces containing security and surveillance equipment/systems and their controls. including engine room. established and included within the restricted access list kept in Appendix 6 of this plan. hydraulic rooms etc • Ventilation and air conditioning spaces • Spaces with access to potable water tanks. the Master and SSO are to establish restricted areas and list these within Appendix 6 of this plan. • Any other area determined by the CSO through the SSA. • Planning of security patrols routes to include restricted areas. • Continuously monitoring surveillance equipment • Dedicating additional personnel to guard and patrol restricted areas.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5. within the accommodation and in the engine room are to be locked when not in use. storerooms and workshops and any other lockable space on board. All other spaces such as the galley. If for any reason a safe becomes insecure. although other goods may also be stored including master copies of computer discs. engine room. Wherever practicable. November 2003/Issue 01 5-4 Restricted . including keys for the ship’s cabins. dangerous drugs as per medical scales.6 Master’s Safe and Cash The Master’s safe is primarily used for storing cash. Restricted areas (see 5. the Company is to be advised immediately and take steps in order to rectify the situation. important documentation. Where applicable cargo compartments are to be secured during non-working hours and when cargo is completed for that space. doors and windows accessing restricted areas including their locks. store rooms and lockers on deck. 5. etc. public rooms. Any loss of keys is to be reported to the SSO immediately. Where practicable consideration should be given to changing the combination at specified intervals to increase security. The Company will keep a record of each safe combination. at anchor or in high risk areas. The number of pass or master keys should be kept to minimum and only senior personnel allowed possession. original bills of lading. When cash is ordered.4 above) shall be secured by means of suitable locks with keys held only by personnel who have authority for access. An entry into the hand-over protocol will then be made accordingly. At change of command. When received on board. Such locks must not impede any emergency escapes from restricted areas. all crew and spare cabins are to be locked up. the sum must not exceed the company approved limit. the Master must ensure that crew cash advances are to be distributed immediately and the remaining money secured in the safe. and not permanently stowed on reels. are to be kept locked in storage below decks. the outgoing Master will hand over the key and/or advise the new Master of the safe combination. The combination should not be written down. Any mooring ropes or wires not in use.5 Keys and Locking of Spaces The Master or SSO is to be responsible for the safe keeping of keys and the recording of all keys issued to personnel. offices. When in port. hinges and other associated hardware are to be constructed of sufficient strength in order to prevent forced entry. Control of access into the accommodation and engine room is to be restricted but care must be taken to ensure that any locked doors can be easily unlocked from the inside in case of fire or other emergency. The only key holder and/or person with the knowledge of the safe combination will be the Master.

maintenance and calibration procedures. Good lighting lessens the degree of success by deterring the intruders and also by increasing the effectiveness of the watch keepers and security patrols. the continued effectiveness of this equipment can be assured. In port. Such equipment may include portable metal detectors for detecting firearms or hand-held vapour detectors for detecting explosives. Any illicit boarding may well take place from the offshore side of the vessel. a log entry is to be made to that effect and the frequency of security patrols increased. 5. Care must also be taken to ensure that the manufacturer’s instructions are followed and that the correct calibration procedures are carried out as required. If the shore authority does not allow any lighting from the offshore side of the ship. When underway in areas of high risk or where piracy can be expected. suitable additional lighting is also to be used directed aft and over the stern area. As a result lights are to be positioned/directed outwards to illuminate the water surface surrounding the vessel including the bow and stern areas. Before entering port or an area where security lighting is required. Lighting must also overlap to the extent that there are no dark or blind sectors where intruders could easily take advantage. The SSO is to ensure that an adequate stock of spare light bulbs and fittings are maintained to ensure the continued effectiveness of security lights at all times. all lights are to be tested and any lights that are not working are to be replaced. If there is any doubt as to the requirements advice is to be taken from the ship’s agent or PFSO. apart from lighting required for the safe operation of the vessel.8 Specialised Security Equipment The Company may supply specialised equipment as an aid to improving security. the following is to be taken into consideration. Details and instructions for the equipment carried are to be included in Appendix 6.7 Security Lighting Darkness and periods of poor visibility create an increased opportunity for intruders to board. Some port authorities may require that any off-shore lighting must not create glare or a danger to navigation. Wherever electronic detection equipment is carried it is essential that the users are properly trained in the correct use of the equipment. In following the correct instructions. It is essential that such lighting does not interfere with a proper and safe navigational lookout or dazzle any other vessels in the vicinity. Security lighting plans for different situations are to be maintained in Appendix 6 for ease of reference. Likewise at anchor. November 2003/Issue 01 5-5 Restricted . lighting is to be directed all around the vessel’s perimeter but must not be directed in such a manner that may cause a distraction or danger to the navigation of other shipping.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5. In doing this it will enable crew members to see beyond the ship’s side.

Crew members are to be constantly aware of this fact and it is essential that any signs of apparent tampering are advised to the SSO or Master. Contraband can be concealed in panels or within spaces onboard. the apparent nature of the distress and the seaworthiness of the vessel. The Master must therefore carefully and fully evaluate the situation before allowing persons to board his vessel. 5. legible accurate and submitted in a timely manner if so required.11 • that no contraband will be tolerated • that crew members will be responsible for such actions and may have to pay any fine as well as costs arising for any delay incurred to the ship. The Master must ensure that the following preventative measures are taken to avoid any contraband by his crew by warning.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5. False Distress Signals Under International Law a ship’s Master is required to assist ships in distress. November 2003/Issue 01 5-6 Restricted . 5. • that the Company will co-operate fully with shore authorities in any prosecution against a crew member involved in smuggling contraband. If the OOW suspects that the package is dangerous. If any of the crew or the Master is approached to carry such goods. The office must also be contacted in such circumstances.9 Suspicious or Unattended Packages If any suspicious looking or unattended packages are noted the Officer-of-the-Watch is to be notified immediately. Similarly no private parcels are to be carried as a personal service. is it a known trouble spot?).10 Non-Manifested Goods/Contraband Measures Masters must ensure that all cargo and goods carried (including stores and personal effects) are properly accounted for and detailed in the manifests required by the Customs authorities of the country being visited. However it is worth remembering the fact that some small vessels manned with criminals may fire distress flares in order to slow down or stop a ship with a view to boarding. Evaluation is to include aspects such as the geographical location (i. the SSO and the Master are to be advised. The guidelines listed within Section 10 (Bomb Threats) are then to be followed. parcels or packages be carried aboard a Company vessel. • that the Master reserves the right to dismiss any crew member for any violation regarding contraband. If in any doubt the Master is to contact the nearest shore authority and advise them of the situation. then the local agent must be notified and the Company advised of the full details and circumstances.e. Manifests are to be complete. On no account must non-manifested cargo.

5. Evacuation may take place via the shore or via lifeboat depending on the circumstances of the case and any guidance/recommendations given by the terminal or other shore authorities.e. It is also to be marked in either an easily accessible place on one of the end transverse bulkheads of the machinery spaces. or in the pump-room (for tankers) or on one of the end transverse bulkheads of the ro-ro spaces (for ro-ro vessels). or on one of the hatchways.13 Ship Identification Number SOLAS Chapter XI-1 Regulation 3 requires that an identification number (IMO number) is permanently affixed and marked either at the stern of the ship or at amidships on both port and starboard sides or on the front of the superstructure. Evacuation routes are to be drawn on to the copy of the GA plan contained in Appendix 6. Evacuation procedures for security issues are to be promulgated amongst all crew by the SSO and contained within Appendix 6 of this Plan. An evacuation may require partial evacuation (i. non-essential personnel) or full evacuation. Such evacuation must be done in a controlled manner similar to that of abandoning ship with a proper method of accounting for personnel required to be disembarked.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 5.12 Evacuation In certain circumstances (such as a bomb threat or imminent danger to the ship and/or terminal) it may be prudent to evacuate the vessel. November 2003/Issue 01 5-7 Restricted . Instructions therefore must be clear so as to avoid confusion. The SSO is to ensure that the above marks are kept well painted in a suitable contrasting colour to the background.

