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Political Geography K

1NC

1NC Political Geography K


The 1ac advances geopolitical narratives that misunderstand
and invalidate China.
Parenti 13 [International Institute Lorenzo de Medici in Rome, Italy. Oct. 10,

Geography, Chinas Path And State-Society Relations: Redressing Western


Misinterpretations, Human Geography: A New Radical Journal, 6(2): 137-150.] GK
The complexity of Chinas state-society relations is often underestimated, or
completely neglected, by Western commentators, journalists, politicians and,
at times, academics. There especially seems to be a lack of theoretical
ideas and systematic analysis in geographical studies. The overall outcome of
said underestimation is the proliferation of misinterpretations on the
meaning-sense of evolving relational configurations between power, people
and places in China. Hence the Western ability (institutions and common
people) to understand and judge, as objectively as possible, ongoing socioeconomic and political trends in China, its hybrid experimental path and general
development trajectory, is concretely invalidated . Starting from this standpoint
and drawing from different sources, this paper first suggests that the changing
characteristics of the current Chinese multi-scalar politico-socio-economic processes
cannot be simply reduced to capitalism. Secondly, to get a better
understanding of China in a comparative perspective by analyzing the
countrys direction of development and governance I summarize some
instructive traits of state-society relations, arguing that the nature and
significance of these differ, when they are not quite the reverse, from the
prevailing (mis)interpretations by Western agents. I specifically refer to the
need to (re)interpret two points from a comparative standpoint: a) the states
popular legitimacy and socio-economic dynamism, and b) the variegated modes of
conflict resolution and financial governance.

The impact is dehumanization, displacement, and geographical


extermination.
Hewitt 83 [Kenneth Hewitt Department of Geography, Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5 (1983). Place annihilation: area bombing and the fate of
urban places. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73, 257284.]
6/25/16
Just as biological life may be called a set of activities intended to resist
death, so our place and world are at least partly a means to resist
psychosocial and cultural dissolution. That becomes more readily apparent
when war or other calamities damage and threaten to destroy land and settlements.
Unfortunately, war also mobilizes the highly charged and dangerous dialectic
of place attachment: the perceived antithesis of "our" places or homeland
and "theirs." Sustained in latent if not overt forms in peacetime, this
polarization has produced unbridled sentimentalizing of one's own while
dehumanizing the enemy's people and land. That seems an essential step
in cultivating readiness to destroy the latter and bear with progressive
devastation at home.
Rootedness is the fundamental metaphor of place in human life. The
derivation of the words we use is literally radical here, as they bear upon

geography in general and upon my particular topic. Thus, to eradicate or extirpate,


is not directly to destroy plant, animal, or person as individual detached organisms,
but to uproot them. To exterminate is literally to kill by geography , not
necessarily damaging an organism, but driving it beyond the bounds.
Exiles, expellees, and others compulsorily displaced have often described
their plight as tantamount to cultural starvation, if not death or worse.
That may seem too subjective to situate the problem squarely within modern
geographic scholarship. Nevertheless, the geographical impact of the uprooting and
removal of tens of millions of people from their longtime homes in the wars,
expulsions, and evacuations of this century cannot but be enormous. Moreover,
such events constitute a large part of the other face of what Yves Lacoste (1973)
calls "geographical warfare." In this case it is societal rather than physical
vulnerability that is involved.

Our alternative is to reject the geopolitical narratives of the


1AC in favor of a critical geopolitics. Only this allows us to
avoid the sound-bite contemporary politics that maintains a
culture of exceptionalism and superiority.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.
Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). "Is US security policy pivoting
from the Atlantic to AsiaPacific." Dialogue on Globalization (2012).] 6/22/16
Critical geopolitics is about providing such scrutiny. Towards the close of the
Cold War, some academic geographers and political theorists in a number of
countries became concerned about how the Cold War and conflicts that erupted
around that time, such as the Contra war in Nicaragua and the first Gulf War, were
represented by political elites and in mass culture and how this had affected their
character and longevity. The main idea was that geography did not have direct
effects on foreign-policy making and the dynamics of conflicts, but that these
were always practically mediated through the ascription of meaning to
places and peoples: from the relative significance of different world
regions to national interests to the use of metaphors and analogies
from other places and times used to communicate and justify given
courses of policy and action. Think, for example, of the putative shift in US
foreign policy from Europe to the Middle East in the early 1990s and the recycling of
Munich and Hitler analogies in both Gulf Wars.
A specific set of insights characterizes the approach as it has developed
since the early 1990s. The first is a conceptual matrix for a geographical
analysis of world politics based on ideas about geographical representations and
socio-economic resources. This refers, respectively, to how the world is
structured geographically from certain geographical vantage points and
the relative capacity to spread such notions and, if need be, enforce them.
Another is an emphasis on the role of vision and geographical imagination
in how the world is structured and acted on by political agents of various
sorts. Cartographic representations that come into popular use are of particular
interest as sources of information about the nature of places and the linkages and
flows that connect them. A third is how important the fusion between territory

and national identity has been in modern nationalism and how its role in
dividing up the world still remains at work. So, much geopolitical discourse is
not surprisingly directed at maintaining a clear sense of domestic
difference and superiority. Exceptionalism is the rule. Our identity is
always at stake in this or that conflict. Finally, I would identify its stress on the
elite-based statecraft that has long lain at the heart of geopolitical reasoning and its
necessary denial of the multidimensional qualities of different places in pursuit of an
overriding Weltpolitik. Thus, foreign places lose their rich physical-cultural
character as they are plugged in to overriding geostrategies that reflect the
narrow security and economic objectives of dominant groups in national politics.
Critical geopolitics resists the tendency to separate out the domestic and the
foreign or international as separate realms. They are in fact completely bonded
together.
For policymakers, particularly in countries other than those where the scripts of
global geopolitics are first written, there are a number of analytic virtues to the
approach. One is to encourage a suspicion of grand geopolitical narratives
based on relatively limited textual sources that fit into the overall Zeitgeist. Another
is to beware of beguiling metaphors and terms such as pivoting that
provide the simple language and sound bites that are the stock-in-trade
of contemporary politics. Like advertising jingles, they bamboozle even
as they seem to clarify . A third is to link new geopolitical narratives to
the anxieties of domestic politics from where they often emanate. In other
words, why did this discussion and the way it is posed arise now rather
than previously and how does this relate to the electoral cycle, elite
succession or dominant issues in domestic politics? Finally, what are the
historical resources upon which the narrative effectively relies? What I have
in mind here are the map images, place stereotypes, and cultural attributes
inherited from accounts of the past that inform the narrative. How are these
mobilized and to what effect?

Impact

Impacts
Oppositional narratives result in scapegoating and endless,
evolving conflict.
Parry 15 [Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories

for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s. He has published three books
on the Bush Family and its connections to various right-wing operatives His latest
book is entitled Americas Stolen Narrative. For details on this offer, click here., The
Power of False Narrative Consortiumnews, 9-28-2015, Accessible Online at
https://consortiumnews.com/2015/09/28/the-power-of-false-narrative/] 6-23-2016
In this age of pervasive media, the primary method of social control is
through the creation of narratives delivered to the public through newspapers,
TV, radio, computers, cell phones and any other gadget that can convey
information. This reality has given rise to an obsession among the power elite to
control as much of this messaging as possible.
So, regarding U.S. relations toward the world, we see the State Department, the
White House, Pentagon, NATO and other agencies pushing various
narratives to sell the American people and other populations on how they
should view U.S. policies, rivals and allies. The current hot phrase for this
practice is strategic communications or Stratcom, which blends psychological
operations, propaganda and P.R. into one mind-bending smoothie.
I have been following this process since the early 1980s when the Reagan
administration sought to override the Vietnam Syndrome, a public aversion
to foreign military interventions that followed the Vietnam War. To get
Americans to kick this syndrome, Reagans team developed themes about
overseas events that would push American hot buttons.
Tapping into the Central Intelligence Agencys experience in psy-ops targeted at
foreign audiences, President Ronald Reagan and CIA Director William J. Casey
assembled a skilled team inside the White House led by CIA propaganda specialist
Walter Raymond Jr.
From his new perch on the National Security Council staff, Raymond oversaw
inter-agency task forces to sell interventionist policies in Central America and
other trouble spots. The game, as Raymond explained it in numerous memos to his
underlings, was to glue black hats on adversaries and white hats on allies,
whatever the truth really was.
The fact that many of the U.S.-backed forces from the Nicaraguan Contras to
the Guatemalan military were little more than corrupt death squads
couldnt be true, at least according to psy-ops doctrine. They had to be
presented to the American public as wearing white hats. Thus, the Contras
became the moral equals of our Founding Fathers and Guatemalas
murderous leader Efrain Rios Montt was getting a bum rap on human rights,
according to the words scripted for President Reagan.
The scheme also required that anyone say, a journalist, a human rights activist or a
congressional investigator who contradicted this white-hat mandate must be
discredited, marginalized or destroyed, a routine of killing any honest
messenger.
But it turned out that the most effective part of this propaganda strategy
was to glue black hats on adversaries. Since nearly all foreign leaders
have serious flaws, it proved much easier to demonize them and work the

American people into war frenzies than it was to persuade the public that
Washingtons favored foreign leaders were actually paragons of virtue.
Once the black hat was jammed on a foreign leaders head, you could say
whatever you wanted about him and disparage any American who
questioned the extreme depiction as a fill-in-the-blank apologist or a
stooge or some other ugly identifier that would either silence the
dissenter or place him or her outside the bounds of acceptable debate.
Given the careerist conformity of Washington, nearly everyone fell into line,
including news outlets and human rights groups. If you wanted to retain your
respectability and influence, you agreed with the conventional wisdom. So, with
every foreign controversy, we got a new group think about the new enemy. The
permissible boundary of each debate was set mostly by the neoconservatives and
their liberal interventionist sidekicks.
That this conformity has not served American national interests is obvious. Take, for
example, the disastrous Iraq War, which has cost the U.S. taxpayers an
estimated $1 trillion, led to the deaths of some 4,500 American soldiers,
killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, and unleashed chaos across the
strategic Middle East and now into Europe.
Most Americans now agree that the Iraq War wasnt worth it. But it turns out that
Official Washingtons catastrophic group thinks dont just die welldeserved deaths. Like a mutating virus, they alter shape as the outside
conditions change and survive in a new form.

***The dialectic of place produces dehumanization,


displacement, and geographical extermination. [1nc card]
Hewitt 83 [Kenneth Hewitt Department of Geography, Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5 (1983). Place annihilation: area bombing and the fate of
urban places. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73, 257284.]
6/25/16
Just as biological life may be called a set of activities intended to resist
death, so our place and world are at least partly a means to resist
psychosocial and cultural dissolution. That becomes more readily apparent
when war or other calamities damage and threaten to destroy land and settlements.
Unfortunately, war also mobilizes the highly charged and dangerous dialectic
of place attachment: the perceived antithesis of "our" places or homeland
and "theirs." Sustained in latent if not overt forms in peacetime, this
polarization has produced unbridled sentimentalizing of one's own while
dehumanizing the enemy's people and land. That seems an essential step
in cultivating readiness to destroy the latter and bear with progressive
devastation at home.
Rootedness is the fundamental metaphor of place in human life. The
derivation of the words we use is literally radical here, as they bear upon
geography in general and upon my particular topic. Thus, to eradicate or extirpate,
is not directly to destroy plant, animal, or person as individual detached organisms,
but to uproot them. To exterminate is literally to kill by geography, not
necessarily damaging an organism, but driving it beyond the bounds.
Exiles, expellees, and others compulsorily displaced have often described
their plight as tantamount to cultural starvation, if not death or worse.
That may seem too subjective to situate the problem squarely within modern

geographic scholarship. Nevertheless, the geographical impact of the uprooting and


removal of tens of millions of people from their longtime homes in the wars,
expulsions, and evacuations of this century cannot but be enormous. Moreover,
such events constitute a large part of the other face of what Yves Lacoste (1973)
calls "geographical warfare." In this case it is societal rather than physical
vulnerability that is involved.

Discourses of legitimacy set up a hierarchy of dehumanization,


colonization, and violence.
Filmer 9 [Filmer, Alice A., Institute of Communications Research, University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign "Discourses of Legitimacy: a love song to our mongrel
selves." Policy Futures in Education 7.2 (2009): 200-216.] 6/25/16
As a powerful means for authorizing, standardizing, and policing human conduct,
discourses of legitimacy set up a hierarchy in which non-conformists find
themselves in a vulnerable position vis- -vis institutional power. At the very least,
those members of society who are deemed to be standing on the wrong
side of a line whether legal, traditional, or moral are scorned and
stigmatized in particular contexts. As non-conformists, they are also readily
available targets of violence. It is much easier to mistreat and exploit a
dehumanized Other, who by definition does not conform to the same
social, cultural, and religious values and practices as the Self. The process of
dehumanization is begun discursively. Its operation can be exposed in
adjectives like immoral, illegitimate, primitive, and nouns like prostitute,
infidel, savage. Historically, religious and patriarchal rationales like moral
salvation, civilization, and modernization have been used to justify
violence against the Other. Colonization is legitimated through the
essentialization and devaluation of human life. A case in point is the
auspicious meeting of total strangers in 1523 on the gulf coast of modern-day
Mexico. What is notable about this example is the tenacious capacity of
discourse to carry and rekindle emotions of shame, betrayal, and anger
over the course of centuries.

The uncontrollable aesthetic power released by geopolitical


narratives threatens nationalism, otherness, and perpetual
danger.
Harvey 89 [David W. Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of anthropology and
geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He received
his PhD in geography from the University of Cambridge in 1961. The condition of
postmodernity. Vol. 14. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.] 6/25/16
Answers to that cannot be rendered in abstraction from the political-economic
forces currently transforming the world of labour, finance, uneven geographical
development, and the like. The lines of tension are clear enough. Geopolitics and
economic nationalism, localism and the politics of place , are all fighting it
out with a new internationalism in the most contradictory of ways. The fusion
of the European Economic Community as a commodity trading block takes place in
1 992; takeovers and merger manias will sweep the continent; yet Thatcherism still
proclaims itself as a distinctive national project resting upon the peculiarities of the
British (a proposition which both left and right politics tend to accept). International
control over finance capital looks inevitable, yet it seems impossible to arrive at that

through the collectivity of national interests. In the intellectual and cultural spheres
similar oppositions can be identified.
Wenders seems to propose a new romanticism, the exploration of global meanings
and the prospects for Becoming through the release of romantic desire out of the
stasis of Being. There are dangers in releasing an unknown and perhaps
uncontrollable aesthetic power into an unstable situation. Brandon Taylor
favours a return to realism as a means to bring cultural practices back into a realm
where some kind of explicit ethical content can be expressed. Even some of the
deconstructionists seem to be reverting to ethics.
Beyond that there is a renewal of historical materialism and of the Enlightenment
project. Through the first we can begin to understand postmodernity as an
historical-geographical condition. On that critical basis it becomes
possible to launch a counter-attack of narrative against the image, of
ethics against aesthetics, of a project of Becoming rather than Being, and
to search for unity within difference, albeit in a context where the power
of the image and of aesthetics, the problems of time- space compression,
and the significance of geopolitics and otherness are clearly understood.
A renewal of historical-geographical materialism can indeed promote adherence to a
new version of the Enlightenment project. Poggioli (1968, 73) captures the
difference thus:
In the consciousness of the classical epoch, it is not the present that brings the past
into culmination, but the past that culminates in the present, and the present is in
turn understood as a new triumph of ancient and eternal values, as a return to the
principle of the true and the just, as a restoration or re-birth of those principles. But
for the moderns, the present is valid only by virtue of the potentialities of the future,
as the matrix of the future, insofar as it is the forge of history in continued
metamorphosis, seen as a permanent spiritual revolution.

The perception that geographical attributions and


environmental conditions are fixed necessitates violence as
the only answer to political impasse.
Agnew 98 (John Agnew is Professor of Geography at the University of California,

Los Angeles, Geopolitics: Re-visioning world politics, 93-94, Second Edition,


Routledge,LD)
The apparently inexorable and inevitable slide into war associated with the First
World War was the outcome of a mindset on all sides that saw war as the
only way out of the politicaleconomic impasse into which they had all slipped.
The conduct of the war itself was also the outcome of a mentality in which
the individual person had to sacrifice for the good of the greater whole:
the nation-state that defined the totality of ones identity. Humanity had
lost control of its destiny. Nature ruled in affairs of state. The naturalized
geopolitics characteristic of this epoch had a number of telltale features: a
world divided into imperial and colonized peoples, states with biological
needs for territory/resources and outlets for enterprise, a closed world
in which one states politicaleconomic success was at another ones
expense (relative ascent and decline), and a world of fixed geographical
attributes and environmental conditions that had predictable effects on a
states global status.

Naturalization had a number of preconditions. One was the (apparent) separation of


the scientific claim from the subject position of the particular writer or politician.
Claims were made to universal knowledge that transcended any particular national,
class, gender or ethnic standpoint. So, even as a particular national interest
was self-evidently addressed, the act of doing so was framed by a
perspective that put it into the realm of nature rather than that of politics.
A vital aspect of this, and another precondition for naturalization, was the conviction
that observation of the worlds political and economic divisions was a form of
innocent perception from which generalizations about resources and power could be
deduced. The pre-existing commitment to this view of perception and its associated
mapping, naming, and citing of spaces as colonial, European, powerful or
backward was not often acknowledged.
Scientifically, in the empiricist sense of the term, the world beyond the
immediately familiar was blank and empty but was then filled and labelled
according to its varying natural attributes as they appeared from Europe. The
world was then known and possessed not just politically but
epistemologically. This was the great achievement of naturalization: to
have depoliticized inter-imperial rivalry into a set of natural and
determining geographical facts of life. The invention of political
geography during this period is of a piece with this trend. On the one hand,
the new field was openly touted by its advocates as a way of educating both lites
and national populations in the ways in which physical geography constrained and
directed state formation and empire building. On the other hand, it based its claims
to seriousness on offering a perspective that was useful primarily for the nationstates from which its advocates came. Thus, Halford Mackinder provided a global
geopolitical model (see Chapter 2) but was concerned primarily about the
implications of this model for the future of the British Empire.

Singular narratives create misconceptions and well meaning


racism-we have an ethical obligation to attempt at
understanding complexity.
Adichie 09 [ Chimamanda Adichie is a writer from Enugu, Nigeria. She wrote

multiple novels and gave a Ted Talk about narratives. The Danger of a Single Story
(Transcript of the Ted Talk).
https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story/trans
cript?language=en] GK 6/24/2016
Years later, I thought about this when I left Nigeria to go to university in the
United States. I was 19. My American roommate was shocked by me. She asked
where I had learned to speak English so well, and was confused when I
said that Nigeria happened to have English as its official language. She
asked if she could listen to what she called my "tribal music," and was
consequently very disappointed when I produced my tape of Mariah Carey.
4:41(Laughter)
4:44She assumed that I did not know how to use a stove.
4: 48 What struck me was this: She had felt sorry for me even before she saw me.
Her default position toward me, as an African, was a kind of patronizing, wellmeaning pity. My roommate had a single story of Africa: a single story of
catastrophe. In this single story, there was no possibility of Africans being
similar to her in any way, no possibility of feelings more complex than pity,
no possibility of a connection as human equals.

5:20 I must say that before I went to the U.S., I didn't consciously identify as African.
But in the U.S., whenever Africa came up, people turned to me. Never mind that I
knew nothing about places like Namibia. But I did come to embrace this new
identity, and in many ways I think of myself now as African. Although I still get quite
irritable when Africa is referred to as a country, the most recent example being my
otherwise wonderful flight from Lagos two days ago, in which there was an
announcement on the Virgin flight about the charity work in "India, Africa and other
countries."
5:54(Laughter)
5:55 So, after I had spent some years in the U.S. as an African, I began to
understand my roommate's response to me. If I had not grown up in
Nigeria, and if all I knew about Africa were from popular images, I too
would think that Africa was a place of beautiful landscapes, beautiful
animals, and incomprehensible people, fighting senseless wars, dying of
poverty and AIDS, unable to speak for themselves and waiting to be saved
by a kind, white foreigner. I would see Africans in the same way that I, as a child,
had seen Fide's family.

