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Nerds Recit-Ready Compilation

Subject: Constitutional Law 1


Date: ___________________
47. LACSON-MAGALLANES V. PAO
Facts:
Jose Magallanes, permittee and actual occupant, ceded his
rights and interest to a portion of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
(public land) in Tamlangon, Basalan, Davao to the plaintiff
corporation, Lacson-Magallanes Co, Inc. The land ceded to
plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture
land and declared agricultural land. Jose Pano and 19 other
claimants applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the ceded
land by Jose Magallanes. Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its
own sales application covering the entire released area. Jose
Pano protested against the plaintiff corporation and claims that
they are actual occupants of the parts thereof covered by their
own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the
conflict, rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiff
corporation. A move to reconsider failed. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, on appeal by Jose Pano,
affirmed the decision of the Director. The case was then
elevated to the President of the Philippines.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President
decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director
of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and :
(1) Declared that it would be for the public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depends on
the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which
they have made
improvements; and
(2) Directed that the controverted land (northern
portion, Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan,
Davao, with Lantian River as the dividing line) should be
subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual
occupants, without prejudice to the corporations right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion.
Issue/s:
W/N the Executive Secretary may, acting by authority of the
President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had
been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources?
Held:
Yes. The plaintiff claim that according to the Public Land Act
the decisions of the Director of Lands as to questions of facts
shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. And that it is controlling
upon the courts and the President. However, the President
naturally controls all of all executive departments. Control
simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.
The plaintiff also submits that the decision of the Executive
secretary herein is an undue delegation of power because it is
the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon
the matter. The court ruled that (1) there are constitutional

powers which the President must exercise in person such as


the following:
o Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to proclaim
martial law [Sec.10(2), Art VII, 1935 Constitution]
o To grant reprieves, commutations and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures [Sec.10(6)]
Also, the President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions.
Under the constitutional setup, the Executive Secretary, who
acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President, has an
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify or even reverse any
order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue.
Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the Executive Secretary is
equal in rank to the other department head as alter egos of the
President. In this case, the Exec Sec cannot intrude into the
zone of action allocated to another department head. The court
ruled that the plaintiff lack appreciation to the fact that the
Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President - his
decision is that of the Presidents. Thus, the court must give
full faith and credit to the decision. Only the President may
rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to
do so.
48. ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO
Facts:
Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc had a
problem of withdrawing their commodities consisting of 1,188
units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by
any Central Bank release certificate and were imported
without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign
exchange.
After failing thus far in all their attempts, the counsel of PepsiCola turned to Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an
attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the
concentrates. Mr. Ang-Angco, seeing perhaps that the
importation did not carry any release certificate from the
Central Bank, advised the counsel to try to secure the
necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office
that had jurisdiction over the case. However, N-Dollar Import
Office wrote a letter to petitioner and said that it did not have
the authority to do what petitioner wanted. Afterwards,
Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by
telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco read to him the
letter after which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval
of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector AngAngco, while still in doubt as to the propriety of the action
suggested, finally authorized the release of the concentrates
upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges,
fees and taxes.
Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release he filed an
administrative complaint against Collector of Customs AngAngco. During the pendency of petitioners administrative
case, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of
the President, rendered a decision on the case on February 12,
1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service", and considering him resigned
effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to
reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs. After exhausting all
the administrative remedies available to him to secure his
reinstatement to the office from which he was removed

without any valid cause or in violation of his right to due


process of law, Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court.
Petitioner contends that there was a violation of due process
and that only the CSC has the power to remove officers and
administer administrative cases.
Respondent contend that, whether the officers or employees
concerned are presidential appointees or belong to the
classified service. If they are all officers and employees in the
executive department, they all come under the control of the
President and, therefore, his power of removal may be
exercised over them directly without distinction.
Issue/s:
W/N the President is empowered by any other law to remove
officers and employees in the classified civil service.
Held:
No. Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code
contains the power of the President
To remove officials from office conformably to law and to
declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For
disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines,
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at
any time remove a person from any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands)
Philippines.
"Conformably to law" is significant. It shows that the
President does not have blanket authority move any officer or
employee of the government but his power must still be
subject to the law that passed by the legislative body. Since
CSC has such law which governs action to be taken against
officers and employees in classified civil service it should be
then stated that the law is binding upon the President.
Section (D) of the Revised Administrative Code Power to
appoint and remove. The Department Head, the
recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or office
concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and
employees appointment is not expressly vested by law in the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines, and may
remove or punish them, except as especially provided
otherwise, in accordance the Civil Service Law.
"In accordance with the Civil Service is also significant. So
we may say that even granting for administrative purposes, the
President of the Philippines is considered as the Department
Head of the Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is
still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959.
In Hebron v. Reyes it was stated that "the [President has] the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter..."to distinguish it from the power of general
supervision over municipal government, but the decision does
not go to the extent of including the power to remove an
officer or employee in the executive department. (Power over
the acts and not the person himself).
President's control over the executive department only refers
to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled
or definite course or method adopted and followed by a
government, body, or individual, and it cannot be said that the
removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of
control over a specific policy of government.

Thus the CSC is given the power over the President primarily
to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to
the classified service. To hold that civil service officials hold
their office at the will of the appointing power subject to
removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and
undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service
System and structure. System will devolve Jacksonian Spoils
System under which a victorious Chief Executive.
49. NAMARCO V. ARCA
Facts:
Respondent Arive was the Manager of the Traffic- Storage
Department of NAMARCO. Pursuant to General Managers
Administrative Order No. 1180, he was investigated by a
committee for violating Management Memorandum Order
directing that the allocation and deliveries of merchandise
imported under the Trade Assistance Program to its designated
beneficiaries be stopped and for causing the improper release
of shipments intended for delivery upon full payment by the
Federation United NAMARCO distributors (FUND). The
committee found Arive guilty, and so the General Manager
issued Admin Order No. 137 holding Arive guilty and
dismissing him from the service. The Board of Directors
adopted Resolution No. 584-60 dismissing him from the
service with prejudice to his reinstatement and to all benefits
he would have been entitled to.
Arive then appealed to the President of the Philippines,
resulting to a decision handed down by Executive Secretary
Ramon Diaz setting aside the Resolution of NAMARCO and
reinstating Arive to his former position. The reason stated was
that the decision of NAMARCO stopping the further delivery
of the commodities had been subsequently declared illegal by
the Supreme Court for violating the contract sale, so it would
be improper to hold Arive liable for his failure to comply with
an illegal order. In addition to that, ,The Pasig River bodegas
being private warehouses could not be controlled and
supervised by Arive, so the release of the commodities cannot
be blocked by him.
NAMARCO filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the
power to remove its subordinate employees through RA 1345
(NAMARCO Charter) belongs to the General Manager with
the approval of the Board of directors, which is not appealable
to any governmental body. The motion was denied, along with
a subsequent motion for reconsideration. NAMARCO failed to
comply with the order to reinstate Arive, despite a complaint
from Arive. The Court in granting the complaint of Arive ruled
that the President has control and supervision over all GOCCs
including NAMARCO, hence he may review or nullify any act
of NAMARCO, and that the right to reinstatement of Arive
appears to be very clear. Thus the present petition filed by
NAMARCO.
Issue/s:
W/N the President has authority to reverse the decision of the
Board of Directors of the NAMARCO and to order the
reinstatement of Arive.
Held:
Yes. The Court rules that the President can review and reverse
the decision of NAMARCO, and to order his reinstatement for
it falls within the constitutional power of the President over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. NAMARCO is

administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office


of Economic Coordination, who shall be responsible to the
President. In invoking the NAMARCO charter stating that the
decision shall be conclusive, it does not mean that the decision
to remove a subordinate employee is not appealable to the
President. The President can modify or nullify an act of a
subordinate officer done in the performance of his duties. As a
Presidential type of government, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
department. In addition to that, the right to reinstatement of
Arive is clear for being unable to comply with an illegal order
by NAMARCO. Wherefore, petition dismissed.
50. DE LEON V. CARPIO
Facts:
Francisco R. Estavillo (Agent III) and Cesar de Leon (Head
Agent) of the NBI were terminated by then Minister of Justice
Neptali Gonzalez. Both appealed to the Review Committee
(EO 17) but the body to decline to act their petitions--lost
control because of ratification of new constitution. They then
moved the case to the Civil Service Commission wherein the
Merit Systems Protection Board sustained their pleading
insofar as their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional
having been violated the security of tenure under the 1987
Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their
reinstatement. However, respondent Carpio, as Director of
NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to
CSC without action, claiming that they were null and void
for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Undersec. Justice Montenegro referred the order reinstating
Estavillo to NBI and also Undersec. Justice
Bello III referred order to reinstate De Leon to the NBI.
Reaction of respondent NBI was to refer to the CSC, claiming
that the said orders were null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
Issue/s:
W/N the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit order
issued by the Sec. of Justice.
Held:
No. It is an elementary principle of our republican
government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in
the breach but in the observance, that all executive
departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines.
The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The
constitutional vesture of this power in the President is selfexecuting and does not require statutory implementation, nor
may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature.
The President has full control of all the members of his
Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at
pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments and replace them in his discretion. In Noblejas
v. Salas the court held that the fiscal was bound to obey the
order of the Sec. of Justice who was exercising over him the
Presidents constitutional power of control. His acts should

therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of


the NBI.
In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed
the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was
acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego
of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected
by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the
Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary.
As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and
is) bound to obey the Secretarys directives, which are
presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The respondent
is hereby ORDERED to immediately reinstate the petitioners
as directed by the Secretary of Justice in implementation of the
challenged orders of the Merit Systems Protection Board of
the Civil Service Commission. No costs.
51. BLAQUERA V. ALCASID
Facts:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to 30% of the employees one month basic salary
but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO
provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be
granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of
agencies, including government boards of government-owned
or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are
strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result
of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of
the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive
benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount
of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of
AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits
without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29
directed all departments, offices and agencies which
authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the
year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the
refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned caused
the deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the
amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
Issue/s:
W/N AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of
presidential control over the executive departments.
Held:
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power
and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His
power includes the control of executive departments as
provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of
control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision

of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or


offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive
benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from
granting incentive benefits without approval from him and
directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount,
the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel by committing limited resources of government for
the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was
only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of
the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from
the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional
origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.
52. DADOLE V. COA
Facts:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the
Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to RTC
and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of
P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities,
respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional
monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000
each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they
received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
Issue/s:
W/N Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President.
Held:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of
1987
Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. x x x" The said
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are
merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are subject to
the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the
local governments or their officials were performing their
duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at
whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or
their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.
They are subject to the President's supervision only, not
control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the
affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter
has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's
supervisory powers over LGUs.
53. DENR V. DENR EMPLOYEES
Facts:
The Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region 12
issued a memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the

DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal


Cotabato. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Executive Order issued by the DENR secretary. Repondents
filed with the RTC a petition for nullity of the order with
preliminary injunction. RTC ruled in favor of respondents
because of procedural matters. Hence this petition. Petitioner
prays for a liberal application of procedural rules considering
the greater interest of justice. (which was granted in the ruling
obviously).
Issue/s:
W/N DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the
DENR Region 12 Office.
Held:
Yes. Under the Qualified Political Agency Doctrine: All
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive;
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
However, as head of the Executive Department, the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory)
powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by
the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally.
President may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts
personally. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency,
the power of the president to reorganize the national
government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members
exercising control over a particular executive department.
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize
the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The
exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter
ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter
had not expressly repudiated the same.
54. JOSON V. TORRES
Facts:
Respondent Torres filed a complaint against Petitioner
Governor Joson before the Office of the President for barging
violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan with the company of armed men. The case was
endorsed to the DILG. Petitioner was declared in default and
ordered the petitioner 60- day preventive suspension for
failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions.
Petitioner later filed a Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation. DILG denied the motion declaring that the
submission of position papers substantially complies with the
requirements of procedural due process in administrative
proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of

the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the


DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty
of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.
Petitioner argues that there is an undue delegation of power to
the DILG and that his motion shouldnt be dismissed because
of the submission of position papers.
Issue/s:
W/N the resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground
of undue delegation, that it is the President who is the
Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG.
Held:
No. The DILGs delegation of power is valid. The President
remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to
discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived
from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against
local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates
the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner
Josons claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency ...which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President
provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very
heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive
Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by
the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of
Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain
matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise
his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time.
Each head of a department is, and must be, the Presidents
alter ego in the matters of that department where the President
is required by law to exercise authority.
55. KMU V. DIR-GEN. OF NEDA
Facts:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420
(EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional. EO 420,
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April
2005, reads: REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
AND GOVERNMENT- OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS TO

STREAMLINE
AND
HARMONIZE
THEIR
IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING
FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
AND
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies
and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems. Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798
allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of
the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420
infringes on the citizens right to privacy. Petitioners in G.R.
No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void because the Executive
has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no
power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation of
the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for
that purpose.
Issue/s:
W/N issuing EO 420 is unconstitutional as it is beyond the
power of the President.
Held:
No. Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All
government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents
shall be covered by this executive order. EO 420 applies only
to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions under existing laws. These government entities have
already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to
adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions
under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs. In short, the purposes of
the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce
costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility,
and provide convenience to the people served by government
entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and
recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific
items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4)
Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8)
Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight;
(12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any
prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and
(14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for
personal identification by government entities, and even by the
private sector. Anyone who applies for or renews a drivers
license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably
more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420
will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in
the ID databases of the government entities. Government
entities cannot collect or record data, for identification
purposes, other than the 14 specific data.
Making the data collection and recording of government
entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will
admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are

savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies,


compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the userfriendliness of a single ID format for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually
limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14
specific items in Sec. 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute
that these government entities can individually adopt the ID
format as specified in Sec. 3 of EO 420. Such an act is
certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards
of the government entities that are already authorized under
existing laws to issue IDs.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be
achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of
agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they
can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format,
especially if the uniform format will result in substantial
savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is
purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the
exercise of legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative
order direct the government entities under the Executive
department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format.
Section 17, Article VII provides for the Presidents power of
control. The same Section also mandates the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of
their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The
Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing
and does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the
Executive branch of government and does not extend to the
Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the
COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to
issue voters ID cards.This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to
establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all
branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating
government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services. The adoption of a uniform
ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is
simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or
repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make,
alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user- friendliness in
the implementation of current ID systems of government
entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an
executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