This may take the form of a ship/shore security checklist taking the form of either a port authority proforma or a self-made checklist from the ship. a port can be construed to mean either alongside. The DOS is a written understanding reached between the SSO and the PFSO to indicate compliance with security measures required by the Code. the Master or SSO must advise the relevant authorities.1 Ship/Port Interface and Declaration of Security The International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities obliges ports and terminals to follow certain requirements. Before arrival. Note that where a ship cannot comply with the security levels set or certain security requirements. When a port requires a DOS to be made. Port Security For the purposes of this Plan. The SSO and the PFSO must therefore have a suitable dialogue/meeting to agree that security on both ship and shore meets with both parties’ expectations and that suitable measures are being taken. During the vessel’s stay in port clear lines of communication must be established between the SSO and the PFSO.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 6. the Master is to acknowledge such a request. Similarly the port should advise the vessel of the security level being implemented at the port facility. 6. Safeguards must be in place to ensure that this communication is capable of being maintained at all times. The contracting government’s party to the ISPS Code may require a Declaration of Security (DOS) to be made. at a floating storage terminal or another vessel when conducting ship-to-ship operations. The PFSO’s responsibilities include the implementation of the port security plan and the co-ordination of the port security with the Ship Security Officer (SSO). These include the development of a Port Facility Security Plan and the appointment of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO). At any rate a log entry must be made to verify that such a ship/shore interface has been carried out and agreed with. It will be completed on a mutual basis between the port and the ship (or ship and other ship where there is off-shore transfer of cargo or similar operation). at anchor. the security level of the ship (see Section 4) must be declared to the port. In certain circumstances out with the above the ship may have to make out its own DOS. These circumstances include but are not limited to: • where the ship is declaring a higher security level • security threat exists involving the ship or port November 2003/Issue 01 6-1 Restricted .

2 Access and Restricted Areas Notwithstanding the need for safe access (as covered in the Safety & Environmental Manual) certain measures must be taken to protect the ship and her crew from criminals. * = records maintained for past ten consecutive port calls (including ship-to-ship interfaces) 6. stowaways and smugglers. port facility’s officially appointed security company representative or an officer from the contracted government.4 and Appendix 6 of this plan). Therefore security issues are only to be discussed with the designated PFSO. If anchors are in use. Each door or entry point requires an identification number and a copy of the GA plan in Appendix 6 is to be marked up accordingly. covers should be placed and secured over the anchor chains in way of the hawse pipes to prevent access via the chain. In order to control access to key areas on board.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX • the ship is at a port facility without an approved facility plan • the ship is carrying out ship-to-ship activities with another vessel that does not have an approved SSP While a close liaison between the ship and the terminal is to be encouraged it is to be remembered that in some circumstances the personnel working in the ports may be the persons that are involved in smuggling or other illegal activities. November 2003/Issue 01 6-2 Restricted . certain spaces will be designated as restricted and entry only allowed for authorised personnel (see section 5. Access to the ship must be limited whenever possible to one point. Rope ladders including pilot ladders must not to be left over the ship’s side. NB This does NOT include this Ship Security Plan. All access points are to be listed within Appendix 6 and actions itemised for each security level. Information given to officers duly appointed by the contracting governments delegated to ensure compliance with the ISPS Code is restricted to the following: • The valid ISSC • Ship’s security level currently implemented • Ship’s security level at previous port/ship interface* • Any special or additional security measures taken by the ship in previous ports* • That appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during previous ship to ship activities* • Other practical security information.

The following wording is to be used on signs at the points of access to the vessel. DRUG WARNING The Owners and Managers of this vessel will co-operate fully with public authorities and Customs in the criminal prosecution of anyone using. Details of any pass system introduced are to be contained in Appendix 9. however the gangway must be able to be lowered at all times in cases of emergency. this pass can be a simple numbered piece of card with clear instruction to return the card before disembarking from the vessel. It can be up to the Master on how elaborate this pass system can be. If a watchman needs to leave the gangway at any time.4 Gangway Watch A good and visible gangway watch must be maintained at all times. November 2003/Issue 01 6-3 Restricted . All gangway watchmen are to be fully briefed by the SSO. wherever possible photographic. The number is matched to a name and the pass is issued to the visitor. The watchman is to be equipped with a torch. possessing or attempting to smuggle illegal drugs on board. The OOW is then to check the identity himself and if still not satisfied. Identification checks must be enhanced at each security level. The Master or SSO will then contact the PFSO or relevant shore authority and advise them of the situation. then the person is not to be allowed past the gangway and the Officer-of-the-Watch advised immediately. stevedores. These passes will then be retrieved before the ship sails. he must advise the officer-ofthe-watch who in turn must ensure that security is not impaired. asked to sign the Gangway/Visitors Log and escorted to their destination. A pass system is to be introduced onboard the vessel. The CSO is also to be advised. the Master or SSO is to be advised. Where possible the pass system should be coordinated with that used by the port facility. If the visitor cannot show identification or if the gangway watchman is unsure as to the validity of the identification shown. All visitors (including agents. Visitors must be on official ship’s business only. a whistle and be in radio contact with the officer-of-thewatch. chandlers and store suppliers etc) to the ship must be asked to show identification. 6. be asked the nature of their business and whom they wish to visit.3 Warning Signs There must be the standard gangway notice clearly displayed at the access point/s to the vessel.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 6. keeping a record of passes issued. In certain circumstances (such as when not working cargo) it may be prudent to lift the gangway/accommodation ladder off the quayside. On correct verification of the visitor’s identification the person is to be reported to the Officer-of-the-Watch. There must also be warning signs advising visitors that drug smuggling or usage will not be tolerated. In its most simple form.

companies. An example format is shown in Appendix 9. but not limited to. boat patrols and foot or vehicle controls where provided. Personnel conducting such rounds are to be fully briefed by the SSO and are to be equipped with a torch.5 Security Rounds Frequent deck patrols are to be conducted whilst in port and at anchor. If the person refuses to be searched then he/she is to be refused permission to board and the Master. A separate log may however be used instead for this purpose at the discretion of the Master. All security rounds are to be recorded in the deck log. visitors or shore workers carrying onboard or leaving with parcels or packages are to be asked to open them for examination. In cases of suspicion. 6. Persons wishing to illegally board or smuggle contraband may monitor the ship for a considerable time. The person is also to be told on whose authority the search is being conducted. These logs are to be retained and filed on board for at least one year. 6. During routine security patrols and/or normal work. all personnel are to be on the lookout for unauthorised craft alongside or approaching the ship and to report any to the officer-of-the-watch. additional patrols are to be coordinated with shore-side including. it may be required to search persons as well as their belongings when coming on board.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX A Gangway/Visitors Log is to be maintained showing names. whistle and be in radio contact with the officer-of-the-watch. PFSO and/or customs authorities advised with details of the person’s identity. whom visiting. Where applicable.6 Unauthorised Craft All small craft that intend to come alongside the vessel must have permission from the terminal and/or the Master. and particularly during periods where the security level is greater than 1. The search must then be conducted in an appropriate manner with the minimum of embarrassment. Therefore wherever possible patrol routines should be varied to avoid or reduce predictability. stern and bow areas. time onboard and time away. terminal. Depending on the security level. This can be a delicate matter for ship’s staff but must be carried out when required. planning of the security rounds is to include restricted areas. aided where possible with security detection equipment. Checks are to be all around the ship and particular attention is to be paid to the off-shore side. The person coming onboard must be politely spoken to and advised that a requirement exists to carry out a search. Masters are also encouraged to arrange for random checking to be carried out. The SSO is to determine the frequency of rounds taking into consideration the security level in force. November 2003/Issue 01 6-4 Restricted .

