Statutory Construction (EH307MC



7. Presumption against ineffectiveness
- In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective statute.
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay.
The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No.
7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to
office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it
must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec.
74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and
par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting
the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for
there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the
Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative
or nugatory.
8. Presumption against irrepealable laws
- It is always to be presumed in case of doubt or ambiguity that the legislature does not intend to
derogate from the authority of its successors, to make irrepealable laws, or to divest the state of
any portion of its sovereign powers.
City of Davao v RTC
G.R. No. 127383 (August 18, 2005)
• Tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions
• The plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of irrepealable laws
FACTS: GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public
bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum
total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
extension given by Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land
it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government
Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the
GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption. Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. 119525 (April 18. Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec. Al G. 234.” The GSIS tax-exempt stats. 39. De Guia v Guingona. • The latter statute must have an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy with the prior statute. No.R. are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. 1146. and charges of any kind on the National Government. then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS. its agencies and instrumentalities. et. and 234 of the LGC. No. a subsequent law cannot be constructed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in terms of the new and old laws 2 requisites: • The statutes must touch the same subject matter. incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. Regarding P. sec. 232. and clear finding thereof must surface. for by doing so. et Al. including GOCCs. Pampanga G. 2009) FACTS: Roma Drug was raided by the NBI and BFAD and seized several important medicines. they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same time upon the request of SmithKline which was the duly registered corporation to distribute such . Thus. 1995) **can’t find said case anywhere.D.D. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao. sec.” However. Presumption against Implied Repeals . Roma Drug. 33. in sum. v RTC of Guagua. as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of “taxes. the two conditions under sec. if honored.The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. These conditions imposed under P. 33. under sec. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. fees. Furthermore. was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997. 149907 (April 26. GSIS being a GOCC. except as provided in said section.R. including CDAsia 9.2 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) HELD: Reading together sec. particularly the amendatory second paragraph. before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. and LGUs. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any tax exemption. exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. In the absence of an express repeal. 133.

such as Rep. which authorizes the head of office to case a reimbursement of payment of medical and hospital expenses of a government official in case of sickness or injury caused by or connected directly with the performance of his official duty. HELD: The legislature did not intend. to repeal Sec. it is clear that the SLCO’s classification of “unregistered imported drugs” as “counterfeit drugs. clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must be given effect. 699 of the old code. It may be that Rep. 9502 unequivocally grants third persons the right to import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the Philippines by the owner of the product. Later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a statute. and understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the old code. However. 3 rules to remember: . The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import or possess “unregistered imported drugs” in the Philippines is further confirmed by the “Implementing Rules to Republic Act No. 699 because it was omitted the revised code. in enacting the new Code. The medicines of Roma Drug was purchased directly from abroad and not through SmithKline. No. 9502” promulgated on November 4. CoA denied the claim on the ground that AC of 1987 which revised the old AC. 103982 (December 11. Section 7 of Rep. Two categories of repeal by implication Provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter that are in irreconcilable conflict.” and of corresponding criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep.3 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) medicines. 9502 since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or otherwise use such drugs. HELD: Yes. 9502 did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD. Act No. rules and regulation. Where a statute of later date. There is no irreconcilable conflict between the two codes on the matter of sickness benefits because the provision has not been restated in the New Code. 2008. Act No. it will operate to repeal the earlier law. or portions thereof. 1982) FACTS: Claim for reimbursement by a government official of medical and hospitalization expenses pursuant to Section 699 of the Revised Administration Code of 1917. decrees.” New code did not expressly repeal the old as the new Code fails to identify or designate the act to be repealed. The whereas clause is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration. Act No. 9502. Act No. “All laws. repealed Sec. inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. During preliminary investigation.R. ISSUE: Whether the contention of Roma Drug is correct. orders. Mecano v Commission on Audit G. ISSUE: WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC. The prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted. organization and procedure. Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of the law on Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD) regarding the distribution of their medicine that were considered counterfeit although they only bought it directly and not from SmithKline.

