Statutory Construction (EH307MC

)

1
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION AND INTEPRETATION OF
LAWS
i. Statutes as a Whole
- Statutes should be construed as a whole;
one portion may be qualified by others
JMM Promotions v NLRC
G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)
Facts: Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II,
Book II of the POEA Rules, the
petitioner, a recruiting agency, made the
following:
a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond of
100k and surety
bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
c. Placed money in escrow worth
200k (Sec.
17)
• The petitioner wanted to appeal a
decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) to the
respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed
the appeal because of failure of the
petitioner to post
an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule
V, Book VII of the POEA Rules. The
decision being appealed involved a
monetary award.
• The petitioner contended that its
payment of a license fee, posting of cash
bond and surety bond, and placement of
money in escrow are enough; posting
an appeal bond is unnecessary. According
to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer
for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant
and use of the license,
and/oraccreditation and contracts of
employment. On the other hand,
according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall
answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result
of recruitment violations or money claims.
• Sec. 6 reads:
“In case the decision of the Administration
involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond…”
The bonds required here are different from
the bonds required in Sec. 4.
Issue: Was the petitioner still required to
post an appeal bond despite the fact that

it has posted bonds of 150k and placed
200k in escrow before?
Held: Yes. It is possible for the monetary
reward in favor of the employee
to exceed the amount of 350,000 because
of the stringent requirements posed upon
recruiters. The reason for such is that
overseas employees are subjected to
greater risks and hence, the money will be
used to insure more care on the part of
the local recruiter in its choice of foreign
principal to whom the worker will be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that
in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules
as in this case), care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. “That the
thing may rather have effect than be
destroyed.”
The rule is that a construction that would
render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. With regard to the
present case, the doctrine can be applied
when the Court found that Sec. 6
complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.
Casela v CA
L-26754 (October 16, 1970)
Facts: (Oct 26, 1956) In CAR Case No.
5666-R-Z of the Court of Agrarian
Relations of Iba, Zambales, Mateo Casela,
was the defendant, and Exequiel
Magsaysay, the plaintiff. The said court
decided against the defendant and the
decision become final and executory
commanding Casela to vacate the
premises and remove his house therefrom.
Casela refused to comply with the said
writ.
(Aug 12, 1957) the court issued another
writ commanding the defendant to vacate
the premises and remove his house. He
again refused to comply with the writ.
(May 6, 1958) the court again issued
another writ.
(April 14, 1959) and another writ.

9 mos. 1964) The agarian court denied Magsaysay’s motion holding that its decision on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years had already elapsed from the said date. At the same time. 1956. In addition to damages in the sum of 1.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 2 Instead of obeying the writ. Optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum – the best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself B. the defendant instituted a Civil case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales asking Magsaysay to pay him the value of his house in the amount of 5. all covering a period of 3 yrs. Counting five years from December 17.000. It must be enforced when ascertained. the essence of the law. By reason of this pronouncement. and the controlling factor in. Issue: That the agrarian court denied Magsaysay’s motion holding that its decision on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years had already elapsed from the said date. Held: That the decision of October 26. however. It would thus appear that Magsaysay's motion for execution of December 11. Undoubtedly. this was granted by the Court in its order of October 1. and 25 days. it has been held. respondent Magsaysay should not be considered to have incurred in delay in the enforcement of the judgment when he filed a motion for execution 6 yrs. The term “intent” includes two concepts. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 1961 within which to move for execution of the said decision. he also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution pending the final outcome of the said civil case. 1956. Consequently. Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. 1963. or a period of 3 yrs. (April 10. and 24 days after the decision in question became final and executory. is not controverted. the court granted Casela motion for suspension until the Civil Case would have been disposed of on the merits. A. that the ascertainment of legislative intent depends more on a determination of the purpose and object of the law. 1964) praying for the issuance of an alia writ of execution attaching a copy of the appealed decision. 1963) and another (FEB 11. The courts are not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute. the plaintiff Exequiel Magsaysay had until December 17. and 25 days. 9 mos. 1964. (March 5. This would indicate that the said motion for execution was filed on time. having been filed beyond the five-year reglementary period. The court ruled the the claims of Casela for indemnification were in the nature of of compulsory counterclaims and must be pleaded before the agarian court and not the court of first instance where they were brought. Magsaysay filed a motion (DEC 2. The intent of the legislature is the law. 1964. the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. that of purpose and that of meaning. (Oct 6. ii. From this latter period must be deducted the time during which the writs of execution could not be served. 1956. Magsaysay could not be compelled to pay the claims.Legislative intent is the vital part.000 and improvements of 2. Magsaysay filed a countermotion against the motion of suspension to declare Casela and the provincial sheriff in contempt of court. Where the writs of execution were not implemented because of petitioner Casela's stubborn refusal to vacate the premises and because of the lower court's order sustaining Casela's for suspension of execution twice. was time-barred. 1965) The civil case eventually reached the Court of Appeals and the court dismissed Casela’s appeal. 1956 of the Court of Agrarian Relations became final and executory on December 17.600. 11 mos. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the five year reglementary period. only 3 yrs. After hearing the respective mtions. 1964) Magsaysay moved for a reconsideration of the order of denial of March 5. Intent is the spirit which gives life to legislative enactment. Legislative Intent must be ascertained from the statute as a whole . – because a statute is enacted in whole . and the key to. its construction or interpretation. which forthwith directed the execution of its judgment of October 26. This rule of construction is especially applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and injustice. Magsaysay's motion for execution was filed well within the five-year reglementary period. although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.

highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.00 totaling P170.R. The case resulted in a verdict adverse to the defendants making them liable jointly and severally. for the sum of $21. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization. Significantly. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. 416 of the Central Bank of the Philippines — amending Section 1 of the Usury Law (Act No. ISSUE: Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections? HELD: The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials. in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest be applied to all kinds of monetary judgement. 2655) by prescribing twelve percent (12%) per annum as the "rate of interest for the loan. 1980. No.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 3 and not in parts or sections. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. The Trial Court’s judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on October 9. 59154 (April 3. 1990) FACTS: The sole issue of this special civil action for certiorari concerns the rate of interest properly imposable in relation to a judgement for the payment of money: 6%.00. HELD: Petition granted. 1980 offered to pay the amount of the judgement with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237. On September 16. RA No. 10153. to be progressive and not static.03 ISSUE: WON Circular No. its view being that the rate of interest should be 12% per annum in accordance with Central Bank Circular No. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a whole .933. or credits and the rate allowed in judgments.D. Meridian thereupon proceeded to this Court praying for a writ of certiorari to annul the orders denying its aforementioned motion to deposit. 1981. The petitioner. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden grounds. No. in its letter of September 21. as provided by Article 2209 of the Civil Code.061. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. No. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign.9390 to a dollar. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. 3 approaches in determining the legislative intent: (1) Literal Rule (2) Purpose Rule (3) Golden Rule – depart from the ordinary meaning. the statute should be construed and given effect as a whole. the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective. Meridian Assurance Corporation. The offer was rejected by First Western. It cannot rewrite other laws.38 or its equivalent in Pesos at the rate of P3. 416. 2011. 2012) FACTS: These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption. was a defendant in Civil Case No. Meridian Assurance Corporation v Dayrit G. Any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with. or forbearance of any money. goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law (P. Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate of the Philippines G. 196271 (February 28. 62317 of the then Court of First Instance in Manila. nor involving loans or forbearance of any money. which implies that one part is as important as the other. goods. a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. 416. dated September 1981. conformably with Central Bank Circular No. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority. and to authorize it "to satisfy the amount of the judgment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237. etc. a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time. or 12%.R. where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal.00. denied the claim. Socorro Ramirez v Hon.plain meaning rule: Where the statute is clear. the SSC stated that the surviving spouses entitlement to an SSS members death benefits is dependent on two factors which must concur at the time of the latter’s death. petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages. 1970. or however otherwise described. Favila G. and other purposes. insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to his dignity and personality. allegedly vexed. in a confrontation in the latter's office. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word. Quezon City Branch on June 30. Resolving Teresita’s claim. intercept. 1981 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder. RULING: No. The Orders promulgated on October 15. Garcia. to secretly overhear. 1995) FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D.061.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 4 and not as series of disconnected articles and phrases. Thus.R. iii. Court of Appeals G.R.000. . words and phrases in statutes should not be interpreted in isolation from one another. In the absence of a clear contrary intention. Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS. No. her husband likewise designated each one of them as beneficiaries. contrary to morals. in addition to costs. the SSC opined that same is affected by factors such as separation de facto of the spouses. marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse under the law. or by using any other device or arrangement. the latter designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form he submitted before petitioner Social Security System (SSS). to tap any wire or cable. Floresa and Florante II.03 is declared to constitute full satisfaction. 1981 and December 2. interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. but only until his emancipation at age 21. 1970.Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florantes pension benefits. 93833 (September 25. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. good customs and public policy. The SSS. 2011) FACTS: Respondent Teresita Favila filed a claim with the SSS for pension benefits. it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. his pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at that time. Ester S. The petitioner's deposit with the Trial Court of the amount of P170. 170195 (March 28. however.When they begot their children Jofel. SSC and SSS v Teresa G. ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. and (2) dependency for support. one does not distinguish. As to dependency for support. The instant petition is hereby DENIED. entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication. plain and free from ambiguity. Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person. 1997. This plain meaning rule or verbal legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. and averred therein that after she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17. The law is clear and unambiguous. Cost against petitioner. In support of her claim. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent. Florante II. attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610. Verba Legis . Teresa further averred that when Florante died on February 1. A word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may thus be modified or restricted by the latter. Where the law makes no distinctions. to wit: (1) legality of the marital relationship. private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200. No.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita is a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as to be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante HELD: The petition is granted. holding that Petitioner Corporation was guilty of illegal deductions considering that COLA should be paid and computed on the basis of 30 days since workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled to COLA on days “unworked”. which is the number of working days in the company. Held: No. for Teresa’s failure to show that despite their separation she was dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his death. which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. Teresa has not presented sufficient evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was dependent upon her husband for support at the time of his death. that is. No. Petitioner Corporation complied with said Order by paying its monthly-paid employees the mandated P3. 