6. agree arrangements with shippers or other responsible for such cargo. supporting documentation etc. check and stow stores in their correct location as soon as possible after delivery and before the ship sails • At security levels higher than 1. explosive devices and even weapons of mass destruction such as “dirty” nuclear or chemical bombs. steps should be taken to check stores before coming on board the vessel.1 General There is a large variety of cargoes carried throughout the Transpetro Fleet. Recommendations are summarised in Appendix 7.8. Look out for any November 2003/Issue 01 6-5 Restricted . sealing. This may include offside checking. in consultation with the port facility.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 6. stowaways. Co-ordination with shipper or other responsible party involved with the loading. unpack.8 Cargo 6. 6.2 General and Break-bulk Cargo Cargo in this category can be loaded in many different ways and styles of packing such as pallets. crates. the CSO or SSO may. depending upon the type of vessel. It is recognised that it will be impossible to check every unit coming on board. bags etc.8. In cases where there are regular or repeated cargo movements. packing note • Check for any signs of tampering • Wherever possible. It is therefore important that measures are taken to reduce the possibility of security breaches and the associated smuggling of illegal goods or weapons. invoice. Most cargoes have the potential for hiding a variety of security problems including drug smuggling.7 Ship Stores and Spares It is possible that contraband or weapons can be hidden amongst stores and spares coming on board. scheduling. It is essential therefore that the following measures are taken: • Check to ensure that packages received match with the manifest. Section 4 and Section 5 of the SSA reviews any cargo related security measures to be adopted at the various security levels. however ship’s personnel working on deck and involved with cargo operations should be as vigilant as possible. Such arrangements are to be communicated to and agreed with the PFSO. Cargo loaded must agree with the manifest and marks should be checked The integrity of the cargo is to be verified by means of visual and physical examination to ensure that there has been no tampering such as the breaking of seals.

When being lifted on board ship’s staff are to be on the lookout for any suspicious “add-on” construction or apparently recent welding/new painting or “repaired” panels. Customs authorities throughout the world are increasing inspections and improving their processes. As a result it should be remembered that there is a potential for “spiking” the cargo with poison or bacteria in order to inflict harm on the end consumer. If in doubt the shore authorities are to be contacted and the container investigated. Some customs authorities will ensure that cargo documentation includes the container ID number alongside the unique seal number. Nonetheless checks should be made of cargo spaces after loading for persons or suspicious items.4 Bulk Cargo It is unlikely that goods. bearing in mind hiding places such as ladder trunking. If an empty container is shipped without being sealed then steps are to be taken to verify that the container is empty. soya meal and sugar. considering the volume and weight of such cargoes. This includes empty containers which are to be shipped onboard sealed wherever possible. However there is a limit as to the success of these inspections bearing in mind the huge number of units throughout the globe. weapons or personnel would be smuggled in a bulk cargo. The USA in particular have a Container Security Initiative which includes pre-screening containers before they arrive in US waters. If containers are sealed by ship’s staff then the seal number is to be logged against the container identification number. Accordingly all November 2003/Issue 01 6-6 Restricted . particularly on their undersides. All containers which come on board must have their seals checked. However there have been a few isolated cases of stowaways being found (usually dead) within the confines of a hold filled with bulk cargo.g. 6.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX suspicious looking packaging (e.8. This enables the relevant authorities and the ship’s staff to determine if a seal has been changed. during and after cargo has been loaded. Many food products are carried in bulk including grain. hold accesses and pipe tunnels. may be different colour or markings from other goods loaded) Routine checking of cargo spaces before. also look out for and report any suspicious persons 6. Look out for spaces created within the cargo which may be used for smuggling items or persons. In view of the quantities carried this could have extremely serious consequences.3 Containers/Closed Cargo Transport Units (CTU) The high volume of container traffic and speed of transhipment of this type of cargo makes it an ideal mechanism for covert smuggling operations.8. It is therefore essential that ship’s staff perform their duties with due diligence. For this purpose Masters are to ensure that there is a sufficient stock of seals and sealing equipment on board. Containers may also have “secret” compartments. It is then to be sealed by the ship’s staff.

All unattended baggage is to be placed here until they have been screened and / or verified safe. Screening may be carried out by visual examination or by X-ray and it is necessary for the SSO to co-operate with the PFSO in order to determine where the examination shall take place. It is the Master’s responsibility that all details recorded are accurate. Section 6 of the SSA reviews actions/measures concerning the embarkation of baggage coming on board relating to different security levels. the ship must take the responsibility. However. 6. recommendations are summarised in Appendix 7 November 2003/Issue 01 6-7 Restricted . In the majority of cases this will be carried out by the port.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX personnel working on deck must be on the lookout for suspicious persons who may be attempting to contaminate the cargo by some means. occasionally there may be circumstances where baggage has been delayed due to unforeseen circumstances. they will have their bags and belongings with them. In such cases it is essential that the applicable country’s requirements are fully met.9 CREW & PASSENGER LISTS Up-to-date crew and passenger lists must be maintained at all times. supernumeraries or riding squad members join the vessel. A storage area or locker for unattended baggage is to be designated by the SSO and listed within Appendix 6. In such conditions it is necessary to carry out screening before the baggage is allowed on board as there is a risk that the bags may have been tampered with during the time where the persons and their belongings were separated.10 Unaccompanied Baggage Generally speaking. Certain countries may require crew and passenger lists to be sent in advance. when crew members. however where this is impossible. 6.

Stowaways today are usually desperate persons who have spent all of their money on escaping from their country of residence because of political problems or war and are usually assisted by organised gangs of criminals. Stowaways 7. Note however that a local security company may actually be an easy means for a stowaway to smuggle himself aboard given the right contacts and prices. enable him to handle the situation in a proper and efficient manner. November 2003/Issue 01 7-1 Restricted . there are other problems faced by the Master and the Ship owner with countries putting up barriers and increasing fines for illegal immigration.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 7. Apart from the problems of discovering stowaways. resulting in the stowaway being carried onto the next port/s with additional administration and associated financial problems being encountered.1 The Problem Occasionally stowaways maybe encountered for no other reason other than free passage between ports but these persons are relatively rare.2 Precautions to Avoid Stowaways Every effort must be made to avoid unwanted persons coming on board and Masters are to ensure that all reasonable precautions are taken to avoid the embarkation of stowaways. damage created by them and looking after their welfare. If circumstances dictate. authorisation can be requested from the Company or Charterer to employ a shore security company. The majority of general precautions have already been addressed in previous sections however there are additional precautions and areas of interest which can be taken into account to help avoid or detect stowaways. Such areas include but are not limited to: • West Africa • Central and South America • Any country where there is political unrest The following sections will assist Masters in avoiding the stowaway problem and/or if unlucky enough to encounter a stowaway situation. It is apparent therefore that to avoid such problems the ship’s Master must be extra vigilant in areas that could be considered as high risk stowaway countries. 7. This frequently causes great difficulty in being able to land a stowaway in a particular port.