Turns warming
Climate change requires a critical understanding of
geopolitical narrativesit cannot be bracketed off to
technocratic calculative thought.
Dalby 10 [Simon Dalby is the Acting Chair of the Master in International Public
Policy program, a CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change, and
Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University. His
published research deals with climate change, political ecology, geopolitics, global
security, environmental change, militarization and the spatial dimensions of
governance. Draft paper for presentation to a workshop on The World in 2030:
Geopolitics & Global Climate Change June 24-25, 2010. Santa Barbara, California,
organised as part of the UNU 2030 Project and the UCSB Global Climate Change
Project.] (DM 6/24/16)
To use the terminology from Steffen, Crutzen and ONeills (2007) periodization of
life in the Anthropocene, we are in what amounts to the fourth generation of the
period of the great accelleration. For the first generation, in the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War the ecological consequences of carboniferous
capitalism were not necessarily clear, but by the second, in the 1970s and 1980s
climate science was making things obvious. The third generation, in the
aftermath of the cold war effectively ignored the problem while talking
endlessly about it. The fourth generation, in the period from now out to
2030 is faced quite literally with making the decision as to whether the
earth has polar icecaps a couple of centuries hence. The geopolitical
consequences are unknowable. But the context in which they will play out
is what is now being decided. Such discussions are not what routine geopolitics
is understood to be about at all; hence the difficulties of how to think about
geopolitics and climate change together ; what is crucial is to recognize
that these are two facets of the same issue, not separate matters that
can be dealt with by different knowledges and political practices. These
insights in turn suggest that it is far from clear who the most important actors now
are in many human affairs, nor does who the most important may be in particular
circumstance in the future. Clearly the geopolitical patterns of the last few
years have suggested that new states are becoming more important. The
long history of empires and great powers suggests likewise that technical
innovations and the ability to master new modes of energy use are also
important. In the face of climate disruptions, or the more immediate
danger of energy supply disruptions should a war destroy or substantially
disrupt the petroleum infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, possessing an
energy infrastructure not dependent on petroleum will likely be a major advantage.
But this is a supposition, not a prediction. Amory Lovins ideas of a soft path in
the 1970s were rejected as petroleum consumption rose and, while
efficiency improvements have made a 21 substantial difference, and the
logic of thinking about an American energy strategy not dependent on
petroleum from afar impeccable, higher corporate priorities won out over
sound public policy. The opportunity to choose to take the route less travelled, to
use Lovins phrasing, now has further impetus from anti SUV campaigners,

climate change and peace activists in addition to clean up crews dealing


with petroleum on the beaches of the Gulf of Mexico in mid 2010, but the
necessary policies require a major rethink of geopolitical priorities
(Paterson and Dalby 2009).

Understanding Chinese environmental policy requires


understanding political narratives.
Lo 14 (Alex Y. Lo. Environmental Economics, Geography, Science, Technology and
Environmental Politics PhD, Australian National University, National development
and carbon trading: the symbolism of Chinese climate capitalism, Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 56:2, 111-126, DOI:
10.1080/15387216.2015.1062731,LD)
The non-liberal political economy of carbon trading in China cannot be
reduced to the language of markets, but has to be understood in the light
of its sociopolitical development trajectories. The conditions in which the
domestic markets can deliver material benefits are not clear. On the other hand,
neoliberal terms such as marketization and capitalism connote
Western-style politicaleconomic successes. While building a market
economy is regarded as a way for the Chinese nation-state to reform the
economy, it is also envisaged as a way for strengthening its ability to regain
recognition and respect from a century of national humiliation (Agnew 2010,
2012; Callahan 2009, 2013). Aspirations to scale up the domestic carbon markets
are discursively linked to the dominant narratives of national development that
revolve around losses of territory, sovereignty, and power in recent Chinese history.
The policy discourse is characterized by a nationalistic desire for influence in global
climate change governance and international carbon markets. The idea of
building a national carbon market is embedded into these narratives (Lo
and Howes 2015). China is pursuing a more active role in international
carbon markets. This imperative is consistent with the broader aspirations to
share global power with industrialized economies. Participating in emission trading
is a crucial first step towards this end, then gradually ascending to a regional
market operator. The Chinese climate change policy from 2013 includes elements
directed to securing greater access to the international carbon market and
strengthening its ability to trade carbon at profitable margins. The regulatory intent
of the policy program and prospects for significant emission cuts are unclear.
Nonetheless, it can be seen as a strategic economic instrument broadly compatible
with its ascending global economic influence.

Turns relations
International relations are not rationally or logically
determined as if from above. Theyre shaped by the same
geopolitical representations of foreign states that frame public
opinion.
Boria 6 [Boria, Edoardo, Faculty of Political Science, Universit La Sapienza,
Rome, Italy. "One stereotype, many representations: Turkey in Italian geopolitics."
Geopolitics 11.3 (2006): 484-506.] 6/26/16
In this context, representations assume special importance, since as Said3 taught
they reveal more about those who produce them than about the people and
places they represent. From a post-structuralist and deconstructionist viewpoint,
geopolitical representations, rather than providing new insight, merely
recycle old metaphors, inevitably based on models already widespread in
the popular imaginary. With regard to national stereotypes, it is well known that
the population of any given state is recognised and identified by the
populations of other states through preconceived representations, for
example, the clichs about austere and hard-working Germans, English
gentlemen or refined Frenchmen. These stereotypes satisfy a basic human
need to know the world, providing appropriate cognitive categories to
that end.
Such labels help define the image of a population in the eyes of others,
leading to perceptions based on expected rather than actual behaviour. As
early as the 1920s, Walter Lippman pointed out that: we can best understand
the furies of war and politics by remembering that almost the whole of
each party believes absolutely in its picture of the opposition, that it takes
as fact, not what is, but what it supposes to be the fact.4 Such prejudices are often
deeply rooted, persisting regardless of the state of official relations between
countries at a given time. Furthermore, such labels can remain in the collective
imaginary for a very long time, unaffected by political change. For example, the
abolition of physical borders within the European Union has clearly not
been accompanied by an analogous removal of the mental boundaries
separating its peoples, who continue to perceive their neighbours in
terms of the representational schemes retained in the collective
imaginary.
The national stereotype thus shapes the collective geopolitical
subconscious, in turn an integral part of the national geopolitical vision,5
and therefore of particular interest in the study of relations between
national collectives. The concept of national geopolitical vision is based on the
observation that, in their interpretations of international political dynamics, the
elites of any given country share certain cognitive mechanisms with their conationals, mechanisms that are the outcome of that countrys historical experience
and geographical circumstances. There are thus, no separate sets of geopolitical
codes, distinguishing between high geopolitics that of political leaders and low
geopolitics that of other citizens. There is, rather, a heritage common to the entire
national community (geopolitical culture), which favours the elaboration of a

geopolitical discourse sensitive to shared values and perceptions.6 This underscores


the role of popular culture in geopolitics: The scripting of global geopolitics in
popular culture popular geopolitics is also significant, in that it is within the
sphere of popular culture that national cultures are formed and reinforced.7 These
concepts are a far cry from the principles underlying classical geopolitics,
whereby political elites are seen to behave in a rational and logical
fashion, while public opinion is perceived as emotional and rather
muddled. Despite the thorough revision prompted by critical geopolitics, the neorealist perception of dominant geopolitical actors as virtually independent primary
agents in the process of collective geopolitical interpretation is, all too often, still
accepted uncritically. In other words, since control of the context in which
interpretations are elaborated is crucial in practical geopolitics, the representations
put forward by the elite and disseminated by the media would necessarily be
imposed on the rest of society from above. To accept this however, would be
to underestimate the role of prevailing social norms. Ever since Max Weber,
sociology has shown that human actions are related to prevailing cultural models
within social structures. Elite representations and readings of the world are
therefore bound to be affected by the cultural models rooted in society,
and their views on foreign politics by preconceived images, such as
stereotypes.

Turns feminism
Critical geopolitics makes feminism aware of its metaphors and
ground it to reality, allowing it to better describe and
transform the world.
Hanson 92 [Hanson, Susan, professor, School of Geography. Clark University.
Worcester, MA. "Geography and feminism: worlds in collision?." Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 82.4 (1992): 569-586.] 6/25/16
Feminism has been much like a space ship, floating free in the cosmos,
unencumbered by the gravity of real geographies. Feminists need to come
down to earth, quite literally, by incorporating space, place, and location
into feminist understandings of everyday life, into feminist understandings of
context, and into feminist understandings of how differences are created and
dissolved. Geographers can trans- form feminism by pulling it down to earth, by
grounding it, by showing how gender is and continues to be shaped by real
geographies. With appropriate infusions of the geographical imagination,
feminists can come to see the importance of the real geography behind
the geographic metaphors that have suffused feminist writing. Once thus
transformed by the gravity of geography, feminism might find it easier not
only to describe the world but to actually transform it.

Links

China link
***The 1ac is emblematic of a Western narrative that
misunderstands and invalidates China. [1nc card]
Parenti 13 [International Institute Lorenzo de Medici in Rome, Italy. Oct. 10,

Geography, Chinas Path And State-Society Relations: Redressing Western


Misinterpretations, Human Geography: A New Radical Journal, 6(2): 137-150.] GK
The complexity of Chinas state-society relations is often underestimated, or
completely neglected, by Western commentators, journalists, politicians and,
at times, academics. There especially seems to be a lack of theoretical
ideas and systematic analysis in geographical studies. The overall outcome of
said underestimation is the proliferation of misinterpretations on the
meaning-sense of evolving relational configurations between power, people
and places in China. Hence the Western ability (institutions and common
people) to understand and judge, as objectively as possible, ongoing socioeconomic and political trends in China, its hybrid experimental path and general
development trajectory, is concretely invalidated . Starting from this standpoint
and drawing from different sources, this paper first suggests that the changing
characteristics of the current Chinese multi-scalar politico-socio-economic processes
cannot be simply reduced to capitalism. Secondly, to get a better
understanding of China in a comparative perspective by analyzing the
countrys direction of development and governance I summarize some
instructive traits of state-society relations, arguing that the nature and
significance of these differ, when they are not quite the reverse, from the
prevailing (mis)interpretations by Western agents. I specifically refer to the
need to (re)interpret two points from a comparative standpoint: a) the states
popular legitimacy and socio-economic dynamism, and b) the variegated modes of
conflict resolution and financial governance.

Pacific Rim narrative


The aff advances the Pacific Rim narrativewith China at the
center of an alternative global focus to the previously
dominant North Atlantic core.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.
Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
The idea of the Pacific Rim now seems so dated. Yet in the 1990s it was central to
much debate about the integration of the newly opened China into world politics.
Within China its main proponents tend to come from think tanks and quasi-official
agencies most supportive of globalization and Chinas links to the overseas Chinese
and neighboring countries. The focus on China as part of a larger Pacific or
Asian world, the terms vary, is designed to place China at the center of a
web of connections around the massive Chinese diaspora in Southeast
Asia and around the Pacific Ocean, paying particular attention to how a
widespread network of nodes and territories has played a
disproportionate role in fostering the opening up and economic growth of
China since the 1980s. Dubbed Rimspeak by Bruce Cumings (1998), rather
than celebrating an essential Chinese identity locked into a historically given
territory, this narrative sees China as a central geographical moment in a new
geopolitical logic knitting together the Pacific Rim as an alternative global
focus to the previously dominant North Atlantic core. What is lacking, it
now seems clear, is much to connect this geopolitical vision to a positive
rendering of the Chinese past. Its proponents seem to have thought that
projecting what seemed to the dominant trend of the present into the future was
sufficient justification. Yet, the emphasis on the diaspora always ran the risk of
bringing to mind, implicitly if not explicitly, the years of Chinese humiliation at the
hands of foreigners and the emigration of Chinese in search of greener pastures
elsewhere than those left at home. The apparent postcolonial and postterritorial moorings of the Pacific Rim concept have also made it seem less
attractive in China in the face of the countrys increasingly self-sustained
economic growth, the crisis in global finance, and fears articulated in the U.S. of
the military threat emanating reflex-like from an economically vibrant
China.

The Pacific rim narrative replicates stereotypes about China


that ignore internal complexities.
Cartier 13 [Carolyn Cartier (Professor of Human Geography and China Studies at

University of Technology Sydney), "Whats territorial about China? From geopolitical


narratives to the administrative area economy," Eurasian Geography and
Economics, final version received 26 March 2013] AZ
The Pacific Rim narrative reflected the eras scholarly concern with the
postsocialist world and perspectives in development economics, including critical
political economy and transition theory. The perspective of transition theory, in its

supposition that marketization engenders democratic political change, was arguably


tone-deaf to the condition that the PRC would decentralize economic planning while
maintaining centralized authoritarian power through the next half-century.
Variations of the Pacific Rim narrative also observed the impact of authoritarian
governments in postwar Asian development, from Japan to Singapore (Cumings
1998). Yet, the idea of the Pacific Rim as a globalization narrative primarily
located power in economic change. To the degree that intellectuals in China
took up the Pacific Rim narrative, its economic focus also usefully bracketed
understanding China as the Peoples Republic and the partystate. Its
interest in flows, networks, travels, and so forth effectively refused to go
onshore. It did not anticipate Chinas opening to the world economy via
the south China coast as a regional strategy an accumulation strategy set in
motion for the long-term primary interest of modernizing the national territorial
state. About the south China coast, my previous work sought to produce a set of
perspectives about regional formation through understanding globalization as a
historical process (Cartier 2001a). Against the trend, I identified problems of the
Pacific Rim narrative: from the worldview perspective of Beijing, the
outward-looking south coast (a maritime frontier and historical mercantile
region) often challenged the inward looking priorities of the northern
capital region. In the 1980s, the PRC acknowledged these differences again by
directing international capital to assume its historical geography in new special
zones in the Pearl River delta: Guangzhou, in the Pearl River delta, was the only city
allowed foreign trade by the Qing dynasty (16441911). In 1949, when the CCP
established the Peoples Republic, many of Chinas capitalists left for
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other overseas destinations. The economies of Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore were restructuring and seeking to redeploy capital
when China opened its economy to external investment. In broad brush, the Pacific
Rim narrative was an updated version of the maritime regions world of globalizing
linkages; but its ungrounded approach was not engaged with guonei and
the PRCs territorial project. An outstanding example of this problem was the
CCPs critique of the River Elegy (He shang ) television series in 1988, a
fundamental guonei-guowai dilemma that portrayed northern China as traditional
and backward, and the south coast as international, contemporary, and leading
Chinas future. No mere pop culture controversy, River Elegy, was produced by
Chinas state television network and the controversy over it infused central
government politics over the Tiananmen incident in 1989. The Pacific Rim
narrative lacked engagement with China from the perspective of the
nations capital and its political-territorial logic. It was geared to both
international perspectives and international capital and mispositioned to
represent China at large .

Orientalism
Their orientalist understanding of China as a unique cultural
power glosses over internal differences and reproduces the
same problems.
Cartier 13 [Carolyn Cartier (Professor of Human Geography and China Studies at
University of Technology Sydney), "Whats territorial about China? From geopolitical
narratives to the administrative area economy," Eurasian Geography and
Economics, final version received 26 March 2013] AZ
The second narrative framework, the Orientalist, represents essential
Chineseness by explaining Chinas place in the world as a unique
cultural-political power. This narrative recalls the imaginary of China as
the Middle Kingdom and its spatial centrality China at the center of the
historical tribute system in which Asian states symbolically recognized Chinas
relational position (Fairbank and Teng 1954). The Orientalist narrative
demonstrates a traditional, descriptive area studies approach,
uninformed by contemporary social theory . This narrative cannot compete
with the scholarly narrative of international relations with Chinese characteristics,
Agnews fourth type, which engages theory in the mode of new area studies. Yet, as
active narrative projects, they both share interest in determining which
characteristics of Chinas history shall be included in geopolitical renderings of
Chinas international relations. In this way, each invites nationalistic and party-state
versions of history. Each also brackets regional differences within China, and
represents the worldview from the capital. In the 1990s, when new area
studies took hold, the nation-state and its narratives from perspectives of elites
became marginalized not only by variations of poststructural theory in
interdisciplinary studies, but also in human geography by path-breaking scholarship
on the urban condition. The scholarship ranged from understanding the city as the
center of capital circulation to new theorizations of place as social relations
entangled with multiple scales of activity. The outcome of new work in human
geography in the 1990s, from especially economic, social, gender, and cultural
subfields, had the effect of instantiating the city as the leading site and context of
research. This shift in scale has been so significant that sometimes it seems
as if only political geographers have continued to pursue questions about
territory, territorial dynamics, and the nation-state.

The aff's is an instance of Sino-speak, which merely substitutes


Chinese dominance for US oppression.
Callahan 14 [William A. Callahan (Professor of International Politics and China
Studies in the Politics Department at the University of Manchester) "Chinese
Exceptionalism and the Politics of History," Asian Thought on Chinas Changing
International Relations, 2014] AZ
Sino-speak is the emerging dialect for the new orientalism . As Jacquess and Lius books
show,

Sino-speak employs a new vocabulary and grammar of naturalized

civilization and essentialized identity to describe and thus prescribe Chinas rejuvenation
greatness. Certainly this is not the first time an Asian power has challenged the West. In the 1980s, conventional wisdom told us that

to global

criticisms of Chinese power


resemble Japan-bashing from an earlier era. But Sino-speaks new
orientalism, which justifies Chinas rise to global power, also has much in
common with Japans chauvinistic celebrations of its uniquely superior
culture in the 1980s. The discourse of Chinese exceptionalism is hardly
the torch had been passed to Japan, and in the 1990s to the Pacific Rim. Today, many

unique ; as articulations of American exceptionalism show, part of being a


great power is celebrating the moral value of your new world order. This is not
simply a scholarly debate; Sino-speak is heavily promoted by government officials, state media, and official intellectuals in China. The
alternative to Western hegemony here is not a post-hegemonic
international society that is more fluid and open , but a different form of
hegemony that is centered on Chinese values. The contours of Chinese exceptionalism, new orientalism,
and Sinospeak become clearer when they are compared with Bruce Cumingss Rimspeak (1998), and particularly with Rimspeaks production of space,
the state, history, race, and values. In the 1980s and 1990s, the discourse of the Pacific century and then the Asian century talked of the transboundary
and trans-oceanic economic and social networks that knittogether the Pacific rim. Sino-speak, however, is resolutely continental. Chinas large territory
and population and long history make it a gravitational center around which the Asian region naturally orbits. Instead of celebrating cross-border flows,

Sino-speak looks to Chinas eternal civilization to determine social,


cultural, and territorial borders. In the 1990s, business writers, anthropologists, and philosophers all declared that

Greater China offered a new grammar of socioeconomic power that was centered on overseas Chinese socio-economic networks rather than on the
political-economy of a centralized state. In Megatrends Asia (1996) John Naisbitt wrote: It is not China. It is the Chinese network to explain the grand shift
in economic activity from nation-states to transnational networks (1996: 7). In the early 1990s, Tu Weiming likewise argued that the periphery [i.e. the
Chinese diaspora] sets the agenda for the center in Beijing (Weiming 1994: 12). With Sinospeak, the state has returned with a vengeance, but in new

Sinospeak asserts China as the center of Asia not as a nation-state, but


as a civilization-state, a military-state, an empire-state, and a party-state .
forms.

