Professional Documents
Culture Documents
that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the
effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by
respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979 [4] was
executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as Felicisima M.
Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to
be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of
the MESINA properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the
spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent
about it. Respondent, by Affidavit of February 18, 1986, acknowledged such
obligation to be his and undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on January 21, 1986 a title over the
Melencio property.
PER CURIAM:
By a verified complaint[1] received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on May
5, 1998,[2] Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged Atty.
Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional
misconduct, and culpable malpractice.
As related by complainants, the following facts gave rise to the filing of the
complaint.
Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now deceased husband
Chua Yap Ans legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and
confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street,
Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondents family, and another
property containing an area of 854 sq. m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan
City (Melencio property), also owned by respondents family whereon they (spouses
Chua) constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the
registered owner, respondents mother Felicisima Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs.
Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained.
As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, respondent convinced
complainant Ana Chua and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her
obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them
at P850.00/sq. m.
Accommodating respondents request, the spouses Chua and their business
partner, herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation
in the amount of P983,125.40.
[3]
A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio
property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name
appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants.
As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they
were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them
Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale or
in February 1986, one Juanito Tecson (Tecson) filed an Affidavit [5] dated February
20, 1986 before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office charging respondents
mother, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of
Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal
Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of
the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it
but that contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and
her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the February 9,
1979 Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property
and was antedated to evade payment of capital gains tax.
Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of
Absolute Sale was antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against
Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of
sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 1, 1986[6] conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio
property for P85,400.00.
A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of Felicisima
M. Melencio, the owners copy of which was entrusted to complainants.
Tecson subsequently filed before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office an
Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 [7] alleging that his filing of the
criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference with herein
complainants and their co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against
them.
The IBP, acting on the complaint, issued a notice of hearing on September 14,
2001,[12] copy of which was sent to respondent at his office address via registered
mail, covered by Registry Receipt No. 2605 of the Meralco Post Office. [13] On the
scheduled date of hearing, complainants personally appeared with their
counsel. Respondent failed to show up.
Received the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 4383 issued by the Register of
Deeds, Cabanatuan City registered in the name of Felicisima Mesina, widow,
consisting of about 854 square meters more or less located at calle Melencio,
Cabanatuan City from Mrs. Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia.
Given the length of time that the case remained pending from its filing, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, by Order of October 12, 2001,[14]directed
complainants to just file their position paper with affidavits and supporting
documents in lieu of actual presentation of witnesses and to serve a copy thereof to
respondent at his last known address.
I promise to and undertake to have the Deed of Sale of the above-mentioned property
in favor of Ana
Chua and Marcelina Hsia to be signed by Mrs. Felicisima Mesina,within four (4) mo
nths from date hereof so that the above-mentioned property and title maybe
transferred in the name of Ana Chua and Macelina Hsia. (Underscoring supplied)
In compliance with the IBP Order, complainants filed on April 1, 2002 their
position paper,[15] annexed to which were photocopies of: 1) a May 5, 1993
Certification[16] issued by the Metrobank Cabanatuan Branch certifying that it issued
the demand drafts to the payees enumerated below, which were debited from the
account of Mr. Chua Yap An under Savings Account No. 760:
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the
attached cars in the court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Los counsel. Atty.
Salomon claimed that on several occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted being used
SECOND DIVISION
Andrew Abundo saw the Nissan Sentra in front of a battery shop on Anonas
St., Quezon City. On February 18, 2006, Architect Roberto S. Perez and three others
saw and took video and photo shots of the same car while in the Manresa Shell
station at P. Tuazon Blvd. corner 20th Avenue, Quezon City. Also sometime in June
2006, Robert M. Perez, complainants driver, saw the said car in another Shell station
near Kamias Street. On December 16, 2006, Arlene Carmela M. Salomon spotted it
driven by bondsman Ferdinand Liquigan allegedly with Atty. Frials consent. As Atty.
Salomon further alleged, when the misuse of the car was reported, paving for
As to the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial deliberately
respondent Atty. Joselito C. Frial with violating his Lawyers Oath and/or gross
withheld information as to its whereabouts. As it turned out later, the Volvo was
misconduct
totally destroyed by fire, but the court was not immediately put on notice of this
arising
from
his
actuations
with
respect
to
two
attached
vehicles. Complainant, owner of the vehicles in question, asked that Atty. Frial be
development.
disbarred.
In his Answer,[2] Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars thru his own
The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo v. Ricardo Salomon et
undertaking, without authority and knowledge of the court. The subject vehicles,
al., docketed as Civil Case No. 05-111825 before the Regional Trial Court in Manila,
according to him, were first parked near the YMCA building in front of
in which a writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favor of Lucy Lo, Atty.
the Manila City Hall where they remained for four months. He said that when he
Frials client. The writ was used to attach two (2) cars of complainanta black 1995
went to check on the vehicles condition sometime in December 2005, he found them
to have been infested and the wirings underneath the hoods gnawed by rats. He
denied personally using or allowing others the use of the cars, stating in this regard
of the Nissan Sentra in different places obviously showed it was being used by
that
others.
if
indeed
the
Nissan
Sentra
was
spotted
on Anonas
St., Quezon
City on December 26, 2005, it could have been the time when the car was being
transferred from the YMCA. The February 18, 2006 and June 2006 sightings, so
In the same Report, the Commission observed that while there is perhaps no direct
Atty. Frial claimed, possibly occurred when the Nissan Sentra was brought to the gas
evidence tying up Atty. Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact
station to be filled up. He said that the car could not have plausibly been spotted in
remains that it was being used by other persons during the time he was supposed to
Project 3 on December 13, 2006, parked as it was then in front of Liquigans house
have custody of it. In addition, whoever drove the Nissan Sentra on those occasions
must have received the car key from Atty. Frial. When Atty. Frial took custody of the
Nissan Sentra and Volvo cars, he was duty bound to keep and preserve these in the
same condition he received them so as to fetch a good price should the vehicles be
Discipline, the parties agreed on the following key issues to be resolved: (1) whether
auctioned.
or not Atty. Frial used the cars for his personal benefit; and (2) whether or not Atty.
Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached properties.