Avon Cosmetics. at any time upon notice to the other. 153674 (December 20. • Law A -> Law B expressly repeals Law A -> Law C repeals Law B = Law A is not revived. in 1972. included in the terms of said agreement are. filed by respondent Luna alleging. Aggrieved respondent Luna filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Makati City. Avon now implores the Court to review. Jose Mari Franco. has a tendency to injure the public. Luna accepted the offer and agreed to sell said products. the terms are to be understood . On November 5. ISSUE: WON the RTC of Makati City erred in rendering its decision that said Supervisor’s agreement was “contrary to law and public policy.It is presumed that the legislature intends its enactments to accord with the principles of sound public policy and the interests of public morality. notified respondent Luna of the termination or cancellation of her Supervisor’s agreement. respondent Luna was invited by former Avon employee who was then currently a Sales Manager of Sandre Philippines. 1985. 2006) FACTS: The present petition stemmed from a complaint dated December 1. Presumption against violation of public policy . Said Supervisor’s agreement is not deemed “contrary to law and public policy. respondent Luna continued working for said successor company. Nonetheless. in order to declare a contract void as against public policy.4 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) • Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.” The RTC of Makati City granted the petition and rendered Avon liable for damages. via a petition for review on certiorari. Avon Cosmetics v Luna G. inter alia. 10. Sometime in 1978. through its President and General Manager. Sometime in the latter part of 1988. Inc. display or promote only and exclusively products sold by the company. In a letter dated October 11. with or without cause. Plainly put. that she began working for Beautifont. acquired and took over the management and operations of Beautifont. first as a franchise dealer and then a year later. (1) That the supervisor shall sell or offer to sell. must find that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be done. whether of personal liability or of private property. Inc. • A general law does not repeal a special law. petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement (Supervisor’s Agreement). and due weight should be given to this presumption in the construction of a doubtful or ambiguous statute. Branch 138 on the grounds that said Supervisor’s Agreement between her and Avon was void on the grounds that it was “contrary to law and public policy. public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. As applied to contracts. as a supervisor. or contravenes some established interests of society or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals. not to violate them. that they do not justify an attempt to read into any alleged intention of the parties. Inc.. petitioner Avon.” When the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit. 1988.” HELD: SC granted Avon’s petition. a court. a domestic corporation engaged in direct selling of vitamins and other food supplements. • Law A -> Law B impliedly repeals Law A -> Law C repeals law B = Law A is revived. (Avon). No. (2) Either party may terminate this agreement at will. Inc. in the absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition. unless it is so expressly provided or they are incompatible. is against the public good.R. 1988. or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.

issued an order. and all other Avon supervisors. was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park or plaza? Held: Neither. 1964. 1975. affirming a prior sale dated January 16. Manila Lodge No. dated November 19. 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila. Plainly put.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. to which was issued TCT No. 1976) Facts: Philippine Commission enacted Act No.. 11. L-41001 (September 30. (BPOE) on the basis of which TCT No. Petitions in both G. 1968 affirmed in G. as amended by Act No. with material dredged from Manila Bay. 1907 Act No. City of Manila. so as to authorize the City of' Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay." BPOE sold for the sum of P4. There is nothing invalid or contrary to public policy either in the objectives sought to be attained by Paragraph 5.700. 1657. The reclaimed area. and on January 20.543. 1911. i. 1360. "The Elks Club. but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights. after hearing. 2195 was issued to the latter over the Marcela. Hence. Manila Lodge No. public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws . Issues: Whether or not property subject of the action. 761. 761.R. O. is hereby affirmed. Philippine Commission passed on May 18.R. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U. the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude maters which if included would defeat the policy of the legislation. Inc. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks. Property.. 1909 cancelled 5. TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31. therefore. No.C. 761. 1657. Inc. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial court's order of reannotation. It is public dominion. dismissing the complaint. however.A. 761 v CA G. from selling products other than those manufactured by petitioner Avon. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension.. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for lack of merit.5 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) literally just as they appear on the face of the contract.000 the land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC)City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase. part of the public domain. It is of public dominion. an extension to the Luneta. Trial court rendered decision that subject land to be part of the "Public Park or plaza" and. pursuant to the provisions of Act No. intended for public use. and the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 30.T. 1360.R. is either of public ownership or of private ownership. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the reclaimed area.07 square meters to the Elks Club. Nos. amending Act No.S.CA affirmed the decision of lower court. Ruling:(1) Although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta extension." was later changed by court order to "Manila Lodge No. the exclusivity clause.directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years. 4 The registered owner. subsequently sold the said 5.It is presumed that the legislature in drafting and enacting a statute had full knowledge and took cognizance of all existing laws on the same subject matter or relating thereto. 67488. BPOE. Inc.543. . in prohibiting respondent Luna. the court. Nos. the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila.e. is declared to be property of the City of Manila.

