P.

Necessary implication
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC. V. SECRETARY OF
LABOR, G.R. NO. 96663, 10 AUGUST 1999)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
NECESSARY IMPLICAITON – x,y,z necessarily includes “a”
1. Counters Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur Asociis: Even if not similar to those
enumerated
2. Purpose is to expand

This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed,
FACTS:

In June 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a
petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the
exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc.
(PEPSI).

On July 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit
statement that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas
(federation) together with two (2) rank and file unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity
(PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP).

On July 23, 1990
PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union
on the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were managers and (b) a
supervisors’ union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the
rank and file union of the same company.

The Secretary of Labor denied the appeal. Pepsi applied for a petition for
certiorari which the Court granted a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of
which two rank and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article
245 of the Labor Code.
2.

Whether or not confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and
file employees.

HELD:
1) As held in Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, the prohibition on
Article 245 (see below) extends to a supervisors’local union applying for
membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions
of rank and file employees. What happened in the case at bar was that the
Union withdrew its affiliation with the Federation before the case was even

decided, resulting it to be moot and academic. However, the Court, as it may
validly do so, still rendered a decision.
2)

While Article 245 of the Labor Code (see below) singles out managerial
employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees, even if not included
in the list, are similarly disqualified. In effect, it is as if confidential employees
like Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are included in
the provision. The reason behind this is that the collective bargaining process,
managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as
representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The
employers are therefore not protected if case is applied otherwise.
IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS

Article 245 of the Labor Code
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization
of the rank and file employees but may join assist or form separate labor
organization of their own.
Doctrine of necessary implication — No statute can be enacted that can provide all
the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not
meet a particular situation. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.

Q. Cassus Omissus
PEOPLE V. MANANTAN, 115 PHIL. 657 (1962))
STATCON DOCTRINE:
CASUS OMISUS = x,y,z where a ≠ x,y, or z; like Expressio unius est exclusio,
alterius
1. Purpose is to limit
2. When a certain provision makes an enumeration of applicable cases and
there is an analogous case which stands upon the same reason but have
been omitted inadvertently or was overlooked, the courts cannot supply
those omissions.
FACTS:
An information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan before the

" R." the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. 3387. city. "judge. as a justice of peace is part of the enumeration in the prohibition in Section 54 of the said code. It was noted that the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance. Section 2636 of Act No.R. 1709. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws. who. However.". the Court of Appeals. having no reason for the said exclusion. The maxim can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. by virtue of his office. 22160. The said section had gone through a lot of revisions and amendments (Section 6 of Act No. in violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. the defendant. who are judges of facts. municipal or rural police force. the application of this maxim does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature. and even jurors. object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge. single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. the rule merely serves as an additional. object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. they were merely called by another term. except to vote. 357 and Section 54 of the Revised Election Code(R. such provision was already present in the first election law in the Philippines (Section 29 of Act No. Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. A "justice of the peace" is a judge. judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Manantan then filed a second motion in the Court of Appeals. The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" invoked by the defendant. instead. or exert any influence in any manner in any election or take part therein. G. Under the said rule. which includes all kinds of judges. There were two instances wherein the words "justice of the peace" were omitted effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. the application by both the trial court and Court of Appeals of the rule "expressio unius. is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the said code. if the law simply said "judge. Thus. it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. 1582). The above-mentions pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in the REC. From the history of Section 54 of the REC. such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. and various judges. Each to each PEOPLE V. A "judge" is a public officer. there is no omission but only substitution of terms. as a justice of the peace. No.. 180)). Justices of the Supreme Court. justices of the peace were just called "judges. Because of the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Manantan filed a motion to dismiss the information saying that he. citing People v. and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate. Hence. Macaraeg which held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. no member of the national. In the case at bar. if entitled thereto. who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute.  Lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was served on his counsel  A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied. the presence of this case. NO. Section 449 of the Administrative Code. it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. it is said. In the case under consideration. are now within its encompass." There was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term. the court denied his motion holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54. est exclusio alterius" has been erroneously applied and neither courts has given the reason for the exclusion.Court of First Instance alleging Guillermo Manantan. a person. In the new law. 21 JANUARY 1974) STATCON DOCTRINE: EACH TO EACH =x or y of a or b where x is to a while y is to b FACTS:  Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was forty-seven days late which appellant's counsel did not oppose. fiscal. the Court of Appeals dismissed the information against the accused. is clothed with judicial authority." the words "justice of the peace" would follow. Lastly. it can be seen from the purpose of the statute that the intent of the legislators was to enlarge the officers within its purview. IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS: Section 54 of the Revised Election Code: "No justice. or to preserve public peace. TAMANI. judge. Rather. ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code HELD: YES." Also. but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person. Rather. . etc. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity. treasurer. no officer or employee of the Army. or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.appellee is not applicable in the case at bar. or assessor of any province. Manantan.A. provincial. however. To further support the decision by the court. if he is a peace officer. 357 and Section 54 of the REC." Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance. including justices of the peace. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the court and found a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant.