3. LABOR LAW: Meaning of a dependent spouse entitled to pension benefits Under Sec. 6 increased the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) of nonagricultural workers in the private sector. Petitioner Corporation had been computing and paying the COLA on the basis of 30 days per month and that this constituted an employer practice. reversed the SSCs decision.00 per day COLA.00 daily COLA by 22 days. since the evidence showed that there are only 22 days in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company.” The primordial consideration . for a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof. She could have done this by submitting affidavits of reputable and disinterested persons who have knowledge that during her separation with Florante. In its computation. which should not be unilaterally withdrawn. one who is dependent upon the member for support. 82511 (March 3. and the full allowance enjoyed by Petitioner Corporation’s monthly-paid employees before the CBA executed between the parties constituted voluntary employer practice. 1992) Facts: Wage Order No. what is clear is that she and Florante had already been separated for about 17 years prior to the latter’s death as Florante was in fact. business.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 5 although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of Florante’s designated beneficiaries. Globe Mackay Cable v NLRC G.R. she is not entitled to the death benefits accruing on account of Florantes death. Issue: WON the computation and payment of COLA on the basis of 30 days per month constitute an employer practice which should not be unilaterally withdrawn. however. 5 and 6 provides that “all covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during the days that they are paid their basic wage. is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante for support in order for her to fall under the term "dependent spouse" under Section 8(k) of RA 1161. living with his common law wife when he died. she does not have a known trade. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on appeal. however. 2. Hence. 8(e) and (k) of RA 1161. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. In this case. aside from Teresa’s bare allegation that she was dependent upon her husband for support and her misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and then subsisting marriage with Florante. Hence. The Labor Arbiter sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that the monthly COLA should be computed on the basis of 22 days. even if unworked. he/she must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e). Petitioner Corporation multiplied the P3. profession or lawful occupation from which she derives income sufficient for her support and such other evidence tending to prove her claim of dependency. There is no question that Teresa was Florante’s legal wife. Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. Teresa cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from claiming the death benefits because she was deemed not dependent for support from Florante due to marital infidelity. The CA. Respondent Union disagreed with the computation alleging that prior to the effectivity of the Wage Order. What is at point. On the contrary.

1994) FACTS: Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law. no vested right may be said to have arisen nor may any diminution of benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code be said to have resulted by virtue of the correction. Spirit and Purpose of the Law . Wilfredo Balderrama. Rapu-Rapu. 119 of the Public Land Act. On December 4. No. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. Calanuga. convicted and imprisoned” in Section 3(a) of R. rather than the letter. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting. Held: Yes. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. hence a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. the leading star and the guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute. were grantees of free patent. of a statute determines its construction. one of the petitioners. but upon. 78687 (January 31. Based on his acquittal.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 6 for entitlement of COLA is that basic wage is being paid. his widow or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance. For failure to pay their loan. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed.” In the instant case. DOJ G. at Palo. in effect. No. The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose . Issue: W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. however.The spirit. Facts: The parents of Elena Salenillas.The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself. convicted. . Al G. which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused. 3(a). Claimant/ Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence. et.R. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Albay. on the night of June 26. but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more. Since it is a past error that is being corrected. For this reason." The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. the property of petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National bank as security for a loan of P2. 1988. petitioners in the instant case. the payment of COLA is not mandated. On June 22. The law is clear and does not call for interpretation. were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso. thereby making him a “victim of unjust imprisonment. however. petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy. even if said days are unworked. 7309.R. Felicito Basbacio v Office of the Secretary. 1989) Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations. The subject property was later sold to Elena Salenillas and her husband. 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief. imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. 109445 (November 7. The payment of COLA is mandated only for the days that the employees are paid their basic wage. It is believed therefor that the phrase “any person… unjustly accused. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant. Petitioner Corporation cannot be faulted for erroneous application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. iv. Act No. On the days that employees are not paid their basic wage.A. sec. legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor." ISSUE: WON Petitioner can rightfully claim compensation for damages on the grounds of unjust imprisonment HELD: Petition is dismissed. Elena Salenillas v Honorable Court of Appeals. Moreover. No.500. the property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a public auction by private respondent. 1973. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled. petitioner filed a claim under Rep. a finding of reasonable doubt. that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. Between two statutory interpretations. Cessante ratione legis. the alleged owner of M/B "Bukang Liwayway". et. petitioners manifested their desire to exercise their right to raise peremptory challenges against the President and the members of the general court martial invoking Art. through the Bureau of Customs. 18 of CA No. the law itself ceases. Eusebio Marges. No. 1963) Coast Guard Cutter 115 of the Philippine Navy pursued a fishing boat bearing the name of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" off Ternate. et. Jose Commendador. 8 was revoked and military tribunals were dissolved. (January 20. 18 of CA No. With the lifting of Martial Law. (4) and that the surety bond of P40. 1964) defendant Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy delivered the M/B "Bukang Liwayway" to Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed under CA No. 14. 408 has been discontinued under PD 39. Silangcruz. 