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Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in
March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both
weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of
the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty
herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The
decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to
have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would
prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who
sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her
petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages
from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and
wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and
subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly
support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled

2. Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael Case Digest

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of
two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived
her share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no
children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the
latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room
while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand,
Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument denominated Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila,
who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was
being made in consideration of the faithful services she had rendered over the past ten
years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for
declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages.

Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco,
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco
Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter
vivos is considered null and void.
3. Ayala Investment v. CA, G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1988
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself
jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon PBMs failure to pay the loan, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the loan with interests. Pending the
appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff
caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on
three of their conjugal properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to
AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.
ISSUE: WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
HELD: No. Petition is DENIED.
RATIO: The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Chings family despite their being
stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the
right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a
contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal

4. Go vs CA
Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of Either Spouse

In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their
wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go
said its not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their
honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce
the said wedding video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The
trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k
in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape
because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their
wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said
wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her husband
should not be impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their
claim after the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses
advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to return for two
months. It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the
video coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies
such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event
therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished
and remembered could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was
correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental anguish,
tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under
the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil
Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is
valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation
or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it
was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she
(Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

5. Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972
Concepcion, C.J.
Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with their daughter boarded a PANAM plane
from Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. While on stopover, Mr.
Zulueta found the need to relieve himself and after finding the terminals comfort rooms full,
he walked down the beach to do his business. Meanwhile, the flight was called and Mr.
Zuluetas absence was noticed. Heading towards the ram, plaintiff remarked, You people
almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not
Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however, the airport manager stopped
plaintiff and asked him to surrender his baggages for inspection. Refusing to comply with the
order, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane. His wife and daughter were able to
proceed but were instructed to leave their baggages behind.

Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of damages against respondents for breach
of contract. The defendants, however, maintain that plaintiffs reason for going to the beach
was not to relieve himself but because he had a quarrel with his wife.
Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach of contract.
YES, plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiffs testimony about what he did upon
reaching the beach is uncontradicted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no direct evidence
about said alleged quarrel. If such was true, surely, plaintiff would not have walked back
from the beach to the terminal before the plane had resumed its flight to Manila, thereby
exposing his presence to the full view of those who were looking for him.
Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the bags of plaintiff, it appears that
Captain Zentner received information that one of the passengers expressed a fear of a bomb
on board the plane. As a result, he asked for the plaintiffs bags to verify the bomb.
Nevertheless, this claim is unfounded. The Captain failed to explain why he seemingly
assumed that the alleged apprehension of his information was justified. Plaintiff himself
intimated to them that he was well known to the US State Department and that the Captain
was not even aware of the informants name or any circumstances which may substantiate
the latters fear of a certain bomb.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff was also guilty of contributory negligence for failure
to reboard the plane within the 30 minutes announced before the passengers debarked
therefrom. This may have justified a reduction of the damages had plaintiff been unwittingly
left by the plane, owing to the negligence of PANAM personnel, or even, wittingly, if he could
not be found before the planes departure. It does not, and cannot have such justification in
the case at bar, plaintiff having shown up before the plane had taken off and he having been
off-loaded intentionally and with malice.
With all the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff is entitled to damages from respondent

6. Wong vs. IAC

GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even
during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living
separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of
land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in
June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the
former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the
20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September
1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan
and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her
husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial
court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4
lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the
lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A
month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision
including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through
the conjugal property.
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the
marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan.
Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they
are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living separately. A
wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for
support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the
execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the
latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family.
There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been
transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the
decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses
Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.


Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later,
Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was
his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said property.
Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to
herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of
the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence this case for
the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner was that following
Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the
property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code.
Servacio and Rito countered thatArticle 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the
want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was
valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and
that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that
what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors
were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not
the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale
of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
The appeal lacks merit.

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal
property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied
ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect
to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in
the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas
share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal orabstract quota in Martas share.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the
other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas
share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the
rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery
of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the coowner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as
if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed
and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee
for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be
validly sold to her.


Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM
G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on
Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in
their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City
the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total
of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of
the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due
to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased
even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the
first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to
the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would
be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary.
G.R. No. L-39587
March 24, 1934
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It
was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the
road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the
crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see
an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an
autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted
from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his
horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see
the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black

mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRCs train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every
allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the
cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays
that it be absolved from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors
on said judgement.

WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages


WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages proper
1. Injuries sustained by Lilius
2. for injuries sustained by wife and child
3. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband

HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the sole modification on
interest to be added on the indemnity in favor of Lilius.
1. YES
Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of the
opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant
company alone, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve
as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the necessary
precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees the flagman
and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn
passers-by of the approaching train
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such
diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good

father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the
careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their
work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
2. a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised by
Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to
him by way of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and
author as a result of his illness. As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages
for the loss of his wifes services in his business, which services consisted in going over his
writings, translating them into foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to
the fact that such services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly
income of P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the
effect that he needed them during her illness and had to employ a translator to act in her
b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife in the language of the court, which saw
her at the trial young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead
caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and
that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very
difficult for her to walk, and taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is
the sum adjudicated to her for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.
As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into
consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that
permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently render it
difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her
balance in addition to the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her
matrimonial future.
c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon
common law consortium of his wife, that is, her services, society and conjugal
companionship, as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident
now under consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husbands rights is to count on his
wifes assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the

performance of household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be

more useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring
to become mans equal in all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the
presumption that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children, which the
law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from
deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In the case under
consideration, apart from the services of his wife as translator and secretary, the value of
which has not been proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence showing the existence of
domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it
may serve as a basis in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are
purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to
render, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove
that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would
be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the
person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is
also necessary that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, , contributed to the
It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and
child, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the circumstances
and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his
horn upon seeing persons on the road. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over
the crossing, in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been
free from obstacles, it was because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go
ahead, he did not see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its
existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which he
received of the impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive
immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already become inevitable.
10. GO vs YAMANE



Lot in Baguio City is registered in the name of Muriel Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane.
Atty. De Guzman who handled a case for wife and her sisters levied the said property to
satisfy the lien for attorneys fees.
The RTC of Baguio City held that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of
Muriel Yamane and not the conjugal property of the spouses. Leonardo Yamane, husband
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The case was brought to the Court of
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court contends that,
property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds
of one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose.
Husbands name appeared on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Both documents indicate that Muriel was married to Leonardo Yamane.
Whether the nature of the property is conjugal or paraphernal

Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be
conjugal in nature, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. (Article 160)
The nature of a property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is determined by law and not by
the will of one of the spouses.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one
spouse, unless some advantage of benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on
February 27, 1967, or specifically during the marriage. We then follow the rule that proof of
the acquisition of the subject property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative. It is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains
to the conjugal partnership.
The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appears to
have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her
exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman
to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the
litigation for her and her sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the contested conjugal property. This
piece of land may not be used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not
been shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. In this case, therefore, the property -- being
conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied upon. Petition is DENIED.


11. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder.
Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to
the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil
indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the
levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against
the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on
her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

12. Carlos vs. Abelardo

GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the
$25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October
1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting
their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full
payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned
from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite
settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making
various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the
spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more
than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo
contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on
contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily
deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner,
however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence.
Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque
property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an
instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the
conjugal partnership.


Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same
served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather
a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part
of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount
of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

13. Guiang v. CA
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking
employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang
one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it
stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went back to the
subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable
settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorer end of the bargain,
respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal
property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.
Whether the sale was void or merely voidable and was ratified by the amicable settlement
Respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent
or absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private
respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence
of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.

Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted
and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the
pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against
private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement"
and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however,
does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a
continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the
property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the
acceptance mentioned in Article 124.


G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents
from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After
some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of
payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with
assurance from him that he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on


surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were backing out of the
agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's
written consent.
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers
of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to
sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent
Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been
aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not
sufficient to demonstrate consent.


G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo,
took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a


Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership
thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises
and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents
null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject
of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the
car which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:


ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under
the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common
fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.


