Note: These questions are patterned from the sample questions by the SC
in this year’s Bar Examination. The answers were intended to be lengthen
in order that the reason behind the law and the decision may be reflected
to guide the Bar Candidates. The candidates can shorten the answers to
make it convenient for the examiners to correct.
Adultery of a woman.
Q – Is the adultery of the woman a ground to declare the marriage void on
the ground of psychological incapacity? Explain.
Answer: No. The adulterous acts of a woman do not even rise to the level of the “psychological
incapacity” that the law requires. Her act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The husband must be able
to establish that the wife's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented
during trial.
Doubtless, the woman was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had
some character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a
psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her
marital and family duties and obligations. (Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27,
2008, 556 SCRA 272; Silvino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinhug, et al., G.R. No.
168796, April 15, 2010; Ochocoso v. Alano, et al., G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011; Villalon
v. Villalon; Rosalino Marable v. Myrna Marable, G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011).
Refusal to have sex with husband.
Q – A and B are married. The man contended that the wife refused to
consummate their marriage by refusing to have sexual intercourse with
him during the marriage. He alleged that their last intercourse was prior
to their marriage. He contended that the wife was suffering from
psychological incapacity. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. The husband’s evidence merely established that the wife refused to have sexual
intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he
confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. There must be proof that the psychological disorder renders her “truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a

“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a
null and void marriage. In Marcos v. Marcos, it was ruled that Article 36 of the Family Code, we
stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. (Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay, et al., G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010).
Effect of a foreign divorce.
Q – A former Filipino citizen got married to a Filipina. Due to work and
other personal commitments, the man returned to Canada after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines to surprise his wife, but he was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
He filed a petition for divorce in Canada which was granted. Wanting to
marry his girlfriend, he registered the Canadian divorce with the Civil
Registry of Pasig but despite the registration of the same, the Local Civil
Registrar refused to issue a license for him to remarry. He filed a petition
for judicial recognition of the foreign judgment which was denied by the
RTC, holding that he was not the proper party to file the petition as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only Filipinos can avail of the
remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26, Family Codeand in
accordance with the legislative intent as determined by the Court in
Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), to “avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
He contended that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right established is in favor of the Filipino spouse. As held
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139 and Pilapil v.
Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 74 SCRA 653:
“To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.”
The provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse

considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. The capacity of
the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree
capacitated the alien spouse to do so. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond; (Art. 17, NCC) Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. (Gilbert B. Corpus v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010).
Judgment declaring a spouse presumptively dead is immediately final and
executory; remedy is Rule 65, not Rule 45.
Q – Yolanda Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1991. In 1994,
Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment but since then, he never
communicated with Yolanda. After nine (9) years of waiting, she filed a
Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead which the RTC
granted. The Republic of the Philippines appealed from the decision
contending that Yolanda failed to prove earnest efforts to locate Cyrus
and thus, failed to prove well-founded belief that he was already dead.
Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death based under Art. 41, Family Code was a
summary judicial proceedings in which the judgment is immediately final
and executory and, thus, not appealable. The CA granted the motion. Is
the dismissal of the appeal correct? Explain.
Answer: The CA is correct. The RTC decision is immediately final and executory and not subject
to ordinary appeal.
Since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of
the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. The appropriate remedy is a special
civil action for certiorari if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Rep. v. Yolanda Granada, G.R. No. 187512, July 13, 2012).
By express provision of law, (Art. 247, F.C.), the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be
had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in
certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors
of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum. void. Enrico & Edna Lindo. Q . the woman obtained a loan secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a real proper under their names but without the consent of the husband.R. 183984. Q – In a case. It is only the share in the net profits which is forfeited . From the decision of the CA. there was an action for legal separation. the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. hence. Yolanda C. G.On October 31. v. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers of the administration do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. Mortgage of conjugal property without consent of spouse is void. under Article 63 of the Family Code. Sale of conjugal property by a spouse without consent of the other. (Rep. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. NCC). Sps. 2011). (See: Art. the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that. Granada. which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2). Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.” (Arturo Sarte Flores v.R. 1995. among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. Is the ruling correct? Why? Answer: No. The RTC dismissed the case as the mortgage was executed without the consent of the husband even as it noted that he executed a Special Power of Attorney for the wife to execute the mortgage on November 4. 2012. the creditor filed a complaint for Foreclosure of the Mortgage with damages. Is the ruling correct? Why? Answer: No. If there is a decree of legal separation. under Article 41 of the Family Code. in rendering judgment thereon. 187512. However. 5. It was ruled by the CA that the ½ undivided share of the offending spouse in the property was already forfeited in favor of their daughter based on the ruling of the RTC that the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties. the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. Note: This is an example of a void contract that can be ratified. Thus. because the execution of the SPA can be considered as acceptance of the mortgage by the other spouse that perfected the contract or continuing offer. subsequent execution of SPA perfects the contract. No. 1995. April 13. even if separated in fact. Sereno. The RTC however ruled that the subsequent execution of the SPA cannot be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the real estate mortgage. No. July 13. She issued checks as partial payments but the same were dishonoured. G. J).

G. the judgment creditor was the purchaser in sheriff’s sale. such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. In Honrado v. they now are barred from raising the same. 185064. J). et al. 2012. Answer: Their failure to invoke and prove that the house and lot was a family home is a waiver of such defense or right. they invoked the exemption of the family home from levy but the plaintiff contended that the spouses did not assert and prove that their house and lot was a family home prior to the public auction conducted by the sheriff. et al. Q – Petitioner filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against the respondent for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262 and asked for financial support. they were sued for ejectment where judgment was rendered. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. A issued a check which was dishonored. No. G. what is forfeited in favor of their daughter is not his share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. January 16... The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such. Interdimensional favor of their daughter.” Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public action. No. Inc. Reyes. They have a family home. He was convicted with civil indemnity. They did not invoked the exemption from levy of the family home.R. (2).R. She alleged that respondent is the father of her child. (De Mesa v.. Acero. (Siochi v. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that “[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43. Siochi. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption. He denied being the father of the child and that the signature appearing in the child Certificate of Live Birth is not his signature. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that . A child must establish filiation before support may be granted. 2010). Q – A and B are married. Gozon. 169977.R. Explain. The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. They however renamed as lessees but for failure to pay the rentals. The family home was levied upon and sold where C. CA. March 18. v. In the execution. No. G. No. the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. 169900. 657 (2005). State the effect of such failure. et al. No. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. it was said that at no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction: While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code. but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. it must be claimed not by the sheriff. (2) and 63.512 Phil.” Clearly.

G. 165016. Before a child may be entitled to support. CA. Tayag-Gallor. Q – In a complaint for support alleging that a child is an illegitimate child of the alleged father. The object of RA 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. 554 SCRA 513). x x x . G. 181 SCRA 861. Alternatively. (Art. Vallecera. in proper action. where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. Vasquez. she may directly file an action for support. it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. To be entitled to legal support. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child. if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. as the father of the child without the signature of the alleged father. One such proof is the record of birth appearing in the civil register. Family Code). 77867. 2010). illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action for compulsory recognition. No. the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him. In short. “It is settled that “[a] certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. 172(2)(2). No.R. Thus. If filiation is beyond question. (Tayag v. 195. 549 SCRA 68). support follows as matter of obligation. The RTC granted the support based on those documents. Is the decision correct? Why? Answer: No. And “while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document. Article 172(1) and any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. because the two (2) documents are not proofs of filiation. he must be recognized by the alleged father. No. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child. Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. G. March 24. there is no basis to order support. Dolina v.R. petitioner must. 182367. No. June 17. 174680. Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. (Art.” The Rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. first establish the filiation of the child. 2008. (De la Puerta v.” The baptismal certificate is not a good proof paternity. An order for x x x support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. (Montefalcon v. December 15. Is the dismissal correct? Why? Answer: Yes.there is no prior judgment establishing the filiation of the child hence. “Time and again.R. 2008. until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. Family Code. the bases were the record of birth although unsigned by the alleged father and the baptismal certificate identifying the alleged father. Just like in a birth certificate. G. this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.R. 1990. February 6. the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.