Naisbitts latest book Chinas Megatrends (2010) turns volte-face to praise Beijings centralized state power as an enterprise-state, and Tu Weiming has
moved from Harvard to Peking University. Rimspeak worked according to a creole-logic that wove together cultures, ideas, and concepts from different
places (albeit according to a neoliberal grammar) into a network; outsiders, like the celebrated overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Australia,

Sino-speak, on the other hand, is


fascinated by essential identity and pure race. Jacques criticizes Chinese
attitudes about racial superiority even as he promotes Chinas superior
civilization. Liu envisions the Chinese nation as the yellow race in
competition with the white race. Cosmopolitanism here is no longer a transnational alternative to ethnonationalism,
and North America, constituted some of this networks main nodes of transmission.

but the means through which Chinas national culture is transmitted around the world. Rimspeaks futurology was largely ahistorical; or, for Japan, it was
about escaping the historical legacy of its wartime atrocities. Overseas Chinese identity emerges from mobility and flexibility, rather than from the weight
of history. Sino-speak, however, is resolutely historical, asserting epic History to explain Chinas inevitable rise as a rejuvenation, one that returns China to
its rightful place at the center of the world. Reading these books gives one the sense of dj vu. In addition to mirroring Japans arguments from the
1980s, Sino-speak raises topics that were very popular in China a century ago: the value of Confucianism, Chinas proper role in the world, the global race
war, and others in this vein (see Kang, 2005). It is as though some of the writers want to build a time machine to take the world back to 1911 (the
Republican Revolution) to have a do-over for Chinese modernity, or to 1799 (the death of the Qianlong emperor) to rejoin the historical narrative of

Sino-speak takes
economic strength for granted and looks to culture to explain war, peace,
and world order. It discards the network-based logic of globalization that
ties us all together (for better and for worse) in an integrated global political-economy to assert a sharp
geopolitical vision of the world instead. For Sino-speaks partisans history
works in reverse, with the Sinocentric neo-tributary system now
challenging the Westphalian system to rewrite the wrongs of Chinas Century of National Humiliation (18401949).
imperial greatness. While the Asian century looked to Asian values to explain the regions economic growth,

Likewise, the Beijing consensus challenges the Washington consensus, and the China dream challenges the American dream in a grand civilizational
competition. While Rimspeak celebrated the rise of postcolonial nations, here we have a new empire: Eurocentrism is replaced by Sinocentrism,

Westernization is replaced by Easternization, and American


exceptionalism is replaced by Chinese exceptionalism . Other possibilities
for Chinas future and the worlds future are largely crowded out of these culturally determined prognostications.
Sino-speak thus expresses thoroughly conservative values in familiar ways to argue
against equality and anti-imperialism. Indeed, it mobilizes hard-core activists
in both Beijing and Washington to defend their respective national
identities, interests, and security against new threats and age-old others .
As this conclusion demonstrates, it is easy to get caught up in the Sino-speak tsunami as it
overwhelms nuanced notions of identity and politics to establish the new
discursive world order of new orientalism. But what if Sino-speak is wrong? What if China continues to

What if China and the world


can actually get along in a new cosmopolitanism that promotes equality
and social justice both domestically and globally? Unfortunately, Sino-speak leaves
little space to ask these questions, let alone answer them. New
orientalisms mix of scholarship and policy-making is not crafting a posthegemonic world order; rather, it provides discursive legitimacy for
Sinocentric hegemony in the twenty-first century.
socialize as an even greater supporter of global norms? What if Chinas inevitable rise stalls?

The affs vision of China is a flawed geopolitical narrative


based on an idealized image of Chinas past.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.
Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
It is the Orientalist vision that has probably been most visible among popular
writers and think tanks associated with the mainstream faction within the
leadership of the partystate over the past five years. But this has older roots in
the common insistence by many authorities, both Chinese and not, of Chinese
history for most of its course down until the 20th century as representing the
workings of a Sinocentric tributary system with Confucian adages
providing the socio-psychological basis to a Chinese exceptionalism that is
completely different from anything to be found anywhere else. Prominent in
certain popular works by Western writers (e.g., Jacques, 2009), this type of
narrative based on an idealized image of Chinas past also has many Chinese
proponents. Such intellectuals have been looking to venerable concepts such as
tianxia (or All-under-Heaven) to rethink empire and world order in a register drawn
from Chinese intellectual history but applied to the contemporary world (e.g., Zhou
Tingyang, 2005, 2011). Thus, for example, Yan Xuetong (2011) borrows from the
ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi to construct a hierarchical-realist perspective
predicting that a balanced economic-political-military approach to Chinese foreign
relations will produce better outcomes all round than would a China emphasizing
economic growth alone. Others look back not so much for philosophical inspiration
as to identify popular historical traditions such as some variety of Confucianism or
historical features such as the lack of a balance-of-power between polities in East
Asia (e.g., see Carlson, 2011) to underpin their prognostications about
contemporary world politics.

Nationalist geopolitik narrative


The aff views China as part of a nationalist geopolitik narrative
territorialist expansion and sea power projection are
necessary to check each every event in the neighborhood,
each of which threaten Chinas resurrection.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
Somewhat less visible has been a developing discovery of old-school German and
Japanese geopolitics framed in nationalist terms. Termed the geopolitik turn by
Christopher Hughes (2011), this type of narrative, epitomized by such books as
China Dream (Liu Mingfu, 2010) and the immensely popular novel Wolf Totem (Jiang
Rong, 2004), focuses on Chinas need to protect access to resources around
the world through the projection of sea power. To one degree or another, all of
these accounts recycle old geopolitical nostrums equivalent to
lebensraum, organismic statehood, and racial categorization. They are
characterized by the same moral exceptionalism as the older German
model. China, as was Germany in its day, is sui generis. It is a Han Chinese
enterprise in a Social Darwinian world. In this construction, China is awakening
from its slumber to resurrect the martial values that in the past had led its
dynasties to expand territorially across Asia. The message from this posture
for Chinas leaders is that every event in Chinas neighborhood involving
other actors is a potential challenge to Chinas status and thus must be
met with an immediate response. As a result, and among other things,
Ultimately no room is left for compromise in the contest with Japan, because
control of the East China Sea is not just about energy reserves; it is about the bigger
question of who controls Taiwan, access to the Pacific and ultimately to the world
(Hughes, 2011, p. 620). The syncretism here is obvious, yet it now serves to
justify totally Sinocentric ends. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is elements in the
Peoples Liberation Army and military oriented think tanks that are the main
proponents of this recycled geopolitik. But it has also become increasingly
popular in the blogosphere among so-called Han (racial) nationalists.

IR link
Attempts to incorporate Chinese characteristics into
traditional IR theory replicate flawed think-tank narratives of
fixed state borders and international anarchy.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.
Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
Finally, by comparison significantly more anodyne, are those attempts at
configuring a conception of international relations with Chinese
characteristics. Many studies are of this genre. They tend to be most closely
associated with American-educated political scientists attempting to reproduce
in China the sort of Ivy League universitythink tankState Department
connection that they have observed in the U.S. As is well known, much of what
goes for international relations theory was invented in the United States (Agnew,
2012). If in the realist register, this involves crucial assumptions of anarchy
beyond state borders and inter-state competition for status, in a
rationalist/liberal one the emphasis is on relative gains in utility and a focus on
economic rather than military contestation. Sinicizing such approaches takes
several forms. One involves highlighting Chinese traditions as a partial
explanation of Chinese diplomatic conduct (Ming Wan, 2012, p. 105). In this
way allusions to harmony and analogies to ancient dynastic wars take on deeper
meaning as representing something fundamentally Chinese rather than as noble
and arguably universal sentiments or historically contingent events of distant
memory. Implicit here still is a potential celebration of an essential Chinese
difference that remains unrelated to much actual Chinese history; the fact,
for example, as Gilbert Rozman (2012, p. 122) puts it, The hereditary family elite in
China is steeped in family socialism, not Confucianism. Rather more profoundly,
however, the other involves reorienting the entire field (inside and beyond China)
around concepts drawn from the ancient philosopher Xunzi (and others), the
benevolent nature of Chinese power, and a normative hierarchical order. Reading
across a number of writers, particularly Qin Yaqing (2011), Yan Xuetong (2011), and
Yiwei Wang (2007), Allen Carlson (2011, p. 101) sees evidence for the
development of a new vision of world order which supplements, if not
replaces, Westphalia with newly resurrected, yet historically grounded,
Chinese concepts of how international politics might be reorganized.
Increasingly, however these accounts appear more realist in their
emphasis on China versus the rest than oriented to a rationalist view of
relative gains among fellow states (Lynch, 2009). Moreover, and ironically, that
the reference point is Westphalia even as Chinese history is mined for
concepts and crucial events to argue against it is suggestive again of the
degree to which these new geopolitical narratives are of mixed and not
simply Chinese origin. Of course, this is by no means a new development. Chinese
intellectuals and politicians have wrestled with Western influences, not least the

now increasingly forgotten borrowing from Marxism, for centuries. Mining history, it
seems, is as much about what is forgotten as what is remembered.

China rise
The narrative of "China's rise" assumes a linear progression of
states locked into a rotation of global hegemons.
Agnew 10 [John Agnew (Professor of Geography at UCLA), "Emerging China and

Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese Particularity," Eurasian


Geography and Economics, 2010] AZ
The modern linear geopolitical narrative has always had four basic elements, even
though these have changed in relative significance over the course of time. The first
is a global vision in which the world as it came to be known from the 16th century
onwards exists for powerful actors to survey and subdue. A hierarchy of places,
from the legitimately powerful to the relatively powerless, is justified in terms of an
objective claim about the global unevenness of natural material conditions
(resource base, access to the sea, etc.), even as it is the interests of specific
states (such as Britain or the United States) that are seen as at stake. In this way,
political claims for particular states are turned into natural claims about the world
as it is. The second element is the representation of different parts of the
world as following a linear path from backwardness to modernity, with
Europe (and the North America) as the presumed standard of judgment. The
imitation of the West becomes the condition of entry into the global state system.
This element assumes a third one: that the singular map of the world is the
political one of a world divided up into putative nation-states. Territorial
states are the individual and usually the singular actors of the modern
geopolitical imagination. State sovereignty is inherently territorialized, the
state essentially maps the society, and there is a fundamental divergence
between the domestic and the foreign. Even though each one of these
statements is empirically problematic, together they have created a sense of
the transcendental force of world divided up into carbon-copy states even though
historically the range of polities has been extremely wide, from kin-based systems
to city-states and classic empires. Finally, the fourth and binding element of the
linear narrative of global geopolitics is that states are in an unremitting
competition with one another for primacy. From this viewpoint, achieving high
rates of economic growth will automatically translate into an urge for
greater power at others expense and the anarchy of the world beyond
state borders makes this task inevitable. Thus is the circle of the modern
geopolitical imagination squared. The adoption of this linear narrative in China and
by foreign authorities, both political and intellectual, is of obvious importance in
producing resulting effects. By way of example, the influential May Fourth
movement of the Republican period (1919) was a direct result of Chinese
intellectuals efforts to come to terms with the Western linear narrative of
nationhood and geopolitics (Duara, 1997, p. 235). So, this is not just a story of the
imposition of a foreign narrative but its active appropriation in China. Indeed, the
great figure in modern Chinese history Sun Yat-sen clearly adopted this
perspective in his writings on the awakening of China to modern
nationhood even, as I shall suggest later, he placed it within a very Chinese
conception of cultural change as the precipitator of political
transformation (e.g., Bergre, 2000; Mitter, 2005; Zarrow, 2005). Nevertheless, it
is foreign commentators who are especially prone to interpret Chinas
geopolitical position exclusively in terms of Western conventional wisdom.

Frequently, this is framed in terms of anxiety and even dread. Recent titles from the
U.S. and France, for example, include Red Dragon Rising: Communist Chinas
Military Threat to America (Timperlake and Triplett, 1999); China: The Gathering
Threat (Menges, 2005); Hegemon: Chinas Plan to Dominate Asia and the World
(Mosher, 2000); The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model Will
Dominate the Twenty First Century (Halper, 2010) and Le vampire du milieu:
Comment la Chine nous dicte sa loi (Cohen and Richard, 2010). Although such
works differ in their precise arguments, for example about the relative utility for
China of economic versus military and hard versus soft power, they share a
nervousness about a seemingly inevitable new world order in which China
will be the next hegemon in the relay race for top dog that is central
to the modern geopolitical imagination. Following a similar geopolitical logic
but welcoming Chinas rise as a harbinger of a revolutionary new approach to
world politics are those authors who see the refusal of the U.S. and Europe to
accept the naturalness of the process of Chinas rise as the main threat to
peace and understanding (e.g., Jacques 2009; Steinfeld, 2010). Thus, to Arrighi
and Silver (quoted in Johnson 2000, p. 32): If the system breaks down, it will
primarily be because of US resistance to adjustment and accommodation. And
conversely, the US adjustment and accommodation to the rising economic
power of the East Asian region is an essential condition for a noncatastrophic transition to a new world order. Waiting for China, as
either threat or hope, is nothing new . Indeed, these have been the two
main ways in which the Western linear geopolitical narrative has been
applied to China since the 19th century. They both rest initially and finally on
a sensibility that China is simply just another Great Power, albeit one that
has had a long period of eclipse after earlier grandeur and, thus, that we can
expect to see much the same translation of economic power into military
power and geopolitical influence in an anarchic world that characterized
previous periods of hegemonic transition. That China might bring a distinctive
sensibility of its own or that a more complex interweaving of its own encounter with
world politics (in the context of a world now no longer appropriately thought of as
one where territorial states simply bang up against one another) may be better
ways of thinking about Chinas contemporary geopolitical situation have not
been in the cards. The Enlightenment objectivist accounting of global geopolitics
still rules in much of what is written about China today by internationalrelations specialists and journalists inside and outside of China.

Asia pivot
The idea of an Asian pivot replicates previous unreflexive,
geographically deterministic claims.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). "Is US security policy pivoting
from the Atlantic to AsiaPacific." Dialogue on Globalization (2012).] 6/22/16
Much has been made by pundits and politicians of the so-called pivoting
of US security policy and military planning since 2010. The United States has
turned towards Asia-Pacific and presumably away from the trans-Atlantic focus that
had, on these accounts, previously defined the overall US global geopolitical posture
since the 1940s. Magazines such as Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy have led the
rush to see a fundamental geographical shift signaled by what can seem to be much
more modest proposals for adjusting US foreign policy in recent speeches by
President Barack Obama, speeches and a major article written by Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, and the new Defense Strategic Guidelines. Exaggerating the
scope of this shift fits in with the view popular in the United States that
the twenty-first century will be an Asian Century (almost entirely because
of the economic rise of China) and that Europe is destined for global
peripheral status as its project of unification falters. American primacy,
even if now nervously asserted more than genuinely believed, remains the one
certainty in official quarters. The main threat now comes from the AsiaPacific, hence the need for the geopolitical tilt.
A critical geopolitical perspective is deeply suspicious of such nostrums.
The academic field of Geography was scarred badly in the early twentieth
century, not least in Germany and Japan, by its association with a
geopolitics which provided geographically determinist claims for pivots
emerging as a result of the coming of the railway, its challenge to sea
power, and, as a direct result, control over the steppes of central Asia
giving the global geopolitical edge to local land powers. Apart from such
idiosyncratic figures as Robert Kaplan in the US, some Eurasianists in Russia, and
enthusiasts for Haushofers Geopolitik in China, reading security policy from
physical geography is not central to contemporary discussions about foreign and
military policy. But the language of pivoting and the idea of wholesale shifts
in the center of gravity of world politics are part of the enduring legacy of
classical geopolitical arguments. Beyond that, the practical reasoning
involved is based on geographical assumptions and labels that should be
investigated rather than simply asserted. The entire narrative about a
shift in US security policy from the trans-Atlantic to the AsiaPacific
world needs close scrutiny.

Humiliation narrative
The aff is part of the humiliation narrative that seeks a return
to China's imperial greatness.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
To the extent that the current Chinese leadership group has its own storyline about
Chinas role in the world, and notwithstanding blustering rhetoric, particularly from
elements in the military, about Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea, it is as a
peacefully rising power aiming toward a harmonious world. Yet, lurking behind
this apparently Confucian image lies a sense of anxiety about what the
China that is rising exactly is. The aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan, etc.
then is not completely divorced from that about the peacefully rising power.
My point is not that the Chinese government necessarily harbors expansionist
sentiments but that the collective memory of humiliation at the hands of
foreign powers in the 19th and 20th centuries is now leading to a desire for
recognition and respectfrom the self-same foreigners and from minorities
scattered within Chinas territory, whose idea of China must be that of a
national space restored to its former greatness. Many Chinese
intellectuals, and not just those affiliated with the military, have become
increasingly concerned about historic slights to what can be called the
Chinese geo-body and how many of these remain both alive (as with the status
of Taiwan and Tibet as Chinese territories) and connected to foreigners perceived
belittling of Chinese claims by their support for the Dalai Lama or of Taiwanese
claims to nation-statehood. Among contemporary scholars, William Callahan (2009)
has done the most to highlight the significance of what he calls the
cartography of national humiliation, the use of historic and contemporary
maps to document both Chinese claims and foreign denials. He makes a powerful
empirical case for how the cartography of national humiliation still animates
official, scholarly, and popular understandings of national territoriality in
China. Most important, these maps show a strangely anxious popular
countercurrent to Beijings current positive images of the PRC as a peacefully rising
power (ibid., p. 171). The maps in question consist of those that show how foreign
countries dismembered China by hiving off chunks of territory and creating
the Treaty Port system in the 19th century and those that purport to show how
much foreigners still regard many Chinese territorial claims as illegitimate.
Callahan makes a number of telling points about the humiliation narrative and
how it fits efforts to portray China as a historical victim presently simply
reestablishing its old self . One is to note how it employs the Westphalian
international systems grid to reduce, classify, or exclude the voices of
[the] quasi states [around its edges] and allow only the story of the great
unity of the emerging Chinese nation-state to be heard (Callahan, 2009,
pp. 159160). This reflects a second important feature of the humiliation
narrative: an almost obsessive concern with mapping contemporary national

sovereignty (in the Western sense of exclusive jurisdiction) onto a


traditional imperial domain. But this is not simply borrowing a foreign idea but
using it to communicate a more profound insecurity about the fragility of Chinese
identity as manifested in the recent history of national geopolitical fragmentation.
Behind this, and a third point, the search for great unity (da yitong) was a
powerful refrain across many dynasties and can thus be viewed as
constituting the guiding leitmotif for an organic historical geography to
the country as a whole.
Two theoretical insights underpin Callahans interpretation of the significance of the
humiliation maps. The first is that in the imagination of those recently and presently
in power in China, the country had until very recently been considered the
Sick Man of Asia. In this telling metaphor, the country represents a life needing
to be saved (jiuguo), with dismembered limbs (fenge) that need re-attaching. Thus,
in a biopolitical register, the re-emergence of an entire body politic for
China can be construed as a productive return of the country to health
after a long period of morbidity. Understanding the nature of the present day
geo-body is served by a second theoretical insight. The size and shape of China
remains a subject of contention within China as well as in relation to neighboring
countries. Polities never acquire some final geopolitical form; they are
always works in progress. This keeps their identities alive by forever
calling them into question. The typical claim, however, is that there has been a
relatively uncomplicated shift from the late imperial Chinese concept of unbounded
domain (jiangyu) to a modern understanding of bounded sovereign territory
(zhuquan lingtu) (Callahan, 2009, p. 146). What Callahan (ibid., p. 145) argues and
shows empirically with the various humiliation maps is that Chinas uneasy
shift from premodern unbounded understandings of space and territory to
bounded understandings of space and territory in the twentieth century
has been anything but a simple linear progression. The tension between past
imperial domain and present nation-state territory is alive and well.
Perhaps nowhere is this tension more apparent than in Chinas relationship to
Taiwan. The longstanding conflict between the renegade province, the seat of the
Kuomintang Government in exile since 1949, and the PRC reflects both the
increasingly separate identity of Taiwan and the refusal of the Beijing government to
countenance the idea of Taiwans distinction from, let alone potential independence
from, China proper. With the rise of the independence movement in Taiwan,
official maps on the island have shifted from the convention of accepting the
possibility of China reunited under the government of the ROC that fled to the island
after the Chinese Revolution and thus that incorporate Taiwan into the geo-body of
China as a whole. Todays maps rather depict it as separate, and use projections to
situate it as a maritime nation facing away from the mainland in a deliberate act of
politicized cartography (Callahan, 2009, pp. 169170).