The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent
of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the
nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . .

Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other

to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit,
non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the
proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never
claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a


certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his
legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory.

16. Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009

FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on
installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de
Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued
on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold
the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the
written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma
filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa
spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he
was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not
aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed
of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this

ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage
although some installments were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal

HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional
Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to
the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June
22, 1970. This full payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April
24, 1968. In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.



January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action
for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity
under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give
love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family
assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued
upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A
DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147
of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition
and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the
case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x
x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.


18. Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In
1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their
marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that
Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that
matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common
by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing
that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of
the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological
incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages
declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same
may be read consistently with Article 129.
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of


When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by
both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any
party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
latter is judicially declared void.
G.R. No. 151967 :: 16 February 2005 :: Callejo, Sr., J.
Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two parcels of residential land and a
house thereon. The Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of Josefina Castillo Francisco
married to Eduardo G. Francisco. Eduardo had written an Affidavit of Waiver stating that
before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house
constructed thereon, with her own savings and that he was waiving whatever claims he had
over the property. The property was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformity of
When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master
Iron Works, the court issued a writ of execution levying the two parcels of land owned by
Josefina. Before Josefina could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina
filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo on the ground that the latter had a
subsisting marriage to one Carmelita Carpio when the two were married. Said annulment
was granted by the RTC.
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and can not be
held liable for the Eduardos personal obligations.



Although it is true that the properties cannot be held as conjugal for the cohabitation
between Eduardo and Josefina are bigamous, the latter failed to adduce preponderance of
evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject
property and hence, is not a co-owner of such. Also, the Court doubted that when she
acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that
the funds for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the Court believed, was
just an afterthought.

20. ABRENICA VS ABRENICA GR 180572 06.18.12

P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to return partnership funds
representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner
retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash
advance that he obtained.
P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties
belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging
that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be
levied and that it was under their ACP.
A Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the
Ps properties.
*P has been previously married to another woman but their marriage has already been
WON Joena had the right to the claim?
NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As
to one of the children, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special
power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot be
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property
acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Thus, neither these two
vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
Petition denied.

21. Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977.
They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage,


they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal
separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in
2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child
(already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the
innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of
Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial
court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to
define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of
the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET
PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC.
However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples
property relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange
of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the
conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and
industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal
partnership of gains.


G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J
Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC
Negros Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by basis of the
formers psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
praying for distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots
of land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of
land be given to the respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two
houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?


The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However,
there are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As
such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.

23. Fuentes v. Conrado Roca, G.R. 178902, April 2010

FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his
mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes












and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes
spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the
removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged
wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such
tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the
document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed,
Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale
and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario
was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses
claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud
is 4

years from


The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the
testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and






On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not
prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of
Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must
be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was











1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos











2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses



3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action






1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in
the document giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The
SC noted that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which
stated consent was completely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence











2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done
in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal
Partnerships already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal
property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of
the family code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes.
On the argument that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud,
that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have
assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the
action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe





3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a
case to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could
bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above,
that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of
Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of
the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right,
under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

24. Ravina vs Abrille

Mary Ann and Pedro Villa-Abrille were husband and wife. They had four children (herein
respondents). The properties involved in this case are: (1982) Lot 7 acquired by the
spouses during their marriage; Lot 8 acquired by Pedro when he was still single; House
built on lot 7 and 8 built from their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from DBP.
(1991) Pedro got a mistress. Pedro offered to sell the house and two lots to petitioners
Ravina. Mary Ann objected. Pedro still sold the properties without her consent. Pedro, with
the connivance Ravina and some Civilian Armed Forces (CAFGU) transferred all the


belongings from the house to an apartment and prevented Mary Ann and the kids from
entering the house.
Thus, Mary Ann and the children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific
Performance and Damages before RTC Davao. During the trial, Pedro declared that the
house was built with his own money. Petitioner Ravina testified that they bought the house
and lot from Pedro upon examination of the title.
RTC The sale of: Lot 7 void as to representing share of Mary Ann; Lot 8 void as to
representing share of Mary Ann who did not consent; house void as to ; pay Mary Ann the
value of belongings that were lost; pay moral and exemplary damages and the cost of suit.
CA sale of Lot 8 valid; sale of Lot 7 null and void; ordered Pedro to return the value of
the consideration to Ravina; ordered Ravina to reconvey the house and Lot to spouses Pedro
and Mary Ann; ordered Pedro and Ravina to pay Mary Ann moral and exemplary damages.
(1) Whether Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property.
(2) Whether sale of Lot 7 by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent.