the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. 180614. Five (5) properties were acquired by them and registered under their names ostensibly as husband and wife. The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. (Hernandez v.R. 1998. petitioner admitted that the properties were acquired from the income of the manpower services company. Garcia. But the relationship did not last long. See: Gotardo v. Answer: Yes. 172471. they were able to organize a manpower services company where petitioner owned 3. Petitioner insists she is a coowner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Answer: The contentions are not correct. an action for partition was filed. They orally partitioned the same. Andal. G.R. G. et al. Decide. the RTC ruled that respondent was the sole owner. It is not required that the partition agreement be registered or annotated in the title to be valid. She further contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition. Brion. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid or enforceable at law. 2012). she contended that she was a pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties and that the court’s decision subjected the certificates of title to collateral attack.baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence. G. hence.33%. August 29. Petitioner demanded for some more. hence. Respondent contended that the properties were acquired out of his personal funds. Buling. On appeal. After exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate. Is the agreement valid? Explain. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. 165166. recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. At the trial. Brion. During their coverture. 2012. et al. Notarte.” (Antonio Perla v. 2010. November 12. 78 Phil. No. No. September 25. equity will in proper cases. G. they agreed to divide the properties. No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition. hence. August 15. they are estopped from denying the existence of an oral partition.R. therefore. J. Mirasol Baring. (Municipality of Biñan v. where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of their respective portions set off to each other. J). Notarte. Existence of partnership necessary in cases of partition.R. 180 SCRA 576). B. and C are the co-owners of a real property having inherited from their parents. 69260. No.. 1989. December 22. but respondent refused. Respondent maintains otherwise.R. G. Lim. 196 (1947). it would be . Tan v. until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved. PROPERTY Oral partition is invalid. No. v. Indubitably. 296 SCRA 445. Q – Parties lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage despite the fact that respondent was legally married. Q – A. 128004.

In Austria-Magat v.R. After the death of one of the donors.premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. Such encroachment was confirmed by the relocation survey of the property.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. 10 October 1994. 264 SCRA 534. the donation was submitted to probate but the RTC ruled it to be a donation inter vivos due to its irrevocability. Despite demands. Is the dismissal correct? Why? Answer: No. 237 SCRA 565. More importantly. The writ of demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order hence. Q – In a case. 91 Phil. March 21. Veridiano II. does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties. Sps. CA. Sps. 109262. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff directing the removal of the structures. If a donation by its terms is inter vivos. 2011). and had only two (2) witnesses.. 48050. Action publiciana or reinvindicatoria is the remedy if a property is encroached upon. Q – There was a donation by the spouses to their children and granddaughter denominated as “Donation Mortis Causa” stating that it is irrevocable. and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim. G. Court of Appeals. CA. Concepcion. September 1. it was held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa. (Javier v. November 21. No. 165427. where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the act. The donees accepted the donation. ruled it to be one of mortis causa and since it did not comply with the formalities of a will.R. 146 SCRA 250 (1986). or petitioner in this case. Betty Lacbayan v. While inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code which provides that in an action to recover. 2010). (Concepcion v. dismissed the same. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 170189. on appeal. No. No. 426 SCRA 263 (2002). G. Elegio and Dolia Cañezo v. there was a complaint for a writ of demolition filed by the owners of a property alleging that they discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by the adjacent owner without their knowledge and consent. It had no attestation clause. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why? Answer: No. The CA. (Fabrica v. 823 (1952)). G. the complaint was filed. the complaint will not even lie if the claimant. The CA reversed holding that a complaint for recovery of possession should have been filed.R. the property must be identified. DONATION Designation of donation as mortis causa is not controlling. G. Bayani Samoy. it is void. 1996. The designation that it is a Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. the other party refused to remove the structures hence. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: . Jr. Bautista.R. (Catapusan v. No. this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

44 Phil. Del Rosario v. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. and 3. Indeed. what amounts to the same thing. 176943. The deed of donation stated among others: (1) a property was given to the done. or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x” (Puig v. may transfer. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti. 668). the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor. No. as the testator did in another case. it was immediately operative and final. Sps. 569 SCRA 697. Concepcion. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. 91 Phil. 2011).1. Q – The petitioner filed an action to recover a property claiming that they purchased it from Casimiro Vere in July 1971. G. Aluad. 2010). 168 Phil 404. but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ. NUISANCE A structure if declared illegal does not mean it is a nuisance per se. 172804. Mata. (3) if the Donee predeceases me. 2008. 734. ad nutum.R.R. (Alejandro v. sell. Sevilla. Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her. October 17. In 1996 the City Council . That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. The respondents answered and claimed that they purchased the property from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated in May 1965. that “the donor. 450 SCRA 598 (2003)). not in futuro. 2. Answer: It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. (2) the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise. Donation inter vivos. 823. (Gonzalo Villanueva represented by his heirs v. Laureta v. January 24.. Ferrer. September 20. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. she could have easily stipulated. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition (Art. (Aluad v. 187056. being reflected in the Deed. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated. Geraldez. the same land will not be reverted to the Donor.” signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez. G. First. as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. (4) The done accepted the land donated. et al. Instead. who bought it from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970. No. took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. No. Branoco. Q – MMDA claimed that the wing walls of a building constructed by Justice Gancayco on his property was a nuisance per se. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos. That before his death. Peñaflorida) or used words to that effect. (Heirs of Sevilla v. when is it one.R. had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the property. or. G. his heirs and successors. NCC) which. Concepcion v. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the Donee predeceases me. What is the nature of the donation? Explain. waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title.

it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code. (Emilio Gancayco v. Gancayco. Tayabas v. the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building. Ma. G. or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others. Pilar Santiago. et al. (Torres & Lopez de Bueno v. et al.gave him an exemption from constructing an arcade. of Quezon City. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. G. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being unsound mind. or its demolished portion. she was publicly known to be insane. condition or property. August 9. 179859. Petitioners. No. when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building. October 11. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will.R. 2011). NCC). MMDA v. it is contrary to law and public policy.. 2009. for purposes of administration only but no one shall be the owner of the same. (3) shocks. (2) annoys or offends the senses. v.R. People. While the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property for more than 20 years. or any body of water. 177807.R. to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. 870 and 1083. The fact that he was given an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisance per se. (Tolentino v. She was likewise suffering from paranoia. When a will provides for indivision of a property. Is the condition in the will valid? Why? Answer: No. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. July 13. Answer: Yes. 517 SCRA 448 (2007)). Is it a nuisance per se? Why? Answer: No. Clearly. Bustamante. contrary to public policy.. petitioners appealed and contended that the testator was “magulyan” or forgetful. 772 . Zoilo Santiago. it is subject to statutory limitation as the law provides that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years. business. No. (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street. establishment. (Arts. Q – After the will was admitted to probate. There was no showing that she was one month or less. Q – The will of Basilio Santiago stated that a house and lot in the City of Manila shall be transferred in the names of Maria Pilar and Clemente. G. G. et al. Lopez. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.R. however. No. (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. omission. defies or disregards decency or morality. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act. 592 SCRA 552. 48 Phil. so much so that it effectively stripped her of her testamentary capacity. 2010). City Gov’t. 177933. SUCCESSION Effect if will provides for indivision of property among heirs. before making the will. or. did not present medical evidence to show that she was of unsound mind. (In Re: Petition for Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago. Is the admission of the will to probate correct? Explain. No. 494. the children. 182567.