As to the burnt Volvo, Atty. Frial admitted receiving it in excellent condition and that
there was no court order authorizing him to remove the car from the YMCA
Thereafter and after the submission by the parties of their respective position papers,
premises. Admitted too was the fact that he secured the release of the Volvo on the
the Commission submitted a Report dated October 9, 2007which the IBP Board of
strength alone of his own written undertaking; [3] and that the car was almost totally
Governors forthwith adopted and then transmitted to this Court. In the Report, the
destroyed by fire on February 4, 2006 at 1:45 a.m.[4] while parked in his residence.
following were deduced from the affidavits of Andrew Abundo, Roberto Perez,
He could not, however, explain the circumstances behind the destruction, but
Robert Perez, and Dante Batingan: (1) at no time was Atty. Frial seen driving the
admitted not reporting the burning to the court or the sheriff. While the burning of
Sentra; (2) Abundo learned that at that time the car was spotted at the battery shop,
the car happened before the mediation hearing, Atty. Frial, upon inquiry of Atty.
the unnamed driver bought a new battery for the car which was not inappropriate
since a battery was for the preservation of the car; (3) Atty. Frial admitted that the
The destruction of the Volvo in Atty. Frials residence was not an ordinary
Nissan Sentra was seen gassed up on February 18, 2006 and in June 2006 and there
occurrence; it was an event that could have not easily escaped his
was no reason to gas up the Nissan Sentra on those times unless it was being used;
attention. Accordingly, there is a strong reason to believe that Atty. Frial deliberately
(4) Roberto Perez said the Nissan Sentra was used to buy goats meat; and (5) photos
concealed the destruction of said vehicle from the court during the hearings in Civil
Case No. 05-111828, which were the opportune times to reveal the condition of the
Volvo car.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to
On the basis of the foregoing premises, the Commission concluded that Atty. Frial
committed acts clearly bearing on his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to
respect the courts order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as
such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued.
observe the diligence required of him as custodian of the cars. The Commission thus
Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of
recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.
the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who
The findings and the recommendation of the Commission are well-taken.
had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the
destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without
A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the attached
property, thus securing the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, we find Atty.
plaintiff or any proper party.[5] When the objects of the attachment are destroyed,
then the attached properties would necessarily be of no value and the attachment
would be for naught.
Frial guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We
must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not without
legal recourse in recovering the Volvos value from Atty. Frial should they desire to
From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is no question that Atty.
Frial is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics that states:
do so.
The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate
penalty of disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.[6] With the view we take of the case, there
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client.
is no compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial intended to pervert the
on the economic life and honor of the erring person. In the case of Atty. Frial, the
Court finds that a years suspension from the practice of his legal profession will
provide him with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct.
in
the
custody
of
properties
in custodia
legis.
He
is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Let notice of this Decision be entered in his
personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the
same served on the IBP and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Clerk of Court, confirmed this to complainant who received from Daroy copies of
the two withdrawal slips drawn from the trial court's savings account. One slip dated
10 March 2000 was for P28,000,3 and another slip dated 19 April 2000 was
for P227,000.4 Thus, respondent received a total of P255,000, as evidenced by two
receipts5 signed by him. The withdrawals were made through Daroy's authorized
representative Antonia Macaraeg, but Daroy personally delivered the money to
respondent. Respondent did not inform complainant of these transactions.
Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent on 30
June 2003 a final demand letter for the accounting and return of
the P255,000.6 Respondent failed to reply.
Hence, complainant filed this case for disbarment against respondent for failing to
account for complainant's funds. Complainant further accuses respondent of
neglecting to pursue the implementation of the writ of execution issued in the
ejectment case.
On 12 May 2004, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ("IBP Director
Vinluan") ordered respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint. Respondent did
not file an answer despite receipt of the notice.7
On 4 October 2004, IBP Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay ("IBP
Commissioner Dulay") notified the parties to appear before him for a mandatory
conference on 15 November 2004, later reset to 17 January 2005. Only complainant
appeared at the conference, prompting IBP Commissioner Dulay to order the
conference terminated and to declare that respondent had waived his right to
participate in the proceedings. IBP Commissioner Dulay directed the parties to file
their respective position papers. Complainant submitted his position paper on 22
March 2005. Again, respondent took no action.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
On 8 June 2005, IBP Commissioner Dulay submitted his Report and
Recommendation ("Report")8 with the finding that respondent failed to account for
money he held in trust for complainant. The Report considered complainant's
evidence "clear and convincing" enough to justify disciplinary action against
respondent for violation of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be declared guilty of gross
misconduct and suspended for one year, aside from being ordered to render an
accounting of the money he had received.
In a Resolution9 dated 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors approved the
Report, with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to two
years.
The Court's Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP.
Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of
money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting
for and returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in
his capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in
trust for complainant. The Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") states:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client
when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and
may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court's
approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds
to him, respondent could have collected any lien which he had over them in
connection with his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A
lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the
mere fact that the client owes him attorney's fees.10 In this case, respondent did not
even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain
the money.
Respondent's failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter's
demands gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his
personal use and benefit. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this Decision.
We ORDER respondent to RESTITUTE, within 30 days from finality of this
Decision, complainant's P255,000, with interest at 12% per annum from 30 June
2003 until fully paid. We DIRECTrespondent to submit to the Court proof of
payment within 15 days from payment of the full amount.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their notice and guidance.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005
finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and
gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice
SO ORDERED.
VALERIANA U. DALISAY,
Complainant,
Present:
-versus-
Promulgated:
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,
Respondent.
documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant,
respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the
attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents,
but respondent refused.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action
had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged
conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office.
in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
Recommendation.
Third, complainant
refused
to
provide
him
with
documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job.
learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax
declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the
Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn
against her.
171[2] and 172,[3] and/or Article 182[4] of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that
complainant offered tampered evidence.
falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her
money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier
if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money
dereliction of duties.
But respondents current assertion came too late in the day. He is already
bound by his previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the AffidavitComplaint,[7] he categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil
Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus:
From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the
is
nothing
in
the
records
to
show
that
With ingenuity, respondent now claims that complainant did not engage
his services for Civil Case No. 00-044 but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of
previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what
proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but
because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. [9] The present
administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents previous
admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He
cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if
anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his
dishonesty to this Court.
representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to
respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-
handle the case.[11] As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the
044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he
certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own,
filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he
respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his
held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the
client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee,
but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the
client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent
is yet to return the money.
cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to
complainant.
inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and
foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should
have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing
nothing.
not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated
fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer
In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by
shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with
documents vital to the case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility by handling a case without adequate preparation. This is
preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied
shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02
of the same Canon specifically provides:
In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or
her retainer.[12] It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is
highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character,
requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.[13] If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
her.
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. [14]Indeed, law is
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is
because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to
an exacting goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral
discipline.
complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth
argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after
complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his
active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a
matter of fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only
after the news of his suspension spread in the legal community. To our mind, there
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the
consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the amount in
court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest.
Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned, however, the
Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good
hands.
The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon
(RTC), where their complaint for annulment of sale was being heard, had required
the parties to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they deliveredP15,000.00 to Atty.
Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the memorandum.6
When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his
promise of returning theP65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter
dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return theP65,000.00, plus interest, and
the P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum.7 Yet, they did not receive any
reply from Atty. Ricafort.
In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be
deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services under
a "package deal," that is, the amount included his acceptance fee, attorneys fee, and
appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of sale until
judgment, but excluding appeal. He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after
considering the value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor,
time, and trouble involved, and his professional character and social standing; that at
the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to the contents
of the complaint, which did not mention anything about any consignation;8 and that
Arnulfo, being a retired school principal, was a learned person who would not have
easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted against him.
Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal more credible
than the testimony of Atty. Ricafort, observing:
Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog
and his collaborating witness, we find their statements to be credible.
Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount of P65,000.00 was
paid to him by the complainant as acceptance fee on a package deal basis and under
said deal, he will answer the filing fee, attorneys fees and other expenses incurred
up to the time the judgment is rendered. He presented a transcript of stenographic
notes wherein it was stated that complainant himself did not consign the money in
court. The respondent admitted in his testimony that he did not have any retainer
agreement nor any memorandum signed or any receipt which would prove that the
amount of P65,000.00 was received as an acceptance fee for the handling of the case.
Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer agreement and that he issued
only receipt because the late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued.
The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent "Basically you describe that
thing that will happen in the litigation related to the payment of fees. But when you
received that P65,000.00 did you not put anything there that you will describe the
nature of legal work which you will undertake considering that you have considered
thisP65,000.00 as your attorneys fees? And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not
know why they were not showing the receipt. That is a big amount, Your Honor.
They demanded for me the receipt of P30,000.00 how much more with
that P65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of that P65,000.00 but I cannot
explain the reason why
During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned Commissioner also asked Atty.
Ricafort why he did not answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and the
proof of service of the said letter was presented by the complainant. Conveniently,
Atty. Ricafort stated that he did not receive the letter and it was received by their
helper who did not forward the letter to him. He also adopted the position that the
complainant was demanding the P65,000.00 wherefore this case was filed. When
confronted by the testimony of Mr. Vidal Miralles, the respondent Atty. Ricafort just
denied the allegation that he received the P65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also
denied that Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for follow-up the reimbursement.
Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules
16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his
dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them.
The main defense of the respondent is that the complainant in this case testified that
the total amount to redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked whether he
consigned the money to the court to redeem the property he answered in the
negative.
The alleged payment of P65,000.00 was made prior to the said testimony sometime
in 1992. Hence, it was stated on complainants affidavit that on November 7, 1992,
prior to filing said complaint I had given him the sum of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
to be deposited to the Regional Trial Court representing redemption money of the
Real Estate Mortgage. The amount of P65,000.00 is very much close to the amount
of the principal obligation of the complainant and it is not surprising for a nonlawyer to hold on to the belief that with the filing of the case for annulment of
foreclosure his case would be strengthened by making a deposit in court hence, the
motivation to produce the deposit was logical and natural insofar as the complainant
is concerned. The testimony of the complainant in court that the bank
needed P240,000.00 for the redemption of the property will have no bearing on the
actuation of the complainant who has been required to deposit P65,000.00 by his
lawyer. The Undersigned Commission has no alternative but to believe in the
credibility and truthfulness of complainants narration that of Mrs. Erlinda Tarog and
Vidal Miralles.10
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVI2004-473,11 resolving to return the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification
of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00 had
been in payment of attorneys fees and other expenses.
upon the client to demand for a receipt;"15 that considering that the Tarogs had
produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection
with their appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for attorneys fees had been made
at the time when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC; that the testimonies
of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with Arnulfos affidavit; and that he did not
receive Arnulfos demand letter, which was received by one Gemma Agnote (the
name printed on the registry receipt), whom he did not at all know.
Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the P65,000.00 from the Tarogs. Even so, we have
two versions about the transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs insisted that the
amount was to be consigned in court for purposes of their civil case; on the other
hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his fees under a "package deal"
arrangement.
Acting on Atty. Ricaforts motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors
downgraded the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension,16 thus:
We hold that Commissioner Reyes appreciation of the facts was correct and in
accord with human experience.
Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the Tarogs on the need for
that amount to be deposited in court for purposes of their civil case. Being nonlawyers, they had no idea about the requirement for them to consign any amount in
court, due to the substantive and procedural implications of such requirement being
ordinarily known only to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricaforts
representations about the requirement to consign that amount in court was entirely
understandable in view of their awareness of Atty. Ricaforts standing in the legal
community of the place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it was not farfetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount close in value to their original
obligation was necessary to be deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering
their property.
Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration,17 assailing the resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to
clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based.
Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by
substantial evidence. However, we impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the
recommended penalty of indefinite suspension, considering that Atty. Ricafort
committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his having been previously
administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was
warned against committing a similar offense.
A.
Version of the complainants was more credible than version of Atty. Ricafort
Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos demand letter was incredible.
He already initially admitted receiving the letter through a househelp.18 His denial
came only subsequently and for the first time through his motion for reconsideration
dated December 30, 2006,19 in which he completely turned about to declare that the
Gemma Agnote who had received the letter was unknown to him.20 Expectedly,
Commissioner Reyes disregarded his denial, because not only was the denial an
apparently belated afterthought, it was even contradicted by his earlier admission of
receipt. In any event, the fact that Gemma Agnote was even the househelp whom
Atty. Ricafort had adverted to becomes very plausible under the established
circumstances.
Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for
the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers
in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the
client to demand for a receipt."21 But such explanation does not persuade us. Ethical
and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue
receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own
records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to
him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was by issuing
and keeping receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
expressly enjoins such accountability, viz:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay yong P65,000.00 na tseke?
Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the
Tarogs. As such, he was burdened with the legal duty to promptly account for all the
funds received from or held by him for them.22
Witness: Opo.
And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the P65,000.00 was not intended for deposit
in court, Atty. Ricafort insisted that Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the
complaint in the civil action of any mention of consignation. However, the complaint
that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs contradicted his insistence,
specifically in its paragraph 16, which averred the plaintiffs (i.e., Tarogs) readiness
and willingness to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 (inclusive of the redemption
price and interest) in court, thus:
16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the plaintiffs, they are ready and willing
to deposit the amount ofP69,345.00 as redemption price plus reasonable accrued
interests, if there are any; 23
Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong interest sa bank ay ibinigay niya
sa amin ang sabi naming salamat.24
Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for consignation. The
consignation was a notion that could have emanated only from him as their lawyer.
In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty. Ricafort only P60,000.00
for the consignation, but that Atty. Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount.
The excerpt of her pertinent testimony follows:
Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you stated that your late husband
and Mr. Vidal Miralles went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter that we
already had the sum of P65,000.00 in the form of check, how did you come to know
this fact?
Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng P65,000.00 tapos
may P60,000.00 kami sabi niya dagdagan niyo ng konti.
Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo?
Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari doon sa tseke na idiniposit?
B.
Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary
duties as an attorney
The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and
good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship.25 In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of
his clients that came into his possession,26 and he needed to be always mindful of the
trust and confidence his clients reposed in him.27 Thus, having obtained the funds
from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation
to deliver such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon
demand.281avvphi1
Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an
attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from
his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit:
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under
the respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would
prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a responsibility to account
for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For
him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent
of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the
memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted
a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to
render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the
particular purposes intended.29 He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the
moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients
trust reposed in him.30 He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the
moneys for the purposes intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys
to his clients.31
Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered
him liable for violation of Canon 16,32 particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon
17,33 all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations
constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that
impaired public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment.34
Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricaforts acts and conduct as gross
misconduct, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
xxx
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
xxx
That this offense was not the first charged and decided against Atty. Ricafort
aggravated his liability. In Nuez v. Ricafort,35 decided in 2002, the Court found him
to have violated Rules 1.0136 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.0337 and Rule 12.0438 of Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to his failure to turn over
the proceeds of the sale of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell
the realty in her behalf). His failure to turn over the proceeds compelled the
complainant to commence in the RTC a civil action to recover the proceeds against
him and his wife. The
Court meted on him the penalty of indefinite suspension, and warned him against the
commission of similar acts, stating:
We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and
approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo
Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the
record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion
that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and
committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her
property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court
for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time
and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint
resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the
Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the
docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the
travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully
belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully
done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution.
But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly
malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully
adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the
checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of
paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought
complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed
on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29
February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their
maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v.
Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon,
337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he
miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza,
328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution
for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends
of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial
processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to
uphold.39
Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering that the penalty for
violation of Canon 16 ranges from suspension for six months,40 to suspension for one
year,41 to suspension for two years,42 depending on the amount involved and the
severity of the lawyers misconduct, we rule that disbarment is the commensurate
punishment for Atty. Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his handling of trust
funds for his clients.
WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation
of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant is directed to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00
and P15,000.00, plus interest of six percent per annum reckoned from the demand
made on December 3, 2002, within twenty days from notice.
This decision is effective immediately.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference.
SO ORDERED.
x-----------------------------------------x
R ES OLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to
CARPIO,
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009
(emphasis supplied)
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
Fe Marie L. Labiano
and circulation of the said calling card.[7]
Paralegal
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
[8]
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]
CPR provides:
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL
SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED
AND
OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
provides:
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise
their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of
the bar is called.[14]
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)
[17]
the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
referrals suits.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only
exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
(such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash
bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
of Court.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that
the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure
a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by
his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
[20]
Again the
fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may
only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice
of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.
[24]
(a)
lawyers name;
(b)
(c)
address;
(d)
(e)
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this reason, lawyers are
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
-versus-
Antecedents
Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a parcel
of land situated in Butuan City in their lifetimes. They died without leaving a will.
Their land was thereafter expropriated in connection with the construction of the
Bancasi Airport. An expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was to
be paid to their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the
compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Pazs granddaughter and son.[2]
On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty,
deceit, conversion, and breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993,
she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in
On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.[6]
collected; that in November 1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the
ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would
beP75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed
Navarro) rendered a report,[7] whereby she found and recommended against Atty.
to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; that on June 5, 1995,
Reyes as follows:
Atty. Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO; that Bayonlas
share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be P109,007.20, but Atty.
Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the balance
of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving her of her just
share.[4]
In her comment dated February 10, 1998, [5] Atty. Reyes admitted that
Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her legal services for the purpose of collecting
their share in the expropriation compensation; that as consideration for her services,
Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had
given to Bayonla more than what had been due to her; that Alfredo had received
from the ATO the check for the second release corresponding to the share of both
Bayonla and Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the second
release; that on June 5, 1995 she had received out of the second release by the ATO
only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed to bear the
expenses for the collection of their share; that she had incurred travel and other
expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be absolved from liability
arising from the complaint.
On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report of Commissioner Navarro through Resolution No. XIII-99-165.[8]
Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on September 27, 1999 the IBP
Board of Governors denied her motion for reconsideration through Resolution No.
XIV-99-117.[9]
Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for reinvestigation. However, through its
As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban, complainant herein
should have been advised by the respondent and given a
breakdown of whatever amount was received or came to her
knowledge as complainants counsel. Short of the foregoing,
respondent violated Rule 16.01 Canon 16 Chapter III of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; to wit:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Respondent was given a chance to rectify whatever errors or
misgivings (sic) she had done for her client but she unfortunately
failed to do so and did not comply with the Order dated October
29, 1998.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned
respectfully recommends that the respondent be required to render
an accounting or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant of
all the collected shares due the complainant and remit to the latter
the said amount of P44.582.66;
Until such time that respondent had complied with the
aforementioned, she is suspended from the practice of her legal
profession.
Respectfully submitted.
Resolution No. XV-2001-111 adopted on July 28, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors
denied the motion for reinvestigation for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the matter
had already been endorsed to the Court.[10]
On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP Board of Governors to report
on whether Atty. Reyes had already accounted for and remitted the amount
of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[11]
On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors informed the Court that
per the manifestation of Bayonlas counsel Atty. Reyes had not yet rendered an
accounting and had not yet remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[12]
Through her manifestation dated September 4, 2002 to the Court, [13] Atty.
Reyes posed some queries, as follows: (a) whether she could be compelled to pay the
amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla even if the latters claims had been based on
perjured statements; (b) whether the payment of the amount would operate to dismiss
the estafa case previously filed by Bayonla against her for allegedly failing to deliver
the balance of Bayonlas share; and (c) whether she could deposit the amount
of P44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of Governors or the Court.
Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that the IBP Board of Governors
money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon
did not accord to her the right to confront Bayonla during the investigation
16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
conducted by the IBP Board of Governors; that Bayonlas counsel had induced
due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or the lawyers option
Bayonla to file the estafa charge against her; and that this had prompted her to
to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the
final resolution of this case. [15] The recommendation was noted by the Court on June
lawyer and her client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of
29, 2010.[16]
fidelity and good faith. There is no question that the money or property received by a
lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter.[17] Conformably with these canons
Issue
obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by
the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.[18]
Ruling
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount
of P84,852.00 out of the first release, and the amount ofP121,119.11 out of the
second release. Her total share from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty.
Reyes being entitled to P82,388.44 as attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of
Bayonlas share, the net share of Bayonla was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually
I
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated
II
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle
to administrative proceeding against respondent
the aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla
was unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client.
[21]
The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes against Bayonla and of
the estafa charge by Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of
Atty. Reyes to render an accounting and to remit the amount due to Bayonla. Nor did
the pendency of such cases inhibit this administrative matter from proceeding on its
due course. It is indisputable that the pendency of any criminal charges between the
lawyer and her client does not negate the administrative proceedings against the
lawyer. We explained why in Suzuki v. Tiamson,[23] to wit:
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition
in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice
versa. In this light, we refer to this Courts ruling in Berbano vs.
Barcelona, citing In re Almacen, where it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
[they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.
We do not consider Atty. Reyess contention valid. She was accorded full
due process, for she in fact participated in all stages of the proceedings.