in provinces and in towns. It is for the party who alleges that the person has no authority to prove the lack thereof. Manila Lodge No. 761 v CA G. the subject property is the southern portion. as claimed by the Manila Lodge No.Presumption of acting within the scope of authority has something to do with “burden of proof” on whether or not someone was within his or her authority to act. the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. contemplation of law.R. Article II. freedom. It may extend to the presumption of regularity of acts by public officials. L-41001 (September 30. All agents are presumed to act under the scope of their authority. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold. 12. and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces.A statute will not be construed as ousting or restricting the jurisdiction of the superior courts. by express statutory provision it could be disposed of. equality. freedom. IV. cooperation.(2) The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. and public waters the promenades. such as the extension to the Luneta. Presumption of Jurisdiction . applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius. 1976) **refer to case in number 11 (Presumption of knowledge of existing laws) 14. and the Title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute. then it is presumed Congress will acquiesce to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute. an impairment of the obligations of contracts. comprises the provincial and town roads. Presumption of acting within the scope of authority .6 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) Without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360. no contract at all. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace. unless there will be express words or a necessary implication to that effect.If congress fails to supply or falls short in providing the specific legislation on a certain subject (like inclusion of copyright). the squares streets fountains. Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use. only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property for. Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has seen. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. 1987 Constitution The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy. 761. for there was it. the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila. Without countervailing evidence." A park or plaza. At most. Presumption against violation of International Law . It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. 15. was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. is undoubtedly comprised in said article. . Consequently. not as its patrimonial property. cannot be. and amity with all nations. or as vesting a new jurisdiction in them. much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. The Manila Lodge No. that the partners and the Board of Directors of a corporation are presumed to have acted within the scope of their authority. GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTEPRETATION OF LAWS . Hence. 13. the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion. and amity with all nations Section 2. equality. justice. 761. cooperation. Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction .BPOE.Philippines as democratic and republican state adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace.It has something to do with agency. justice.But also has implications in partnerships and corporation laws. . the court will presume that the agent acted properly and with authority.

• The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee. “That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed. 4 and 17.” The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. the plaintiff. 1956) In CAR Case No. Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before? Held: Yes. instead. 4) b. posting an appeal bond is unnecessary.7 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) i. 6 reads: “In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award. 6. 4. Book VII of the POEA Rules. the money will be used to insure more care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will be sent. 17) • The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to the respondent NLRC. 4.Statutes should be construed as a whole. With regard to the present case. on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Doctrine: Construction: It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case). Book II of the POEA Rules. Rule II. was the defendant. according to Sec. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. and Exequiel Magsaysay. Statutes as a Whole . apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. 17. and/oraccreditation and contracts of employment. one portion may be qualified by others JMM Promotions v NLRC G. 5666-R-Z of the Court of Agrarian Relations of Iba. posting of cash bond and surety bond. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4) c. and placement of money in escrow are enough. 1970) Facts: (Oct 26.000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The decision being appealed involved a monetary award. an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond…” The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of 350. Zambales. Casela v CA L-26754 (October 16. 6 complements Sec. • Sec. 109835 (November 22. but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of the petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. . On the other hand. care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect. Casela refused to comply with the said writ. 1993) Facts: Following Secs. the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license. The said court decided against the defendant and the decision become final and executory commanding Casela to vacate the premises and remove his house therefrom. the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.R. 17. No. the doctrine can be applied when the Court found that Sec. Rule V. made the following: a. the petitioner. Mateo Casela. According to Sec. a recruiting agency. 4 and Sec. Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. Paid the license fee (Sec. The reason for such is that overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence.