56. BSP V. COA


Facts:
The Commission on audit issued a Resolution no. 99- 011. The
said resolution stated that the Boy Scouts of the Philippines
(BSP) was created as a public corporation under the
Commonwealth Act. No. 111 amended by P.D. no. 460 and
R.A. No. 7278. With this BSP is said to be put under the
jurisdiction of the COA to be financially audited as it is
classified among government corporations belonging to the
Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector.
BSP claims that it is not subject to audit as (1) it does not have
funds invested in BSP; (2) its assets are acquired from charity
(mostly America); and (3) it finances its operation from
membership dues.
COA commented that BSP is a public corporation (1) under
commonwealth act; (2) its a government agency whose funds
are subjected to audit; and (3) RA 7273 did not change in
character of BSP. Under the BSP charter (commonwealth act
of 111) created BSP as a public corporation for public interest
and purpose. Under administrative code 1987 BSP is classified
as an attached agency whereby there shall be at least one
representative of the government in its governing board,
another provision to be taken into account is article XVII
which bans the creation of "private corporations by special
law.
Issue/s:
W/N BSP is no longer a Government-controlled corporation,
thus Philippine government no longer has control over it and
has no power to be audited under COA.
Held:
No. GOVERMENT STILL HAS CONTROL OVER BSP.
NOT ALL NON GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED
CORPORATION
ARE
IPSO
FACTO
PRIVATE
CORPORATION.
SOME
MAY
BECOME
INSTRUMENTALITY (agency under special charter) OR
CHARTERED INSTITUTION (has some corporate power,
operational autonomy, and can administer special fund). A
government instrumentality is one that has a public
purpose/interest, that is not integrated within the department
framework and endowed with some if not all corporate powers
administering.
In the case at bar, BSP is a public corporation with a public
purpose whereby the purpose is for the wellbeing of youth,
future leader of the country. It is also under the administrative
code of 1987 and includes department of education culture and
sports pursuant to its charter. Thus it does not mean that if a
corporation is not a government owned or controlled then it
automatically means it is a private corporation since under the
Art XII of Sec. 16 that there exist public corporations that are
not judged base on ownership or economic viability.
Additionally, according to The Veterans Federation of the
Philippines v. Reyes, despite the VFP being not granted
government funds by DBM it is not proof that it is considered
then a private corporation. This will not also prevent/preclude
the government from extending financial support to BSP. The
erroneous application as cited in VFP does not bar the
government from correct application of the law. Not being
audited by COA in the past does not also prevent COA from
conducting it in the present.

57. NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LIT. VIRGILIO


Facts:
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of
the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of
Trustees was held to discuss, among others, the evaluation of
the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the
National Artist Award Secretariat.
In a letter submitted to the President it was stated:
We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the
NCCA Board of Trustees and CCP Board of Trustees for the
Proclamation of the following as 2009 Order of National
Artists:
Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) Film and Broadcast
Arts
Dr. RAMON SANTOS Music
Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) Literature Mr.
FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ Visual Arts
The above persons were identified by experts in the various
fields of arts and culture, including living National Artists. An
intensive selection process was observed following established
practice.
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was
referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and
individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco
Manosa and Jose Moreno.
The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these
nominations and invited resource persons to validate the
qualifications and credentials of the nominees. On July 6,
2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring
Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Manosa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists.
Petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition,certiorari and
injunction and claimed that former President MacapagalArroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the
results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the
Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice
for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners,
the Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter
cannot be exercised in the absence of or against the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
Issue/s:
W/N President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening
and selection process for the Order of National Artists.
Held:
Yes, the President abused her discretion.
Limits of the Presidents Discretion
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of
the NCCA Board of Commissioners with respect to the
conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear. They
jointly administer the said award and, upon their
recommendation or advice, the President confers the Order of
National Artists.

To recommend and to advise are synonymous. In


Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, it is stated that the power to
recommend is includes the power to give advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in
character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made.
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National
Artists, the President may or may not adopt the
recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject
to the Presidents discretion.
Assuming that it is a power of discretion, is it a transgression
on Section 17? Under Sec. 17, the President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Thus the power of discretion of President is circumscribed to
faithfully execute the relevant laws such as the NCCA and
CCP boards as NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with
the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive
issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, PD No.
208 dated June 7, 1973 and RA 7356.
The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists
Awards Committee under RA 7356:
The [NCCA] shall coordinate with the national cultural
agencies including but not limited to the Cultural Center of the
Philippines, the Institute of Philippine Languages, the National
Historical Institute, the National Library, the National
Museum, the Records Management and Archives Office.
However, they shall continue operating under their respective
charters or as provided by law where provisions therein are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
The NCCA has been given the following mandate:
1) extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards,
grants and services to artists and cultural groups which
contribute significantly to the Filipinos cultural legacy;
2) Sec. 13. Powers and Functions - (j) advise the President on
matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the
creation of a special decoration or award, for persons who
have significantly contributed to the development and
promotion of Philippine culture and arts
3) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any and all
measures as may be necessary to implement this Act.
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection
with the conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA
and the CCP decided to work together and jointly administer
the National Artist Award.We have held that an administrative
regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of
law and they are binding upon executive and administrative
agencies, including the President himself/herself as chief
executor of laws.
Given everything, what is then the implication of this to the
Committee of Honors within the Office of the President?
Section 2.5(A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003 provides: The existing
modalities of the NCCA for selecting recipients for the Order
of National Artists, and the Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan,
and of the NAST for selecting recipients of the Order of
National Scientists, shall remain in force.
In Section 2.4 it is stated under The Committee on Honors
that - The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards
Committee.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a
screening committee to ensure that nominations received from