It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or suspended from the practice
Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian Promotions Talents
Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza [24] that
of law until she has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the
charges against her, to produce witnesses in her behalf, and to be heard by herself or
counsel.[26] Contrary to Atty. Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of Governors
was under no legal obligation to conduct a trial-type proceeding at which she could
have personally confronted Bayonla. In other words, the lack of such proceeding
neither diminished her right to due process nor deprived her of the right. A formal
investigation entailing notice and hearing is required in administrative proceedings
for disbarment, but the imperative need of notice and hearing does not always mean
the holding of an adversarial trial-type proceeding. Due process is still satisfied
when the parties are afforded the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
evidence in support of their respective sides. [27] As the Court said in Samalio v. Court
administrative case, even if the charges and the evidence to be adduced in such cases
of Appeals:[28]
are similar, does not result into or occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or
deprivation of due process to the parties in either of the cases.[25]
III
No denial of due process to respondent
Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her right to due process because
the IBP Board of Governors did not permit her to personally confront the
complainant.
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite
demand of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a
client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years. In Almendarez, Jr.
v. Langit,[33] the lawyer who withdrew the rentals pertaining to his client
totaling P255,000.00 without the knowledge of the client and who ignored the
demand of the client to account for and to return the amount was suspended from the
practice of law for two years. In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[34] the lawyer
received P155,000.00 from the adversary of his clients as partial payment of a final
and executory decision in favor of the clients pursuant to a secret arrangement
between the lawyer and the adversary, and deposited the amount to the lawyers
personal bank account without the knowledge of the clients; the lawyer thereafter
refused to surrender the money to his clients. The suspension of the lawyer for two
years from the practice of law was ordered by the Court. In Small v. Banares,[35] a
similar penalty of suspension for a period of two years from the practice of law was
imposed on a lawyer who had failed to file a case for the purpose of which he had
received
an
amount
of P80,000.00,
and
to
return
the
amount
upon
demand. In Barcenas v. Alvero,[36] the Court suspended for a period of two years from
the practice of law a lawyer who had failed to immediately account for and to
returnP300,000.00 received from a client for the purpose of depositing it in court,
after the lawyer had been found not to have deposited the money in court.
Navarros report (and its recommendation), Atty. Reyes was still afforded the fair
opportunity to challenge the adverse findings by filing her motion for
reconsideration, although such motion was ultimately resolved against her.[32]
Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had striking resemblance with the
sins thus sanctioned in the aforementioned precedents, the proper penalty for her is
suspension from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar
IV
Sanction
complete written accounting and inventory of: - (a) the amounts she had collected
which the IBP Board of Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution.
from the Air Transportation Office as expropriation compensation; (b) the total
amount due to the complainant; (c) the total amount she had actually remitted to the
exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts silence
complainant; and (d) the amount she had deducted as her contingent fee vis--visthe
about the respondent lawyers legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be
complainant.
both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the
clients funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding
Within the same period of compliance, Atty. Reyes shall submit to the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, authentic written proof that her
liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the
from June 22, 1997, the date when she was formally charged with disbarment. This
rate of interest was prescribed by the Court in Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit and Small v.
Banares.
Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts and to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, with a copy of it to be included in Atty. Reyes file in the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court FINDS
AND
PRONOUNCES ATTY.
PURITA A. REYES guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the practice of
law for a period of two years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with warning
that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
VITUG, J.:
The petition for disbarment filed by J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises,
Inc. ("Mercado and Sons"), and the spouses Jesus K. Mercado and Rosario P.
Mercado against Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera and Atty. Jose Rongkales Bandalan, the
former Regional Trial Court Judge of Davao City, Branch 14, is an offshoot of Civil
Case No. 17215, an action for "dissolution/liquidation of conjugal partnership,
accounting, support with supportpendente lite, annulment of contract, reconveyance
or recovery of possession of conjugal share, partition, damages, and attorneys fees"
filed by Rosario P. Mercado ("R. Mercado") against Jesus K. Mercado ("J.
Mercado"), Mercado and Sons, and Standard Fruits Corporation ("Stanfilco"). The
case was assigned to the sala of then Judge Bandalan. Representing R. Mercado was
Atty. De Vera.
On 15 December 1986, Judge Bandalan decided the case in favor of R. Mercado. She
was awarded the sum of a little over P9 million. On 19 December 1986, J. Mercado
and Mercado and Sons filed a timely notice of appeal. Stanfilco, for its part, filed a
motion for reconsideration. On 05 January 1987, Judge Bandalan granted the motion
for execution pending appeal filed by Atty. De Vera. On even date, the judge likewise
granted Atty. De Vera's "motion to note plaintiffs counsel's statement of claim of
Attorney's lien (charging and retaining) and motion to direct Provincial Registry of
Deeds of Davao to annotate such liens on the certificates of titles of (the) Mercado
spouses." On 12 January 1998, a writ of execution was issued. Two days later or on
14 January 1987, notices of garnishment under execution pending appeal were
served by Sheriff Aquillo Angon on the respective managers of RCBC, Claveria,
Davao City; RCBC, Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Traders Royal Bank, City Hall Drive,
Davao City; and Traders Royal Bank, R. Magsaysay Ave., Davao City. It would
appear that a total amount of P1,270,734.56 was garnished.1wphi1.nt
On 26 February 1987, R. Mercado terminated the services of Atty. De Vera, offering
the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She, at the same time,
demanded an accounting and the turn-over of the money still in the possession of
Atty. De Vera. The latter refused to heed the demand, claiming that pursuant to the
decision, he should, in fact, be entitled to P2,254,217.00 by way of attorney's fees.
Failing to recover what she had felt was lawfully due to her, R. Mercado filed
disbarment proceedings against Atty. de Vera. The matter was initially referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation;
however, upon the approval and implementation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, the case was transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") and
assigned to Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda.
Assailing the conduct of the proceedings, Atty. De Vera filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, docketed G.R. No. 96333, to
enjoin Commissioner Pineda from continuing with the investigation. The petition
was dismissed by the Court, in its resolution 1 of 02 September 1992, and
Commissioner Pineda was directed to proceed and to submit his report to the Court
within ten (10) days from notice. Prior to his receipt of the resolution, however,
Commissioner Pineda had ceased to be the IBP hearing officer; consequently, the
case was re-assigned to Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose.
Noting that the proper forum of complaints against Justices and judges of lower
courts is the Supreme Court, Commissioner Jose dismissed the case against Judge
Bandalan for lack of jurisdiction. In his report, dated 04 November 1992,
Commissioner Jose recommended the dismissal of the disbarment case "without
prejudice to the rights of the parties to ventilate the question of attorney's fees that
should be due to Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera before the proper forum." It would appear
that a clarificatory addendum report, dated 06 December 1993, was later submitted
by Commissioner Jose.
Meanwhile, on 23 March 1993, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No.
X-93-41 recommending to the Supreme Court the suspension of Atty. De Vera from
the practice of law for one (1) year and dismissing the case against Judge Bandalan
for lack of jurisdiction. This action of the IBP Board of Governors prompted Atty. De
Vera to file Administrative Case No. 4438 seeking the disbarment of Attorneys
Mervyn G. Encanto, Numeriano G. Tanopo., Jr., Jose Aguila Grapilon, Beda G.