1963 or 48 days after. Ibarra. "notice" as "order"  The construction is sanctioned by the rule REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS meaning "referring each to each. Ibarra's yard. Francisco Siyang. they were headed to Pua's store where Mayor Domingo was. 6. o Tamani fired two volley's hitting Siyang with through and through gunshot wounds and hitting Mayor Domingo on his palm o Tamani signed and thumbarked two sworn statements before the NBI agent wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot Siyang and Mayor Domingo ISSUE: Procedural: 1. and not eleven days  That kind of construction is an application by analogy of the rule governing appeals in civil cases (Section 3. Villamor Tamani returned to his position as Vice Mayor and summoned Tamani and one Cadawan to liquidate the Mayor. Moreover. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney. WoN the appeal should be effected only within the 15-day period after promulgation Substantive: 3. o Tamani and Cadawan crossed the Mrs. where Mrs. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court the word "must" is synonymous with "ought" which connotes compulsion. He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10. considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of his counsel's inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted. Defendant's counsel. it was not corroborated by Vice-Mayor Tamani or by any other person. to be tenable. WoN Tamani's alibi can be given serious consideration PROVISION:  Rule 122 of the Rules of Court o SEC.    A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail to defendant's counsel through his wife.  Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. HELD: Procedural Issue: The clear terms mentioned in the specific provision in the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt that the appeal should be affected within 15 days from promulgation of the judgment. respondent's cousin. . must be such as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Its concocted character is manifest. Disposition: the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. He had eleven days within which to appeal. filed a sworn statement that the court's order was never brought to his attention and averred that his wife must've lost the envelope containing the order. the Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice Substantive Issue: No. So ordered. When appeal to be taken. The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have been submitted but the trial court gave due course to the appeal FACTS (Substantive): *sorry mejo magulo ito*  Two different set of facts were presented to the Court. Ibarra saw Tamani carrying a gun. o When Domingo came back. functioned as acting mayor when Domingo was suspended.  The word "promulgation" should be construed in the same section as referring to "judgment". he had only 1 day to file his notice of appeal. o According to Mrs.  In Sec. referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object" or "let each be put in its proper place. it was Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng who fired the shots and killed Jose Siyang o Ibarra and Tumaneng were hired by Mayor Domingo to kill Siyang  Prosecution: o Villamor Tamani.—An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. 6. the words should be taken distributively"  When the order was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel.  The settled rule is that an alibi. that is. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)  However. It cannot be given serious consideration.  Tamani: o At the time of the murder he was at the house of his cousin o A confession was forced out of him by NBI Agent Almeda o According to the father of the deceased.