one of them donated a property belonging to the co-ownership to one of her nephews. there was a complaint for partition filed by one of the heirs as the other refused to partition the properties. hence. March 23. the proper objects of his bounty.There was an application for a renewal and increase in their loan using a title but the bank disapproved it without returning the title.997 without any legal right to do so. et al. injury or other cause. Title was issued. The owner filed an action for reconveyance. Laxa. 800.R. No. or that his mind be wholly unbroken. 728 Phil. 174489. Q . But while this is true. The bank contended that it has already prescribed since 30 years have already lapsed. Abella. No. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of. the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the reconveyance is based on fraud which makes a contract voidable (and that the aggrieved party is not in possession of the land whose title is to be actually reconveyed). Article 1410 of the Civil Code categorically states that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. April 11.(1926). J). v. 2012. a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will (Art. (Baltazar. without approval of the court. Article 799 of the New Civil Code states that to be of sound mind. More importantly. or unshattered by disease. there was foreclosure and sale of the property. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. after learning that there was a Donation Inter Vivos. Sancho v.” grounded on the theory that the DBP foreclosed their land covered by TCT No.R. 728 (1933)). G. Yet. 164693. NCC) and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS Rescission is the remedy for reparation of the damage done. Del Castillo. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. PRESCRIPTION 10-year prescriptive period for reconveyance does not apply if the contract is void. Darapa. It does not apply to an action to nullify a contract which is void ab initio. G. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states: The burden of proof to show that the testator was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies in the oppositors. and the character of the testamentary act. In this case. the action was an action for “Annulment of Tile. unimpaired. rendering the sale and the subsequent issuance of TCT in DBP’s name void ab initio and subject to attack at any time conformably to the rule in Article 1410 of the Civil Code. 2011). they filed a Supplemental . Recovery of Possession and Damages. Sps. While the action was pending. (Abalos. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. Besides. et al. it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. Some of them took possession of the properties hence. v. the heirs became the co-owners of several parcels of land. Q – After the death of their predecessor-in-interest. T1.

even if it should be valid. No. On appeal. Provision in contract of lease granting the lessee exclusive right to renew. v. NCC applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the contending parties actually owned the properties under litigation. conceding that the right to bring the rescissory action pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is preconditioned upon a judicial determination with regard to the thing subject litigation. valid. Reyes. to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract. Surely. et al. The assertion that rescission may only be had after the RTC had finally determined that the parcels of land belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon does not intrinsically amiss. thus. The petitioners’ right to institute the action for rescission pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not preconditioned upon the RTC’s determination as to the ownership of the said parcels of land. there is the possibility that the same may had already been conveyed to third persons acting in good faith. J). (Lilia Ada. the CA reversed the judgment on the ground that before an action for rescission may be filed there must first be a judicial determination that the same actually belonged to the estate of the donor. principle of mutuality of contracts. may be rescinded. rendering any judicial determination with regard to the thing subject of litigation illusory.R. this paradoxical eventuality is not what the law had envisioned. validly entered into and therefore obligatory under normal conditions. Florante Baylon. The right to ask for the rescission of a contract under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not contingent upon the final determination of the ownership of the thing subject of litigation. Contracts which are rescissible are valid contracts having all the essential requisites of a contract. The primordial purpose of Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is to secure the possible effectivity of the impending judgment by a court with respect to the thing subject of litigation. this would only bring about the very predicament that the said provision of law seeks to obviate. The RTC ordered the rescission of the deed of donation as it was done without the knowledge and approval of the other parties or plaintiffs or the Court. Accordingly. but by reason of injury or damage caused to either of the parties therein or to third persons are considered defective and. 2012. Moreover. a definitive judicial determination with respect to the thing subject of litigation is not a condition sine qua non before the rescissory action contemplated under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code may be instituted. . the petition raising such issue. August 13. by reason of external causes resulting in a pecuniary prejudice to one of the contracting parties or their creditors. It seeks to protect the binding effect of a court’s impending adjudication vis-à-vis the thing subject of litigation regardless of which among the contending claims therein would subsequently be upheld. Hence. It is a remedy to make ineffective a contract. Assuming arguendo that a rescissory action under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code could only be instituted after the dispute with respect to the thing subject of litigation is judicially determined.Pleading praying that the donation be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. G. 182435. The donee opposed the Supplemental Pleading contending that rescission under Article 1384(1). Answer: Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons. Decide. by means of the restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to the celebration of said contract.

Will the action prosper? Why? Answer: Yes. Inc. otherwise. the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the lessee. the mortgagor contended that it was void. (MIAA v. No. but it was foreclosed even as there was no demand for payment. Their rights and obligations become mutually fixed. First.R. The lessor argued that the renewal of the contract cannot be made to depend upon the sole will of the lessee. 2011). Q – An obligation was contracted secured by a mortgage. This option. After all. The lessor refused to renew the contract. and the lessee is entitled to retain possession of the property for the duration of the new lease. 161718. a complaint to compel the lessor to renew it was filed. What was done was for GMC to request the debtors to go to their office and discuss the settlement of their account. both parties are thereafter bound by the new lease agreement. The right of renewal constitutes a part of the lessee's interest in the land and forms a substantial and integral part of the agreement. It is a purely executory contract and at most confers a right to obtain a renewal if there is compliance with the conditions on which the right is made to depend. Thereafter. Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since they remain with the same faculties in respect to fulfillment. GMC should have first made a demand on the spouses before proceeding to foreclose the real estate mortgage. An express agreement which gives the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is frequent and subject to statutory restrictions. because there was no delay. The fact that such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not render it void for lack of mutuality. and the lessor may hold him liable for the rent therefor. There was no provision on extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage without need of demand. December 14. the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance. no default. the debtor delays performance. is fundamentally part of the consideration in the contract and is no different from any other provision of the lease carrying an undertaking on the part of the lessor to act conditioned on the performance by the lessee. G. the same would be void for being a potestative condition. once he exercises his option to continue and the lessor accepts. because of the principle of mutuality of contracts. the obligation is demandable and liquidated. The act of asking to go to the office for a possible settlement of the account is not the demand required. There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. . Foreclosure of mortgage void for lack of demand. hence. Is the foreclosure valid? Why? Answer: No. The lessee cannot thereafter escape liability even if he should subsequently decide to abandon the premises.. When it was foreclosed. GMC proceeded to foreclose the mortgage. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to continue with the lease or not. which is provided in the same lease agreement. and third. As the contract carries no such provision on demand not being necessary for delay to exist. Ding Velayo Sports Center. valid and binding on the parties. second.Q – The parties entered into a lease contract over a parcel of land granting unto the lessee the exclusive option to renew the contract subject to the condition that it should comply with a 60-day notice of the intention to exercise the option to renew the contract which the lessee did.