all covering a period of 3 yrs. Counting five years from December 17.600. At the same time. 1956. only 3 yrs.000 and improvements of 2. and 25 days. or a period of 3 yrs. 1959) and another writ. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the five year reglementary period. the court granted Casela motion for suspension until the Civil Case would have been disposed of on the merits. this was granted by the Court in its order of October 1. 1956. In addition to damages in the sum of 1. 1964) praying for the issuance of an alia writ of execution attaching a copy of the appealed decision.000. which forthwith directed the execution of its judgment of October 26. and 24 days after the decision in question became final and executory. Issue: That the agrarian court denied Magsaysay’s motion holding that its decision on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years had already elapsed from the said date. Held: That the decision of October 26. 1957) the court issued another writ commanding the defendant to vacate the premises and remove his house. 1964. (May 6. Magsaysay filed a countermotion against the motion of suspension to declare Casela and the provincial sheriff in contempt of court. 1961 within which to move for execution of the said decision. he also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution pending the final outcome of the said civil case. the plaintiff Exequiel Magsaysay had until December 17. (April 10. (April 14.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 8 (Aug 12. By reason of this pronouncement. the defendant instituted a Civil case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales asking Magsaysay to pay him the value of his house in the amount of 5. 1958) the court again issued another writ. 1964. 1965) The civil case eventually reached the Court of Appeals and the court dismissed Casela’s appeal. 11 mos. From this latter period must be deducted the time during which the writs of execution could not be served. It would thus appear that Magsaysay's motion for execution of December 11. 1956. . Magsaysay could not be compelled to pay the claims. 9 mos. 1964) The agrarian court denied Magsaysay’s motion holding that its decision on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years had already elapsed from the said date. Magsaysay filed a motion (DEC 2. Undoubtedly. Consequently. is not controverted. 9 mos. After hearing the respective mtions. and 25 days. Magsaysay's motion for execution was filed well within the five-year reglementary period. He again refused to comply with the writ. having been filed beyond the five-year reglementary period. 1963. respondent Magsaysay should not be considered to have incurred in delay in the enforcement of the judgment when he filed a motion for execution 6 yrs. 1963) and another (FEB 11. (Oct 6. The court ruled the the claims of Casela for indemnification were in the nature of of compulsory counterclaims and must be pleaded before the agarian court and not the court of first instance where they were brought. 1956 of the Court of Agrarian Relations became final and executory on December 17. Instead of obeying the writ. Where the writs of execution were not implemented because of petitioner Casela's stubborn refusal to vacate the premises and because of the lower court's order sustaining Casela's for suspension of execution twice. This would indicate that the said motion for execution was filed on time. (March 5. 1964) Magsaysay moved for a reconsideration of the order of denial of March 5. was timebarred.

– because a statute is enacted in whole and not in parts or sections. it has been held. ISSUE: Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections? HELD: The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption. The term “intent” includes two concepts. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. that the ascertainment of legislative intent depends more on a determination of the purpose and object of the law. This rule of construction is especially applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and injustice. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign. where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. ii.R.R. The intent of the legislature is the law. the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. 2011. 2012) FACTS: These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18. although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. 196271 (February 28. The courts are not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute. A. No. that of purpose and that of meaning. however. 10153. Intent is the spirit which gives life to legislative enactment. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization. Optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum – the best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself B. the essence of the law. the statute should be construed and given effect as a whole. to be progressive and not static. No. and the controlling factor in. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. which implies that one part is as important as the other. a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time. Meridian Assurance Corporation v Dayrit G. its construction or interpretation. 3 approaches in determining the legislative intent: (1) Literal Rule (2) Purpose Rule (3) Golden Rule – depart from the ordinary meaning. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. RA No. 1990) .Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 9 Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. and the key to. Legislative Intent must be ascertained from the statute as a whole . It must be enforced when ascertained. the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective. Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate of the Philippines G.Legislative intent is the vital part. 59154 (April 3.