1963 while moored at Cañacao Bay. 408. Said fishing boat was boarded and found loaded with untaxed foreign made cigarettes. 1964) Pedro Pacis. 1964) the Republic and defendant base commander filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to lift the writ of replevin on the grounds that: (1) the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the object in litigation (2) that the action for replevin was premature inasmuch as administrative remedies have not been exhausted. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under PD 39. G. 1964)The Court denied the motion to lift writ of replevin on but ordered Marges to post an additional surety bond of P60.00 was insufficient.000. as an instrument of the crimes. to wit: 495 cases Union cigarettes 1. 1937) by issuing a warrant of seizure and detention against the cigarettes and M/B "Bukang Liwayway On the same day. Their case was referred to General Court Martial No. filed Civil Case in the Court of First Instance at Trece Martires City for replevin (a procedure whereby seized goods may be provisionally restored to their owner pending the outcome of an action to determine the rights of the parties concerned) against the Flag officer of the Philippine Navy and others. cessat ipsa lex. GCM No. 408. 96948 (August 2. As such. Facts: Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and were charged with violations of Articles of War in relation with their alleged participation in a failed coup d’etat. Cavite City and that notice of loss was reported on December 16. al. L-22526 (November 29. (December 27. 8 issued during martial law to create military tribunals. When the reason of the law ceases. (February 20.385 cartons Union cigarettes 3. 1991) Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases.R. (3) that a criminal action for smuggling was being prepared against Marges under which case M/B "Bukang Liwayway" would be liable for forfeiture.00. Al v B/Gen. No. Cavite.1963) the cigarettes were delivered to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. (January 13. (January 27. Statute of Later Date Prevails .because it favors the latest intention of the legislature Pacis v Averia G. B/Gen.000. Held: No. PD 39 however was issued to implement General Order No. the law itself ceases. filed a motion for intervention. .Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 7 of the act. acting Collector of Customs of Manila. 1964) the Republic of the Philippines. commenced seizure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to Title VI of the Tariff and Customs Code (Republic Act No. General Order No.R. At a hearing. v. alleging that said fishing boat was stolen on December 15. Cavite City Police and the Collector of Customs of Manila. 1996) FACTS: (December 26. 1963 to the Philippine Constabulary. the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically. that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.197 packs Union cigarettes 88 cases Chesterfield cigarettes 498 carton Chesterfield cigarettes 87 cases Salem cigarettes 799 cartons Salem cigarettes 50 cartons Winston cigarettes The cigarettes and the fishing boat were confiscated and turned over to the Flag officer in command of the Philippine naval base at Cavite City. (February 17. Demetrio Camera.

1964. HELD: 1st issue: on the availability of the remedy of certiorari with preliminary injunction. of such tribunal. Silangcruz may be adjudged in contempt of the Supreme Court for failure to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in this case on April 22. Silangcruz had delivered the M/B.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 8 (February 29. much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. 1964) Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. 1964) Respondent Sheriff however manifested on March 17. has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. Whether or not Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. owner of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" on who informed him in writing that the vessel in question was on a fishing expedition. 1964 to require respondent Sheriff to report to this Court whether or not he has complied with the aforesaid writ and required him to show causes why he may not be declared in contempt of court. 2nd issue: the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cavite to entertain Marges Civil Case (action for replevin) and the existence of therein plaintiff's cause of action. respondent Sheriff on returned the writ unsatisfied. The original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance under Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. or officer exercising judicial functions. as amended by Republic Act 3828. It is available for such purpose and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings or conclusion. board. (April 22. (February 25. It is pressed that the order of the lower court in denying the motion to dismiss and to lift the writ of replevin is an interlocutory order. Petition for certiorari — When any tribunal. 1964) the Collector of Customs of Manila and the Commander of the Philippine Naval Base of Cavite City filed with this Court on the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Whether or not petitioners could elevate the case at bar to this Court on a petition for certiorari. 1964) this court issued another preliminary writ: Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In a certiorari proceeding. 1964 after petitioners failed to object to the sufficiency of the surety bond filed by Eusebio Marges and after they failed to file a counterbond needed for the retention of the vessel. (June 11. ISSUES: 1. 1964) When asked to comment on the Solicitor's motion. 1964. commanding the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite to take possession again of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" and to keep the same under his custody until further orders from this Court. 1964 that he had already delivered the vessel in question to its owner on February 25. the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. the court is confined to questions of jurisdiction. But it should be remembered that the case before Us is not an appeal. a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 1957. (April 28. For more than one month said sheriff did not make a return of the writ. the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings. "Bukang Liwayway" on to Eusebio Marges (March 17. because the jurisdiction of the latter is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1. The reason is that the function of the writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction. Whether or not the owner of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" could recover possession of the same by way of a civil case with replevin 3." Certiorari was therefore properly brought. as the law requires. or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal. nor any plain. It is a special civil action of certioari under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the aforesaid order for having been rendered without or in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction. speedy. and that despite diligent efforts said vessel could not be located. Issuance of a writ of replevin by the court of first instance will prevent the Bureau of Customs from further proceeding with the seizure and forfeiture for allegedly under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 2. stating that said writ was served upon Eusebio Marges on April 30. hence not appealable. 1964) Respondent Sheriff received copy of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on. It is axiomatic that a later law . Not until the Solicitor General moved on June 3. The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court reads: 1 "Section 1. that Marges promised to surrender the same upon its return. tends to encroach upon and to render futile. board or officers.