furnished the same property and paid for the first public school in Tacondo. 1996.—(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election once during his term of office for loss of confidence. FACTS: The appellants were accused of vagrancy under Act No. and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. ARROYO. 1996 election is barred because the SK election on the first Monday of May 1996. Rizal from Labrador Development Corporation. he showed that he operated a hotel and saloon. ISSUE: Whether or Not PD 957 is applicable to the contracts making the cancellation of the contracts of the sale incorrect. Relative and qualifying terms MAPA V. 1995. Petitioner argues that the scheduled January 13. Labrador sent Mapa a notarial cancellation of the 4 contracts to sell. during the second year of his term of office. 519. FACTS: Petitioner Danilo Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula. that is. . Hart had been conducting two gambling games. Evidence of prosecution showed that Hart previously pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge before his arrest on the vagrancy charge. ISSUE: WON Section 74 (b) can be invoked to bar the recall election. administered and sold several hectares of land. 15 and 16 in Barangay Hills Subdivision in Antipolo. A clause should be construed with other related clauses as to determine the legislative intent. COMELEC. Mapa stopped payments of his monthly obligations 5 months after the effectivity of PD 957 or about a year after the contract execution. 26 PHIL. Mapa undertook a monthly installment of P2137. Mapa invoked Clause 20 – Subdivision Development of PD 957 which states that all improvements except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government shall be completed within a period of 3 years from the date of the contract. HELD: No. because Section 74 provides: “Limitations on Recall.54 over a period of 10 years but defaulted in the payment. Context and related clauses PARAS V. U.e..” The intent of Sec 74 is to subject an elective official to recall election once during his term of office. There is no intention to give retrospective application to the provisions of the decree that can be gathered from its language. Furthermore. Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. one in his saloon and the other in another house. every night. V. T.S. it was improper for Mapa to suspend his payments on the ground of non-development since the period allowed for the developer to undertake such development has not yet expired.S. Use of punctuation marks U. 13. Failure by the seller to comply with this shall permit the buyer to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that the improvements have been made as scheduled. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. 175 SCRA 76) STATCON DOCTRINE: AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAT RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENCIA 1. Following the petitioner’s interpretation of “regular local election” will unduly circumscribe the provision of LGC on recall. and the COMELEC approved the petition and set the recall election on November 13. 264 SCRA 49) STATCON DOCTRINE: Statutes are construed with the context in mind. Hence. A petition for his recall as PB was filed by registered voters.” Petitioner maintains that the SK Election (which is barely 4 months from the recall election) is considered to be a local election. 149) STATCON DOCTRINE: An argument on punctuations mark cannot stand by itself. The recall election got postponed for 3 times until it was finally scheduled on January 13. (b) No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election. the initial non-construction was because Mapa requested the suspension of its construction since his intention was to purchase adjoining lots and enclose the same. HELD: No. FACTS: Jose Mapa bought lots 12. that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts. Labrador has the right to cancel the contract because PD 957 does not apply because it was issued long after the execution of the contracts. HART. Labrador still has 1 and ½ years to comply with its legal obligation to develop the subdivision under the said PD and 2 years to do so under the agreement. Paragraph (B) construed with paragraph (A) merely designates the period when such local official may be subject of a recall election. raised imported hogs. following Section 74 (b) of Local Government Code which states that “no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a local election. i. In his defense. unless it be prevented by the context.

Thus. Miller was discharged from the Army having the position of Sergeant and received a rating as “Excellent” on discharge. the absence of “visible means of support” is necessary under the statute in order to be convicted for loitering around saloons. shed. are to be considered as vagrants. and the other who cannot invoke such defense. (5) every idle peron who lodges in any barn.1 of Act No. Fortunato Mercado. to give the Act the effect intended by the Legislature. The AG relies on the 2nd clause to sustain the guilt of defendants. and having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling house. or else a comma after country would have been inserted. or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support. NO. FACTS: 1. and Antonio Mercado worked since 1972 and the rest of the petitioners worked since 1960 up to April 1979. 1. without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the possession thereof. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private respondents since 1949. in a licensed public saloon. Section 1 of Act No. 3. within the meaning of the statute. HELD: V. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. non-payment of overtime pay and other benefits against the private respondents before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. also pleaded guilty and was also fined prior to the arrest on the charge of vagrancy. all of the three defendants were earning a living by legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher than the average. III of NLRC in San Fernando. it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. burglar. having the reputation of being a gambler.” such that loitering in such places is in itself a crime. In this case. vessel. G.Miller. are two classes of vagrants under the 2nd clause – one whose visible means of support is a defense. it is the duty of the courts to ascertain the true legislative intention. It would be an illogical classification on the part of the Legislature to say that there STATCON DOCTRINE: The proviso outweighs the body of the provision. Since then. However. dram shops and gambling houses. 2. Fortunato Mercado. either the comma after gambling houses would have been ommitted. (3) every person known to be a pickpocket. (6) every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill fame. outhouse. thief. and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling. or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposes. 5 SEPTEMBER 1991) The Attorney General (AG) insists that it was not the intention of the Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no means of support. The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. is a vagrant. Each clause enumerates a certain class of persons who. an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive. (4) every idle or dissolute person or associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual hours of the night. and they played openly. when they were all allegedly dismissed from their employment. because the phrase “without visible means of support” applies to “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses” and to “tramping or straying through the country. (7) every common prostitute and common drunkard. He is a tailor who earns enough to support his family. cockpit. 79869. (2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. Thus. When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question. Pampanga. Petitioners alleged that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of ace land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter.R. he had been engaged in tailoring business. the AG argues that “visible means of support” does not apply to “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses” but is confined entirely to “or tramping or straying through the country. NLRC. Natividad also pleaded guilty of the charge of gambling prior to the charge of vagrancy. Sr. or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo. Proviso MERCADO ET. . Words and Phrases: No. either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of either of said offenses.519 is divided into seven clauses separated by semicolons. 519 ISSUE: WON the appellants committed the act of vagrancy (1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence. underpayment of wages. and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary. and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect.AL. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in accord with the legislative will. It is insisted that had it been intended for "without visible means of support" to qualify the first part of the clause. ladrone. they are acquitted. who has the physical ability to work. Jr. Sec. Their sole offense was gambling. V.