Exceptionalism/Confucianism
Appeals to Confucian philosophy feed a narrative of Chinesecentered politics and strengthens autocracy.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
One irony in the hostility to Taiwan is that until recently it was the Kuomintang
governments in Taiwan that had made most use of Confucianism as providing
the cultural basis to their rule, yet now a similar recourse is under way in the
PRC. The themes of harmony (hexie) and the rule of virtue (yi de zhi guo) have
become favorites of both Chinas leaders and many intellectuals. These are
terms with a long Confucian genealogy but fit uneasily into the twin and
utterly contradictory worlds of socialist ideology and capitalist
organization that currently characterize China. At first sight, usage seems
largely instrumental. The notion of a Confucian renaissance (ruxue fuxing) would
certainly seem premature. The current regimes legitimacy still depends to a
degree on the break with the old cultural order symbolized by the 1949
Revolution (Billioud, 2011, p. 235). Yet, there has been an obvious drift
toward Confucian themes among both intellectuals and politicians over
the past 10 years. Although there is a variety of schools of thought, from liberal to
socialist Confucianism, even thinkers outside any particular school such as the
New Left writer Gan Yang (2007), for example, now advocate some sort of
Confucian socialist republic (rujia shehuizhuyi gongheguo). In his case, it is to
be an amalgam of liberal (rights), Maoist (equality), and Confucian (filial piety,
family relations) elements. There are others whose Confucianism is more
hardcore. Though sometimes criticized for a legalism and authoritarianism,
authors such as Jiang Qing (2003) are often difficult to classify. They are
committed to a much greater institutional reliance on Confucian principles
for justifying central political authority, such as developing proposals for, among
other things, a tricameral parliament representing three quintessential Confucian
sources: Heaven (tian), the transcendental scheme of things; the Earth (di), cultural
history; and humanity (ren), the will of the people. However fanciful such schemes
appear, they do suggest how much Confucian language and thinking have begun to
penetrate into Chinese political discourse in general. Even when they are criticized,
their naming as Confucian brings such ideas into greater currency (Billioud,
2011, p. 234).
The various tracks of political Confucianism undoubtedly feed into the
exceptionalist renderings of Chinese history and the positive spin that is
increasingly given to pre-revolutionary China. An increasingly vibrant
Sinocentric Confucianism (as opposed to that based on sharing with much of
East Asia, as was redolent for a while in the 1980s and 1990s) now challenges an
increasingly faux socialism for command over competing geopolitical
narratives. Its authentically native alternative (Rozman, 2012, p. 123) could, of
course, become the basis for a critique of both Maoist-era socialism and what has
substituted for it since the rise of Deng Xiaoping and his political offspring,

beginning in the late 1970s. Such an approach might also not travel that well,
particularly in neighboring states reminded of their own historical memories of
sinocentrism (Rozman, 2012, p. 124). This has not discouraged attempts at doing
so. Since 2004, as a part of its soft power drive to spread its cultural-political
influence, the Chinese government has set up over 700 Confucius Institutes and
Classrooms around the world in an effort to propagate Chinese language and culture
in the name of the Great Sage (Hartig, 2012). The Confucian bona fides of many of
the values championed by the Confucius Institutes seem doubtful. As Elena
Barabantseva (2011, p. 196) notes:
It is remarkable how the recent move of the Chinese authorities to promote
Confucian ideas is mixed with other modern ideas, such as mobility, adaptability,
and affluence. These attributes are not only incompatible with classical Confucian
thought but also go against its very grain. When China claimed to be ruled
according to Confucian principles, emigration and trade were perceived by the
Chinese rulers as undermining the stability of the Confucian order. Confucianism
prioritized agriculture and regarded commerce as a dishonorable activity; it
associated those engaged in commerce with exploitation and parasitism. Trade was
seen as corrupting of human morality. Emigration was suppressed and condemned
as against the value of filial piety toward parents and ancestors, as emigrants could
not dutifully pay their respects to older family members.
The term Confucianism, therefore, has come to have such a wide range of meanings
that it is now equivalent to Chineseness. What precisely it signifies in terms of
guiding practice and policy is unclear.
This is not the case, however, concerning what can be garnered from Chinas
eventful dynastic history. Imperial memories have become important resources in
informing Chinas contemporary domestic politics and foreign policy planning alike.
Naval strategists, for example, increasingly look to historic epochs when foreign
dynasties (such as the Yuan and the Qing) dominated China and potentially,
therefore, open to question whether it is the more inward-looking Han dynasties,
such as the Ming, that offer the best lessons for the present and the future of
Chinas external relations (Horner, 2009, p. 145). But the Qing Dynasty, once the
last word in feudalism and reaction as far as both Kuomintang and Communist
cosmologies of Chinese history were concerned, has become fashionable as a
source of historical analogies for reasons other than its relative foreignness and
openness. This is apparent in popular television programs as much as it is in the
pronouncements of intellectuals. The Qing is not alone. Particularly popular are the
Han (206 BCE220 CE) and Tang (618917) as well as the expansionist and
flourishing eras of the early Qing emperors Kangxi (r. 16611722) and Qianlong (r.
17351796).
What appears to be most appealing for many of todays intellectuals about
these epochs seems to be the mode of governance most frequently
associated with them. This is what Pierre-tienne Will (2011, p. 5) calls a sort of
autocratic paternalism, as opposed to a democracy where manipulative and
incompetent politicians are chosen by an ignorant populace. He makes this
judgment on the basis of examining the recent revival of interest in so-called
magistrate handbooks (guanzhen shu) from the golden age of the Qing in the 18th
century (e.g., Guo Chengwei, 2000). Alongside their paternalism, it is the imperial
successes of the 18th-century Qing emperors that attracts most positive attention.
But even the previously reviled 19th-century Qing emperors are now being
reevaluated as symbols of resistance against external aggression and

internal rebellion, even though in reality they proved totally unable to


deal with situations that were beyond them (Will, 2011, p. 6). The Ming
Dynasty, a native Han one, attracts nothing like the same positive attribution. In
Wills (2011, p. 13) opinion this is because the Ming were seen by the Qing
emperors and still are today as having being fatally weakened (and thus subject
to the overthrow that the Qing brought their way) by their relative openness to
factional politics. The Qing determined, and present-day policy entrepreneurs and
many intellectuals seem to be leaning the same way, that they would not allow the
same sort of situation to endanger their own regime. This is one important
institutional way in contemporary China in which the past speaks to the present and
the future.
Another more subtle influence is worth mentioning. This is that the early Qing
Emperor Kangxi made himself into the final authority of classical Confucian
authority, thus replacing the cadre of scholars who had dominated previously. This
should remind their contemporary equivalents (and us) of the real limitations on
their autonomy in contemporary China. However much they may contribute to
debate about the relevance of episodes in Chinas past in the present, in the end
this debate is always conducted within fairly narrow parameters. As Will (2011, p.
15) concludes in making this allusion: capturing ideological legitimacy at the
expense of the intellectuals, as Kangxi and his successors were able to do, is
something that cannot fail to remind us of more recent realities in China.

Frontier narrative
Their narrative is part of a territorialization strategy that
reproduces a periphery and reproduces the frontier of
otherness.
Oakes 12 [Tim Oakes, "Looking Out to Look In: The Use of the Periphery in China's
Geopolitical Narrative," Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53:3, 315-326, 2012]
AZ
Agnew (2012) argues that narratives re-imagining a settled Chinese past
have an important role to play in the unsettled China of today. Indeed, we
might extend this thought by pointing out the territorializing effect that such
narratives have had in China. My main point in this commentary has been to
emphasize that this territorializing effect can be viewed as a spatial process of
peripheralization, whereby frontier narratives tend to purify a history of crossborder contamination as a territorialization strategy in constituting the Chinese
geo-body. Whereas during the Mao era of centralized party-state socialism, these
purifying narratives reproduced a periphery that marked the leading edge of an
expanding and homogeneous Chinese culture emerging and spreading from a
single-origin in the Yellow River valley some 5,000 years ago, post-Mao and postsocialist narratives have constructed more of a peripheral contact zone between
China and its neighbors, where Han ethnicity and Chinese civilization alike are
viewed as having absorbed external influences. Although such borderland
narratives often express an alternative or even oppositional cultural space
to that of central China properas in the case of Zhang Chengzhis Xinlingshi
they nevertheless remain consistent as peripheralization projects,
reproducing the frontier of otherness necessary in constructing a coherent
geo-body. In other words, they reinvent histories of mixture, ambiguity, and
territorial complexity as coherent and pure expressions of an unambiguous
and knowable space called China. Agnew finds that recognition of the multiple
and competing geopolitical narratives currently informing Chinas foreign
policy and international relations should dispel any notion that there is a
single true story to tell in understanding how China views its emerging
place in the world. In what ways, then, do the peripheralizing projects and
narratives discussed here add to or disrupt this picture? It seems that
peripheralization narratives help bring into sharp focus the important cultural,
ethnic, and even racial dimensions that underlie, yet remain hidden within, the
geopolitical narratives discussed by Agnew. We are accustomed to reading in news
media outlets almost daily Chinas ongoing claims of territorial sovereignty in Tibet,
Taiwan, and the South China Sea. These are most often interpreted within a Western
realpolitik framework. Yet peripheralization suggests a much more culturally
complex set of dimensions underlying these claims. While there are many of these
dimensions worth discussing, I will conclude by noting, briefly, two kinds of
emergent representations that I think are particularly significant for our
understanding of Chinas place in the world today. These are first, representations
of the Han as one of the worlds great diasporic ethnicities, and second,
representations of Chinese culture as uniquely suited for absorbing global cultures,
purifying them, and ultimately rendering them Chinese. These representations,
then, tell us something about some of the emerging cultural, ethnic, and racial

undertones to the geopolitical narratives vying to describe Chinas place in the


world.

Authoritarianism link
The aff paints China as authoritarianfailing to acknowledge
the way in which it is constantly evolving politically and
economically.
Parenti 13 [International Institute Lorenzo de Medici in Rome, Italy. Oct. 10,
Geography, Chinas Path And State-Society Relations: Redressing Western
Misinterpretations, Human Geography: A New Radical Journal, 6(2): 137-150.] GK
Terms such as dictatorship, authoritarianism and single-party
system (often used interchangeably to draw a negative portrait of China)
are rarely associated with a systematic analysis of the relationship between the Chinese
authorities and the rest of the society, or rather, of the mechanism of the political class reproduction and the

people-politics/state-citizens dialectic. Hence, misinterpretations of China are extremely common. For instance ,

China is generally considered as a close and rigid system (another


assumption that is taken for granted), both politically and socially.
However, during the last few decades of land, fiscal and administrative reforms (not to mention
their historical precedents), the variegated and complex Chinese society has once
again recovered large margins of political agility. Formal recognition
enforced by the law of the right to demonstrate, freely exercised after obtaining
official authorization (as occurs in Western societies); the increasing number
of strikes in factories (an abolished right which, nevertheless, led to the new
labour contract law being drawn up in 2008); the state strategy to reactivate the
capillary role played by the Partys trade unions (recently even accepting independent trade
union representatives) to limit corporate abuse and improve the conditions of
labour (see The Economist, May 8, 2010: 61-62; Financial Times, February 4, 2013: 1,3; Van Der Pijl 2012: 512);
and the widespread use of direct elections for Village Committee members since 1988 (Trichur 2012 ); all are
significant aspects of the intense Chinese political and social dialectic.
The current processes of class formation and struggle appear to be
pushing the country towards a re-politicisation of social relations limiting
capitalist development (Van Der Pijl 2012: 504). And, despite capitalist influence and
presences, the determining characteristics of the Chinese regime of accumulation remain those of a contender
state-society complex, in which 10 the state class retains the key levers of power and operates as a force
anticipating and guiding class formation rather than being confronted by it, as was still the case in 1989

Diplomatic engagement
Diplomatic engagement unreflexively orders and legitimizes
state identities.
Jones and Clark 15 [Jones, Alun, school of Geography, University College Dublin

(UCD), Ireland and Julian Clark, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental
Sciences, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. "Mundane Diplomacies for the
Practice of European Geopolitics." Geoforum 62 (2015): 1-12. Web. (DM 6/23)
Moreover, debates on the geographies of state power have neglected the crucial
role of diplomats in maintaining the chimera of state permanence and
solidity in an era of profound change in polities globally (cf. Painter and
Jeffrey, 2009). The alleged hollowing out of the state, where complex networks
of relations among institutions and actors are constantly being made and
remade, provokes fundamental questions of how diplomatic practice is
implicated in creating this illusion of state presence, and in ordering and
legitimising state identities nationally and transnationally. Research on this
topic is particularly needed as national territories become more open to transsovereign contacts and paradiplomacy...enormously complicating the delivery of
[state] mechanisms and practices (Jessop and Sum, 2006, 118). Diplomacy in this
situation is becoming more and more about complexity management...
[characterised by] a progressive hollowing out of traditional diplomatic duties
(Henrikson, 2013, 130). Thus, as diplomacy now cuts across complex nested scalar
arrangements of organisations and practices, diplomats are no longer
guardians of the borders of the foreign, [but instead] boundary spanners
integrating the different landscapes and actors of the diplomatic
environment (Hocking et al., 2012, 5).
This boundary spanning allegedly requires a shift from statecentred to
integrative diplomacy (Hocking et al., 2012, 1) to address the need for
reorganisation of the modalities that shape and regulate state presence. This
recognises the different stakeholders and ensembles of actions and things
that constitute the state, and enable its projection through diplomacy,
nationally and internationally. Such reorganisation brings with it the
challenge of fashioning new pathways of diplomatic engagement to
counter the disordering of routinized diplomatic practices, alongside new
possibilities for diplomatic space to be used by various actors and interests. In sum,
the move to integrative diplomacy commands closer academic attention to
the contemporary geographies of diplomatic practice, and how these
practices are transacted in diverse spatial settings, sites and domains,
under conditions of multiple contestation of state authority and
legitimacy. Consequently, the ways in which diplomats devise, trial, make
claims and counter-claims about geopolitical representations are, in our
view, ripe for practice-based analysis.

Nature
Narratives that view places and events as natural assume
discrete categorization and binary thinking.
Little 8 [Little, Jo, Professor in Gender and Geography, University of Exeter.

"Nature, fear and rurality." Fear: critical geopolitics and everyday life (2008): 87-98.]
6/25/16
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the geographies
of fear and nature. The chapter argues that studies of fear have incorporated the
idea and the practical realities of nature in complicated, confused and often
contradictory ways. Nature has been seen variously as both the source of
fear and as a protector against fear; inflicting huge damage and
destruction when it acts beyond the control of human society but also
providing security against an unpredictable human threat. As
poststructuralist geographies have opened up new ways of
conceptualising the relationship between nature and society, challenging
the dominance of binary thinking and the assumption of discrete
categories (see for example, Doel 1999; Murdoch 2006), so space has been
created for rethinking the social construction of nature and the ways in
which ecology and the environment are incorporated within human
experience of space.
The chapter differs from many of the others in this volume in that it is not about a
specific fear affecting a defined group of people. Indeed, nature itself may, at first
sight, be rather remote from geopolitical concerns about struggles over land and
security felt by individuals and groups. It is telling that any discussions of nature
tend to be couched in terms of global environmental questions and
sustainability within the geopolitics literature. While such issues are clearly
hugely important (and very firmly related, as Castree (2003) points out, to power
knowledge and global inequality at the local level) they do not often engage with
the local experience of nature and with the emotions that shape our responses to it.
In this chapter I show how the global and the local are woven together in peoples
understanding of nature and how their day to day concerns help to shape
ideas of nature in a whole variety of ways that serve to influence global
environmental politics. The examples used show the importance of emotional
responses to nature. They also highlight the interrelatedness of nature and
emotion reminding us that nature does not simply create an emotional
response but is, in turn, a construction that emerges from our emotions.

Globalization
The narrative of globalization as an all-encompassing flow of
information ignores concrete geographical realities
Agnew 11 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). "Space and place." The SAGE
handbook of geographical knowledge (2011): 316-330.] 6/25/16
The main current challenge to both of the dominant meanings comes from
the idea that the world itself is increasingly placeless as space-spanning
connections and flows of information, things, and people undermine the
rootedness of a wide range of processes anywhere in particular. Space is
conquering place (e.g. Friedman 2005). From this perspective, new
technologies -- the container, the Internet, the cell phone -- are making places
obsolete (but see for a robust empirical counterview Goldenberg and Levy 2009).
Yet, previous rounds in the diffusion of technological innovation, even though
often touted as likely to do much the same thing (roads, railways,
telegraphy, ship canals, etc.), had no such effect. What they did do was help
reconstitute and reorganize spatial relations such that places were
remade and reconfigured (Pacelli and Marchetti 2007). Distance did not die ,
its forms and effects were reformulated. What seems to lie behind so much
of this intellectual diminution of the role of place, if not now then immanently,
is the image of an isolated, traditional and passive place increasingly
transcended in the march of history (from feudalism to capitalism, etc. or some
other linear or stage conception of history) by the increasing power of mobility.
Such ideas die hard in a Western thought more committed to very general
ideas about how the world works than to an accounting of its concrete
geographical realities . The first view of place (as a node in space) is itself a
doubtful particularism emerging from a reading of the history of northwest Europe
as a progressive overcoming of local places by national spaces (and now by global
space) rather than a self-evident and natural universal coming about everywhere
as a transcendental becoming. Consequently, Geography as a field of study has
suffered from the marginalization of what it can study beyond a narrow
recounting of locations and their names.

Heg
Hegemony is, by definition, the capacity to reduce others to
singular narrative to which they must conform.
Agnew 03 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Geopolitics; Re-visoning world
politics Page 10.] GK 6/24/16
The dominant representations and practices (or hegemony) constituting the
modern geopolitical imagination have been overwhelmingly those of the
political lites of the Great Powers, those states and empires most capable of
imposing themselves and their views on the rest of the world. Membership
of this group depends on recognition by existing members. Qualification has
depended not simply on coercive power, the ability to force others to do what you
want, but also on the capacity to write the political economic agenda of
others, defining appropriate standards of conduct and providing the
framing for inter-state relations with which others must conform if they
are to gain recognition and rewards from the Great Powers. News stories
using the common-sense accounts of what is at stake for us or others in
this or that part of the world, official stories told by political leaders, and
the presentations of intellectuals elaborating on the logic of particular
foreign policies and military strategies are all important ways in which the
dominant story-lines and agendas of different states (and other actors) can be
disseminated, both domestically and internationally.

Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a geopolitical narrative that intentionally
misrepresents fractured coalitions as singular units for
political purposes.
Nicolae 15 [Marius Nicolae is a grad student Babe-Bolyai University.
Sovereignty in the current geopolitical context. New meanings and dimensions
https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=304952 accessed 6-25-16] TW
From a general perspective, the concept of sovereignty seems frequently to
be extremely, and maybe purposefully, misleading, and may be used by
politicians and the media to avoid the difficult and very complex thinking
that should be assumed for the real policy issues involved 25 (Fowler,
Bunck, 1995). Notwithstanding, the major change that shaped the concept is the
trend known as globalization. According to some scholars, sovereignty has two
faces. First one is represented by the authority relationship that it builds
and the second one is represented by the relationship of formal equality.
The latter one is the one that suffered major changes in the past decades. As noted
by Waltz in 1977, between sovereign states "none is entitled to command; none is
required to obey" (Waltz, 1977, p.88). Is the same issue addressed by Jackson in
1990, who referred at it as juridical sovereignty and the one mentioned by Krasner
in 1999 as international legal sovereignty (frequently violated in practice.). Both
aspects are inherently joined: domestic hierarchy and international anarchy are
different sides of the same coin. As defined, one cannot exist without the other.
"Sovereignty is, therefore, an attribute of units, which, depending on the referent,
entails relationships of both hierarchy and anarchy. This point is not new and should
be obvious, but it is often overlook" (Lake, 2003, p. 305.)
Nowadays, the issue of sovereignty cannot be addressed as the exclusive
characteristic of a unitary state, because most of the elements of
international interactions are extended beyond the territory of two or
more states and because the global context is a direct result of the
permanent negotiated agreement between sovereign entities. Legal scholar
Kanishka Jayasuriya argues that the notion of the concept analyzed in this work
needs to be changed in order to fit the new structure of the global relations. Like
this, sovereignty cannot be considered anymore as indivisible (how it is
considered in the Westphalian approach) but as a fractured characteristic. The
best example to support this vision is given by the tools use by the states in dealing
with global markets. "Regulatory agencies within states have become self-regulating
islands of sovereignty specializing in the regulation of global markets. These
agencies interact directly with transnational organizations as well as similar
agencies in other states. This essentially internationalizes these agencies
within the state. One example of this is the development of independent central
banks" (Jayasuriya, 1999, pp. 425-426).