1979 the parcel of land (Lot No. is hereby declared in contempt of the Supreme Court. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was received by respondent Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant . No. Furthermore. informing Us that he could not enforce the same because the subject vessel was out on a fishing expedition. vi.Special provisions prevail over a general one.00. vii. The said respondent is therefore liable for contempt punishable under Section 6 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. It is essential to the effective administration of justice that the processes of the courts be obeyed. Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code which requires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to be heard in his defenses. 1964. T19077 to DBP upon the latter’s duly . Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. the Register of Deeds cancelled their title over the subject property and issued TCT No. Upon no one else does this obligation of obedience rest with more binding force than a judicial officer such as respondent Sheriff. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals. and only after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs. No pronouncement as to costs. The writ of replevin issued on January 14. actions for forfeiture of property for violation of customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of replevin. clearly indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case. Nothing was heard of the writ nor from said Sheriff.000. 1980. 2-B covered by TCT No. T-13218) that the spouses Fiestan owned in Ilocos Sur after extrajudicial foreclosure of said property. The more than one month's time when the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction stayed frozen in the hands of Sheriff Silangcruz made it possible for interested parties to whisk the boat in question from the reach of the law. The mandatory injunction of April 22.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 9 prevails over a prior statute. 1979. artifice or contrivance of any kind. The respondent Sheriff's non-performance has resulted in the frustration of the mandates of the Supreme Court and the setback of the administration of Justice. The Court cannot tolerate evasion of its commands by any omission. Silangcruz. the latter was able to acquire at a public auction sale on August 6. spouses Fiestan also executed a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which was likewise registered on September 28. When spouses Fiestan failed to redeem their parcel of land within the 1 year period which expired on September 28. the petition for certiorari is granted. Proceso P. Respondent Sheriff of Cavite. The Provincial Sheriff issued a certificate of sale that same day which was registered on September 28 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. Moreover. negligence. 81552 (May 28.R. 1964 and the order issued on February 17. 1964 by the Court of First Instance of Cavite are hereby declared null and void. 1964. So ordered. thus directly interfering impeding or obstructing its processes. Fiestan v CA G. or on September 26. 1964 when the Solicitor General filed a motion charging him of contempt of court for noncompliance with the writ did Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz oblige himself to make a return of the writ. WHEREFORE. Earlier. 1990) FACTS: For failure of petitioner spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada (spouses Fiestan) to pay their mortgage indebtedness to respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). nor would it countenance any disregard of its authority. Silangcruz is in contempt of this Court for failure to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by this Court on April 22. Otherwise. Only after June 3. it cannot but be concluded that respondent Sheriff's failure to enforce the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Supreme Court. Silangcruz on April 28. Last issue: whether or not respondent Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. and considering all attendant circumstances. it is reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. 1964 to deliver the Boat M/B "Bukang Liwayway" is hereby reiterated. and his failure to make a return thereof for quite a time had in effect prevented the Court from taking possession of the vessel in question. sentenced to imprisonment of six months and to pay a fine of P1. A special law prevails over a general law.