the . However. NHA sought annulment/rescission of the sale because they violated the five-year restriction against such sale provided in their contract. 2011). Such violation comes under Article 1191 where the applicable prescriptive period is that provided in Article 1144 which is 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. 2011). v. et al. but with an oral assurance that if the purpose would not be pursued. here at least within five years from the time he acquired it free from any encumbrance. void. 1998. hence. No. hence. 185440. Foreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation. Ramos.R.R. et al. Licuanan it was ruled that demand made before the foreclosure is effected is essential. V. Q – The property of the respondent was declared condemned for public use to expand the Lahug International Airport. This meant that respondents had not defaulted in their payments and the foreclosure by petitioner was premature. STATUTE OF FRAUDS Statute of frauds is inapplicable if oral compromise has been performed. NCC. The restriction clause is more of a condition on the sale of the property to the beneficiaries rather than a condition on the mortgage constituted on it. there was a compromise to stop the respondent from pursuing with the appeal. 185440.R. NHA.In Development Bank of the Philippines v. The NHA’s right of action accrued on February 18. then the loans had not yet become due and demandable. G. (G. 516 SCRA 644. like sale of property within the prohibitory period is a ground for rescission. counted from the release of the property from the NHA mortgage. Q – It was claimed that under Article 1389 of the Civil Code the “action to claim rescission must be commenced within four years” from the time of the commission of the cause for it. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. then they were already in default and foreclosure was proper. July 20. the contention is that it has already prescribed. The beneficiaries contended that as owners. The five-year restriction against resale. G. G. No.R. 150097. (Lalicon. 193723. Since the NHA filed its action for annulment of sale on April 10. NHA. it did so well within the 10-year prescriptive period. Is the sale valid? Why? Answer: No. General Milling Corp. if demand was not made. measures out the desired hold that the government felt it needed to ensure that its objective of providing cheap housing for the homeless is not defeated by wily entrepreneurs. 2007. Substantial breach. No. 1992 when it learned of the forbidden sale of the property. No. The NHA filed the action after four (4) years. Indeed. (Lalicon. within the prohibitory period. The essence of the government’s socialized housing program is to preserve the beneficiary’s ownerships for a reasonable length of time. the prohibition against resale remained even after the land had been released from the mortgage. July 1. The resale without the NHA’s consent is a substantial breach. If demand was made and duly received by the respondents and the latter still did not pay. Period to file action for rescission under Article 1191. July 1. V. The beneficiaries sold the same to their son. 2011). Q – NHA sought to rescind the sale made by housing beneficiaries of a property they bought from it within the prohibited period of five (5) years from the date of release of the mortgage without prior written consent of the NHA. they have the right to dispose of the same. On appeal. February 26. Sps.

Sr. Even third persons may file an action for nullity if they directly affected.R. et al. Tudtud. and. for. 2010). a simulated contract. G. hence. in executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. It is well-settled that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid. while it appears to be supported by a valuable consideration. responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby.. v. Is the sale valid? Why? Answer: No. The public use was not pursued. which is void. 165748). v. NCC).R. G. therefore. Heirs of Liberato Ureta. the oral compromise settlement having been partially performed. Is the defense proper? Why? Answer: No. but no money was involved.00 was paid to the seller for the subject properties. respectively. they have no personality to question its validity.000. 1421. follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of consideration. 174012. (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority. Lozada. 176625.R. Q – The contract provided for a consideration of P2. there was a demand for the resale of the property. hence. Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide that contracts take effect only between the parties. and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially performed. it is extended to third persons who are directly . although the contract states that the purchase price of P2. However. et al. et al. G. 434 Phil. November 14. The Statute of Frauds cannot apply.. The Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts. their assigns and heirs. Thus. x x x and the defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected. By reason of such assurance made in their favor. It must. The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties. Reyes. the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith. (Heirs of Policronio Ureta. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. February 25. Effect if document states that there was consideration. It was contended that since the heirs of a party were not privies to the contract of sale. the heirs of an owner of a property whose signature was forged in a contract of sale filed an action to declare it void. as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts. It was further contended that defense of illegality of a contract is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected (Art.. Sr. the deed of sale is null and void for lack of consideration.. at the same time. et al. No. but no money was involved. evade the obligations. but the petitioner contended that it is not bound by the oral assurance that it would be resold. respondents relied on the same by not pursuing their appeal before the CA. using the Statute of Frauds as defense. especially so that it has been converted to a commercial area. if a contract has been totally or partially performed. for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in litigation. there was no money involved in the sale. The reason is that. (Montecillo would be resold to him. it is void. 456 (2002)). (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. No. 571 SCRA 165). Q – In a case. it has been proven that such was never in fact paid as there was no money involved. 2008.00 in the sale of 6 parcels of land.000.No.

“the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to . No. the heirs of a decedent sought the annulment or nullity of a deed of extrajudicial settlement and sale upon a claim that the signatures of some of the heirs had been falsified and that the remaining signatories could not have signed the deed as they were already dead. but the lessee contended that since the lessor was no longer the owner. v. et al. 165748. For failure to pay the rentals. The rule is not absolute. hence. Fernando. While a certificate of title was issued in respondents’ favor. where a contract is absolutely simulated. For failure of the lessor to pay the loan. subject to attack anytime. Registration does not vest title. (Sps. 2(b). A forged deed is a nullity. because the deed is void. and other cases. and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance of the property. the parties are not strangers to the parties to the contract. An action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. it is held in trust. May the action prosper? Why? Answer: Yes. (Heirs of Ureta. et al. for lack of consent. it passes no right. such title could not vest upon them ownership of the entire property. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. they have the right to question the same. he had not right to sue for ejectment. hence. IAC. even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its inexistent. September 14. G. the property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered.. neither could it validate a deed which is null and void. G. 2011) ESTOPPEL Tenant cannot deny the title of the lessor due to estoppel. it is merely the evidence of such title. What a tenant is estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. Is the contention of the lessee correct? Explain. Sr.. demand was made to pay and vacate. exception. Fernando. No. Q – There was a contract of lease over a property but the lessor did not inform the lessee that there was a mortgage over the property subject of the lease contract. Answer: Yes. January 31. The conclusive presumption found in Sec.R.R. the bank foreclosed the mortgage and eventually the property was transferred to the bank. Thus. et al. 227 Phil. It is recognized in our jurisprudence that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title. v. 36 (1986)). If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation. In this case. 191889. the presumption will not apply.affected by the contract. an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner. and as long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration. 2011). Heirs of Ureta. The lessor contended that the lessee is stopped from questioning the title of the lessor. When there is a showing of such illegality. but heirs. (Arsenal v. Q – In a case. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court known as estoppel against tenants provides the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.” Hence.

except if passed to an innocent purchaser for value. PNB. same held in trust. 479 Phil.R. The party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their title over the property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The titled owner even acknowledged such error. (New Sampaguita Builders Construction. because he is holding it under the rule of implied trust for the benefit of the true owner. a tenant in proper cases such as this.” It is true that the tenant cannot assert ownership of the property by a third person. The fact that a property is sold at public auction for a price lower than its alleged value. the person obtaining it is. The owner filed an action to recover the erroneously included property. Meneses. a low price is more beneficial to the mortgage debtor for it makes redemption of the property easier. (Huang v. However. Acuña. it was sold for only P900. 171129. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. An action for reconveyance of registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years.R. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. Jr. In order to do this.00. 2010).. A. G. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. National Statistic Office. September 30. et al. the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. NCC. if property is acquired through mistake or fraud. No. action for reconveyance. Q – A property was wrongfully included in the title of another.. and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent. and where there is no showing that a better price . is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. Under Article 1456. does not prescribe.another or himself. April 6. which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property. He alleged that he was in possession of the property all the time even if registered under the name of the other party. if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. et al. Inc. SALES Q – In a foreclosure sale of a property worth P5M. Unlike in an ordinary sale. (Enrico Santos v. Will the action prosper? Why? Answer: Yes. 161030. TRUST Fraudulent acquisition of property. G. is not of itself sufficient to annul said sale. The National Loan and Investment Board v. who contended that the action has already prescribed. as what the tenant did in this case. 2011). 236 SCRA 420 (1994)). (Fernando. may show that the landlord’s title has been conveyed to another.000. The contention that he action has already prescribed because of the lapse of ten (10) years is not correct. It was contended that the sale is void. the tenant must essentially assert that title to the leased premises already belongs to a third person who need not be a party to the ejectment case. where there has been strict compliance with all the requisites marked out by law to obtain the highest possible price. v. the right to seek reconveyance. inadequacy of the price at a forced sale is immaterial and does not nullify a sale since. 498 (1939)). v. 453 (2004). 67 Phil. No. in a forced sale. by force of law.