the various awards committees meet two tests: that there has
not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and
that the nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination
meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President for
conferment shall be made.
Clearly, the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited to
determining whether the nominations submitted by a particular
awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA and CCP
Boards, have been tainted by abuse of discretion, and whether
the nominees are in good standing. Should the nominations
meet these two criteria, the Committee on Honors shall make a
recommendation to the President for conferment of the Order
of National Artists.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection
process and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully
enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the
matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the
names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards.
Applying this to the instant case, the former President could
not have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Manosa and Moreno, as their names were not
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who
was the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time, the
Guidelines expressly provides: NCCA and CCP Board
members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and
staff are automatically disqualified from being nominated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009
proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Manosa, and Jose Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
58. IBP V. ZAMORA
Facts:
Because of the growing number of criminal incidents around
Metro Manila, then President Estrada gave a verbal directive
to the PNP and Marines to conduct a joint visibility patrols to
prevent and suppress crimes. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the
PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
were tasked to execute and implement the said order. A Letter
of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI) which detailed the manner of
the TASK FORCE TULUNGAN was released by PNP .
The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the Marines
and filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment of the Marines, unconstitutional on the ground
that: (a) There was no emergency situation obtains in Metro
Manila as would justify such deployment (violates Art 2, Sec.
3 of the constitution), (b) Deployment constitutes an insidious
incursion by the military in a civilian function of government
(violates Art. 16, Sec. 5) (c)Deployment creates a dangerous
tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions
of the government. Unwittingly making the military more
powerful than hat it should be under the constitution
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation
exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that
by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law

enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article


II.
Issue/s:
W/N the deployment of the Marines does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian
character of the police force.
Held:
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the
LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds
of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all
times, the real authority belonging to the PNP .
In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of
the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the
LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers
on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct
and manage the deployment of the Marines. Chief of Staff of
the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law
enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in
derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in
these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head
of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Additionally, the Philippine experience
reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the
military in the implementation and execution of certain
traditionally civil functions (e.g. elections, Red Cross,
disaster response, etc.).
59. LACSON V. PEREZ
Facts:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an
angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms,
bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons
assaulting and attempting to break into Malacanang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in
NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a
state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance of
legality to the arrests, the following four relation petitions
were filed before the Court.
Issue/s:
W/N the Court can inquire into factual basis of the state of
rebellion.
Held:
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against
Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a
state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of

powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary


which has the constitutional prerogative to determine or
interpret what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the
general rule on the allocation of governmental powers.
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not
easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since
matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts.
Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use
to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the
evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a
need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a
vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which
may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, onthe-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property.
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is
no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having
been lifted. DISMISSED.
OTHER MATTERS
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of
rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as
having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May
6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila.
Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot
and academic.
As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of
rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has
issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in
connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant
are general instructions to law enforcement officers and
military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed,
as stated in respondents' Joint Comments: already the declared
intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to
obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that
preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted. (In
simple terms, the President still ordered to get Warrants before
any arrest happen).
G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (DefensorSantiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are
under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do
not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of
mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law.
Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods
provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise

the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the


delivery of detained persons.
Should the detention be without legal ground, the person
arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary
detention.
60. SANLAKAS V. EXEC. SEC.
Facts:
The case has its origins in the Oakwood Incident of Rebellion
between 3 junior officers of the AFP-- demanded the
resignation of the President and other executive officials
because of the worsening corruption. Due to this, President
issued Proclamation 427 and General Order 4 both of which
declared a state of rebellion and calling the AFP to suppress
such rebellion. Petitioners assert that the issuance of the
respective Proclamation order 427 and General order 4 is
unconstitutional claimed:
- Section 18 Article 8 of the constitution in so far that it does
not authorize a declaration of a state of rebellion.
- Also they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as the congress
has not delegated any power to the president.
- Also, it was an unwarranted and abuse of power to exercise
martial law.
Issue/s:
W/N the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper.
Held:
According to Article 18 Article 8 of the constitution the
President is granted a sequence of graduated powers: calling
out power, power to suspend and the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and power to declare martial law. The
constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions
namely 1) an actual invasion or rebellion and that 2) public
safety requires the exercise of such power. The Article not
only vests to the president the commander-in-chief power but
also with executive powers. The Commander-in-chief Powers
are broad enough when taken together with the provision on
executive power. Thus, the presidents authority to declare a
state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and draws strength from the commander-in-chief
powers.
The Solicitor-general points out Sec. 4 chapter 2 Book III
(Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987. This provision states that the presidents proclamation
gives notice to the nation that such state exists and that the
AFP may be called upon to prevent or suppress it. Mere
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights. These are purely executive
powers vested on the President by Sec. 1 and 18 Art. 8 as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2) of Article 6.
61. DAVID V. ERMITA
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 and GO No. 6 as
to implement it.
The reasons that the President stated for declaring such
General Order to implement the Presidential Proclamation

were that over the past several months, elements in political


opposition have conspired with extreme left represented by
NDF-CCP-NPA and military adventurists. This presented a
clear danger to the president as political opposition tried to
oust her as president and take over the government. On March
3, Presidential Proclamation 1017 was lifted by President
Arroyo. The Solicitor General defended the basis of President
Arroyo for declaring PP 1017, was that the intent of the
Constitution was to give the President full discretionary
powers in determining the necessity to call out the AFP.
Notwithstanding the SGs contentions, the Magdalo group
instigated the Oakwood mutiny and wearing or read bands on
their left arms to show disgust.
Simultaneously, Oplan Hackle I (plans of bombings and
attacks on the PMA alumni homecoming in Baguio, where the
President was invited) was discovered. The next morning,
after the discovery of the plan, a bomb was discovered in the
campus. Also, information was intercepted by PNP Chief
Arturo Lomibao regarding PNP-SAF members that are
planning to defect from the Arroyo administration, along with
Congressman Peping Cojuanco who planned out moves to
bring down said administration.
A large number of soldiers joined the rallies as critical mass
and armed components to anti-arroyo protests. Another factual
basis after the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation and
General Order was the bombings of telephone communication
towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan. These events
show a clear and present critical situation, leading the
President to cancel all events related to EDSA People Power I.
Executive Secretary Mike Arroyo declared that warrantless
arrest and takeover of facilities can be implemented. One of
these warrantless arrest was Randy David (Filipino journalist,
UP professor) , due to mistake of fact that he was a participant
in the street rallies. Also, Cong. Crispin Beltran (representative
of Anakpawis party). The following facilities were taken over:
Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante (local news
publications). This was done, according to the PNP. to show a
strong presence to tell media outlets not to connive or help out
rebels to take down the government.
Issue/s:
1. W/N Article 6 Sec. 23 was violated.
2. W/N PP1017 is constitutional.
Held:
The provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize
the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above
provision refers not only to war but also to other national
emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution
was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a
state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article
VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers
could have provided so.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over
of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.

The said powers of the President is additionally recognized


during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call
the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of
Section 17 which reads:
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private
corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without
any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word
emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC
made a distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers
does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must
be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by
Congress.
Thus the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
(2) PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a
call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions
of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of
its overbreadth. They claim that its enforcement encroached
on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution and sent a chilling effect to the
citizens.
Overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. A plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence.
The said powers of the President is recognized in Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution wherein it is stated that the
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. (Calling-out powers)
The Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In the present case it is stated that, owing to her Offices vast
intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine
the actual condition of the country.