On no account must they be given the opportunity to dispose of documentation (such as requesting to go to the toilet) before they are properly searched. • If more than one is discovered then they are to be separated. their clothes to be removed and any possessions and documents retrieved. However if a stowaway is discovered once the ship sails then the process is more complicated. If the person cannot be confirmed as being ashore a thorough check is to be made of the vessel.4 Action Upon Discovering Stowaways If a stowaway is found trying to board or found on board at the port of embarkation.e. a careful check is to be made to ensure that all passes are returned before the ship is ready to sail.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Containers. The checklist is to contain all spaces that a stowaway could possibly hide and is to be divided into at least four sections. A proper and systematic use of searching must always be deployed before the ship sails. Identities of seals should be sought from the shippers or customs authorities.g. Cargo Spaces and Main Deck Spaces. Note also that palletised cargoes can be built in such a way that the stowaway is surrounded and hidden by the cargo. 7. These sections would then be subdivided into specific spaces. namely Accommodation. If any passes are missing then the agent/stevedore company is to be contacted with the pass holder’s name to determine if the person is ashore. both empty and laden. e. It cannot be emphasised enough that the main way of deterring unwanted visitors including stowaways is to have good and obvious security on board including frequent rounds during cargo operations and not just before departure. i. time port and names of the individuals undertaking the search. This can take various forms including the use of false destination boards. Where a pass system has been introduced. then it should be a simple task of having him expelled back ashore.3 Stowaway Checklist A checklist is used for routine and final inspections for stowaways (Appendix 10) which is contained in the Shipboard Procedures & Checklists dated 1/1/99. 7. Such a search must November 2003/Issue 01 7-2 Restricted . Use of psychology. recording the date. Engine Room/Machinery Spaces. should be sealed and seals checked throughout loading and on voyage for signs of being broken. • They are to be taken to a secure area such as a mess room and strip-searched. One or more officers are to be tasked to complete the checklist and once completed the checklists should be returned to the Master and a deck log entry made. Another method is to sound a fire alarm or other emergency signal before sailing in an attempt to frighten stowaways into the open. Issue 2. the destination of Lagos may prove less desirable than Amsterdam.

• The Company will advise the Master as to any action taken by P&I and possibilities of repatriation. any other distinguishing features) Documents held (include all details) • The Company is to be notified as soon as possible and supplied with the above information. feeding. This list is to be signed by the Master. • The term “Political Asylum” is not to be mentioned to the stowaway. clothing etc is borne by the ship owner. SSO and witness to the search as well as the stowaway. In the case of badly soiled clothes the stowaway is to be given suitable alternative attire.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX be done by the SSO or senior officer with another crewmember in attendance as a witness. • The agent at the next port must be advised of the stowaway before arrival. colour of eyes. If a stowaway claims Political Asylum he can use this is a possible means of securing a long term in the next country whilst he awaits a legal hearing. If the stowaway is unable to write then a thumb print is too obtained. During that period. • The stowaways are to be then given the use of washing/toilet facilities and then given their clothes back. If this were to be done. all expenses for detention. complexion. but treated in a humanitarian way with adequate supplies of food and water made available to them. • A photograph (full face) is to be taken of the stowaway. • Stowaways must not be made to work. the ship owner would lose his P&I insurance cover and may be unable to recover any repatriation expenses. • The following details are then to be obtained from the stowaway. November 2003/Issue 01 7-3 Restricted . which has been known to reach in excess of one year. o o o o o o o o o Full name Any other name(s) Date and place of birth Nationality Parents’ names Children Permanent Address Description (height. • Documents and possessions must be placed into the Master’s safe keeping and a list made of the same. colour of hair. There has also been problems concerning involvement with the ITF with stowaways being awarded substantial amounts of “wages” for the work which they had apparently carried out on board. • Stowaways must be kept secure and locked up independently.

To complete the claim it is necessary to receive a breakdown of expenses incurred during the stowaway/s time on board such as food and clothing. November 2003/Issue 01 7-4 Restricted . There may also be some instances in which the Club may be involved in covering the Owner for relative expenses incurred during a deviation to land the stowaway. This procedure may be repeated as the voyage progresses. It is therefore important to keep an accurate record of such expenses. Once full identity is established the correspondent will then liaise further with immigration and the police and try to persuade them to take the stowaway off the vessel for repatriation. These expenses can include repatriation (usually by air). Upon arrival at the next port the Club correspondent will usually attend to interrogate the stowaway along and in co-operation with the local immigration authority. He will secure a full statement wherever possible. Once the stowaway is repatriated. charges incurred when the stowaway is kept in custody by immigration authorities and clothing if this is deemed necessary. food consumed whilst on board the ship.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 7. Once advised by the ship’s Master.5 P&I Club Involvement The P&I Clubs offer cover which includes expenses which the ship owner may incur in carrying out his obligations towards the necessary arrangements for stowaways in so far as the owner is legally liable to do so. However this course of action is not recommended as it can cause legal problems associated with unjustifiable deviation. employment of escorts to accompany them. On no account is a ship to deviate to land a stowaway without the full consent of the Company and Ship owner. The local authorities may insist on keeping the stowaway on board under lock and key or may take him to the local police station cells. depending whether or not the particular authority allows repatriation or not. the Company will formalise a claim and recover costs from the Club depending upon the agreed deductible. the Company will notify the P&I office and a claim file will be started. During this time the correspondent will be in communication with the local embassies or consulates to request them to issue emergency documentation for repatriation.

• Prepare a contingency plan and hold drills before entering a high risk area. Master’s cabin and radio room as these are the areas most likely to be attacked first • Agree emergency signals with crew and if possible other ships and shore authorities November 2003/Issue 01 8-1 Restricted .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 8. Whilst their activities are more or less world-wide. there are certain areas which can be defined as being of a particularly high risk. relatively slow. 8. Locate a hand held VHF out with the bridge. few people on board. extremely dangerous and well organised. • Maintain a 24-hour visual watch.1 The Problem Today’s pirates are a dangerous group of violent criminals who are armed. It is therefore crucial that all possible precautions are taken when transiting waters (or indeed at anchor or in port) which pose a potential high risk.2 General Precautions Standard security precautions as outlined in previous sections are to be adopted but with the additional points. Pirates 8. The Company may from time to time send updates on piracy information to the Fleet. carrying expensive cargo (particularly in containers) and carrying personal goods and cash. • West Africa (especially Nigeria and Ivory Coast) • Somalia • Colombia • Ecuador • Brazil • Indonesia • South China Seas • Malacca Straits A merchant ship can be seen as an easy target as she is unarmed. namely. particularly astern • Seal off means of access to the accommodation (due regard must be had to the need of escape in emergency) • Establish VHF contact.