et al.000. Written notice to prospective redemption is mandatory. The heirs of one of the adjoining owners learned about the sale a day after it was sold and conveyed their intention to redeem the property but the seller obtainable. No. 2012). Green. the method of notification prescribed remains exclusive. its terms and its validity. Guerrero vs. The terms and conditions pertained to the performance of the contract and not the perfection therefore or the transfer of ownership. 182769. 54 Phil. 123 Phil. Banas. The terms and conditions of the contract only affected the manner of payment. 52 Phil. the period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-emption may be exercised. Hulst v.. mere knowledge of the sale. NCC but they failed to exercise the right of redemption. Such written notice is mandatory. 491. April 12. The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case of Conejero v. the . The statute not having provided for any alternative. La Urbana vs. 2007. 442. 930. G. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. and that. There was a conflict between the buyer and seller since the seller sold it again on the contention that the first contract was a contract to sell. and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The buyer contended that it was a contract of absolute sale.. The written notice was obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale. because of the lack of written notice to the prospective redemption. as a rule. does not start. Belando.. Guerrero. 532 SCRA 747. (Government of the Philippines vs. 57 Phil. Bank of the Philippine Islands v .00 upon the execution of the deed of sale with the balance payable directly to the mortgagee bank within a reasonable time.. G. (Barcellano v. G. Obligation of seller to transfer ownership. No. Inc. Without a written notice. G. acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner. September 14. (Art. in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched. Bank of PI v. 1623. De Asis. PR Builders. There was likewise no need to comply with the written notice requirement since they already knew of the sale. Q – The owner of a real property offered the sale to the adjoining owners and one of them agreed to the sale to take place after the harvest season. Whose contention is correct? Why? Answer: The contention of the buyer is correct that it is a contract of absolute sale. Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that. not the immediate transfer of ownership upon the execution of the notarized contract. 45483. Settled is the rule that the seller is obliged to transfer title over the properties and deliver the same to the buyer. 156364. A complaint for legal redemption was filed but it was opposed on the ground that he complied with the requirement of notice under Article 1623.R. No. 2011). R. But he later sold the same to another. Reyes. 695 (1966) where the SC said that such notice is indispensable.R. 1939. 165287. Nothing in the contract showed that the seller reserved the right of ownership. In this regard. No. Q – There was contract of sale where the seller sold properties in a manner absolute and irrevocable requiring the buyer to pay P415.R. Court of Appeals. NCC).. does not satisfy the statute. saying that there was already a contract of sale executed with the buyer and that they never tendered the redemption amount. September 3. February 1.

this fact should have put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted them to check with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent certificates of title to discover if there were any liens. The heirs of Cabigas sought to recover the properties. et al. Petitioner however. Limbaco. however.. because their predecessors in-interest are not buyers in good faith and for value. et al. but petitioner did not because of the presence of tenants. At the time of the sale to the Cabigas spouses. Execution of public instrument is equivalent to delivery. but respondent took possession of the property. the Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobarde’s representation that he owned the properties in question. By itself. 2011). Ouano’s heirs were able to get back the properties. After obtaining titles. (503 Phi. No. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title. the land was registered not in Cobarde’s name. encumbrances. They never alleged that NAA was in bad faith in purchasing the same from Ouano. 480 (1960)). 175291. (2005). Sps. Cobarde made representations that he owned the lots and sold the same to Cabigas. There was no inscription of both documents. Their failure to exercise the plain common sense expected of real estate buyers bound them to the consequences of their own inaction. or other attachments covering the lots in question. (Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas. Instead. July 27. alleging that their predecessor bought the properties from Cobarde. 170405. Revilla v. they would easily have learned that Cobarde had no legal right to the properties they were acquiring since the lots had already been registered in the name of the National Airports Corporation in 1952. In Abad v. Ouano sold the lots to National Airport Authority for the use of the Cebu-Lahug Airport but when the use fell. (De Leon v. Are the heirs of Cabigas entitled to recover the properties from the buyers from NAA? Why? Answer: No. it was said that the law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. G. but in Ouano’s name.R. Q – The owner of a titled property sold it twice to different buyers. one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for one to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor. she already acquired possession and thus. although no title was shown to him. Is petitioner correct? Why? . 07 Phil. its requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner. they sold the same to several buyers. Corollarily. Mirror doctrine once again applied. although the land object of the transaction is registered. Galindez.execution of a notarized deed of sale is equivalent to the delivery of a thing sold. v. contended that upon execution of the public instrument. considering that the execution thereof took place ahead of the actual possession by the respondent.R. 2010). Ong. she has a better right. Had the Cabigas spouses only done so. or in the capacity to transfer the land. Q – Real properties were sold by Ines Ouano to Salvador Cobarde although the same was never registered and titles were never obtained by the latter. Guimba. G. and did not even bother to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by checking the properties’ titles with the Registry of Deeds. No. February 2. 321.

Guiang v.R. there was no violation. It states that a lessee that commits any of the grounds for ejectment cited in Article 1673. 181126. G.Answer: No. Yet. v. the lessee wrote a letter to the lessor manifesting the exercise of the option to buy. The property was however sold to PUP by NDC upon order of the President. the lessee lost sight of the restriction provided in Article 1675 of the Civil Code. (Ten Forty Realty & Dev. the next question is who. the contract expired without exercising the right. It is a . v. Q – There was a contract of lease with option to buy. Since there was no inscription. No. the price to be negotiated and determined at the time the option to purchase is exercised. cannot avail of the periods established in Article 1687.. first took possession of the subject property in good faith. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. ASB Realty Corp. between petitioner and respondent. February 9. 877 (2001). Samano. Admittedly. 457 Phil. 2011). The law simply recognizes that there are instances when it would be unfair to abruptly end the lease contract causing the eviction of the lessee. Corp. June 15. The lessee contended that NDC. et al. Indeed. (Lo Chua v.R. 428 Phil. & Agro-Industrial Corp. In asking for an extension of lease under Article 1687. 196 SCRA 114. therefore. 1991. however.R. 603 (2003)). has a better right. v. No. Huang Chao Chun. G. 2011). Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. including non-payment of lease rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those stipulated. the two sales were not registered with the Registry of Property. An extension will only benefit the wrongdoer and punish the long-suffering property owner. Cruz. Gasis. Umale. 665 (2002) Moreover. hence. It is only for these clearly unjust situations that Article 1687 grants the court the discretion to extend the lease. the execution of a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract. There was. April 22. G. (LL & Co. CA. because the right of first refusal was exercised before the contract of lease expired and before it was sold to PUP by the lessor. 179641. the extension in Article 1687 is granted only as a matter of equity. As aptly held by the trial court. An option is a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that the latter shall have the right to buy the former’s property at a fixed price within a certain time. it was respondent who took possession of the subject property and. (Beatingo v. LEASE Extension of lease cannot be done if lessee committed grounds for ejectment. Dev. the lessor violated its right of first refusal by the sale of the property to PUP. extension is a matter of equity. it was asking the court to extend the lease. with the right of first refusal not being carried over into the impliedly renewed contract. No. Before however the sale was made. However. 50501. It is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. 408 Phil. the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. It was contended on the other hand by the lessor that since the contract has already expired. Q – The lessee failed to pay the rentals for fourteen (14) months. no action on the offer to buy. Lease with option to buy.

Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. the lessor has the legal duty to the lessee not to sell the leased property to anyone at any price until after the lessor has made an offer to sell the property to the lessee and the lessee has failed to accept it. Golden Horizon Realty Corp.R. 124791.. No. 2010). v. v. 184260. or in compliance with certain terms and conditions. or which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. No. March 15. 183612. G. National Dev. No. 2010). It binds the party. Apeles.R. if the latter should decide to use the option. who has given the option. whether it was carried over into the impliedly renewed contract is irrelevant. (Eulogio v. No. National Dev. March 15. because the right was exercised before the contract of lease expired.R. and any party for that matter. No. In entering into the contract. 167884. Basic is the rule that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally withdraw a right of first refusal that stands upon valuable consideration. Since the stipulation forms part of the entire lease contract. (Carcellar v. The lessor however sold the property to another without offering the property first to the lessee. G. the lessee is in effect stating that it consents to lease the premises and to pay the price agreed upon provided the lessor also consents that.R. Lacson. No. March 25. Not even the avowed public welfare or the constitutional priority accorded to education. 2004. 724. Polytechnic Univ. G. 1999.R. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. 134971. Co. should it sell the leased property. of the Phils. or under terms and conditions more favorable to the lessor. of the . then. citing Tayag v. 302 SCRA 718. G. (Polytechnic Univ. or under. 426 SCRA 282. 576 SCRA 561. While education may be prioritized for legislative and budgetary purposes. Is there a consideration in the grant of a right of first refusal such that it cannot be withdrawn at any time? Explain. 2009.. to enter into such contract with the one to whom the option was granted.condition offered or contract by which the owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time. It is not correct to say that there is no consideration for the grant of the right of first refusal if such grant is embodied in the same contract of lease. Sued. would serve as license for the Court. 184260. No. v. he contended that the right of first refusal provision is not binding upon him as there was no consideration. within that period. v. When a lease contract contains a right of first refusal. it is doubtful if such importance can be used to confiscate private property such as the right of first refusal granted to a lessee. Court of Appeals. January 20. Co. the lessee shall be given the right to match the offered purchase price and to buy the property at that price. to destroy the sanctity of binding obligations. (Polytechnic Univ. and. the lessor violated the right of first refusal. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. Hence. As the right was still existing when it was exercised and when the property was sold to PUP. Q – It was contended that the right of first refusal was not impliedly renewed when the lease contract expired. February 10. Only after the lessee has failed to exercise his right of first priority could the lessor sell the property to other buyers under the same terms and conditions offered to the lessee.R. invoked by petitioner PUP in the Firestone case. Answer: Yes. 304). not to enter into the principal contract with any other person during the period designated. G. of the Phils. the consideration for the lease includes the consideration for the grant of the right of first refusal. G.. Q – There was a contract of lease with right of first refusal.R. 183612. G..

J). G. Golden Horizon Realty Corp. G.. National Dev. 2010). 154 (1997). the lessee’s right to continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of detainer. No. There was an exclusive option to renew the contract of lease granted to the lessee. 2010. Q – In case of an impliedly renewed contract. 170509. Inc. (b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate. Samelo v.. 1998. Golden Horizon Realty Corp.R. An implied new lease or tacita reconcluccion will set in when the following requisites are found to exist: (a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired. the tacita reconduccion was aborted. 385 Phil. When the lessor sent a notice to vacate to the lessee on August 5. 184260. v. 84154-55. Since the rent is paid on a monthly basis. Manotok Services. Whose contention is correct? Explain. 1993. 170509. There was an impliedly renewed contract. Inc. “A notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by the lessee of its property. The notice to vacate was given only on August 5. (Tagbilaran Integrated Sellers Assn. It was contended otherwise by the lessor.” (Arquelda v. thus. Prohibition against subleasing of land does not include the building constructed by the lessee. the agreement was that the lessee shall establish a sports center and parking area to ease the parking congestion at the Domestic Airport. July 20. the lessee contended that the period is the same as that of the original. 339 Phil. (Lim v. CA. June 27. the period of lease is considered to be from month to month. v. Answer: The contention of the lessor is correct. 2012. Answer: By the inaction of the lessor. . CA. June 27. Nos. Q – In a lease contract over a parcel of land. the land. but the lessor refused to renew on the ground that it violated the prohibition against subleasing of the premises. No. Phil. in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Manotok Services. v.. G. J). Q – The contract of lease between the parties commenced on January 1.. “A lease from month to month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor. March 15. (Paterno v. The lessee was not leasing the improvements from the lessor. No.R. said improvements are owned by it until the turn over to the lessor at the end of the contract. because the prohibition against subleasing the premises refers only to the subject property. 1998. Brion. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. CA.R. Co. 2012. and the contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month. G. Inc. (MIAA v. supra.) When there is implied renewal of a contract of lease. What is the effect of the inaction of the lessor? Explain. No. 1997. No. 1200 (2000)). G. 386 (2004)).R. After such notice. there can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract (Bowe v. Samelo v. Brion. 183612. March 19. The lessor did not give a notice to vacate the premises upon the expiration of the lease and the lessee continued to possess the same for more than 15 days without objection from the lessor. CA.Phils.R. Being the builder of the improvements on the subject property. G. 95771. 1997 and expired on December 31.. Veterans Bank. then it is not subleasing the same to third persons.R. Ding Velayo Sports Center. 486 Phil. (c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor. 220 SCRA 158).

NCC. Explain. Q – General Milling Corporation is the owner of a property which was leased to Cebu Autometic Motors. the lessor is not required to first bring an action for rescission.In a complaint for ejectment. The lessee. the lessee cannot be considered in default and the lessor had no cause to terminate the lease. Rule 70. a lessor may judicially eject (and thereby likewise rescind the contract of lease) the lessee if the latter violates any of the conditions agreed upon in the lease contract. hence. 2. or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises. The letter did not demand compliance with the terms of the contract. Merit Phils. 176324. The CA ruled that the claim of failure to comply with Sec. This situation calls for the application. Implemented in accordance with Section 2. such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee. Inc. April 14. it was contended that there was no proper demand since the letter merely stated that the lessor expected the lessee to vacate the premises and pay the unsettled accounts. Inc. but may ask the court to do so and simultaneously seek the ejecment of the lessee in a single action for unlawful detainer. 2. This was denied by the lessee. What is involved in the case is a contract of lease and the twin remedies of rescission and judicial ejectment after either the failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease. 2008. v. The lessor sent a letter to the lessee terminating the contract and demanding the vacation of the premises and settlement of unpaid accounts. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Rule 70 is belated. but allegedly. Rule on the contention of the lessee. it filed a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that it terminated the contract for violation of the terms of the same and continued to do so despite repeated demands and reminders for compliance that the lessee refused to vacate the premises. the lessor may simultaneously eject the lessee and demand for rescission of the contracts. G. (Abaya Investments Corp. The lessor contended that the lessee violated the contract by subleasing and for failure to deliver the required advance rental and deposit. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that unless otherwise stipulated.. of Article 1673 in relation to Section 2. Based on this provision. in invoking Article 1169. and the . It was stipulated that it shall be used as garage and repair shop for vehicles. or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon. not of Article 1169 of the Civil Code but. Sec.R. apparently overlooked that what is involved is not a mere mora or delay in the performance of a generic obligation to give or to do that would eventually lead to the remedy of rescission or specific performance. The MTC rendered a judgment ordering the lessee to vacate. it cannot be considered in delay invoking Article 1169. but the RTC reversed the judgment holding that the lessor failed to comply with the requisite demand under Rule 70. Later. it was subleased without the consent of the lessor. it cannot be entertained anymore. The lessor did not send the proper demand letter. Answer: The lessee is correct. No. hence. Section 2. It contended that since the lessor never sent a proper demand letter. Before the SC.. Article 1673 states that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract. 551 SCRA 646).