(1) Presumed to be Conjugal property of spouses Pedro and Mary Ann.
(2) Annullable with five years
(1) Petitioner Ravina asserts that Lot 7 was exclusive property of Pedro, it being acquired by
Pedro thru barter or exchange with his another exclusive property.
The Court is not persuaded. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property
was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. The
fact is, Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. Likewise, the
house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of
the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Article 160 of
the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
(2) Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and
the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the
Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the


absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that
alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was
with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years
from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years
from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale
pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No.
T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely
without Mary Anns consent.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision
dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: Sale of one spouse of conjugal property with the knowledge of the spouse
sale is null and void; Sale of one spouse of conjugal property with knowledge but without
consent of the other spouse sale is annullable, within five years, by the non-consenting








Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love
and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in
their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was
refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of
the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the
property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their relationship did
not last long and they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner
for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and
a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner
sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the
name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer
and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the
owner thereof.


1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich
who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the
acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three
parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal
constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a
buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation
over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the
fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not
help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but
otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent
was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for
each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in
order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means
of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title
does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has
the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner.

26. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against
her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with Pacita, Procopio
Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties
(subject properties), claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff
Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926.
Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue
City. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in
Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well
as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue
City. Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant,
Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was
the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started
living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from
which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his
illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya.
Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial
courts decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia
and Procopio are conjugal


HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed

RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during
the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting
in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these
are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.

29. G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57402, February 28, 1985
FACTS: Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a businessman engaged in
business as a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging
concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged
primarily in the business of leasing heavy equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the
Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-Tractors under the terms of
which the latter leased to the former tractors for the purpose of constructing switchroads
and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's logging concession at del Gallego,
Camarines Sur. The contract provided for payment of rental for the use of said tractors. Luis
Narciso failed to pay; G-Tractors instituted an action urging Luis to pay a certain amount
(P155,410.25), representing the unpaid rentals. G-Tractors accepted his offer for a
compromise agreement, stating the mode of payment (installment plan); Luis failed to
comply; G-Tractors filed a motion for execution; Luis asked for suspension of the motion
stating that he still has a pending loan with a banking institution; request for suspension
denied. Levy was accordingly made by the City Sheriff of QC on certain personal properties
of the spouses at their residence in Quezon City. Auction sale was held, and G-Tractors was
awarded with the sale of such. Luis then offered to redeem such properties for the same
amount; accepted; a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-Tractors.
On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all rights, interest, title,
participation which the defendant Luis R. Narciso" may have over a parcel of residential land
of the Registry of Deeds of QC which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property of the
spouses Luis and Josefina. Sheriff sold at public auction to the highest bidder for cash.
Certificate of Sale was then issued to G-Tractors as the highest bidder for P180,000.
On March 31, 1976, Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI of Quezon City for "declaration
of nullity of levy on execution and auction sale of plaintiff's conjugal property with damages
and injunction", claiming that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be


made liable considering that the subject matter was never used for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership or of the family

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the
debt of the husband
HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the debt of the
husband. CAs decision reversed and set aside
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where
she may legally bind the partnership

His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use of petitioner's
tractors which he leased for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees
at the jobsite of the logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not his
exclusive property but that of his family. There is no doubt then that his account with the
petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a
commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership.
It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in connection with his
legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited
the conjugal partnership.
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he believes he
is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer alone. So that, if he
incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses
in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and
the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
The sale at public auction belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains of the Narcisos in
order to satisfy the judgment debt of the private respondent Luis R. Narciso was validly and
legally made in accordance with law.