Fajardo, Rene C. Villa, and Carmen Leonor P. Mercado-Alcantara for grave
misconduct, violation of the lawyer's oath, and malpractice. Atty. De Vera averred
that the resolution of 23 March 1993 was not formally discussed, deliberated upon,
actually adopted nor passed upon during, and before the expiration of, the term of
office of the members of the IBP Board of Governors. He also accused Atty.
Alcantara of conspiring with the IBP officers in the preparation, rendition and release
of the resolution, citing the latter's motions for early resolutions filed on 12 October
1993 and 26 July 1994. He, finally, alleged that a copy of the resolution was sent to
him only on 09 June 1995.
Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo, Jr., explained that Resolution No. X-93-41 was adopted
at a special meeting convened on 23 March 1993 by Executive Vice President
Mervyn Encanto during which Governors Jose Aguila Grapilon, Ma. Zita C. Valera,
Beda G. Fajardo, Rene C. Villa and Teodoro D. Nano, Jr., were in attendance. The
resolution was placed in the charge of the Directorate for Bar Discipline for the
procurement of the signatures of the members of the IBP Board of Governors. Since
the members from the nine different IBP regions would normally visit the National
Office only once a month, it was not unusual for the signing of resolutions to take
place a month or so following board meetings. The adoption of the assailed
resolution, according to Atty. Tanopo, had no taint of irregularity at all, asserting that
the term of office of the aforenamed members of the Board of Governors expired
only on 30 June 1993. Atty. Tanopo himself expressed surprise why the "Addendum
Report," dated 06 December 1993, had surfaced nine months after the adoption of
the resolution of the Board of Governors in A.C. No. 3066. He explained that the
newly-elected members of the IBP Board of Governors, in a special meeting held on
18 December 1993, noted that "the previous Board under President Tanopo already
rendered a decision in the above-entitled case as embodied under Resolution No. X93-41 dated March 23, 1993, except that the same has not been forwarded to the
Supreme Court inasmuch as some members of the previous Board had not affixed
their signatures on the copy of the decision." Hence, he said, Resolution No. XI-93170 was passed directing Governor Agustinus Gonzaga, Chairman of the Committee
on Bar Discipline, "to require the members of the immediately preceding Board of
Governors to affix their signatures on their decision in the above-entitled case," and
that, therefore, it was not possible for Atty. De Vera to be informed sooner of the
resolution of his case.
Attorneys Mervyn G. Encanto, Jose Aguila Grapilon, Beda G. Fajardo, Rene C. Villa
and Ma. Zita C. Valera added that the adoption of Resolution No. X-93-41 was duly
taken up and considered in the Special Meeting held on 23 March 1993. Attorneys
Grapilon, Tanopo, Encanto and Fajardo were able to sign the resolution before the
expiration of their term on 30 June 1993. Atty. Valera affixed his signature in the
early part of 1994 while Atty. Villa also did so sometime in October 1994 or
thereabouts. Attorneys Estenzo and Nano were unable to sign the resolution at all.
Atty. Encanto said that he could not have given a copy of the resolution to Atty. De
Vera when the latter went to his office in May 1994 since the resolution was not yet
ready for release at the time nor could he then discuss the matter with Atty. De Vera
because of the rule on confidentiality of pending proceedings.
Atty. Alcantara, in her case, denied the charge that she had conspired with the IBP
officers in the issuance of the IBP Board resolution and pointed out that the motions
for early resolution she filed would show nothing more than an adherence to the
regular procedure adopted in resolving A.C. No. 3066.
Atty. De Vera, in his reply, contended that the Minutes could not be taken to be a true
and faithful recording of the proceedings. He cited, for instance, the absurdity that
while on page four thereof, the minutes indicated that Commissioner Plaridel Jose
was asking for thirty days from 21 October 1992 within which to submit his report in
A.C. No. 3066, Resolution No. X-93-37 approved the request granting
Commissioner Jose a period of thirty days from 21 October 1993 within which to
submit the report. For another, the request for extension of time to submit the report
was granted on the same day the report was taken up. He likewise questioned why
the IBP Board of Governors evidently failed to consider that Commissioner Jose had
actually submitted two reports.
course, entitled him to take proper legal steps in order to recover what he might feel
to be his just due but, certainly, it was not a matter that he could take into his own
hands.
The Court is not prepared to conclude, however, that the circumstances detailed by
the IBP would create an impression, as so suggested in the resolution of 23 March
1993, that respondent lawyer somehow had much to be responsible for in the turn of
events that led to his possession of the funds of his client. In any event, the proven
actuations of Atty. De Vera, in the view of the Court, would sufficiently warrant a
commensurate disciplinary action.
In A.C. No. 4438
A close review of the IBP proceedings, substantially reflected in the Minutes of
Meeting of the Board of Governors, would indicate to the Court that no serious
irregularity attended the adoption of Resolution No. X-93-41 insofar, particularly, as
it recommended the suspension of Atty. De Vera from the practice of law.
Respondents were able to adequately show why the assailed resolution of the Board
of Governors' recommendation could not have been accomplished on the same day
of the meeting. Evidently; it was not an uncommon practice for board resolutions to
be signed on different dates by the members of the Board of Governors. While
Resolution No. X-93-41 had been signed by some of the previous members of the
Board of Governors after the expiration of their term of office, the action attested to
by the resolution, nevertheless, would unquestionably disclose that it was adopted
during their tenure. In fact, the succeeding members of the Board of Governors
affirmed, in their meeting of 18 December 1993, that the "previous Board . . . already
rendered a decision . . . as embodied under Resolution No. X-93-41 dated March 23,
1993 . . . " but that only some members of the previous Board had yet to affix their
signatures thereat. There might have been some inconsistencies in the assailed
minutes of the meeting of the Board of Governors, but these incongruences hardly
would establish convincingly, a concerted effort on the part of respondents to
manipulate the outcome of the case against Atty. De Vera.
The charge against Atty. Alcantara likewise has nothing much to stand on. The
allegation that she has been bragging about the fact that she could have Atty. De Vera
disbarred because of her influence in the IBP is not substantiated. Her motions for
the early resolution of the case, after the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution
No. X-93-41, only confirm the long delay in the release of the resolution and, indeed,
her apparent lack of knowledge of the final resolution theretofore reached by the
Board of Governors.
THIRD DIVISION
[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]
DOMINADOR
P. BURBE, complainant,
MAGULTA, respondent.
vs. ATTY.
ALBERTO
C.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both
cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client
relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other
disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe
with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the
following:
xxxxxxxxx
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,
sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law
Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to
legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties
for breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the
demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly
paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty.
Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently
drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4,
1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the
Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had
already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from
Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented
his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every
time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the
court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even
brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00
p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the
building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk
of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of
Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to
the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to
personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at
all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification
dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie
to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only
when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to
appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks,
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the
allegations of complainant for being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had
allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the formers law partners. After
their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill
Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre,
one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested
that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer,
complainant asked the process server of the formers law office to deliver the letter to
the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour
meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of
compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He
was also requested by complainant to do the following:
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000]
TEODORO R. RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and
FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.
R ES OLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Sergio Angeles on the grounds of Deceit and
Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint[1] reads as follows:
1.....The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q13128 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon
City;
2.....Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and
his office is located at Suite 335, URC Building, 2123 Espaa, Manila;
3.....That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973
and sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias
writ of execution was issued in said cases;
4.....That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a
sheriffs return, dated November 10, 1982, stating that no leviable
property can be found in the premises of the defendants;
5.....That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M.
Silva, one of the defendants in said cases had already given Atty.
Angeles a partial settlement of the judgment in the amount of
P42,999.00 (as evidenced by xerox copies of Partial Settlement of
Judgment dated September 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated
September 22, 1982, hereto attached as Annexes A and B,
respectively), without our knowledge.
6.....That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the
amount of P42,999.00 he received from Mr. Silva nor remitted to them
even a part of that amount;
7.....That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was
received by him on February 17, 1983, but as of this date the
undersigned have not yet received any reply. (See Exhibit C and D
attached).
appear on the scheduled hearings. However, the records from said Office
do not show any resolution.
In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an
Order requiring the parties to manifest whether or not they are still
interested in prosecuting this case, or whether supervening events have
transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise. The
copy of said Order sent to the complainants was received by their counsel
on October 30, 1998 while the copy to the respondent was returned
unclaimed.
Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report
on April 29, 1999 finding respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Rule 1.01,
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on
June 19, 1999, issued a resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151
Adm. Case No. 2519
Teodoro R. Rivera, et al. vs.
THIRD DIVISION
hearing the following day (8[:]30 o'clock a.m. December 15, 1998)
and further told the [r]espondent that she (Norma Trajano) will
make another partial payment to Primitiva M. Del Rosario and that
she will just leave her payment in the sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand
[five hundred] [p]esos (P16,500.00), Philippine [c]urrency, in the
office of the [r]espondent. Respondent then told Norma Trajano to
inform Primitiva M. Del Rosario first but Norma Trajano replied
that she will just call Primitiva [Del Rosario]. Nonetheless,
[r]espondent told Romeo Jamisola Jr. to call Primitiva Del Rosario,
using the office phone, and let her talk with Norma Trajano, and, if
Primitiva Del Rosario agreed [r]espondent instructed Romeo
Jamisola Jr., to just prepare a receipt. Respondent, fearing that his
case (People vs. Rommel Senadrin et al. above-stated) might have
been called in the calendar, immediately left the office and
proceeded [at] the sala of the Honorable Remigio E. Zari.
Respondent, after the hearing x x x, returned to his office and upon
learning that his signature was affixed by Romeo Jamisola Jr. upon
the insistence of Norma Trajano scolded Romeo Jamisola Jr. and
for his unsuccessful attempt to contact first Primitiva Del Rosario
before receiving the sum of money left by Norma Trajano; Maniks
"4). The following day [o]n the morning of December 15, 1998
[r]espondent arrived at his office and met Primitiva Del Rosario
and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario and immediately the trio
appeared before the sala of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles in the
hearing of the Norma Trajano case. Returning [to] the office of the
[r]espondent after the hearing, Primitiva Del Rosario and Aurora
Del Rosario, being earlier informed that on December 14, 1998
Norma Trajano went [to] his office and made partial payment in
the sum of P16,500 thru Mr. Romeo Jamisola Jr., the [r]espondent
told Mr. Romeo Jamisola to get the money from the filing cabinet
and while the money in the envelope [was] being handed over to
Primitiva Del Rosario, [the latter] and her daughter x x x, however,
told [r]espondent to just let the money in the sum of P16,500.00 be
kept at the office of the [r]espondent so that future payments of
Norma Trajano will be save[d] in whole and for them to avoid
spending the same as what had happened to the past installment
payments of Norma Trajano. Respondent then acceded to the
request of Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter and told them
that they can get the money anytime they want from the
[r]espondent's office. Hence, the money was kept locked [in] the
filing cabinet of the [r]espondent where he used to keep all his
personal file[s]. Manikan
"5). On December 23, 1998, early before noon, Primitiva Del
Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario, on a prior invitation,
attended the Christmas Party of the office of [r]espondent and
undersigned counsel. x x x Respondent, after the x x x lunch,
instructed Mr. Romeo Jamisola Jr., to give the sum of money
(P16,500.00) and for Primitiva Del Rosario to receive the same for
fear of a repetition of a burglary incident before, where some cash
and minor office appliances of undersigned were lost. Primitiva
Del Rosario, however, insisted that said sum of money be kept at
the office of the [r]espondent to save in whole the installment
payments of Norma Trajano and that [was] the wish of her son
Fernando 'Bong' Del Rosario, who is a long time friend and a
compadre of the [r]espondent. Respondent, respecting the trust
reposed upon him by Primitiva Del Rosario, her daughter Aurora
Del Rosario, and son Fernando Del Rosario, acceded to hold in
trust the said sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred
(P16,500.00) [p]esos, Philippine [c]urrency, which [was] locked
and safely kept [in] the filing cabinet of the [r]espondent until
February 12, 1999; x x x;
"6). On February 10, 1999 [during] the hearing of the Norma
Trajano case before the Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, [r]espondent
appeared shortly before 10:30 o'clock in the morning, pursuant to a
'Motion to Call Case at 10:30 o'clock in the Morning x x x.
"7). When the said Norma Trajano [case] x x x was called on
second call at 11[:]25 a.m., [i]n said February 10, 1999 hearing,
respondent was first scolded by the Honorable Court (Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles) x x x [for] giving more preference to the
Metropolitan Trial Court than her Court. Resp[o]ndent, however,
beg[ged the] indulgence of the Honorable Court (Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles) and explained why [he] first attend[ed] the
Mandaluyong hearing of Manny Chua's case, to wit; x x x. Oldmis
o
"8). That it was during the course of [the] litany of sermon, [i]n
that hour, made by the Honorable Court addressed to the
[r]espondent that Norma Trajano x x x butted in and informed the
Honorable Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) that she will be
tendering another partial payment; it was at that moment that Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles asked Norma Trajano how much had she
paid Primitiva Del Rosario, and, Norma [T]rajano answered that
she had already paid P36,500.00 as full payment for one case, and
that of the P36,500, P20,000.00 was paid to Primitiva Del Rosario
and HESITANTLY said that the P16,500 was paid to the
[r]espondent. Judge Angeles then took the receipt from Norma
Trajano and had it xeroxed by a personnel of the Court. The carbon
duplicate original of the Receipt, dated [D]ecember 14, 1998,
showing the receipt by the office of the [r]espondent, through
Romeo Jamisola Jr., whose printed [name] was pre[ceded] by the
word 'By', indicating that he received the sum of money on behalf
of or in representation of the [r]espondent, is hereto [attached] and
marked as ANNEX '5', to form part hereof;
"9). That it was perhaps due to the belief [in] and the immediate
impression of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles [of the] answer of
Norma Traiano that prompted Judge Angeles to ask,
instantaneously in a loud manner, Primitiva Del Rosario IN
TAGALOG', the question, 'NATANGGAP MO BA KAY ATTY.