However, a President must be careful in the exercise of his


powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to
act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our
Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.
Thus according to Justice Mendoza, the PP 1017 is merely an
exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commanderin-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers.
The said powers of the President is also recognized in Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution wherein it is stated that The
President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Take Care powers). As the Executive in whom the
executive power is vested, the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies
to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. In
the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may
employ the powers attached to his office as the Commanderin-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the
Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior
and Local Government.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing
issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by
Former President Marcos under PP 1081. She can only order
the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its
duty to suppress lawless violence.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
62. KULAYAN V. GOVERNOR TAN
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held:
63. AMPATUAN V. DILG
Facts:
The day after the infamous Ampatuan massacre happened,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City under a state of emergency. She then directed
the AFP and PNP to undertake measures as may be allowed by
the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in the said areas. Three days
later, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order 273 which
transfers the supervision of the ARMM from the Office of
the President to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). The word transfer was then changed to

delegate/delegating because of some issues raised over the


terminology. It was amended by AO 273-A.
Petitioner contends that the President unlawfully exercised
emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP
and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the
proclamation. But such deployment is NOT by itself an
exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution. They also claim that the
issuance of the AO273/AO273-A encroached the autonomy of
ARMM as a local government unit. Thus the petition of
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue/s:
1. W/N Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A
violate the principle of local autonomy under Section
16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1,
Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act.
2. W/N President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency
powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawlessness
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City.
Held:
(1) No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated
post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession
found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM
Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali- Generale, Acting
ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not
take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
(2) No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency,
only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And
she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in
the President a stated in Section 18 of Article 7. Therefore she
did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
64. FORTUN V. ARROYO
Facts:
This case is concerned the constitutionality of a presidential
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were
withdrawn after just eight days. The case started when heavily
armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent
civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this
carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent
and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except
for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with


Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing
of her action. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session,
convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action.
But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could
act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963
(PP1963), lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the
writ ofhabeas corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners Philip
Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners challenge the
constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959
affecting Maguindanao.

since petitioners filed the present actions to annul


Proclamation 1959.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its
duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the
short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the
petitions challenging the Presidents action, and ascertain if it
has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul
the proclamation or the suspension.
What if 30 days is inadequate to review? Carpio states that 30day period does not operate to divest this Court of its
jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated
petitions on the ground that the same have become moot and
academic.

Issue/s:
W/N the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao,
render the issues moot and academic.
Held:
Issue is moot. Although the above vests in the President the
power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the
Congress. Thus:
o The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary,
good for only 60 days;
o He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension,
report his action in person or in writing to Congress;
o Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly
convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for
the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
o The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the
Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow their limited
effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems
warranted.
Supreme Courts Power in Emergency Powers
Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers.
The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a
justiciable one in the hands of the Court. President Arroyo
withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.
Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot
and the Court has nothing to review.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully
implemented. The military did not take over the operation and
control of local government units in Maguindanao.
No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported President did
not issue any law or decreeaffecting Maguindanao. Those who
were arrested during the period
were either released or promptly charged in court.
Stated in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
Court has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate
proceeding to review but more than two years have passed

65. DIEGO V. PEOPLE


Facts:
Issue/s:
Held:
66. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN
Facts:
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan
convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum,
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500.
They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify
the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court
which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion
for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended on December 17,1984 by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.By
reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioners letter-request was referred to the Ministry of
Finance.
In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance
Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the
city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which
the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of
the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be
satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner
wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is
August 1,1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire

period of her suspension; and that she should not be required


to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
Issue/s:
W/N a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to
her former position without the need of a new appointment.
Held:
No. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the
power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts
the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.
A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon,
the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the crime for
which she was convicted.
The Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are
prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal
consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning
to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not
subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt
of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been
the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon
can produce such "moral changes" as to equate pardoned
convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly
maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all
the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation
for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly
kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and
purpose of the privilege.
Thus it restores a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They
cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on
automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa
would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of
the punishment prescribed by the RPC for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment
were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for
reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of

her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and


suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense
must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted
with public funds.
Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted
in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former
post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
67. TORRES V. GONZALES
Facts:
Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the
records before the SC), petitioner was convicted by the Court
of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts)
and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from 11
years 10 months and 22 days to 38 years 9 months and 1 day,
and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos.
68810, 91041 and F- 138107).
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982
and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty
counts of estafa which were pending trial before Regional
Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City on May 21, 1986).
The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June
1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in
Criminal Case No. Q-22926: this conviction was then pending
appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 8
September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional
pardon of the petitioner.
On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued
"by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
Issue/s:
W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original
sentence.
Held:
No. In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has
two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny,
or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement

of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less


conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a
convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.
Under Art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded
as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be
made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. (*note*)
The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of
his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the
convict or prisoner carries with it the authority or power of the
Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of
the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department
of the Government has such power been intrusted.
68. IN RE: TORRES V. DIR. OF BUREAU
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held:
69. GARCIA V. COA
Facts:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station
of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A
criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him. The
president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner
filed a claim for back payment of salaries. The petitioner was
later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records
do not show whether petitioners reinstatement was to the
same position of Supervising Lineman.
Issue/s:
W/N Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after
having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive
clemency.
Held:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment
to public office which was forfeited by reason of the
conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally
result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to
apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it
affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as
innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense
charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not
truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all
punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to
him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character
prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court
was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but
on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed
to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as

a public servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary


reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him,
bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his
reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer
apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored
to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service
entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to
petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make
reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded
to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus
ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the
charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1
1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984
(reinstated) to the petitioner.
70. LLAMAS V. ORBOS
Facts:
Petitioner maintains that sometime in August, 1988,
respondent governor, in his official capacity as Provincial
Governor Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan Agreement
with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non- stock and nonprofit organization headed by the governor himself as
chairman and controlled by his brother-in-law as executive
director, trustee, and secretary; that the said Loan Agreement
was never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board, in
direct contravention of the provisions of the Local
Government Code; that the said Agreement is wholly onesided in favor of the Foundation and grossly inimical to the
interest of the Provincial Government (because it did not
provide for interest or for any type security and it did not
provide for suretyship and comptrollership or audit to control
the safe disbursement of said loan); that a total amount of
P20,000,000.00 was disbursed to the aforesaid Foundation.
The Secretary of the then Department of Local Government
rendered a decision. Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is, as
he hereby found guilty. On February 26, 1991, herein public
respondent Executive Secretary issued a Resolution dismissing
respondent governor's appeal and affirming the September 21,
1990 DLG decision. petitioner, on March 1, 1991, took his
oath of office as acting governor. Under the administrative
suspension order, petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting
governor. On the same date (March 1, 1991), respondent
governor moved for a reconsideration of the Executive
Secretarys Resolution, to which petitioner filed an opposition.
On May 15, 1991 after serving 60 days of his suspension and
that the public respondent believing that the governor wanted
to accelerate the development and there was no direct benefit
to him the loans that were given out, public respondent issued
Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is hereby granted executive
clemency in the sense that his ninety-day suspension is hereby
reduced to the period already served. Petitioner's main
argument is that the President may grant executive clemency
only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution only after conviction by final judgment.
Issue/s:
W/N pardon is applicable to administrative cases.
Held:
Yes. Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.