• Provide and rig water hoses and prepare pumps for operation at all times (it can be an advantage to rig hoses over the stern with water constantly spraying from them.) Include rigging plans in Appendix 6. • Do not put your own or other’s lives at risk but safeguard the ship as far as possible.3 • Provide good lighting on deck and over-side. • The bridge is to remain manned. however if you are unsuccessful and raiders do come on board. November 2003/Issue 01 8-2 Restricted . • Whilst at anchor have both hawse pipe anchor wash hydrants turned on and a protective locked grill over the top of the hawse pipe to prevent raiders climbing the cable. However care is to be taken to ensure that safe navigation is not compromised by excessive lighting. When Raiders are Detected When a potential raider is sighted. • All other personnel should retreat to the pre-arranged secure location • Report situation by radio to shore authorities • Request urgent and immediate assistance if available • Do not take unnecessary risks. The following suggested steps should be taken. • If caught and held to ransom. If large numbers of armed pirate’s board the ship it may be necessary to retreat to a secure location within the accommodation. then co-operate to the best of your ability. • In port rat guards will help deter raiders from climbing the mooring ropes.4 • Sound the General Alarm • Increase speed and/or alter course to seaward if possible and safe to do so • Switch on additional lighting and use searchlights to dazzle the raiders • Start deck water to pre-rigged hoses • Alert shore stations and other ships in the vicinity • Fire warning rockets If Raiders have Boarded Usually if the foregoing precautions and actions have been taken. The raiders will probably be armed and will not hesitate in injuring or taking a crewmember’s life. this will be enough to successfully deter a potential raider. 8.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 8. the pre-agreed pirate contingency plan is to be put into action. • Establish a secure location.

The Company will forward the details on to the relevant organisations. • General description of the raiders • Number of and nationality • Number and types of boats involved and any distinguishing marks • Method of boarding • Date and time of attack • Ships position at time of attack • Nearest countries/ports • Any casualties (give details) • Any damage or danger to vessel • Details of equipment.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 8. November 2003/Issue 01 8-3 Restricted . personal effects. the report should be submitted to the nearest coastal state administration. cargo. the Master is to contact the Company and make out a full report with the following information.5 After an Attack Make an immediate report to the relevant shore authorities. This should be done even if the attack was unsuccessful. As soon as the initial report has been made. These reports will add to the growing database of the IMO and will help to ensure that action is taken by the various countries or authorities that may otherwise deny knowledge of the problem. If in international waters. money etc stolen.

but it still poses a threat to the safety of life and the environment. 9.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 9. the tanker Limburg was hit by a small boat laden with explosives off the coast of the Yemen causing major damage to the ship’s hull and resulting in some loss of cargo. Accordingly there is every reason to be aware that a terrorist attack can take place on any type of vessel. They will have thought out their plan well in advance and will have full confidence in carrying out at least their initial objective. More recently. in October 2002. that of taking over control of the vessel. for instance. In the past terrorism at sea has been targeted at passenger ships due to the high publicity and large potential demands on exchange for a large number of human lives. 9. However terrorism on a global scale has escalated into a problem for the majority of countries more so than the threat of war.1 The problem The problem of ship hijacks and terrorism at sea is relatively rare. • Act as calm and normal as possible and advise all others to stay calm. November 2003/Issue 01 9-1 Restricted . The following guidelines should be followed where practicable.3 When Hijackers have Boarded When hijackers have boarded they will at first be in a very volatile state of mind. Hijacking and Terrorists 9. over-run by terrorists and threatening to pollute entire coastlines would be just as successful for gaining publicity and demanding high ransoms. Terrorists or other hijackers will almost certainly have undergone military style training and be well organised and disciplined. A VLCC with a full cargo of oil. Terrorists can and will usually strike with the minimum of warning or no warning at all.2 Precautions There are few if any additional precautions to take over and above those listed elsewhere in this plan. DO NOT put up resistance or return any abuse or aggression. • Offer reasonable co-operation. They are also becoming more professional in their approach and can have many sympathisers infiltrating the organisation or target. They will be threatening crew members with guns and will not hesitate to shoot if they suspect that anyone is attempting to undermine their authority. however they will need reassurance that no plans are being plotted against them. It is unlikely that the boarders will have the expertise to navigate the ship safely or operate her machinery correctly. In order to ensure the safety of the ship offer them assistance.

As a result it is essential that all personnel are aware to behave in the following manner: 9. inform members of the security force as to the whereabouts of the hijackers. Depending upon the circumstances different forces will use different means of boarding and taking control. there is likely to be some form of military intervention to recapture the vessel. • Be aware that the incident may be prolonged and last a number of days before anything is resolved • Try not to become involved in any negotiations between the hijackers and the authorities. • Be aware that there will likely be a confrontation at some point between the terrorists and the authorities. any explosive devices or weapons • Do NOT shelter or hide terrorists • Do NOT take photographs of the operation After the Assault The military and the authorities will advise the Master as to how to proceed.5 • Do NOT react surprised to any newcomer that is seen on board • Do NOT attract attention to any unusual activity seen • On hearing the command “Stand Still!” immediately stop and stay motionless otherwise there is a danger of being shot • On hearing shooting or on the command “Get Down” immediately lie face down on the deck. This will be carried out by highly trained and specialised forces with anti-terrorist expertise. Military Assistance If negotiations between the hijackers and the relevant authorities fail. close the eyes and slightly open the mouth.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 9. In any event it is likely that hijackers will make their presence known to the outside world sooner rather than later as they will want to make their demands known. hostages. However it is likely that the vessel will be infiltrated in a covert manner (at least initially).4 • If possible transmit a security alert using the Ship Security Alert System. cover the ears. Stay in this position until the “all clear” is given • Obey all instructions given by the military force • If in a position to do so. • Try and set up a reasonable relationship with the hijackers. The Company will be in close liaison with the authorities during the incident and will also offer advice as to any follow up action and repatriation as required. November 2003/Issue 01 9-2 Restricted . However if forced to take part simply relay messages or dialogue accurately back and forth. This will help to reduce the chances of the terrorists acting violently towards the crew.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX There will be substantial media interest in the incident. a Company representative or Company’s media adviser will be on hand to offer advice. However the Master. No information is to be given out unless express permission has been granted by the Company and/or governments involved November 2003/Issue 01 9-3 Restricted . officers and crew must not talk to the press on their own about the attack. If required to do so.

1 The Problem Bomb threats can be received from a variety of sources ranging from organised terrorists to persons who hold a personal grudge against person/s on the ship or the Company. The following indicators may help to decide whether a package could be a letter/parcel bomb: Look • Look for suspicious return address • Unusual shape • Stained packaging such as grease marks on the envelope or packing • Poor handwriting and/or misspellings of the address • Excessive postage paid (i. Whatever the source. Explosive Devices and Bomb Threats 10. The methods of detonation include timing devices.g.e. the more sophisticated and better concealed will be the bomb. mercury switches (designed to be set off with movement) and remote controlled detonation.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 10. Bombs include incendiary devices.2 Types of Explosive Devices There is almost an infinite variety of bomb types and the types used will depend on the person or organisation. Where there is threat of an explosive device being placed on board it must be assumed that the device does exist and the threat is not just a hoax. a nail bomb) designed to cause significant human injury and those that are small to cause immediate and personal injury such as parcel bombs. too many stamps for the weight of package) • Visible wiring or tin foil. 10. Any suspicious package should be treated as a potential bomb but perhaps one of the most common type of bomb is that of the letter or parcel bomb. particularly if the package is damaged • Small pin hole visible Feel • Heavy or unusual weight for size of package • weight distribution is uneven November 2003/Issue 01 10-1 Restricted . any such threat must be taken very seriously indeed. explosives mixed with debris (e. The more sophisticated the organisation.