Competitiveness
Competitiveness discourse mobilizes populations for economic
warfare. Its produced by threat construction rather than
economic reality.
Bristow 4 [Dr. Gillian Bristow, Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography @ Cardiff
University, 4 (Journal of Economic Geography 5.3: 285-304, Everyones a
winner)] WH
This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused,
narrow and ill-defined content has become so salient
in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute the only valid
currency of argument (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative
discourses based around co-operation can be conceived (e.g. see Hines, 2000; Bunzl,
2001), they have as yet failed to make a significant impact on the dominant
view that a particular, quantifiable form of output-related regional competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and
ultimately beneficial. The answer appears to lie within the policy process, which refers
to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the public

This therefore includes the ideas which inform policy conception, the
talk and work which goes into providing the formulation of
policy directions, and all the talk, work and collaboration which goes into
translating these into practice (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major debate exists in the
policy studies literature about the scope and limitations of reason,
analysis and intelligence in policy-makinga debate which has been re-ignited with the
sector.

recent emphasis upon evidence-based policy-making (see Davies et al., 2000). Keynes is often cited as the main
proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he argued that policy-making should be informed by

has significantly
challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely
objective, rational, technical assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued
that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge and evidence
selectively to justify policy choices which are heavily based on value
judgements. It is thus persuasion (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their
institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy process, not the logical
correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather
than ideas that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of
competitiveness is the language of the business community . Thus, critical to
understanding the power of the discourse is firstly, understanding the
appeal and significance of the discourse to business interests and,
secondly, exploring their role in influencing the ideas of regional and national
policy elites. Part of the allure of the discourse of competitiveness for the business
community is its seeming comprehensibility.Business leaders feel that they already understand the
basics of what competitiveness means and thus it offers them the gain of apparent sophistication
without the pain of grasping something complex and
new. Furthermore,competitive images are exciting and their accoutrements of
battles, wars and races have an intuitive appeal to businesses familiar with the
knowledge, truth, reason and facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However, Majone (1989)

cycle of growth, survival and sometimes collapse (Krugman, 1996b). The climate of globalisation and the turn
towards neo-liberal, capitalist forms of regulation has empowered business interests and created a demand for new
concepts and models of development which offer guidance on how economies can innovate and prosper in the face

Global policy elites of governmental and


corporate institutions, who share the same neo-liberal consensus, have played a
of increasing competition for investment and resources.

critical role in promoting both the discourse of national and


regional competitiveness, and of competitiveness policies which they think are good for them (such
as supportive institutions and funding for research and development agendas). In the EU, for example, the
European Round Table of Industrialists played a prominent role in ensuring that the Commission's 1993 White Paper
placed the pursuit of international competitiveness (and thus the support of business), on an equal footing with job
creation and social cohesion objectives (Lovering, 1998; Balanya et al., 2000). This discourse rapidly spread and
competitiveness policies were transferred through global policy networks as large quasi-governmental organisations
such as the OECD and World Bank pushed the national and, subsequently, the regional competitiveness agenda

Part of the appeal of the regional competitiveness discourse for


policy-makers is that like the discourse of globalisation, it presents a relatively
structured set of ideas, often in the form of implicit and sedimented
assumptions, upon which they can draw in formulating strategy and,
indeed, in legitimating strategy pursued for quite distinct ends (Hay and
upon national governments (Peet, 2003).

Rosamond, 2002). Thus, the discourse clearly dovetails with discussions about the appropriate level at which
economic governance should be exercised and fits in well with a growing trend towards the decentralised, bottomup approaches to economic development policy and a focus on the indigenous potential of regions. For example, in
the UK:the Government believes that a successful regional and sub-regional economic policy must be based on
building the indigenous strengths in each locality, region and county. The best mechanisms for achieving this are
likely to be based in the regions themselves (HM Treasury, 2001a, vi). The devolution of powers and responsibilities
to regional institutions, whether democratic or more narrowly administrative, is given added tour de force when
accompanied by the arguments contained within the regional competitiveness discourse. There is clear political
capital to be gained from highlighting endogenous capacities to shape economic processes, not least because it
helps generate the sense of regional identity that motivates economic actors and institutions towards a common
regional purpose (Rosamond, 2002). Furthermore, the regional competitiveness discourse points to a clear set of
agendas for policy action over which regional institutions have some potential for leverageagendas such as the

This provides policymakers with the ability to point to the existence of seemingly secure paths
to prosperity, as reinforced by the successes of exemplar regions. In this way, the discourse of
regional competitiveness helps to provide a way of constituting regions as
legitimate agents of economic governance. The language of regional
competitiveness also fits in very neatly with the ideological shift to the
Third Way popularised most notably by the New Labour government in the UK. This promotes the
reconstruction of the state rather than its shrinkage (as under neo-liberal market
development of university-business relationships and strong innovation networks.

imperatives) or expansion (as under traditional socialist systems of mass state intervention). Significantly, this
philosophy sees state economic competencies as being restricted to the ability to intervene in line with perceived
microeconomic or supply-side imperatives rather than active macroeconomic, demand-side interventionan

attractiveness of the
discourse may also be partly a product of the power of pseudoscientific, mathematised nature of the economics discipline and the
business strategy literature from which it emanates. This creates an
innate impartiality and technicality for the market outcomes (such as
competitiveness) it describes (Schoenberger, 1998). Public policy in developed countries experiencing
the marketisation of the state, is increasingly driven by managerialism which emphasises the
improved performance and efficiency of the state. This managerialism is founded upon economistic
and rationalistic assumptions which include an emphasis
upon measuring performance in the context of a planning system driven by objectives and targets
(Sanderson, 2001). The result is an increasing requirement for people, places and
organisations to be accountable and for their performance and success to
be measured and assessed. In this emerging evaluative state, performance tends to be scrutinised
through a variety of means, with particular emphasis placed upon output indicators. This provides not
only a means of lending legitimacy to the institutional environment, but
also some sense of exactitude and certainty, particularly for central
governments who are thus able to retain some top-down, mechanical
sense that things are somehow under their control (Boyle, 2001). The
evolutionary, survival of the fittest basis of the regionalcompetitiveness
agenda that is thus clearly in tune with the discourse around competitiveness. The
competitiveness

discourse clearly resonates with this evaluative culture. The discourse of


competitiveness strongly appeals to the stratum of policy makers and
analysts who can use it to justify what they are doing and/or to find out how well they are
doing it relative to their rivals . This helps explain the interest in trying to measure regional
competitiveness and the development of composite indices and league tables. It also helps explain why particular
elements of the discourse have assumed particular significanceoutput indicators of firm performance are much
easier to compare and rank on a single axis than are indicators relating to institutional behaviour, for example. This
in turn points to a central paradox in measures of regional competitiveness.

The key ingredients

of firm competitiveness and regional prosperity are increasingly perceived as lying with assets such
as knowledge and information which are, by definition, intangible or at least
difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. The obsession with performance measurement and
the tendency to reduce complex variables to one, easily digestible number brings a kind of
blindness with it as to what is really important (Boyle, 2001, 60)in this case, how to
improve regional prosperity. Thus while a composite index number of regional competitiveness will attract
widespread attention in the media and amongst policy-makers and development agencies, the difficulty presented
by such a measure is in knowing what exactly needs to be targeted for appropriate remedial action. All of this

competitiveness is more than simply the linguistic


expression of powerful exogenous interests. It has also become rhetoric. In other words,
regional competitiveness is deployed in a strategic and persuasive way , often in
conjunction with other discourses (notably globalisation) to legitimate specific policy initiatives
and courses of action. The rhetoric of regional competitiveness serves a useful
political purpose in that it is easier to justify change or the adoption of a
particular course of policy action by reference to some external threat
that makes change seem inevitable. It is much easier for example, for
politicians to argue for the removal of supply-side rigidities and flexible hire-and-fire workplace rules by
suggesting that there is no alternative and that jobs would be lost anyway if productivity
improvement was not achieved. Thus, the language of external competitiveness...provides a
rosy glow of shared endeavour and shared enemies which can unite
captains of industry and representatives of the shop floor in the same big
tent (Turner, 2001, 40). In this sense it is a discourse which provides some
shared sense of meaning and a means of legitimising neo-liberalism rather
than a material focus on the actual improvement of economic welfare . 5.
Conclusions The discourse of regional competitiveness has become ubiquitous in
the deliberations and statements of policy actors and regional analysts. However, this paper
has argued that it is a rather confused, chaotic discourse which seems to conflate
serious theoretical work on regional economies, with national and
international policy discourses on globalisation and the knowledge
economy. There are, however, some dominant axioms which collectively define the discourse, notably that
suggests that regional

regional competitiveness is a firm-based, output-related conception, strongly shaped by the regional business
environment. However, regional competitiveness tends to be defined in different ways, sometimes microeconomic,
sometimes macroeconomic, such that it is not entirely clear when a situation of competitiveness has been
achieved. It is argued here that the discourse is based on relatively thinly developed and narrow conceptions of how

The discourse chooses to ignore


broader, non-output related modalities of regional competition which may
tend to have rather more negative than positive connotations. Moreover, it overregions compete, prosper and grow in economic terms.

emphasises the importance of the region to firm competitiveness and indeed the importance of firm

proponents of regional competitiveness are


guilty of what the eminent philosopher Alfred North Whitehead termed the Fallacy of Misplaced
Concreteness. In other words, they have assumed that what applies to firms can
simply be read across to those other entities called regions, and that this
is a concrete reality rather than simply a belief or opinion.
competitiveness to regional prosperity. In this sense

Marxism/sociology
Marxism and social sciences devalue conceptions of place
ethnography, anthropology, human geography, etc. are
confined to colonial societies, while modern societies
function operationally.
Agnew 89 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). "The devaluation of place in
social science." The power of place (1989).] 6/26/16
Why has the intellectual devaluation of place occurred? Hints at an explanation have appeared
earlier. But it is an important and useful task to systematically sort out a chain of explanation" from intellectual to social-historical sources of devaluation
in orthodox social science.
The argument with respect to orthodox social science proceeds as follows: first, the most immediate intellectual source of devaluation is seen as the focus
on the evolutionary sequence of transition from community to society. Second, an important correlate of the evolutionary perspective is identified. This is
that the transition is natural, lawful, and universal. Third, the key historical period for the intellectual devaluation of place is located in the 19th century, an
important period in the growth of nationalism as a place-transcending ideology. Fourth, it is argued that the extension of placeless social science in the
form of modernization theory occurred in the historical context of the Cold War and the struggle for hearts and minds" between the West" and World
Communism in the Third World of developing nations.
As previously argued, at the root of the intellectual devaluation of place in orthodox social science is the oppositional dichotomy of community and society
and its image of total temporal discontinuity between two totally different forms of human association. In this usage, the concepts of community and
society embody a specific theory of social change, that of the evolutionary transformation of life from community to society. When community and society
are seen as opposites, co-existence is transitory and life must move from one end of the continuum to the other. In this process as society displaces
community, place loses its significance since it is closely intertwined with community.
In bare essentials, therefore, the evolutionary sequence of movement from community to society provides the intellectual backbone to the devaluation of
place in orthodox social science. But though a necessary element in a complete examination this is not in itself sufficient. In particular, there is no
reference to why this approach should have become so compelling and why it did so when it did.
An important feature of late 19th-century social thought was its use of ideas from the natural sciences of the day. Evolutionary ideas from biology,
particularly those of Lamarck and Darwin, were especially attractive to social thinkers. Motivations for drawing on these fields were mixed but one
powerful encouragement was that natural explanations, ones drawing by analogy or homology from the natural sciences, would be free of the tinge of
religion= ideology, and free opinion that had previously characterized social thought. Such explanations would also be universal and thus congruent with
the tenets of the empiricist philosophy predominant amongst scientists and philosophers at that time.
Use of the term natural is potentially confusing in the context of a discussion of community and society. Proponents of society generally maintain the
usage of the Physiocrats and have in mind unconstrained and self-regulated social order such as that found in nature. Proponents of community, usually
critics of the status quo and thus easily portrayed as an ideological lot, use natural more in the sense of simple, primitive, or close to nature. In both cases,
however, the former scientific and the latter ideological, nature is invoked as the appropriate standard and grounding for explanation.
One can trace the scientific analogy to nature amongst social thinkers back at least to the 17th century. Many Enlightenment thinkers, perhaps especially
the Physiocrats, aspired to explanation of social facts in terms of natural processes or by analogy to natural processes (Weulersse 1919, Fox-Genovese
1976). Viner (1960, p. 59) has noted of the Physiocrats that they arrived at their laissez-faire doctrine by way of a curious blend of the myth of a
beneficent physical order of nature. of Hobbesism, of Cumberlands and Cartesian rationalism, and of some fresh and important economic analysis of the
coordinating, harmonizing, and organizing function of free competition. There was a providential harmonious and self-operating physical order of nature,
which, under appropriate social organization and sound intellectual perception, could be matched in its providential character, in its automatism, and its
beneficence, in the social order of nature.
The mimesis or imitation of scientific discourse in the context of social theory encouraged a strong tendency towards objectification. Instead of sacred
symbols and rituals as the expression of collective existence the essence of society is seen to be production and subsistence. Society is reconstituted in
terms of functional relationships between individual people and things. Indeed people become indistinguishable from things. At the same time conceptions
of natural law exclude the possibility of exception or idiosyncrasy. Natural law is associated with recurrent regularities, uniformities among phenomena,
and classifications which omit singularities or differences (Gierke 1934, I958. Crocker 1959, Meek 1976, Wade 1977).4
In this intellectual milieu social science found its first distinctive voice not as a new theory of society or politics but as a discourse about economies.
Although economic ideas have roots that can be traced back to Aristotle's discussion of 0117):, one source of modern economics lies with the Physiocrats.
Their ideas were later absorbed into a number of different theories. Physiocracy, physis (nature) + Kratos (rule), can be translated as nature's regime or as
that form which embodies nature's rule. The Physiocrats discovered the economy to be a submerged order, suffocating under the burden of government
and mercantilism, diverted from its natural course. The economy was thus an immanent order, ready to emerge and function according to laws inherent in
the nature of things but stifled by politics (Meek 1976).
In asserting that free economic activity was natural, the Physiocrats transferred to the plane of economics the cosmological understanding of a universe
in which phenomena, social as well as physical, obeyed the laws of their nature, a nature perhaps initially implanted by God but now operating as a
natural necessity without need of an "external" power to cause or correct it (Meek 1976. Livingstone 1984, Hamowy 1987). The freeing of the economy,
therefore, became equivalent to the liberation of nature.
This is not to say that 19th-century theorist were of the same mind as the Physiocrats or one another when it came to either their views of laissez faire or
nature or how to cast their analogies (compare Spencer and Marx, for example) (Anchor 1967). But it is to argue for a fundamental continuity in the
attractiveness to many social theorists of the analogy to nature as essential to scientific explanation. Marx, for example, counterposed his scientific
socialism to thee socialism of those he characterized as Utopians (e.g. Proudhon) largely on the presumed grounding of his argument in the natural order
of things.
It is in the intellectual context of the naturalness and lawfulness of social life that the evolutionary perspective on the transition from community to society
must be seen. Not only because the movement itself can be seen as natural and lawful but more especially because, at least in the hands of some
theorists, the world of society is also natural and lawful when compared to the world of community. This implies, of course, that the analogy to nature is
always social or political rather than scientific. In Gusfields (1975) terminology concepts such as society or community are utopias as well as idealtypes. The active pursuit of society, however that concept is rendered, is justified as one with nature. How can nature be doubted?
In the 19th century, the analogy to nature favored by many social theorists had perforce to co-exist with the growth of nationalism as a powerful political
ideology. This led to an interesting convergence between the two (Mandrou 1973). Society, rather than remaining an abstraction or ideal-type, became
coterminous with the boundaries of national statesand naturally so. Herder (in Barnard 1969) provided a clear connection and many social theorists
followed suit: a nation is as natural a plant as a family, only with more branches. A principle of what Smith (1979, p. 191) calls methodological
nationalism came to prevail.
The three disciplines that were the major winners in the institutionalization of the study of social life, sociology, political science, and economics, each
developed a subservience to the state. Indeed each had at its origins the practical interests of the state, respectively, in social control, state management,
and the national accumulation of wealth (Robinson 1962, pp. 24-25, Letwin 1963, p. 217, Nisbey 1966, p. 17, Deans 1978, p. 203, Skinner 1978, p. 3350).
At their roots, therefore, they were national in focus.

Many of the most influential thinkers of the 19th century were


methodological nationalists. Whatever their other differences, Marx,
Durkheim, and Weber all accepted state boundaries as co-extensive with
those of societies or economies they were interested in studying. More
particularly, to some thinkers such as Durkheim the modern state was both
creator and guarantor of the individuals natural rights against the claims
of local, domestic, ecclesiastical, occupational, and other secondary
groups. The state could thus function both as an enforcer of natural order as
well as a container, through the territorial definition it provided and the
statistics it collected, of empirical observations about social and economic
processes.5 The categories used by the state for collecting statistics came to be
the main operational categories of empiricist social science. Social science
became operationally confined to national categories even when it
looked elsewhereto local settings or abroad.
Other disciplines such as ethnography, anthropology, and human
geography served the state through the knowledge they provided about
potential and actual colonial societies (Ranger 1976). These were ones in
which community (and place) were still important. At home, however,
these disciplines, especially human geography, provided a rationale for
territorial delimitation of the state (so-called natural boundaries) and,
notoriously, in the form of geopolitik, a rationale for state expansionism
(see Kasperson & Minghi 1969, Parker 1982).
This is not to say that there were not real changes in the power of the state, vis-vis other institutions. Great social and political change did occur in the 19th
century. Above all the 19th-century state brought about the conditions for
a liberal capitalist economy. In one way or another the development of
national labor and commodity markets, the shift to factory production, the
class segregation of urban populations and numerous changes in the
texture of social life followed from this (Desai 1986). In the intellectual arena the
growth of liberalism undermined the political and legal legitimacy of all groups and
institutions that held an intermediate position between what we now think of as
the sphere of the individual and that of the state (Frug 1980, p. 1088).
It was in this context that the social sciences became oriented towards the
national state as a natural unit upon which to build their claims to
generalization. This presupposed the diminished importance of community on a
local scale and the social significance of place along with it. Even attempts at
reviving community, perhaps most visibly in the hands of national dictators such
as Mussolini and Hitler, but also more generally, have tended to operate solely at
the national scale (Mosse 1975, Hobsbawn & Ranger 1983). Reference to local
settings or to global processes was largely closed off by the nationalizing
of social science and its subservience to the national state.

Third world
The conception of first, second, and third worlds forces
communities into a fixed historical hierarchy.
Agnew 89 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). "The devaluation of place in
social science." The power of place (1989).] 6/26/16
In the aftermath of the World War II. Pletsch (198 1, p. 569) argues:
A great variety of social scientists and even journalists from several
different nations, diverse ideological perspectives, and academic
disciplines suddenly found the idea of a third world useful for organizing
their thinking about the international order that had emerged from the
settlements and unsettlements of World War II. And understanding the
new order, they could place the significance of their own particular
research in the grand enterprise of understanding social phenomena in
general.
He traces the origins of the term Third World to a pair of binary distinctions. First,
the world is divided into the traditional and modern parts. Second, the modern
part is divided into communist and free portions. These terms derive their
meaning from their mutual opposition rather than from any relationship to realworld phenomena. The traditional world is the Third World, for example, whatever
the situation on the ground. Thus,
The Third World is the world of tradition, culture, religion, irrationality,
underdevelopment, over-population, political chaos, and so on. The
second world is modern, technologically sophisticated, rational to a degree, but
authoritarian (or totalitarian) and repressive, and ultimately inefficient and
impoverished by contamination with an ideologically motivated socialist elite. The
first world is purely modern, a haven of science and utilitarian decisionmaking, technological, efficient, democratic, free-in short, a natural
society unfettered by religion or ideology (Pletsch 1981, p. 574).
The distinctions are not only ideal-types, they also imply a historical
relationship between the three categories they generate. Traditional
societies are all destined to be modern ones somehow and to some
degree. That has been the trajectory of history. That is how the First World
has emerged. The Second World is an unfortunate perversion of natural
modernization. The Third World is presently the zone of competition between these
two models of modernity.