Lichano v Civil Aeronautics Board 43 SCRA 670 FACTS: Petitioner Lechoco contends that by the enactment of Republic Act No. the Provincial Sheriff ordered them to vacate the premises.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 10 executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership. as amended. regulating the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of “ordinance” in general. are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction. mortgage and cancellation of transfer certificates of title against the DBP-Laoag City. may purchase at a sale under his mortgage to protect his own interest or to avoid a loss to himself by a sale to a third person at a price below the mortgage debt Bagatsing v Ramirez G. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. assailed the validity of the ordinance. as provided under Section 5 of Act No 3135. Thus. which the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur allegedly failed to comply with. the DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria. they filed a complaint in the RTC of Vigan. Ilocos Sur. and in this case the DBP. the present petition. so the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur cancelled DBP’s title over said property and issued TCT No. Even in the absence of statutory provision. (7) of Article 1409 of the Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase. the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general. declaring valid the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the DBP and its subsequent sale to Francisco Peria as well as the real estate mortgage constituted in favor of PNB-Vigan. one as a general law of the land. there is authority to hold that a mortgagee. the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522. 41636 (December 17. However. Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. The ordinance is valid. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. He thereafter mortgaged said lot to the PNB-Vigan Branch as security for his loan of P115. 2677 (on 18 June 1960) amending sections 13(a) and 14 of Commonwealth Act No. which is a special law that must prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law. PNB-Vigan Branch. while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges” in particular. alleging among others the noncompliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. The spouses Fiestan herein seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property on the ground that the Provincial Sheriff conducted the foreclosure without first effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at the public auction sale. Since the spouses Fiestan were still in possession of the property. jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board and . the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them unless the consent of the principal has been given.00. but instead of leaving.R. Ilocos Sur for annulment of sale. ISSUE: Who has the right to acquire by purchase the subject property? HELD: In denying the petition. The lower court dismissed said complaint. even at a public or judicial auction either in person or through the mediation of another. 1982. However. who later secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. which the general statute treats in particular. the Supreme Court ruled that the power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection. No. 1976) FACTS: In 1974. the other as the law of a particular case. ISSUE: What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance? Is the ordinance valid? HELD: The Local Tax Code prevails. (2) of Article 1491 and par. 146 (the original PSC Act). The spouses Fiestan insisted that what prevails over the case are par. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general. On April 13. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision. the Supreme Court reiterated that the formalities of a levy. T-19229 to Peria’s name.000.

as amended by Republic Act 2677. and freight. at the very least. It is sufficient that the 2 or more statutes relates to the same specific subject matter. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an express national policy. . instead of delivering it to Subdivision. since Republic Act 2671 impliedly repealed section 10 (c) (2) of Republic Act No. 4501.)." The same legislative intent to maintain the jurisdiction and powers of the CAB appears from a consideration of the legislation subsequent to the enactment of Republic Act 2677. Republic Act No. leased a lot to Benares for five years. Hence. asserting its jurisdiction to fix the reasonable fares that air carriers may demand. Thus. Even that will result in no more than a concurrent jurisdiction in both supervisory entities.Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing. the Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. . and not in the divesting of the power of one in favor of the other. ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction to whether authority to fix air carrier's rates is vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or in the Public Service Commission (PSC). The absence of intent to repeal Republic Act No. that. and that following the rule on concurrent jurisdictions of judicial bodies. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and warrant of arrest A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had o jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case. the CAB and the PSC. A warrant of arrest was then filed to the petitioners.in relation to domestic statutes/laws Montelibano v Ferrer 97 Phil 228 Facts: In 1940. are in accord with law. of which Montelibano is the president and general manager. A statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts or acts on the same subject matter. The questioned order of the CAB. There is no irreconcilable inconsistency between section 14 of the Public Service Act. 776 by the enactment of Act 2677 is also evidenced by the explanatory note to House Bill 4030 (that later became Act 2677). jurisdiction over air fares and rates was. 776. passed on 20 June 1952. . with an option in favor of Benares of another five crop years. It expressly stated the desire to broaden the jurisdiction of the PSC "by vesting it with the power to supervise and control maritime transportation . Acting upon Montelibano. PARI MATERIA RULE ix. their interpretation should be in accordance with the circumstances or conditions peculiar to each. 2677 would be difficult to explain if said law had already repealed the power of the CAB over fares or rates. HELD: Petition denied. exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC." Such references to the Civil Aeronautics Board after the enactment of Republic Act No. the Subdivision Inc. there being no showing that the PSC has fixed any maximum rates therefor. 4147. and section 10 (c) (2) of the prior Republic Act 776. On 1951. on the other hand. or have the same purpose or object. passed in 19 June 1965 (granting a similar franchise to Air Manila. his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by Benares.Exception: If 2 or more statutes on the same subject were enacted at different times and under different conditions and circumstances. Reenacted statutes .Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 11 revested in the PSC. Respondents aver. as contended by petitioner Lechoco. or cover the same specific or particular subject matter. a criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. Benares continued planting on the said lot. the first to exercise or take jurisdiction (CAB in this case) should retain it to the exclusion of the other body. and Republic Act No. subject to the regulations and approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board or such other regulatory agencies as the Government may designate for this purpose. However. . Inc. enacted 20 June 1964 (granting an air transportation franchise to Filipinas Orient Airways). except for the fact that power over rates to be charged by air carriers on passengers and freight are vested in different entities. . except air transportation and warehouses which are now subject to regulation and supervision by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Bureau of Commerce respectively. both uniformly require (in their section 3) that the franchise grantee — "Shall fix just and reasonable and uniform rates for the transportation of passengers viii. under both statutes. conferring control over air rates and fares on the CAB.