The following actions are to be taken: 10. It is therefore essential that persons searching are familiar with the spaces being searched. • Co-operate fully with any shore or military authority. • Advise local security forces immediately and alert the Company. the letter is to be treated with care. If the bomb threat is received by letter. It is important that whoever receives the call keeps calm and makes careful notes. November 2003/Issue 01 10-2 Restricted . The search is therefore to be conducted by looking for an item of any description which is not usually in that location. Action on Discovering a Bomb or Suspicious Package If a suspicious package has been identified. There are many ways in which explosives can be disguised and may look like an innocent hold-all or parcel. • Organise a thorough search of the vessel using the search checklist. • Close all watertight doors and compartments. placed into a clean envelope and kept in a secure place in order to preserve it for forensic investigation later. If at sea contact is to be made with relevant authorities in order that guidance can be received from experts ashore.3 Action in the Event of a Bomb Threat When a bomb threat is received it will normally be made by telephone. The details of the call are to be recorded on this form and will prove very useful to the authorities in investigating the incident. handled as little as possible. When a bomb threat is received it must be assumed that the threat is real and there is a bomb or explosive device on board. If at sea broadcast a Pan-Pan message. the following conditions are to apply: • DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE THE PACKAGE.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX NB: DO NOT HANDLE UNNECESSARILY Smell: • Unusual smell such as an odour of marzipan / almonds IF IN ANY DOUBT OR HAVE SUSPICIONS ABOUT A LETTER OR PACKAGE DO NOT OPEN IT! 10. • Note that it may be dangerous to use radio communication when searching for bombs as the radio frequency may accidentally set off the device.4 • Sound the general alarm and have all crew mustered and briefed • Advise the Company and local authorities. Appendix 11 gives a checklist which includes important information.

place soft cushion material (such as mattresses) around and close to the object to take some of the blast effect should the package detonate. This is in order to protect any forensic evidence.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX • If possible. Do not use steel plate or similar material. • Consideration is to be given to opening doors and vents in the vicinity in order to vent the force of the blast outward or overboard to minimise damage to the ship’s structure. • Co-operate fully and obey all instructions by trained bomb disposal experts. • Leave any removal or disarming to the military/bomb disposal experts. • Rig fire hoses as appropriate. Do not attempt to cover the package. • Evacuate the area and make consideration to evacuate the ship completely if deemed appropriate. Stand down from emergency stations when the device has been made safe and removed and only when the all-clear has been given. November 2003/Issue 01 10-3 Restricted . • If a blast does occur then the immediate and surrounding areas should not be disturbed unless to treat or evacuate casualties and for the purpose of fire-fighting. Such material must not make contact with the package.

Indonesia. Argentina. principally from Brazil South & Central America and the Caribbean: Probably the most infamous area of production of hard drugs. The Caribbean states. In West Africa cannabis is grown or turned to resin. Anti-Drug Security 11. Australia and N. However the following gives an indication of only some key areas which pose the greatest of threats: Africa: Opium is grown in Egypt.1 The Problem The smuggling or trafficking of drugs by sea is regretfully a common occurrence and is on the increase. Brazil and Chile consume mainly cannabis although other drugs are also used. Japan. November 2003/Issue 01 11-1 Restricted . intelligence and security is increased.E.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 11. morphine and heroin. cannabis resin. South Asia: Opium and heroin produced and destined for Europe. Lebanon is a distribution centre for cocaine. Algeria. it is no surprise that they are used ruthlessly and frequently by professional smugglers. it can be assumed that smuggling may be carried out just about anywhere.Asia: Main production is heroin. Transhipment is also common-place with drugs entering the region from S. opium and cannabis. Illegal drugs today make up a high proportion of organised serious crime. Korea. As drug abuse and trafficking has now become a global problem. Malaysia and the Philippines bound for Europe. Cannabis is also known to be smuggled from Laos. Drug producers and drug dealers have no problem in finding customers for their criminal product. As customs. so do the sophisticated methods used by the criminals. Taiwan. Venezuela and Colombia play a major role in transhipment. Heroin is frequently shipped from Bangkok. The island states are notorious for dropping-off cocaine shipments from light aircraft or ships and then being picked up by small fast craft for taking to the southern USA. The problem that they are invariably faced with is how to transport it to its final destination.W Asia and then moved to Turkey. Bangladesh is being used frequently as a transit country for drug smuggling. opium. Kenya and Sudan. Almost all of the countries in the region produce or store illegal drugs including cocaine. central America. Morocco and Tunisia have been identified as transit countries for cocaine entering Europe East and S. Cannabis is illicitly exported from Sri Lanka.America. Singapore. As ships remain the main carriers of cargo around the world. Philippines and Thailand into Australia. Near & Middle East: A major producer of cannabis. the USA and Europe.

American cocaine. rudder or propeller bracket.2 Methods of Drug Smuggling Ships are relatively easy targets for smugglers due to their vast size and small number of persons on board. • External Concealment: This is where drugs are placed in a watertight container and attached to the ship’s hull such as a main intake. The above lists are not exhaustive and it can therefore be seen that the Master and crew must be vigilant in their approach in taking counter-measures. Main transit areas include Greece. cleaning gangs. Cyprus. conceals a package and then leaves) • Conspiracy: where one or more members of the crew or shore staff are involved • Proxy: where the smuggler does not board but uses a convenient means of smuggling the package on board via the cargo or provisions for example. stevedores and hired security personnel • concealing cargo within the ship’s machinery spaces or hull Such methods above may be carried out by the following: • Overt/covert entry to the ship (i. Vessels can be used in various ways including. freight vehicles etc • by visitors bringing on board and leaving a package • concealing in ship’s stores • concealing in cargo. This is used by sophisticated smugglers with well trained teams of divers/swimmers at both ends of the vessel’s voyage. Europe: The Netherlands and Poland are major sources of LSD and amphetamines. while cannabis is cultivated in the European CIS states.e. However the main problem in Europe is transhipment and importation of illicit drugs. where the smuggler goes on board the ship. heroin and cocaine pose serious threats to the majority of European countries.African cannabis and S. Whilst cannabis is the most common. including cargo structures such as containers and pallets • as part of the crew’s personal effects • by contract personnel such as repair squads. Smugglers also know that that not every ship will be searched by customs at the destination port due to limited resources. November 2003/Issue 01 11-2 Restricted . Some production of cannabis exists in Mexico while California produces some LSD.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX North America: This area is the main consumer of illegal drugs in the world and it can assumed that a ship entering any port of the USA or Canada can pose a serious risk of being used by drug smugglers regardless of her port of departure. but not limited to. the following: • concealing drugs in cars. and the Adriatic while Portugal and Spain remain important points of entry for N. 11.

the same practices are to be adopted throughout the vessel’s trading pattern. It is also to be remembered that drug smugglers will frequently use divers to attach packages to the ship’s hull. Whilst this book relates to the United States of America. Unannounced searches are to be arranged before arrival in port and whilst at sea. missing keys etc. sacks of vegetables etc • Places unlikely to be searched due to respect (e. 11.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX 11. The checklist (Appendix 10) is to be used as guidance with additional areas added as required. the Master’s cabin). awkwardness (e. such as damaged bolts. disturbed stowage. mast tops) or danger (e. There may be evidence of tampering on board. November 2003/Issue 01 11-3 Restricted .4 Drug Searches The main way of avoiding drug smuggling is by conducting thorough searches. The following factors are listed to assist in considering some additional locations where drugs could be discovered: • Oil drums and other liquid containers: these may have dummy or double bottoms. This must be read in conjunction with this section and gives many details on the means of concealment. All of the procedures and precautions listed in Section 6 (Port Security) will assist in reducing the risk of drugs being smuggled onboard. Always be on the lookout for suspicious behaviour on board. behind electrical spaces) • In or near the funnel where fumes may disguise the smell of cannabis • Places where access is restricted to only a few authorised personnel • Inside vent pipes.3 Precautions to Avoid Drug Smuggling The Company fully endorses the United States Sea Carrier Initiative Agreement and includes this as a reference publication.g. This is in order to alert the next port whose Customs officials or coast guard will have the vessel under surveillance on arrival with a view to catch the criminals removing the package. • Containers in stores such as rice bins.g. pallets or containers The extent of such a search is dependant upon the apparent risk and therefore a risk assessment is to be conducted before a search is decided upon. If a package/canister is found it will normally be left and only the Master advised. closed off spaces. Therefore be on the lookout for bubbles coming from the water around the hull. In very high-risk areas it may be prudent to organise an underwater search by qualified clearance divers arranged by local customs. This can be by shore workers. shafts and cable ducts • False cargo crates. A crew member may be involved either through his own free will or may have been coerced by criminals through blackmail or other means of extortion. Keep a close watch on the rudder and propeller area and consider the use of turning the propeller occasionally. methods of smuggling and searching.g. shaft tunnels. maintenance contractors or even amongst the crew.