in Reynaldo’s affidavit. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment discloses that the concept of regular and casual employees was designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided. • He deemed petitioners’ contention of working twelve (12) hours a day the whole year round in the farm. regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary. through Spouses Fortunato Mercado. or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment and the employment is for the duration of the season. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers in relation to the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. an employee is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the usual business or trade of the employer. for the reason that the planting of rice and sugar cane does not entail a whole year as reported in the findings of the Chief of the NLRC Special Task Force. The MR filed by the petitioners was likewise denied.000 worth of financial assistance to the petitioners. Policy Instruction No. Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she engaged their services. the proviso is applicable only to the employees who are deemed "casuals" but not to the "project" employees nor the regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. deems as regular employees those "casual" employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken. 12 of DOLE PD 830 has defined the concept of regular and casual employment. Sr. Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. on-and-off hired to work and render services when needed. Aquino ruled in favor of private respondents. The same instructions show that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 was not designed to stifle smallscale businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further the interests of laborers. 280 answers the question who are employees. 280. Petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of the private respondents. What determines . whether agricultural or industrial. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. PROVISIONS: Article 280 of the Labor Code: Article 280. The Labor Arbiter’s contentions: • The nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their services would be available to any other farm owner. Hence. Respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter. except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. after which they would be free to render services to other farm owners who need their services. 280 of the Labor Code. in said second paragraph. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties. an exaggeration. The proviso. but only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane production. with the modification of the deletion of the award for financial assistance to the petitioners. 280 demarcates as "casual" employees. Also. The second paragraph of Art. that is. for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their services would be available to any other farm owner. • He was also of the opinion that the real cause which triggered the filing of the complaint by the petitioners who are related to one another was the filing of a criminal complaint for theft against Reynaldo Mercado. illegally dismissed by the private respondents HELD: NO. Hence. The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. 6. 5. wherein. their "mandarols". which has been abused by many employers to prevent called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. except for project employees (seasonal employees). all other employees who do not fall under the definition of the preceding paragraph. It states that. The first paragraph of Art. and Rosa Mercado. 7. DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED. That. under review. any employee who has rendered at least one year of service whether such service is continuous or broken. Regular and Casual Employment. however. persons who take charge in supplying the number of workers needed by owners of various farms.4. hence. Policy Instruction No. granted P10. Thus petitioners are project/seasonal employees. son of the spouses (Mercado). A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking. stated under oath that petitioners were never regularly employed by private respondent but were. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission affirming that of the Labor Arbiter. this petition. is AFFIRMED.