Alternative

Critical Geopolitics
***Our alternative is to reject the geopolitical narratives of the
1AC in favor of a critical geopolitics. Only this allows us to
avoid the sound-bite contemporary politics that maintains a
culture of exceptionalism and superiority. [1nc card]
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). "Is US security policy pivoting
from the Atlantic to AsiaPacific." Dialogue on Globalization (2012).] 6/22/16
Critical geopolitics is about providing such scrutiny. Towards the close of the
Cold War, some academic geographers and political theorists in a number of
countries became concerned about how the Cold War and conflicts that erupted
around that time, such as the Contra war in Nicaragua and the first Gulf War, were
represented by political elites and in mass culture and how this had affected their
character and longevity. The main idea was that geography did not have direct
effects on foreign-policy making and the dynamics of conflicts, but that these
were always practically mediated through the ascription of meaning to
places and peoples: from the relative significance of different world
regions to national interests to the use of metaphors and analogies
from other places and times used to communicate and justify given
courses of policy and action. Think, for example, of the putative shift in US
foreign policy from Europe to the Middle East in the early 1990s and the recycling of
Munich and Hitler analogies in both Gulf Wars.
A specific set of insights characterizes the approach as it has developed
since the early 1990s. The first is a conceptual matrix for a geographical
analysis of world politics based on ideas about geographical representations and
socio-economic resources. This refers, respectively, to how the world is
structured geographically from certain geographical vantage points and
the relative capacity to spread such notions and, if need be, enforce them.
Another is an emphasis on the role of vision and geographical imagination
in how the world is structured and acted on by political agents of various
sorts. Cartographic representations that come into popular use are of particular
interest as sources of information about the nature of places and the linkages and
flows that connect them. A third is how important the fusion between territory
and national identity has been in modern nationalism and how its role in
dividing up the world still remains at work. So, much geopolitical discourse is
not surprisingly directed at maintaining a clear sense of domestic
difference and superiority. Exceptionalism is the rule. Our identity is
always at stake in this or that conflict. Finally, I would identify its stress on the
elite-based statecraft that has long lain at the heart of geopolitical reasoning and its
necessary denial of the multidimensional qualities of different places in pursuit of an
overriding Weltpolitik. Thus, foreign places lose their rich physical-cultural
character as they are plugged in to overriding geostrategies that reflect the
narrow security and economic objectives of dominant groups in national politics.
Critical geopolitics resists the tendency to separate out the domestic and the

foreign or international as separate realms. They are in fact completely bonded


together.
For policymakers, particularly in countries other than those where the scripts of
global geopolitics are first written, there are a number of analytic virtues to the
approach. One is to encourage a suspicion of grand geopolitical narratives
based on relatively limited textual sources that fit into the overall Zeitgeist. Another
is to beware of beguiling metaphors and terms such as pivoting that
provide the simple language and sound bites that are the stock-in-trade
of contemporary politics. Like advertising jingles, they bamboozle even
as they seem to clarify . A third is to link new geopolitical narratives to
the anxieties of domestic politics from where they often emanate. In other
words, why did this discussion and the way it is posed arise now rather
than previously and how does this relate to the electoral cycle, elite
succession or dominant issues in domestic politics? Finally, what are the
historical resources upon which the narrative effectively relies? What I have
in mind here are the map images, place stereotypes, and cultural attributes
inherited from accounts of the past that inform the narrative. How are these
mobilized and to what effect?

Discourse Analysis
The alternative is to endorse a method of discourse analysis.
Only this allows us to deconstruct the deeply essentialized
Chinese geopolitical narratives that taint media and academia.
Grant 16 [ Andrew Grant (graduate of department of geography at university of
California, Los Angeles), Belonging and Ethnicity in Chinas West: Urbanizing
Minorities in Xining City on the Eastern Tibetan Plateau, UCLA electronic thesis and
dissertation, card cut 6/24/16] CB
Research in this dissertation relied on four different methods that I will discuss in turn. The first method is primarily
textual, relying both on recent publications in Chinese and on secondary histories of China and its western regions.

Discourse analysis has been an


important part of political geography, especially critical geopolitics, since
the early 1990s. Gearid Tuathail and John Agnew have argued for the
importance of an emphasis on language as a contested space for ideas in
political geography, drawing on ideas such as Foucaudian discourse,
rhetoric, and narrative ( Tuathail and Agnew 1992; Tuathail 1996). Recently, this approach has
This research method was used in the first two chapters.

faced pressure from a theoretical perspective that argues that Foucaults theory of discourse envelops practices,
and that the two cannot be separated. From this perspective, the subject-positions that are created by discourse
constrain those that occupy them. As a result, agents strategy making practices must be considered part of the

Rather than a genuine multiplicity


of agents and ideas, there are only the variances within a hegemonic
discourse, or a potential disruption of the entire authorizing episteme.
discursive ordering (Mller 2008; Mller and Reuber 2008).

Another more general trend, part of a growing interest in the social sciences, is in breaking up structures, whether
they are periodizations, discourses, or materials. While earlier critical geopolitics writings were influenced by postmodern concerns with narrative and the power in the production of knowledge, the field has also recently began

While a move
towards ontological fluidity is useful for understanding how geopolitical
visions materialize, or fail to materialize, on the ground, the study of ideas
remains an important feature of geopolitics in general, as this study bears
out.
Discourse analysis has been used to deconstruct the Western geopolitical
imagination ( Tuathail 1996). It need to be applied more to Chinese geopolitics
in order to counter deeply essentialized notions of the Chinese territory
and the Chinese nation, ideas that still circulate in the popular media and
even in academic works. This does violence to the history of the Chinese
geobody and mirrors the PRCs official narrative, which was in part invented to justify its
claims to the frontier territories of the multi-ethnic Qing Empire. In recent decades scholars have
challenged this deeply naturalized notion of China. Prasenjit Duara (1995) has shown
how the Chinese nation was produced through intellectual battles to tame
alternative conceptions of Chinese regions. Other scholars have recently taken to
deconstructing the notion of Han ethnic identity (Mullaney 2012). The re-embrace of a timeless
Chinese Civilization after the Reform Era can obscure the politics of
essentializing China. Of particular concern to political geographers today is the political role of Chinas
borderlands. We must carefully navigate Chinas recent turn to its frontiers so
as to make sure that an emphasis on cosmopolitan interactions across
frontier cultures does not sit too easily with claims of naturalized Chinese
rule and belonging. A real emphasis on plurality is cognizant of the power geometries that structure
emphasizing relational space and the contingent assemblages (Dittmer 2014; Mller 2015).

Chinas borderlands

Geopoetics
The alternative is to engage in geopoetics. Our performance is
critical to overcome the labeling of identity as something
static. A critical interpretation of traditional geopolitics can
unravel the logic used to control non-static bodies.
Angelea 16 [Last, Angela, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University

of Glasgow. "Fruit of the Cyclone: Undoing Geopolitics through Geopoetics."Fruit of


the Cyclone: Undoing Geopolitics through Geopoetics. Geoform, 11 June 2015. Web.
26 June 2016.] (DM 6/26/16)
Je ne pourrai aimer que quant jaurai aussi dcolonis mon corps.
je,
tu,
le,
aile,
Il faut faire avec ce que lon EST. (Maximin, 1981: 98)
I wont be able to love unless I have also decolonised my body.
I
You
Island [phonetically both he and island]
Wing [phonetically both she and wing]
One has to make do with what one IS.
Maximins geopoetics stress everyones ability (and responsibility) to shift
the imaginary horizon of humanworld relationships for the benefit of
others human and nonhuman like, and to attempt this through a myriad
of cultural practices. This is particularly relevant for geographers whose
writing, which often has a paradoxically monologic tendency in its
discursive practices, should be one of those starting points and open itself
to as many different perspectives as possible. The problem that further
needs to be confronted is the persistent practice of the dominant to
appropriate the emergent (Spivak, 2003: 100; see also 2012: 72), including the
appropriation cultural practices that seek to undermine. This dynamic makes
geopoetically driven practice, such as this article, increasingly difficult, since
the anglophone geographical discourse has particularly strong ties to neoliberalism
(e.g. knowledge privatisation, publication rankings) and hegemony. In our
endeavours to critically engage with geopolitics, it may not be sufficient to
merely shift the discourse from a less material one to a more material
one, or vice versa. Rather, it may also be an urgent task to follow
Maximins proposal of re-reading geography to liberate ourselves.

Framework/Alt solvency

K prior and turns everything


Place is the base unit of analysisit frames and shapes our
institutions, practices, and selves, and political behavior and
outcomes depend upon it.
Flint et al 2k [Flint, Colin, Professor of Political Science, Utah State University,
Mark Harrower, Assistant Professor of Geography and Associate Director of the
Cartography Lab at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Robert Edsall, Idaho
State University, History Department, Faculty Member. Studies Geospatial Analysis,
Geovisualization, and Geovisual Analytics. "But how does place matter? Using
Bayesian networks to explore a structural definition of place." New Methodologies
for the Social Sciences Conference. University of Colorado at Boulder. 2000.]
6/25/16
Place matters because it structures the way we behave (Pred, 1990). Our
everyday experiences and actions are a framed by the institutions,
practices and people with whom we interact. The problems people face, the
possible avenues towards solutions, and the interpretation of what needs to be
done and why differ depending upon the economic trajectory of a place,
how institutions within a place filter information, and the senses of
identity that are developed and given meaning within places. The
uniqueness of a place is not a matter of the variation in the size of particular socioeconomic groups, i.e., the size of the black population or Muslim populations. Such a
compositional view of place misses the complexity of a place and how its
institutionalized practices and customs mediate behavior.
When place is considered a structure rather than an entity composed of
different attributes, it becomes the unit of analysis. Political behavior is
place-specific because of the intricacies of interaction, the specificity of
particular times and spaces, the sense of living as meeting, the context
(Thrift, 1983, p. 39). An analysis of place-specific political behavior, at the very
least, needs to capture the institutions that are interacting, the senses of identity,
and the actions of different socio-economic groups. Political outcomes are
place-specific because knowledge is interpreted and acted upon within
the varying contexts of institutionalized memory, interpretation of
contemporary events, and endorsement of political responses (Thrift, 1983,
p. 45). A contextual analysis of political behavior considers the role of institutions
and identity in mobilizing particular groups. In other words, a structural view of
place considers the setting of political actors rather than just the
attributes of those actors.
Thus, the analysis of place and politics is, at the outset, an ontological
issue. The scale of analysis for a contextual approach to politics is the
geographic setting that mediates the political outcomes of interest. The
key questions are what are the components of place that determine
political behavior, and how do these components interact? A number of
geographers have established theoretical frameworks to guide us in an
interrogation of these questions.

Understandings of geographical space shape our actions K


prior
Arnold 15 [Lisa Arnold (assistant professor of English at North Dakota State
University), Samantha NeCamp, and Vanessa Kraemer Sohan, "Recognizing and
Disrupting Immappancy in Scholarship and Pedagogy," Pedagogy: Critical
Approaches to Teaching Literature, Language, Composition, and Culture, Volume 15,
Number 2, doi 10.1215/15314200-2845033, 2015] AZ
In the past twenty years, a multitude of scholars have called attention to the
influence of place and space in our research and teaching. In 1995, four
international scholars critiqued the US- centric focus in composition studies by
arguing that the very diversity rightly celebrated in composition literature may
lead a teacher to forget that it is diversity joined in a particularly American way,
within American institutions, in an American space. The teacher in New York or Los
Angeles may look out over a classroom and think, The whole world is here. It isnt
(Muchiri et al. 1995: 195). Christiane Donahue indicates that this critique has as yet
been little heeded: The U.S. picture of writing around the globe its
teaching, its learning, and our theories about these has been highly partial,
portraying the issue in particular ways, largely export- based, that I believe might
create obstacles for U.S. scholars thinking and thus impede effective
collaboration or hearing of work across borders (2009: 214). At present,
advocates of a translingual approach to language are helping to focus attention on
the importance of place and space to our work. Bruce Horner and Min- Zhan Lu
(2013), for instance, have drawn on applied linguist Alastair Pennycooks Language
as a Local Practice (2010) to argue that translingual pedagogies consider how
space, time, and place interact in everyday reading, writing, and thinking practices.
Additionally, in perhaps the most thorough discussion of the role of geographical
understanding in writing and rhetoric, Nedra Reynolds emphasizes in her book
Geographies of Writing (2007) that we must attend to not only the physical
realities in which we work but also our social, political, and cultural
understandings or representations of that space ; our spatial metaphors,
she cautions, tend to operate, through ideology and across institutional
boundaries to make us think . . . that space doesnt matter, that public
space is truly public, or that borders just need to be stepped over (45).
While all of these authors have turned attention to the impact of geographical
locations on our work, many have also identified as a problem the general
lack of geographical understanding among scholars and students. As
Reynolds (2007: 47) writes, using herself as an example, The only geography
textbook and geography lessons I remember were in the fourth grade. . . . After
about 1968, I didnt receive any direct instruction in geography. This neglect of
geography within the US educational system continues today, in part due to the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (20 USC Sec. 6301): in the acts 670 pages of text, the
word geography appears only five times, emphasizing instead other forms of social
studies instruction, particularly civics. Similarly, the Common Core State Standards,
currently adopted by forty- five states, touch only briefly on geography, outlining
the literacy skills students would need to read and produce texts on social studies
topics; the standards identify no specific concepts within geography as a content
area that students should be expected to learn (Common Core State Standards
Initiative 2012). While the dearth of geographical education in the United
States has been recognized as a hurdle for space- and place- based

pedagogies and rhetorics, few scholars have addressed how to overcome


this hurdle. Instead, much work concerning space and place has taken as its ideal
a student body, discipline, and general public quite familiar with geographical
concepts and has sought to articulate appropriate pedagogies and rhetorics for
these groups. In this article, we identify the problems presented for place- oriented
pedagogies by the term immappancy, meaning insufficient geographical knowledge.
We begin by defining immappancy as a misperception both of physical
space and of representations of that space. We then select instances of
scholarly rhetoric within English studies, particularly instances that outline
approaches to pedagogy, which, while seeming to account for spatial
relationships , in fact unintentionally enact a form of immappancy . Finally,
we describe two pedagogical sequences that we argue will confront students
potential immappancy while forwarding a nuanced view of space and place: the first
works to denaturalize students and teachers perceptions of the spaces they
currently inhabit, and the second aims to trouble students understanding of the
global and the local.

Role of the ballot


The role of the ballot is to endorse the team that best
challenges the geography of the existing academic hierarchy.
Only through developing public intellectuals can we resist the
derisive nature of public discourse on China.
Bashi 13 [Shir Bashi, BA at leiden university college. Serve The People: Politics of

China as Reality and Academic Pursuit. The Structure and Role of the Academic
Study of China in the Twenty-First Century May 20 th, 2013
http://www.academia.edu/9857812/Serve_The_People_Politics_of_China_as_Reality_a
nd_Academic_Pursuit._The_Structure_and_Role_of_the_Academic_Study_of_China_in
_the_Twenty-First_Century_BA_Thesis_ accessed 6-23-2016] TW
A quick look at the lists of most read and most cited articles in academic journals of the China field reveals

there appears to exist a kind of discrepancy between the


information that is used most by scholars (measured by citation) and the
information that is most sought after, even by members of the broad
academic community (those with access to academic journals). Articles that were often
read included many that concentrated on the export of a China model, Chinese soft
something interesting:

power and other spectacular discussions about the scope and

rise in the international system.

possible consequences of Chinas

While it would be unwise to allow such subjects to dominate the

agenda in the study of China, it is clear that there exists a market. If China scholars would distance themselves
from the more idiosyncratic, particularistic discussions on the uniqueness of the rise of China ,

the role of
public interpreter of Chinas behaviour might come to be fulfilled by public
intellectuals unrestrained by academic checks on quality and balance.
The failure to develop some public intellectuals among each generation
of students of Chinese politics can diminish the quality of public discourse
on China

(Lieberthal, 2010, 277).

As Callahan (2012) demonstrates, if the Area China field does not maintain a strong influence of the social
sciences or, better, a desire to contribute to the social sciences ,

there exists a real danger that

an emerging historicist or exceptionalist tradition will gain dominance,


serving itself with comfortable Sino-Speak (Callahan, 2012 ) instead of more generic
terminology that implicitly necessitates comparison perhaps we should speak of the
re-emergence of the old China is China is China (Dreyer, 2009, 14) school, only then with support from within
China itself. This is dangerous as we have seen that

the place of scholarship in the

academic hierarchy matters: the political and social study of China, when
it happens outside of an area framework, is further removed from this
kind of discussion and in any case less likely to even engage ideas in the
first place when these clearly stand no chance within the current
disciplinary theoretical paradigm. And the more formal the research methods used by political
scientists are, the less likely it is that the results of that work will inform in any serious way the deliberations of
policy makers. Public intellectuals who are able to translate such work into terms readily accessible to the policy
community, and to place their presentations in outlets that command community attention, can play a vital role in

It is thus important to
retain strong Political and Social Science components in the Area Study of
China or, that Political Scientists and other social scientists continue to choose a career in Area Studies. To not
making academic work on China inform better public policy (Lieberthal, 2010, 277)

do this would be to leave discourse in the educated public to the mercy of the likes of Martin Jacques (Callahan,
2012). This is a strong argument for the public legitimacy of China studies, provided that China scholars forget their

Area nor their disciplinary roles and responsibilities .

It is worrying, then, that some scholars


see a decline in China Area Studies scholarship in Political Science.

Turns policymaking
The K has important implications for policy.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.
Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
A striking feature of recent intellectual and policy debate in China has
been the way in which versions of the Chinese past have been brought to
bear on contemporary questions about Chinas place in the world. As
well as opening up to the rest of the world since the 1980s, Chinese society seems
also in the process of opening up to its past. But rather than a single story that all
accept, and notwithstanding political pressures to keep their imaginations in check,
a wide range of actors is actively engaged in constructing narratives
about how the past can inform the present and the future in Chinas
relations with the rest of the world.
After laying out the main background premises that inform the approach taken in
the paper, I provide a brief argument for and review of multiple and competing
Chinese geopolitical narratives. Opening these to question is seen as a
preferable epistemological strategy to that of imposing a singular vision
on recent Chinese geopolitical experience. In the remainder of the paper, I
show how various traditions and elements of Chinese history have fed
into a number of different themes that have emerged into prominence in
recent Chinese discussions of geopolitics and foreign policy. These are
usually not simple projections from readings of Chinese history but involve
cross-fertilization with ideas of decidedly non-Chinese provenance. I briefly
consider a number of these: the theme of humiliation experienced at the hands of
colonialists and its continuing relevance; Taiwans place in Chinese cosmology; the
preference for Qing versus Ming dynasties in choosing appropriate analogies for the
present; and the nationalizing of Confucius as a prophet for the Peoples Republic of
China. The purpose of these examples is to give the flavor of current proposals for
justifying the different geopolitical narratives and associated strains of foreign
policy, not to claim anything definitive about any one of them.

Geopolitical narratives are especially useful heuristics for


considering Chinese foreign policy.
Agnew 12 [John A. Agnew is a prominent British-American political geographer.