It should be noted that if one package is found. in reality the tasting of pure concentrated drugs could kill in seconds. Despite many feature films and police television programmes showing this practice. take a photograph. November 2003/Issue 01 11-4 Restricted . This will be used as evidence if required.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX In the case of personal searches. If possible.5 If Drugs are Discovered When drugs have been discovered on board (or where there is suspicion that drugs may be onboard) the Master is to advise the Company immediately in order to obtain advice. get another person to witness the position and type of package. they will be extremely concerned. approximate weight/quantity. 11. lids and sides or compartments. the person who is being searched must be treated with courtesy and with a minimum degree of embarrassment. if not worried for their lives. time. Look for any suspicious behaviour from any persons on board. Look out for tampering or apparent repair to a case. If the person is having bags or cases searched. foil. The following points are to be followed to ensure personal safety when handling suspected drugs: • Do not open or pierce unrecognised suspicious packages that are wrapped in newspaper. As much detail as possible is to be included such as date. If this is the case. person finding the package and any witnesses. If a package containing (or suspected of containing) drugs is discovered. • Do not feel. Masters are to make an entry into the deck log every time a drug search has been carried out. Handle as little as possible to avoid contaminating possible fingerprint evidence. there is a distinct possibility that more packages may also be located in similar places on the vessel and an additional search is to be carried out. Customs authorities are to be advised as soon as possible and if at sea the authorities at the next port must be advised before entering territorial waters. handle or touch the substance without skin protection and a face mask • Under no circumstances taste the substance. then check for false bottoms. • Do not attempt to smell the substance • Do not smoke near the substance or expose it to heat • Always wash hands and brush clothing free from any contamination as soon as possible If any discovery is made then an entry is to be made into the log book. Remove the goods to a safe place under lock and key and guard. If they have been involved in the smuggling and realise that the drugs have been discovered. do not approach them or make any specific comments but advise the Company and the Customs authorities of the fact. location. carbon paper or polythene bags and sealed with masking tape. and will probably react differently.

e. November 2003/Issue 01 11-5 Restricted .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX A full report on the discovery is to be made giving all relevant details including the circumstances surrounding the discovery (i. This will be required by and will help the Customs authorities. during a routine search or other activity).

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX November 2003/Issue 01 11-6 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 1 SSP Review and Update Procedure October 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

Reason for Update The reason for the update to the SSP is to be provided. In the case of new text a reference to where the text is to be inserted will be required. additions or deletions can be raised and submitted.Update to SSP Identified Step 1 . Part 1 . Master. For example reference to supporting Standard Operating Procedures.Processing Upon receipt of the Update Form the CSO will review update as follows: October 2003/Issue 01 App1-1 Restricted . For example to provide additional information or to correct existing information or to delete information that no longer applies.6 1. however. 11. Step 2 . Part 3 .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix 11. Step 3 . Step 4 . Maintenance Procedures. Additional pages can be attached to the form if required. SSO. to ensure that the process of raising updates is both effective and efficient the following framework will be utilised.New or Revised Text The new or revised text is to be provided.Supporting Documentation Where appropriate reference to supporting documentation is to be provided which supports the update. The form should then be forwarded to the Company Security Officer for processing.Authorisation Once the update has been identified and documented Part 2 of the Form will record the authorisation of the update by the appropriate authority (i. Certification or Technical Handbooks etc Part 2 .2 Framework An update to the Ship Security Plan can be raised by any individual.7 1.1 Introduction The objective of the SSP Update Form is to provide a mechanism that allows any individual within the company to raise an update to the MV XXXX Ship Security Plan. The form provides the means by which individual updates.e. CSO).Identify Section and/or Paragraph The originator will identify the section and paragraph which is to be updated or deleted.

3. Record the number assigned to the proposed update to the SSP for future reference. October 2003/Issue 01 App1-2 Restricted . Review the form for completeness of information. Updates which are incomplete or not authorised may be returned to the originator for further consideration.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix 1. Updates accepted for incorporation will be completed during the periodic reviews of the SSP and a revised MV XXXX SSP will be published. 2.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Table App 1. Maintenance Procedures. Supporting Documentation . New Text or Revised Text to be incorporated 4. Section/Paragraph in SSP 2. Reason for New. Revision or Deletion to Text 3.To be completed by person who identified Revision to SSP This form records updates to Ship Security Plan. Revision or deletion to Text 1.1 – MV XXXX SSP Update Form MV XXXX SSP Update Form Page of Part 1 . New. October 2003/Issue 01 App1-3 Restricted . Unused sections of the form should be scored through.For example reference to supporting Standard Operating Procedures. Certification or Technical Handbooks etc.

Date Fax No.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix MV XXXX SSP Update Form Page of Part 2: Authorisation To be completed by the originator and the appropriate authority (or Nominee). Allocated Form Status CSO Comments To be incorporated __/____/____ Returned . Authoriser Signature: Authoriser Comments: Date Received Part 3: Entry into the SSP To be completed by the CSO No. Originator: Organisation/Dept. October 2003/Issue 01 App1-4 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix October 2003/Issue 01 App1-5 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 2 Company Contact Details And Ship Communication Details October 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

Operations Contact Address Main Phone Fax Cell Phone Transpetro Emergency 24 Hour Number Email October 2003/Issue 01 App2-1 Restricted .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Information Contact Details Owner/Operator Transpetro Address Management .

Internal Communications System Location Coverage Comments Portable VHF (3) GMDSS VHF (3) Intercom system Telephone system Sound Powered Telephone System October 2003/Issue 01 App2-2 Restricted .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Table 8.2 .1 – External Communications System Number / Address Location Coverage Comments Sat C Telex Sat C Telex Mobile Phone Mini M Phone Mini M Phone Mini M Fax VHF (2) VHF DSC (2) MF/HF DSC Table 8.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix October 2003/Issue 01 App2-3 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 3 Declaration of Appointment of Ship Security Officer October 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

MV XXXX) Date Note: A copy of this letter is to be sent to the Company Security Officer October 2003/Issue 01 App3-1 Restricted . Transpetro. This letter serves to declare that ______________________________________ (insert name and rank of Officer) has been appointed as the Ship Security Officer (SSO) for the MV XXXX on ___________________ (insert date). The above SSO is suitably trained and certified and is aware of the responsibilities laid down within the Transpetro Ship Security Plan and the ISPS Code. MV XXXX) Date Signed: (Ship Security Officer.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Declaration of Appointment of Ship Security Officer To: CSO. Signed: (Master.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix October 2003/Issue 01 App3-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 4 Form of Declaration of Security October 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

including berthing areas and areas surrounding the ship Handling of cargo Delivery of ship’s stores Handling unaccompanied baggage October 2003/Issue 01 App4-1 Restricted . The affixing of the initials of the SSO of PFSO under these columns indicates that the activity will be done. including berthing areas and areas surrounding the ship Monitoring of the ship.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Form of a Declaration of Security between a ship and a port facility Declaration of Security Name of Ship: Port of Registry: IMO Number: Name of port facility: This Declaration of Security is valid from____________________________until__________________________ For the following activities: ____________________________________________________________________ (list the activities with relevant details) under the following security levels Security level(s) for the ships: Security level(s) for the port facility: The port facility and ship agree to the following security measures and responsibilities to ensure compliance with the requirements of part A of the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities. in accordance with the relevant approved plan by Activity The port facility: The ship: Ensuring the performance of all security duties Monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only personnel have access Controlling access to the port facility Controlling access to the ship Monitoring of the port facility.