and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. and "(3) That for and in consideration of this agreement the plaintiff and defendants hereby waive any and all further claims monetary or otherwise against each other regarding the subject matter of this case. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had.R. He admitted though in the same motion that he received P20. Two statutes with a parallel scope. the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case. In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. both parties submitted to the trial court a "Compromise Agreement" providing. by Bonifacio Bonamy against the spouses Jesus F. the decisions of courts in such country construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of such local statutes.481. requiring a different conclusion.00 in cash from the Alvendias sometime in January 1980 and an additional amount of P4.00 by way of proceeds of the sale of the Alvendias' vehicle. Subsequently. each in its own field. 10. criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city. Doña Felisa Village and Housing Corporation. 1977. 1990) FACTS: The case traces to a simple collection suit. 72138 (January 22. 1978. in the amount of P107. purpose and terminology should. In the case at bar.000.R. 1980. x. No. Alvendia and Felicidad M. or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto.August 12. 72373 (January 22. 1990) & Bonamy v Justice Paras G. Held: No. and violations of city ordinances. Therefore.481. the Bulacan provincial sheriff levied on the Alvendias "leasehold rights" over a fishpond and a certificate of sale over said leasehold right was executed in favor of Bonamy on Sept. among other things: "(1) That defendants do hereby acknowledge the indebtedness of their family corporation. the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. under the provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act # 183. On January 6. the latter should prevail . the first writ having been returned unsatisfied. Bonamy sought the issuance of an alias writ of execution. "(2) That the plaintiff and defendants shall thereby join hands in asking the GSIS to expedite the releases of the funds due to said corporation. have a like interpretation.the former will only apply if there is no other law applicable Alvendia v Intermediate Court G. No. thereby preventing the full realization of the aforesaid decision. representing the cost of construction materials bought on credit from plaintiff from June 20 . 1984.Where local statutes are patterned after or copied from those of another country. 1980.50.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 12 Issue: Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326. Common Law Principle v Statutory Provision . . alleging that the Alvendias "have not submitted any finished project with the GSIS. misdemeanors. On the same date. the trial court approved and adopted the same as the decision of the case. The provisions of the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of Manila should then be interpreted the same. unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under consideration. (Civil Case No. xi.000. Bonamy moved for execution of judgment.50 representing construction materials which the Alvendias had purchased on credit from Bonamy. Adopted Statutes . section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney shall charge of the prosecution of all crimes. in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod. Pursuant to the alias writ issued by the Court on May 2. In a motion dated April 23. Chief of Police wherein it was held that in the City of Manila. the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the judge shall be annulled.between the two. 5182-M) filed on September 12. Alvendia before the then Court of First Instance (CFI Bulacan) for the sum of P107. 1975 and hereby bind themselves to pay said obligation out of the first release of funds from the GSIS for housing units and lots sold by the said corporation to members of the GSIS.

They also failed to redeem the property within the required period despite the fact that the Final Deed of Sale was issued only on January 25.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 13 On February 2.000 but the latter refused to do so contending that the doctrine of solution indebiti does not apply because there was negligence on the part of the respondents and that they were not unjustly enriched since Facets still has a balance of $49. 82670 (September 15. Cruz.000 remittance it had delivered to petitioner . No. the release of a loan from the GSIS. and [5] the leasehold rights possessed by the Alvendias had already expired before the issuance of the order. ISSUE: WON the judgment debtors may successfully ask that they be allowed to pay the judgment debt in cash long after they have failed to pay or redeem their properties which have been sold in execution. 1989) FACTS: Andres. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent has the right to recover the second $10. [4] the fishpond. Facts instructed the First National State Bank (FNSB) of New Jersey to transfer $10. HELD: In any event. when under the "agreement" their family corporation was also supposed to be liable.” Private respondent sent PNB another telex stating that the payment was to be made to “Irene’s Wearing Apparel. G. Among its foreign buyers was Facts of the United States. owned by the government though leased to the Alvendias. the spouses argued as follows: [1] that the writ and the alias writ of execution levied upon properties not referred to in the judgment by compromise. Private respondent.R. men’s apparel and linens for local and foreign buyers. FNSB instructed Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the transfer by charging the amount to the account of FNSB with private respondent. levy and sale – such motion was denied and the trial court. After Mantrust effected the transfer. The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. using the business name “Irene’s Wearing Apparel” was engaged in the manufacture of ladies garments. unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance.324. 1983. Facets informed FNSB about the situation. namely. instructed PCIB to pay $10. After learning about the delay. Manila branch.” On August 28. cannot be a proper subject of a levy on execution. The rule is "equity follows the law" but where a particular remedy is given by the law and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules. informed private respondent and amended its instruction y asking it to effect the payment to Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) instead of PNB. undeniably showing a lack of intention or capability to pay the same. There is no question therefore. the payment was not effected immediately because the payee designated in the telex was only “Wearing Apparel. petitioner received the remittance of $10. 1982.000 to petitioner. which is applied only in the absence of and never against statutory law or as in this case. FNSB discovered that private respondent had made a duplication of remittance. Facts. Statutory Principle: Equity has been aptly described as "a justice outside legality".000 which was charged again to the account of Facets with FNSB. 1980. it is axiomatic that there is no justification in law and in fact for the reopening of a case which has long become final and which has in fact been executed. In a nutshell. children’s wear.000. also unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance. Private respondent asked petitioner to return the second remittance of $10. the spouses moved for the quashal and annulment of the writ of execution. Sometime in August 1980. Andres v Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corp. it would be very improper. judicial rules of procedure. [3] the writ was premature because the Compromise Agreement contained a condition which had not yet been fulfilled. [2] the writs made only the Alvendias liable. for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows. that the Alvendias failed to pay on time the judgment of which the execution sale was a necessary consequence.000 to Irene’s Wearing Apparel via Philippine National Bank (PNB) Sta. long past the aforesaid period. Hence. petitioner received another $10.