1. Preventive suspension may be imposed by


the Minister of Local Government if the
respondent is a provincial or city official, ...
2. Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the
issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe
that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained
of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the
gravity of the offense s warrants, or when the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose
a threat to the safety and integrity the records and other
evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend
beyond sixty days after the start of
said suspension.
3. At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation the proceedings against him until its termination.
Let us first deal with the issue on jurisdiction While it is true
that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the
President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the
wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the
issue involved concerns of the validity of such discretionary
powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed
by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power
of judicial review:
According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase "after
conviction by final judgment" applies solely to criminal cases,
and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or
pardon to anyone who has been "convicted in an
administrative case," allegedly because the word "conviction"
refers only to criminal cases.
"Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," if the
law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with
the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token,
if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases,
it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section
19 of the Constitution.
It is our considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she
grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses. Other laws also
attest to the Presidents power of executive clemency: Under
Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, the President may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities
issued upon officers and employees, in disciplinary cases,
subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the
interest of the service."
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
therefore, that the President's executive clemency powers may
not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided
in the Constitution.
In administrative cases, compared to criminal, the quantum of
evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a
decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of
evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical
and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It
will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty
administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon
or executive clemency cannot be extended to them.

We wish to stress however that when we say the President can


grant executive clemency in administrative cases, We refer
only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in
the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
71. DRILON V. CA
Facts:
Sometime in 1973, the private respondents (Rodolfo Ganzon
and Raul Paredes) were charged with double murder before
Military Commission No. 34. On July 27, 1973, the military
promulgated a decision acquitting Paredes but sentencing
Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor.
The records show that the private respondents had been
arraigned by the military court, pleaded not guilty, and, with
respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with respect to Ganzon,
convicted and sentenced. The records also show that Ganzon
had served time until 1978, when he was placed under "house
arrest" by then President Marcos. He also claims that in 1986,
he was pardoned by the then President, an alleged pardon he is
invoking to deter the reinvestigation by the Department of
Justice.
In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey Ordonez directed State Prosecutor Aurelio
Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against the
private respondents for the above murders. The private
respondents moved for dismissal: in Ganzon's case, on the
ground that he, Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon
by the President Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been
previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew; in Paredes'
case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted
Trampe, however, denied both requests and reconsideration
having been likewise denied, the private respondents went to
the Court of Appeals on prohibition. (For reinvestigation) and
the CA granted the prohibition.
Issue/s:
W/N the pardon granted to Ganzon is conclusive.
Held:
Yes. The Court as discussed in Tan vs Barrios: There should be
no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against
civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. ...
Not everybody who was convicted by a military court, much
less those were acquitted and released, desires to undergo the
ordeal of a second trial for the same offense ....
The Court is of the considered opinion that these twin
developments six-year service of sentence and subsequent
release are significant, since if President Marcos ordered
Ganzon's release after
six years of imprisonment, President Marcos, unavoidably
commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six years , although as a
condition, Ganzon shall remain under "house arrest." Court is
of the opinion that if Ganzon's sentence had been commuted,
Ganzon, has therefore served his sentence and if he has served
his sentence fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated, or, be
made to "complete the service of his sentence."
The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo
Ganzon had been pardoned, and whatever "pardon" the former
President may have extended to him did not erase the fact that
as early as 1978, he was a free man. Of course, he was
supposed to have remained under house arrest but as we said,

not as a continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos'


vast arrest and commitment powers during martial rule.
Dismissed.
72. PEOPLE V. SALLE
Facts:
Francisco Salle and Ricky Mengote were found guilty of the
crime of murder and destructive arson. After filing their Notice
of Appeal, Salle suddenly filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o
of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the
voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the
assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion
was necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid
Prison following the grant of a conditional pardon by the
President on. She also stated that Mengote was also granted
conditional pardon and that he immediately left for his
province without consulting her. She prayed that the Court
grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.
The Court granted Salle's Motion to Withdraw Appeal
Taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that the President may, except in
cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the
Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final judgment,
the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for
accused-appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of
the enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon to inform the Court why it recommended to the
President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the
pendency of the appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that the conditional pardon granted to appellant
Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction
is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his
appeal.
However, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the
conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and
enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that
although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the
appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his
acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the
finality of his conviction. Mariano, Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor, contends that per information given to the
Secretariat by Assistant.
Director Villanueva, Mengote's carpeta or prison record does
not show that he has a pending appeal with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. For that reason, the Secretariat
was not able to advise those concerned to take appropriate
steps for the withdrawal of the appeal before it recommended
to the Committee the grant of conditional pardon in favor of
Mengote. Mariano then assures the Court that there was no
intention on the part of the Secretariat and the Committee to
violate Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, and that
what happened was a clear misappreciation of facts due to the
incomplete records of Mengote.
Issue/s:
W/N a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is
enforceable.

Held:
No. It should be observed that there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this constitutional prerogative on pardon by the
Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of
impeachment.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is
seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to
serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly
waived in writing, except where the death penalty was
imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies
for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and
has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case,
executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial
court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be
acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government concerned must require proof from the accused
that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a
certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as
the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those
in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as
a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
Counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is
hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which
to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to
submit it to this Court.
73. ECHEGARAY V. SEC. OF JUSTICE
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of
death was to be imposed upon him. He then filed motion for
recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death
penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress
changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No.
8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a
Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection
against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel,
degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due
process, 3. a violation of the Philippines obligations under
international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative
power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent
Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation
of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion
to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has


already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the
most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and
easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in
addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the lethal injection is a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
2. W/N it is a violation of intl treaty obligations.
3. W/N it is discriminatory.
Held:
1. No. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection
constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment because
(1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in
carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s
into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are uncertain as to
the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which
will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the
greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders
lethal injection inherently cruel. It is well-settled in
jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of
Prisons- punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life. Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by
lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or
inhuman? The Court believes not. Petitioner contends that
Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which court will
fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution
and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the court which designates the date of
execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The
procedure is that the judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are
remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to
the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the
date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must
be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of
R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be
carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor later then
eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the
death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to
the exercise by the President of his executive clemency
powers at all times. Hence, the death convict is in effect
assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment
imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein
he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal
and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also contends that the infliction

of wanton pain in case of possible complications in the


intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained
and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of
lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that
lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists
and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered
are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in
the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the
convict, without any other evidence whatsoever. Second.
Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No.
8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public
officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third.
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in
carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall
within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment. In a limited sense, anything is
cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be
said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the
Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely.
2) Yes. Violation of international treaties? In countries which
have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and
not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be
imposed for the most serious crimes. Included with the
declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming
at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
3) Denied. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the
Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory. SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE
EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by
lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the
three years next following the date of the sentence or while
she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years
of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner contends that Section 17 amends the instances when
lethal injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any
person over seventy years of age. While Article 83 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic


Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death
penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one
(1) year period following delivery as an instance when the
death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension
of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after
a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioners view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination. Being an
implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to
implement.
74. GARCIA V. SESBRENO
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held:
75. RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and
political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local
elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction
for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner
relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification
holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has
been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by
former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be
proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue/s:
W/N Estrada may run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored


all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not
actually specify which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estradas rights of suffrage
and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was
the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardons
text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of
the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along
with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that
the only instances in which the President may not extend
pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of
the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a)


of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the
OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary
pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving
moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate
to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part
of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by
the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas
clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make
the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to
limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot
be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be
conditional on Respondents promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the
pardon extended to former President Estrada.
76. PEOPLE V. CASIDO
Facts:
The case started when the court released a resolution on 30
July 1996. The court ruled that the conditional pardons granted
in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19 January 1996
during the pendency of their instant appeal. They were rearrested and REQUIRE the officers of the Presidential
Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon to
SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt for
approving the applications for the pardon of the accusedappellants despite the pendency of their appeal.
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon (hereinafter Committee) stated that the applications for
conditional pardon of the aforenamed prisoners were
recommended by the Committee to the President for the grant
of Conditional Pardon after the Secretariat had evaluated the
crimes for which they had been charged in pursuit of their

political belief. Such recommendation was approved by the


President.
They also allege that prior to their release, subject prisoners
filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal which was
received by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1996.
Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify first whether the
counsel of the accused had also withdrawn their appeal or that
the NGO lawyers had filed in their behalf a motion to
Withdraw their Appeal. There was no intention on the part of
the Secretariat and the Presidential Committee to violate
Section 19, Article VII, of the Constitution, but that what
happened was a clear misappreciation of fact.
Solicitor General additionally alleged that the accusedappellants in this case, in an effort to seek their release at the
soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the
Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC). They claim that the effect then
is that since the amnesty, unlike pardon, may be granted before
or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes even after conviction, the amnesty then granted to
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
rendered moot and academic the question of the premature
pardon granted to them.
Issue/s:
W/N amnesty rendered the question on pardon moot.
Held:
Yes. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is
a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence (article 36, RPC). While
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having
been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before
conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the
first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution,
the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under
Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation was
concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent
Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994.

The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and


Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not
by the pardon.
77. SPOUSES CONSTANTINO V. CUISIA
Facts:
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came
up with a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The
solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three
restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for
foreign debts they are basically buyback programs and bondconversion programs. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and
Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their
minor children who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC
(Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the buyback and
bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do not
constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in
Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the
President has such power, unlike other powers which may be
validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign
debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of
the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank
Governor Josse Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the
Philippines or such power can be delegated to them.
Constantino argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the
power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President
alone must exercise this power. They argue that the
requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically
named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the
submission that not respondents but the President alone and
personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would
like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said scheme.

sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation


would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded
and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in
running the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not
unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must
be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by
any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised
by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of
martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within
this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no
means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import.
78. HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL V. TRB
Facts:
Issue/s:

Issue/s:
W/N the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her
debt power to the respondents.
Held:
Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing
powers and that the President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever
and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant.
On the other hand, the President can delegate this power to her
direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President
to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy
for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm
of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is
to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and
cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals. If the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she
would have to pause from running the country long enough to
focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward
this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives
to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board,
explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and
more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to

Held:
79. LAND BANK V. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held:
80. GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
Facts:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales
filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA
No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207,
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA
2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines,
and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration
and any other government agency from importing rice and
corn, Section 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties
may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid executive agreements
with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA
2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be
resolved under the American jurisprudence.

Issue/s:
W/N RA 3452 prevails over the executive agreements entered
into by the President.
Held:
Yes. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established.
The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the
same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said
contracts may properly considered as executive agreements,
the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent
with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement,
enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted
prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers
of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may
not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of law, byindirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point
of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, also insist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon
the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a
branch of the legislative department. No such justification can
be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up
and that of the United States.
81. PIMENTEL V. ERMITA
Facts:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the
cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective
departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed
a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel
averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the
consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in
accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive
Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective
departments should be designated in an acting capacity and
not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue
temporary designation to an officer in the civil service

provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one


year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and
GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those
previously appointed in acting capacity.
Issue/s:
W/N the appointments made my ex PGMA are valid.
Held:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO
292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not
be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation
shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after
the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the
Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim
appointments this also proves that the president was in good
faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos
of the president. The choice is the presidents to make and the
president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She
cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has
the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an
office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego
should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the
alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That person
may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will
also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is
allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the functions
of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may
even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an
Acting Capacity
Ad
Appointments

Descript
ion

Interim

It is a permanent
appointment because it
takes effect immediately
and can no longer be
withdrawn
by
the
President
once
the
appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that
it
is
subject
to
confirmation by the
COA does not alter its

Appointments
in an Acting
Capacity
Acting
appointments
are a way of
temporarily
filling
important
offices but, if
abused, they
can also be a
way
of
circumventin

permanent
character
(Matibag vs Benipayo)

g the need for


confirmation
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments
.

When
Effectiv
e

Upon Acceptance
Appointee

When
Made

When Congress is in
recess

Any
time
when there is
vacancy

Submitt
ed to the
COA

Yes

No

by

Upon
Acceptance
by Appointee

82. LIM V. EXEC. SEC.


Facts:
Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of
Balikatan-02-1. They were subsequently joined by
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both
party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention.
Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the
other hand, claimed that certain members of their organization
are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be
directly affected by the operations being conducted in
Mindanao.
The petitioners alleged that Balikatan-02-1 is not covered by
the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines
and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only
provides for mutual military assistance in case of armed attack
by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US.
Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in
combat operations in Philippine Territory.
Issue/s:
W/N the Balikatan-02-1 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the
Philippines and the US and it is the VFA which gives
continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave
legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercise.
The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are
prohibited from engaging war on Philippine territory. This
limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference
of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the
petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the
Terms of Reference.

Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the
holding of Balikatan-02-1 joint military exercise has not
intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call
for the correction on its part.
The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.
83. BAYAN V. EXEC. SEC.
Facts:
On March 14, 1947 the Philippine and United States Forged a
Military Bases Agreement which allowed the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by United States
personnel. On August 30, 1951 the Mutual Defense Treaty was
signed where US and Phil agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessel,
and aircraft.
In 1991, the Philippines and US negotiated in the possible
extension of the military bases agreement since it was
expiring. On August of that year, the Senate rejected the RPUS Treaty of Friendship, which is the treaty that would have
extended the duration of military bases in Phil. The expiration
of the treaty held in abeyance the joint military exercise
between the two countries. Though the 1951 defense treaty
was still active.
In 1997, US Defense Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell and Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino, Jr. to exchange notes regarding the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). In 1998,
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA together with the
US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. President Joseph Estrada
also ratified the treaty during the same year through the Sec of
Foreign Affairs Exec Secretary Ronaldo Zamora. Sec Zamora
send the treaty to the Senate for concurrence pursuant to
Article 21 of the 1987 Constitution (No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate). The
Committee on Foreign Relations headed by Rodolfo Biazon
held joint public hearings and consider it for recommendation.
The treaty was numbered as Resolution number 443. In May
27, 1999, the Resolution number 443 was approved by the
Senate by a two-thirds (2/3) vote. It entered into force on June
1.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section
21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution.
2. W/N the US Senate needed to ratify the treaty with
the Philippines or a mere signature of the President
was enough.
Held:
(1) Section 21 deals with (a) treaties or international
agreements in general and (b) applies to variety of treaty or
international agreements. On the other hand, Section 25 deals
with treaties which involve the presence of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. In this case,
Section 25 is applied since it is a treaty concerning the
military. Section 21 will determine the number of votes
required, which is two-thirds or not less than 16 (Senate is
composed of 24 members). The 16 number will not be reduced
despite absence of other senators since it refers to the Senate
as a whole. Lex specialis derogant generali means that where

there is a statute of a particular enactment and also a general


one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include
what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must
be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect
only such cases within its general language which are not
within the provision of the particular enactment.
(2) Ratification is an executive act undertaken by the head of
state or the government through which formal acceptance of
the treaty is proclaimed. The State may provide other means as
when the State may provide in its domestic legislation the
process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to
be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when (a) the
treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise
established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification
should be required, (e) the representative of the State has
signed the treaty subject to ratification or (d) the intention of
the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from
the full powers of its representative or was expressed during
the negotiation. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is in the
President and NOT the legislature. The Senate is there only to
give or withhold its consent or concurrence to the ratification.
Executive agreements in international law are binding as a
treaty. A treaty under the Vienna Convention is a written
agreement between two or more states and governed by
international law. Whether embodied in a single instrument or
in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation. Also, the names given in a treaty are
inconsequential as well. The name of the treaty whether it is a
protocol, agreement, pact, cordat, convention, declaration, etc.
are of no prejudice to the meanings given to them by the
internal law of the State.
Thus in the Philippines, we recognize the binding effects of
executive agreements. It is stated in the Commissioner of
Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading that the courts have long
never questioned the validity of executive agreements.
Confirmed by long usage, the subject has covered vast
amounts of subject that the Congress never did question as
well. In the case of US, as well expressly recognize the
validity and constitutionality of executive agreements. The
Philippines in the Constitutional Commission stated that it will
act on good faith to judge that the country that is contracting
with has done everything if they said they have done
everything for the said agreement to be recognized.
Thus the Philippines is bound now to the treaty and is bound
by Article II Sec. 2 of the Constitution. It cannot plead that the
Constitution as an excuse for non- compliance with our
obligations duties and responsibilities under the international
law and part of the community of nations. Pacta sunt servanda
(Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law, and it may not invoke the provisions in its
constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this
duty).
84. SEC. OF JUSTIECE V. JUDGE LANTION
Facts:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine
Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the


Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel
of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark
Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment
on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the
consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must
present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue/s:
W/N to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
Held:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the
rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so
although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of
the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international
law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative
action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic
sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional
provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason
that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law
of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and
a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
they are in conflict with the constitution.
85. BAYAN MUNA V. SEC. ROMULO
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group
established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as
then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The
serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent
US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA
and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003
(E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In
esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace
of the strategic security and defense partnership between the
two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements
have been effected by and between the US and 33 other
countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or
former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other
shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any


international tribunal for any purpose, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any
other entity or third country, or expelled to a third
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to
any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers
a person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not
agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise
transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP]
will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the
third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the
date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to
terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement
shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or
any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L.
Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28,
2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that,
under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of
discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
effect.
Issue/s:
W/N the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab
initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or
otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles
of international law.
Held:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to
form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot
be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain
well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and
jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls into the category of intergovernmental agreements, which is an internationally

accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations


Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term
as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement,
that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of
the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the
accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government
Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of
its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and
executive agreements have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On
the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and
at other times that of more formal documents denominated
agreements or protocols. As former US High
Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in
his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and
other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself,
or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent
to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab
initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x
it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal
to the [ICC] x x x.63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners
earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the
RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international
law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard
that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its
desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x
The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence
of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national
criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression
that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape

criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.


Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the
Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the
US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of
individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things,
there is nothing immoral or violative of international law
concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an
offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.
86. VINUYA V. ROMULO
Facts:
Petitioner Isabelita Vinuya, et al. were all members of the
Malaya Lolas Organization, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during WWII.
Petitioner argue that (1) the general waiver of claims made by
the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is
void. (2) They claim that the comfort women system
established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of
petitioners constituted a crime against humanity, sexual
slavery, and torture. (3) They allege that the prohibition
against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from
which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims
of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their
complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in
breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes
against humanity. (4) Finally, petitioner assert that the
Philippine govts acceptance of the apologies made by Japan
as well as funds from the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) were
contrary to international law.
Respondent Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al.
maintain that (1) all claims of the Philippines and its nationals
relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956. (2) In addition, RES argue that the apologies made by
Japan have been satisfactory, and (3) that Japan had addressed
the individual claims of the women through the atonement
money paid by the AWF.
Issue/s:
W/N Respondent Romulo is ultra vires in refusing to espouse
the claims of the PET for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them; and, can the Court compel
respondent Romulo to espouse petitioners claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals.
Held:
No. The issue is political in nature. It is not within SC power
to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners
cause. SC only power in this regard is to urge and exhort the
Executive Department to take up petitioners cause.
Jurisdiction over such issues of international scope lies with

the Executive Department, particularly the Chief Executive.


As a general principle and particularly here, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys
conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be
given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of
the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or
necessary.
[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.
(US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp)
It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive
and the most confidential information about foreign countries
for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on
meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited
access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the
presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the
President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion
in the conduct of foreign affairs (CJ Punos Dissent in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion)

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means


available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able
to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals
behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being
asserted, but rather, the states own rights.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as
a whole. Such obligations derive, for example, in
contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.
In international law, the term jus cogens (literally,
compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus
cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they
are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified
only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

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