.on the……………………………………………………… Signed for and on behalf of The port facility: The ship: (Signature of port facility security officer) (Signature of master or ship security officer) Name and Title of person who signed Name: Name: Title: Title: Contact details (to be completed as appropriate) (indicate the telephone numbers or the radio channels or frequencies to be used) For the port facility: For the ship: Port Facility Port Facility Security Officer Master Ship Security Officer Company Company Security Officer October 2003/Issue 01 App4-2 Restricted .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects Ensuring that security communication is readily available between the ship and the port facility The signatories to this agreement certify that security measures and arrangements for both the port facility part A of the Code that will be implemented in accordance with the provisions already stipulated in their approved plan or the specific arrangements agreed to and set out in the attached annex Dated at…………………………………………….

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix October 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 5 Training. Duties And Responsibilities October 2003/Issue 01 Restricted . Drills.

Drill Type (delete as appropriate): Date: • • • • • Time: • • Anti-Piracy Measures Search for Unauthorised Personnel Bomb Threat & Search Contraband Search Access Training (including bag & personnel search) Vessel Evacuation Other (please specify) Drill Content. Aim & Brief Details: Comments and Observations Ship Security Officer Master October 2003/Issue 01 App5-1 Restricted . Describe briefly the content of the drill and actions/measures expected to be taken during the exercise. This form can be updated as experience and training is developed.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 5 .Security Drill & Exercise Scenario This table is to be completed on board for each of the different types of security drills/exercises in order to assist in successful training and contingency planning.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix October 2003/Issue 01 App5-2 Restricted .

Anti-Piracy Fire Hose Rigging Plan (to be provided) November 2003/Issue 01 App6-1 Restricted .Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 6 Ship Specific Security Information 1. Ship Security Equipment/Systems (to be completed) 4. Vessel Particulars 2. General Arrangement (Marked Up) 3. Lighting Plan (to be completed) 5. Evacuation Plan (to be provided) 6.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Vessel Particulars Name of Vessel Type IMO Number Call Sign Ship Security Alert System Date Keel Laid Port of Registry Flag State Full Class Length Overall Length Between Perpendiculars Breadth Depth Moulded Deadweight Gross Registered Tonnage Net Tonnage Summer Draft Summer Freeboard Ballast Freeboard Number of Holds Cargo Capacity (m3) Total Crew Crew Nationality November 2003/Issue 01 App6-1 Restricted .

coverage and location of any security equipment/systems carried on board. Location Type Area Covered Monitor Point November2003/Issue 01 Power Source Remarks App6-2 Restricted . These may be highlighted on the copy of the GA plan in Appendix 6.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Security Systems Carried List below the type.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November2003/Issue 01 App6-3 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 7 Summary of SSA Recommendations November 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

Section 2 – Access to the Ship 10 11. 8. Section 3 – Restricted Areas 13. 15. 5. 12. Section 6 – Embarkation of Personnel and Baggage 21. 2. Section 4 – Handling of Cargo 19. 17. 4. 7. Implemente d Recommendation Section 1 – General Information 1. 14. 3. 18.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix No. 23. 22. November 2003/Issue 01 App7-1 Restricted . 6. Section 5 – Ships Stores and Provisions 20. 9. 16.

Section 10 – Contingency Plans 37. 28. 32. Section 11 – Threat Evaluation and Risk Assessment 38. Implemente d Recommendation 24. 26. Section 8 – Communications Na Information Technology 31.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix No. 35. 29. 34. 30. November 2003/Issue 01 App7-2 Restricted . Section 9 – Records and Documentation 33. Section 7 – Monitoring of Security 27. 36. 25.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App7-3 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 8 Ship Security Alert System (This appendix will contain details of the Ship Security Alert System when fitted) November 2003/Issue 01 App8-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App8-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 9 Visitors Log November 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix GANGWAY / VISITORS LOG DATE:______________________________ SHIP:_______________________________ LOCATION:_________________________ NAME COMPANY CALLING ON November 2003/Issue 01 TIME ONBOARD TIME AWAY App9-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App9-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 10 Stowaway and Drug Search Checklist (to be inserted from Company Forms Manual) November 2003/Issue 01 App10-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App10-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 11 Bomb Threat Checklist November 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

Phone Number (Include area code) 3.Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix BOMB THREAT BY TELEPHONE ASK THE CALLER: • • • • • When is the bomb to go off?____________________________________________ Where is the bomb to go off?____________________________________________ What kind of bomb is it?________________________________________________ What does the bomb look like?___________________________________________ Where are you calling from?_____________________________________________ 1. Caller BACKGROUND NOISES (describe street sounds. Recipient b. Recipient f. Serious) e. Sex b. Other WERE THERE ANY WITNESS TO THE CALL? No Yes (List Name) DO YOU HAVE ANY SUSPICION AS TO THE IDENTITY OF THE CALLER? No Yes (List Name) YOUR NAME JOB TITLE: November 2003/Issue 01 App11-1 Restricted . Recipient d. Nervous. continue on reverse. If more space is needed. Location 4. Caller c. Caller e. Time DETAILS / TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION a.) INFORMATION ABOUT CALLER/VOICE CHARACTERISTICS a. Age c. Date 2. Apparent Nationality d. Day of Week 5. Attitude (Calm. etc. voices. music.

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App11-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 12 Security Breach November 2003/Issue 01 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Transpetro Security Breach Form Date: Destination/Port: Time: Description of Incident or Threat How were the Security Measures Circumvented Additional Details as Required Master Signature Comments SSO Signature Comments November 2003/Issue 01 App12-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App12-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App12-3 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 13 Ship Security Officers Assessment Form November 2003/Issue 01 App13-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App13-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 14 Ship Security Audit Form November 2003/Issue 01 App14-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App14-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 15 Additional Requirements for USA (This Appendix will contain additional information that may be required for vessels trading to the USA and shall be issued when made available by the company) November 2003/Issue 01 App15-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App15-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 16 Additional Security Information November 2003/Issue 01 App16-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App16-2 Restricted .

Restricted SSP/1103/XXX Appendix Appendix 17 Trading Area and Recent Ports Visited November 2003/Issue 01 App17-1 Restricted .

Restricted SSA/1003/XXX Appendix General Trading Area Question Details Risk to vessel and crew Low Med Comments/ Recommendations High Theft Smuggling Drugs Drugs searches carried out Smuggling weapons Stowaways Stowaway searches carried out Piracy Hijack Terrorism Use of vessel as weapon November 2003/Issue 01 App 17-2 Restricted .

1 Restricted .Restricted SSA/1103/XXX Appendix November 2003/Issue 01 App 17 .