It is one which. the doctrine of implications sustains the contention of the City of Manila that the additional one-half percent is sanctioned by the Special Education Fund Law when the same states that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum. Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a coterminus employee is excluded from the benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law) Held: No. CASUS OMISSUS .Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 14 HELD: Yes. expressed in the maxim.” The doctrine of necessary implications means that “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed. in the second remittance.” The additional one-half percent then is legal. It was evident by the fact that both remittances have the same reference invoice number.No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is no substantial difference between a co-terminus employee and a contractual. Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of Manila is valid or legal. Private respondent Esso Philippines paid the additional one-half percent realty tax under protest and later filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. simper inest et minus. Facts: The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at 1. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the SC were to sustain respondent's submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. Doctrine of Necessary Implications . Art 2154 of the New Civil Code is applicable. in eo quod plus sit. the Special Education Fund Law imposed an “annual additional tax of 1% on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed 3%” Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%. The doctrine of necessary implications should be applied in this case. non-career and temporary. Sec. 1992) Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications." Petitioner Lydia Chua. The greater includes the lesser. "all regular. 1% as per Special Education Fund law and . Furthermore. Ex necessitate legis or from the necessity of law. No. believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program filed and application with the respondent NIA which was denied due to the fact that she is a co-terminus employee. It contended that the additional one-half percent is void because it is not authorized by the city charter or any law. casual and emergency employees. Held: Yes. the following requisites must concur: 1) that he who paid was not under obligation to do so. For this article to apply. may impose a realty tax of “not less than one-half perfect but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property. object or .5% to fix the total imposable tax on real property at 3% which is divided into the following: 1. by ordinance. 88979 (February 7. is compelled by a reasonable view of the statute. City of Manila v Gomez No. temporary.” xiii.The term “necessary implication” is one that is so strong in its probability that the contrary thereof cannot reasonably be supposed. under the circumstances. not negligence.5%. the municipal board of Manila imposed an additional .R. xii. casual or emergency employee for all are tenurial employees with no fixed term.5% as per charter of Manila. 2 provides for who are qualified to avail of the benefits of RA 6683 which includes. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. On the other hand.5% as per order of the municipal board. Facts: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. L-37251 (August 31. 1981) Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications.This rule states that a person. and the contrary of which would be improbable and absurd Chua v Civil Service Commission G. There was a mistake. The principle is expressed in the maxim. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. . Her appeal with respondent Commission was likewise denied. and 2) that payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact.

Inc.R.” Defendant contends that this provision excludes justice of the peace and as such. It means one should follow past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled. like judges of the Courts of First Instance. Courts of Industrial Relations and justices of the peace. Mariano G. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. the maxim operates and applies only if and when the omission has been clearly established. v Hon..” The term “judge” in Section 54 is not modified or qualified. be included therein. Because of this. he is excluded from this prohibition. 735. Facts: Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of the Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that “No justice. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Facts: Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares. The rule of casus omissus has no applicability to the case at bar for the maxim only applies and operate if and when the omission established. The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person. Held: Yes. Held: OCT No. Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. has been clearly xiv. People of the Philippines v Guillermo Manatan G. except to vote. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. The Solicitor General appealed. No. Considerng the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled). 735 is valid. Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs Tuason. The rule rests on the desirability of having stability in the law. The validity of OCT No.Statutory Construction (EH307MC) 15 thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.M. the lower court dismissed the case against him. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. STARE DECISIS . making it broader and more generic to comprehend all kinds of judges. Tuason and Co.R. the word judge in the former provision was qualified or modified by the phrase “of first instance. Courts of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No.The legal maxim which requires the past decisions of the court be followed in the adjudication of cases is known as stare decisis et non quieta movere. L-14129 (July 31. and is such a case what is omitted in the enumeration may not. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again. et al. 1978) Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. J. 1962) Statutory rule: The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. by construction. . Although petitioner argues that when Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words “justice of peace” from the Revised Administrative Code provision from which it was taken and thus making the intention of the legislature clear in the omission. No. Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs Tuason. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. 735 is valid.In other words. . L-33140 (October 23. fiscal…. 1914 in Case No. shall aid any candidate in any manner in any election. judge. object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.