et al. 2011). (Abad. In this instance. Art. (Arlegui v. Hence. v.R. a bank should exercise extraordinary diligence to negate its liability to the depositors. No. J).R. G.” This is the basis of the principle of abuse of right which. one imbued with public interest. 179419. (Cebu Autometic Motors. a check was dishonoured resulting in great embarrassment and humiliation especially that he had a heated argument with a friend and their falling out. Q – Upon arrival of guest at City Garden Hotel. Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. is based upon the maxim suum jus summa injuria (the abuse of right is the greatest possible wrong). 151168. It may not wantonly exercise its rights without respecting and honoring the rights of its clients. Answer: Yes. April 2. Gonzales. because there was a contract of deposit with the hotelkeeper. Q – Petitioner had a credit line with the bank. The contract of deposit was perfected from the owner’s delivery. No. et al. Was the termination of the credit line proper? Why? Answer: No. CA. the bank terminated the credit line but without notice to petitioner. Deposit in hotels. act with justice. G. The attendant issued a valet parking customer claim stab and parked the car at the Equitable PCI Bank parking area which the latter allowed as parking space for vehicles of the hotel guests in the evening after banking hours. Like a common carrier whose business is imbued with public interest. August 25. (Solidbank Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. G. General Milling Corp. give everyone his due. in turn. Tan. the guest gave notice to the doorman and parking attendant of the hotel when he entrusted the ignition of his car to the latter. Due to failure to pay the interest on the loan. v. January 12. G. It must inform the client of the aggregate amount due and the dates they became due. It was not enough to apprise petitioner of his default and outstanding dues. it is liable for damages for the loss of the car. . (Durban Apartments Corp. DEPOSIT Nature of liability of banks. and observe honesty and good faith. when he handed over the keys to his vehicle with the parking attendant with the obligation of safely keeping and returning it. 19 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that “[e]very person must.. Inc. J)). 129-130). 520 SCRA 123. No.. PCIB. Hence.. Gonzales v.R. 180257. 378 SCRA 322 (2002). 2011. 167346. 2012.. Is the hotel management is liable for damages for the loss of the car? Explain.lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. The business of banking is impressed with public interest and great reliance is made on the bank’s sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. 2007. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties.R. the bank is sorely remiss in the diligence required in treating with its client. Brion. He sued for damages for the unjust dishonour of the check but the RTC found no fault of the bank in the termination of the credit line as the dishonour of the check was proper considering that the credit line had already been terminated or revoked before the presentment of the check. February 23. No.

If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract. Sps. 2011). No. Dy. the doctrine of indivisibility of mortgage does not apply once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof. with the obligation of safety keeping it and returning the same. secured has been fully paid.R. . November 28. on the part of the latter. the entire auction price must be paid. notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation. No. The latter is bound by the registered mortgage on the title he acquired. Sps. 162333. 2011). Sr. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries. the option of collecting from the third person in possession of the mortgaged property in the concept of owner. v. (Teoco v. The mortgagee contended that there must be complete tender of the amount of the price since mortgage is indivisible. December 23. (Art. v. The deposit of effects made by travellers in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. Inc. G. where the amount of the auction sale was P216.R. (Sps. Article 2129 of the Civil Code gives the mortgagee.R. even though the debt may be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or of the creditor. G. No. Sps. 2008. G. 179 SCRA 619. Dumaguete Rural Bank. Dy. Inc.Dumaguete Rural Bank. The reason for this is that the mortgage credit is a real right. Sps. 4689899. there can be piecemeal redemption. or to their employees. NCC). Sr. Dy. provided that notice was given to them. 171991.R. GUARANTY/MORTGAGE Indivisibility of mortgage does not apply after it is extinguished by complete foreclosure. Yap v.000. 1962. Metrobank. NCC. 1998. Yap v. 575 SCRA 82) More.A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another. when a mortgagor sells the mortgaged property to a third person. Sr. 171991. De los Reyes.. (Art. Sps. No. of the effects brought by the guests and that. It provides that a pledge or mortgage is indivisible. No.What is the meaning of the indivisibility of a mortgage? Explain. July 27.00 to redeem a property. there is no deposit but some other contract.R. Q . No. the mortgagor-owner’s sale of the property does not affect the right of the registered mortgagee to foreclose on the same even if its ownership had been transferred to another person. Answer: What the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. July 27. 171868. G. which follows the property wherever it goes. the creditor may demand from such third person the payment of the principal obligation. G. Dy.93 there was tender of P40.040... As held in the case of Philippine National Bank v. Hence. 2089. even if its ownership changes. (Art. Answer: Yes. G. 1989. This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus. but.. Sr. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. NCC). it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied. they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects. Q – After the foreclosure of a mortgage. 171868.R. Q – May the mortgagor sell the property mortgaged without the consent of the mortgage? Explain. hence.

No. 158891. and is in conformity with Article 2087 of the Civil Code. Antonio & Leticia Vega v.R. CA. Pablo Garcia v.R. 2012. with authority to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject property. and (2) There should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. No. v. November 25. (Tan v. Explain. G. Sps. June 27. J). Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another. What it granted was the mere appointment of Villar as attorney-in-fact. which reads: Art. Inc. an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family . but there was failure to deliver because the employees were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the loan.R. Instead. it was sold to her. The following are the elements of pactum commissorium: (1) There should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation.R. 181672. et al. Inc. to sell the property in case of default in the payment of the loan. but B contended that the employees alone are liable. 603 SCRA 108. A sued B for damages. as owner of the mortgaged property. C & A Construction. No. Villar. 2010. Jam Transit.The contract cannot absolutely forbid the mortgagor. Rule on the contention. as there was no automatic appropriation of the thing mortgaged. Inc. citing Delsan Transport Lines. September 20. 2012). (Cinco v. No. This provision is customary in mortgage contracts. G. G. 158891. Del Castillo. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. 675. 156 (2003)). (Garcia v. G.. 459 Phil. 2087. It is also of the essence of these contracts that when the principal obligation becomes due. 2009.. the things in which the pledge or mortgage consists may be alienated for the payment to the creditor. 183198. Answer: B’s contention is not correct. 15 (1998)). there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. Such stipulation contravenes public policy. CA. No. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee. Q – A and B entered into a contract for the delivery of cargo. SSS. Mortgagee’s purchased of the subject property did not violate the prohibition on pactum commissorium. Yolanda Villar. being an undue impediment or interference on the transmission of property. G. The employer should be made answerable for damages. June 27. 151903. The power of attorney provision did not provide that the ownership over the subject property would automatically pass to mortgagee upon the mortgagor’s failure to pay the loan on time. from selling the same while her loan remained unpaid..R. October 9. It was contended that there was a violation of the prohibition on pactum commissorium. 2009. 605 SCRA 659. 348 Phil. (DBP v. QUASI-DELICT and DAMAGES Employer is liable for the loss of cargo due to acts of its employees. Pactum commissorium Q – In a mortgage contract there was a stipulation appointing the mortgagee as the mortgagor’s attorney-in-fact.

et al. without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party.. 2011). Inc. No. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. 179446.R. The bank was made liable for damages for the accident as said . In Aguilar Sr. January 10. Glodel Brokerage Corp. Loadmasters failed.R. The contention is no longer novel. et al. No. the owner of the vehicle contended that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus. it may appear that one of them was more culpable. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. Effect if there are several causes for the resulting damages. Commercial Savings Bank. v. hence. where the car of the bank caused the death of a victim while being driven by its assistant vice president. Q – A is the owner of a motor vehicle which met an accident resulting in injuries to B. v. 357 Phil 703 (1998): x x x. Glodel Brokerage Corp. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons. 412 Phil. In this regard. even partially. What is the extent of the respective liabilities of several parties if the cause of loss is due to their negligence? Explain. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. he alone should be liable. Sued for damages. A contended that B was negligent. The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No.. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone. the selection and supervision of his employee. The RTC ruled in favor of B. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages. a party is not relieved from liability.. Answer: Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered. v. regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owner’s vehicle in connection with his employment. Court of Appeals. Q – There was a head-on collision of two (2) vehicles belonging to A and B resulting in the injuries to C who sued both A and B. (Loadmasters Customs Services. January 10. 834 (2001). Inc. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. G. although acting independently. the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. an employer’s vicarious liability for the employee’s fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him. (Loadmasters Customs Services. 2011).. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. 179446.