RULING: No. as provided by Article 2209 of the Civil Code. It cannot rewrite other laws. words and phrases in statutes should not be interpreted in isolation from one another. The Orders promulgated on October 15. The petitioner. or 12%. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. On September 16. dated September 1981. 416. Meridian Assurance Corporation. Garcia. or forbearance of any money.00 totaling P170. The offer was rejected by First Western. contrary to morals. Any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with. goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law (P. HELD: Petition granted. in addition to costs. petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages.00. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word.000. Ester S. goods. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent.933. to .D.03 is declared to constitute full satisfaction. The Trial Court’s judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on October 9. etc. 1980 offered to pay the amount of the judgement with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.00. No. private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a whole and not as series of disconnected articles and phrases. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden grounds. 416. No. Court of Appeals G. A word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may thus be modified or restricted by the latter. conformably with Central Bank Circular No. interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610. or credits and the rate allowed in judgments. insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to his dignity and personality. for the sum of $21. In the absence of a clear contrary intention. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority. good customs and public policy. In support of her claim.38 or its equivalent in Pesos at the rate of P3. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. Socorro Ramirez v Hon.R. Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person. was a defendant in Civil Case No. in a confrontation in the latter's office. allegedly vexed.061. 1981 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. 416 of the Central Bank of the Philippines — amending Section 1 of the Usury Law (Act No. 1980. nor involving loans or forbearance of any money.061.03 ISSUE: WON Circular No. and to authorize it "to satisfy the amount of the judgment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237. in its letter of September 21. 1981 and December 2. 62317 of the then Court of First Instance in Manila.9390 to a dollar. its view being that the rate of interest should be 12% per annum in accordance with Central Bank Circular No.10 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) FACTS: The sole issue of this special civil action for certiorari concerns the rate of interest properly imposable in relation to a judgement for the payment of money: 6%. and other purposes. 2655) by prescribing twelve percent (12%) per annum as the "rate of interest for the loan. entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication. 1995) FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D. ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. The case resulted in a verdict adverse to the defendants making them liable jointly and severally. The petitioner's deposit with the Trial Court of the amount of P170. in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest be applied to all kinds of monetary judgement. Meridian thereupon proceeded to this Court praying for a writ of certiorari to annul the orders denying its aforementioned motion to deposit. 1981. 93833 (September 25.

There is no question that Teresa was Florante’s legal wife.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 11 tap any wire or cable. he/she must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e). Floresa and Florante II. Resolving Teresita’s claim. plain and free from ambiguity. The CA. 1970. but only until his emancipation at age 21. SSC and SSS v Teresa G. What is at point. 1970. that is. Cost against petitioner. however. or however otherwise described. No. LABOR LAW: Meaning of a dependent spouse entitled to pension benefits . it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. his pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at that time. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. however. Thus. marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse under the law. or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder. or by using any other device or arrangement. Teresa has not presented sufficient evidence to discharge . for a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof. The SSS. Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS. however. Verba Legis . Where the law makes no distinctions. to secretly overhear. is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante for support in order for her to fall under the term "dependent spouse" under Section 8(k) of RA 1161.R. the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from claiming the death benefits because she was deemed not dependent for support from Florante due to marital infidelity. one does not distinguish.plain meaning rule: Where the statute is clear. Teresa further averred that when Florante died on February 1. 8(e) and (k) of RA 1161. intercept.Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florantes pension benefits. and (2) dependency for support. aside from Teresa’s bare allegation that she was dependent upon her husband for support and her misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and then subsisting marriage with Florante. Favila G. As to dependency for support. reversed the SSCs decision. The law is clear and unambiguous. the SSC stated that the surviving spouses entitlement to an SSS members death benefits is dependent on two factors which must concur at the time of the latter’s death. Florante II.When they begot their children Jofel. to wit: (1) legality of the marital relationship. iii. 170195 (March 28. and averred therein that after she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17. Quezon City Branch on June 30. 2011) FACTS: Respondent Teresita Favila filed a claim with the SSS for pension benefits. one who is dependent upon the member for support. This plain meaning rule or verbal legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita is a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as to be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante HELD: The petition is granted. the latter designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form he submitted before petitioner Social Security System (SSS). the SSC opined that same is affected by factors such as separation de facto of the spouses. her husband likewise designated each one of them as beneficiaries. although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of Florante’s designated beneficiaries. The instant petition is hereby DENIED.Under Sec. 1997. In this case. denied the claim.