UY ANG PERA NA P16,500.00?'. Primitiva Del Rosario, a
seventy-year-old, who was shocked by the tone and the manner she
was asked by Judge Angeles simply just answered 'HINDI PO,
KASI GUSTO [KO] PO NA MABUO ANG PERA'. Primitiva Del
Rosario, however, tried to explain her answer 'HINDI PO' and why
she did not yet [receive] the money from the [r]espondent by
raising her hand but was prevented by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles
from further answering by telling Primitiva Del Rosario to stop.
With that answer of Primitiva Del Rosario, [r]espondent butted in
to explain Primitiva Del Rosario's answer of 'HINDI PO' and her
having not yet received the sum of money, subject of the
inquisition of Judge Angeles by manifesting to wit; x x x that
Primitiva Del Rosario did not get the money when x x x handed
the same on December 15, 1998 because she wanted [it] to be
save[d] in whole together with the future installment payments of
Norma Trajano and to be kept in the office of the [r]espondent as
wished by her son Bong Del Rosario; and, that the said sum of
money [was] kept in the filing cabinet in the office of the
[r]espondent. All explanation[s] of the [r]espondent went to x x x
naught as the [r]espondent was cut short by x x x Judge Angeles,
[who] in a loud and angry voice orally directed the [r]espondent to
get the money from [r]espondent's office and give the same to
Primitiva Del Rosario. It was already 11 :45 o'clock in the
morning, more or less, an the [r]espondent was given fifteen (15)
minutes to comply; [r]espondent requested Judge Angeles to be
accompanied by Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora
Del Rosario but both were ordered to stay in court by Judge
Angeles; Ncm
"10). Respondent in compliance with the oral order of Judge
Angeles immediately proceeded [to] his office but only to find out
that Romeo Jamisola Jr., who [held] the only key [to r]esponddnt's
filing cabinet, was on errand x x x that morning of February 10,
1999 [for] Atty. Angel B. De Veyra (the Undersigned Counsel)
[who had sent him] to the offices of the solicitor general in Makati
City, and, the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila to [furnish copies
to] both offices; x x x;
"11). Respondent, expecting that Romeo Jamisola Jr. would
[arrive] before 12[:]00 noon, x x x waited for Romeo Jamisola Jr.
while at the same time called up [his] wife to immediately [come]
to his office to spare the sum of P16,500.00 as Romeo Ja[mi]sola
may not [arrive] [within] the time allotted by Judge Angeles. The
wife of respondent, however, arrived at about 12:25 P .M., more or
less, ahead of Romeo Jamisola Jr. and spared [r]espondent the sum
of P16,500.00 and [r]espondent immediately went [to] the fourth
floor, where the sala of Judge Angeles [was] located but
unfortunately the session was already adjourned. Respondent then
talked to 'Armand', one 'of the court personnel and is known as the
door keeper of the chamber of Judge Angeles, and [requested that
he be allowed to go inside the chamber to show [his] compliance,
though late. Respondent, however, was told by 'Armand' that Judge
Angeles was on her lunch break an that it [was] better for
[r]espondent to take his lunch too and return a little later; Ncmmis
xxxxxxxxx
"In the instant case, Atty. Uy, upon receipt of the P16,500.00 from
the accused in the criminal case, should have promptly remitted the
same to his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Had Judge Angeles not
inquired of the whereabouts of the money, the same would have
remained with Atty. Uy, to the prejudice of the latter's client."[4]
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Scs daad
Respondent maintains that on December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs. Del Rosario
about the payment. He further avers that he kept the money up n her instruction, as
she had allegedly wanted "future payments x x [to] be saved in whole and for them
to avoid spending the same as what had happened to the past installment payments x
x x."[7] This assertion allegedly finds support in her answer to the question of Judge
Angeles, who had asked her whether she had received the disputed payment: "Hindi
po, kasi gusto [ko] po na mabuo ang pera."
The Court is not persuaded. Respondent's assertions are contradicted by the
following transcript of stenographic notes:
"Court: This P16,500, did you turn it over to the private
complainant?
Atty. Uy: No your Honor, because she wanted the full amount of
the settlement.
Court: Private complainant, is it true that you did not want to
accept the money?
Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po, sila po ang nagbigayan. Juris
Court: Hindi po ibinibigay sa inyo ni Atty. Uy?
Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po.
"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client. Sup rema
xxxxxxxxx
Court: Nasaan iyong P16,500? Huwag kayong matakot.
"Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property
coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and
accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him."[6]
In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account
for the P16,500 he had received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client,
Primitiva Del Rosario. Although the amount had been entrusted to respondent on
December 14, 1998, his client revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing that she
had not yet received it. Worse, she did not even know where it was.
Neither are we convinced by the affidavits of Mrs. Del Rosario and her son, both of
whom affirmed their intention to have their money in the safekeeping of respondent.
It should be stressed that he was her counsel and the compadre of her son. Moreover,
the affidavits were executed after the filing of this Complaint. As the Office of the
Bar Confidant observed, these considerations militate against the credibility of the
affiants. In any event, their affidavits fail to explain adequately why Mrs. Del
Rosario, during the hearing on February 10, 1999, did not know where her money
was.
The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the
said amount; in fact, Mrs, Del Rosario acknowledge that she had received it on
February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report
that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional responsibility.
Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia,[9] the Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in
favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to them. In Daroy v. Legaspi,
[10]
the Court held that "lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property
received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct."
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been
prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar.
[11]
In this case, respondent has not done so. Indeed, we agree with the following
observation of the Office of the Bar Confidant:
"Keeping the money in his possession without his client's
knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the tempting opportunity to
appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This
situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar.
Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also appear
clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system would
remain undisturbed."[12]Juris sc
In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into dealings between
attorneys and their clients and to guard the latter from any undue consequences
resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal.[13] The present situation
calls for the exercise of this duty.
For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money they received
on behalf of their clients, some lawyers have been disbarred [14] and others have been
suspended for six months.[15] In the present case, the records merely show that
respondent did not promptly report that he received money on behalf of his client.
There is no clear evidence of misappropriation. Under the circumstances, we rule
that he should be suspended for one month.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .is hereby SUSPENDED for one month. He
is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be served on Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr. at his given address
or any other known one. Copies of this Decision shall also be entered in his record as
attorney and served on the IBP, as well as the Court Administrator who shall
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.