Agnew was educated at the Universities of Exeter and Liverpool in England and Ohio
State in the United States. Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Looking Back to Look Forward:
Chinese Geopolitical Narratives and China's Past, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 53, 3:301314, 2012] 6/22/16
Four premises inform the logic of the perspective implicit in this article. The first is
that although Chinese government remains authoritarian, policy making is
increasingly open to a variety of influences including that of intellectuals,
military officers, journalists, and an increasingly vibrant public opinion (e.g.,

Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Murtha, 2009). This fragmented


authoritarianism offers a useful heuristic for considering the pluralistic
range of geopolitical narratives that have emerged into prominence in recent
years. The Chinese party-state is no longer best thought of as a monolithic
entity. Not only do recent fissures within the party elite over promotions to top-tier
leadership positions reveal distinctive ideological and personalized factions, but
different factions are clearly recruiting support from within the ranks of the
burgeoning intelligentsia to provide them with rationales and justifications for their
policy positions (e.g., Zhu Xufeng, 2009). This said, it is important not to overstate
the degree to which opinions can be freely expressed outside fairly narrow and
officially prescribed limits. China may be a post-totalitarian society but it is hardly
an open one. As the Chinese proverb says: The gun shoots the bird with its head
up (qiang da chutou niao) (quoted in Esarey and Qiang, 2008, 755756).
A second premise reflects the view that Chinas opening to the world represents a
timespace crisis in the sense that China can no longer be set in an eternally
present and geographically contained world but must be increasingly externally
oriented and dynamic, drawing ideas both from abroad but also from what had been
lost with the official disavowal of the past China from before the 1949 Revolution.
In other words, the geographical and historical limits of China are undergoing a
fundamental redefinition. This helps to understand why perhaps so much
contemporary geopolitical debate in China involves recourse to
prerevolutionary historical sources and analogies even as they must be
adapted to a different world-geographical milieu than those historical
ones from which they derive. Chinas new prominence demands looking back to
when it had a similar destiny. This may or may not be equivalent to a shift in
historicity regime, in the sense that Francois Hartog (2003) uses the terma
temporal crisis for late-18th-century Europe in which the future was no longer seen
as a projection of the past but as leading up to the present with the future imported
from somewhere else (revolutionary France or the United States; see also Billioud,
2011, 235236). As yet, however, recognition of the fact that China is ensnared to a
startling extent in the network-based logic of globalization has had only limited
effects on most of the geopolitical visions in question. They remain largely
captive to a territorialized image of global politics with great swathes of
the globe presumably always under some Great Power or others sway.
The third premise is that the narratives in question together constitute an
evolving geopolitical discourse that situates China in relation to world
politics . I would reject the contention that these narratives are somehow not
equivalent to a discourse (or meaningful and potentially long-lasting script) because
they privilege texts authored by agents more than eventual practices or actual
policies (Mller, 2008). The entire point is to identify those clusters of selected
ideas and historical events that potentially animate practices and policies.
They are not the same thing as those practices and policies. This is why we
have different words for each. Now, at present the discourse is rather inchoate,
hence the value of speaking in terms of various narratives rather than of a singular
discourse in this particular case.
Finally, the various stories told about Chinas historical past and Chinese
geographical presence today (and how they relate to Chinas place in the
world) emanate from discrete sites or venues inside China. They are
overwhelmingly the output of policy entrepreneurs and intellectuals in institutes,

universities, and think tanks in Beijing. These sites are not sealed off from the rest
of the world. In fact, though knowledge is always made in particular places by
specific persons, the geography of knowledge rarely reduces to simply
national influences untainted by foreign borrowings. Although much of the
literature in the history of science, for example, regards place largely in terms of
national territories, in this respect it parallels the history of social science tout court
(Agnew, 1989). To speak of places of knowledge production is to invoke
much more sociologically meaningful but also typically localized sites where
local, national, and long-distance influences on thinking and research
practice come together (e.g., Livingstone, 2007; Agnew and Livingstone, 2011).
In China, an array of foreign policy think tanks and research institutes, some with
and some without official governmental affiliation, has arisen over the past 30
years, drawing explicitly on U.S. models (e.g., Zhu Xufeng, 2009; McGann, 2012).
The figure of the intellectual, long reviled during and in the aftermath of
Maos Cultural Revolution, has also made a parallel comeback (Bondiguel and
Kellner, 2009). The renewed role for intellectuals oriented to public questions,
including international relations and geopolitics, itself reflects the pluralization
of public discourse and implicit acceptance of the idea of multiple narratives
competing with one another in the marketplace of ideas, even as they
all attempt to influence the policies and practices of the party-state
(Cheek, 2006). Indeed, as the various narratives gain acceptance in different
quarters, a sort of arms race for political attention and influence among
the various agencies and institutes within the government can push the
boundaries of policy in ways that a more centralized polity might be able to
resist. This seems to have become the case in relation to Chinas official actions in
the South China Sea (e.g., Pilling, 2012).

Epistemology first
Theorizing about China with the same flawed theses results in
error replicationour form of knowledge production is a
prerequisite.
Bashi 13 [Shir Bashi, BA at leiden university college. Serve The People: Politics of
China as Reality and Academic Pursuit. The Structure and Role of the Academic
Study of China in the Twenty-First Century May 20 th, 2013
http://www.academia.edu/9857812/Serve_The_People_Politics_of_China_as_Reality_a
nd_Academic_Pursuit._The_Structure_and_Role_of_the_Academic_Study_of_China_in
_the_Twenty-First_Century_BA_Thesis_ accessed 6-23-2016] TW
Still, there exists a powerful idea that China Studies lacks a sufficiently
strong disciplinary profile, and this affects the behaviour of members of the China Studies community
as well as the fields academic prestige and position in the academic hierarchy. Part of this concern is legitimate.
While China Studies appears to have enough internal academic validity, it partly lacks external academic validity: it
is questionable how big an impact the field has had on academia at large and especially the parent disciplines. In

at a higher level of analysis, there is doubt as to the contribution


of China Studies to scholarly debate and universal theorizing at a
disciplinary level, and thus its legitimacy. Consequently, the field could be said to be low in
other words,

the academic food chain, where it still must accept much theory and method from above without having much
influence on these defining aspects of general disciplines.

done ,

It is clear that something must be

for now the incentives are wrong. Scholars and aspiring academics are now tempted to seek to be

associated with the parent discipline more than the field, aiming for methodological rigour where this is not
appropriate, diverging from the research agenda that is one of China Studies strengths, making their research less
accessible to field scholars of a different (sub-)disciplinary background. In the process, they might be doing away
with the most valuable properties of Area Studies scholarship. 31 While there are reasons for their relative standing,

In the disciplines, some


theories have been examined for years without adjustment of the original
there is much to be remarked about the general social disciplines.

thesis : instead, theses are simply applied to various cases, in order to


comment on the extent to which reality , in a particular case, conforms to
theoretical predictions . This goes especially for scientists and fields low in the academic hierarchy. It
would be a shame if scholars in the China field sought to blend into disciplines as they are, when China Studies as a
giant case study is still too low in the academic food chain to influence theory and method making at the higher
level. It would imply the loss of the benefits and the internal validity of Area China Studies without the gain of a
chance to influence the current paradigms in the social disciplines. [t]he more a scholar integrates into []
specialist discourse [], he or she will lose the ability to freely communicate with other China scholars with a
different specialization. However, we need to retain this ability in order to avoid fragmentation of Chinese political
studies and actually accumulate substantive and theoretical knowledge (Alpermann, 2009, 354). This point to
another danger that deserves to be stressed: the existence of many forms of China expertise at the same time may
form an obstacle to academic legitimacy of the production of knowledge on China as a whole. Scholars who study
appear to increasingly China live and work in different epistemic and social academic communities.

Knowledge communities do not always coincide with disciplinary


communities do not necessarily coincide with methodological communities
do not equal epistemological formations do not quite overlap with schools
of thought. Within the field of China Studies, however, these differences appear to have long been tolerated.
When scholarship becomes more and more divided along these different community borders into islands of
research (OBrien, 2011, 539) this is not conducive to effective contestation, falsification or sound academic

production of knowledge, in the most extreme case turns into


production of opinion or individual interpretations: there is less way to
consensus20. The solution probably has to be sought in the continued production Area Studies knowledge,
while trying to improve the standing and impact of the field as a whole. The field of China Studies
needs to work out a way to contribute to theory building and method
discussion. Thus

development in the main disciplines, without sacrificing its unique grip on


reality in the area and beneficial original internal structure . One good way appears
to be an emphasis on contextualization in connection to general 20 According to
Bourdieu (2001/2004), the basis of a scientific field is a struggle for the arbitration of the real, and essential to this
struggle is closure (p. 70), or the idea that competition about the way the real is arbitrated happens among peers,
not among different fields! 32 theoretical debates and translation of concepts to Chinese reality. This alone,
however, may be too narrow a conception of mission and too servile a position. It is imperative that scholars avoid
idiosyncratic language, overly independent theorizing, or an abundance of strongly field-specific approaches.
Research results might be integrated with a more general theoretical framework if this truly adds to the value of the
research and understanding of the theory, and it should at least be argued very clearly to which bigger debate

the aim should be to produce


knowledge that is accessible, acceptable and useful to senior disciplinary
scholars and to strive, if not for moderate consensus on important topics,
then at least for unity of the field and a unified debate . This should make it difficult
specialist China research is contributing but most importantly,

when working on universal theory and in general scholarship to point to an abundance of approaches and
perspectives, choose arguments selectively and use China to prove anything and equally difficult to marginalize or
ignore China altogether as a useful case study for general theory.

Ontology first
K priorgeographical narratives are not just discursive
accounts but speak to the truth of affirmative claims. We
cannot make predictions without first understanding reality.
Bennett 15 [Mia M. Bennett (Graduate of geography department in University of
California, Los Angeles), How China Sees the Artic: Reading Between Extraregional
and Intraregional Narratives, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group] CB
Just as borders and boundaries at all scales and across all dimensions are formed through
narrativity,12 so too are regions. The narratives that describe and frame
regions can be termed grand regional narratives, which refer to a
generalized, empirically grounded account of what is going on, or has
gone on, in a region of sufficient size and importance to be widely viewed
13
as a significant presence on the world stage. Furthering Reubers point that different
geopolitical narratives can combine and influence one another,

14

the case of Chinese framings of the Arctic and their engage- ment

they are more than just


discursive accounts that conjure regions into existence from nowhere, for
they are grounded within ontological realities about which they make
differing claims. Cumings, for instance, argues that the Pacific Rim is a Euro-American construct that emerged through
with intraregional framings reveals multiple grand regional narratives at work. But

dis- courses he terms Rimspeak.

15

Yet the Pacific Ocean, a maritime region surrounded by populations with histories of exchange
16
well before the term Pacific Rim arose in the

and economic ties, has still been interlinked since at least the sixteenth century,
late 1970s.

Policy framework bad


Their framework is demobilizingpushes individual voices to
the margins.
Horschelmann 8 [Horschelmann, Kathrin, Research Associate, Leibniz-Institute for
Regional Geography Leipzig (IfL) . "Youth and the Geopolitics of Risk after ll
September 2001." Fear: Critical geopolitics and everyday life (2008): 139.] 6/24/16
What constitutes the political has been conceived primarily in terms of
the actions of the state in international relations theory and geopolitics
(England 2003; Cox and Low 2003; Marston 2003; Dowler and Sharpe 2001; Smith
2004). Although the often severe effects of geopolitical events such as interstate
war on civilians and children in particular are recognised (Thorne 2003; Carlton-Ford
et al. 2000), the power of state actors to instigate, manipulate and regulate
international conflicts has led to a conceptual emphasis on elite discourses and
actions, supplemented today by work on popular media (Sharpe 1996; Dodds 1996;
2000; 2005; Dittmer 2005). The primacy accorded to the state as geopolitical
agent is notable even in critical geopolitics, where it is seen as a
producer, administrator and ruler of space and geopolitics as world space
as organized by the state (Dalby and Tuathail 1996, 452; also see Mann 1993;
Shapiro 1994). Although power is recognised here as not simply a matter of
elite control or state rule but a matter also of contested localities where
rule is resisted, thwarted and subverted by social movements (Dalby and
Tuathail 1996, 453; also see Routledge 1996), we find few analyses that bring such
an understanding squarely into the heart of critical geopolitics, moving beyond a
resistance model to theorise the complex involvement of agents at a range of
scales, bringing the everyday fully into [political geographys] analyses (Kofman
2003, 622). Feminist political theory has long engaged with these questions and
shown that the gendered spheres of the private and public are intricately
connected through cycles of social reproduction (Enloe 1989; Peterson 1992;
Marston 2003; Staeheli and Kofman 2004). In political geography, such a
perspective is only gradually leading to a revision of the political.
In the cases that form the basis of this chapter, neglecting the voices of those
seemingly on the sidelines of international conflict reinforces a sense of
political disenfranchisement that can lead to a further decline in political
interest or, on the contrary, to more radical responses. The focus of this
chapter is on perceptions of risk after the World Trade Centre (WTC) attacks of 11
September 2001 of students between 16 and 18 years of age, most of them South
Asian, in the British city of Bradford. For those students with hybrid locations in
diasporic communities, attachment to people and places in different parts of the
world has meant that the effects of these events have been felt strongly in both a
direct and mediated way (also see Werbner 2002a and b; 2004; Sivanandan 2006;
Hopkins 2007). While the political rhetoric of western pro-war governments and
media has portrayed the attacks of 11 September 2001 as primarily a threat to
democratic values and securities in the west, thus particularising the effects of this
most global event (Smith 2001; Ang 2002), our research begins to show its plural
consequences as individuals are increasingly placed in-between intersecting scales,
social relations and political commitments. For disaporic groups, the personal and
the local are intricately articulated with the political and supra-local, as Philo and
Smith (2003) argue for children and young people more generally, especially as

they share connections with friends and relatives across geographical distances,
care for others on the basis of religious or ethnic affiliation, or are themselves the
targets of increased abuse after 11 September.

Limiting research to data-gathering and other research


practices with methodological rigour prevents us from
asking questions about and discovering linkages between
perspectives of China.
Bashi 13 [Shir Bashi, BA at leiden university college. Serve The People: Politics of
China as Reality and Academic Pursuit. The Structure and Role of the Academic
Study of China in the Twenty-First Century May 20 th, 2013
http://www.academia.edu/9857812/Serve_The_People_Politics_of_China_as_Reality_a
nd_Academic_Pursuit._The_Structure_and_Role_of_the_Academic_Study_of_China_in
_the_Twenty-First_Century_BA_Thesis_ accessed 6-23-2016] TW
The most contentious issues in social sciences research on China in the
past decade appears to be the role of theory, the disciplinary backgrounds of scholars and
the balancing of different aims: the desire to be recognized by the disciplines through disciplinary
rigour and to upgrade the status of Area Studies has to be weighed against the wish or
need to fulfil a distinctive function in the study of China as area experts , to

advance the study of China more than would have happened otherwise and to more adequately and quickly
recognize and address acute issues that arise in rapidly developing China. To aspire to remain close to the
disciplines most often means adopting their methods, which have become the single most defining aspect of social
disciplines like Political Science, and methodological rigour often equals quantitative research. A recurring complaint

methods dictate the forms of data-gathering, and these forms of


data-gathering in turn determine the research agenda: in the Chinese case especially,
adherence to authoritative and quantitative modes of data gathering at
times severely restricts possible questions and subjects. This way, China Studies
is that

appear to add little to the parent social sciences. There is now tremendous focus on framing questions that can be
pursued in a methodologically rigorous fashion [] Otherwise, the rigour with which one can pursue an issue tends
to drive what issues are pursued. Since rigour itself is not directly proportional to importance, its pursuit can
weaken the field as a whole (Lieberthal, 2010, 275). Another issue is that the methods preferred by (especially the
American) mainstream disciplines are simply not the most efficient in many cases, when studying China.

Methodological rigour might consume so many practical and intellectual


resources as to limit the scope and breadth of research, the speed of
research or the depth of research. Several authors complain that China scholars avid
to integrate general disciplinary theory into their work manage to do little
more than applying the theoretical paradigm as it is to the Chinese case and
concluding on its relevance. Pye (1992) mockingly speaks of [using] polysyllabic vocabulary [] to
elucidate the obvious (p.1162) and social sciences theories in search of Chinese realities (p.1161). Some of the
criticisms and problems identified with disciplinary rigour, it should be noted, appear to have been most applicable
towards the beginning of the disciplinary revolution in the early 1990s. This does not take away the fact that if a
distinct academic field of (area) China Studies exists, there must be reasons, legitimizing arguments for its
existence. China Scholars typically not having enough power over disciplinary theoretical paradigms to actually
modify these, it is a legitimate question about the legitimacy of China Studies to ask what the application of general

of course, the application of


theoretical lenses may help us view China from various perspectives and
discover linkages and processes earlier, but it remains a question whether
this is the right mission for China Studies. The prime purpose of research is to find answers
disciplinary theory adds to the usefulness of China area scholarship:

to less than obvious questions and to be sure that the findings can meet the "so what?" test of relevance (Pye,

Mainstream disciplines already have as their main goal the


development and improvement of theory and method and Area Study of
China has far less influence on this front than pure (or American domestic)
disciplinary scholarship (Carlson, Gallagher & Manion, 2010, 5). Surely, China Studies, or the area
1992, 1170).

approach to the study of China must have its own mission or function in the academic whole? On this point, authors

clearly differ in opinion. While few authors are as unabashedly critical as Pye (1992) in the early 1990s12, most are
also not so optimistic as to strongly endorse further disciplinary specialization and urge European universities to

The
majority of those who set themselves to assess the state of their field see
a mission somewhere in the middle between the one extreme of
development of universalist theory and refinement of disciplinary method,
and the other of studying China as a one-of-a-kind, unique phenomenon,
ascribing historical or cultural13 12 For instance, Stavis (1993) who criticizes Lucian Pyes own
use of social science theories, praises studies that systematically integrate the
study of China with highly generalizable social science theories that cut
across all countries and disciplines (Stavis, 1993, 806, emphasis added). 13 There are
different definitions of culture, among which for example rather
anthropological definition of all the origins, or Chinese characteristics to
Chinese phenomena. The compromise often but not always involves a form of comparativism.
learn from the US and bring Chinese studies out of the confinement of area studies (Brdsgaard, 2008, 55).

Affirmative Answers

Engagement good
The politics of engagement endorsed by the aff turns the K.
Nesbitt-Larking 16 [NesbittLarking, Paul, Acting Chair of the Department of
Political Science, University of Western Ontario. "We Got To Live Together: The
Psychology of Encounter and the Politics of Engagement." Political Psychology 37.1
(2016): 5-16.] 6/25/16
In a global world of strangeness in which personal identities are
increasingly contingent and the group boundaries of us and them
increasingly in question, we require new forms of openness toward each
other. This is a normative claim, but it is also one grounded in the empirical
analysis of those individuals, communities, and societies that respond to
the challenges of the contemporary world through a series of unviable
choices: social closure, cutting themselves off, parallel communities,
fundamentalist religions, and essentialist nationalisms. While these might
achieve for their subjects a kind of ontological security and at least a temporary
relief from existential anxiety, they serve to inflame prejudices, enhance mistrust,
engender fear, and condition contempt. Both empirically and normatively then we
can say that they push us in the wrong direction. There are no magical
solutions to these huge issues, which are the condition of our time, but
scholarship that promotes a politics of engagement in various ways
points the way . One example of this that has been influential in my own work is
Frances Henrys understanding of deep multiculturalism. Far from being an
invitation to develop separate ethno-cultural communities, multiculturalism for
Henry (2002) should promote:
empowerment and resistance to forms of subjugation; the politicization and
mobilization of marginalized groups; the transformation of social, cultural and
economic institutions, and the dismantling of dominant cultural hierarchies,
structures and systems of representation. (p. 238)
It means above all reading back into ones own history in a critical manner. This is a
postcolonial reading of multiculturalism that is grounded in a globalized take on the
contemporary world, one in which sovereignties, borders, and regimes are
increasingly fluid, contingent, and plurilocational.
Over the past two decades, such realities have been reflected in the emergence of
what is referred to as the cosmopolitical perspective. In the words of Gerard Delanty
(2006), the cosmopolitical mind is characterized by:
Irony (emotional distance from ones own history and culture), reflexivity (the
recognition that all perspectives are culturally conditioned and contingent),
skepticism towards the grand narratives of modern ideologies, care for other
cultures and an acceptance of cultural hybridization, an ecumenical commitment to
dialogue with other cultures, especially religious ones, and nomadism, as a
condition of never being fully at home in cultural categories or geo-political
boundaries. (pp. 4243)
This is the basis of a functioning politics of engagement : mutual
recognition, openness, dialogue, accommodation, agonistic bargaining,
and care. Only through a collective or communitarian order that is safe, dignified,
and free from disorder can we live as free relational beings. This requires what

Bryan Turner (2006) refers to as an adequate hermeneutic of the Other. Such a


hermeneutic entails full recognition, respect for difference, fully honest and critical
disclosure and mutual evaluation, and a basis of care for the other. Moreover, as
Connolly (1999) says: In the politics of generosity and care, none of us can
be said to occupy the authoritative center (p. 154).

Not reductionist
Engaging in geographical narratives doesnt mean advancing
them as some comprehensive, determinate understanding.
Critical geography is useless if it doesnt contribute to public
understanding and policy.
Murphy 15 [Alexander B. Murphy (professor of geography and Rippey Chair of

Liberal Arts and Sciences at University of Oregon), Advancing geographical


understanding: why engaging in gran regional narratives matters, Dialogues in
Human Geography] CB
The lack of much discussion of grand regional narratives in the geographical
literature may well reflect a concern about giving credence to stories that,
at least implicitly, purport to be authoritative. Yet, to engage a grand regional
narrative is not to accept either that it offers some comprehensive,
determinate understanding or to suggest that a counter narrative can play
that role. It is, instead, to make an argument based on a set of ideas,
perspectives, and understandings that can contribute to shaping the
overarching stories about regions that so profoundly influence public understandings
and actions. Promoting geographys role in public debate requires that we think
seriously about influential understandings of events and developments,
and that we undertake the research and analysis that can speak to those
understandings. It also requires that we periodically adopt forms of
communication that are accessible to a broader audience. In so doing, it is
important to be attentive to the possibility that dominant public discursive framings
of issues can foreclose consideration of alternative possibilities (Gregory, 2005). Yet,
many important points can be made to a broad audience without sacrificing
intellectual integrity; following Kathar- yne Mitchell (2008b: 3), the adjustments and com- promises one
needs to make when presenting ideas to the general public are often relatively minor in the larger course of
things.