without being held liable should anything untoward befall the unwary guests. Mary’s Academy v. G. Jr. Carpetanos. Applying by analogy Article 2000. The evidence shows that the management practice before the murder had been to deploy one security or roving guard every three or four floors of the building which its witness admitted to be inadequate considering the L-shape configuration of the hotel that rendered the hallways not visible from one or the other end and that despite his recommendation. et al. CA. 173870. 102 Phil. the vehicle owner cannot escape liability for quasidelict resulting from his jeep’s use. and Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the personal effects of their guests). 470 (1989)) which are valid defenses available to a registered owner. the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests. that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained. hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. Jepte. Article 2001.. The hotel business is imbued with public interest. CA. Liability of hotel for the death of a guest. 255 Phil. responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual.e. was murdered inside his room. 412 Phil. it contended that it was the guest’s fault for having allowed other people to enter his room. 2005. 878 (2002).. 451 SCRA 638). hence.provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles. his own negligence was the proximate cause of his own death as the hotel is not an insurer of the safety of its guests. 103 (1957)). would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Commercial Savings Bank. February 17. Aguilar v. Is the contention of the defendant-hotel correct? Why? Answer: No. The court had already ratiocinated that: The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens. 426 Phil. April 25. that the registered owner of any vehicle. (Erezo v. 102 Phil. Inc. or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways. Q – A hotel guest of Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort. Bayot.R. 103 (1957)). Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use (Doquillo v. Erezo v. v. (St. Geronimo Bacoy.R. 121 (1939)) or that the subject vehicle was stolen (Duavit v. Jepte. in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. the management did not approve it because the hotel was not doing well at that time as it was only halfbooked. That would be absurd. 834 (2001). so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public. (YHT Realty Corp. It is to forestall these circumstances. i. it was held that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved. (Oscar Del Carmen. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers. No. G. Catering to the public. something that no good law would . the registered owner. or with very scant means of identification. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. 2012). even if not used for public service. No. When sued for damages. 126780. V. 67 Phil. Otherwise.

Under the New Civil Code. Driving beyond required speed limit is negligence.588. judgment was rendered holding the defendants liable for damages. (Art. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed. whenever necessary. (Nunn v. Is the employer liable? Explain.R.. The proximate cause of the damage done was the bank’s negligence in debiting the account prior to the date as appearing in the check which resulted in the subsequent dishonour of several checks. 189998. Inc. 2012. March 16. May 8. Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap. The respondent sued petitioner for damages contending that the check was postdated hence. (RA) 4136)). hence. a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered (Caminos. G. It was well established that the driver was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law.72 in favour of Sulpicio Lines. Answer: Yes. The allowed rate of speed for the vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour. ConAgra Poultry Co. to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. Inc. People. Q – Respondent issued PCIB check dated “5/3/0/92” in the amount of P34. et al. August 29. 2009. No.. 2011).R. Wilfredo delos Santos. Jr. No. NCC) Apparently.ever envision. After trial. the driver's violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Bersamin. 152033. for failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee. he was violating any traffic regulation. G. 361. G. Petitioner contended that it was not postdated and in fact. Financial Indem. No. 694 So. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. v. Q – There was a collision of a car and a shuttle bus along Katipunan Road (White Plains) in Quezon City resulting in the dragging of the car about 12 meters from the point of impact.. (Makati Shang-ri La Hotel & Resort. he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. 147437. Harper.R. At the time of the accident the vehicle belonging to the petitioner was travelling at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour.87. v. Co.2d 471) which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and. it should not have debited the amount immediately. 587 SCRA 348.. The car burst into flames and burned the passengers to death beyond recognition. he created confusion on the true date of the check by writing the date of the check as “5/3/0/92”.. the bank debited the amount from the account of respondent leaving a balance of only P558. It showed the driver’s proficiency and physical examinations as well as NBI Clearances as well as daily operational briefings. 670 So. 2185. . (Section 35 of Republic Act No. Banks are required to exercise higher degree of diligence in dealing with the accounts of clients. J). He subsequently issued two (2) checks but were dishonored because of insufficient funds. v.2d 630. Actions for damages were filed against the defendants where the defendant employer proved that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee. unless there is proof to the contrary. et al. citing Foster v.

G. Cabilzo. G.” petitioner should have required respondent drawer to countersign the said “/” in order to ascertain the true intent of the drawer before honoring the check. Sec.” (Sec. VIII. particularly. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. and as promptly as possible. (Equitable Bank v.R. as the American experience has shown. No. The rule reflects a matter of policy that is better addressed by the other branches of government. In the absence of a positive duty there could be no breach. (Art. goes beyond the power of the Court to promulgate rules governing pleading. without the counter-signature of its drawer.If. indeed. instead of proceeding to honor and receive the check. petitioner was confused on whether the check was dated May 3 or May 30 because of the “/” which allegedly separated the number “3” from the “0. whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. is more than that of a good father of a family. which is the agency that supervises the operations and activities of banks. No. 5(5). Tan.R. 510 SCRA 259. To adopt the foreign rule. the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity. Essentially. 129015. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. bank tellers would not receive nor honor such checks which they believe to be unclear. Petitioner should have exercised the highest degree of diligence required of it by ascertaining from the respondent the accuracy of the entries therein. 2010). Far East Bank and Trust Company. August 13. and which has the power to issue “rules of conduct or the establishment of standards of operation for uniform application to all institutions or functions covered. 270) From the foregoing. December 6. Acknowledging that no such duty is imposed by law in this jurisdiction. G. the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. . these statutes do not impose a duty on banks to freeze the deposit upon a mere notice of adverse claim. in order to settle the confusion. 154469. many American states have since adopted adverse claim statutes that shifted or. practice and procedure in all courts. A 8791. In other words. Inc. August 23. No. To adopt this rule will have significant implications on the banking industry and practices. confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. therefore. at least.R. 421) In every case. 165339. 2006. they first require either a court order or an indemnity bond. 4. and opens it to liability to both the depositor and the adverse claimant. (Samsung Construction Company Philippines. no liability for damages. however. equalized the burden. The bank must record every single transaction accurately. down to the last centavo. it is clear that petitioner bank did not exercise the degree of diligence that it ought to have exercised in dealing with its client. The General Banking Act of 2000). Constitution)). Recognizing that the rule imposing duty on banks to freeze the deposit upon notice of adverse claim adopts a policy adverse to the bank and its functions.1. The diligence required of banks. As a matter of practice. v. Q – The spouses Serfino invoke American common law that imposes a duty upon a bank receiving a notice of adverse claim to the fund in a depositor’s account to freeze the account for a reasonable length of time. the bank has a duty not to release the deposits unreasonably early after a third party makes known his adverse claim to the bank deposit. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit. the spouses Serfino asked the Court to adopt this foreign rule. sufficient to allow the adverse claimant to institute legal proceedings to enforce his right to the fund. 2004. 436 SCRA 402.

there could be no breach that entitles the latter to moral damages. 136371. 171845.R. 511 SCRA 100). November 11. (Gendler v. 805 (1945) “a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and always to have in mind the fiduciary nature of its relationship with them. it has no option but to uphold the existing policy that recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking. No. No. . 2012. As current laws provide. et al..In the absence of a law or a rule binding on the Court. J). not with the third party. October 10.R. FEBTC. the bank’s contractual relations are with its depositor. (Serfino v. Lim. Brion. It likewise rejects the adoption of a judicially-imposed rule giving third parties with unverified claims against the deposit of another a better right over the deposit. Sibley State Bank. 62 F. 2005. G. In the absence of any positive duty of the bank to an adverse claimant.” (Prudential Bank v. Supp. G.