SEC. and installations are exempt from the above subject requirements: xxx xxx xxx 30. neighbors of petitioner Sterling Selections Corporationa sterling silver fabrication company operating in a private house-filed a complaint to the barangay because of the loud noise and toxic fumes emitted by the manufacturing plant. so a Cease and Desist Order was served to them. NO.A. FACTS: In 1992 and 1998. an American citizen is married to Leonardo S. 2. petitioners filed a Review on Certiorari to the SC. McGee. 171427. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner (husband/appellee) having a legitimate child . Crisostomo by whom he has one child.A. Did the CA misinterpret LLDA Resolution No.000. Findings of LLDA showed that the petitioner has no permit to operate. Further. partnership or corporation whose total assets. REPUBLIC. Section 2.00. This concept of regular and casual employment is designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs which has been abused by many employers to prevent so-called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions.000 medium : P5. cooperative. 3. written or otherwise. states that cottage industries include those with value of Php 50. 41 which enumerated businesses included in cottage industries. 41 when it said that only those enumerated in the law are cottage industries? HELD: 1. — "Small and medium enterprise" shall be deemed as any business activity or enterprise engaged in industry. but the nature of the job. Employment for a definite period which exceeds one (1) year shall be considered re for the duration of the definite period. whether single proprietorship. ISSUE: 1.160.handicrafts. The CA cited LLDA Resolution No.000 small : P500. McGee filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor step-children Maria and Amada.rattan/furniture manufacturing Thereafter. 6977. and equipment are situated . 6977 their business was a cottage industry and was exempt from securing a permit. According to the court. After the complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Mayor. Exemptions.R.000. 3. If the job is usually necessary or desirable to the main business of the employer.000 cottage : P50. then employment is regular. agribusiness and/or services.000.001-P500. That contention is misleading because the amount Php 312. G. L-5387. — The following activities. R.R. The petition was denied. No.regularity or casualness is not the employment contract. If not. Is Sterling Selections Corporation considered a cottage industry? 2. The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari at the RTC. although the prevailing law at that time. they cannot be considered a cottage industry.001-500. Therefore. “Including” STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION V. in an enumeration only businesses of the same kind should be included.001-P20. The total assets of the company amounts to 37. LLDA.500.340. Cottage Industries. inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entity's office. the use of the word “including” implies that there are activities other than those enumerated. including . a complaint was also filed to the DENR which the latter endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority Corporation (LLDA). both surnamed Magpayo are Leonarda's children by her first husband Ernesto Magpayo who was killed by the Japanese during the occupation.stuffed toys manufacturing . The enumeration did not tend to be exclusive and was only there as examples. NO. and . No.500. 29 APRIL 1954) STATCON DOCTRINE: Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory FACTS: Appellee Clyde E. 30 MARCH 2011) STATCON DOCTRINE: The word “include” means to take in or comprise as a part of a whole. They argued that under R. following the principle of ejusdem generis. G. No. In 1998. plant. the provision did not restrict the cottage industry to those activities mentioned in the Resolution. The minors Maria and Amada. projects. Yes. 2.001-P5.000. then the employment is casual. must have value falling under the following categories: micro : less than P50. They were considered a cottage industry because the total value of the corporation was Php 312.000 The Petitioner’s appeal to the CA was also denied.00 only represents their capital stock and not the totality of their assets. Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries. Negative vs affirmative words IN RE MCGEE V. the latter issued a closure order against petitioner.

“subject to availability of loanable funds” and “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years. 1948.may adopt a step-child pursuant to Article 335. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Not only does the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent … can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. 91 PHIL 608 (1952) STATCON DOCTRINE: The word “shall” is imperative. Mandatory v permissive BERSABAL V. 1 being phrased in a negative manner. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. the verb-phrase is mandatory.” After receipt. in the case at bar. operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.000. The defendant resists the suit on the following grounds: o the demand to accept the backpay certificate as payment is not authorized by and. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. Therefore. article 335. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.355.” o There seems to be no question that. not mandatory. or natural children by legal fiction. The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate. o the law permits only “acceptance or discount of backpay certificate. namely. ordinarily. Under the rule of statutory construction. Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. FACTS: This case is an appeal from a judgement of Court of First Instance (CFI). On January 27. the case cannot fall thereunder… Thus this appeal. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency. the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion. NO.14 dated August 30. Also.” not the repayment of loans. it is directory merely. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP. The following may be adopted: (3) A step-child. 3 of the new Civil Code 4. by the step-father or step-mother. the court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court. Plantiff. Diokno. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. In the case at bar.. 1 and Article 338. contrary to the provisions of section 2 of RA 304. IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS Article 335. through this action. . HELD:  The verb-phrase “shall accept or discount” has two modifiers. ISSUE: Whether or not section 2 of RA 304 is mandatory upon the defendant. while the word “shall is imperative. However. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional. He now seeks to compel.00 of which P47. in fact. legitimated. Thus. is the holder of a bacakpay certificate of indebtedness issued under the provisions of RA 304 of a face value of P75. G. par. acknowledged natural children. 1950 he contracted an outstanding loan with the defendant. par 3 of the new Civil Code provides: ART 335. 21 JULY 1978 STATCON DOCTRINE: As a general rule. to accept the payment of the balance of his indebtedness with his backpay certificate. HELD: NO. par. and even if it was mandatory. the rule is not absolute..  No. in the total sum of P50. DIOKNO V. par 3 (phrased in the affirmative) of the same Code should be confined to the provision of the former. ART 338. par.R.28 was still unpaid. Article 335. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. L-35910. SALVADOR. par. par 1 and Article 338. par 3 of the new Civil Code. article 338. appeal DISMISSED. o the loan was obtained much after the passage of RA 304.857. 1 and Article 338. the word may is “directory”. as to the second modifier. The CFI dismissed the case stating that section 2 of RA 304 is permissive merely. the petitioner cannot adopt the two children from the former marriage of his wife because he already has a legitimate child with his present spouse. it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.