Felicito Basbacio v Office of the Secretary. Held: No. The Labor Arbiter sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that the monthly COLA should be computed on the basis of 22 days.R. On the days that employees are not paid their basic wage. Since it is a past error that is being corrected.12 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) her burden of proving that she was dependent upon her husband for support at the time of his death. Teresa cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. She could have done this by submitting affidavits of reputable and disinterested persons who have knowledge that during her separation with Florante. Respondent Union disagreed with the computation alleging that prior to the effectivity of the Wage Order. The payment of COLA is mandated only for the days that the employees are paid their basic wage. she does not have a known trade. 1994) . 109445 (November 7.” The primordial consideration for entitlement of COLA is that basic wage is being paid. Issue: WON the computation and payment of COLA on the basis of 30 days per month constitute an employer practice which should not be unilaterally withdrawn. 5 and 6 provides that “all covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during the days that they are paid their basic wage.R. No. for Teresa’s failure to show that despite their separation she was dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his death. Petitioner Corporation had been computing and paying the COLA on the basis of 30 days per month and that this constituted an employer practice. Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. she is not entitled to the death benefits accruing on account of Florantes death. what is clear is that she and Florante had already been separated for about 17 years prior to the latter’s death as Florante was in fact. which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. even if said days are unworked. Globe Mackay Cable v NLRC G. living with his common law wife when he died. Moreover. holding that Petitioner Corporation was guilty of illegal deductions considering that COLA should be paid and computed on the basis of 30 days since workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled to COLA on days “unworked”. and the full allowance enjoyed by Petitioner Corporation’s monthly-paid employees before the CBA executed between the parties constituted voluntary employer practice. Petitioner Corporation multiplied the P3. Petitioner Corporation cannot be faulted for erroneous application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. In its computation. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on appeal. DOJ G. which is the number of working days in the company. profession or lawful occupation from which she derives income sufficient for her support and such other evidence tending to prove her claim of dependency. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. since the evidence showed that there are only 22 days in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company.00 daily COLA by 22 days. On the contrary. 2. which should not be unilaterally withdrawn. business. the payment of COLA is not mandated. no vested right may be said to have arisen nor may any diminution of benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code be said to have resulted by virtue of the correction. Hence. 6 increased the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) of non-agricultural workers in the private sector. No. even if unworked. Petitioner Corporation complied with said Order by paying its monthly-paid employees the mandated P3. 82511 (March 3. 3.00 per day COLA. Hence. 1992) Facts: Wage Order No.

were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso. convicted. hence a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. thereby making him a “victim of unjust imprisonment. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment. but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more. On December 4. one of the petitioners. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting. the property of petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National bank as security for a loan of P2. of a statute determines its construction.” In the instant case. sec. Calanuga.R. iv. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled. On June 22. .The spirit. 119 of the Public Land Act. 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. For failure to pay their loan. which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused. The distinction made by respondent contravenes . rather than the letter. Wilfredo Balderrama. The subject property was later sold to Elena Salenillas and her husband. No. Rapu-Rapu. Issue: W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. on the night of June 26. No. 1973. 1988. Al G. legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor.A.The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself. It is believed therefor that the phrase “any person… unjustly accused. 78687 (January 31. the leading star and the guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute." The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. at Palo. Act No. a finding of reasonable doubt. however. For this reason. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief. Based on his acquittal. but upon. 119 of the Public Land Act. the property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a public auction by private respondent. imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. 3(a). however. petitioner filed a claim under Rep. petitioners in the instant case. were grantees of free patent. Facts: The parents of Elena Salenillas.500. Claimant/ Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence. The law is clear and does not call for interpretation. Sec. convicted and imprisoned” in Section 3(a) of R. 7309. Elena Salenillas v Honorable Court of Appeals. et. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. Held: Yes. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant. Spirit and Purpose of the Law . Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 1989) Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner." ISSUE: WON Petitioner can rightfully claim compensation for damages on the grounds of unjust imprisonment HELD: Petition is dismissed. petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.13 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) FACTS: Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law. in effect. his widow or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance. that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail. Albay.