Geopolitical narratives are not deterministic, but useful in


clarifying strategic possibilities.
Owens 15 [Mackubin T. Owens (Dean of Academics at the Institute of World
Politics in Washington, D.C. He is also the Editor of Orbis: a Journal of World Affairs
and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute), In Defense of Classical
Geopolitics, FPRI, cut 6/26/16] CB
Napoleon defined strategy as the art of using time and space. His focus was the operational level of war, but his

Geopolitics provides the link between


geography and strategy. Geopolitics is based on the undeniable fact that
all international politics, running the gamut from peace to war, takes place
in time and space, in particular geographical settings and environments. It
then seeks to establish the links and causal relationships between
geographical space and international political power, for the purpose of
devising specific strategic prescriptions.
definition applies as well to the level of grand strategy.

Geopolitics is not geographic determinism , but it is based on the


assumption that geography defines limits and opportunities in

international politics: states can realize their geopolitical opportunities or


become the victims of their geopolitical situation. One purpose of grand strategy is to
exploit ones own geographical attributes and an adversarys geographical vulnerabilities.

Geopolitics is dynamic, not static . It reflects international realities and


the global constellation of power arising from the interaction of geography
on the one hand and technology and economic development on the other .
Technology and the infusion of capital can modify, though not negate, the strategic importance of a particular
geographic space.

geopolitics clarifies the range of strategic choices , providing a guide


for achieving strategic efficiency. While it places particular stress on geographic space as a
critically important strategic factor and source of power, it recognizes that geography is only a
part of the totality of global phenomena.
Finally,

As Colin Gray observes, geopolitics is a wordas well as a basket of associated ideasthat all but begs to be
58
abused by the unscrupulous.
Properly understood and employed, however,

geopolitical analysis is an indispensable part of strategy making.

Alt fails
The alt fails coexisting narratives means we can't escape our
own underlying assumptions.
Shenhav 6 [Shaun Shenhav (associate professor at the Department of Political

Science, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), "Political Narratives and Political


Reality," International Political Science Review, July 2006] AZ
In the previous sections, we saw that assessing how faithfully a particular
narrative represents "political reality" depends on changes in the core
perceptions of the agent performing the assessment. Thus, it is necessary to
define the provisional basic view, or perception, of the relationship between
narratives and "political reality" on which the assessment will be based. Clearly, in
political studies this will involve distinguishing between the scholar's own
view and that held by his object of study. If the scholar decides to assess
the representational fidelity of a political narrative according to his or her
basic view, it is a relatively simple case, requiring only that the scholar be
aware of his or her underlying view. Matters become much more
complicated when one attempts to examine the fidelity of a political
narrative based on the views of the party being studied, for example,
according to the common views of a political leadership or wider public. In that
case, we must seek indications of how these agents perceive "political
reality" and its potential to be represented in narrative. One way of doing this is to
locate within political discourse consensual paradigms that reflect dominant views
of how "political reality" might be depicted. These consensual paradigms of political
reality are revealed when elements of discourse on a certain subject become a
recurring theme in a critical mass of political texts. Such a theme can manifest itself
in the repetition of, or variation on, the episodic representation of particular events,
the representation of events in sequence, or even full representation that also
includes causal relationships.9 Once we have identified such consensual
paradigms in a certain issue, we can regard them as if they are "political
reality." Thus, we can bring them to bear on specific narratives that refer to the
same issue and use them to determine how faithfully these narratives represent
"political reality." Based on the interrelation between the three elements of narrative
and the four basic views of the relation ship between narratives and "political
reality" (see Table 1), we can also deduce that consensual paradigms can indicate
the basic view behind them. Thus, for example, if the consensual paradigm is a
narrative with causal relations, those who so concur probably share the "full
representation" basic view (that is, that narra tives are capable of fully representing
"political reality"). On the other hand, if a consensual paradigm undertakes only
discrete episodes and events, the "episodic representation" basic view is probably
at work. The consensual paradigms need not necessarily involve major or
"historical" issues. Paradigms can also apply to "minor," everyday events, such as
occur in the course of a particular incident. Of course, consensual paradigms of
political reality cannot be located for every issue , either because they do
not exist or because they are too hard to identify. We occasionally become
aware of such paradigms only at the end of a deep social process that allows
them to become entrenched, and we are sometimes trapped by them in a
way that renders them invisible to us . The need to be prepared for changes in

basic views of the narrative-"political reality" relationship makes it necessary for us


to understand how these paradigms gain their standing and evolve.

Political narratives are inescapable since there's no coherent


criterion to determine their truth-value.
Shenhav 6 [Shaun Shenhav (associate professor at the Department of Political
Science, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), "Political Narratives and Political
Reality," International Political Science Review, July 2006] AZ
Assessing the credibility of causal links in political narratives is difficult, if
not impossible. It requires, of course, some sense of the "real" causal
connections in "political reality," which might then be compared to the
links suggested in the narrative. Another possibility is for one particular
dominant narrative to be considered unequivocally truthful, in which case
it would probably not even be described as "narrative" at all, but by some
other term, such as "reality." For, to use Catharine MacKinnon's (1996: 235)
illuminating words, " Dominant narratives are not called stories. They are
called reality. " In other words, those who believe that a particular narrative
can offer an absolutely truthful representation of reality will, when
encountering such a narrative, resort to objective and unequivocal terms
such as "history" or "reality." Table 1 sums up the possibilities of assessing
fidelity in narrative representation. It takes into account the four basic views of the
relationship between narrative and reality (see Table 1, columns), as well as the
three elements of narrative discussed above (see Table 1, rows). The "+" sign
indicates that the basic view allows for that narrative element to be used in
assessing the credibility of narrative representation. Table 1 summarizes the
different strategies for evaluating the fidelity of repre sentation in political
narratives, according to the four basic views of the relationship between reality and
narrative that scholars may hold. The table shows that the concept of narrative can
be used by scholars with an entire range of perspectives, and not, as is the common
misperception, only by those who adhere to a radical relativism (represented by the
right-hand column).

Their kritik is non-falsifiable and totalizing reject it.


Shenhav 6 [Shaun Shenhav (associate professor at the Department of Political
Science, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), "Political Narratives and Political
Reality," International Political Science Review, July 2006] AZ
Political narratives do not just spring into being; they are created in the
course of political action, a process that can be followed in both public forums
and closed ones (Shenhav, 2003). The fact that political narratives are
constructed and shaped, however, still does not determine how capable they
are of representing particular aspects of "political reality." In other words, even
if it is clear that narrative cannot capture the whole of "political reality,"
this does not mean that all narratives are equally true or equally false.
While it is, admittedly, hard to find a consensual definition of "political reality," the
political perspective (especially in democracies) includes as one of its central
functions the representation of elements that exist outside the political narrative.
Since politicians, at least to some extent, "have their words and actions
owned by those whom they represent" (Hobbes, 1960: 105, Ch. 16), they must
refer to the same framework that their constituents see as the "political reality,"

even if this is not an objective reality. Moreover, the fact that any political
narrative is locked in competition with other narratives naturally raises
the question of their respective adherence to "reality." Even if we assume
that "political reality" is a construct made up of various representations, it
still remains to be determined how compatible a particular narrative is
with this amalgam. Because political discourse is often defined by a
predominant "referential function" (Jakobson, 1960) privileging the (usually
contextual) informational content of an utterance, the relationship between a
political narrative and its context is of special importance for evaluating the fidelity
of representation in political narratives. It is therefore difficult to rely only on
internal criteria, which can presumably help gauge a narrative's credibility
based on such standards as coherence and consistency. Because a political
narrative addresses a context shared by both speakers and addressees,
and because it performs this function under conditions of competition and
struggle with other narratives, such criteria cannot adequately measure a
narrative's reliability in reflecting "political reality."

Perm
Endorse the permmultiple, even contradictory, global and
territorial narratives can reinforce each other in responsible
and conscientious ways.
Bennett 15 [ BA in Political Science at Department of Geography, University of
California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, How China Sees the Arctic: Reading Between
Extraregional and Intraregional Narratives, Geopolitics 20:3, 645-668, Page 646647.] GK 6/23/16
China is building two spatially inconsistent but ultimately mutually
reinforcing narratives to earn legitimacy as a regional stakeholder with
states both inside and outside the Arctic. In the countrys more territorial
narrative, Chinese officials recognise the continuing salience of territory in
the circumpolar north and draw attention to the countrys relatively
northern latitudes, proximity to the Arctics natural resources, and
vulnerability to climate change, which their scientists research through
state-funded expeditions. In the more globalist narrative, Chinese officials
put forth a vision of the Arctic as a maritime, global commons where
climate change has environmental implications for the entire planet. China
also encourages the creation of a global polar culture to justify its involvement in
the Arctic, repossessing it for the international community of which China is a
member. Taken together, these narratives serve to enhance the countrys
domestic polar identity and its global identity as a responsible,
environmentally conscientious, and cooperative state. Superficially, these
narratives may seem contradictory as they draw on contrasting spatial
imperatives. But arguably, they actually reinforce each other. By
emphasising Chinas proximity to the north, officials promote the loose
territorial sense of the Arctic that they more openly advocate in their
more globalist narrative. Interestingly, other non-Arctic states like Japan and
Germany also present similarly opposing narratives about the Arctic, as this paper
will briefly explore. China is therefore not necessarily unique in its deployment of
two such narratives. Rather, it epitomises how countries outside the Arctic
can frame the region according to two distinct spatialities in order to
defend claims to stakeholder authenticity and legitimacy.

Their critique doesnt indict our affthe goal of IR isnt to


describe the world perfectly but rather to make predictions
that are useful.
Fettweis 15 [ Christopher J. Fettweis (Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science at Tulane University), On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical
Geopolitics, Then and Now, FPRI, cut 6/25/12] CB

Critiquing geopolitics for failing to construct coherent theories of state


behavior is not entirely fair, however, because although description may
be at the heart of most political science, it has never been the goal at
which the research program has aimed. Scholars of geopolitics have never
tried to generate a coherent science of political behavior, preferring
prescription, and in some senses prediction, over description. Surely, however,
they are correct in pointing out that geographical variables are among the most important, enduring influences over

As the chessboard shapes the game, so, too, terrestrial geographys


provide the most basic influence upon the behavior of states. That
geography affects international relations is not controversial ; what is not yet
states.

clear, however, is exactly how, under what conditions, and to what extent. After all, there is a limit upon how much
a board can teach about the nature of a game played upon it.

Critical geography bad


Critical geopolitics is too focused on national symbols at the
expense of lived experience.
Dodds 01 [Klaus Dodds, Department of Geography @ University of London.

Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics after Ten Years Progress in Human
Geography 25,3 pp.469-484. Accessed 6-26-16. TW]
It is striking that much critical geopolitical writing on foreign policy and
national identity has been concerned (perhaps excessively) with
representation rather than the mass of textual and bodily practices which
enable such expressions of geopower (see Thrift, 1999; 2000). Particular bodily
practices can be used to investigate how imagined communities are perceived and
integrated into peoples every day lives. In part this is because
methodologically most attention has been given to national symbols,
histories and geographies without really demonstrating how everyday life
becomes nationalized (but see Billig, 1995; Paasi, 1996). As Linde-Laursen notes
with reference to the importance of education, With the establishment of the
nation-state, history becomes territorialized and territory becomes historicized
(1995; 1131). Various styles of dish cleaning (apparently the Danes like to dry using
the tea towel and Swedes prefer to air dry!)6 are shown to demonstrate how
differences over domestic hygiene can be used to demarcate imagined national
identities (even if the gendered divisions of labour received less attention). National
experience can, therefore, occur in some of the most unexpected places and
critical geopolitics needs to perceive how nations as imagined
communities are reproduced in the context of everyday life (see, on food
and national/cultural differences, Cook and Crang, 1996; May, 1996).
One of the ironies of critical geopolitics is that the well-founded critiques
of disembodied and privileged geopolitical world-views of writers such as
Halford Mackinder have not been replaced by studies which demonstrate
how geopolitics works in everyday life. No ethnographic studies have
demonstrated how, for instance, foreign policies emerge through the interaction of
government departments, gender divisions of labour and particular textual practices
such as the generation of briefing papers and intelligence reports (see, in part,
Klein, 1994; Milliken, 1999). Methodologically, critical geopolitics has been
very disappointing. There has been little detailed ethnographic research
on foreign policy communities (such as those based around Chatham House in
the UK) and popular cultural formations. Hugh Gustersons (1996) analysis of
the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and nuclear weapons culture is an example of
what can be achieved by careful ethnography. Critical geopolitics ought to
demonstrate how popular and lite forms of geopolitical reasoning collude
with one another and then resonate with and through popular culture.
Joanne Sharps (2000b) detailed analysis on the Readers Digest will be an
important intervention here. Michael Billigs (1995) work on banal nationalism offers
another possible methodological and theoretical pathway. Geographers such as
David Newman, Anssi Paasi and James Sidaway have produced some first-class
research on how geopolitical boundaries actually shape everyday life for those living
on the borderlands (Newman, 19992000; Paasi, 1996; 1999; Sidaway, 2000a).
Others such as John McKendrick have also demonstrated how careful statistical
analysis can be combined with theoretical rigour for the purpose of exploring new

forms of nationalism and democratic politics (McKendrick 1999). Other political


geographers such as Matthew Sparke (1994; 2000) have also demonstrated how
feminist ideas relating to embodiment can be of some importance to critical
geopolitics. These varied strands of critical geopolitics are now far removed
from the disembodied and largely descriptive studies of political
geography and boundary studies in the immediate postwar period (for
example, Jones, 1945; Roucek, 1956).
Christine Sylvester (1998), as Thrift has noted (2000: 383), has written an
interesting paper on President John Kennedy and an administration dominated by
sexual politics and tense diplomatic dramas in Berlin and Cuba. After reviewing a
recent biography of Kennedys tenure of the White House, Sylvester considers how
these accounts of diplomatic intrigue were generated overwhelmingly by powerful
men holding grand offices of state; these included the former Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger, and other policy advisors. In contrast, scant attention has been
paid to the people who were the agenda setters. The Kennedy White House could
not have functioned without a legion of choreographers and secretaries who not
only generated position papers but also typed the agendas of presidents and
government departments. These positions were held overwhelmingly by women
and, in moments of extreme national crisis, they could hold a balance of power. The
most famous example was to be provided ten years after Kennedys death when
President Nixons personal secretary claimed that she had erased secretly taped
messages accidentally while typing agenda papers. Subsequent to that event,
media wags invented the term the Mary Lou stretch in order to describe the
amazing act of contortion that was required in order to erase those tapes in the
secretarial office. While her dexterity did not save Nixon from disgrace, it did point
to the considerable amount of influence and loyalty that these relationships can and
do generate (see Enloe, 1999). Clearly, one could also think of other bodily
movements during the Clinton administration, which have been highly significant.7
In sum, critical geopolitics needs to engage with these concerns over the
role of practices in everyday life. The impact of the 1947 partition of Kashmir
illustrated only too well how expressions of geopower have profound consequences
for local populations (Hans, 2000). Personal experiences of the 1947 partition were
combined with a moving account of how womens bodies were violated and
displaced in areas close to the border between India and Pakistan. Both the Indian
and Pakistan states later immortalized these women as heroines and widows of
freedom in a way that other feminist writers have shown reproduces and sustains
the legitimacy of the state (see Yuval Davis, 1997). Ironically, shortly after hearing
this paper, the other conference delegates and I were transported to the borderline
near the village of Atari. As the sun began to descend, an extraordinary spectacle
unfolded as Indian and Pakistani troops began a ritual involving goose-stepping,
stamping feet and the blowing of bugles. Throughout this spectacle, mixed crowds
on both sides of the border were cheering the male soldiers who had clearly
performed these choreographed rituals on many occasions. To the north of this
border, where western visitors are rather thinner on the ground, the unseen and
insecure victims of borderlands remain predominantly women and children. I was
left with many uncomfortable questions in my mind (see Krishna, 1994; 1999).

The ability to craft and use grand geopolitical narratives is


productivea necessary skill for policymakers to sell their
agenda given our contemporary mass media.
Coe et al 4 [Kevin Coe (masters degree students at University of Washington),

David Domke, Erica S. Graham, Sue Lockett John, and Victor W. Pickard, "No Shades
of Gray: The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press,"
International Communication Association, 2004] AZ
The post-September 11 binary discourse of the president, therefore, seems
to be a clear example of what Manheim (1991, 1994) has termed strategic
political communication, in which leaders craft their public language with
the goal of creating, controlling, distributing, and using mediated
messages as a political resource (see also Domke, Watts, Shah, & Fan, 1999;
Watts, Domke, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Zaller, 1994b). A binary discourse seems
ideally suited for a political culture dominated by mass media for several
reasons. For one, central organizing objects provide the media with a
coherent frame within which their coverage can have a greater resonance
with the public. Further, these objects frequently comprise the big story of
the time, something that appeals to media outlets because of the increased
public interestand economic rewardsthat accompany these stories. The
presence of a particular ordering of discourse also supports this big-story mentality
that exists among the media: The establishment phase provides the press with the
discursive icons that will shape the story and make it memorable, while the
extension phase prolongs the storyand the chance for elevated media profits
until the next compelling narrative arrives. Finally, the presence of multiple binary
constructions is particularly attractive to the press because each of them (a) feeds
a sense of conflict, which is the heart of most political news coverage; (b) provides
rhetorical flourishes that news media outlets desireand that television news, in
particular, requires; and (c) has moral staying power, as suggested by the
decades-long, binary-rich Cold War era (see Ivie, 1990; Kuypers, 1997). As a result,
a political leader can have high confidence that the press will echo a binary
discourse, as occurred here with President Bush. Indeed, our findings show
quite clearly that the pressat least the institutional voices of the press
aligned remarkably with the presidents good/evil and security/peril
constructions. Generally, editorials also echoed the presidents emphasis upon
each particular side of the binary as he extended them over time. The exception to
this trend was good discourse, a theme that editorials are less likely to echo
because it is a regular feature of both presidential rhetoric and press coverage. As
such, editorials have less reason to rely on the president to trigger its usage.
Notably, this tendency of the press to echo the presidents usage of binaries
suggests a type of agenda-setting effect. Although most agenda-setting
scholarship has focused on the ability of the press to set the public
agenda, some scholarship has also considered the factors that set the
media agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1993; McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 1997). Our
findings suggest that presidential discourseat least during periods of high crisis
can play an important role in shaping editorial commentary and
therefore adds to the body of scholarship that has noted the importance
of political messages in setting the media agenda (e.g., Roberts & McCombs,
1994; Wanta, 1992; Weaver & Nimley Elliot, 1985).

A2 K prior
Political and social practices shape identitynot the other way
around.
Meyer 2 [(David S. Meyer is associate professor of sociology at the University of

California, Irvine, Opportunities and Identities: Bridge-Building in the Study of


Social Movements, Social Movements:
Identity, Culture, and the State, Oxford University Press, 2002)] AK
2. Politics and Identity.We need to link notions of identity to an analysis of
the political process. This need is particularly evident in the apparently
dichotomous character of paradigms emphasizing the political process and
those emphasizing collective identity or culture (Jasper and Goodwin
1999; Koopmans 1999; Rochon 1998). Both deductive logic, however, and close
examination of cases point to the necessary relationship between identity
and state processes (Clemens 1997; Stevens 1999). If we can move beyond
the crudest biological determinism, we recognize that the process of
turning physical features or social practices into identities is forged
from the interaction between people and that state. By forcing some
people to sit in the back of the bus, wear a yellow star, or hide their sexual
orientations, states create the conditions in which particular identities
develop. States can create identities by endorsing or prohibiting religious
or sexual practices, by regulating access to social goods, and by setting
rules of interaction between groups and individuals. Within these
parameters, activists choose how to define themselves, by alliances,
claims, and tactics, as Mary Bernstein shows in her chapter about gay and lesbian
politics in Vermont (also see Bernstein 1997).