“and/or” RMBSA V. 19 JUNE 2000 STATCON DOCTRINE: The term ‘and/or’ means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or”. commerce and industry.1 … to provide credit facilities for the rehabilitation and development of agriculture. articles of incorporations. and any provision of their charters. HDMF. if not most. the Court believes that the Legilature intended that the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation should from time to time set aside some reasonable amount for the discount of backpay certificates as circumstances and its resource may warrant. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987)  Respondent o Exercising its rule-making power under Sec 13 of PD 1752 (Clarified confusion of “and/or” by choosing only “and” in Sec 19 of PD 1752) . Republic Act No.  If backpay certificates are to be mandatorily accepted. all. NO. 1011. the phrase “subject” would mean that acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. It seems evident that legislature never could have intended such absurd consequence. o Nov 16 1995 – Petitioner filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan. accept or discount at not more than two percentum per annum for ten years such certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the acquisition of real property for use as the applicant’s home. Series of 1995. 2 … And provided. and the broadening and diversification of the national economy … o 5. petitioner sent a letter supporting their application explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invlalid o March 18 1996 – Respondent disapproved petitioner’s application. it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG fund. Rules implementing RA 7742 did not amend or repeal Sec 19 of PD 1752 but merely implement the law o March 31 1997 – Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA and was dismissed on the ground that (1) coverage of employers and employees under HDMF are mandatory (2) petitioner is not a distressed employer to warrant its exemption from Fund coverage (3) amendments to the rules and regulations implementing RA 7742 are valid (4) respondent is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations (rule-making power) (5) published in Philippine Star CONTENTIONS  Petitioner o 1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the enabling law PD 1752 (merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident/retirement plan or a superior housing plan. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987] o Did not file with the UP Law Center 3 Certified copies of every rule adopted (Sec 3. or rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding.R.As to the first modifier.  The Court cannot compel the corporation to accept the backpay certificate as acceptance and discount of backpay certificates has been placed within the sound discretion of the corporation and subject to availability of loanable funds. the reconstruction of property damaged by war. subject to availability of loanable funds. G. or (2) the building or construction or reconstruction of the residential house of the payee of said certificate: … Creation of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. 1996 Amendment is also void as they abolish the exemption granted by sec 19 of PD 1752 o Repeal of such exemption ivolves the exercise of legislative power o No public hearing making the amendments void [Sec 9 (1). That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall. also. 304  Sec. FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA Petitioner was exempted from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 o Sept 1 1995 – HDMF Board of Trustees pursuant to Sec 5 of RA 7742 issued Board Resolution No. of the activities of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation will be suspended taking into account the available cash balance at the time of the tria. STATUTE INVOVLED BACKPAY Law. amending and modifying Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742:  Sec 1 of Rule VII – for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage. Ch 2. 85  Sec. Republic Act No. 131082. This intention can be inferred from the fact that Congress itself expressly ordered that all financial institutions accept or discount backpay certificates in payment of those loans… .  Nonetheless. Ch 2. by-laws. not both).

null and void as recently resolved in China Banking Corp. v. it requires PUBLICATION at least in once in a newspaper of general circulation ISSUE:  W/N 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742. specifically Sec 1. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs) Effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or” o The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive “or” alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive “and” willexclude the efficiacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone “It…seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Sec 19 of PD 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. o . but in conformity with. and be not in contradiction to.o Public hearing is only operational or discretionary on the part of the agency concerned except when the same is required by law (PD 1752 does not require).g. The Members of the Board of Trustees of the HDMF HELD: Legal Signification of the words “and/or” o Used interchangeably o Shall be taken in its ordinary signifcation (e. Rule VII on Waiver or Suspension are valid >> NO. Rule-making power of HDMF should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency o Required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law. the standards prescribed by law.