T-19229 to Peria’s name. et. Jose Commendador. T-13218) that the spouses Fiestan owned in Ilocos Sur after extrajudicial foreclosure of said property. G. No. 2-B covered by TCT No. 1979 the parcel of land (Lot No. mortgage and cancellation of transfer certificates of title against .Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 14 the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations. 1991) Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases. who later secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. v. On April 13.000. Statute of Later Date Prevails . With the lifting of Martial Law. the law itself ceases. Al v B/Gen. the Register of Deeds cancelled their title over the subject property and issued TCT No. they filed a complaint in the RTC of Vigan. Facts: Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and were charged with violations of Articles of War in relation with their alleged participation in a failed coup d’etat. 408. al. Ilocos Sur for annulment of sale. 14. When spouses Fiestan failed to redeem their parcel of land within the 1 year period which expired on September 28. The Provincial Sheriff issued a certificate of sale that same day which was registered on September 28 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. When the reason of the law ceases. that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail. the Provincial Sheriff ordered them to vacate the premises. Held: No. Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 1980. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed under CA No.00. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under PD 39.R. Earlier.because it favors the latest intention of the legislature Pacis v Averia G. T-19077 to DBP upon the latter’s duly executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership. A special law prevails over a general law. 18 of CA No. 1996) vi. cessat ipsa lex. GCM No. 1990) FACTS: For failure of petitioner spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada (spouses Fiestan) to pay their mortgage indebtedness to respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). but instead of leaving. 1982. 81552 (May 28. the DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria. or on September 26. spouses Fiestan also executed a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which was likewise registered on September 28. No. petitioners manifested their desire to exercise their right to raise peremptory challenges against the President and the members of the general court martial invoking Art. At a hearing. General Order No. 18 of CA No. B/Gen. et. L-22526 (November 29. the latter was able to acquire at a public auction sale on August 6. Since the spouses Fiestan were still in possession of the property. vii. 408. No. the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically. 1979.R. Fiestan v CA G. Demetrio Camera. so the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur cancelled DBP’s title over said property and issued TCT No. He thereafter mortgaged said lot to the PNB-Vigan Branch as security for his loan of P115. 8 issued during martial law to create military tribunals. 96948 (August 2. Cessante ratione legis. 8 was revoked and military tribunals were dissolved. Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant . the law itself ceases. As such. Their case was referred to General Court Martial No. PD 39 however was issued to implement General Order No.R.Special provisions prevail over a general one. 408 has been discontinued under PD 39.

The Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of “ordinance” in general. alleging among others the noncompliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The lower court dismissed said complaint. and in this case the DBP. PNB-Vigan Branch. may purchase at a sale under his mortgage to protect his own interest or to avoid a loss to himself by a sale to a third person at a price below the mortgage debt Bagatsing v Ramirez G. the present petition.R. as provided under Section 5 of Act No 3135. (2) of Article 1491 and par. are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction. However. the Supreme Court reiterated that the formalities of a levy.15 Statutory Construction (EH307MC) the DBP-Laoag City. . there is authority to hold that a mortgagee. which the general statute treats in particular. one as a general law of the land. Even in the absence of statutory provision. No. the other as the law of a particular case. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general. the Supreme Court ruled that the power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection. Thus. declaring valid the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the DBP and its subsequent sale to Francisco Peria as well as the real estate mortgage constituted in favor of PNB-Vigan. even at a public or judicial auction either in person or through the mediation of another. assailed the validity of the ordinance. However. the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general. as amended. the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them unless the consent of the principal has been given. the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522. regulating the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. Ilocos Sur. while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges” in particular. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision. which is a special law that must prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law. 41636 (December 17. Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. which the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur allegedly failed to comply with. The spouses Fiestan insisted that what prevails over the case are par. 1976) FACTS: In 1974. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. (7) of Article 1409 of the Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase. The spouses Fiestan herein seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property on the ground that the Provincial Sheriff conducted the foreclosure without first effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at the public auction sale. The ordinance is valid. ISSUE: Who has the right to acquire by purchase the subject property? HELD: In denying the petition. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. ISSUE: What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance? Is the ordinance valid? HELD: The Local Tax Code prevails. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void.